Arab monarchies
cannot survive by
divine right alone
Jane Kinninmont demolishes the theory of
monarchical exceptionism
38 | THE WORLD TODAY | OCTOBER & NOVEMBER 2012
the resilience of monarchy. First, that
they enjoy a legitimacy that more recently
formed republics do not, with their own
established methods of consultation and
consensus-building, and, especially in
Saudi Arabia and Morocco, claims to
religious legitimacy. Second, that the monarchies are better equipped to adapt and
reform, and have European models to follow where rulers have ceded power gradually while retaining status and dignity as
national figureheads.
One problem with the first argument is
that perceptions of royal legitimacy are difficult to evaluate in political contexts which
lack reliable opinion polls or a free press,
and which typically have laws against
JOHN MOORE/GETTY IMAGES
It’s a testing time for Western policymakers as they try to get to grips with an
increasingly politically diverse Middle
East. While they declare support for more
democratic forms of government in Egypt,
Tunisia, Libya, Yemen and Syria, they are
also seeking to maintain traditional alliances with governments none too keen on
democratic change. No wonder the theory
of monarchical exceptionalism – that Arab
monarchies are somehow more resilient to
political challenges than their republican
counterparts – is becoming so popular.
But is it true?
The idea that Arab monarchies in the
Gulf, Jordan and Morocco are more likely
to survive has gained currency since the
Arab Spring, based on the observation that
only republican leaders have been overthrown to date. This is true as far as it goes,
but it is a short-term view ignoring the
fact that most of the republics – including
Egypt, Iraq and Libya, all of which saw
their hereditary rulers overthrown by
coups in the 1950s and 1960s – were monarchies once too. It seems more likely that
today’s monarchies have remained in place
because they are resilient, rather than being resilient because they are monarchies.
To understand this resilience, analysts
need to look at other factors: the loyalty
of the armed forces; the opposition’s effectiveness; and support received from larger
powers. Indeed these factors may help
to explain why some republican governments, such as Algeria’s, have also contained protest pressures to date.
The monarchical exceptionalism theory
might obscure significant differences between the royal regimes in the eight Arab
countries that have them and overstate the
differences with republican regimes.
Two arguments are made in favour of
A tattered portrait of King of Bahrain
Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa
‘insulting the ruler’. Any claim that the
Arab awakenings have passed the monarchies by is off the mark. That said, it would
also be incorrect to assume that all who live
under non-democratic governments necessarily sees themselves as oppressed.
Certainly, there is opposition activity in
all of the Arab monarchies, but to varying
degrees. Opposition MPs won 70 per cent
of seats in Kuwait’s 2012 parliamentary
elections, and 45 per cent of the vote in
Bahrain’s 2010 election. The main Bahraini
opposition group now boycotts the parliament because of its weakness, as do Islamist movements in Jordan and in Morocco,
where more conciliatory Islamists, nonetheless, won more than a quarter of seats
in 2011. Since the start of 2011, six out of
eight of the monarchies have seen protests.
These have been most pronounced in Bahrain but have also contributed to constitutional changes in Jordan, Morocco and
Oman, as well as the dismissal of the
cabinet in Kuwait. Moreover, activists,
writers and bloggers have been tried and
jailed for ‘insulting’ or ‘slandering’ governments or rulers in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia,
the UAE, Kuwait and most recently Oman.
Yet in most cases protests have not been
directed against the system of monarchy.
Pragmatic activists are seeking political
reform under the existing rulers, by calling
for a genuine constitutional monarchy
where the ruler’s powers are circumscribed
by a stronger parliament, independent
judiciary or an elected government.
The legacy of tradition will not guarantee that sovereigns are immune forever.
One of the lessons of the Arab awakenings has been that a heavy-handed state
response to protests can lead to an escalation in protesters’ demands.
This brings us to the second argument
– that monarchies have more options for
power-sharing. There is value in the idea
that monarchies have a range of options
to develop their political systems in an
evolutionary, rather than revolutionary,
manner. But this does not mean their
survival is inevitable. It means their continuation depends on actions, adaptation
and reforms – both to accommodate the
changing aspirations of a fast-growing,
young and increasingly globally aware
citizenry, and to build sustainable economic models. The theory should be a spur to
reform, not an excuse for complacency.
Jane Kinninmont is Senior Research
Fellow at the Chatham House Middle East
and North Africa Programme.
For more on the Gulf states, go to
www.chathamhouse.org/gulfstates