Psychology, Public Policy, and Law
1998, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1160-1181
Copyright 1998 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
1076-8971/98/$3.00
PSEUDOSCIENCE, CROSS-EXAMINATION, AND
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN THE RECOVERED
MEMORY CONTROVERSY
Kenneth S. Pope
Norwalk, CT
The recovered memory controversy is a contentious mix of conflicting claims,
theories, and research. For example, reports of recovered memories of child sex
abuse may be described as the result of implanting, false memory syndrome,
repression, dissociation, motivated forgetting, directed forgetting, amnesia, betrayal
trauma, retroactive inhibition, suggestion, self-induced hypnotic trance states,
personality disorder, thought suppression, retrieval inhibition, cognitive gating, or
biological protective processes. These terms may be used without clear definition or
scientific basis and may unintentionally foster pseudoscientific beliefs. Drawing on
Daubert and other sources, this article suggests using 6 basic sets of crossexamination questions to assess the material in this area and to expose pseudoscience. These 6 questions focus on research basis, unclear terms and deductive
fallacies, inferential errors and confirmation bias, links in the chain of reasoning, ad
hominem fallacies, and original sources.
The recovered memory controversy has emerged kicking and screaming
during the past decade or so, a daunting arena of science and pseudoscience, of
claims and conclusions in the absence of adequate data and data lacking adequate
explanatory theories, of elegant research, bullying dogma, thoughtful questions,
extreme positions, and no shortage of confusion. Attempts to understand how
adults could come to report newly emerging memories about having experienced
child sex abuse have become all but lost in a bewildering blizzard of conflicting
terms and concepts. Such reported memories may be described as the result of
repression, dissociation, implanting, motivated forgetting, directed forgetting,
amnesia, betrayal trauma, retroactive inhibition, suggestibility, self-induced hypnotic trance states, personality disorder, thought suppression, retrieval inhibition,
cognitive gating processes, biological protective processes, a clinical syndrome,
and so on. These terms and concepts may be used without clear definition or
scientific basis and may foster pseudoscientific beliefs.
A useful approach to the booming, buzzing confusion in this area may be to
approach it as if it were an expert witness and to use the fundamental questions of
cross-examination to search out relevant information, assess accuracy, and expose
pseudoscience. The six sections that follow illustrate this process of crossexamination, emphasizing the importance of closely examining (a) research basis,
(b) unclear terms and deductive fallacies, (c) inferential errors and confirmation
bias, (d) links in the chain of reasoning, (e) ad hominem fallacies, and (f) original
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Kenneth S. Pope, P.O. Box 777,
Norwalk, Connecticut 06856-0777. Electronic mail may be sent via the World Wide Web site at
http://www.idealist.com/memuries.
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The Research Basis
One of the landmark shifts in the cross-examination of expert witnesses
occurred with the U.S. Supreme Court's 1993 rendering of the Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals decision. Prior to Daubert, the admissibility of scientific
testimony was most often determined by some version of the 1923 Frye rule. Frye
focused on whether a concept, finding, theory, or claim had been generally
accepted by the scientific community. Daubert, interpreting the 1974 Federal
Rules of Evidence, broadened the focus to include questions such as whether the
matter had been subjected to methodologically sound research and scientifically
sound inference and whether it had appeared in peer-review journals.
When considering the area of recovered and false memories, it is crucial to
determine the degree to which scientific research supports any specific claim. For
example, consider the following two statements. Blume (1990) wrote that "it is not
unlikely that more than half of all women are survivors of childhood sexual
trauma" (p. iv; italics in original). Martinson (1994) wrote that "In the process of
growing up, it is almost inevitable that a child will have one or more encounters of
a sexual nature in which the other party is either too young or too old to be
regarded as a peer" (p. 75). What, if any, scientific research supports such claims?
It appears that there are no scientific studies published in the peer-reviewed
scientific literature that establish the validity of these statements. It is not just
conclusions, such as those above, but also evaluative instruments that may lack a
basis in research providing scientific evidence of their validity or reliability.
Unfortunately, there seems to be no shortage of unvalidated checklists used by
those at either extreme in this controversy (for a discussion of unvalidated
checklists in this area, see Olio, 1996; Pope & Brown, 1996).
Although many concepts, claims, and instruments in this area clearly lack any
research basis, in other instances determining whether there is a solid research
basis is more challenging. The concept repressed memories shows how complex
and difficult making this determination can be.
Recovered memories of child sex abuse—whether accurate or false—are often
termed repressed memories. The use of this term (often with ambiguity and
confusion as to whether it simply means "forgotten" for a period of time or implies
a specific mechanism of forgetting) has grown common in the popular media, legal
cases, and some of the scientific literature. Interestingly, those at both ends of this
controversy's extremely polarized spectrum have used the term to describe the
relevant mechanism—for example, Repressed Memories: A Journey to Recovery
From Sexual Abuse (Fredrickson, 1992) and The Myth of Repressed Memory:
False Memories and Allegations of Sexual Abuse (E. F. Loftus & Ketcham, 1994).
Does the concept of repression rest on a sound research basis? Early in the
century, a wide variety of laboratory experiments and other studies seemed, at least
according to the investigators, to provide sound scientific support for the concept.
In "Functional Abnormalities of Memory With Special Reference to Amnesia,"
Sears (1936) focused on Freud's discussion of repression and how it could be
tested experimentally. Stewart (1962) reviewed 17 studies of repression and
concluded that this "research has refined methodology since the work of Sears and
has related repression to other personality facets. In the future, research on
perceptual defense, subception, and vigilance may lead to a more complete
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explanation of repression" (p. 93). In their textbook Theories of Learning, Hilgard
and Bower (1966) reviewed an array of laboratory experiments and concluded:
Where do these studies lead us? The facts of amnesia, without additional
experiments, make abundantly clear that repression occurs, and that memories once
lost can be recovered without relearning. While therefore experiments are not
needed to establish the phenomenon of repression, they may help us to delineate the
precise circumstances under which repression occurs. Clarification of repression
phenomena is today more important than establishing their genuineness, (p. 290)
Hilgard and Bower also noted a trend among some experimental psychologists
that had grown quite strong in the 1950s and 1960s and would continue to gather
force: a turning away from impartial consideration of repression and other
psychoanalytic concepts toward emotional attacks. "These attacks on the psychoanalytic method of treatment presently spread to attacks on psychoanalytic theory
generally. These have turned out to be rather intemperate, seeking through
debater's tactics to find flaws in psychoanalysis without making any effort to
determine what there is to be learned from i t . . . . " (p. 295).
Not all of experimental psychology turned in this direction. Loftus, in her
earlier work, exemplifies those who continued to argue that repression rested on a
firm empirical basis. A decade after Hilgard and Bowers wrote of the intemperate
attack on psychoanalytic concepts, Loftus wrote:
Memories that may cause us great unhappiness if they were brought to mind often
appear to be "forgotten." However, arc they really lost from memory or are they
simply temporarily repressed as originally suggested by Freud (1922)?
Repression is the phenomenon that prevents someone from remembering an event
that can cause him pain and suffering. One way that we know that these memories
are repressed and not completely lost is that the methods of free association and
hypnosis and other special techniques used by psychotherapists can be used to
bring repressed material to mind and can help a person remember things that he has
failed to remember earlier. (G. R. Loftus & E. F. Loftus, 1976, p. 82)
Loftus maintained that laboratory experiments demonstrated the process of
repression. Describing Zeller's (1950) research, she noted: "This experiment
indicates that when the reason for the repression is removed, when material to be
remembered is no longer associated with negative effects, a person no longer
experiences retrieval failure" (G. R. Loftus & E. F. Loftus, 1976, p. 83).
If there is a motivation to avoid memories "that can cause . . . pain and
suffering" and to ensure that memories causing "great unhappiness" should
remain "forgotten," is it not possible that removing or overcoming this motivated
forgetting might cause unhappiness? E. F. Loftus (1988) discussed a case in which
a college professor, R. J., experienced a massive and robust forgetting (e.g., of her
own name, what she did for a living, where she lived, or who her friends were)
after a series of traumatic events including the breakup of her marriage and
witnessing her mother's death.
Eventually, R. J. was able to remember all of her iraumatic experiences; when they
returned, so did all of her other lost memories. Even though the return of her
memories made her wiser, she was also much sadder. More than most of us ever
will, R. J. understood the true meaning in Christina Rossctti's words in Remember:
PSEUDOSCIENCE AND CROSS-EXAMINATION
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"Better by far you should forget and smile than that you should remember and be
sad." (p. 73)
In the article "Memories of Childhood Abuse: Remembering and Repressing," E. F. Loftus, Polonsky, and Fullilove (1994) studied the extent to which
repression and even "robust repression" occurred in a sample of women in regard
to child abuse. They obtained a rate of about 1 in 5 women in this particular sample
but speculated that this may overstate the degree to which repression of child abuse
actually occurs. "There is a reason to believe that the 19% figure we obtained in
the current study may actually be an overestimate of the extent to which repression
occurs" (p. 81); "One could argue that this means that robust repression was not
especially prevalent in our sample" (p. 80).
Do these laboratory and survey studies of repression constitute an adequate
research basis for the concept of repression? Many believe that the answer is no.
Voicing the minority view at a 1986 conference on Repression and Dissociation at
Yale University (see Singer, 1990a, 1990b), Holmes (1990) stated: "I want to point
out that, despite over sixty years of research involving numerous approaches by
many thoughtful and clever investigators, at the present time there is no controlled
laboratory evidence supporting the concept of repression" (p. 96). Other scholars,
however, have pointed out difficulties with Holmes's decision about what research
to exclude from his review, his analysis, and the potentially misleading ways in
which he stated his conclusions (see, e.g., Braude, 1995; Gleaves, 1994, 1996;
Gleaves & Freyd, 1997). Is the laboratory research inconsistent with the concept of
repression? Gleaves (1996) wrote:
In summary, Holmes' (1990) conclusion, which generally differed from the original
investigators of much of the research, was that the memory-related phenomena that
were observed in the laboratory studies could be best explained by mechanisms
other than repression. Thus, although his conclusions have been cited as being that
there is no scientific support for the concept of repression, a more accurate
description of his conclusions would be that, although many data are consistent
with repression theory, Holmes found no evidence for repression that could not (in
his opinion) be explained by a mechanism other than repression, (p. 9) [italics in
original!
Thus, for example, Holmes (1990) reviewed one set of controlled laboratory
studies and found that when conditions were experimentally manipulated,
participants in an experimental group were less able to recall the stimulus material
than participants in a control group. However, when the negative manipulation was
removed, participants were then able to recall the material at comparable rates to
those in the control group. As Gleaves (1996) observed, although the results, even
according to Holmes, were consistent with predictions made on the basis of the
repression hypothesis, the experiments were not able to prove that there was no
other possible explanation beside repression for the phenomenon. Holmes (1990)
conceded that "the performance of the subjects in these experiments is consistent
with what would be expected on the basis of repression" but argued that "it is also
possible that the decrement in recall was due to the interfering effects of stress"
(p. 91).
The literature examined in this section illustrates the process and sometimes
difficulty of pursuing questions about whether a concept, claim, or instrument rests
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solidly on scientific research. One of the reasons why establishing that scientific
basis is so difficult is that practitioners and scientists sometimes lapse into the use
of confused terms, concepts, and definitions.
Unclear Terms and Deductive Fallacies
A skilled cross-examiner recognizes instantly when an expert witness is
equivocating, exploiting ambiguity, escaping into vagueness, trying to baffle and
confuse, or simply does not know what he or she is talking about. It is the
cross-examiner's job to pin the witness down and to ensure that the terms are
well-defined and are used in a consistent, logical manner. The energy and
resourcefulness some experts devote to evading clarity and the anguish when all
escape routes are cut off was vividly captured by a trial lawyer, who compared the
process to a hunter who finally trees an evasive quarry.
Have you ever seen a "treed" witness? Have you ever had the experience of
watching a witness's posterior involuntarily twitch? Have you ever seen them
wiggle in their chairs? Have you ever seen their mouths go dry? Have you seen the
beads of perspiration form on their foreheads? Have you ever been close enough to
watch their ancestral eyes dilating the pupil so that they would have adequate
tunnel vision of the target that was attacking? (Burgess, 1984, p. 252)
The hunter's dogged determination is essential in the pursuit of clarity in this
area. Attempts to understand how adults could come to report newly emerging
memories about having experienced child sex abuse have become all but lost in a
bewildering blizzard of conflicting terms and concepts. As noted earlier, such
reported memories may be conceptualized as the result of repression, dissociation,
implanting, motivated forgetting, directed forgetting, amnesia, betrayal trauma,
retroactive inhibition, suggestibility, self-induced hypnotic trance states, personality disorder, thought suppression, retrieval inhibition, cognitive gating processes,
biological protective processes, a clinical syndrome, and so on. Such terms and
concepts may be used without clear definition or differentiation, contributing to
confusion, misunderstandings, and logical fallacies.
The prior section noted that some of the most prominent writers at both
extremes of this controversy have helped popularize the unsupported notion that
"recovered memories" of child sex abuse must inherently be conceptualized and
defined as "repressed memories." Using these terms interchangeably creates
confusion and misleadingly contributes to flawed arguments such as the following:
Recovered memories of sex abuse must be due to repression;
There is no valid experimental evidence that repression exists;
Therefore there is no scientific support for recovered memories.
Recovered memories of sex abuse are a form of repression;
There is experimental research demonstrating repression;
Therefore there is research demonstrating recovered memories of sex abuse.
Controversy often encourages oversimplification and confusion and lays the
ground for such fallacies. It may be important to avoid any unwarranted
assumption that a single mechanism such as repression (or dissociation, etc.) is the
sole possible explanation for forgetting or retrieving such experiences. Rather than
looking for one mechanism at work in all instances in which memories of child sex
PSEUDOSCIENCE AND CROSS-EXAMINATION
1165
abuse might be lost and later recovered, it may make more sense to ask: What
mechanisms, if any, enable the loss or recovery of child sex abuse memories for
what individuals at what developmental levels under what conditions?
Inferential Errors and Confirmation Bias
While maintaining many of the outward forms of a science, pseudoscience
tends to allow beliefs and expectations to override objective evidence and
rationality. Beliefs and expectations may profoundly affect both a person
conducting an evaluation (e.g., a research study, a forensic or clinical assessment, a
review of the literature by an expert witness) and anyone who is the focus of an
evaluation. Practicing trial lawyers are unlikely to be surprised by the occasional
tendency, however unintentional, of expert witnesses called by the defense to be
more alert to and rely more on information favoring the defense and the tendency,
however unintentional, of experts called by the plaintiffs or prosecution to be more
alert to and to rely more on information favoring the plaintiff or prosecution. It is
possible that each side's experts have simply been exposed to essentially different
sets of information. However, attorneys cross-examining such experts also need to
consider the possibility of a common inferential error in which the expert has not
been equally open to the full array of available and relevant information.
Confirmation bias is perhaps the best known and most widely accepted notion of
inferential error to have come out of the literature on human reasoning. The claim
. . . is that human beings have a fundamental tendency to seek information
consistent with their current beliefs, theories or hypotheses and to avoid the
collection of potentially falsifying evidence. (Evans, 1989, p. 41)
Freud's study of Leonardo da Vinci provides a vivid example of confirmation
bias (Coles, 1973a, 1973b; see also Fischoff, 1982). Freud's psychoanalytic
interpretation was based on da Vinci's reminiscence of his infancy. Da Vinci's
distant memory was that a vulture swooped down from the sky and lightly touched
him on the lips while he was a tiny infant.
Freud brought a stunning diversity of knowledge to help illuminate the impact
of this event on da Vinci's life. He emphasized, for example, that the Egyptian
hieroglyph for vulture is identical to that for mother. Little else was known about
the da Vinci's earliest years, but the themes of an intimate relationship with his
mother that was reflected in this remembered event enabled an extensive
psychoanalysis.
The problem with this analysis was discovered later. The translation that Freud
had relied on contained an error: The Italian word for kite had been mistranslated
into the German word for vulture. Da Vinci's reported memory had involved a kite,
rather than a vulture, that had supposedly touched his lips as he lay in his cradle.
Whenever a scientist, practitioner, or expert begins an investigation with
beliefs or expectations about the results, or gains such beliefs and expectations
early on, the subsequent aspects of assessment may be severely biased. Judge
Dennis Yule highlighted a version of this inferential fallacy when he wrote in
regard to expert witness Richard Of she:
Finally, Dr. Ofshe characterizes plaintiffs memories as a progress toward ritual,
satanic cult images, which he states fits a pattern he has observed of false
memories.
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II appears to the court, however, that in this regard, he is engaging in the same
exercise for which he criticizes therapists dealing with repressed memory. Just as
he accuses them of resolving at the outset defining repressed memories of abuse
and then constructing them, he has resolved at the outset to find a macabre scheme
of memories progressing toward satanic cult ritual and then creates them. (Crook v.
Murphy, 1994, p. 27)
It is possible that beliefs or expectations have significantly influenced how
many scientists, professionals, and others have attempted to respond to questions
about the nature, extent, and validity of reported recovered memories of abuse. It is
worth noting, for example, that when clinical and counseling psychologists
address the issue of therapists implanting false memories, they are confronting
questions about their own profession causing harm to those who come to them for
help. When a large part of professional identity involves seeing oneself as a source
of help for those hurting from other causes, it may be difficult to believe or expect
that one's own profession is a significant cause of harm to patients. Pope and
Vasquez (1998; see also Pope, 1994) provided detailed examples of diverse areas
in which individual psychologists and the profession as a whole have experienced
difficulty acknowledging harmful behaviors in therapy or other contexts, have
denied or diverted responsibility, and have engaged in rationalization.
The extent to which therapists have been sexually exploiting their patients
provides an example. For many decades, the profession tended to deny that
therapist-patient sex occurred on any but the most rare basis (see Pope, 1994; Pope
& Bouhoutsos, 1986; Pope, Sonne & Holroyd, 1993; Pope & Vasquez, 1998). The
first study appearing in a peer-reviewed journal that used actuarial data from
existing archival information to address the notion that therapist-patient sex might
actually occur appeared in American Psychologist in 1971. The data included all
malpractice suits that had occurred during a 10-year period under the professional
liability insurance plan provided specifically for members of the American
Psychological Association. Focusing on the many complaints alleging therapistpatient sex, the report made no mention of any valid allegation of this type. The
majority of all malpractice suits were attributed to false allegations made by
female patients. The reason for this supposed epidemic of false allegations of
sexual violations was set forth as follows:
the greatest number of [all malpractice] actions are brought by women who lead
lives of very quiet desperation, who form close attachments to their therapists, who
feel rejected or spumed when they discover that relations are maintained on a
formal and professional level, and who then react with allegations of sexual
improprieties. (Brownl'ain, 1971, p. 651)
The ways in which psychologists approached the question of therapist-patient
sex illustrates another trend that may influence beliefs, expectations, data
collections, and inferences in the area of recovered memories: The profession has
repeatedly found it difficult to address realistically questions about forms of sexual
abuse (e.g., incest, rape) in which the vast majority of (but not all) victims are
female and the vast majority of (but not all) perpetrators are male. As recently as
1955, for example, a scholarly text stated that there were approximately one or two
cases of incest annually for each million U.S. citizens (Weinberg, 1955). Two
decades later, the Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry placed the incidence at
PSEUDOSCIENCE AND CROSS-EXAMINATION
1167
between 1.1 and 1.9 per million (Henderson, 1975). Amir noted in 1971 that he
was unable to find even one book devoted to the topic of rape, and as late as the
early 1970s, rape allegations were generally viewed as "lies or fantasies" (Estrich,
1987, p. 43). The 1970 edition of Wigmore's widely used and authoritative text on
legal evidence exemplified the extent to which both the legal and the mental health
professions accepted as scientifically conclusive the view that virtually all charges
of sex abuse reflected false imaginary narratives that had become accepted by the
woman as true memories. Wigmore called attention to factors that
may have a direct connection with veracity, viz., when a woman or young girl
testifies as complainant against a man charged with a sexual crime—rape, rape
under age, seduction, assault. Modern psychiatrists have amply studied . . . girls
and women coming before the courts in all sorts of cases. Their psychic complexes
are multifarious, distorted partly by inherent defects, partly by diseased derangements or abnormal instincts, partly by bad social environment, partly by temporary
physiological or emotional conditions. . .. The unchaste (let us call it) mentality
finds incidental but direct expression in the narration of imaginary sex incidents of
which the narrator is the heroine or the victim. . . . No judge should ever let a sex
offense go to the jury unless the female complainant's social history and mental
makeup have been examined and testified to by a qualified physician.. . . The
reason I think that rape in particular belongs in this category is one well known to
psychologists, namely that fantasies of being raped are exceedingly common in
women, indeed one may almost say that they are probably universal. (Wigmore,
1934/1970, pp. 745-746)
This view can be traced in part to the early psychoanalytic tenet that female
claims about incest did not represent an actual memory but rather an imaginative
process. In renouncing his earlier "seduction theory," Freud set forth this tenet as
if it were beyond doubt: "When girls who bring forward this event [incest] in the
story of their childhood fairly regularly introduce the father as the seducer, neither
the phantastic character of this accusation nor the motive actuating it can be
doubted" (Freud, 1924/1952, p. 379).
It is likely that many if not all of us have beliefs and expectations that could
interfere with our gathering experimental data in an unbiased manner, reaching fair
conclusions about a set of studies, conducting an impartial forensic assessment,
testifying as neutral expert witnesses, and engaging in other scientific and
professional pursuits in this or any other area. What is crucial is that we seek to
become aware of such beliefs and expectations and the ways in which they can
interfere with our work, that we institute safeguards to help identify and correct for
such factors, and that we remain alert to the possibility of such inferential errors in
our own work and the work of others.
Links in the Chain of Reasoning
Those to whom the courtroom is familiar territory know the expert witness
who, enjoying the unfettered freedom of open-ended questions during direct
examination, creates a compelling structure of argument. The expert moves
smoothly and efficiently, linking concept to concept in a chain of reasoning with
dazzling dexterity. The result is like a seemingly impenetrable chain-link fence
that covers and protects the landscape.
The naive attorney may step back in awe and discouragement. Much like not
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seeing the individual trees for the forest, seeing the fence in its enormous reach and
complexity may distract the attorney from the individual links. The skilled
cross-examiner questions carefully each link in this chain of reasoning, refusing to
let individual assertions gain a false aura of validity through their sheer number,
pattern, and interconnectedness.
The argument that there is an epidemic of false memories implanted by
therapists provides an example of looking at the individual links in a chain of
reasoning. In the scientific and popular literature, one of the most commonly
discussed scenarios of implanting false memories of sex abuse is that therapists
mistakenly conclude or strongly suspect that a patient has a history of child abuse
and then, through questions or other means, implant a false memory of an abuse
history. Authors claim that this scenario has occurred with such frequency that it
constitutes an epidemic (see Pope, 1996, 1997, for a review of these claims).
Trauma, Amnesia, and Psychopathology
According to this argument, therapists begin by failing to understand that there
is no evidence linking trauma causally to either amnesia or psychopathology. For
example, Kihlstrom (1995c) wrote that "there is nothing in the available evidence
that would permit us to have any confidence in any exhumed memory, in the
absence of independent confirmation, or to have any confidence that there are
causal links among trauma, amnesia, and psychopathology" (p. 66; see also
Constantine & Martinson, 1981; Henderson, 1975, 1983; Martinson, 1994;
Masserman & Uribe, 1989; Wakefield & Underwager, 1994). Cleaves is among
those who do not accept this reasoning. Quoting Kihlstrom's sentence above,
Gleaves (1995) provided the rational for his disagreement by providing a
counterexample;
The last part of the sentence is what I find particularly noteworthy. Here you are
clearly saying that there is nothing in the available evidence that would allow us to
have any confidence that there is a connection between trauma and psychopathology. I find that to be a very extreme statement. For example, given that PTSD is a
form of psychopathology,.. .
Gleaves's reasoning is that the research into the nature, validity, reliability, and
other aspects of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a diagnostic category
permits confidence in a causal link between this form of psychopathology (PTSD)
and trauma. That is to say, when PTSD occurs, it is viewed as a consequence of
trauma.
Child Abuse and Presenting Symptoms
The second step in the argument is that therapists reason fallaciously from this
false premise (i.e., about trauma as a cause of amnesia or psychopathology). Kihlstrom
(1995b; see also Olio, 1995) set forth an absolute prohibition against forming even
a suspicion of child abuse no matter what the presenting symptoms might be: "it is
not permissible to infer, or frankly even to suspect, a history of abuse in people
who present symptoms of abuse." He similarly asserted that "you can never,
never, never, never, never, infer a history of sexual abuse from the patient's
presenting symptoms. Nevernevernevernevernevernevernevernevernevernever"
(1995a). He reasoned that it is impermissible "even to suspect" because there is no
PSEUDOSCIENCE AND CROSS-EXAMINATION
1169
specific association—let alone causal link—between any symptom and child
abuse and because to do so would constitute the logical error of affirming the
consequent. Olio (1995, 1997) disagreed and presented a counterexample: a
3-5-year-old girl, one of whose presenting symptoms is infection by the
gonococcus bacterium, Neisseria gonorrhoeae. According to Olio, a competent
clinician might reasonably suspect child sex abuse as one of the diagnostic
possibilities to be investigated.
Olio's counterexample (1995, 1997) not only demonstrates the invalidity of
Kihlstrom's prohibition against ever suspecting child abuse on the basis of
presenting symptoms but helps illuminate Kihlstrom's mistake in concluding that
suspecting child abuse on presenting symptoms such as a young girl's manifestation of gonorrhoeae symptoms constitutes the error of affirming the consequent.
Kihlstrom's (1995b) claim that therapists must never suspect child abuse no matter
what the symptoms confuses the syllogistic proof of deduction with the formation
of diagnostic hypotheses. (For a discussion of the affirming of the consequent
fallacy in assessment, see Pope & Brown, 1996; Pope, Butcher, & Seelen, 1999.)
Forming hypotheses on the basis of incomplete information (such as
presenting symptoms) is a necessary, inherent, and useful component of clinical
assessment, particularly early in the evaluative process. Gathering additional
information guides the process as new data support, refine, or contradict the initial
hypotheses and often lead to new hypotheses. Therapists who perform assessments
customarily and legitimately form suspicions about various diagnostic, etiologic,
or prognostic possibilities. Presenting symptoms and other initial data form a valid
basis for such clinical hypotheses. New and varied diagnostic and etiologic
possibilities may expand the "ruled out" list during the process of differential
diagnosis.
There is a substantial body of research and theory for this process of
professional decision making in the face of uncertainty (e.g., Bell, Raiffa, &
Tversky, 1988; Dowie & Elstein, 1988; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982;
Pope, Butcher, & Seelen, 1999; Wolf, Gruppen, & Billi, 1985). Presenting
symptoms such as the symptoms of a venereal disease in a young child may form a
legitimate, logical, and valid basis for suspecting that a patient may have been
abused while forming an inadequate, fallacious basis for determining that abuse
must have occurred.
Consider an array of presenting symptoms such as trouble catching one's
breath; feeling pressure in the chest area as if someone were stepping on the chest;
light-headedness as if one were about to pass out; and a pain in the shoulder, arm,
or jaw. This set of symptoms helps illustrate the stark difference between a clinical
suspicion (i.e., a provisional hypothesis) and deductive proof. It is likely that no
qualified physician would hold up these symptoms as proof of a heart attack. These
presenting symptoms, singly or in combination, could have numerous other
causes, both physiological and psychological. However, it is completely legitimate
for the physician to suspect a heart attack as a possible cause of the symptoms and
to consider this hypothesis as a guide to collecting additional data. In fact, it is
worth asking: Under what conditions would a qualified physician not suspect a
heart attack as a possible cause of these presenting symptoms?
The distinction between deductive proof and diagnostic hypothesis in this area
forms a useful and legitimate basis for public policy and the law. Reviews of state
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laws suggest that almost half use a varient of the term suspect (e.g., "suspect that a
child has been abused") in laws requiring therapists to report suspected child
abuse (Kalichman, 1993, 1999). Claims that therapists must not suspect child
abuse on the basis of presenting symptoms may influence clinicians' decisions
about whether to file reports of suspected child abuse pursuant to these laws.
It is worth noting that not long ago in this nation's history, clinicians tended not
to suspect child abuse despite even the most striking presenting symptoms. Caffey
(1946), for example, presented case histories in which infants' presenting
symptoms were chronic blood clots in the brain, broken arms, and broken legs.
Neither parents nor others volunteered reports of accidental or intentional trauma
that might have caused such patterns of presenting symptoms. Caffey described the
clinicians' lack of any hypothesis about what might have caused this pattern of
injuries to the infants. In light of its considerable implications for clinical practice,
law, and public policy, this second link in the chain of reasoning—that it is
impermissible for clinicians to suspect child abuse on the basis of presenting
symptoms—warrants extremely careful questioning.
Therapist Behaviors
The third step in the argument is that therapists, acting on the false belief or
suspicion that a patient has a history of child abuse, implant—however unintentionally and unknowingly—in the patient a set of false autobiographical memories of
child abuse (see, e.g., False Memory Syndrome Foundation [FMSF], 1995). One
of the most common methods of implanting false memories is, according to this
line of reasoning, "recovered memory therapy." Lindsay and Read (1994), for
example, discussed a study supposedly showing that 25% of therapists used this
method, noted that they "refer to such approaches collectively as 'memory
recovery therapy' " (p. 282), and expressed the fear "that these powerful
techniques are being used in ways that are damaging the lives of many clients and
their families" (p. 282). Lindsay and Poole (1995) similarly expressed their fear
about these approaches and their effects: "In our view there are solid grounds to
fear that tens of thousands of people have developed illusory memories or false
beliefs about CSA [child sexual abuse] through suggestive memory recovery
techniques and ancillary practices in psychotherapy, self-help, or group therapy"
(p. 464). Recovered memory therapies include some of the most long-standing and
extensively studied therapies. Kihlstrom (1996), for example, wrote that "psychoanalysis is a prime example of recovered memory therapy" (p. 298). For a detailed
critique of the logic and methodology of attempts to define, assess the extent of,
and demonstrate the effects of "recovered memory therapy," see Olio (1996).
According to this reasoning, therapists easily persuade patients that they were
abused through just one or a few inquiries or statements. Kihlstrom (1996), for
example, wrote that "even a few probing questions and suggestive remarks by an
authoritative figure such as a therapist may be sufficient to inculcate a belief on the
part of a patient that he or she was abused. . ." (p. 308; see also FMSF, 1995). Lief
stated, "The problem arises, however, when counselors overtly ask the question,
"Were you ever sexually abused as a child?' " (Peck, 1993, p. 20). E. F. Loftus
(1995) wrote: "Individuals are being imprisoned on the 'evidence' provided by
memories that come back in dreams and flashbacks—memories that did not exist
until a person wandered into therapy and was asked point-blank, 'Were you ever
PSEUDOSCIENCE AND CROSS-EXAMINATION
1171
sexually abused as a child?' " (p. 20). It is important to ask: Is there any scientific
evidence that therapists are capable of implanting a false history of child sex abuse
in their patients simply by including the question "Were you ever sexually abused
as a child?" in their clinical interview? Therapists taking a history may ask if the
patient has ever been hospitalized, been battered, been forced to engage in sexual
activity, lost consciousness (except for sleep, etc.), been in therapy previously,
taken psychotropic medications, or made a suicide attempt, to name but a few
questions relatively standard in taking an adequate history. Is there scientific
evidence that these other direct questions give rise to problems and false
memories, or is it only "Were you sexually abused as a child?" that should be
avoided when taking a history? Moreover, is this link in the chain of reasoning
based on sound scientific evidence?
The experimental research basis, supposedly demonstrating that therapists can
implant false memories of child abuse in their patients, is composed of a diverse
set of studies showing apparent success in implanting false memories in college
students and others (for reviews and discussion, see, e.g., E. F. Loftus & Pickrell,
1995; Pezdek, Figer, & Hodge, 1997; Pope, 1995b, 1996, 1997). Often in such
experiments, the research participant's parent (or older relative) is asked whether
he or she remembers an event from years ago (e.g., getting lost in a shopping mall,
an embarrassing episode at a celebration) as one that did or did not actually occur.
In the first of this line of studies, Coan (1993) convinced his younger brother that
the younger brother, when a small child, had become lost at a shopping mall, an
event that supposedly had not occurred. The younger brother reported that he came
to believe that this event—a "false memory"—had actually occurred. As reported
by Loftus (see, e.g., E. F. Loftus & Ketcham, 1994), this became known as the
shopping mall experiment.' These studies supposedly illustrate how therapists or
others may implant detailed and compelling false memories of trauma, such as
incest. In response to the following skepticism, "But it's just not possible to
implant in someone's mind a complete memory with details and relevant emotions
for a traumatic event that didn't happen," Loftus responded: "But that's exactly
what we did in the shopping mall experiment" (E. F. Loftus & Ketcham, 1994,
p. 212).
Despite Loftus's assurances, it is worth questioning whether these experiments, which do not involve the therapy, therapist, or patients, can be reasonably
and validly generalized to the therapeutic process. (For reviews and discussions of
this line of analog experiments that have been generalized to therapy, see, e.g.,
Freyd & Cleaves, 1996; E. F. Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Pezek et al., 1997; Pope,
1995b, 1996, 1997; Zaragoza & Koshmider, 1989; see also the website "Abuse,
Memory, Science, Therapy, Ethics, and Malpractice" at http://www.idealist.com/
memories). Stated more powerfully, does leading a subject in a psychology
experiment to provide a self-report that he or she now remembers an event that did
not occur, such as once becoming lost in a shopping mall, constitute sound and
adequate scientific evidence that a therapist can implant a memory of abusive
sexual events such as a patient's having been forced to perform fellatio and having
been anally raped for several years when these events never occurred? One
'For a dialogue presenting conflicting views of the ethics, methodology, and less well-known
aspects of this experiment, see Crook and Dean (1999a, 1999b), E. F. Loftus (1999), and
http://users.owt.com/crook/memory.
1172
POPE
important task in questioning this link in the chain of reasoning is to examine
whether consistent criteria are used in attempting to generalize—in regard both to
essentially valid memories that have been lost and recovered and to implanted
memories that are completely or essentially false—from the laboratory to therapy,
from a mildly traumatic stimulus to child sex abuse, or from a single incident to an
incident repeatedly experienced over years.
These attempts to prove that therapists implant false memories of sex abuse
rest on experiments that do not involve therapy or memories of sex abuse
circumvent the established scientific procedures for identifying harm caused by
therapists and the therapeutic process. The realization that the "talking cure" or
psychotherapy can cause harm dates back at least to Freud, who compared it to
wielding a knife. He observed that the newly developed "talking therapy" was
"comparable to a surgical operation" (1924/1952, p. 467) and emphasized that
"the transference especially . . . is a dangerous instrument.. .. [I]f a knife will not
cut, neither will it serve a surgeon" (p. 471). Recognizing the potential harm that
could result from psychotherapy was, according to Freud, fundamental:
[I]t is grossly to undervalue both the origins and the practical significance of the
psychoneuroses to suppose that these disorders are to be removed by pottering
about with a few harmless remedies.. . . [Psychoanalysis . . . is not afraid to handle
the most dangerous forces in the mind and set them to work for the benefit of the
patient. (Freud, 1915/1963, p. 179)
An extensive body of scientific research has underscored Freud's assertion and
demonstrated that psychotherapy can result in patients changing for the worse or
experiencing iatrogenic harm. Some studies have found that this negative result
occurs in perhaps 3-10% of cases (see, e.g., Bergin & Garfield, 1993; Lambert,
1982; Menninger Foundation, 1977; Pope & Vasquez, 1998). A scientifically
sound methodology for determining whether a specific set of therapist behaviors
(such as those hypothesized to implant false memories of child sex abuse) must
take account of the potential for therapy, as a process, to cause iatrogenic harm in
some patients. To determine whether these therapist behaviors are associated with
the creation of false memories of child sex abuse or with other forms of harm in
therapy would require a 2 X 2 table (see Olio, 1996; Pope & Brown, 1996). That is
to say, a (near) random selection of therapists would each be classified, using a
method of demonstrable reliability and validity, into one of the following four
cells: (a) those who engaged in the identified behaviors and (some of) whose
patients developed false memories of child abuse, (b) those who engaged in the
identified behaviors and whose patients did not develop false memories of child
abuse, (c) those who did not engage in the identified behaviors and (some of)
whose patients developed false memories of child abuse, and (d) those who did not
engage in the identified behaviors and whose patients did not develop false
memories of child abuse.
This approach has been followed when investigating whether other forms of
therapist behavior cause iatrogenic effects. In a large array of diverse studies, for
example, researchers investigated whether therapists' sexual behavior with
patients was associated with iatrogenic harm (Pope, 1994; Pope & Bouhoutsos,
1986; Pope et al., 1993; Pope & Vasquez, 1998). Approaches to learning about
effects have included studies of patients who have returned to therapy with a
PSEUDOSCIENCE AND CROSS-EXAMINATION
1173
subsequent therapist as well as those who undertook no further therapy after their
sexual involvement with a therapist. The consequences for patients who have been
sexually involved with a psychotherapist have been compared to those for matched
groups of therapy clients who have not been sexually involved with a therapist and
of patients who have been sexually involved with a (nontherapist) physician.
Subsequent treating therapists (of those clients who undertook a subsequent
therapy), independent clinicians, and the clients themselves have evaluated the
effects. Standardized psychological assessment instruments have supplemented
clinical interview, behavioral observation, and other measures.
Moreover, it is scientifically inappropriate to conclude that a few questions or
comments or other behaviors by a therapist can implant a false memory of a sex
abuse history solely on the basis of research using a different set of factors with a
different outcome measure (i.e., not an implanted memory of sex abuse) in a
different (i.e., nontherapeutic) situation with a different population. Scientific
rigor, common sense, and reasonable skepticism require the kind of careful studies
exemplified by those that have identified therapists' sexual behaviors as associated
with harm in psychotherapy.
Ad Hominem Fallacies
Attacking a person rather than the person's evidence or reasoning can be a
powerful rhetorical device. It can move listeners or readers not only to modify their
beliefs but in some instances to take action, sometimes violently, against the
person under attack. However, when occurring in the midst of purported scientific
analysis, the argumentum ad hominem is both a logical fallacy and a form of
pseudoscience. In basic terms the fallacy is as follows:
Person A is associated with X evidence, Y arguments, and/or Z point of view;
Person A is bad in some way (e.g., unethical);
Therefore:
X evidence, Y arguments, and/or Z point of view are bad and should be rejected.
An example of the ad hominem is to scorn those who disagree with one's own
particular beliefs as True Believers. This term was originally defined by Hoffer
(1951/1989). The True Believer is a fearful, slimy, and malevolent person who is
ignorant of facts and actually tries to shut them out:
It is the true believer's ability to 'shut his eyes and stop his ears' to facts .. . which
is the source of his unequaled fortitude and consistency. . . . Thus the effectiveness
of a doctrine should not be judged by its profundity, sublimity or the validity of the
truths it embodies, but by how thoroughly it insulates the individual from his self
and the world as it is. ... [T]he acrid secretion of the frustrated mind, though
composed chiefly of fear and ill will, acts yet as a marvelous slime to cement
the embittered and disaffected into one compact whole" (Hoffer, 1951/1989,
pp. 80, 124).
Making clear her reference by quoting from Hoffer's (1951/1989) The True
Believer, Loftus claims that there are two sides to the recovered memory
controversy and those on the other side (i.e., those who disagree with her) are True
Believers. Noting that she identifies herself as a skeptic, Loftus writes: "On one
side are the True Believers', . . . . On the other side are the 'Skeptics', . . ." (E. F.
Loftus & Ketcham, 1994, p. 31).
1174
POPE
Such assertions warrant open, careful analysis on more than one level. First, it
is worth asking whether the assertion is true and to what extent it has been
established by scientific evidence. Do those who are in fundamental disagreement
with Loftus in the area of recovered memories have poorer character (e.g., more
full of ill will) or less desirable characteristics (e.g., more eager to avoid facts, or
more fearful), either as a group or as individual scientists and practitioners, than
Loftus and those with whom she groups herself (for additional examples, see
Brown, 1998)? Or is it possible that the scientists, clinicians, and others with
whom she disagrees are not inferior in these ways and that the claim that those on
the other side are True Believers represents unsupported pseudoscience?
Second, however, even heuristically assuming the truth of her claims about
those on the other side of the controversy, should the alleged personal characteristics (e.g., in regard to fear, ill will, etc.) of those who are associated in some way
with evidence, arguments, or point of view determine how scientists, practitioners,
and others may evaluate the evidence, arguments, or point of view? Is it arguable
that a person (or group of people) with spotless character may be wrong about a
scientific theory, claim, or conclusion, and that a scoundrel (or group of
scoundrels) may make a sound logical argument or set forth a valid hypothesis?
One interesting aspect of the ad hominem argument in the recovered memory
controversy is that, although traditionally it was recognized as a logical fallacy
inappropriate in scientific discourse, it has begun to find its way into some
scientific journals that address this controversy. For example, in Psychological
Science, Crews (1996), after describing a process involving psychoanalysts
becoming "converts" to "the recovered memory movement" as part of something
"sinister," referred to the "true believers" who had reached a conclusion about
repression that differed from the one he held (p. 66).
Another interesting aspect is the way in which ad hominem attacks seem to use
increasingly vivid and intense images. For example, Hagen's discussion of
individual researchers who testify about their own and others' research in
recovered memory cases appears in a book titled Whores of the Court: The Fraud
of Psychiatric Testimony and the Rape of American Justice (Hagen, 1997). As with
any ad hominem claims, one fundamental question is this: Do the individuals
whom she names and critiques deserve to be viewed as essentially whores and
rapists? That is to say, is the charge implied in the book's title and in individual
chapters (such as the chapter on recovered memories) valid? What constitutes
valid and reliable evidence that a specific group of colleagues with whose views
the author disagrees have lied under oath in exchange for money or otherwise
whored their testimony? Another fundamental question on a different level is this:
How do such ad hominem statements influence the degree to which the evidence,
arguments, or point of view associated with those termed whores and rapists are
fairly and carefully examined?
One important focus of science is the nature, prevalence, and effects of various
forms of pseudoscientific thinking and argument. Scientific research might
usefully study the degree to which ad hominem arguments have become prominent
in the recovered memory controversy, the forms they have taken (for examples of
proponents of various points of view in regard to recovered memories being
compared to Nazi butchers, etc., see Pope, 1996, 1997; see also http://
www.idealist.com/memories); their influence on individual readers in evaluating
PSEUDOSCIENCE AND CROSS-EXAMINATION
1175
the evidence or arguments presented by those whose character or characteristics
have been attacked, their use of demonstrably false claims (Brown, 1998,
discusses an example of a false claim of unethical behavior that was published and
its aftermath), and so on.
Original Sources
The competent cross-examiner never simply assumes that an expert witness's
characterization of an original source document is necessarily accurate in all
details. A thorough cross-examination is guided by a careful comparison of
secondary accounts to the original source documents. In this area, it seems
particularly useful to return to the fundamental data, to check claims, reports, and
conclusions against the original evidence and on which they are supposedly based
(Pope, 1995a).
Heated controversy often leads to oversimplification and premature closure, to
hardened stances that lead individuals to accept and perhaps even to notice only
evidence that supports the stance. Examining original sources is necessary because
all of us in this area—the tone of some of our writings to the contrary—are human
and subject to error. It is likely that all of us have, at one time or another, made
mistakes in characterizing an experiment, a legal case, an article, or some other
source of information. Unfortunately, such mistakes may remain in the literature2;
may be repeated in second- and third-hand articles, textbooks, legal cases, or
courses; and may become widely accepted as accurate despite discordance with
the original source on which it is based.3
Consider the case of Ross Cheit, who was alleged to have had a recovered
memory of sexual abuse. Schooler, Bendiksen, and Ambadar's (1997) presentation
of Ross Cheit's documented case history illustrates the importance of checking
original sources. Schooler et al. opined that Cheit's case seemed to offer reasonable
corroborative evidence supporting the hypothesis that recovered memories of
child sex abuse can be valid. They based their discussion of the evidence on a 1993
U.S. News & World Report article (Horn, 1993). Schooler et al. considered
"multiple sources of indirect corroboration of the event. Specifically, the author of
this article was able to find other individuals who had independently recorded
instances of [the abuser's] sexual improprieties, both before and after Cheit's
recovered memory experience" (p. 261).
The available evidence, as presented by Schooler et al. (1997), is amazingly
weak, and, even according to Schooler et al., in no way conclusive. The
documented evidence, according to them, only supports the possibility that Cheit
may have been abused. The evidence according to their account, is that other
children at the camp claimed to have been abused during the same general time
span. Thus, perhaps Cheit was also abused. "Although these sources of evidence
do not conclusively demonstrate that Cheit himself was the victim of abuse, their
implication of Farmer [the alleged perpetrator] as a sexual abuser clearly supports
the possibility that he may have abused Cheit as well" (Schooler et al., 1997, p. 261).
2
For discussion of an instance of a research team's declining to publish an erratum, see Pope
(1997).
3
For detailed documentation of how errors in describing a prominent child abuse case became
widely accepted as fact in the scientific and popular literature, see Olio (1998).
1176
POPE
Schooler et al. (1997) argued that even this evidence supporting the possibility
that Cheit may have been abused comes from a source they view as questionable
because the source's personal bias may have tainted the findings. "It should be
noted that the reporter who investigated this case was a friend of Cheit's. While
such an affiliation need not invalidate the evidence provided, it is possible that the
evidence was not collected in a completely unbiased manner" (p. 261). It is
important to note that whereas Schooler et al. called into question the reporter's
credibility, they cited no instance or evidence that the information in the reporter's
article was not gathered and reported in a fair and accurate manner.
Is the evidence supporting Cheit's recovered memories as sparse as Schooler
et al. (1997) contend? Is the evidence supporting Cheit's recovered memories only
indirect, a set of similar allegations by others about other children, gathered and
reported by a source of questionable credibility? Examining the original sources
reveals a significantly different set of information, remarkable for what has been
excluded from Schooler et al.'s secondary account. For example, although
Schooler et al. do not acknowledge it, the U.S. News & World Report article which
they identified as the source for their chapter describes a taped confession. "For
nearly an hour, Cheit held Farmer on the phone, a tape recorder running all the
while. Farmer admitted molesting Cheit in his cabin at night" (p. 62). Among the
other reporters who have listened to the audiotape and reported on its contents,
Wagner (1993) transcribed and published excerpts and subsequently (1994, p. B7)
reported, "At that time, Farmer admitted molesting Cheit, according to the tape."
Diverse evidence, including this audiotaped confession, was reviewed by the court
in Cheit's civil suit against Farmer. Cheit was awarded a "judgment from said
defendant in the sum of $457,000" (Cheit v. Farmer, 1994, p. 1). The sponsors of
the camp at which Farmer was camp director included explicit mention of this
audiotaped confession in their public letter of apology to Cheit. The camp sponsors
stated to Cheit and his parents that they were "deeply sorry for the harm that came
to them while Ross Cheit attended the Chorus' summer camp in 1968 and wishes
to assure them that the Chorus is doing everything possible to prevent child
molestation at the Chorus and at the summer camp" (San Francisco Boys Chorus,
1994, p. 2). McNeil-Lehrer (1995) and Stanton (1993, 1995) are among other
reporters who have described this case. (Descriptions and citations of documentation of similar cases as well as larger scale studies can be found on The Recovered
Memory Project website at: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Taubman_Center/
Recovmem/Archive .html.)
Deliberations in the areas of psychology, law, and public policy about whether
a documented case history supports the validity of recovered memories must be
made in light of the full range of available information. If original sources are not
carefully reviewed, secondary accounts may become accepted as accurate even
when they present an incomplete or misleading review of the available information.
In a thoughtful chapter likely to be helpful to virtually any expert witness and
those seeking to study and understand expert testimony, Brack (1998) provided an
illustration of how an attorney can question whether an expert has examined a
primary source of data.
Prosecutor: Doctor, did you appear on the show 20/20 in the fall of 1993?
A: Yes, I did.
PSEUDOSCIENCE AND CROSS-EXAMINATION
1177
Prosecutor: Okay. And the segment that you were on was regarding child sexual
abuse and the interviewing of children. Is that correct?
A: Yes.
Prosecutor: And you made the following answer to the following question, "You
think there are dozens of people in jail now who are totally innocent," and your
answer was "Yes, I do." Is that correct?
A: That's correct.
Prosecutor: And Doctor, in order to come to that conclusion were you present for
the trial of these people and listened to the evidence and come to a different
conclusion than the jury? (p. 100)
Salter provided an example of how examining the original source of data can
be conducted on a systematic basis. In her book Accuracy of Expert Testimony in
Child Sexual Abuse Cases (1989), she collected a large set of statements
purporting to paraphrase, summarize, or characterize research reports and other
original sources as part of expert testimony. She then compared each statement to
the original source on which it was purportedly based. Such books could be useful
in examining the original data relevant not only to expert testimony but also to
textbooks, popular books, and other works that discuss or rely extensively on
original sources.
Conclusion
This article presents a process similar to cross-examination as a way of
approaching the confusing and contentious area of recovered memories. Those
interested in additional sets of questions that may be adapted to this area beyond
the six suggested here are referred to the chapter "Deposition and CrossExamination of the Expert Witness: 100 Basic Questions" (Pope, Butcher, &
Seelen, 1999, pp. 173-224).
It is worth noting one aspect of cross-examination that is the opposite of what
is needed in approaching this area. Even the most inexperienced cross-examiner
has likely heard the axiom: "Never ask a question for which you don't know the
answer." It can be disastrous when the cross-examiner is caught off-guard with a
surprise answer. However, if we are to make progress in this area of science, and if
psychology, law, and public policy are to benefit, our attitude, even in asking the
most routine or fundamental question, should be one of not knowing all the
answers. Only if we are willing to find out that our expectations, assumptions, and
conclusions were wrong will the data be able to teach us anything. The best
cross-examiners are those who are exceptionally good listeners. Asking the right
questions is an important part of this process, but it is useful only if we listen to the
response.
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Received August 14, 1998
Accepted September 15, 1998 •