Is a Paternalistic Government Beneficial to Society and its Individuals?
By Mike Brock
Postgraduate, Second Prize
Introduction
‘Paternalism’ is defined as “the policy or practice on the part of people in authority of
restricting the freedom and responsibilities of those subordinate to or otherwise dependent
on them in their supposed interest” (www.oxforddictionaries.com). A society’s Government,
as an authoritative institute, can potentially enforce such action upon the population they
preside over, introducing legislation under the supposition that the constraints imposed
benefit either individuals or groups within that community.
The force of paternalistic action can take many forms. ‘Strong’ or ‘Hard’ Paternalism relates
to more extreme policy implementation. In its most powerful strain, this involves
prohibiting an activity gauged as detrimental to the individual or society. Other strong
paternalistic acts involve implementing uniform tax levies or quantity restrictions upon
certain goods or actions. By contrast, ‘Soft’ or ‘Libertarian’ Paternalism refers to more
subtle interventions, with the authority “designing policies to help individuals in overcoming
their weakness of will” (Cserne; 2012 (p.1)). Examples include interventionist advertising,
psychological ‘nudging’ (Sunstein & Thaler; 2008), or progressive taxation which penalises
those who excessively engage in a harmful activity.
This essay will explore the opposing arguments surrounding paternalism in its various guises.
It initially outlines the argument for pursuing a paternalistic stance and describes the
perceived benefits this can have for society and its members, before then addressing the
associated counter-arguments. Following an examination of the debate, the investigation
will provide a reflective overview, indicating the circumstances or dynamics under which
paternalism might be seen as advantageous, or where instead it appears overly-interfering.
The Benefits of a Paternalistic Government
Returning to our definition given at the beginning of this paper, those advocating a
paternalistic Government would invite concentration upon the words “in their supposed
interest”. Pro-paternalists would point out that we live in a society full of temptations,
many of which can potentially damage our health and well-being if we concede to them too
often. Classic examples include the addictive and unhealthy food and drink products, as
well as damaging actions like smoking or recreational drug use. It is equally true that people
insufficiently engage in promotable activities such as exercise, healthy eating or wise
financial investment.
It is not that these goods or actions exist per se, but our failure to exercise enough selfcontrol so as to undertake them at levels deemed desirable from an individual or societal
viewpoint. ‘Neuroeconomics’, a fusion or psychology and behavioural economics, has
identified a number of reasons why such inadequacy persists. Many of these hypotheses
revolve around our brain’s construction and the way we then form decisions. For example,
(Fudenberg & Levine; 2006) propose addictive behaviour occurs through the ‘Dual –Self
Model’. Here, the ‘sensible’ or self-controlling area of one’s brain is persistently
overpowered by an impulsive self. This forces an individual to over-indulge in ‘bad’ actions,
or insufficiently undertake promotable ones. Another similar cognitive action which
seemingly prevents individuals from adequately self-regulating their lifestyle is myopia.
When somebody suffers from myopic tendencies, they are unable to sufficiently discount
the future, and consequently over-consume in the present, leaving them destitute in later
years. Empirical impacts of such short-sightedness can involve insufficient retirement saving
(Benartzi & Thaler; 1995), inconsistent or erroneous purchasing patterns (Strotz; 1956) and
an inability to select tariffs or packages which optimise or match personal usage patterns,
creating ‘cognitive overload’ (Malhotra, Jain & Lagakos; 1982) and insufficient instances of
switching to preferable bundles of goods (Wilson & Waddams-Price; 2010).
The systematic ‘errors’ above provide the evidence pro-paternalists cite for an authority to
undertake protective action. Their argument is that these mistakes are ones which, in
hindsight, the individual would prefer not to make. In fact, these people may welcome an
intervention which remedies what are cognitively challenging dilemmas for them. Take the
example of pension savings. A myopic member of society finds it impossible to sufficiently
save because the task of calculating their required future saving is too demanding. In the
absence of paternalistic action, they will over-consume in early life and will be impoverished
in their retirement. Pro-paternalist economists suggest that if it were feasible to show the
person this pattern, they would prefer to refrain from some expenditure today and smooth
their consumption to maximise lifetime comfort and utility. Because it is impossible to show
people their futures, these theorists argue the next-best strategy is to enforce compulsory
pension payment plans so that the myopic or uncontrollable self is at least partially
constrained.
Of course, the great debate arises regarding how forceful the paternalistic action should be.
The above example illustrates a strong paternalist action; you make everybody contribute to
a pension plan through legislature, regardless of how much self-control anybody can
autonomously exercise. Libertarian or “hard anti-paternalist” (Cserne; 2012 (p.16))
economists might refute the appropriateness of this, instead suggesting more subtle ways
to combat these self-control ineptitudes. One such solution might be to use cognitive
manipulation to guide society towards action deemed ‘correct’. An intriguing experimental
example is given by Shiv & Fedorikhin (1999):
In their study, Shiv & Fedorikhin present the choice of a healthy (fruit) or unhealthy (cake)
food options, each located down a corridor. Subjects are given a number to remember of
differing lengths, and must repeat this number to an experimenter located at the end of the
corridor. They must select a food item on their way to this experimenter. The authors
discover that those who had been given a long digit to recount were significantly more likely
to choose an unhealthy food option than those with less challenging numbers to repeat. The
psychological explanation for this relationship is that when our brain’s mathematical section
(the Cortex) is more vigorously tested the additional cognitive burden this imposes
subsequently creates lapses in self-control.
Whilst a quirky study, the above case study demonstrates how weak paternalism could be
implemented with equal efficiency as their stronger counterparts. Furthermore, it shows
how inter-disciplinary research between psychologists and behavioural economists can have
significant and progressive impact in tackling empirically challenging problems.
Few economists now dispute the existence of these systematic ‘errors’ in human behaviour.
Such ‘bounded rationality’ has been tested robustly and provides intuitive reasoning
regarding why the choices made by those in society may not always match those predicted
through pure economic theory. However, the question remains as to whether paternalism
is the optimal solution to this problem. The following section will outline the counterarguments to its use, explaining the possible detriment this could have to both individuals
and wider society.
The Arguments against a Paternalistic Government
Returning to our opening quote, a major criticism of paternalism relates to its’ “restricting
the freedom and responsibilities of those subordinate”. In the previous section, we
introduced examples where people habitually engage in inadvisable activities through
lacking self-control. However, much paternalistic action designed to remedy this cannot
distinguish between these ‘reckless’ members of society and those who enjoy a particular
good or activity to moderate levels, consistent with a ‘promotable’ lifestyle and which
maximises their utility.
This quandary’s implication is most visible with strong paternalism. Take the extreme case
of banning a product, like alcohol, which people tend to over-indulge in. A Government
may prohibit such consumption with the best of intentions, citing the significant section of
society which consumes excessive amounts of an addictive substance, causing damage both
to themselves and others around them. This additional harm can be social, like aggressive
behaviour, or economic, through property destruction or the strains placed upon health
services. Prohibition can also be justifiable paternalistically, and in hindsight uncontrolled
individuals may welcome the intervention which curbs their lacking self-control. However,
those opposing paternalism on the grounds of unfair freedom restriction would remind us
that not everybody consumes alcohol in this excessive or addictive manner. Studies show
that over 50% of Americans are described as ‘frequent drinkers’, yet only a fraction do so to
detrimental levels (Winter; 2011, p.63). Indeed, the majority of society drink alcohol safely
and responsibly, and do not create the negative externalities (or side effects) mentioned
above. Given this, anti-paternalists would argue that the supposed benefit from banning
alcohol is achieved at an unfair and penalising cost to the wider (responsible) majority.
Prohibition constitutes a very strong paternalistic act, enabling very clear counterarguments to be manufactured. Alongside the restrictions to freedom addressed above,
such action would mean foregoing many economic and social opportunities, including the
trade and community benefits which the alcohol industry brings. The argument surrounding
paternalism becomes more divisive as the strength of its imposition weakens. Imagine the
government instead decides to impose a per-unit levy on alcohol, an act constituting one of
the most favoured empirical alcohol control policies (Winter; 2011). This significantly
offsets one major argument of anti-paternalists because ‘responsible drinkers’ are taxed
relatively moderately on their actions. The biggest impact hits high-volume consumers,
which suggestively correlates with those deficient in self-control. An anti-paternalist’s
stance now predominantly hinges upon how distasteful they find any restriction to one’s
freedom. By this, one must decide whether it is reasonable to oppose the levy upon the
notion that responsible drinkers are still financially targeted for an action which they
undertake in a safe and socially-considerate manner. Put succinctly, the taxation is still
unable to discriminate between the alcoholic and the wine connoisseur at the point when
each purchases a given bottle of alcohol. In the long-term, the former shall incur a greater
tax burden, but the latter must still pay the levy and thus have certain ‘needless’ restrictions
imposed upon them.
These ethical questions become even further muddied when turning to acts of Soft
Paternalism. Remaining with alcoholic beverages for consistency, let us explore the morality
of employing cognitive tactics to dissuade the purchase of these products. One example
might target how such goods are displayed, and authorities could force vendors to conceal
alcoholic products from direct sight or locate them in obscure sections of their
establishment. This may seem wise, because the extra physical or mental effort required for
misusers to obtain the goods are achieved at no direct financial cost to responsible
consumers. Nevertheless, this situation still involves a subtle form of discrimination from
which “hard anti-paternalists” would object. This is because a form of psychological
constraint is still imposed upon the freedom of our careful individuals. Whilst its nature
may perhaps seem more palatable than the aforementioned (direct) impositions, the impact
could still be perceived as improper and unfair on the responsible section of the population.
Furthermore, one could argue that excessive consumers hold a lessened propensity to
forget where alcoholic beverages are located, remembering to purchase these more
frequently than casual drinkers, courtesy of their addictive dependence. If so, the real
‘sufferers’ from psychological interventions are the latter, who simply forget to buy their
infrequent vice from which they derive a small but unobjectionable level of utility.
In the cases above, the objection to paternalistic action stems from an inability to
distinguish and discriminate between those who truly require an authority’s help to make
better consumption choices and those who autonomously can achieve this in a rational and
reasonable manner. This brings us nicely to the other major critique held by antipaternalists. That is, who has the right or authority to dictate the threshold at which actions
are determined as socially undesirable or unhealthy? This point carries even greater
poignancy in today’s modern and multicultural society, where unanimous perceptions on
what is deemed excessive or inappropriate often fail to exist, or can quickly adjust over a
very short spell of time.
An interesting example of this relates to homosexuality laws. Until 1967, the practice of
homosexual activity was banned in the UK. Driven by a combination of societal and
religious belief, such laws were passed under the assumption that homosexuality was
corruptive and dangerous for the individual. It was therefore in both the individual’s and
society’s interest for this action to be prevented. However, society has evolved since these
times, realising that somebody’s inclination to be gay is not a ‘choice’ per se, nor that
engaging in its associated acts guarantee harm to either the individual or community.
Consequently, many homosexuality laws have now been rescinded or amended. If argued
from an anti-paternalist’s perspective, this exemplifies how there are certain features of an
individual’s life and their choices upon which a Government should intervene minimally, if
at all. Moreover, these are clearly areas where society’s collective perspective are too
malleable, so much so that imposing restrictions would be improper because too much
uncertainty exists as to whether current support will always be so complete.
The arguments above provide a significant bank of evidence to suggest that paternalistic
action, particularly that of a strong nature, may not always serve as beneficial to the
individual or society as first assumed. One objection revolves around a government’s
inability to perfectly discriminate between reckless and sensible individuals when devising
paternalistic laws, frequently creating an unjust penalisation against those who do not
suffer from deficiencies in self-control. Another allied complaint involves the scepticism
that authorities can accurately judge if and to what extent an action is seen as proper or
improper for its citizens to engage in. Furthermore, the advocacy of paternalistic
intervention assumes that an associated law will be received agreeably and universally by
society, both at its time of imposition and consistently so in the future. Empirically, many
paternalistic topics involve high levels of subjectivity, meaning that communities hold a
greater tendency to adjust their stance on whether today’s ‘taboo actions’ remain so
through later years or decades.
Conclusion: Should a Government intervene through Paternalistic action?
This investigation has identified many arguments both for and against the notion that a
Government should enforce paternalistic laws upon its residents. If well-defined and wellintended, ‘paternalism’ should involve an authority taking on the persona of a benevolent
parent, guiding its ‘children’ of society into or away from action which ultimately enables
individual or wider social and economic prosperity. Because boundedly-rational humans
frequently ‘misbehave’, exhibiting erroneous behaviours like myopia, lacking self-control
and decision inconsistency, the notion of this guidance is at first sight very appealing,
comprising a potential mechanism to ‘correct’ these habitual mistakes.
However, the anti-paternalist argument is also very compelling. One objection is that such
intervention impinges upon freedom of choice, whilst an equally important one questions
the aptitudes of governmental bodies to accurately gauge what actions are socially desirable
or undesirable, and their subsequent ability to implement an appropriately measured
corrective policy. The contention around paternalism undoubtedly rises with an action’s
strength, and so-called “soft anti-paternalist” (Cserne; 2012, p.16) scepticism is far greater
when policies of prohibition or active restriction is pursued. However, debate still exists
even when more subtle or cognitive ‘nudges’ are proposed by the state as, even if more
weakly, these counter-paternalism principles hold. This leaves us asking whether any such
interventionist action is ever appropriate. Indeed, it is perceived that unless a government
is able to fully ‘understand’ the nature of inconsistent individuals, the economic reasoning
behind paternalistic social policies will leave them futile (Winter; 2011, p.138).
Given the above, the conclusion of this investigation must assume that no ‘hard and fast’
rule can be applied, and whether individuals or society profit from paternalistic action hinge
upon many context-specific factors. Broadly, these are captured by (i) the extent to which
the average member of society seems unable to exhibit necessary self control; (ii) the wider
externalities which are felt as a consequence of any associated improper use and (iii) the
ease and strength of paternalist action that an authority would have to employ to correct
such inadequacies, and how detrimentally this impacts upon the freedom of already selfcontrolling individuals.
Whilst this conclusive stance might appear broad, some insightful findings do arise as a
consequence of this discussion. Firstly, any authority must exercise caution whenever they
decide to impose paternalistic restrictions upon society as these binds, however wellintended, might not always be unanimously agreed with, either today or over time.
Secondly, although the actions of the ‘irresponsible’ may create detrimental externalities for
society, it is equally important to remember the corresponding penalisation that a
paternalistic act could impose upon already ‘well-behaved’ citizens. Finally, whilst strong
paternalistic actions will probably be met with greater resistance, Governments should still
be wary when seeking to impose even subtle guidance, including cognitive manipulations or
nudging. These might be just as imposing and unjust regarding the violation of freedom for
self-controlling individuals as taxation or prohibition of practices and consumption.
This study’s conclusive statement must surely be this- before judging an intervention as
‘necessary’, governments must consider its full impacts and acknowledge society as a
diverse and ever-changing creature. Enforcing rigid rules or tactics to combat apparently
detrimental activities might not be welcomed by everybody today, or by anybody tomorrow.
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