REFORM
A new force
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Reform
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T 020 7799 6699
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[email protected]
www.reform.co.uk
Dale Bassett
Andrew Haldenby
Laurie Thraves
Elizabeth Truss
February 2009
19/2/09 10:21:08
A new force
The authors
Dale Bassett is Reform’s Senior Crime Researcher.
Andrew Haldenby is Director of Reform.
Laurie Thraves is a Researcher at Reform.
Elizabeth Truss is Reform’s Deputy Director.
A new force
Reform
Reform is an independent, non-party think tank whose mission is to set out a better way to deliver public
services and economic prosperity.
We believe that by reforming the public sector, increasing investment and extending choice, high quality
services can be made available for everyone.
Our vision is of a Britain with 21st Century healthcare, high standards in schools, a modern and efficient
transport system, safe streets, and a free, dynamic and competitive economy.
A new force
Dale Bassett
Andrew Haldenby
Laurie Thraves
Elizabeth Truss
February 2009
A new force
Contents
Executive Summary
5
1 The myths of policing
7
Myth 1: The politicisation myth
9
Myth 2: The local force myth
12
Myth 3: The intelligence myth
17
Myth 4: The scale myth
19
Myth 5: The serious crime myth
21
2 The principles of reform
24
3 A new force
28
References
39
Appendix: How the forces could restructure
42
A new force
Executive summary
Without effective police reform, England and Wales will lose the fight against crime in years to come.
Serious crime is rising and mutating as new crimes emerge such as people trafficking and internet fraud,
creating entrenched social problems. But the nightmare position of the public finances means that the
police’s extravagant spending increases over the last decade cannot be sustained and will in all likelihood be
reversed. The police in England and Wales are the most expensive in the developed world – costing a fifth
higher as a share of GDP than in America.
The structure of the police presents a block to necessary reform. The “tripartite model” – with power
shared between the Home Secretary, Police Authorities and Chief Constables – means that Government
does not have effective control over national policing priorities. The 43 forces are run as fiefdoms by their
Chief Constables. To get things done, the Home Office resorts to bribing forces with sweeteners.
Five myths have defeated reforming politicians over the years:
Myth 1
Policing should not be “politicised”. In fact the police should be accountable to elected politicians. Currently
the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) – a self-perpetuating oligarchy – is the key influence on police
forces, in a textbook example of producer capture. It will gain more power over appointments in the new
Policing and Crime Bill.
Myth 2
All policing is local. In fact England and Wales does have a national lead police force – the Metropolitan
Police – which is already coordinating serious crime fighting across the country. In addition national
politicians interfere in day-to day policing, preventing local leaders from answering their democratic mandate
to fight crime.
Myth 3
The 43 police forces work well together. In fact the 43 forces operate separately, in particular failing to share
information, as the Bichard Inquiry found.
Myth 4
The 43 forces generate economies of scale. In fact waste occurs at two levels: unnecessary regional
bureaucracies, and duplicated spending on serious crime at a national level.
Myth 5
The creation of the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) has solved the serious crime problem. In fact
serious crime is rising, while SOCA is a white elephant.
To move forward the reality should be acknowledged, both at a national and local level.
The Metropolitan Police is the only credible force capable of leading on national and regional serious and
organised crime. The Government confirmed this in 2008 by putting the previously abolished e-crime unit
(at a cost to the taxpayer of £7 million) with the Metropolitan Police, not SOCA.
A new force
Executive summary
Counter-terrorism hubs, funded by the Home Office, operated by local police forces and coordinated by
the Metropolitan Police present an exciting model for how effective national crime fighting could work.
The Metropolitan Police should be given a formal role leading national serious crime policing.
A change in the accountability structure would be impractical given the dual national and local role of the
Metropolitan Police. However, greater scrutiny should come through full operational and financial
transparency which is currently lacking.
Until Jacqui Smith’s retreat in December 2008, there was cross-party consensus for greater local accountability
for policing. The principle is right: smaller policing units solve more crimes per officer than larger ones.
Proposals for local accountability have foundered partly because they have tried to follow a one-size-fits-all
model for the whole of England and Wales. Proposals should reflect the varying reality of local government
arrangements in England and Wales. In most areas, the natural arrangement for policing is for higher tier
council areas (for example County and City Councils) to hold police forces to account.
In practice 11 forces, such as Gloucestershire, can become accountable at a county level in their current
boundaries. 25 forces, such as WestYorkshire and Avon & Somerset, could be split to reflect local government
boundaries; local authorities in these areas should be allowed to secede their local policing from the regional
force. Seven forces have structures that are currently incompatible with local government.
These recommendations require a new role for the Home Office and Home Secretary. The Home Secretary
would become, in effect, the commissioner of national policing. The Home Office should then address itself
to becoming an excellent commissioner of serious organised crime services and abandon its role in volume
crime fighting at a local level.
A new force
1
The myths of policing
Since the establishment of the “Bobby” by Sir Robert Peel, policing in Britain has been characterised by
strong emotional imagery and established practice. From Inspector Lestrade to Dixon of Dock Green to
The Bill, public imaginings of police activities are based more on popular culture than practice. This is
nothing new. The 1962 Royal Commission report on policing refers to “a certain historical sentimentality
about the police constable”. The public still believe in the honest officer who is independent, uses his
judgement and is an integral part of the local community.
In their discourse politicians and policymakers are similarly subject to the “smoke and mirrors” that
surround policing and its practice. Police themselves are in the grip of a powerful culture and sense of being;
in discussions with officers, Reform has frequently heard outsiders referred to as “civilians”.
Respect for the force
The British police have been regarded as the best in the world. Much of the record of the police is positive,
and a number of strong features exist in the current structure. Police officers are well-respected professionals
with high status in society. Police in England and Wales are relatively free of corruption in comparison with
other countries.
The functions of police have vastly increased since the 1960s, as the service has evolved to deal with new
threats like hi-tech crime and people trafficking. There have been high-profile successes in meeting these
new challenges. The Dedicated Cheque and Plastic Crime Unit, for instance, is a partnership of officers
from the Metropolitan and City of London forces and fraud investigators that was responsible for £107
million in estimated fraud savings in 2007. There is strong expertise in the Metropolitan Police on serious
crime. The police are loyal and proud of their work.
Falling confidence
But there are problems. Public confidence in the police, measured by the British Crime Survey, is falling
dramatically. In 1982, 92 per cent of people had confidence in the service; in 2004 only 47 per cent did. A
2002 ICM poll found that 68 per cent of people thought that the police did not reflect local priorities. A 2007
ICM poll found that 73 per cent of the public felt that the police do not spend enough time out on the beat.
The self-confidence of police officers is suffering. In North Wales, discontent over management style,
mounting paperwork and targets has resulted in plummeting morale. The top jobs no longer hold the
appeal and prestige that they once did. Investigations by The Times have found a dwindling number of
officers putting themselves forward for the position of Chief Constable.
oyal Commission on the Police (1962), Final Report.
R
European Crime and Safety Survey (2005), The Burden of Crime in the EU: The UK came seventh out of 18 European countries in terms
of public perception of police performance.
Miller, J. (2003), Police Corruption in England and Wales: An assessment of current evidence, Home Office: The report concludes that
corruption is “limited to a small minority of police staff”; Transparency International (2002), Corruption at the Local Government Level:
the US Experience: Local police corruption is “widespread” in the US.
APACS (2008), apacs.org.uk.
Home Office (1982), British Crime Survey: 92 per cent of people rated their confidence in the police as very good or fairly good; Home
Office (2004), British Crime Survey: 47 per cent of people rated their confidence in the police as good or excellent.
Loveday, B. and Reid, A. (2003), Going local: Who should run Britain’s police force?, Policy Exchange.
The Conservative Party (2007), Policing for the People: Interim report of the Police Reform Taskforce.
D
aily Post (2008), “North Wales Police officers suffer low morale says survey”, 9 September.
T
he Times (2008) “Police recruitment crisis as officers spurn chance to be chief constables”, 19 June.
1
A new force
The myths of policing
The tripartite structure
Police accountability in England and Wales is in theory shared between three actors: the Home Secretary,
the Police Authorities and Chief Constables themselves.
In England and Wales, the role of Chief Constables is embedded through the tripartite system and ACPO.
The Home Office describes its role as working with Chief Police Officers and Police Authorities to manage
police forces. It says that “this system prevents political interference in policing and avoids giving any single
organisation power over the entire police service”.10
The police are divided into 43 arbitrary regions across England and Wales. In some cases these regions
match local government boundaries; in the majority they do not.
The new myths
The old myth of the Bobby has been replaced by a new set of myths about politicisation, the local copper,
intelligence and serious crime that hold the modern force together and act as a barrier to reform. They
stand in the way of genuine reform of the police force which would benefit the taxpayer, the public and the
police themselves.
10
Home Office (2008), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/police/about/.
1
A new force
The myths of policing
Myth 1: The politicisation myth
There is a belief that politicians can control the police, harnessing the force to reassure the public that crime is
being reduced. Politicians try to “out-tough” each other with their talk on crime. The result is increasing
concern that the police are becoming “politicised” and that their “operational independence” is being eroded.
The recent Damian Green case has come to epitomise the problem. The Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith,
approved a decision to call in the police to investigate leaks by a civil servant working in the Home Office.
The resulting raid on Mr Green’s House of Commons offices provoked outrage amongst MPs of all stripes,
and embroiled Ms Smith as well as Sir Paul Stephenson (then acting and now permanent Metropolitan
Police Commissioner), Boris Johnson (Mayor of London) and Michael Martin (Speaker of the Commons)
in a public row over the independence of the police’s operations.11
Reality: Politicians interfere in policing practice but not the strategy
Policing priorities are inherently “political”. Citizens have particular concerns about crime and they elect
politicians who claim that they will address those concerns. However the lack of a clear sense of the division
of responsibility between politicians and the police creates confusion and prevents genuine accountability.
Police Chiefs’ day-to-day decisions are hampered by central targets determining whom to hire and fire,
which crimes to prioritise, and how much time officers must spend on any particular task. Meanwhile
politicians struggle to grip the strategic priorities which are heavily guarded by ACPO.
The operational independence of the police is protected
The operational independence of the police is not enshrined in statute.12 Further, the 1999 Patten Report
on policing in Northern Ireland suggests that:
“The term ‘operational independence’ is itself a large part of the problem. In a democratic society,
all public officials must be fully accountable to the institutions of that society for the due performance
of their functions, and a chief of police cannot be an exception. No public official, including a chief
of police, can be said to be ‘independent’. Indeed, given the extraordinary powers conferred on the
police, it is essential that their exercise is subject to the closest and most effective scrutiny possible.”13
But the actual independence of police to plan and execute their own operations is well in place, and case
law such as R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex p. Blackburn (1968) has confirmed that chief officers
have final discretion as to whether or not to investigate any particular case.14
Politicians interfere in policing practice
Whilst politicians have steered clear of the operational independence of the police, they frequently involve
themselves in policing practice. The tendency of politicians to “feed the fear”, frightening the electorate into
thinking that urgent action must be taken and that the toughest-talking politician is best placed to take that
action, fuels centralisation and has resulted in “the Home Secretary and sometimes even the Prime Minister
taking responsibility for every assault”.15 Reform’s report The lawful society cited one academic who noted 33
“tough on crime” initiatives between June 2001 and May 2003 alone.16
The proliferation of targeting and central control prevents Chief Constables from exerting their influence
where it matters. Unable to direct policing strategy and improve the effectiveness of their officers, they can
focus on those relatively trivial issues and “pet projects” over which they do have discretion. Reform’s interviews
have revealed numerous instances of Chief Constables’ micro-management. One example is uniform. Each
force determines the uniform components its officers wear; one Chief will veto tunics on the grounds that
they are impractical and not waterproof, whilst another will ban fleeces for not being smart or traditional.
Senior officers are heavily involved in politics
Whilst it is generally clear that there is little outright corruption in the UK, there is evidence that senior
police officers spend time trying to influence politics and politicians spend time trying to alter police
11
12
13
14
15
16
rince, R. (2008), “Jacqui Smith defends police probe over whistleblower affair”, The Daily Telegraph, 4 December.
P
Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland (1999), A new beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland: “The term ‘operational
independence’ is neither to be found in nor is it defined in any legislation.”
Ibid.
R
v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis ex parte Blackburn (1968).
Giangrande, R. et al. (2008), The lawful society, Reform.
Tonry, M. (2004), Punishment and Politics.
1
A new force
The myths of policing
priorities.17 Decisions on policing strategy go through ACPO committees.
One high-profile example of political involvement was the former Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir
Ian Blair, who campaigned publicly in favour of the Government’s plans to introduce identity cards and to
allow detention without charge for 42 days. The result of this was an erosion of trust and the widespread
questioning of Sir Ian’s independence.18
A force of “robots”
The result of the centralisation of policing practice is police officers who do not use discretion. This has been
amplified by the centralisation of operational decisions and technological changes – people now interact with the
police by phone, not in person. Force Control Rooms determine the location and response of police on the beat,
directing them to the crime scenes which are deemed the most important. But this strategy has transferred
management of uniformed patrol officers from police Basic Command Units (BCUs) to civilian control room
operators.The result is that BCU Commanders have no real control over the deployment of their patrol staff.19
This has led to the creation of a dependency culture amongst patrol officers who now just go where they are
told. The prestige and power of junior managers such as Sergeants has been reduced to that of a highly-paid
Constable.20 The proliferation of “civilians” in these areas has further implications. Reform has been told
that after the Metropolitan Police centralised operations into three control rooms, staff have refused to stay
once their hours are up, even if there is an large-scale emergency in progress.
Tripartite risk sharing
Accountability is diluted by the tripartite structure of police governance, which shares risk and blame across
three parties: the Home Office, Police Authorities and Chief Constables. ACPO’s role in it is akin to the
British Medical Association being part responsible for the running of the health service or the Association
of Head Teachers approving education plans. ACPO’s blurred purpose and responsibility does not help.
Shami Chakrabarti, Director of Liberty, recently said:
“[ACPO] advises government, it sets policing policy, it campaigns for increased police powers, and
now we learn it is engaged in commercial activities – all with a rather shady lack of accountability.”21
ACPO’s incorporation as a private company shields it from accountability, for example through the
Freedom of Information Act.22
Accountability and the Metropolitan Police
The Metropolitan Police is unique in that, as well as being London’s “local” police force, it has national
responsibilities, in particular for counter-terrorism.23 This dual role results in confused accountability. The
Metropolitan Police Commissioner reports both to the Home Secretary, for national serious crime, and the
Mayor of London, for local policing. As such he is not accountable to any single person or body.
A lack of local accountability
The Home Office has filled the vacuum of accountability by taking more responsibility for decision-making
along with ACPO. In other public services, such as health and education, government departments have
also asserted their control. But these decisions have been balanced (admittedly to a very limited extent) by
efforts to increase the power of local decision-makers, for example through greater choice of hospital for
patients or choice of new types of school.
Policing has not seen a comparable increase in local accountability. Part of the issue is the wider problem of
weak local government structures in England and Wales. Because local government relies on central
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
10
Miller, J. (2003), Police Corruption in England and Wales: An assessment of current evidence, Home Office; The Independent (2005),
“Police accused of lobbying MPs over shooting”, 16 November: The aftermath of the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes has shown
some members of the police attempting to involve themselves with government policy and investigations.
Laville, S. (2008), “The fall and fall of Sir Ian Blair”, The Guardian, 2 October: “Early in his tenure Blair earned the reputation for being a New
Labour lackey. Lobbying first for identity cards and later for detention for 42 days without trial, he was accused of being a mouthpiece for
his namesake, the then prime minister, Tony Blair.”
Northamptonshire Police (2009), Force Communications Centre recruitment website (http://www.greatunderpressure.co.uk/fcro.html):
“Force Control Room Operatives direct and control police incidents ensuring the timely deployment of appropriate resources to ensure
successful resolution.”
Brooks, P. (2002), “Putting civvies in the control room is asking for trouble”, The Guardian, 15 October: “If you put a civilian in a job where
someone has to think like a police officer – the control room, for instance – then you ask for trouble. Imagine the army sending civilians
out to battlefields to control a war, it doesn’t make sense. Well it’s the same in the police service.”
Jones, S. (2009), “Police chiefs body faces calls for review after cash revelations”, The Guardian, 16 February.
Association of Chief Police Officers (2007), ACPO and the Freedom of Information Act 2000: “ACPO is a private company and the Office
of the Information Commissioner has confirmed that the Freedom of Information Act does not apply to the Association, since Schedule 1 of the Act does not include a definition which covers ACPO.”
Metropolitan Police Authority (2008), Policing London Annual Report 07/08.
1
A new force
The myths of policing
government for the great majority of its income, its own accountability is blurred and uncertain.24 Equally,
the territories of most police forces are not coterminous with local government boundaries, making it
impossible for citizens to know who is responsible for policing in their area.25
Proposals to increase local accountability have an unhappy history.The most recent example that foundered was
Jacqui Smith’s plans to elect Police Authority members.26 One reason for successive Home Secretaries’ lack of
success may be their failure to address the structural problems of local accountability, in particular the uncertain
relationship between police and councils. The result of this is, in the words of one commentator, “a huge gap
between how we want to be policed, how the police want to police us and how we are actually policed.”27
The Bichard Inquiry into the murders of Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman in Soham, Cambridgeshire
strongly criticised the “worrying” lack of “clarity of accountability” of the police.28
The secret police
There is a distinct lack of transparency of information available about the police. Reform has repeatedly
found that attempts to research specifics on police budgets, strategies and accountability structures have
been futile. Although Police Authorities do publish high-level annual budgets, there are no detailed,
publicly-accessible accounts. There is no clear document explaining who reports into whom, particularly in
terms of national bodies. Enquiries directly to police forces have yielded some information, but in many
cases they have refused to help or suggested a Freedom of Information request.
The Policing and Crime Bill
The Policing and Crime Bill currently going through Parliament significantly tones down the pledges in the
policing Green Paper on local accountability. Instead of endorsing the direct election of some members of
Police Authorities the Bill calls for Police Authorities to “have regard to the views of the public”.29 Vernon
Coaker, the Police Minister, has argued that this will “strengthen [Police Authorities’] current duty”, but
David Ruffley, his Shadow, concluded that it represents “a very modest change”.30
The Bill also creates a Police Senior Appointments Panel to advise the Home Secretary on the appointment
of senior police officers.31 This would be a change from the current system where senior police officer roles
are advertised by Police Authorities. The successful candidate is appointed by the relevant Police Authority,
subject to approval by the Home Secretary.
The new Panel will consist of members nominated by the Home Secretary, the Association of Police
Authorities (APA) and ACPO. This will therefore reduce accountability since Police Authorities will have
less of a say in order to make room for ACPO, who will in effect become responsible for appointing their
own people. The proposed appointment structure will strengthen the “self-perpetuating oligarchy” that is
ACPO by embedding it at all levels. Chris Grayling, the Shadow Home Secretary, commented:
“It is strange that [the Bill] gives ACPO a statutory position in advising on appointments when the
status of ACPO itself remains undefined. Is it an external reference group for Home Office Ministers,
or a professional association protecting senior officers’ interests? Is it a national policing agency, or is
it a pressure group arguing for greater police powers?”32
Conclusion
The problem for the police is not politicisation; it is a lack of accountability.
>
>
>
>
24
Department for Communities and Local Government (2008), http://www.communities.gov.uk/localgovernment/
localgovernmentfinance/counciltaxes/counciltaxfacts/: Central government is providing local councils in England with over £70 billion in
2008/2009. Total local government revenue expenditure in 2008-09 is £98.4 billion.
Reform research: Only 11 of the 43 forces are coterminous with the boundaries of local government structures (see Appendix).
The Guardian (2008), “Labour forced to ditch police elections plan”, 18 December.
Sergeant, H. (2008), “The dangerous gap in policing”, The Sunday Times, 25 May.
Bichard, M. (2004), The Bichard Inquiry Report.
Policing and Crime Bill 2008-09.
House of Commons Public Bill Committee (2009), 4th Sitting, 29 January.
Policing and Crime Bill 2008-09.
Hansard (2009), 19 January, Col. 258.
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
The tripartite model and in particular the role of ACPO creates an accountability gap.
Greater local political control over most police priorities would enhance accountability. It would
clarify who is responsible for police performance (the police) and who can be changed in order to
change those priorities (locally elected representatives).
Better accountability will sharpen management within police forces.
11
1
A new force
The myths of policing
Myth 2: The local force myth
“The civilisation of many English counties is sufficiently backward to make it hazardous for the
Crown to part with power over the police; even if that power should be looked on as a proper
municipal attribute, which I am inclined to doubt.”
Lord Salisbury
There is a belief that the 43 forces in England and Wales are independent. Chief Constables direct their
forces, allocating funding and resources to respond to local needs and priorities. The forces are perceived to
be strong enough and of sufficient scale to cope with the demands placed upon them.
Reality: National policing is entrenched
Lord Salisbury’s remark about local policing appears to have informed the attitude of the Home Office and
ACPO. Reform has found that the UK has one of the most centralised criminal justice systems in the world.
The centralisation phenomenon has been particularly pronounced in policing, where there has been a
relentless drive towards government control through a many-layered management regime and the creation
of a multitude of new national agencies such as the Police Standards Unit and the National Policing
Improvement Agency (NPIA).33
In reality police forces are not independent. The Home Office sets strategies and targets. ACPO directs
national policy and commissions national services. The Metropolitan Police acts as the de facto national lead
police force and its Commissioner, Sir Paul Stephenson, as the country’s lead police officer and adviser to
the Home Secretary. The NPIA is also achieving some national coordination, albeit with little leverage.
The four elements of national policing
Effectively England and Wales already has national policing. The Metropolitan Police, the Home Office,
ACPO and the NPIA together provide many of the functions that national police forces cover in other
countries, albeit in a disjointed, inefficient and fragmented way.
ACPO – the power behind the throne
The Association of Chief Police Officers is a powerful and independent body consisting of Chief Constables,
Deputy Chief Constables and Assistant Chief Constables. It has a major role as the primary coordinator of
policing policy, encouraging the 43 forces in England and Wales to adopt the policies it promotes:
“Few understand that ACPO is a private company, which happens to be funded by a Home Office
grant and money from 44 police authorities. [It has an] important role in drafting and implementing
policies that affect the fundamental freedoms of this country [and has been responsible for promoting
policies including] police officers ... being equipped with 10,000 stun guns [and] the automatic number
plate recognition camera network [being] set up to record and store data from most road journeys.”34
ACPO has the ear of the Home Secretary and this, in combination with its influence over senior officers
(and those wishing to become senior officers), means it is a prominent voice in determining policy. Reform’s
interviews revealed a widespread belief that ACPO is the main party persuading forces to adopt particular
policies. If the Home Secretary wants to ensure the adoption of a policy idea, she will “strike a bargain”
with ACPO to ensure its implementation:
“ACPO is the driving force behind policy, and the Home Office succumbs, either because of its
own autocratic instincts or because the police are exceptionally good at pushing through the things
they want.”35
This focus of ACPO on national policy means that individual Chief Constables are left focusing on
administrative matters and equipment choices. In fact this situation should be reversed: ACPO could
take a useful national lead on administration and interoperability while Chief Constables focus on their
forces’ operations.
33
34
35
12
Giangrande, R. et al. (2008), The lawful society, Reform.
orter, H. (2009), “The secret police are watching you”, Comment is free, 10 February.
P
Ibid.
1
A new force
The myths of policing
The Metropolitan Police – the de facto national force
It is commonly thought that each of the 43 forces has exclusive control over all policing with their
boundaries. In fact the Metropolitan Police has a key role as the de facto national lead police force.
The Metropolitan Police has numerous responsibilities above and beyond those of the other 42 forces in
England and Wales. It coordinates counter-terrorism operations, liaises with local forces on intelligence
gathering and operations and provides “close protection” services to VIPs everywhere in the country.36
In effect it has informal responsibility for coordinating serious and organised crime fighting across the
country, in conjunction with SOCA.
The Metropolitan Police also provides national services which are in effect commissioned by ACPO on
behalf of the 43 forces.
Mutual aid
The Police National Information Centre (PNIC) coordinates the allocation of “mutual aid” resources
across the country, when forces require additional police resources. It is the central point for arranging the
supply of Police Support Units (PSUs) and specialist services (such as motorcycles or firearms) from one
force to another, and it administers the payment system for this. The PNIC is technically part of ACPO but
is based at New Scotland Yard and is “resourced by the Metropolitan Police Service on behalf of ACPO”.37
Counter-terrorism hubs
Counter Terrorism Units (CTUs) and Counter Terrorism Intelligence Units (CTIUs), established over the
last two years, are accountable to ACPO(TAM) (ACPO’s Terrorism and Allied Matters committee) and
coordinated by a senior Metropolitan Police Officer (known as the Senior National Coordinator).
ACPO(TAM) is ultimately accountable to the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) at the
Home Office. Their aim is surveillance and investigation of terrorist activity across England and Wales.
These hubs are funded by the Home Office; the officers and premises are provided by the relevant local
force, known as the “host” force.
The following hubs are in place:
CTUs (investigative and surveillance capability)
CTIUs (surveillance capability)
West Yorkshire
East Anglia
West Midlands
South West
Greater Manchester
Wales
Thames Valley (under construction)
Derbyshire
These hubs are reported to be successful by both local and national police as they avoid a national/local
split that a national agency would create, yet they are coordinated to effectively counter national threats.
E-crime
After dissolving the National Hi-Tech Crime Unit into SOCA in 2006, the Government has launched a new
Police Central e-crime Unit (PCeU), run by the Metropolitan Police. The new unit was created, at a cost of
£7 million, after the Home Office acknowledged that e-crime was not being properly addressed by SOCA.38
36
37
38
Metropolitan Police Service (2008), met.police.uk.
ouse of Commons (1999), Minutes of Evidence Appendix 6, Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport.
H
Home Office (2008), Press release: “New £7m specialist e-crime unit launches”, 30 September; Metropolitan Police Service (2009),
http://www.met.police.uk/pceu/index.htm; Pinsent Masons (2008), “OUT-LAW News: New computer crime unit established two years
after disbandment of NHTCU”, 2 October.
13
1
A new force
The myths of policing
The Home Office – a Faustian pact with ACPO
Given the roadblock that ACPO and the 43 forces have presented, the Government has sought to centralise
and mandate, subject to ACPO’s agreement. The 1964 Police Act enabled central government to take many
powers from local government in the name of fighting corruption.39 The 1996 Police Act enabled the Home
Secretary to set national policing priorities, leaving power resting almost exclusively between the Home
Secretary and Chief Constables.40
Since 2001 the Home Office has conducted a sustained campaign to take control of policing decisions. The
Home Office published three National Policing Plans along with a variety of supporting documents, and
established new agencies.41 Through these, the Home Office took responsibility for setting the priorities for
police forces, for setting many of their performance targets, and for key questions of operational
management. The result of this process was a considerable uniformity of activity across England and Wales,
directly in line with the Home Office’s intentions.
National Policing Plans
The National Policing Plans were the clearest expression of the policy of centralisation. Each Plan set out a
series of “priorities” for police forces to follow, supported by a greater number of targets, metrics or directives.
National Policing Plans
Home Office
NPP 2003-06
Number of top level priorities
Four
e.g. “Tackle anti-social behaviour and disorder”
Supporting targets
51 “directives”
e.g. “Chief officers should work closely with local partners to tackle alcohol-related
crime effectively”
NPP 2004-07
Seven (including two “themes”)
e.g. “Combat serious and organised crime, both across and within force boundaries”
37 performance metrics
e.g. “New statutory indicator of sanction
detection rates for domestic rates for
domestic burglary and violence against the person by ethnicity of victim”
NPP 2005-08
Five
e.g. “Provide a citizen-focused police service which responds to the needs of communities and individuals … and
inspires public confidence in the police”
13 “Statutory Performance Indicators”
and 32 metrics
e.g. “Using the British Crime Survey,
[measure] the percentage of people who
think their local police do a good job”
This proliferation of targeting and central direction inhibits local initiatives and priorities, leaving Chief
Constables unable to exercise their prerogative to direct their force.
Wresting more control
The current Policing and Crime Bill contains measures that will increase central control over forces through
new rules on collaboration. The Bill gives the Home Secretary the power not just to sanction and veto
collaboration agreements but to give guidance and directions on which forces should collaborate and how.42
Sir Norman Bettison, Chief Constable of the West Yorkshire Police, said:
“Our reading of the bill is that ultimately the Home Secretary, who currently has the power, will have
a mechanism by which to mandate collaboration.”43
39
40
41
42
43
14
olice Act 1964: “The Secretary of State may cause a local inquiry to be held by a person appointed by him into any matter connected
P
with the policing of any area”.
Police Act 1996: “The Secretary of State may by order determine objectives for the policing of the areas of all police authorities ... The
Secretary of State may direct police authorities to establish levels of performance [and] may impose conditions with which the
performance targets must conform, and different conditions may be imposed for different authorities.”
Home Office (2002), National Policing Plan 2003-06; Home Office (2003), National Policing Plan 2004-07; Home Office (2004), National
Policing Plan 2005-08. The Home Office states that the National Policing Plans should be “seen in the wider context” of the Home Office
Strategic Plans and policing policy papers. Bodies established since 2001 include the Police Standards Unit, the National Policing
Improvement Agency and the Serious Organised Crime Agency.
Policing and Crime Bill 2008-09: “The Secretary of State may give chief officers or police authorities guidance about collaboration
agreements or related matters … In discharging their functions, chief officers and police authorities must have regard to the guidance.”
House of Commons Public Bill Committee (2009), 1st Sitting, 27 January.
1
A new force
The myths of policing
This drive towards centralisation includes giving politicians the ability to direct from the centre operational
and practical elements of police activities. This could include, for example, the ability to create “a national
suite of forms” or as suggested by Vernon Coaker, “you could mandate the IT systems and software that are
used by some forces”.44 Whilst it is arguably necessary that common systems and procedures are rolled out
across the country, it seems unlikely that Home Office Ministers, rather than senior police officers
themselves, are best placed to decide what does and does not work.
NPIA – the toothless quango
The National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) was established in 2005 to “provide a large and diverse
portfolio of products and services” to police across the country. Its job is to manage national infrastructure
and encourage the adoption of standard equipment, systems and practices.45
It has certainly had some success, spearheading the rollout of the new Airwave radio to facilitate
communication across forces, and leading the IMPACT information-sharing programme and the
development of the Police National Database.46
However, although it is leading on these projects, the NPIA is powerless to enforce their adoption. The
Police National Database, for example – which is costing around £600 million to roll out – is supposed to
link up the computer systems of all 43 forces.47 But the NPIA has confirmed to Reform that participating in
the new system is not compulsory.
National funding
The centralised model of police funding is a mess, eroding local accountability and inhibiting police forces
from spending money where it would be most useful. It removes the incentive to spend effectively and
efficiently, and denies local residents a say in how much they pay for their policing, and what its priorities
should be. This disintermediation of the payment and the benefit prevents citizens from understanding
what they pay for policing, and discourages them from taking an active part in reducing costs.
The bulk of police resources comes from central government grants, which have increased by 58 per cent in
the past decade.48 The amount allocated to each force is based on a complex formula which in essence tries
to predict the level of crime in each force, based on criteria including the number of single parent
households, the number of long-term unemployment benefit claimants, the number of bars per 100
hectares, the amount of student housing and the number of residents in terraced accommodation.49
The performance of a police force is not taken into account. The value of grants arising from this formula is
then changed, multiplied by various scaling factors. An additional grant for various designated purposes is
then added. Finally, in the case of the Metropolitan Police, a further arbitrary amount is added “in
recognition of the Metropolitan Police’s distinct national and capital city functions”. For 2009-10 that
amount is £202.5 million.50
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
House of Commons Public Bill Committee (2009), 4th Sitting, 29 January.
ational Policing Improvement Agency (2009), npia.police.uk.
N
Ibid.
Heath, N. (2009), “Police database will make ‘a very big difference’”, silicon.com, 9 February.
Giangrande, R. et al. (2008), The lawful society, Reform.
Home Office (2009), The Police Grant Report (England and Wales) 2009/10.
Ibid.
15
1
A new force
The myths of policing
The “bribery culture”
In interviews Reform has also heard evidence of a “bribery culture”, with government effectively withholding
a particular piece of funding unless the force in question agrees to implement a given initiative. One example
of this was the recent rollout of the national Airwave radio system, where forces that needed to replace their
ageing systems were offered money by the Home Office to do so – but only if they opted for the
Government’s preferred system.
The Home Office does not publish specific figures on these financial incentives, but one Police Authority
member suggested to Reform that up to 60 per cent of police spending – £9 billion nationwide – is targeted
Home Office grants.
Local funding
It is clear that the central funding allocated to police is obscure, unaccountable and bears little resemblance
to the effectiveness or efficiency of the force, or even historical crime levels. So what about local police
funding? Police forces are part-funded through council tax, but:
“While police authorities have the ability to raise additional funding locally through the council tax
precept, this has been constrained by the 5 per cent cap on council tax increases.”51
There is widespread variation across the country, so while Surrey raises 46 per cent of its funds (the greatest
portion) from council tax, Northumbria raises only 12 per cent of its funds locally.52
Although Police Authorities have some flexibility in spending their budgets, an increasing proportion remains
ring-fenced for areas including neighbourhood policing and counter-terrorism.53 The plethora of government
targets substantially limits police forces’ ability to spend money where it would have the most impact.
The absence of a local funding model makes it impossible for police expenditure to be accountable to the
local people who pay for it. The inevitable consequence of this is a “black hole” policing system, swallowing
all the cash it is allocated with little incentive to improve results.
Conclusion
>
>
>
51
52
iangrande, R. et al. (2008), The lawful society, Reform.
G
Surrey Police Authority (2007), Policing Surrey: Your council tax for policing services in 2007-08; Northumbria Police Authority (2008),
Budget Plan 2008-09.
Giangrande, R. et al. (2008), The lawful society, Reform.
53
16
There is centralisation, but in the wrong areas – government has focused on operations instead of
administration.
Targets inhibit local initiatives and priorities.
The Metropolitan Police is already the de facto national lead force.
1
A new force
The myths of policing
Myth 3: The intelligence myth
The 43-force structure is intended to cope with crimes that cross force boundaries by sharing information
and intelligence. Roads policing, fraud and major incidents should see forces working together, sharing
resources and cooperating in the planning and implementation of strategy. There are some good examples
in the service of collaboration and joint arrangements.
Reality: 43 fiefdoms resist action
Denuded of a real connection with the electorate and stymied by edicts from the Home Office, police chiefs
have sought to exert influence over the aspects of policing that are under their control. The reduction in the
number of police forces from 123 in 1964 to 43 today has, by definition, concentrated more power in the
hands of fewer people.54 The role was also strengthened through the 1994 Police and Magistrates Court
Act and the 1996 Police Act. Through these Acts the size of police authorities governing local police forces
was reduced from 35 members to 17.55 The Acts also abolished elections to Police Authorities and gave
Chief Constables control over police budgets.56
Poor inter-force intelligence
The Bichard Inquiry gave a damning verdict on the state of inter-force intelligence sharing. It declared that
“the importance everyone concerned professes to give intelligence was not borne out in reality”.57 There
was a devastating failure of the forces involved to share information:
“[Ian Huntley, the offender] had come to the attention of Humberside Police in relation to allegations
of eight sexual offences from 1995 to 1999 (and had been investigated in yet another). This
information had not emerged during the vetting check, carried out by Cambridgeshire constabulary
at the time of Huntley’s appointment to Soham Village College late in 2001.”58
Moreover, the IT systems which should have facilitated information-sharing were quite literally non-existent.59
The Inquiry called for the urgent implementation of a new system to enable forces to identify intelligence
that is held on an individual by another police force. This system, the IMPACT Nominal Index (INI) is
now in operation but is still missing tens of millions of records.60 The new Police National Database, which
should “replace the INI, as well as facilitate key links with other national information systems”, is yet to be
implemented.61 And, as we have seen, adoption of this database is not even compulsory.
Lack of agreement
The practical consideration of achieving agreement between 43 Chief Constables is problematic. In
interviews with Reform there has been widespread agreement that it is impossible to engage with a “seminar”
of 43 Chief Constables; indeed there is some thinking that at least part of the motivation behind Charles
Clarke’s “superforces” plan was the appeal of dealing with fewer Chief Constables.
However there are some good examples of collaboration in the service. Kent and Essex, for example, have
arrangements in a wide variety of areas. The forces have a joint procurement department and collaborate on
marine services, specialist vehicles, a helicopter and numerous back office functions.62 There are also examples
of cost-sharing between emergency services. Gloucestershire has one control room shared by the police, fire
and ambulance services. In addition to saving money, this tri-service arrangement facilitated an extremely
high level of cooperation during the 2007 floods. But while some inter-force collaboration is happening –
largely spurred on by the threat of police force mergers – it is not enough, and it is not happening fast enough.
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
Mount, F. (2005), “The police are listening at last. But they won’t like what we say”, The Daily Telegraph, 17 November.
oveday, B. (2006), Size Isn’t Everything, Policy Exchange.
L
Ibid.
Bichard, M. (2004), The Bichard Inquiry Report.
Ibid.
Ibid: “Although national Information Technology (IT) systems for recording intelligence were part of the original National Strategy for
Police Information Systems (NSPIS) as long ago as 1994, no such system exists even now. It was, in fact, formally abandoned in 2000
[and] there are still no firm plans for a national IT system in England and Wales.”
National Policing Improvement Agency (2008): “As of January 2008, a total of 61 million records were held on the system and it is
estimated that, by 2010, a total of 110 million records will be accessible.” (http://www.npia.police.uk/en/8493.htm).
National Policing Improvement Agency (2008) (http://www.npia.police.uk/en/8495.htm).
Kent and Essex Police Authorities (2009), Programme Manager’s Report to the Joint Statutory Committee, 30 January.
17
1
A new force
The myths of policing
Un-joined up
Despite some good examples of inter-force collaboration, there are far more cases of things gone awry.
Although the Home Office strongly encourages forces to work together, it does not compel them to do so;
as such there are occasions when rivalries and “turf wars” have taken priority over policing. The refusal of
forces in the M4 corridor to properly collaborate on organised crime forced the Metropolitan Police to
spearhead a regional task force to take on the issue.
Then there are the purely logistical issues involved in having 43 forces trying to work together. Reform’s
interviews have produced tales of incompatibilities in equipment and methods that are at best inconvenient
and at worst life-threatening. Until the recent rollout of the Airwave radio, incompatibilities in forces’ radio
systems meant that police cars involved in high-speed chases would lose contact with their base when they
crossed regional borders.
Incompatibilities between IT systems create huge additional workloads. If a lack of empty cells requires a suspect
to be taken to another custody suite after being arrested, all of the suspect’s details must be re-entered manually.
Even differences in training can have a major impact in the field. Officers from two forces team up to storm
a building. But in one force they have been trained to go through the door and head left; in another force,
they are told to run to the right. The result is, quite literally, officers falling over one another.
What is clear is that effective communication, collaboration and action is delayed and prevented by a
cumbersome structure that inhibits forces from working together.
Conclusion
18
There are serious flaws in collaboration, communication and compatibility
(especially of IT systems).
>
>
Chief Constables have repeatedly acted as a block to reform.
1
A new force
The myths of policing
Myth 4: The scale myth
The history of the police has shown repeated thought that bigger is better. There have been numerous
attempts to merge forces; the 1964 force amalgamations and Charles Clarke’s “superforces” plans are two
prominent examples of this thinking. Successive reorganisations have promised more efficiency with
centralisation.63 Although each force contains one or more Basic Command Units (BCUs) which provide
the on-the-ground police operations, strategy and finance is largely decided at force level.64
Reality: Regional forces result in waste and unaccountable spending
The current structure introduces inefficiencies into the system by forcibly centralising expenditure which is
best done at BCU level. And it creates waste by duplicating expenditure which would best take place at a
national level.
Far from creating efficiency gains, the result of force mergers and rolling centralisation has spiralling costs
and productivity decline. Expenditure on policing has increased by over £4.5 billion in real terms since
1997 – a real increase of 43 per cent.65 Britain’s police are the most expensive in the world. As a proportion
of GDP, spending on policing in England and Wales is higher than every OECD country for which figures
are available (except Scotland). For comparison, expenditure in England and Wales on the police was 0.9
per cent of GDP in the latest year available (2005) – 20 per cent higher than the US figure of 0.75 per cent
of GDP (2006).66
False economies
The artificial force boundaries encourage arbitrary centralisation of services such as call centres, which at
face value appear to offer cost benefits and efficiency savings, but in fact have dramatic unintended
consequences. Centralised call centres waste time and money, as operatives in regional control centres lack
the knowledge of the area that officers at the local police station would have. Their response is delayed as
the operative attempts to identify the location of the crime. In the best case, this would cause frustration on
the part of the citizen attempting to interact with the police; in the worst case, lives could be put at risk.
Small is beautiful
Independent research shows that the myth that larger policing units are more efficient than smaller ones is
simply not true. There is “a genuine scale effect in policing”, with different-sized BCUs – ranging from
under 100 officers to over 1,000 – showing “a very clear negative relationship between scale efficiency and
size”.67 In other words, smaller policing units solve more crimes per officer than larger ones.
The cost of merging
Merging forces to create economies of scale is not straightforward either. As we have seen there are myriad
incompatibilities between different forces’ systems and equipment. These problems could make the cost of
merging forces prohibitive. Indeed, in 1996 the Government looked at merging police forces but abandoned
the plan due to the huge costs involved in homogenising systems and equipment.68
Another problem is the funding implications that arise from a lack of coterminosity with local government
boundaries. Different levels of council tax can cause friction as residents of one local authority can feel they
are “subsidising” policing provision elsewhere in the force.
63
64
65
66
67
68
enkins, S. (2005), “It’s not a Blair police state we need fear, it’s his state police”, The Sunday Times, 13 November: “The 1994 reforms
J
centralised police policy and finance but left 43 forces in place.”
Audit Commission (2001), Best Foot Forward: Headquarters’ Support for Police Basic Command Units.
Giangrande, R. et al. (2008), The lawful society, Reform.
R
eform research; US Department of Justice (2009), Bureau of Justice Statistics.
Drake, L. and Simper, R. (2005), “Police Efficiency in Offences Cleared: An Analysis of English ‘Basic Command Units’”, International
Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 25 pp. 186-208; http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/methodologies/basic-commandintroduction.html.
Police Act 1996. The Act provided the powers for the Home Secretary to merge forces.
19
1
A new force
The myths of policing
Duplicated efforts
Services which could sensibly be organised at a national level are not, so each of the 43 forces must
independently develop and run their own.
For example, there is no single national IT system that forces can use. The 43 forces pay 43 times to develop
43 different IT systems. Not only is this clearly a waste of money but, as the Soham case indicates, the
incompatibilities of the systems can have tragic consequences.
The same is true of other key administrative systems such as HR and payroll. As shown earlier,
incompatibilities in forces’ equipment, from radios to riot shields, cause practical problems – but they also
waste cash. Bulk-buying would bring down the cost of the items in question. But the current arrangements
prevent this even in areas where forces do want to cooperate.
There are savings to be made in areas where buying services on a larger scale makes sense. Kent Police Authority
has told Reform that their collaboration with Essex has generated savings of £2.8 million since 2007.69 Interforce collaboration can also provide services which would otherwise be out of forces’ reach; Gloucestershire
and Avon & Somerset share a helicopter which neither force would be able to afford on its own.
It is clear that there is huge potential for savings to be made. But different things are better done at different
levels. The current structure creates endemic waste by failing to provide centralised services where they are
appropriate, and refusing to hand power to BCU Commanders where decisions are best made locally.
Conclusion
20
The 43-force structure creates a substantial amount of waste, both through inefficiencies created by
centralising expenditure that would best be done locally, and by duplicating expenditure which
would best take place at a national level.
>
69
Kent and Essex Police Authorities (2009), Programme Manager’s Report to the Joint Statutory Committee, 30 January.
1
A new force
The myths of policing
Myth 5: The serious crime myth
When it launched in 2006 the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) was hailed as Britain’s FBI.70 It
was to “borrow intelligence-gathering techniques from MI5 and MI6 [and] poach methods from the world
of counter-terrorism”.71 According to its website:
“SOCA is an intelligence-led agency with law enforcement powers and harm reduction responsibilities.
Harm in this context is the damage caused to people and communities by serious organised crime.”72
While the police deal with local and more minor crime, SOCA takes responsibility at a national level for
serious and organised crime such as drug trafficking, people trafficking, money laundering and fraud.73
Reality: Serious crime remains a problem
Serious and organised crime presents a significant threat to the UK. The social and economic cost of serious
organised crime, including the costs of combating it, is estimated to be £20 billion.74
Drugs trafficking, people smuggling and gun crime are the principal elements of this serious crime, which is
referred to as Level 2 (regional) and Level 3 (national and international).75 Level 2 also includes other
issues such as homicide, riot control and contingencies such as flooding, major disease outbreaks and
strategic road policing.76
In 1998 the Home Office estimated that up to 1,420 women were trafficked into the UK. Just five years
later this estimate had risen to 4,000.77 The End Violence against Women Campaign has said the number is
now closer to 10,000.78
The price of cocaine has fallen by half in the last decade, and the International Narcotics Control Board
has warned that prices will continue to fall unless supply is curtailed.79 Heroin seized by the authorities in
2003-04 amounted to just 12 per cent of the overall market in Britain.80
The most recent SOCA Threat Assessment found that criminal gangs were succeeding in bringing in larger
quantities of firearms than had previously been assessed. This has fuelled street gun crime in three force
areas: London, Greater Manchester and the West Midlands.81
Internet crime is a growing phenomenon, which does not respect police force or even national boundaries.
One review estimated that there were around 35,000 identity thefts online in 2006, with an increase
expected in future years. There were estimated to be 207,000 cases of online financial fraud in 2006, up 35
per cent on the previous year. The review concluded: “It is clear that cybercrime is a pressing and prevalent
social problem.”82
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
O’Neill, S. (2008), “Soca abandons hunt for crime lords”, The Times, 13 May.
’Neill, S. (2008), “Is Soca just too soft?”, The Times, 13 May.
O
Serious Organised Crime Agency (2006), soca.gov.uk.
Ibid. The SOCA website lists the organisation’s focuses as drug trafficking, organised immigration crime, individual and private sector
fraud, money laundering and chemical suspicious activity reporting.
Serious Organised Crime Agency (2008), The United Kingdom Threat Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime.
Ibid; HM Inspectorate of Constabulary (2005), Closing the Gap. Level 2 services are grouped under seven headings: counter terrorism
and extremism; serious organised and cross border crime; civil contingencies and emergency planning; critical incident management;
major crime (homicide); public order; and strategic roads policing. The National Intelligence Model (NIM) describes criminality as follows:
Level 1 – local criminality that can be managed within a Basic Command Unit (BCU), Level 2 – cross border issues, usually of organised
criminals, major incident affecting more than one BCU, Level 3 – Serious crime, terrorism operating at a national or international level.
HM Inspectorate of Constabulary (2005), Closing the Gap.
House of Commons (2006), Joint Committee on Human Rights: Twenty-Sixth Report.
Eaves (2008), Eaves information sheet – sex trafficking, December.
International Narcotics Control Board (2008), Report; BBC News Online (2009), “Cocaine price ‘set to fall more’”, 19 February.
Reuter, P. and Stevens, A. (2007), An Analysis of UK Drug Policy, UK Drug Policy Commission.
Serious Organised Crime Agency (2008), The United Kingdom Threat Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime.
Fafinski, S. (2006), UK Cybercrime report, Garlik.
21
1
A new force
The myths of policing
The serious crime gap
These threats are the responsibility of SOCA (high-level serious and organised crime) and the Metropolitan
Police (serious and organised crime and counter-terrorism).83 However, there is a vacuum between the
local crime dealt with by regional police forces and the organised crime dealt with by SOCA. Jan Berry,
former Chair of the Police Federation, said:
“There’s a whole raft of crime that’s now not even being looked at. It is not local enough to be treated
by the local police force and not serious enough to be dealt with by SOCA. To a certain extent, the
criminals are benefitting from the lines drawn on maps.”84
A relentless national focus on organised crime has removed local forces’ incentives to tackle it – but without
putting anything in their place.
Poor information sharing and cooperation leads to a failure to deal with serious and organised crime that
crosses BCU or force boundaries. The “gap” exists at this level because, as shown earlier, although it is
popularly thought that there is seamless integration across police forces, this is simply not the case. The
result is that, while minor, local crime and major, international crime are dealt with effectively, Level 2
serious crime is not.
The 2005 report Closing the Gap by Denis O’Connor, then HM Inspector of Constabulary, acknowledged
that the current structure of the police service creates this problem:
“Whilst Basic Command Unit (BCU) arrangements and neighbourhood policing provides a solid
local platform for the future, the current 30 year old, 43 force structure of widely different sizes, and
capabilities does not … There will be a requirement for a more efficient, integrated operating
platform above BCU level.”85
The report concedes that the supposed collaboration between forces is inadequate and ineffective:
“The modest scale of collaboration to date, and the significant problems associated with it, such as
governance and performance and accountability suggests that, at best, progress will be complex,
slow and of limited impact.”86
It argues that there must be a structural change in order to close the Level 2 policing gap:
“Put simply, when viewed from the context of the range of challenges and future threats now facing
the service and the communities it polices, the 43 force structure is no longer fit for purpose.”87
SOCA – a white elephant
The writing is already on the wall for SOCA, which has been described as “cautious and bureaucratic,
overburdened with managers and inexperienced at the sharp end”.88 In interviews Reform has often heard
SOCA described as “ineffective” and interested in “sexy” work over the nuts and bolts of organised crime.
It lacks operationally-experienced staff; 148 former police officers – many of whom were cherry-picked to
join the unit – retired or returned to policing within two years of moving to SOCA, complaining of a lack of
enforcement activity.89 The Agency has effectively been “downgraded”, with its budget slashed by the
Home Office two years after it opened for business.90
One SOCA officer explained the problems:
“Since SOCA started, I haven’t taken on any new investigations and haven’t been asked to develop
any intelligence to move into an investigation. I am just purely performing email, admin tasks … It is
bureaucratic. Its management is top-centred … I and my team are under-utilised in comparison to
what we were doing before. In my section of the organisation, morale is probably the lowest I have
ever known it.”91
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
22
The City of London Police is the lead force on fraud.
The Times (2007), “Soca performance slammed”, 24 January.
HM Inspectorate of Constabulary (2005), Closing the Gap.
Ibid.
Ibid.
O’Neill, S. (2008), “Is Soca just too soft?”, The Times, 13 May.
O’Neill, S. (2008), “Soca abandons hunt for crime lords”, The Times, 13 May.
Ibid.
The Times (2007), “Soca performance slammed”, 24 January.
1
A new force
The myths of policing
The missing Metropolitan Police mandate
As shown earlier, the Metropolitan Police already has responsibility for dealing with serious crime, counterterrorism and e-crime. The problem is that it does not have the formal control or resources to effectively
coordinate serious crime policing. Sir Paul Stephenson may be the de facto “national” Chief Constable, but
he is not in charge of everything he needs to be in charge of; he lacks a clearly defined mandate.
The Metropolitan Police is good at fighting serious and organised crime, and has the resources to do so.
The average number of criminal networks it disrupted rose from 3.4 per month in 2004/05 to 27.1 per
month in 2007/08.92 However outside London there is a gap – where the Metropolitan Police does not have
full control over serious crime fighting, but other forces do not have the resources and expertise to take on
the mantle themselves.
Going round in circles
Government’s focus on total crime numbers played a major role in destroying Level 2 policing. With three
key areas to focus on – response policing, neighbourhood policing and protective services (i.e. serious
crime) – Chief Constables found that they got no credit for work in the latter area. Accordingly it ceased to
be a priority. Resources were moved to a national level as Regional Crime Squads were replaced by the
National Crime Squad. As serious crime was no longer individual forces’ responsibility, the gap was allowed
to open.93
Now the HMIC series of “Level 2 Gap” reports has focused attention on the problem. As a result Regional
Intelligence Units have been established, at a substantial cost; Reform has been told that Gloucestershire
had to raise council tax by 52 per cent to fund the rebuilding of its protective services.
Continued confusion about serious crime fighting has created this gap in an essential area of policing
provision, wasting vast sums of money along the way. The lack of effective national coordination of serious
crime provision – and of a single point of leadership – will perpetuate this fudge.
Conclusion
SOCA has been downgraded.
>
>
>
92
93
Metropolitan Police Service (2005), Annual Report 2004/05; Metropolitan Police Service (2008), Annual Report 2007/08.
BC News Online (1998), “National squad targets top criminals”, 31 March: “The [National Crime Squad] is taking over from the old
B
regional crime squads”.
Serious crime fighting is not effectively coordinated.
There continues to be a problem with serious crime, especially outside the London area.
23
A new force
2
The principles of reform
Policing in Britain has been insulated from change by a collection of powerful myths, equally powerful
entrenched interests and a failure of political will. The cost of failure to address this issue head on is high. It
has created a complex web of arrangements with little or no transparency and accountability. It is expensive.
It has failed to deal with the rising threat of organised and supra-regional crime. There are serious problems
with accountability and efficiency in modern policing.
Accountability
Striking the correct balance between efficiency and accountability is central to public service reform. Unlike
other services such as health and education, which are consumed by individual patients or pupils, policing
is a public good and not subject to choice as a method of providing accountability. Consumer power can
therefore only be exercised through a popular election.
Local accountability
Political debate about crime in England and Wales has been restricted to point-scoring and blame games.
The lack of accountability, and the need for politicians to be seen to be “doing something about crime” has
created a culture of short-termism and knee-jerk reaction. It has resulted in the trading of meaningless
statistics, accusations of interference and seemingly limitless centrally-directed initiatives.
One Chief Constable told Reform that he is accountable to “at least a dozen” authorities, with three –
HMIC, the Police Authority and the Audit Commission – responsible for inspecting and auditing his force.
But accountability to many bodies actually means no accountability at all.
These problems are shared by few other developed countries. Almost all developed countries have a federalstyle policing structure, with local and national police having distinct and separate powers. America has the
FBI and thousands of local police departments. Germany has a federal police force (BPOL) and 16 state
police forces, with a national office (BKA) to liaise between the two. Italy, which does not currently have a
federalised structure, is trying to move to one.94
A federalised local government structure allows for direct local accountability over policing. In the US, for
example, elected Mayors are able to appoint Police Chiefs and direct overall crime strategy.95 Election
campaigns are frequently fought on the issue of crime. Most famously Rudolph Giuliani fought his campaign
to become Mayor of New York City on a promise to focus the police department on shutting down petty
crimes and nuisances to restore quality of life. This “Broken Windows” approach was hugely popular and the
Mayor’s electoral mandate allowed him to instruct the NewYork Police Department to follow this course.96
Giving local officers real autonomy and the power to make their own professional decisions, rather than relying
on Whitehall edicts, would start to rebuild the relationship between the police and local people.The popularity
in Japan of Kobans – local “police boxes” where a few officers are stationed – shows the importance of allowing
local officers to build relationships with the community and use their own judgement.97
94
95
96
97
24
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2008), Policing OnLine Information System.
oveday, B. and Reid, A. (2003), Going local: Who should run Britain’s police?, Policy Exchange.
L
Ibid.
Giangrande, R. et al. (2008), The lawful society, Reform.
A new force
Transparency
The police service in England and Wales suffers from opacity of information. Accounts are not published.
Command structures are not documented. Statistics are nearly impossible to come by. Attempts by Reform
to secure detailed budgets or breakdowns of expenditure from Police Authorities have revealed that this
information is not published.
Different areas of expenditure are devolved to different levels. Some BCUs have local responsibility for
road policing, for example, whilst elsewhere it is handled regionally at force level. No BCU has full control
over its staff pay, which makes up around 80 per cent of the total police budget; indeed in the current
system devolving pay to BCUs makes no sense since police numbers are centrally controlled.
Greater transparency of information about the police would make a substantial contribution to increasing
accountability. Without information on how decisions are taken and how funding is allocated it is difficult for
anybody to hold the police to account. Even politicians are hampered by a lack of readily available information.
In other countries, transparency helps to deliver accountability. An excellent demonstration of this is the
US National Institute of Justice, which was created to conduct studies based on information made available
by the Department of Justice. Many of its studies subjected long-held assumptions in policing to careful
testing and found them unsupported by the data. Those findings led to changes in policing strategies.98
One illustration of the National Institute of Justice’s impact is a study into police response time which
found that this criterion was unrelated to the probability of making an arrest or locating a witness, and
rather the length of time it takes a citizen to report a crime to the police was the deciding factor. This paved
the way for a more efficient deployment of police resources. Another was a study into the benefits of making
or not making an arrest in domestic violence cases. The study found that “arrest worked best” and led to a
change in policy in 90 per cent of police forces and over half of the 50 states.99
The introduction under Mayor Rudolph Giuliani of the “Compstat” information system in the New York
Police Department shows the effect that readily-available information can have. This system allows officers
to engage in weekly, monthly and annual crime analysis, broken down by precinct and crime type. This
information is used in weekly meetings with senior and lower-ranking officers, the Mayor, the district
attorney and other relevant officials, and facilitates detailed planning of operational strategies.100 It also
allows the Mayor to hold the Police Chief to account over delivery of his strategic priorities.
Efficiency and effectiveness
Policing involves national and local functions and many agencies. Successful reform will combine local
accountability for performance on most crime with opportunities for cooperation and cost control.
Serious crime is a national responsibility
Research has shown that there is a strong correlation between the size of a force and the quality of its serious
crime provision. Smaller forces do not have the manpower, resources or expertise to provide top-quality
services in each of the seven serious crime areas.101 The Bichard Inquiry simply said: “It is clear that a
national intelligence capability is needed.”102
The Home Secretary concedes the importance of achieving the right balance between local and national
policing, writing in her Strategic Policing Priorities for 2009-10 that “there is little benefit in increasing
public confidence through local policing and ignoring protective services”.103
With a strong national lead on serious crime, BCUs would be able to focus on local policing priorities and
the wishes of local people. They would be able to direct resources and staff to matters of direct concern to
the local population, and would have increased flexibility to home in on issues of particular local concern.
cDonald, W. and Paromchick, S. (1996), Transparency and the Police: External research, policing and democracy.
M
Ibid.
Loveday, B. and Reid, A. (2003), Going local: Who should run Britain’s police?, Policy Exchange.
HM Inspectorate of Constabulary (2005), Closing the Gap: “Size matters: larger forces are likely to have much greater capability and
resilience, whilst smaller forces in many cases find it hard to provide these services to standard.” The report cites the example of the
inadequacy of Murder Investigation Teams in smaller forces: “Where Hybrid Teams exist, and staff are precepted from BCUs and other
Departments there are often issues regarding the skills and experience of those staff provided. This can affect the quality of the
investigation and increases the organisational risk of failure. Where there is no provision in a force for a MIT, staff have to be extracted
from day-to-day policing activity.”
102 Bichard, M. (2004), The Bichard Inquiry Report.
103 Home Office (2008), Home Secretary’s Strategic Policing Priorities 2009-10.
98
99
100
101
25
2
A new force
The principles of reform
Interoperability matters
A failure to procure equipment and adopt practices that are interoperable leads to wasted money and time,
and as we have seen can have a major (negative) impact on inter-force operations.
This is changing with recent success on radio equipment, and the adoption by many forces of compatible
items such as riot shields. But the NPIA is an indirect and inefficient way of doing this. As we have seen, it
has no directive power and so the Government spends considerable resources cajoling forces into action.
Responsibility for coordination and interoperability should be incorporated within the policing structure.
There should be a national lead with directive powers –responsibility held by police, not government.
Economies of scale
As we have seen, there are numerous examples of inter-force collaboration and joint procurement lowering
costs. Better use of premises and specialist and technical resources have been identified as areas for potential
savings. Staffing, particularly in administrative areas such as IT, communications, HR and support, could
also yield cost savings, as could unified IT services.104 HM Inspectorate of Constabulary has calculated that
potential savings from merging existing forces could amount to up to £2.25 billion over ten years, so it
seems reasonable to assume that at least this level of savings could be achieved.105
A greater pressure for value for money will lead to cost reductions of this kind. That pressure will come
from greater local accountability.
Lessons from reform
History is littered with failed police reform attempting to either increase efficiency or accountability. In
1828 Robert Peel advocated a single national force but was resisted by MPs with strong local interests. He
was allowed control of the Metropolitan Police only; oversight of policing in the rest of the country was left
to the local watch committees.106 Subsequent Home Secretaries have made other radical attempts at reform.
But in many cases it is senior officers who have frustrated their progress.
A new deal with Chief Constables
Any realistic police reform must attract the support of Chief Constables. Their powerful position and lack
of accountability is one of the key defects of the current structure; equally, it gives them what amounts to a
veto on reform.
Sir Patrick Sheehy’s proposal to streamline management structures, introduce performance indicators and
reform conditions of service was successfully resisted by the police. A mass public campaign was organised
that culminated in a rally of 21,000 officers in Wembley Stadium. Michael Howard, the then Home
Secretary, was forced to reject most of Sheehy’s more far reaching proposals.107
Henry Brooke’s 1964 Police Act passed without incident because the police hierarchy had succeeded in striking
down controversial measures, such as the creation of a national force, in their evidence to the Royal Commission
that preceded the Act. The Royal Commission noted that testimony “from persons and organisations closely
associated with the present system” had been particularly compelling in rejecting the idea of a national force.108
What remained was a coup for the Chief Constables. It created new, larger forces that would be overseen by
local authorities that were weaker and less democratic than the watch committees.109
The new deal for Chief Constables is a quid pro quo – greater independence from Home Office direction in
return for greater local accountability.
M Inspectorate of Constabulary (2005), Closing the Gap.
H
Ibid.
Jenkins, S. (2006), Thatcher and Sons: A Revolution in Three Acts.
Leishman, F. (1995), “Reforming the police in Britain: New public management, policy networks and a tough ‘old bill’”, International
Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol. 8, No. 4.
108 Royal Commission on the Police (1962), Final Report.
109 Williams, C. (2003), Britain’s Police Forces: Forever Removed from Democratic Control?
104
105
106
107
26
2
A new force
The principles of reform
Work with the grain of police culture
The police are a proud and loyal tribe. Attempts to instil new organisations that do not fit within the police
“family” ends in difficulty. Attempts by Tony Blair and his Home Secretaries to shake things up with the
introduction of SOCA failed to gain traction in a powerful culture.
Mergers fail – as does “collaboration” in the absence of other reform
Charles Clarke’s proposed “superforce” model failed for two reasons: it angered those opposed to regional
integration, and it would have incurred significant cost.
The then Home Secretary proposed the merging of the 43 forces into 12 “superforces” to generate economies
of scale and centres of expertise.110 This was a hugely unpopular proposal and Police Authorities refused to
cooperate.111
The plan was substantially flawed. At the most basic level, it advocated replacing 43 forces delimited by
arbitrary boundaries with 12 forces, delimited by equally arbitrary boundaries. This arguably would result
in some efficiencies, as described earlier, but does not solve the fundamental problem of force cooperation
and would result in even less local connection and accountability than the current system offers.
Opposition from the Treasury scotched the plan where local support had been secured. Merger talks
between the Lancashire and Cumbria forces, the only two forces to volunteer for the proposed mergers,
failed when it became clear that the Treasury would not provide the necessary finance. Funding would have
to be secured by raising council tax. This led ACPO, the major police body in favour of mergers, to conclude
that mergers would not take place.112
The problem with the “superforce” model is that it was a fudge and not a proper solution. It does not solve
the long-term structural problems, although it may hide them for a while. It was a plan designed to try and
improve the situation to some extent without treading on too many toes (although it notably failed to
achieve this objective). Further, it seems likely that the idea was at least to some extent politically motivated:
a Home Secretary can deal with 12 Chief Constables much more easily than with 43.
After abandoning the “superforces” plan the Home Office pursued a policy of “encouraging” collaboration
between the 43 regional forces.113 This has certainly yielded some positive results. But it is not a comprehensive
solution because it does not solve the problem of accountability, nor does it ensure that all 43 forces are
capable of providing a full suite of high quality services efficiently and at the lowest possible cost.
110
111
112
113
The Times (2005), “Snub for Clarke over police merge plans”, 23 December.
Ibid.
The Guardian (2006), “Clarke rounds on ‘weak’ Reid for delaying police mergers”, 12 July.
publicservice.co.uk (2007), “Seismic change brings new fight to fore”, 5 November: Tony McNulty, then Minister for Security, Counterterrorism and Policing, was quoted as saying: “To be perfectly honest, it probably took the police family six months to get over the whole
debate about mergers … Since that time there has been a real focus across the country on collaboration.”
27
A new force
3
A new force
The police service has advantages to which other public services in England and Wales can only aspire.
These include a sense of purpose and mission – a genuine esprit de corps. They also include the operational
lead that is provided by the police and the strong expertise in the Metropolitan Police on serious crime.
Constructive change is needed
Equally the evidence leaves little doubt: that a change to existing accountability arrangements is required.
Police forces are not accountable for performance for either serious or local crime. Like many
unaccountable organisations, they are expensive and lacking public confidence. The Home Office’s role
is uncomfortable – it claims some direction over forces, but cannot be an actual manager. Meanwhile
serious and organised crime is not a political priority. It is in everyone’s interests that the current fudges
within the system are addressed.
One mistake of police reform has been to discuss separately reforms to local accountability and serious
crime provision. In fact both need to taken together. If local forces take on responsibility for local crime, the
Metropolitan Police can give serious crime the attention that it deserves.
Another mistake has been to propose “one size fits all” solutions, which will inevitably fail given the diversity
of England and Wales’ local characters and governance arrangements. In fact both local and national
accountability needs to go with the grain of existing arrangements.
The key outcomes of reform must be to clarify responsibilities for national and local policing, and to change
the role of the Home Office. In particular:
Local police forces should be responsible for local policing, and for sharing information on serious
crime.
>
>
>
>
The Metropolitan Police should be responsible for leading the response to serious and organised
crime across England and Wales. It should use a variety of methods of joint working with other forces.
Local commissioners based in local authorities should commission policing from local forces, holding
individual Chief Constables to account. Scrutiny would be provided by remodelled Police Authorities.
The Home Office should commission policing of serious and organised crime from the
Metropolitan Police.
The police is a highly respected public service and it is important to avoid the pitfalls that have occurred in
health and education of demotivating professionals and confusing consumers within the service. A botched
reform would have the potential both to fail and to lower morale further. The history of the police is littered
with ideas conceived outside the system that failed to embed with the existing culture, SOCA being the
most recent example.
An approach that works with the grain of the current operations of the police is advisable. As we have seen
historically, reform happens in fits and starts. It is important to note that the changes proposed in this
report evolve from existing arrangements and can be implemented independently from one another.
28
A new force
The following table gives an outline of the changes that could take place.
Implementing reforms
Issue
Defect in current practice
Local accountability Weak local accountability for Chief
Constables
Remit of the Home Secretary
Operational
responsibility
Proposed reform
Clear accountability to elected commissioner of local policing services
Too wide a brief for the Home Secretary
Home Secretary to commission organised and serious crime services from the Metropolitan Police
Too much political meddling in the “how” of Full operational responsibility for police
policing and the consequent diminution of the officers codified in a “constitution”, discretion of Chief Constables and officers
in return for clear accountability
Publication of costs
High and opaque costs
Full publication of police accounts, including sub-divisions such as BCUs
Budgets to be proposed by local
commissioners
Serious crime
Gaps in fighting organised and serious crime
The Metropolitan Police to lead on
nationwide serious crime
Interoperability
Poor interoperability, especially around IT
The Metropolitan Police to have power to direct interoperability
1. Strengthen local accountability
There are two key ways in which local accountability can be strengthened: by making police forces more
answerable to local leaders, and by making the electorate more directly involved in crime fighting strategies
through direct elections.
There have been genuine attempts to create local accountability over policing in England and Wales over
the last decade. The most important of these was the proposal in the 2008 Green Paper to allow citizens to
elect Crime and Policing Representatives who would represent their concerns locally.114
These proposals have foundered; they should not have. In particular, ACPO opposed the proposals on the
grounds that a greater pull from local leaders would distract from “strategic”, i.e. national, efforts.115 In fact, as
this report argues, improvements in local accountability should go hand in hand with improvements in
national policing.
The principle of local accountability
In all areas, local leaders – whether at the level of county, city or metropolitan borough councils – would be
the commissioners of their local policing, with a continuing role for Police Authorities as scrutiny bodies.
This would prevent the centralisation of policing and do much to build local sympathy for the police.
Because local government varies in England and Wales, the identity of the police commissioner should also
vary. He or she would be an elected Mayor, a council Leader or a new elected Police Commissioner or
Criminal Justice Commissioner.116
114 H
ome Office (2008), From the neighbourhood to the national: policing our communities together: “We are therefore committed to
introducing a stronger link between those responsible for delivering policing and the public they serve. We will legislate to reform police
authorities, making them more democratic and more effective in responding to the needs of the local community. We will retain the
crucial role that independent members play, and they will be appointed as they are at present with, as now, at least one of the members a
magistrate or ‘lay justice’. We will also retain at least one councillor on each police authority to ensure we maintain the important links and
relationships with local government. The majority on each police authority will, however, no longer be formed from local councillors
however. Instead, people throughout England and Wales will directly vote for individuals, known as Crime and Policing Representatives
(CPRs), to represent their concerns locally.”
115 Association of Chief Police Officers (2008), ACPO Response to the Green Paper: From the neighbourhood to the national: “In particular,
ACPO urges Government to reconsider the impact of the directly elected local Police Authority to be accountable to local communities
for policing delivery. At a time when Government is taking steps to better enable the delivery of strategic protective services, this Green
Paper proposal would skew policing activity to the local with no compensatory counter weight in the strategic direction. That counter
balance is currently performed by a Chief Constable with operational independence who must determine, with professional judgement,
how to meet the full spectrum of demands AND a Police Authority which, whilst representing local communities, has a strategic
responsibility to ensure that serious harms and threats affecting the wider society are being adequately and efficiently addressed.
Altering the ‘checks and balances’ provided by the tri-partite structure will greatly damage the governance of policing.”
116 Giangrande, R. et al. (2008), The lawful society, Reform: In this report Reform recommended the introduction of elected local Criminal
Justice Commissioners to oversee all local criminal justice matters, including policing. This would be a matter for local referendum; in
cases where there is already an elected Mayor, he or she could take on the role of the Criminal Justice Commissioner.
29
3
A new force
A new force
The critical factor is that the commissioner has control of the budget and is able to set a clear direction.
Where different parties who form part of a Police Authority have different objectives there is a danger of the
Chief Constable having less accountability and either being rudderless, or simply being able to do what he
personally wants.
Police forces should be accountable to local people
The variation in local government and BCU structures mean that different arrangements are currently in
place for different forces. The map below shows how the existing 43 forces and their BCUs relate to local
government boundaries. Some forces are already in a good position to enhance accountability – others
would need some changes.
The recommendation is that local leaders and their electorates would be able to decide whether to stay within
the existing force structure or have a more local police force, such as the Brighton City Police Force or the
Devon County Police.
The potential for local accountability
Northumbria
Durham
Cumbria
Already matches local
government boundaries
Cleveland
North Yorks
Scope for independence
Humberside
Lancashire
Requires restructuring
West
Yorks
Gtr
Man
Mersey
South
Yorks
Cheshire
Derbys
Notts
North
Wales
Lincolnshire
Staffs
Leicester
Norfolk
W Mids
West
Mercia
Dyled-Powys
Warwicks
Northants
Cambs
Suffolk
Beds
Gloucs
South
Wales
Gwent
Thames Valley
Essex
Herts
City
MPA
Wilts
Avon &
Somerset
Devon &
Cornwall
30
Dorset
Surrey
Hampshire
Sussex
Kent
3
A new force
A new force
Police forces match local government boundaries – already effective
accountability can be strengthened
There are a number of forces where local government boundaries already reflect the police force’s
jurisdiction. These places – such as Gloucestershire, where the Constabulary covers the same area as the
County Council, and the Metropolitan Police which covers the Mayor of London’s area of responsibility –
already show signs of greater local accountability and ownership. For example Gloucestershire County
Council has funded new police officers for the force, as has the Mayor of London.
In these cases accountability can be strengthened, for example through the introduction of direct elections
where they do not currently take place. Police Authorities for the changed force would comprise local
councillors and independent members.
These 11 forces are:
Cumbria Police
Norfolk Constabulary
Gloucestershire Constabulary
Northamptonshire Police
Hertfordshire Constabulary
Suffolk Constabulary
Lincolnshire Police
Surrey Police
London (Metropolitan Police and City of London Police)
Warwickshire Police
Scope for joint commissioning or independence
The vast majority of police force Basic Command Units are based on local government boundaries. This
means that groups of local authorities could jointly commission a force. For example, Devon and Cornwall
may wish to continue to have a joint force on efficiency grounds and share the cost. In this case, the
recommendation is to strengthen accountability by each constituent council having a commissioner in
addition to a Police Authority for each commissioner.
However, if the commissioner was unhappy with the performance of a joint force, he could have the right to
seek independence from the arrangement. This would be relatively easy to implement as the forces in
question are already divided into BCUs that match local authority boundaries. Reform has been told that in
a typical police force, over 60 per cent of the budget is already spent at a BCU level. It is likely that there
would be some scope for cost savings from the remaining 40 per cent.
The threat that local commissioners could secede is likely anyway to make the regional forces more
responsive to the requirements of local communities.
These 25 forces are:
Avon and Somerset Constabulary
Humberside Police
Sussex Police
Bedfordshire Police
Kent Police
West Mercia Constabulary
Cambridgeshire Constabulary
Lancashire Constabulary
West Midlands Police
Cleveland Police
Merseyside Police
West Yorkshire Police
Derbyshire Constabulary
Northumbria Police
Wiltshire Police
Devon and Cornwall Constabulary
North Yorkshire Police
Dyfed-Powys Police
Dorset Police
Nottinghamshire Police
South Wales Police
Greater Manchester Police
South Yorkshire Police
Hampshire Constabulary
Staffordshire Police
31
3
A new force
A new force
Scope for joint commissioning or restructure required
There are a few cases where there is no existing BCU to match local authority boundaries. It is likely that
some of these forces would be joint commissioned by local authorities due to the relatively low populations.
However for others, if there was local demand then a restructure would be required.
This is the case for the following seven forces:
Cheshire Police
Thames Valley Police
Durham Constabulary
Gwent Police
Essex Police
North Wales Police
Leicestershire Constabulary
The likely result
As a result of these reforms, local police commissioners would gain far more leverage over their local force
with the ability to secede if issues were not dealt with. The structure could evolve with the structure of local
government. For example if a new city Mayor was instituted in Manchester, the structure would allow the
leader or commissioner in that city to commission the police force. Local policing will be more clearly
focused on cities, rural areas and metropolitan boroughs.117
Situation
Example forces
Structure
A police force matching local government boundaries
Gloucestershire
Metropolitan Police
Accountable to county government (whether council or elected Mayor)
Local people could elect a Police or Criminal Justice Commissioner
A BCU or group of BCUs that matches a city council or metropolitan district, where the local leader wants to secede
Leeds City
Bristol City
The city council or direct election would choose a Police or Criminal Justice Commissioner
A force that matches with several councils, which wish to jointly commission policing
Devon and Cornwall
Accountable to county government
The county councils each would choose a Police or Criminal Justice Commissioner
117 T
his is not to say that local government has the right boundaries today. Local government in Manchester, for example, has particularly
artificial boundaries. Improvements in local government boundaries will also improve local police accountability.
32
3
A new force
A new force
Transparent local funding
If local accountability is to be meaningful, it has to be accompanied by real control of budgets. At present
the majority of police budgets are funded from central government, with some local precepts raised through
council tax. Because police forces are rarely coterminous with local government, it is not clear to local
taxpayers where their money is being spent. In future, the body to which police forces are accountable
should raise the majority of their policing budgets. Every force would have to publish detailed, publiclyaccessible accounts.
Force coordination
There may be a concern that a greater number of forces would be harder to coordinate into joint activities,
particularly in addressing gang and serious crime.This is already a weakness of the 43-force model. However
the main reason for this problem is a lack of focus. Successive Home Secretaries have recognised that
electoral popularity stems from very local visible crime fighting and therefore want to identify themselves
with it. If local policing was no longer the responsibility of the Home Secretary, she would have to focus on
serious and organised crime, using the capabilities of the Metropolitan Police.
With much more transparent costs and operations in all forces, police commissioners could compare cost
performance and drive their police forces to collaborate. Forces would also be obliged to share all of their
intelligence and data with the Metropolitan Police, which will be facilitated with compatible systems.
2. Operational responsibility held by police officers
Better accountability must go hand in hand with greater professional responsibility. Chief Constables have
demanded greater autonomy and discretion. That is right – but in return, Chief Constables need to accept
that the strategic direction will be set in conjunction with the local commissioner. This will be a key lever to
persuade Chief Constables to back reform of the system.
The recent debate about operational independence has resulted from confusion about what the police and
politicians are for and what local and national government is for. Local politicians should set the objectives
of what they want the local police force to achieve and hold it to account about how it achieves these
objectives. If it does not, they should be able to reprimand or replace the Chief Constable.
Operational responsibility for local police means a changed role for the Home Office. By definition it means
that the Home Office will retreat from any operational decision-making. In particular that means an end to
the linking of police budgets with particular operational decisions. The Metropolitan Police can take on the
responsibility for ensuring interoperability between forces in regard to key equipment.
By implication, it means that the Home Office should refocus its attention on serious, national crime, and
leave operational decisions on volume crime to the police.
33
3
A new force
A new force
Police must be responsible for policing practice
Chief Constables should be able to conduct policing practice – the “how” – in the way they see fit and not
expect interference from politicians in the conduct of these operations. While Chief Constables nominally
determine how they spend their resources, in practice they are subject to earmarks and allocations decided
by the Home Office.
In a useful intervention in June 2008, ACPO proposed the idea of “foundation forces”.118 Forces operating
at a certain level would have greater freedom over budgets, both in terms of raising revenues from local
populations and in terms of spending, in particular on salaries. This is the right direction of travel, although
ACPO should have gone further. Forces should have full discretion over expenditure, in particular on
manpower: to hire and fire police officers and staff, and to set pay structures and gradings.
There would continue to be common training and professional qualifications for police officers and staff
across the country. However, local forces would be able to hire wardens, civilian detectives and use
volunteers as they thought appropriate.
Coordinating intelligence on organised crime and counter-terrorism would remain a national issue, handled
by the Metropolitan Police.
Ensuring interoperability
Clearly, greater discretion over operational matters needs to go hand in hand with interoperability, i.e. the
common use of key equipment by police forces. This will become even more important if the number of
police forces increases.
The appropriate body to ensure interoperability is the Metropolitan Police, guiding the NPIA. It is respected
by other police forces as a senior body; it can take a coordinating role.
The Metropolitan Police should have the ability to direct local forces over a specified number of procedural
and administration issues to ensure interoperability:
IT and communications systems
>
>
>
Uniform and equipment
HR management and training
The recent Airwave radio is a good example of how this can work.119
Subject to the Metropolitan Police’s monitoring role, local forces could procure individually, jointly or
nationally through the Metropolitan Police itself.
The current practice and proposal is that NPIA and the Home Office coordinate interoperability. This is
likely to result in less operational control by the police and a dilution of expertise in the force.
118 A
ssociation of Chief Police Officers (2008), Submission: Police Reform Green Paper, the Future of Policing: “Foundation forces is a
concept of deriving freedom for successful (high performing) forces to be released from aspects of bureaucracy (aka Foundation
Hospitals) and follows on from the consideration that across the public sector, management control from the centre is not a solution for
the future. Foundation forces would be recognised as able to act corporately and trusted to balance both short and long term
considerations for the good of national and local policing. Whilst it is acknowledged that the Home Office, HMIC, APA and ACPO are
currently focusing on enhancing localism, reducing bureaucracy and streamlining performance mechanisms, foundation forces would
provide an opportunity to push this vision further for a small number of high performers thus providing a very tangible demonstration of
government commitment. A foundation force could be given a range of on-going freedoms, such as:
> On-going freedom from headcount/other revenue constraints
> Less frequent PPAF/APACS reporting
> Less/no HMIC inspections
> Exemption from requirement to produce statutory plans/reports
> Powers to charge for discretionary services
> Relaxation of precept capping
> A degree of local pay determination.”
119 National Policing Improvement Agency (2009), http://www.npia.police.uk/en/10506.htm.
34
3
A new force
A new force
The Home Office to relinquish role in local policing
For the Home Secretary to get a better grip over serious and organised crime, she needs to relinquish
interference and targeting in the minutiae of local policing issues such as burglary and street crime. She also
needs to pass responsibility for issues such as interoperability to the professionals in the police force.
3. Strengthen the role of the Metropolitan Police as the lead national
force on serious crime
One danger in public sector reform is, when faced with a weakness in provision, to create an entirely new
organisation where one is not needed. At worst, this duplicates effort and wastes resources without solving
the problem itself.
In retrospect the creation of SOCA is an example of this danger in practice. The gap in serious crime
provision that Denis O’Connor described in 2005 is real and remains.120 The Police Superintendents’
Association agrees that the current structure is outdated and not fit for purpose.121 But there was no need to
create a separate agency.
The creation of SOCA was the wrong answer to the right question. One organisation should be accountable
for serious, national crime. The Metropolitan Police already holds many of the responsibilities of a national
force, albeit with imperfect accountability and transparency. It commands the necessary respect from the
other police forces; Sir Paul Stephenson is accepted as the most senior police officer in the country.
The Metropolitan Police’s role should be enhanced and made transparent.
Metropolitan Police should have responsibility for serious crime at a national level
The Metropolitan Police should be answerable to the Home Secretary about whether serious and organised
crime is being effectively tackled. It should have a leadership role on all Level 2 and 3 serious and organised
crime across England and Wales.
SOCA should therefore cease to exist as a separate entity. Its responsibilities should be migrated to the
Metropolitan Police or the intelligence services as appropriate.
Giving the Metropolitan Police formal responsibility for leading national, serious crime fighting would
utilise its capabilities far better and provide local forces with the support they need.
This proposal has the advantage of allowing greater focus on performance and efficiency without requiring
a major restructuring of police forces and the consequent cost in morale and energy that this would cause.
National funding would continue to be provided, but rather than the “fits and starts” that have characterised
the setting up of agencies, it should be a continued stream overseen by the Home Secretary and scrutinised
by Parliament.
Improvements in local accountability will then be balanced by greater accountability for serious national crime.
120 H
M Inspectorate of Constabulary (2005), Closing the Gap.
121 Police Superintendents’ Association of England and Wales (2006), Press release: “Police Force Amalgamations – Wasted Opportunity”,
1 July: “[The] structure [of the police service] will remain rooted in the 1970s when there were no mobile phones, no internet, no
cybercrime – we only had three television channels and the M25 had not been built. The world has changed and so must policing.”
35
3
A new force
A new force
The practical implementation of serious crime fighting
As described above, the Metropolitan Police is already successfully coordinating other forces in counterterrorism through a series of hubs. A senior Metropolitan Police officer acts as the national coordinator of
counter-terrorism work. The actual activity is carried out by local forces, funded by the Home Office. Thus
local forces are funded by the Home Office and coordinated by the Metropolitan Police to investigate and
track criminal gangs, trading guns, drugs and people. This is an ideal example of joint working which can be
repeated in other areas of serious and organised crime.
The one key difference in future is accountability for performance. Counter-terrorism hubs at present are
formally accountable to a part of ACPO, ACPO(TAM). This is a poor form of accountability. It means that
the providers of the service are accountable to chief police officers, who have little incentive in criticising the
performance of their officers and, as described above, are insufficiently accountable under the tripartite
structure. Instead the Metropolitan Police should be directly responsible for performance on counterterrorism hubs and other coordination, accountable to the Home Secretary.
In all cases, it is important to emphasise that local forces will retain a responsibility for information
gathering, intelligence sharing and operations in their area. But the effort will be better organised due to the
Metropolitan Police’s coordination.
Resource sharing, mutual aid and specialist services
The Metropolitan Police would continue to administer additional resource deployment, such as Police
Support Units and specialist services, through the PNIC. These arrangements should be transparent to
ensure that police commissioners can see that they are getting value for money.
Accountability arrangements at the Metropolitan Police
These reforms point towards a re-examination of accountability arrangements of the Metropolitan Police.
As mentioned earlier the Metropolitan Police has a dual responsibility – for serious crime across England
and Wales, and for local policing in London.
London presents a difficulty as it is the by far the largest population centre with the greatest expertise in
serious and organised crime in its police force.The pressure of serious crime and the need for better national
capability is clear. And yet an independent national agency, established as SOCA, failed because it was not
embedded in police practice.
If accountability at the Metropolitan Police was separated between the London Mayor and the Home
Secretary, issues of resource allocation between the national and local remit are likely to become contentious,
effectively creating a separate national and London force. This would be expensive and is likely to reduce
the intelligence flow between the forces.
Therefore the current de facto situation, where the Home Secretary appoints the Metropolitan Police
Commissioner, with the veto of the Mayor of London, whilst not ideal, seems the preferable model. There
is a general consensus amongst academics, politicians and the police themselves.
As per the organisation chart below, clear responsibilities for London-specific and serious crime are already
laid out. This arrangement is already working effectively.
36
3
A new force
A new force
The Metropolitan Police Management Structure
Director of Human Resources
Commissioner
Director of Resources
Deputy Commissioner
Director of Public Affairs
& Communications
Director of Information
Administration
Assistant
Commissioner
for Specialist
Operations
Assistant
Commissioner
for the Specialist
Crime Directorate
Coordinates national
counter-terrorism and
security policing and
operational delivery
through ACPO(TAM)
Leads on high-profile
and serious cases,
intelligence and
disrupting criminal
networks
Assistant
Commissioner for
Central Operations
Assistant
Commissioner for
Territorial Policing
Responsible for public
order, operational
support, roads policing,
aviation security,
specialist firearms and
diplomatic security
Responsible for London
borough policing
SERIOUS & ORGANISED
CRIME POLICING
32 Borough Operational Command Units
Barking and Dagenham
Barnet
Bexley
Brent
Bromley
Camden
Croydon
Ealing
Enfield
Greenwich
Hackney
Hammersmith and Fulham
Haringey
Harrow
Havering
Hillingdon
Hounslow
Islington
Kensington and Chelsea
Kingston
Lambeth
Lewisham
Merton
Newham
Redbridge
Richmond
Southwark
Sutton
Tower Hamlets
Waltham Forest
Wandsworth
City of Westminster
London Policing
The simple change recommended for the Metropolitan Police is much better transparency. In line with
other forces, it should publish accounts at a BCU level and produce organisation charts showing the chain
of command.
37
A new force
The Home Secretary – commissioner of national policing
These recommendations require a new role for the Home Office and Home Secretary. The Home Secretary
becomes, in effect, the commissioner of national policing. The Home Office should then address itself to
becoming an excellent commissioner of serious organised crime services. This pattern would reflect the
successful arrangements in most other developed countries.122
Reform will deliver cost savings with minimal outlay
Given the historically poor position of the public finances, any police reform should deliver increased value
for money. The reforms proposed above should do so, for the following reasons.
Most importantly the commissioners of policing will have to account more clearly for the police budgets
that they spend. Local commissioners will have to raise funds from local taxpayers to a greater extent than
is currently the case. The Home Secretary will account for the funding of serious crime provision.
The most successful productivity improvement does not lie in carrying out the same services for slightly
less input. It lies in a thorough redesign of services, which often results in innovation. Inevitably existing
providers of services will be tempted to oppose such wide-ranging redesign. If commissioners face clear
accountability for value for money, they are under the positive pressure to face down such opposition in the
interests of taxpayers.
One outcome of the reforms in this paper will be to remove the direct influence of ACPO – the provider of
policing – from the commissioning of policing services. This will necessarily increase efficiency.
Another is the removal of duplication and waste. In particular, under the current arrangement, the Home
Office duplicates the efforts of local forces in regard to local crime, and SOCA duplicates the efforts of the
Metropolitan Police.
Lastly, the costs of national and local policing will be transparent to commissioners and taxpayers. At present
they are highly opaque.
A new force to crime fighting
These proposals would bring a new force to crime fighting in England and Wales.
Local people will become more aware of the reality and the costs of crime in their area, and more willing to
get involved in the fight against crime. Policing will share in the benefits of the localism that is now supported
by all major Parties: better communication with local people, greater innovation and less central political
direction.
Different ideas will work in different places; “kobans”, the three-to-four man police boxes used by the
Japanese city police, will work particularly well in densely-populated urban areas. The barriers to innovation
– producer capture and national political influence over local policing – will be removed.
Better results on serious crime will also mean greater safety on local streets. The growth in crimes which
have quickly become major social problems – guns, drugs and people trafficking – should go into reverse.
The serious crime fighting force of the Metropolitan Police will be unleashed against criminal networks
nationwide in a more concerted and coordinated way.
122 Giangrande, R. et al. (2008), The lawful society, Reform.
38
A new force
References
APACS (2008), apacs.org.uk.
Association of Chief Police Officers (2007), ACPO and the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
Association of Chief Police Officers (2008), ACPO Response to the Green Paper: From the neighbourhood to the
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Association of Chief Police Officers (2008), Submission: Police Reform Green Paper, the Future of Policing.
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Bichard, M. (2004), The Bichard Inquiry Report.
Brooks, P. (2002), “Putting civvies in the control room is asking for trouble”, The Guardian, 15 October.
Daily Post (2008), “North Wales Police officers suffer low morale says survey”, 9 September.
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Drake, L. and Simper, R. (2005), “Police Efficiency in Offences Cleared: An Analysis of English ‘Basic
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Eaves (2008), Eaves information sheet – sex trafficking, December.
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Fafinski, S. (2006), UK Cybercrime report, Garlik.
Giangrande, R. et al. (2008), The lawful society, Reform.
Hansard (2009), 19 January, Col. 258.
Heath, N. (2009), “Police database will make ‘a very big difference’”, silicon.com, 9 February.
HM Inspectorate of Constabulary (2005), Closing the Gap.
Home Office (1982), British Crime Survey.
Home Office (2002), National Policing Plan 2003-06.
Home Office (2003), National Policing Plan 2004-07.
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Home Office (2004), National Policing Plan 2005-08.
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Home Office (2009), The Police Grant Report (England andWales) 2009/10.
39
A new force
References
House of Commons (1999), Minutes of Evidence Appendix 6, Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport.
House of Commons (2006), Joint Committee on Human Rights:Twenty-Sixth Report.
House of Commons Public Bill Committee (2009), 1st Sitting, 27 January.
House of Commons Public Bill Committee (2009), 4th Sitting, 29 January.
Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland (1999), A new beginning: Policing in Northern
Ireland.
International Narcotics Control Board (2008), Report.
Jenkins, S. (2005), “It’s not a Blair police state we need fear, it’s his state police”, The Sunday Times, 13
November.
Jenkins, S. (2006), Thatcher and Sons: A Revolution in Three Acts.
Jones, S. (2009), “Police chiefs body faces calls for review after cash revelations”, The Guardian, 16 February.
Kent and Essex Police Authorities (2009), Programme Manager’s Report to the Joint Statutory Committee, 30
January.
Laville, S. (2008), “The fall and fall of Sir Ian Blair”, The Guardian, 2 October.
Leishman, F. (1995), “Reforming the police in Britain: New public management, policy networks and a
tough ‘old bill’”, International Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol. 8, No. 4.
Loveday, B. (2006), Size Isn’t Everything, Policy Exchange.
Loveday, B. and Reid, A. (2003), Going local:Who should run Britain’s police force?, Policy Exchange.
McDonald, W. and Paromchick, S. (1996), Transparency and the Police: External research, policing and
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Metropolitan Police Authority (2008), Policing London Annual Report 07/08.
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Miller, J. (2003), Police Corruption in England andWales: An assessment of current evidence, Home Office.
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17 November.
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O’Neill, S. (2008), “Soca abandons hunt for crime lords”, The Times, 13 May.
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2008), Policing OnLine Information System.
40
A new force
References
Pinsent Masons (2008), “OUT-LAW News: New computer crime unit established two years after
disbandment of NHTCU”, 2 October.
Police Act 1964.
Police Act 1996.
Police Superintendents’ Association of England and Wales (2006), Press release: “Police Force
Amalgamations – Wasted Opportunity”, 1 July.
Policing and Crime Bill 2008-09.
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December.
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41
A new force
Appendix: How the forces could restructure
This appendix shows the potential for local police forces, given the current local government and police
force structure.
Already coterminous
11 of the existing 43 forces already match local government boundaries. These forces would not require
any change.
Cumbria Police
Norfolk Constabulary
Gloucestershire Constabulary
Northamptonshire Police
Hertfordshire Constabulary
Suffolk Constabulary
Lincolnshire Police
Surrey Police
London (Metropolitan Police and City of London Police)
Warwickshire Police
Could be made coterminous
25 forces are not coterminous with existing local government boundaries, but have one or more BCUs
coterminous with each local government region. These forces could be made coterminous by the relevant
BCUs becoming separate, independent forces. In each case the relevant local authority would make the
decision as to whether or not they wanted their police force to secede from the existing regional force.
Each potential force is listed with the BCUs from which it could be constituted.
Current Force
Potential New Forces
Constituted from BCUs
Avon and Somerset Constabulary
Bath and North East Somerset
Police Force
BCU Bath and North East Somerset
Bristol Police Force
BCU Central Bristol
North Somerset Police Force
BCU North Somerset
Somerset Police Force
BCU Somerset East
BCU Somerset West
South Gloucestershire Police Force
BCU South Gloucestershire
Luton Police Force
BCU Luton
Bedfordshire Police Force
BCU Bedfordshire County
Cambridgeshire Constabulary
Peterborough Police Force
BCU Northern
Cambridgeshire Police Force
BCU Central
BCU Southern
Cleveland Police
Hartlepool Police Force
BCU Hartlepool
Redcar and Cleveland Police Force
BCU Redcar and Cleveland
Middlesbrough Police Force
BCU Middlesbrough
Stockton-on-Tees Police Force
BCU Stockton
Bedfordshire Police
42
A new force
Current Force
Potential New Forces
Constituted from BCUs
Derbyshire Constabulary
Derby Police Force
BCU Derby
Derbyshire Police Force
BCU Alftreton
BCU Buxton
BCU Chesterfield
Devon and Cornwall Constabulary
Isles of Scilly Police Force
BCU Penwith and Isles of Scilly
Plymouth Police Force
BCU Plymouth
Torbay Police Force
BCU Torbay
Devon Police Force
BCU East Devon
BCU Exeter
BCU Mid Devon
BCU North Devon
BCU South Hams
BCU Teignbridge
BCU Torridge
BCU West Devon
Cornwall Police Force BCU Caradon
BCU Carrick
BCU Kerrier
BCU North Cornwall
BCU Restormel
Dorset Police
Bournemouth Police Force
BCU Bournemouth
Poole Police Force
BCU Poole
Dorset Police Force
BCU Eastern
BCU Western
Greater Manchester Police
Manchester Police Force
BCU North Manchester
BCU South Manchester
BCU Metropolitan
BCU Airport
Bolton Police Force
BCU Bolton
Bury Police Force
BCU Bury
Oldham Police Force
BCU Oldham
Rochdale Police Force
BCU Rochdale
Salford Police Force
BCU Salford
Stockport Police Force
BCU Stockport
Tameside Police Force
BCU Tameside
Trafford Police Force
BCU Trafford
Wigan Police Force
BCU Wigan
Isle of Wight Police Force
BCU Isle of Wight
Portsmouth Police Force
BCU Portsmouth
Southampton Police Force
BCU Southampton
Hampshire Police Force
BCU Central
BCU Western
BCU North & East
Hampshire Constabulary
43
A new force
Appendix: How the forces could restructure
Current Force
Potential New Forces
Constituted from BCUs
Humberside Police
East Riding of Yorkshire Police Force
BCU East Riding of Yorkshire
Kingston upon Hull Police Force
BCU Kingston upon Hull
North East Lincolnshire Police Force
BCU North East Lincolnshire
North Lincolnshire Police Force
BCU North Lincolnshire
Kent Police
Medway Police Force
BCU Medway
Kent Police Force
BCU North Kent
BCU West Kent
BCU Mid Kent
BCU East Kent
BCU South Kent
Lancashire Constabulary
Lancashire Police Force
BCU Eastern
BCU Northern
BCU Pennine
BCU Southern
Blackburn with Darwen Police Force BCU Central
Blackpool Police Force
BCU Western
Wirral Police Force
BCU Wirral
Liverpool Police Force
BCU Liverpool North
BCU Liverpool South
Knowsley Police Force
BCU Knowsley
Sefton Police Force
BCU North Sefton
St Helens Police Force
BCU St Helens
Newcastle Police Force
BCU Newcastle
Sunderland Police Force
BCU Sunderland
Gateshead Police Force
BCU Gateshead
Northumbria Police Force
BCU Northumberland
North Tyneside
South Tyneside
North Yorkshire Police
City of York Police Force
BCU Central
North Yorkshire Police Force
BCU Eastern
BCU Western
Nottinghamshire Police
Nottingham Police Force
BCU (C) – Nottingham City
BCU (D) – Broxtowe, Rushcliffe &
Sherwood
Nottinghamshire Police Force
BCU (A) – Mansfield & Ashfield
BCU (B) – Bassetlaw, Newark &
Sherwood
South Yorkshire Police
Barnsley Police Force
BCU Barnsley
Doncaster Police Force
BCU Doncaster
Rotherham Police Force
BCU Rotherham
Sheffield Police Force
BCU Sheffield 1
BCU Sheffield 2
Staffordshire Police
City of Stoke-on-Trent Police Force
BCU Stoke on Trent
Staffordshire Police Force
BCU Chase
BCU North Staffordshire
BCU Trent Valley
Merseyside Police
Northumbria Police
44
A new force
Appendix: How the forces could restructure
Current Force
Potential New Forces
Constituted from BCUs
Sussex Police
Brighton and Hove Police Force
BCU Brighton & Hove
Sussex Police Force
BCU East Sussex
BCU North Downs
BCU West Downs
BCU Gatwick
West Mercia Constabulary
Herefordshire Police Force
BCU Hereford
Telford and Wrekin Police Force
BCU Telford & the Wrekin
Worcestershire Police Force
BCU North Worcestershire
BCU South Worcestershire
Shropshire Police Force
BCU Shropshire
Birmingham Police Force
BCU D1 – Erdington/Aston/Nechells/
Saltley/Ward End
BCU D2 – Sutton Coldfield/Castle
Vale/Kingstanding
BCU D3 – Stechford/Shard End/
Bordesley Green/Bromford/Sheldon
BCU E1 – Bournville/Bartley Green/
Longbridge/Selly Oak/Frankley/
Northfield
BCU E2 – Kings Heath/Billesley/
Kings Norton
BCU E3 – Acocks Green/Sparkhill/
Sparkbrook/Edgbaston/Balsall
Heath/Selly Park/Moseley
BCU F1 – Birmingham City Centre/
Digbeth
BCU F2 – Soho/Winson Green/
Harbourne/Lady Wood/Quinton
BCU F3 – Soho/Handsworth/
Sandwell/Perry Barr/Aston (part)
Wolverhampton Police Force
BCU G1 – Wolverhampton Town
Centre/Wolverhampton West/
Whitmoreanes/Tettenhall/Penn
BCU G2 – Wednesfield/Bilston
Walsall Police Force
BCU H1 – Walsall North and South/
Walsall Town Centre/Aldrige
BCU H2 – Willenhall/Bloxwich/
Brownhills/Darlaston
Dudley Police Force
BCU J1 – Brierley Hill/Dudley/
Sedgeley/Gornal
BCU J2 – Halesowen/Stourbridge/
Lye/Cradley/Kingswinford
Sandwell Police Force
BCU K1 – West Bromwich/
Wednesbury/Tipton/Great Barr
BCU K2 – Smethwick/Oldbury/Old
Hill/Langley/Warley
Solihull Police Force
BCU Solihull
Coventry Police Force
BCU M1 – Coundon/Hillfields/Tile
Hill/Coventry Centre
BCU M2 – Fletchamstead/Stivichall/
Willenhall/Coventry/Stoke
BCU M3 – Radford/Foleshill/Bell
Green/Wyken
West Midlands Police
45
A new force
Appendix: How the forces could restructure
Current Force
Potential New Forces
Constituted from BCUs
West Yorkshire Police
Leeds Police Force
BCU Chapeltown
BCU City & Holbeck
BCU Killingbeck
BCU Pudsey & Weetwood
Bradford Police Force
BCU Bradford North
BCU Bradford South
Calderdale Police Force
BCU Calderdale
Kirklees Police Force
BCU Kirklees
Wakefield Police Force
BCU Wakefield
Wiltshire Police
Swindon Police Force
BCU Swindon
Wiltshire Police Force
BCU Chippenham
BCU Salisbury
Dyfed-Powys Police
Carmarthenshire Police Force
BCU Carmarthenshire
Pembrokeshire Police Force
BCU Pembrokeshire
Ceredigion Police Force
BCU Aberystwyth
Powys Police Force
BCU Powys
Bridgend Police Force
BCU Bridgend
Cardiff Police Force
BCU Cardiff
Merthyr Tydfil Police Force
BCU Merthyr Tydfil
Neath Port Talbot Police Force
BCU Neath and Port Talbot
Rhondda Cynon Taff Police Force
BCU Rhondda Cynon Taff
Swansea Police Force
BCU Swansea
Vale of Glamorgan Police Force
BCU Vale of Glamorgan
South Wales Police
46
A new force
Appendix: How the forces could restructure
Restructure required
The remaining seven forces cannot be made coterminous with local government boundaries as one or more
BCUs cover multiple local government regions. If these local authorities wished to secede from the regional
force, it would be necessary to restructure the BCU in question.
Current Force
Local Authorities
Related BCUs
Cheshire Police
Halton
Warrington
BCU Northern Cheshire
Cheshire West & Chester
BCU Western Cheshire
Cheshire East
BCU Eastern Cheshire
Durham Constabulary
Darlington
County Durham
BCU North Durham
BCU South Durham
Essex Police
Southend on Sea
Thurrock
Essex
BCU Eastern
BCU South Eastern
BCU Central
BCU Western
BCU South Western
BCU Stansted
Leicestershire Constabulary
Leicester
BCU City
Leicestershire South
BCU South
Leicestershire North
Rutland
BCU North
Thames Valley Police
Bracknell Forest
Slough
Windsor and Maidenhead
BCU Berkshire East
Buckinghamshire
BCU Aylesbury Vale
BCU Chiltern Vale
Milton Keynes
BCU Milton Keynes
Oxfordshire
BCU Northern Oxfordshire
BCU Oxford
BCU Southern Oxfordshire
Reading West Berkshire
Wokingham
BCU Berkshire West
Gwent Police
Blaenau Gwent
Caerphilly
BCU Caerphilly & Blaenau Gwent
Newport
BCU Newport
Torfaen
Monmouthshire
BCU Pontypool
North Wales Police
Conwy
Denbighshire
BCU Central
Flintshire
Wrexham
BCU Eastern
Gwynedd
Isle of Anglesey
BCU Western
47
A new force
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