WESTERN ONTARIO MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2011
BACKGROUND GUIDE
JOINT CRISIS: FLN LEADERSHIP
INTRODUCTION
Welcome to the Second Committee of the Joint Crisis: Algerian War! The Joint Crisis promises to be
the most intense of all the committees at WOMUN 2011, and we look forward to the heated debate
and innovative crisis-resolution that is sure to ensue.
Since the Joint Crisis is run along different procedures from the General Assemblies and other Special
Committees, we have prepared an additional Joint Crisis Rules and Procedures that will supplement,
and in some cases, replace standard procedure.
Please note that while the committee has two topics, since there is no primary or secondary speaker’s
list, delegates will be required to consider both topics in all their deliberations. Ignoring the issues
presented by either topic will result in consequences in crisis. The actions taken in one committee will
have an immediate and direct impact on the opposing committee. Members of the Joint Crisis are
encouraged, but not required, to read the topic guides for both committees (the historical background
for both committees is the same).
Staff of the Second Committee
Chair – Michael Kryworuk
Director – Thomas Mullie
Assistant Chair – Mohammed Siddiqui
THE ALGERIAN WAR
Algeria, now a prosperous and stable northern African democracy, was once the site of some of the
most savage and destructive conflict that has ever been seen on the continent. From approximately
1
1954 to 1962, Algerian rebels fought the French government in the name of seeking Algerian
independence.
The war was highly complex, with a multitude of factions and interests straining at both sides, in
addition to the civil violence and brutal warfare that accompanied it. It was characterized not only for
the total disregard for human rights and dignity by both sides, but also by the fraternal strife that
affected both the French and Algerian people. During the conflict, Algerian fought Algerian and
French fought French just as the two sides fought each other.
This guide will address the war from the perspective of the Leadership of the main Algerian rebel
movement, the National Liberation Front (FLN). It will describe the rise of the Algerian nationalist
movement, and how that movement later sought to bring about the end of colonial rule and Algerian
independence. The FLN was at the verge of military defeat many times over the course of the war, but
it succeeded in winning the hearts and minds of the Algerian people, and massive public opposition to
the war is often credited as forcing the French to withdraw. However, the FLN’s attempts to end
colonial rule often resulted in the murder of accused Algerian ‚collaborators‛ and large numbers of the
civilian French population, in addition to the military casualties they caused. Delegates to the Second
Committee will have to decide what actions are most likely to defeat their enemies, both French and
Algerian, all while winning support for the nationalist cause at home and abroad.
2
3
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
French Algeria
Historically, Algeria did not exist as any kind of united nation. Most of the country is composed of the
Sahara desert, with no permanent inhabitants. There are also vast stretches of arid mountains that
supported only sparse populations of tribal goat herders. The relatively fertile coastal corridor has
mostly been used by various empires, from the Carthaginians to the Romans, Moors, Spanish and
Ottomans as a passage across northern Africa. In the 1700s, its rocky and convoluted coastline was
used by the Barbary Pirates as a base for raids across the Mediterranean.
In 1830, King Charles X of France, desperate to bolster his failing popularity and save the Bourbon
restoration, set upon the idea of conquering Algeria as a means to distract the unhappy French
population. In 1827, using the pretext that the Turkish dey (Regent of Algiers) had insulted his
diplomatic representative, Charles had already blockaded Algiers, although its ineffectiveness had left
the possibility of outright invasion open. On June 14, 1830, French forces landed at Sidi Ferruch, and
by July 5th had occupied Algiers. The dey fled, and Algiers became a French colony.
Between 1830 and 1848, the French consolidated their control over the rest of Algeria and eliminated
all opposition to colonial rule. Following the revolution of 1848 and the fall of the French monarchy,
the new constitution of the Second Republic ended Algeria’s status as a colony and declared it an
integral part of France. The decision to officially incorporate Algeria into metropolitan France was
unusual, and would also have far-reaching consequences for the colonial administration.
While the French government (first the Second Republic, later the Second Empire) under Napoleon III
originally encouraged significant French settlement of Algeria, following visits to Algeria, Napoleon
ended all French settlement. He felt that the natives were being corrupted by colonial influence, and
pursued liberal reforms to protect the tribal lands from the incursion of the colons (French colonists),
also known as the pied-noirs. However, after Napoleon III was deposed in 1870, the pied-noirs
toppled the military government of Algeria. Thereafter, the French government began to pursue the
interests of the settlers over those of the native population. While Algeria remained mainly peaceful,
the domination of the Europeans over the Algerian population, and the restriction of political rights to
those holding French citizenship continued to breed racial and ethnic tensions.
The Rise of Algerian Nationalism in the 20th Century
4
The direct nature of French rule over Algeria slowed the development of organized nationalist
movements; it was not until around 1910 that even the beginnings of Algerian nationalism could be
seen. A small, disunited cadre of Algerian elites began agitating for reforms that would grant them the
rights of French citizens. The First World War, which saw many Algerians serve on the battlefields of
France, reinforced the pleas for greater equality in Algeria.
At the time, Algeria was divided into three separate departments, just as France was divided into its
own departments, although unlike France its administrators were appointed. A Governor-General
ruled over the colony; he was advised by a partially-elected bicameral assembly, which was dominated
by Europeans. Reforms were made following the First World War that enabled more Algerians who
were not French citizens to vote. Those members of the Muslim population were allowed to elect half
of the representatives of these assemblies, while the Europeans (representing about 10% of Algeria’s
population) elected the other half. Neither side was satisfied by the reforms, but they nonetheless
provided the basis for the formation of early Algerian nationalist parties, which will be addressed later
in this guide.
Sétif and the Beginnings of the Independence Movement
The Second World War proved to be an important catalyst for the Algerian independence movement.
Thousands of Algerians enlisted in the French army and fought in Europe for French liberation. This
experience both gave Algerian soldiers an experience of guerrilla warfare with the French Resistance
and planted ideas of nationalism and liberation both in veterans of the war and at home.
The first major act in the struggle for
independence began with a parade in the
town of Sétif to celebrate the Allied victory
in Europe. Nationalist banners were spotted
in the crowd, prompting a confrontation
with gendarmes (the French police) that
ended with a Muslim protester being shot.
The march turned into a riot, and as many
as 200 Europeans were killed in the ensuing violence. The government responded by sending in the
army to conduct a ratissage (rat hunt) in the local area, as well as bombing villages from the air and
5
bombarding the area from ships. Europeans in the surrounding area formed lynch mobs and hunted
Muslims who they suspected of involvement. Estimates of casualties vary from 5,000 to 50,000.
The brutal quelling of the Sétif riots drove nationalists underground. For almost ten years there were
virtually no violent Algerian nationalist demonstrations. The effects of Sétif, however, set in motion the
events that lead to the rise of the FLN movement that eventually toppled the French Republic and won
Algerian independence. First, pied-noir attitudes were hardened considerably by the violence. The piednoirs, who controlled the Algerian representation in the French parliament, began to take a harder line
on rights for Muslim Algerians, and blocked any reform attempts by the government in Paris. With the
succession of weak and short-lived governments that comprised the French fourth republic, the piednoirs, voting as a bloc, could prevent any reforms of Algerian policy they did not approve of. Second,
the brutal crackdown that followed Sétif terrified the Muslim population and made it harder for
moderate leaders to argue for a negotiated road to independence. This was made worse by the hostile
attitude of the pieds-noirs.
Some attempts at reforms were made. In 1947 a law was passed creating a national council for Algeria
and further increasing the franchise of Muslims. The elections held in 1950 and 1951 were
transparently rigged, however, and the few Muslim representatives who managed to get elected were
not made welcome by the ultra-conservative pied-noir-dominated faction.
The Algerian Nationalist Movement – Factions and Aims
After the Second World War, popular Algerian nationalism emerged in three forms. The first of these
was the Islamic fundamentalism of the Association des Ulema (Association of Legal Scholars) lead by
Sheikh Abdulhamid Ben Badis. The Ulema, founded in 1931, believed in a strict interpretation of Islam
that condemned the perceived decadence and corruption of French rule. It can be seen as similar to the
Wahabi sect of Islam that is the basis for Al Qaeda in the 21st century in its condemnation of the West
and its call for a return to strict religious control. Islamic scholarship is often credited with creating the
basis for Algerian nationalism in the 19th century and keeping it alive through the world wars. The
formation of the Ulema strengthened and popularized the idea. The Ulema itself was never an overtly
political organization, however, and its contribution to the independence movement was strictly
intellectual.
6
The second major group was the liberal wing. Liberal Algerians were never well organized into one
party, but Ferhat Abbas is generally recognized as their leader. Abbas tried until 1955 to work for a
political settlement with France, through the Algerian national assembly and through diplomacy with
the French government itself. He was repeatedly frustrated by the lack of cooperation of the pied-noirs
and lack of strength of the more liberal French government. By 1954, his position in the centre of
Algerian politics was becoming untenable.
The final, radical strand of nationalism was embodied
by Messali Hadj. Messali served with the French army
in the First World War, and while in France married a
French woman who converted him to communism. He
returned to Algeria and became a leader of a series of
increasingly radical groups throughout the 20s, 30s and
40s. His organizations were repeatedly broken up and
banned by the police, and Messali himself spent several
spells in exile. By 1954, he was back and leading the
Mouvement National Algerienne (MNA), the largest
Messali Hadj
public nationalist group. Messali himself was the most famous nationalist in Algeria at the outbreak of
war.
The Formation of the FLN and the Setup for War
By the late 40s, there was a small faction within the MNA that was growing tired of what they saw as
the unproductive talk that consumed the organization’s time. Lead by Ahmed Ben Bella, they formed a
splinter group that called itself the Organisation Spéciale, dedicated to fight colonialism by ‚all means‛.
The first act of the OS was a raid on the post office in Oran, Algeria’s second largest and most
European city. The raid netted the equivalent of several thousand dollars, but poor security allowed the
French to capture most of the leaders of the OS including Ben Bella. Many of them soon escaped from
prison and fled to Cairo. A series of meetings between April and October 1954 drew together the nine
leaders of the OS, plus thirteen rebel and bandit leaders from around Algeria. This ‚Committee of the
Twenty-two‛ agreed that there was a necessity for a protracted armed struggle for Algerian
7
independence. On October 10, 1954, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) was created, and this
organization would be at the forefront of the nationalist violence that would soon consume Algeria.
DEFEATING THE COLONIAL REGIME and UNIFYING THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT
Initial Conflicts
From the time that the FLN was created, orders were given to plan for a revolution beginning on All
Saints Day, November 1st. Ben Bella and 4 others were dispatched to Cairo to attempt to drum up
funds and weapons for the cause.
The November first rebellion was meant to include a series of coordinated attacks on targets
throughout Algeria. The primary targets were infrastructure like telegraph lines and bridges. The most
important targets, however, were
Gendarme stations. The FLN was
desperately short of weapons and
hoped to seize the arms depots at
the stations. Unfortunately, the
attacks were poorly executed and
largely unsuccessful. Many targets
were missed, and many attacks
aborted before they could really
start. In addition, the broad mass of
Algerians were not initially
A still from The Battle of Algiers (1965)
attracted to the violent movement.
The French government responded by deploying troops to Algeria, quickly doubling their forces in the
country to 100,000. The troops were successful in restoring order in the towns, and began attempts to
hunt the FLN guerillas into the harsh badlands of the interior. This proved difficult, however. The
superior knowledge of the terrain and mobility of the FLN forces made them almost impossible to
catch. A kind of stalemate developed. The FLN forces were dramatically weakened and chased into the
hinterlands, from where they were limited to occasional guerilla attacks and ambushes on French troop
convoys. The French, in turn, were not able to pursue the FLN into the interior and finish them off.
8
Through 1955, the main action was on the side of the French government. A new reformist GovernorGeneral, Jacques Soustelle, was appointed. Soustelle attempted to save the situation by promoting a
program of ‚integration‛ designed to increase the political rights and economic opportunities for
Muslim Algerians. Unfortunately, a combination of pied-noir resistance and continued FLN violence
prevented him from implementing his full plan. Soustelle became highly popular, but by the end of his
one year in office, in February 1956, few serious reforms had been implemented, and what had been
accomplished was seen by radicals as too little too late.
In contrast to the civil administration’s liberalism, military policy was brutally repressive. Because of
the difficulty of catching the FLN operatives behind guerilla attacks, the military instigated the policy
of collective responsibility. This meant at first that if the FLN destroyed a telegraph line or a bridge,
the local villages would be responsible for rebuilding it. In addition to this forced labour, this meant
that in cases where Europeans were killed, revenge was often taken on innocent locals. In the most
extreme example, after a massive attack on the mining town of Philippeville killed around 130
European residents, the army slaughtered most of the 1200 Muslim Algerian inhabitants. The effect of
this was to drive many Algerian citizens, not previously sympathetic to the FLN cause, towards the
movement.
The FLN, in turn, instituted a reign of terror aimed at gaining control of the peasantry and
undermining French control. ‚Collaborators‛, including Muslim Algerian town administrators and
constables, were the largest single group of targets for FLN assassination. In many areas, recruits were
required to carry out an assassination as part of their initiation. French forces found that they were
unable to get any information or aid from terrified villagers. To undermine Soustelle’s liberal policies,
which the FLN feared could create support for a negotiated solution, the FLN started killing farmers
who took part in a land redistribution program he implemented. The combination of these tactics by
the French and the FLN lead to a dramatic increase in FLN recruitment and control of the hinterland.
The result of this trend was that through 1956, the position of the FLN began to improve. The FLN
was strengthened by the defection from the French army of many ‚trailleurs‛, Muslim Algerian
soldiers who had recently returned from France’s war in Indo-China, and it managed to get back to the
troop levels it had at the beginning of the war in 1954.
The Real Algerian War, 1956-1962
9
On September 30th, 1956, bomb attacks were carried out on two
cafes in Algiers. Pied-noir pressure lead the government to publicly
guillotine two FLN prisoners convicted of murder. The FLN
responded by stating that for every FLN member guillotined, 100
French civilians would be killed indiscriminately. This began the
‚Battle of Algiers‛, part of a campaign by the FLN to bring the war
into Algeria’s cities where it had previously not often gone.
Terrorism was accompanied by a general strike in which most
Muslim workers participated and during which Muslim businesses
were forced to shut down for fear of reprisals. The French gave
control of the city to paratrooper Colonel Jacques Massu, under
orders to restore stability by any means necessary. Using martial law and widespread torture, Massu
was able to regain control of the city. The FLN, despite being weakened by Massu’s tactics, had proven
that it could strike anywhere in Algeria and that it could compel the majority of the population to
acquiesce to its demands. In addition, Massu’s brutality further angered Muslim Algerians and raised
the first serious questions within France about its roll in Algeria.
France broadened conscription to deal with the growing crisis in Algeria. This allowed them to raise
troop levels in Algeria to over 400,000 by the end of 1956, but also fanned resentment in France and
dramatically raised the cost of the war. Around this time, French tactics improved dramatically. Instead
of a focus on tanks and heavy weapons, the French began focusing on hunting the FLN with
paratroopers and the foreign legion, highly mobile and highly trained units much better suited to
counterinsurgency. They also began making widespread use of ‚harkis‛, militias of loyal Muslim
Algerians raised by village military administrators. These were a perfect tool for counterinsurgency
because of their speed and detailed knowledge of the local terrain. Another tactic successfully employed
by the French was the relocation of the peasantry. The French found that, even with half a million
soldiers, it was impossible to patrol all of Algeria. They therefore instituted a policy of moving entire
areas into fort towns that could be protected and watched by French soldiers. This effectively denied
the FLN the support of the local tribes, but it was also jarring for the relocated peasants. They were
unable to return to their traditional way of life in the fort towns, which were located on the plains
away from their traditional mountain homes.
10
In consequence, the FLN was in decline by 1958. It was engaged in a ‚café war‛ against the remainder
of the MNA. An alternating series of assassinations and revenge attacks killed as many as 5000 people
and weakened the position of the FLN overall, and especially in metropolitan France. The French
military took advantage by conducting enormous search and destroy missions in the Algerian interior
that systematically rooted out the FLN. By the spring of ‘58, although there were still strong FLN
presences in Tunisia and Morocco and terror networks within Algeria, the French military had all but
regained control.
The May Crisis and the Fifth Republic
Despite its success, the French military began to fear that the weakness and instability of the
governments of the Fourth Republic were undermining its efforts and setting it up for another
humiliating disaster like it had suffered in Indo-China in 1954. Jacques Soustelle, the previous
Governor General, along with the military leadership in Algeria, organized a coup that took power in
Algeria under Massu. The Algerian junta then took control of Corsica with a bloodless invasion on
May 24th and demanded that Charles DeGaulle, the leader of the Free French during the Second
World War, be made Prime Minister. They believed that DeGaulle was the last French politician who
could unite the nation and provide the support they needed to win the war.
DeGaulle was duly made Prime Minister
and visited Algeria, declaring ‚Vive
L’Algerie Francaise.‛ He drafted a new
constitution for a Fifth Republic, which
would associate with Algeria but not
include it as an integral part of France. All
Algerians were to have voting rights in the
referendum on the constitution. The FLN,
seeing a chance that they could be
discredited if war-weary Algerians accepted the constitution, set up a provinisional government in exile
in Tunisia under Ferhat Abbas (GPRA), who had finally been forced to abandon his moderate
positions and join the FLN. Abbas stated that the draft constitution could be a basis for a peace
agreement, but the French government refused to recognize the GPRA.
11
Betrayal and ‚The Week of the Barricades‛
Despite his public support for French Algeria, DeGaulle was worried about the prospects of holding
the country. Public resistance was building in France, as the cost of the war in money and lives was
compounded by the atrocities of the café war. In addition, a substantial part of the population was
opposed to colonialism ideologically. In addition, France was facing growing international pressure,
especially from NATO allies worried that too much of France’s military resources were tied up in
Algeria. As a result, on September 16th, 1959, DeGaulle made a speech arguing that ‚selfdetermination‛ for Algeria was the best option to end the conflict.
The pieds-noir and the military felt betrayed by DeGaulle, whom they had put in power specifically to
take a strong line in Algeria. A group of army officers in Algiers declared a revolt, and the pieds-noirs
in the city threw up barricades to keep
loyal troops out. The army was ordered
not to fire on the demonstrators, but
Algiers was put ‚under siege‛ by loyal
units from around Algeria for the next
week. Eventually, seeing that they did
not have the support of the bulk of the
army, the leaders of the coup
surrendered. Many of the officers involved and pied-noir community leaders were imprisoned. This
essentially destroyed the ultraconservative faction of the pied-noir, which was the biggest obstacle to
resolution of the war. It also made it politically feasible for DeGaulle to ignore the pieds-noir, a faction
no previous French government had been strong enough to write off
The end of the War
A referendum on Algerian independence was held on January 8th, 1961. Across France and Algeria,
75% voted in favour of independence. DeGaulle therefore began secret negotiations with the FLN on
independence and the formation of a government. The final obstacle to peace came from a coup
attempt in Algiers by General Challe, who had put down the earlier pied-noir revolt but now felt
betrayed by DeGaulle’s peace plans. The coup began on April 21st, 1961. DeGaulle responded by
making a popular call for support on Algerian radio. His personal popularity as the hero of French
12
liberation was enough to persuade the conscripted French troops ignore their officers, and the coup
never really got off the ground. As a result of its humiliation in the coup, the army ceased to be a
political force for the remainder of the war. DeGaulle was able to reach an accord with the FLN in
May. The Evian accord allowed for Algerian independence, but guaranteed equal rights and protection
for the property of pieds-noirs and Muslim Algerians who had served with the French. They could opt
to stay in Algeria after the war as Algerian citizens. A second referendum was held in June 1962 on the
Evian accords. Of 6 million votes cast in Algeria, more than 5.99 million were for independence.
Loyalist Muslims and pieds-noirs largely abstained from voting. As a result, Algeria became an
independent nation.
Throughout this period an extreme-right wing splinter group of the French military, calling itself the
Organization de l’Armee Secrete (OAS), conducted a campaign of terrorism across Algeria and France.
Their goal was to cause a breach of the ceasefire by the FLN or the military that would derail the peace
process. The OAS caused severe damage and hundreds of casualties, but had little effect on the peace
process. It was effectively destroyed by the French by 1963.
Aftermath
Following the establishment of an independent Algerian government, it became immediately clear that
the FLN would not honour its guarantees of safety for pieds-noirs. Four days after the vote, a mob
attacked the European quarter in Oran and murdered as many as 3,500 people. In addition, reprisals
against Muslim Algerian collaborators and their families claimed over 50,000 lives in the first years of
independence. As a result, 1.4 million people, including almost the entire European population, fled to
France within a year of independence. Ahmed Ben Bella, the most charismatic of the FLN leaders, took
the Prime Ministership and promptly turned Algeria into a one party state.
The Situation at the Conference
It is September 1956. The FLN is stronger, but still nowhere near challenging the French Army
militarily. There are three immediate goals that it must pursue with the long term goal of winning the
war in Algeria. First, it must undermine the French position. The French cannot be defeated militarily,
so the FLN must make their control of Algeria expensive and politically untenable. Several tactics
should be considered in pursuing this goal. An increase in reprisal attacks against Muslim allies of the
French could further extend FLN’s influence and weaken the French administration. In addition, terror
13
should be considered as a weapon. Up to now, the majority of FLN activity has been focused in rural
areas and villages. Although any military presence in the cities is out of the question while the French
army exists in Algeria, hit and run terror attacks could weaken French resolve. As an extension, some
local commanders have begun to suggest that bombings would be easier if the bomber stayed to
detonate the bomb himself. These so-called ‚suicide‛ attacks would demonstrate a new level of
bloodthirstiness and horrify the French, but risk turning appalled allies against the cause. Finally, the
FLN should consider internationalizing the struggle. There is a large pool of Algerian expatriates in
metropolitan France who could be mobilized to carry out attacks there. This would bring the Algerian
issue home to millions of French citizens, and make continuing to hold our country politically
expensive. Farther afield, attacks on French targets internationally could force the outside world to take
note of our struggle. This is a risky strategy, as it could have the effect of alienating some friendly
states who would face international pressure to distance themselves. But it could also greatly increase
pressure on the French to end the war. Whichever actions the FLN decides to take, one thing is clear.
More pressure must be exerted, by any means, to drive the French from Algeria.
Second, the FLN must secure more resources in order to broaden the struggle. Despite recent
recruitment successes, the FLN is still short on men and weapons. There are several states
internationally that may be willing to help. Gamal Nasser’s Egypt has been pushing propaganda
arguments about anti-colonialism and pan-Arab nationalism for years. With several of the FLN’s
leaders stationed in Cairo, you are in a good position to ask him to back up his words with actions. In
addition, talks should be opened with Morocco and Tunisia, Algeria’s two Muslim neighbors who just
gained independence from France in the spring. They won’t get militarily involved, for fear of French
re-colonization, but they may be willing to provide sanctuary to FLN fighters and supplies.
Finally, the FLN should seek to unify the nationalist movement within Algeria. Messali Hadj has been
exiled to France, but his MNA is still the largest nationalist organization. It also has the strongest
organization of Algerians in metropolitan France. Bringing the MNA membership into the FLN would
greatly strengthen its numbers and its ability to strike across Algeria and into France. Because of
France’s heavy handed crackdown on nationalists since the beginning of the war, many members may
be willing to voluntarily join the FLN. Not all will be so easily convinced, however. Tribal and political
differences may prevent some from joining willingly, and may even lead them to form rival armed
organizations. This cannot be permitted if the FLN is to shape the destiny of Algeria after the French.
14
Steps should be taken both to draw members from the MNA into the FLN fold, and to destroy
potential rival organizations that may arise as the MNA decays. The other faction to be considered is
the Parti Communiste Algerienne. The Algerian communists are a smaller organization that includes
both Muslim and pied-noir members. They are well armed, however, because of their European
members’ access and because of successful raids on arms convoys. Whether to negotiate with or
attempt to crush the communists will be an important decision.
Ferhat Abbas and the thousands of moderate Algerians he carries with him are also a high priority for
integration into the FLN. He represents a real threat to the FLN agenda by holding out hope for a
peacefully negotiated settlement. On the other hand, pied-noir intransigence and French military
repression are frustrating his attempts at negotiation. Enlisting Abbas in the FLN would increase the
legitimacy of the cause of armed revolution. He will be reluctant to endorse the FLN’s agenda,
however, if its violence escalates or if it engages openly in terrorism. The threat of force may also
persuade him to come over to the FLN, but that carries the risk that he will refuse and have to be
liquidated.
How the FLN deals with these challenges will determine whether it is successful in driving the French
out and establishing an independent Algerian nation.
15