William O’Brochta
Hendrix College
February 27, 2015
U.S. Response to the Tajik Civil War
Scholars of United States foreign policy frequently cite a trend toward non-intervention
in humanitarian crises during the Clinton administration caused by failed military attempts to end
the Somali Civil War in 1992. With this history established, the U.S. was slow to react to the
Bosnian War from 1992-1995 and the Rwandan Genocide of 1994. Indeed, even in Bosnia,
where European support for intervention was extraordinarily strong, it took a media campaign
focused on an otherwise routine Sarajevo market bombing to force the U.S. into supporting
NATO airstrikes on the Serbs. Was this a complete shift from providing humanitarian aid and
brokering peace to doing nothing or was Somalia an anomaly in a norm of inaction? To add
credence to the latter, this analysis examines the 1992-1997 Civil War in Tajikistan, arguing that
the U.S., though tacitly supporting the United Nations and Russian efforts to broker peace and
providing limited humanitarian aid, did virtually nothing to raise awareness about the conflict or
seriously engage in negotiations.
Brief Historical Background
Of all the conflicts and civil wars that began during the Clinton administration, the Civil
War in Tajikistan ranks first among the most forgotten. A direct and exceedingly complicated
result of the fall of the Soviet Union, the Tajik Civil War resembled the Bosnian War in terms of
ethnic and religious issues that were brought to light immediately after it became an independent
state (Djalili, Grare, and Akiner 1997, 86). Unlike Bosnia, which had something of a compelling
narrative in that the war evolved over time and revolved around decisions and negotiations
among key leaders, Tajikistan was a comparative mess that went in and out of active hostilities
for years. The War began as a series of demonstrations in 1990 led by political parties formed
years earlier in secret against the Communist party (Shapoatov 2004, 14). Contested elections
followed, and demonstrations were often violent (Shapoatov 2004, 15). Eventually, after several
coup attempts, opposition leader Rahmon Nabiyev was elected President of Tajikistan in 1991
(Shapoatov 2004, 16). Throughout 1991 and 1992, opposition protests against Nabiyev cropped
up; they were especially focused on the fact that he refused to include opposition leaders in his
parliament (Shapoatov 2004, 17-18). Eventual negotiations between Nabiyev and his opposition
resulted in his resignation late in 1992, but his government actively supplied arms to favorable
militias, and dozens of competing opposition groups fought each other while seeking to
assassinate key officials from other parties (Shapoatov 2004, 18-21). Russia intervened in an
attempt to end arms smuggling into Tajikistan from Afghanistan because Tajikistan did not even
have her own army or border guards to protect herself (Shapoatov 2004, 22). President Emomalii
Rahmon was elected to succeed Nabiyev in a coalition government (Shapoatov 2004, 22).
Several opposition groups concentrated power in various enclaves in Tajikistan and declared
their regions independent, and Rahmon responded by declaring these groups illegal (Shapoatov
2004, 23). The U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) was deployed in 1993 with a
U.N. Special Envoy to prod all parties for a ceasefire and negotiations (Djalili, Grare, and Akiner
1997, 187; Tasjbakhsh 1996, 2). What resulted was essentially a back and forth stalemate
between the competing factions that led all parties to agree to a ceasefire and negotiations
beginning in 1994 (Djalili, Grare, and Akiner 1997, 187, 194). Years of peace negotiations
followed with sporadic fighting throughout and President Rahmon holding, sometimes clinging,
to power until a final accord was reached in 1997 officially ending the Civil War (Shapoatov
2004, 27). General estimates of war deaths range from a low of twenty thousand to a mostly
accepted number of one hundred thousand, with another million people displaced (Shapoatov
2004, 27; Djalili, Grare, and Akiner 1997, 86). Given the roughly five million people living in
Tajikistan at that time, the effects of the Civil War were huge and further repressed the least
economically prosperous state in Central Asia (Djalili, Grare, and Akiner 1997, xi).
A Chronological Examination of Executive and Legislative Actions with Regard to Tajikistan
To comprehensively examine U.S. foreign policy attitudes toward the Tajikistan Civil
War, I reviewed all public statements made about Tajikistan and the Civil War from 1992 until
1998. These statements included, but were not limited to: Daily Press Briefings (White House,
Department of State, Department of Defense), State Department Cables, Presidential Documents
as prepared for President Clinton, the Federal Register, the Congressional Record, and
Congressional Committee hearings (House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations).
Though the War is regarded to have begun in May 1992, the first visible U.S. response
was in September (Djalili, Grare, and Akiner 1997, 111; USDOS 1992). The State Department
Daily Briefing on September 9 began with a discussion of the Bosnian War, but State
Department Spokesman Boucher received a question about the “situation in Tajikistan” (USDOS
1992). Responding to that question, Boucher provides the first public statement regarding
administration policy and involvement in the War (USDOS 1992). Boucher first expresses
concern for the “prospect of violence” and alludes to statements against the outbreak of war that
had previously been made by U.S. Ambassador to Tajikistan Stanley Escudero (USDOS 1992).
Unfortunately, there is no public record of these statements, though U.S. policy during the War
placed a heavy reliance on the Dushanbe Embassy to handle the entire U.S. War response (USC
1994). Mr. Boucher admits that “the situation is somewhat unclear” and states that the State
Department in Washington is talking to “a variety of contacts” about the situation, but seems
hesitant to say that anyone other than the Dushanbe Embassy is involved in the U.S. response to
the crisis (USDOS 1992).
Given the lack of knowledge expressed by Mr. Boucher in 1992, it is, perhaps, not
surprising that Tajikistan did not emerge again as a topic of discussion until early 1993 (USDOS
1993). Mr. Boucher took a broad question about U.S. efforts to “resolve the crisis in Tajikistan”
(USDOS 1993). This time, he laid out what came to be the U.S. policy toward this Civil War
until its conclusion: Ambassador Escudero has authority to represent U.S. interests, the U.S.
supports the UNMOT and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, part
of the OSCE), and the U.S. provides Tajikistan with humanitarian assistance (USDOS 1993). On
his last day in office, President Bush reinforced U.S. humanitarian aims by allocating five
million dollars to assist in managing Tajik refugees (Bush 1993).
Again, there was a significant gap in time before the next mention of Tajikistan, but mid
to late 1994 was when the bulk of U.S. activity toward Tajikistan occurred. This activity
transpired after the beginning of the Inter-Tajik talks in Moscow which started in April and
which the U.S. attended as an observer (Djalili, Grare, and Akiner 1997, 194; USCRS 2013, 16).
Mr. DeConcini, Senator from Arizona, made a statement on June 7 encouraging the U.S. to
continue to send humanitarian aid to Tajikistan (140 Cong. Rec., H69). DeConcini stated that the
situation in Tajikistan was currently fairly stable and encouraged the U.S. to support
humanitarian organizations that are experienced working in this part of the world (140 Cong.
Rec., H69). Though Mr. DeConcini’s interest in the region is commendable, it seems that the
lack of attention provided to Tajikistan may be the result of the Civil War never entering fierce
periods of fighting. At this point in time, there were three more years left of violence, but
DeConcini stated that Communist control had been solidified and refugees were moving back to
their homes (140 Cong. Rec., H69). Indeed, President Clinton’s only statement regarding the
situation at this time revolved around the use of Russian peacekeeping forces as partners to the
UNMOT (USNSC 1994). Misunderstanding refugee movements as long-term stability and not
short-term progress continued through the only Congressional hearing about Tajikistan and a
resulting Congressional Resolution.
The fact that the Civil War even rose to the prominence as to receive a hearing in the
House is itself significant, but fleeting, as the few members present attempted to direct their
limited knowledge about the situation into questions that mostly demonstrated support for the
actions of other groups such as the U.N. and OSCE and limited the U.S. to financial support,
itself contingent on a more democratic political system (H.CON.RES. 302). The hearing took
place in late September, with the Resolution following in early October (USC 1994). Simply in
the listing of witnesses, we find a definite emphasis on human rights violations and how those
violations can be mitigated through humanitarian assistance (USC 1994). Both Mr. Andrews and
Mr. Hastings, the Congressmen present at the beginning of the hearing, explain that their interest
in Tajikistan stemmed from “growing concern regarding human rights violations” (USC 1994).
Mr. Andrews then made a most telling statement, in essence saying that the hearing was
designed to draw sufficient attention to the situation in Tajikistan such that Members would
seriously consider the human rights violations occurring there (USC 1994). This statement is
consistent with what we saw occurring at the same time in Bosnia where U.S. inaction was
eventually spurred on by media attention and posturing for the 1992 Presidential election.
Without these aspects, Bosnia would not have risen to prominence. Now, with the media focused
on the Bosnian War, Mr. Andrews sought to bring about the attention of his colleges in the hopes
that Congressional action would warrant media attention and, thus, reduce human rights abuses
(USC 1994).
Mr. Presel, speaking for the State Department, portrayed the U.S. involvement in the
conflict as limited (USC 1994). He again mentioned Mr. Escudero’s efforts at the Dushanbe
Embassy, stating that Mr. Escudero has been in charge of all coordination with the U.N., CSCE,
and other humanitarian organizations (USC 1994). This is supplemented with the
aforementioned humanitarian aid, which Mr. Presel characterized as “small” and uses
“somewhat limited resources” (USC 1994). Ironically, Mr. Presel indicated that it was the
administration’s view that the U.S. must withhold additional humanitarian aid until the political
situation improved (USC 1994). This portrays the U.S. as making a conscious decision to be
involved really only as an advocate for peace rather than an active participant in making it (USC
1994).
The small amount of humanitarian assistance provided to Tajikistan mostly consisted of
monetary aid to food assistance programs and basic pharmaceuticals and vaccines (USC 1994).
Mr. Presel drew the conclusion that additional humanitarian intervention in Tajikistan is
unnecessary because existing NGOs were more skilled at running relief operations than the U.S.
(USC 1994). This is a fair assessment, though the positively tiny amount of funding is interesting
considering the huge number of refugees (USC 1994). However, the U.S. did contribute half of
aid delivered to Tajikistan from foreign countries during this time (Tasmuhammadov 2004, 20).
It is unclear whether this amount of aid was consciously chosen by the State Department or
whether it represented all plausible available funding the State Department could give. The Soros
Foundation stated in the hearing that spending humanitarian assistance money in Tajikistan and
getting it to worthy organizations was almost impossible (USC 1994). Because of this, the
feeling that such a small amount of money could not sustain an entire human development
program is largely unwarranted.
Toward the actual violence that is occurring, Mr. Presel connected ending the killing with
Presidential elections, but stopped short of recommending that the U.S. send election monitors to
the critical November 6 election (USC 1994). This election appears to be key in U.S. policy. If
the election met the “very low, fairly low hurdle” of being free enough, then the U.S. would have
two options: “close the embassy and leave” or increase investment (USC 1994). Both of these
options are, however, representative of the administration policy of doing virtually nothing
because Mr. Presel stated that determining whether the elections were freely conducted would
take significant time (USC 1994). In fact, Mr. Gilman directly said that the State Department was
not doing enough to monitor elections, nor did the State Department have an “accurate
description of where this conflict was heading” (USC 1994). In other words, Mr. Gilman is citing
the State Department for lack of interest in Tajikistan, and this lack of interest can certainly be
associated with the entire Executive branch (USC 1994). The hearing then continued with
regional experts offering suggestions for U.S. foreign policy toward Tajikistan. It is important to
note that these suggestions were being offered a full two years after the Civil War began (USC
1994). It was the general consensus that U.S. “assistance had been tremendously effective,” but
that the U.S. had not made the democratic transition in Tajikistan a priority (USC 1994).
Many of the problems members of the hearing had with U.S. policy in Tajikistan were
encapsulated in H.CON.RES 302 introduced in the House in early October and passed by voice
vote, only to die in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations likely because of the end of the
Congressional Session. This bill included the following important Resolutions: Congress
supports open elections, U.N. peacekeeping activities, and U.S. participation in the CSCE and
U.N.; the President should continue humanitarian assistance and encourage other countries to do
the same; and aid should be relegated to NGOs until such a time that the Tajik government is
sufficiently concerned with human rights (H.CON.RES 302). At such a time, a trigger would
encourage the President to give economic assistance directly to the Government of Tajikistan
(H.CON.RES 302; 140 Cong. Rec., E144). The Resolution confirms the sense of the House in
the Tajikistan hearing, but goes further in encouraging additional humanitarian intervention after
a “free” election (H.CON.RES 302; 140 Cong. Rec., E144).
Between January and February 1995, opposition leader Mr. Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda
visited the U.S. (Tadjbakhsh 1995, 2). He met with U.N. officials including Special
Representative Ambassador Ramiro Piriz-Ballon and apparently some U.S. officials, though
exactly who these people were is unclear (Djalili, Grare, and Akiner 1997, 199). Turajonzoda’s
visit was meant to persuade the U.S. to become more active in peace negotiations to
counterbalance Russia who, thus far, had played a leading, but non-neutral role in negotiating a
comprehensive ceasefire on behalf of the U.N. (Djalili, Grare, and Akiner 1997, 199;
Tasmuhammadov 2004, 16). These talks appear to have had little effect because the U.S.
completely removed herself from the situation in Tajikistan, working only in support of several
ongoing U.N. Security Council Resolutions and in agreement with the principles of the UNMOT
(USEOP 1995; USNSC 1995).
The final active period of U.S. involvement during the Civil War was early in 1996, with
further comments about the UNMOT mission extending through 1998. On the eve of the
expiration of a sixteen-month ceasefire in 1996, State Department Spokesman Burns released a
statement of support for the peace process, urging cooperation with the UNMOT, and calling for
the ceasefire not to end (USDOS 1996a, USDOS 1996b). The potential end of the ceasefire was
a symbolic time where support from all parties involved in the UNMOT was required to press
the mission to continue. Supporting the UNMOT mission with positive statements, but no
contribution of money or forces toward it, remained the U.S. policy toward Tajikistan after the
Civil War officially ended in 1997 and thorough the U.N. implemented peace plan, though the
U.S. did encourage other nations and the World Bank to donate significant funds to Tajikistan
(USDOS 1998a; USDOS 1998b; 143 Cong. Rec., E1426).
Overall
Our chronological evaluation of U.S. responses to the situation in Tajikistan has revealed
that the U.S. maintained a default position of non-intervention. This was tempered by usually
tacit, but occasionally strong verbal support for the UNMOT and the U.N. mediated peace
process. A small, but significant amount of humanitarian aid money was disbursed and used
effectively, but a trigger that would provide further and more comprehensive resources was
never enacted. Interest from Congress and from the State Department in Washington was
sporadic and very limited; activity was often not about ending the War as much as proper use of
funds and the impact of Russia on the process. Even though hearings on the issue were designed
to raise awareness, little action followed, and credit for instituting a successful peace should be
given to the U.N., while credit for economic rebuilding should be given to the actual aid
organizations, of which U.S. support was just a part. However, apart from sending election
monitors, which all experts saw as critical to the future success of Tajikistan or providing
additional economic assistance, the only other real role the U.S. could have played in the War
was as an active member and promoter of the UNMOT and the resulting negotiated peace
agreements. This would be similar to the role Richard Holbrooke took on in negotiating the
Dayton Agreement. It is completely unclear to what extent, if any, this would have helped the
process, but, full U.S. attention on the Civil War in Tajikistan would have certainly raised the
media specter about the situation, roused public sentiment, and possibly helped move the process
along more quickly for, as was stated in the hearing, serious U.S. attention to a human rights
issue certainly aids in solving the problem (USC 1994; Tasjbakhsh 1996, 5).
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