Prenomination Candidate Choice and General Election Behavior: Iowa Presidential Activists in
1980
Author(s): Walter J. Stone
Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 2 (May, 1984), pp. 361-378
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2110877 .
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Prenomination
CandidateChoiceand
GeneralElectionBehavior:Iowa Presidential
Activists
in 1980*
ofColorado
WalterJ. Stone,University
activistsin Iowa, thisstudyexaminesthetension
Based on a two-wavesurveyof presidential
and generalelectionphasesofthepresidential
selectionprocess.
partiesfacebetweenthenomination
less in
fortheirparty'snomination
tendedto participate
Activists
whosupported
thelosingcontender
of thenomination
winners.Kennedysupporters
were
thefallpresidential
campaignthansupporters
but Bush
as activein stateand local races as Cartersupporters
amongthe Democratssurveyed,
of
partisanswereless activeon behalfof theGOP Senatecandidatein Iowa thanweresupporters
persistwhencontrolsfor
RonaldReagan. These effectsof prenomination
presidential
preference
and past levelsof activityare imposed.The data
ideology,attachment
to the partyorganization,
nomineescontesthadnegativeconsequencesforbothpresidential
indicatethe1980prenomination
as linkedto personalloyaltyto thelosingcandidates,ratherthanto
consequencesbestunderstood
ideologicalpreferences.
of thepresidential
nomination
Scholarshave linkedreforms
processsince
in American
politics.In particular,
the
1968to thedeclineofpartyorganizations
candidateshas
growthof primariesas a mechanismforselectingpresidential
a greatly
campaign,and
extended
presidential
meanta proliferation
ofcandidates,
a further
of theparties.Writing
well beforethewave of reform
fragmentation
processin the1970s,V. 0. Key (1958) lamented
whichswepttheprenomination
on thepartyorganizations:
"The generaladoptionof the
theeffectof primaries
forcesthatgradually
fractionalized
directprimary
openedtheroadfordisruptive
directappealsbyindividual
By permitting
moreeffective
thepartyorganization.
the primarysystemfreedforcesdriving
politiciansto the partymembership,
of factions
of partyorganizations
and theconstruction
towardthedisintegration
of individualleaders"(p. 376). Contemand cliquesattachedto theambitions
outthattheprocessof reform
poraryscholarstendto agreewithKey,pointing
(Sorauf,1980; Epstein,
has acceleratedthe declineof thepartyorganizations
1982).
nomination
ofpresidential
hasverylikelyaffected
Theproliferation
primaries
For example,due to
politicsevenin stateswhichdo notrelyupontheprimary.
racesin
devotedto thenomination
thelengthof thecampaignand theattention
of nationalconvention
delethenationalmedia,theIowa campaignfora handful
national
observed
rather
has
While
413)
sharp
Key (1958, p.
gates
significance.
at theannualmeetingof theWestern
PoliticalScienceAssocia*Revisionof a paperpresented
to ConradMcBrideand to an anonymous
tion,Seattle,24-26 March1983. The authoris grateful
on earlierdrafts,
andto CharlesN. Brasherforresearch
referee
forthisJournalforhelpfulcomments
assistance.
BEHAVIOR OF 198O IOWA PRESIDENTIAL
ACTIVISTS
362
in primary
differences
betweenthepartyorganizations
as comparedwithcaucusconvention
states,Sorauf,writing
bemorerecently,
emphasizedthesimilarities
of contemtweenthetwomethods,primarily
because of thenationalcharacter
of thetwo
porarynomination
campaigns:"In short,we havehad a convergence
moreimdelegateselectionprocessesintoa morelengthy,
morehomogeneous,
andmoreexpensivepreconvention
portant,
politics"(Sorauf,1980,p. 273). (Cf.
andMiller,1981.)
Marshall,1978, 1979; Farah,Jennings,
nomination
camThis studyexaminestheeffectsof the 1980 presidential
ofa sample
theattitudes
andbehaviors
paignsinbothpoliticalpartiesbystudying
ofIowapresidential
thenationalnominating
activists
beforeandafter
conventions.
Leadingcandidatesin bothpartiespressedtheircampaignsin Iowa withthe
formanyoftheproblems
ofhisday,even
potential
Keyobservedin theprimaries
thoughIowa uses thecaucus-convention
methodof selectingnationalconvention
on activistsparticipating
in presidential
nominadelegates.Indeed,theliterature
and
tionshas strongly
thatactivists'concernswithideologicalinterests
suggested
candidateloyalty
haveincreasedthetensionbetweenthepre-andpostnomination
stagesoftheprocess(PolsbyandWildavsky,
1980;Soule andClarke,1970;Soule
andMcGrath,1975; Kirkpatrick,
1976; Sullivan,1977-78;Wayne,1981).
on nomination
activistsspeculateson the conseMuch of the literature
without
attitudes
andbehavior
thebenefit
quencesforthepartiesofprenomination
of indicators
of postnomination
or noninvolvement
involvement
by thesame activists.Johnson
and Gibson's(1974) studyof Iowa congressional
campaignacwhosupported
theprimary
tivistsis a notableexception.
Theyfoundthatactivists
loserweresignificantly
less likelyto workforthenomination
winnerthanwere
thenomineeduringtheprimary
thosewhohad supported
period.However,
they
did notuncoversystematic
evidencethatthepartyorganization
as a wholewas
Forexample,supporters
hurtbythedivisiveprimary.
oftheloserswereas likely
to saythattheywouldbe activein thefuture
as weresupporters
of thenominee.
The Johnson
and Gibsonstudybearsreplication
and extension.For one thing,
theirconclusionssuggesta tempering
of theprevailing
pessimismabouttheeffectsof theprenomination
Moreimportantly,
campaignon partyorganizations.
thereareno studiesofpresidential
activistswitha comparable
follow-up
design.
Thereare severalreasonsforbelievingpresidential
activistswho supported
thelosingcandidatein thenomination
race will be drawnback intothefrayto
workon behalfof theirformer
opponentwithintheparty.Soberreflection
after
thenationalconventions
maycausethemtorealizetheirnonparticipation
(petulant
orotherwise)
is onlyhelpingthecause oftheopposingparty.
Thismayleadthem
to contribute
to theirparty'scampaignevenwhensix months
before,duringthe
heatednomination
fight,theyappearedbeyondreconciliation.
By includinghis
forthe1980 GOP nomination
on theticketas thevice presprincipal
competitor
identialnominee,RonaldReaganfolloweda time-honored
methodofreconciling
inpresidential
warring
factions
politics.Is itfar-fetched
toexpectitto work,even
in a periodofrelatively
open,"amateur"nomination
politics?
WalterJ. Stone
363
Despitethepressuresactivistsmayfeelto help theirpartyin thegeneral
ofthelosingcandidate
election,therearealso goodreasonstobelievesupporters
tothe
winner,
fromthenomination
willwithhold
theirsupport
forthenomination
In 1980,JohnAnderson'sdissatisfaction
ofthenomineeandtheparty.
detriment
campaignforthe
raceled himtomountan independent
withtheGOP nomination
formanyDemocratic
altemative
and he mayhavebeen an attractive
presidency,
and Republicanactivists,even if theirsupportwas notenoughto give him a
crediblerunat theWhiteHouse. As Sullivan(1977-78) has pointedout, the
nomination
processseemsto emphasizecandidateloyalties
natureof thecurrent
campaign
and ideologicaldivisionswithintheparty:"The longpre-convention
investment
each delegatehas in his/
can onlyserveto increasethepsychological
forlosersto
hercandidate.These facts,we think,makeit evenmoredifficult
theirenergiesto thewinner"(p.
outcomeand recommit
accepttheconvention
637).
Design and Method
ofpreconoftheeffects
It is hightimewe beginto carryourunderstanding
activists.
ofpresidential
vention
politicstoa studyofthegeneralelectionbehavior
surveyofpartyactivistsin Iowa duringthe
This studyis basedupona two-wave
Delegates
a startin thatdirection.
electionand thusrepresents
1980 presidential
andthenreconin Juneweresurveyed,
to the1980Iowa presidential
conventions
afterthe Novemberelection.My major
tactedwitha follow-upquestionnaire
candidatepreference
on activists'
concernwas withtheeffectof prenomination
campaignand on activitylevelsin
generalelectionactivityin thepresidential
Iowa campaigns.In addition,I examinedseveralindiother"subpresidential"
of
catorsof partisansupportto getas cleara readingas possibleof theeffects
on thewillingnessof theseactiviststo workforthe
preference
prenomination
parties.The designpermitsaddressingthesequestionsbecause activistswere
and
conventions,
firstin Juneof 1980, beforethenationalnominating
surveyed
'
election.
thenresurveyed
aftertheNovember
becauseofitsfirstforthisresearch
setting
Iowa is a particularly
interesting
conprecinct
caucuses.Candidatesandthenationalmediainvested
in-the-nation
in thestateduringthelatefallof 1979. In bothparties
siderabletimeand effort
forthenomination,
onesaw moreofthe
though
competition
therewas substantial
at thatpoint
Republicancandidatesbecausethereweremoreofthemcompeting
SenatorEdward
Carterfolloweda Rose Gardenstrategy.
and because Jimmy
thestate.RonaldReagan
Kennedymade severalhighlyvisibleswingsthrough
likewisecampaignedin thestate,andGeorgeBushheavilyemphasizedhis Iowa
87 ofIowa's 99 countiesbefore
27 fulldaysthere,traversing
campaign,spending
caucuses.2
the21 January
1980 precinct
I A fulldescription
of thedesign,alongwiththequestionsused to measuretheconceptsmentionedin thetext,is providedin theappendix.
thisarticlewill focus
16 January
1980, p. 11. The analysisthroughout
2Des MoinesRegister,
in each party.
uponthetwomajorcontenders
forthenomination
364
BEHAVIOR OF I980
IOWA PRESIDENTIAL
ACTIVISTS
Prenomination
Indicatorsof PartyDivisiveness
An examination
ofpartisan
divisiveness
in IowapriortothenationalconvendividedbytheCartertionssuggeststhattheDemocratic
Partywas moresharply
KennedycontestthanweretheRepublicansby theBush-Reaganfight.Indeed,
wisdomthata seriousnomiis notsurprising
thisfinding
giventheconventional
nationchallengeto a sittingpresident
is likelyto provevitriolicfortheparty.
said in June
Twenty
percentof theDemocraticdelegatesto thestateconvention
a Cartercandidacywerehe renominated
thattheycouldnotsupport
bytheparty,
whilefully33 percentof the Democratssaid theycould not supportSenator
Kennedyifhe receivedthenomination.
AmongtheRepublicans,
only12 percent
a Reagancandidacy,
and 9 percentoftheGOP delesaid theycouldnotsupport
gatessaid theywouldnotsupport
GeorgeBushwerehe to be nominated.
in
Activists
wereaskedin theJunewaveofthesurveytoranksix candidates
forthepresidency.
The rankings
includedthreecandidatesin
orderofpreference
Carteras theirfirstchoiceforpresieach party.3
AmongtheDemocratsranking
saidthatKennedywas theirsecondchoice.Fully45 percent
dent,only36 percent
or lowerin theirrankings,
of theCarterDemocratsrankedKennedyfourth
preatleastoneoftheRepublicans
listedinthepresidential
ferring
preference
question
to SenatorKennedy.Likewise,27 percentof the KennedyDemocratsranked
and 48 percentrankedat leastone
Carteras theirsecondchoiceforpresident,
Republicanaheadof President
Carter.4
The contrast
in theGOP resultsis stark.
AmongRepublicanactivistsrankingReagan as theirfirstchoice, 89 percent
ofBushsupporters
rankedBushas theirsecondchoice.Sixty-five
ranked
percent
rankedReaganbelowat least
Reaganas theirsecondchoice,and only9 percent
one Democraticcandidate.
Leftonlywithdatafromthepreconvention
period,we mightconcludethat
theDemocratsweresharplydivided,whiletheRepublicanssurvivedtheirprenomination
fightin Iowa withtheirunityrelatively
undisturbed.
Since Bushwas
on theticketwithhis former
opponent
forthenomination,
theconclusionseems
ironclad.We mightbe sympathetic
to Carter'spostelection
claimsthatdivisivenessresulting
fromtheKennedychallengecontributed
to hisdefeat.We
mightily
caneasilyimaginetheKennedyactivists,
of
convinced hisprenomination
critique
of Carteras "just another
Republican,"failingto supporttheirparty'snominee
aftertheconvention.
Justas easily,we can imaginetheBushactivists,placated
bythevice presidential
slotfortheircandidateandrejuvenated
bythecelebration
of partyunityin Detroit,activelyparticipating
in thefall campaignto defeat
Carter.
Jimmy
3The Democratic
candidates
activistswereaskedtorankwereBrown,Carter,
andKennedy.
The
RepublicancandidateswereAnderson,Bush, and Reagan. Activistsin bothpartiesrankedall six
candidates.
4 Fifteen
percent
of theCarterDemocratsrankedBushas theirsecondchoiceforpresident,
and
35 percent
rankedAnderson
as theirsecondchoice.AmongtheKennedyDemocrats,only4 percent
rankedBushas theirsecondchoice,but40 percent
gaveJohnAnderson
theirsecondranking.
Walter
J. Stone
365
The Postnomination
Stage
Fortunately,
we can movebeyondconjecture
based uponprenomination
indicatorsof partisandivisiveness.The wayin whichwe shallexaminetherelaandgeneralelectionstagesofthe1980campaign
tionship
betweenthenomination
on activity
is by lookingforan effectof prenomination
candidatepreference
in
to whichKennedyDemocrats
thesecondstage.Ofparticular
is theextent
interest
andBushRepublicans
on behalfof theirparty'snominee.We might
participated
also expectideologyto have an effect,particularly
which
giventhe literature
roleofideologyinthepostreform
suggests
theheightened
parties.As an example,
Kennedyactivistswhofelttheircandidatewas ideologically
morecongenialthan
theirloyaltiesto Carterafter
Cartermighthavehad moredifficulty
transferring
theconvention
thanthosewho supported
Kennedydespitebeingideologically
closerto Carter.Finally,withComer(1976), it is reasonableto expectthatactivistswhoare strongly
wouldbe morelikelyto
attachedto thepartyorganization
overcometheirdisappointment
aftersupporting
a loserin thenomination
race
thanactivistswhoare less concerned
aboutthepartyorganization.
in thegeneralelection
We includea numberof measuresof participation
nominee(including
campaignbothon behalfof thepresidential
voting,contribandan indexofcampaignactivities)
andin otherIowaraces.Since
utingmoney,
of thenomination
partyorganizations
maybe jeopardizedif activistsupporters
loserwithdraw
frompartisanactivity,
severalmeasuresof commitment
to the
partyquiteapartfromthemeritsof anyparticular
campaignare included.
TheEffects
ofPrenomination
CandidatePreference
Table1 presents
thebivariate
betweenprenomination
relationships
candidate
and generalelectionbehavioramongthe Iowa activists.5Kennedy
preference
Democratsand Bush Republicansweresignificantly
less likelyto becomeinvolvedinthepresidential
campaign,tocontribute
moneytothepresidential
effort,
orto votefortheirparty'snomineethanwerethesupporters
ofthewinners
in the
preconvention
races.Supporters
ofthenomination
losersinbothpartieswerealso
morelikelytovoteforJohnAnderson.
ofdivisiveness
Giventheindicators
during
thenomination
stageof thecampaign,it is striking
thattheBush Republicans
wereno moreactiveon behalfoftheirparty'spresidential
nomineethanwerethe
of placing
KennedyDemocrats.Apparently
Reagan's ticket-balancing
strategy
Bushon theticketdid notplacatetheTexan'sIowa supporters.
The datahintat someminordifferences
in ratesofparticipation
in thepresidentialcampaignbetweentheparties.Reagansupporters
appearto havebeen
moresupportive
oftheirnomineethantheCarterfactionwas of theirs,a
slightly
S The presidential
preference
variableused throughout
theanalysisis a comparison
of thepreferencerankingsof thetwo majorcontenders
forthenomination
as measuredin thepreconvention
wave.Thus,a Democratwhopreferred
CarteroverKennedy,
evenifhisfirstchoiceforpresident
was
Jerry
Brown,was countedas "preferring
Carter."Runningtheanalysiswhereonlyfirstchoicesare
compareddoes notchangetheresults,butdoes slightly
ofcases available.
reducethenumber
366
BEHAVIOR OF I980
IOWA PRESIDENTIAL
ACTIVISTS
TABLE 1
Effects
of Prenomination
on Postnomination
Behavior
CandidatePreference
Activity
Presidential
Level
Involvedin campaign
Contributed
money
Votedfornominee
VotedforAnderson
Mean presidential
activity
indexscore
Democrats
Republicans
Prenomination
Candidate
Choice
Prenomination
Candidate
Choice
Carter
(N = 287)
68%
63%
91%
5%
1.29
Level
Subpresidential
Involvedin Senatecampaign 75%
72%
Contributed
money
Mean Senateactivity
1.76
indexscore
Involvedin House campaign 66%
Contributed
moneyto House
68%
campaign
Involvedin statelegislature
60%
campaigns
Money to state legislature
50%
campaigns
IndicatorsofPartisan
Support
Contributed
moneyto party 70%
Ratedparty"very
62%
favorable"
willbe active
Definitely
in future
71%
Mean partyticketactivity
indexscore
2.26
Bush
(N = 165)
Kennedy Reagan
(N = 166) (N = 148)
(***)
(***)
48%
38%
65%
20%
(***) 0.42
80%
66%
97%
1%
1.36
(***)
(***)
86%
81%
79%
69%
(**)
(***)
(**) 2.79
(*)
73%
1.88
68%
(NS)
65%
57%
(*)
49%
(NS)
58%
56%
(NS)
49%
(NS)
51%
42%
(NS)
41%
(NS)
67%
73%
(**)
62%
(NS)
60%
60%
(**)
44%
(NS)
76%
75%
(NS)
76%
(***)
(**)
(NS) 2.38
2.20
44%
32%
73%
18%
(***) 0.31
43%
34%
(***) 0.48
(***)
52%
(**)
1.69
ofthetaucorrelation
NOTE: Thestatistical
testusedwasthesignificance
between
prenomination
candidate
choiceandactivity.
In thecaseofgeneral
election
thechi-square
voting
choice,I report
teston therelationship
between
thenominal
variable
andprenomination
choice(alfive-category
fortwocategories,
"Votedfornominee"
and"VotedforAnderson,"
though
onlythepercentages
arereported).
Forthecomparisons
ofmeannumber
ofactivities,
thet testwasemployed.
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
NS,p 2 .10, correlation
considered
notsignificant.
WalterJ. Stone
367
difference
whichmayhaveresultedfromgreater
on theDemocratic
divisiveness
side. Thereare also some indications
thatBush Republicanswereless loyalto
theirparty'snomineethanKennedypartisans
wereto Carter,
although
thedifferencesin activity
levelsare slightanddo notextendto votingbehavior.
At thesubpresidential
level,thereare markeddifferences
betweentheparties,particularly
intheSenaterace.Kennedyloyalists
apparently
rebounded
from
theirdisappointment
in theCarternomination
to participate
activelyin JohnCulver'scampaignto holdhis SenateseatagainsthisRepublicanchallenger,
Charles
Grassley.
Indeed,in theSenatecampaigntheKennedysupporters
appearto have
beenmoreinvolvedthantheCarterpartisans.Bushsupporters
weresignificantly
less activein theGrassleycampaignthanweretheReaganactivists.Theywere
also less involved
in thesix IowaHousecampaigns,andtheyappeartohavebeen
less supportive
of theIowa GOP thantheirReagancounterparts.
One important
difference
betweentheIowa partiesin 1980 mayaccountfor
thefactthatBushpartisans
tendednottoparticipate
in theGOP Senateracewhile
didbecomeinvolvedon behalfofJohnCulver.Culver,as the
Kennedysupporters
incumbent,
was popularamongIowa Democrats,and therefore
had faced no
primary
challengeto his renomination.
On theRepublicanside, however,
there
was a primary
contestbetweenCharlesGrassley,representing
theconservative
wingof theGOP, and therelatively
TomStoner.Grassleywas an easy
moderate
winnerin thatrace,butmanyof theactivistswhosupported
Bushforthepresidentialnomination
also hadpreferred
StonerintheSenateprimary
(tau-c= .53).
Thus, it is notsurprising
to discover,forexample,thatRepublicanspreferring
Stonerwereless activein theSenatecampaignthanwereRepublicanactivists
preferring
Grassley(26 percentto 77 percent)and thattheywereless likelyto
contribute
moneyto theGOP Senatecandidate(27 percentto 66 percent).The
questionis, Does thefactthatBushsupporters
also tendedto prefer
TomStoner
in the RepublicanSenateprimary
accountforthe lowerlevelsof involvement
amongBushpartisans
in theSenaterace?
The datain Table2 demonstrate
thatthelowerlevelsof participation
in the
GrassleycampaignamongBushsupporters
cannotbe explainedcompletely
as a
residueof theGrassley-Stoner
primary
fight.Thereis a cleareffectof theGOP
Senateprimary
in the1980 Senateelection:Bushsupcampaignon participation
who had preferred
porters
Stonerwereless likelyto be activeforGrassleythan
weretheBushsupporters
whohadpreferred
Grassley.
Similarly,
therelatively
few
Stonerpartisans
whopreferred
ReaganoverBushforpresident
wereless activein
theSenatecampaignforGrassleythanweretheReaganpartisans
whosupported
in supportfortheGrassleycandidacy
GrassleyoverStoner.But thedifferences
betweentheBush and Reagancampsremainsignificant
and strongevenwhen
preferences
relevant
to theStoner-Grassley
primary
fightare controlled.
So far,
then,theevidencesuggeststhatdivisiveness
in theprenomination
campaignbetweenBush and Reagandid intrudeon otherraces in Iowa, includingthesuccessfulGrassleycampaignto wresttheSenateseatfromJohnCulver.
368
BEHAVIOR OF I980 IOWA PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVISTS
TABLE 2
and SenatorialPreference
Comparison
ofPrenomination
Presidential
on
in theGOP SenateCampaign
Involvement
SenatePrimary
Preference
Stoner
Grassley
Presidential
Preference Presidential
Preference
Bush
Reagan Bush
Reagan
(N= 9) (N= 54)
(N= 128)
(N= 72)
Activein Senate
campaign
Contributed
moneyto
Senatecampaign
24%
(**)
56%
65%
(***)
83%
22%
(***)
67%
52%
(***)
72%
ofthetaucorrelation
betweenpresidential
candidate
NOTE:The statistical
testis thesignificance
preference
and Senatecampaignactivity.
**p <
***p <
.05.
.01.
TheEffects
ofIdeology
ofideologyareofparticular
in assessingtherelationship
The effects
interest
and thegeneralelectioncampaigns.Ideologicaldifbetweentheprenomination
ferences
withina party'scoalitionmaygiveriseto different
candidaciesforthe
An openprocesswhichencourageshighlyvisiblecampaigning
nomination.
by
candidatesand whichemphasizestheideologicaltensionswithinthepartymay
addtothedivisiveeffects
whichresultfromthepurelypersonalloyaltiesactivists
mayfeelforthecandidates.Moreover,
ideologymayhelpaccountfordifferences
of
betweentheIowa partiesin Senatecampaignactivity
levelsamongsupporters
thepresidential
losers.The Democraticincumbent,
JohnCulver,was a Kennedy
protegeintheSenatewitha votingrecordverysimilartothatoftheMassachusetts
Senator.6
mostofwhomwererelatively
Kennedyloyalists,
liberal,mayhavebeen
in thepresidential
nomination
race
able to reboundfromtheirdisappointment
becausetheywereoffered
ideologicalreliefin theformoftheCulvercandidacy.
Bush supporters
also differed
ideologicallyfromReagan partisanswithinthe
an ideologically
candidateto support
GOP, buttheywerenotoffered
compatible
fortheSenatesinceCharlesGrassleywas clearlyidentified
withtheconservative
wingoftheparty.7
Thus,whileKennedyDemocratscouldpursuetheirideological
interests
forCulver(evenas theytendedto remainrelatively
inactive
byworking
6 Culver'scomposite
ADA ratingwas 85 forthethreeyearsbetween1976 and 1978 (Barone,
Ujifusa,and Matthews,1979, p. 309). This ratingwas a bitlowerthanKennedy's95 forthesame
years,butbothCulverand Kennedywereopenabouttheirmutualpersonalandpoliticalties.
between1976 and 1978 were15, 15,
7Grassley'sADA scoresin theHouse of Representatives
and 5 (Barone,Ujifusa,andMatthews,1979,p. 305).
Walter
J. Stone
369
on Carter'sbehalf),BushRepublicans
hadno ideologicalalternative
at eitherthe
presidential
or senatorial
levels.
The prenomination
waveofthesurveyindicatesthatideologywas relatedto
in bothparties.An ideologicalproximity
candidatepreference
measurewas calculatedby takingtheabsolutevalueof thedifference
betweentherespondent's
positionon the five-point
ideologyquestionand his or her perception
of the
to
candidate'spositionon thesamescale. AmongDemocratscloserideologically
President
Carter,
92 percent
preferred
himto SenatorKennedy,
while63 percent
himoverthepresident.
who perceivedthemselves
closerto Kennedypreferred
himtoGeorge
86 percent
oftheRepublicans
closertoReaganpreferred
Similarly,
himto Reagan.These
Bush,while75 percentof thosecloserto Bushpreferred
of ideologycarriedoverintothegeneralelectionwhereDemocratsideoeffects
logicallyclosertoCarterweremoreactiveon hisbehalfthanweretheDemocratic
andis evidentinthe
activists
closertoKennedy.
The sameholdsforRepublicans,
as
For
senatorial
on
the
side
well.
race
Republican
example,66 percentof those
closerto Reagansaid theywereinvolvedin theSenatecampaign,whereasonly
37 percent
ofthoseclosertoBushwereinvolvedin theSenaterace.Itis therefore
wereless activein thefall
entirely
plausiblethatKennedyand Bush supporters
presidential
campaigns(and theBush factionwas less involvedin theGrassley
withthenominee,ratherthan
Senateeffort)
because of ideologicaldifferences
candidateor as a resultof the
outof personalloyaltyto thedefeated
nomination
of thenomination
divisivecharacter
campaign.
ofprean analysiswhichpermits
us to observetheeffects
Table3 presents
on generalelectionactivity
withideologicalproxconvention
candidate
preference
I havepresented
imitycontrolled.8
theactivityvariableswhichshowedat least
to candidatepreference
in Table1, savetheactivity
somerelationship
indexes.A
multivariate
analysisoftheseindexesis presented
below.
relatedto
Participation
in thepresidential
campaignremainssignificantly
candidatechoicein Table3 evenwithideologytakenintoaccount
prenomination
ofcases in somecells. Nonetheless,
of
anddespitethesmallnumber
someeffect
ideologyis visible,althoughit is notconsistent.
AmongBushRepublicanswho
60 percentsaid
saw themselves
closerto ReaganbeforetheDetroitconvention,
theywereinvolvedin his campaign,whereasonly36 percentof theBush supporterscloserideologicallyto Bush thanto Reagan said theywere involved.
Carter
liberalCartersupporters
Similarly,
(i.e., thoseDemocratswho preferred
to Kennedy)wereless likelyto coneventhoughtheywerecloserideologically
ofthepresident
tribute
moneyto theCartercampaignthantheirfellowsupporters
whoweremoreconservative
to 64 percent).Despitetheseexamples
(47 percent
of an effectof ideology,the majorfindingat thepresidential
levelis thatprenomination
candidatepreference
remainssignificantly
relatedto generalelection
withideologycontrolled.
activity
8All of theanalyseswhichfollowhavebeen replicatedusingtherespondent's
self-placement
ofideology,
aloneas theindicator
andthefindings
arevirtually
identical.
TABLE 3
Prenomination
CandidateChoice,IdeologicalProximity,
andGene
Democrats
Carter
Activity
IdeologicallyCloserto:
Kennedy
Prenomination
Choice
Prenomination
Choice
Pren
Carter
Kennedy Carter
Kennedy Reagan
(N = 12) (N = 47)
(N = 139)
(N = 133) (N 89)
Presidential
Level
Involvedin campaign
Gave moneyto campaign
Votedfornominee
VotedforAnderson
71%
64%
89%
4%
(**)
(**)
42%
33%
58%
33%
67%
47%
90%
7%
(***)
Subpresidential
Level
Involvedin Senatecampaign
Gave moneyto Senatecampaign
Involvedin House campaign
Gave moneyto House campaign
77%
68%
69%
68%
(*)
(NS)
(*)
(*)
58%
67%
50%
50%
78%
76%
69%
65%
IndicatorsofPartisanSupport
Gave moneyto party
Ratedparty"veryfavorable"
68%
63%
(NS)
(NS)
58%
67%
72%
58%
44%
36%
64%
19%
84%
72%
97%
1%
(**)
(NS)
(NS)
(NS)
90%
84%
77%
67%
81%
74%
72%
64%
(NS)
(NS)
66%
56%
75%
53%
(*)
NOTE: The statistical
testused was thesignificance
of thetau correlation
betweenprenomination
candida
votingchoice,I reportthechi-squareteston therelationship
betweenthenominalfive-category
variableandpre
twocategories,"Voted fornominee"and "Voted forAnderson,"arereported).
Forthecomparisons
of meann
*p < .10.
NS, p 2 .10, correlation
considered
notsignificant.
**P < .05.
***P < .01.
WalterJ. Stone
371
The othermajorfinding
in Table3 is a clearindication
thatBushpartisans
supported
GrassleyfortheSenateat a lowerratethanReaganadherents,
regardless of whichideologicalwingof thepartytheywerein. ModerateRepublicans
whohad supported
Reaganwereverynearlyas activeon behalfof Grassleyas
theirmoreconservative
copartisans.
Conservatives
whohadpreferred
Bushbefore
theconvention
weremorelikelyto be activein support
ofGrassleythanthemore
moderate
members
oftheBushfaction,
buttheywerecertainly
no morelikelyto
contribute
moneyto his campaign.
The effects
of prenomination
choiceappearonlysporadically
in therestof
thetable.Bushsupporters
in themoderate
wingofthepartyappearto havebeen
less activein Housecampaignsandto havecontributed
moneyless often,though
in neithercase is thedifference
statistically
significant.
Therealso remainsa
significant
forBush supporters
in bothideologicalcamps withinthe
tendency
thanReagansupporters.
GOP to ratethepartyless favorably
Takenas a whole,
thedatain Table3 suggesttheeffects
oftheRepublicannomination
campaignin
Iowa weremoreextensive
thanin theDemocratic
Party.Comingin secondat the
top of theticketapparently
was smallconsolationto theBush supporters,
and
theirloss tempered
theirenthusiasm
forfallactivity
in theGOP almostwithout
regardto theirideologicalleanings.
A Multivariate
AnalysisofGeneralElectionActivity
Theanalysisofprenomination
candidate
fortheeffects
preference
controlling
of ideologyis particularly
important
because of thepersistent
claimamongoboftheprocessthatideologyis a centralmotivating
servers
factor
amongactivists.
The findings
reported
in Table3 areconsistent
withotherrecentworksuggesting
presidential
activists
maynotbe as "purist"or "amateur"as earlierstudieshave
claimed(Stoneand Abramowitz,
in press[1983]). In additionto ideology,
however,otherfactors
mustbe takenintoaccountto providea fullassessment
ofthe
effect
ofprenomination
candidatechoiceon postnomination
politicalparticipation
activists.A multivariate
amongpresidential
analysisof theindexesof participationin theIowapresidential,
andgeneralpartycampaignswillhelpto
senatorial,
theeffects
of prenomination
pindownmoreprecisely
choice.
Theeffect
ofattachment
tothepartyorganization
is ofinterest
indetermining
whethersupporting
a losingcandidatein the nomination
campaigndepresses
nomination
participation
duringthegeneralelection.Presidential
campaignshave
thepotential
to drawintothepoliticalprocesslargenumbers
of neophytes
with
littlepoliticalexperience
andno particularly
strong
attachment
tothepartyorganizations.Thatactivistssuchas thesewhohavesupported
a nomination
loserdo
notbecomeactivefortheparty'snomineewouldhardlybe surprising.
Neither
couldit be said to harmthepartiesor eventhecampaignof thenomineesince
thenonparticipation
of suchactivistsmightbe considered
normalin theabsence
of a candidatewhomtheyfindespeciallyattractive.
If student
supporters
of,say,
in 1968 satoutthecampaignbecausetheircandidatefailedto
EugeneMcCarthy
receivethenomination,
can it be arguedtheDemocraticParty(or HubertHum-
372
BEHAVIOR OF I980
IOWA PRESIDENTIAL
ACTIVISTS
attempt
at thenomiphrey'scampaign)was hurt?In theabsenceof McCarthy's
nation,manyof his supporters
wouldsimplyhaveremained
inactiveduringboth
stagesoftheprocess.
andattachment
to
The matter
maybe putanother
way.Pastpoliticalactivity
thepartyorganization
shouldhelpexplainparticipation
in the1980 generalelectionperiod.Does thisexpectedrelationship
accountfortheassociationwe have
duringthegenobservedbetweenprenomination
preference
andpoliticalactivity
eralelection?Forexample,amongRepublicanactiviststherewas a relationship
ofpartyidentification
candidatepreference
betweenstrength
andnomination
(57
percentof the strongRepublicanspreferred
ReaganoverBush, whileonly31
oftheweakidentifiers
percent
preferred
Reaganto Bush). In bothparties,strong
identifiers
weresubstantially
morelikelyto be activein thegeneralelectioncamin Table4 is intended
to demonstrate
paign.The multivariate
analysispresented
affectedparticipation
thatnomination
preferences
in bothpartiessignificantly
oftheeffects
of ideology,
pastlevelsofpolitamongIowa activists,independent
ical activism,andattachment
to thepartyorganization.
candidate
prefTheindependent
variablesincludethefamiliar
prenomination
to thetwomajorcontenders
withinthe
erenceand relativeideologicalproximity
of
I includestrength
As measuresof attachment
to thepartyorganization,
party.
and whether
or notthe activisthas held partyoffice.The
partyidentification
measureof pastpoliticalactivity
includespreciselythesameactivitiesincluded
FortheDemocrats,I add a measure
in thedependent
indexesofpoliticalactivity.
comparing
evaluationsof the two candidatesforthe Senate,JohnCulverand
in theSenatecampaignand
in theequationspredicting
CharlesGrassley,
activity
Since therewas a primary
racefortheGOP Senate
forthegeneralpartyticket.9
nomination,
I havealso includedintheRepublicanSenateand"ticket"equations
ofevaluations
ofthetwoprimary
Stonerand
an intraparty
candidates,
comparison
equationintercept
Grassley.These variablesare coded suchthattheregression
whowere
oftheaveragerateofparticipation
amongactivists
providesan estimate
andwhohadbeeninactive
on thecandidateandideologycomparisons
indifferent
in pastcampaigns,had neverheldpartyoffice,and wereweakor independent
10
identifiers.
9Respondents
wereaskedtheiropinionsaboutseveralstateand local politicalleaders(see apbetweentheratingforCulver
andthevariableused hereis thedifference
pendixforexactwording),
favoredCulveroverGrassley,
and theratingforGrassley.A negativescoremeanstherespondent
whilea positivescoremeanstheactivistfavoredGrassleyoverCulver.This is theonlyinterparty
ofgeneral
comparison
includedintheanalysis.Elsewhere(Stone,1983)I examineindepththeeffects
variablesanalyzed
alongwiththeprenomination
electionpresidential
candidateandpartycomparisons
reported
here
does notmodifytheconclusions
in thisarticle.Includingthesegeneralelectioneffects
activityindexis statistically
candidatechoiceon thepresidential
since theeffectof prenomination
thanthegeneralelectioncomparisons.
significant,
andremainsstronger
10The codingoftheindependent
variablesis as follows:
Presidential
preference:
Ideology:
-1
1
-1
overCarter/Reagan
Prefers
Kennedy/Bush
overKennedy/Bush
Prefers
Carter/Reagan
Closerto Kennedy/Bush
thanto Carter/Reagan
Walter
J. Stone
373
In bothparties,prenomination
candidatepreference
is thesinglemostimofpostnomination
inthepresidential
portant
predictor
participation
campaign(see
Table4). Withideology,
pastactivity
in campaigns,and attachment
to theparty
organization
all controlled,
thereremainsclearevidenceof candidate-based
divisivenessin bothparties,and theeffecton theRepublicanside appearsto be
thanamongtheDemocrats.Presidential
stronger
had no significant
preference
effect
on Democratic
in theSenaterace,nordiditextendto broader
participation
fortheDemocraticticketin Iowa. AmongRepublicans,however,
participation
prenomination
presidential
preference
didaffect
intheGrassleycamparticipation
of theGOP Senateprimary
paign,evenwiththedivisiveeffects
controlled.
To
be sure,theprimary
fightbetweenStonerand Grassleyhad a slightly
stronger
effecton participation
in theSenatecampaign,buttheevidenceclearlydemonstratesthatBush Republicansparticipated
significantly
less in theGOP Senate
race,notprimarily
outofdistastefortheconservative
candidate'sideologybutas
a resultof thelingering
of theirloss at thepresidential
convention.
11
aftertaste
ThatGrassleywas able to unseattheDemocraticSenatorindicateshe overcame
thesignificant
withinhis partyof a divisiveprimary
disadvantages
fightforthe
nomination
andtheintrusion
oftheBush-Reagan
contest.
Ideology(continued):
Strength
ofpartyidentification:
Officeholding:
Past campaignactivity:
0
1
0
1
0
1
Interparty
Senatepreference:
-1
Intraparty
Senateprimary
preference:
1
-1
O
O
1
Equallyclose to bothcontenders
in party
Closerto Carter/Reagan
thanto Kennedy/Bush
identifier
Independent/weak
Strongidentifier
Neverheldpartyoffice
Has held,or is holding,partyoffice
Numberofwaysrespondent
has participated
in
pastcampaigns
Culver-Grassley
ratingfavorsCulver
Culver-Grassley
ratings
equal
Culver-Grassley
ratingfavorsGrassley
Stoner-Grassley
ratingfavorsStoner
Stoner-Grassley
ratingsequal
Stoner-Grassley
ratingfavorsGrassley
Because thedependent
variablesare right-skewed,
and theR2 valuesare nothigh,I experimented
The resultwas someimprovement
withseveralwaysofhandlingthis,including
log transformations.
in thefit,butthese
in thestandard
errorsoftheregression
coefficients
anda veryslightimprovement
smallgainsdidnotappeartooutweigh
thebenefit
ofretaining
thenaturalcodingofthevariables.All
independent
variablesweremeasuredduringthefirst-wave
survey,
while,of course,thedependent
variablesresultfromthesecondwave. Analysisof suchpostnomination
measuresas ideologyindicates thattheyare veryhighlycorrelated
withtheprenomination
measures,thoughthereis some
forpreconvention
indichangebetweenthetwostages.Whensecond-wave
measuresare substituted
in thefitis achieved,and theclearcausal precedencewhichis protected
cators,no improvement
by
usingtheprenomination
measuresis lost.
11Insome respects,includingthe interparty
Senatecandidatecomparisonsin the equations
in that
amountsto a surrogate
measureof ideologysince thecandidateswereso sharplydifferent
respect(see nn. 6 and 7 above). The effectof ideologyis reducedsomewhatwhentheinterparty
Senatecomparison
to an insignificant
is introduced,
butin no case is it reducedfroma significant
effect.
374
BEHAVIOR OF I980
IOWA PRESIDENTIAL
ACTIVISTS
TABLE 4
CampaignParticipation
Predictors
of Postconvention
Democrats(N = 386)
in
in
Participation
Participation
Presidential
Campaign SenateCampaign
Independent
Variable
presidential
Prenomination
preference
Ideology
ofparty
Strength
identification
Officeholding
Pastcampaignactivity
Interparty
Senate
preference
Participation
fortheTicket
(p)
Beta
b
(p)
Beta
b
(p)
Beta
.33
.21
(.00)
(.01)
.21
.13
-.11
-.07
(.32)
(.56)
-.06
-.03
.01
-.10
(.92)
(.46)
.01
-.04
.25
.33
.10
(.19)
(.06)
(.01)
.07
.10
.14
.31
.38
.26
(.16)
(.08)
(.00)
.07
.09
.29
.65
.71
.30
(.01)
(.00)
(.00)
.13
.15
.28
-.60
(.02)
-.12
-.48
(.10)
-.08
b
-
Intercept
Samplemeanrateof
participation
MultipleR
-
-
0.16
0.11
0.04
0.94
.37
1.93
.44
2.38
.47
Republicans(N = 276)
in
Participation
Presidential
Campaign
Independent
Variable
Prenomination
presidential
preference
Ideology
ofparty
Strength
identification
Officeholding
Pastcampaignactivity
Interparty
Senate
preference
Senate
Intraparty
primary
preference
Intercept
Samplemeanrateof
participation
MultipleR
b
in
Participation
SenateCampaign
Participation
fortheTicket
(p)
Beta
b
(p)
Beta
.39
.05
(.00)
(.71)
.22
.03
.11
-.02
(.44)
(.91)
.06
-.01
-.11
.07
.25
(.65)
(.80)
(.00)
-.03
.02
.28
.12
.41
.39
(.68)
(.17)
(.00)
.03
.08
.39
-
.11
(.65)
.03
.98
(.00)
.26
-
.54
(.00)
.26
-.32
(.06)
-.14
(p)
Beta
.44
.10
(.00)
(.41)
.29
.06
-.02
.07
.18
(.95)
(.77)
(.00)
-.00
.02
.23
-
-
-
-
b
0.27
0.22
0.36
0.80
.43
1.16
.55
1.94
.50
NOTE: See n. 10 forthecodingof thevariables.
as controls
to
The remaining
variablesin theanalysisareincludedprimarily
candidatepreference,
butthereare some
validatetheeffectsof prenomination
and
ofpartyidentification
in thedata.The effects
of strength
interesting
patterns
increaseas the visibilityof the electiondecreasesforthe
partyofficeholding
whichis duplicated
inboth
a pattern
Democrats(thoughnotfortheRepublicans),
Walter
J. Stone
375
This supportsan observation
partiesfortheeffectsof past campaignactivity.
commonlymade amongstudentsof the process:it is easierto drawpolitical
thanit is
neophytes
intoa relatively
visiblecampaignsuchas forthepresidency
in
campaigns
forthe
of
the
party
less
glamorous
to get themactiveon behalf
it
is
the
people
who
For
these
lower
offices,
statehouse
or countycommissioner.
to theparty
themselves
havealwaysbeenactiveand thosewhohavecommitted
who are themainstays
of thecampaign.12The evidencein Table4
organization
by
thattheseracesremainunaffected
by thecleavagesstimulated
demonstrates
at lower
prenomination
presidential
politics,thoughof coursedivisiveprimaries
forthesenominees.
levelsmayintrude
on partyactivity
Summaryand Conclusion
The resultsof thisresearchhaveconsistently
pointedto an effectof preForthe
candidateloyaltyon generalelectioncampaigninvolvement.
nomination
in theCartercamparticipation
Democrats,thateffectwas limitedto inhibiting
itextended
beyondtheGOP campaignagainstReagan,butfortheRepublicans
paignfortheWhiteHousetotheGrassleySenatecampaign.Whatarewe tomake
of thetensionbetweenthe
theeffects
of thesefindings?
Clearlytheyrepresent
selectionprocess.This researchprofirstand secondstagesof thepresidential
of thistension,at leastinsofaras it affects
presvidesthefirstpreciseestimates
are settled.13
Giventheliterature
identialactivistsafterthe partynominations
natureof contemporary
whichemphasizestheideologicaland uncompromising
thatso manyoftheKennedyandBushsupporters
activists,
we maybe surprised
forthenomination.
Thiscomopponent
transferred
theirloyaltiesto theirformer
effecton
binedwiththefactthatideologydid nothavemuchof an independent
suggeststhatideologicalfactionswithintheparty
generalelectioninvolvement
as sometimes
arguedin theliterature.
maynotbe as troublesome
The factthatthemajorfactional
tensionwithinthepartyis linkedto candito thoseworriedby
dateloyaltyratherthanto ideologymaybe smallcomfort
canin thepresidential
nomination
process.Preconvention
recentdevelopments
and it may
has an effecton postconvention
behavior,
didateloyaltyundeniably
ofthelosingcanon partisaninvolvement
havelongertermeffects
bysupporters
12Notethatwhiletheeffects
increaseas thevisibility
loyaltyandpastactivity
of organizational
also goes up. Thatis due in partto the
of thecampaigndecreases,theaveragerateof participation
factthatstateand local campaignsare simplymuchmoreaccessibleto activiststhannationalcamstrategy)
willnotbe
in thepresidential
campaign(e.g., planning
paigns.Somekindsof involvement
opento manyactivistson thestateor local level,whereascampaignsforcountyor stateofficeswill
activists:
i.e., they
in thisstudywereall presidential
requiretheirservices.Buttheactivistssurveyed
in orderto participate
in theselectionof nationalconvention
convention
attended
a statepresidential
delegates.Thattheywereon averagequiteactivein othercampaignsas wellshouldbe encouraging
maintained.
to thosewhowishto see thepartyorganizations
loserin the 1972 and
a consistent
effectof votingforthenomination
13Lengle (1980) reports
on subsequentvotingin thegeneralelection:"Primaryvotersshowed
1976 presidential
primaries
to defectifthe
theirfirstchoice,anda strongpropensity
staunchloyaltyto thepartyif it nominated
partynod wentto someoneelse" (p. 272).
376
BEHAVIOR OF 198o IOWA PRESIDENTIAL
ACTIVISTS
didate.Thesenegativeeffects
wereevident--indeed,
theyweremoreevident-in
theRepublican
Partywherethelosersweregranted
a consolation
prize.Throughoutitshistory,
therehavebeenmanydisparaging
and colorfulremarks
madeby
a meansof balancingthe
vice presidents
abouttheirjob, butit is traditionally
ticketto placatepotentially
disgruntled
members
of thecoalition.ThattheBush
as theKennedy
partisansremainedat leastas removedfromtheReaganeffort
werefromtheCartercampaignmaybe evidenceof a "new politics"
supporters
withinthepartyis less effective.
wheresuchbalancingandcompromise
Thesedatafromthe1980 campaigncannotdirectly
addressthequestionof
long-term
changeintheparties.Wecannotknow,forexample,whether
theeffects
we have observedare greateror less in magnitude
thanthosewe mighthave
uncovered
among,say,Humphrey
and Lodge activistsin 1960. Probablyvariationswouldbe evidentbothovertimeand withdifferent
werethedata
contexts,
available.It is possible,forexample,thatBush's intensefallcampaignin Iowa
stimulated
deep-seatedloyaltiesamonghis supporters
there,and thatdatafrom
Unforotherstatesmightshowa positiveeffectof theticketbalancingstrategy.
and fromearlier
datafromotherstateswithdifferent
tunately,
politicalcontexts,
times,are notavailableforcomparison.Perhapsotherscholarsconcemedwith
thepresidential
selectionprocesswill buildintotheirdesignswaysof gathering
to theanalysisofactivists'behavior
dataappropriate
beforeandafterthenational
on parties
conventions.
Onlythenwillwe havea completepictureofthetensions
createdbythetwostages.
19 May1983
submitted
Manuscript
Final manuscript
received27 September
1983
APPENDIX
SurveyDesignand QuestionsAsked
ThePrenomination
Survey
weredistributed
to all delegatesat theIowa Democraticand Republicanstate
Questionnaires
in June1980. Preciseattendance
conventions
presidential
figureswerenotavailablefromthepolitical
to the conventions
at about 2,400 delegates.The
parties,but bothpartiesestimatedthe turnout
Democraticsurveyresultedin 1,673 usablequestionnaires
(foran estimated
responserateof about
70 percent)whiletheRepublicansreturned
1,107 usablequestionnaires
(foran estimated
response
rateofabout46 percent).Thepurposeofsurveying
theconventions
was notto sayanything
aboutthe
conventions
convenient
perse. Rather,
thedelegatesto theconventions
provided
samplesofpresidential activistsparticipating
in theearlystagesof theprenomination
campaigns.The delegatesto the
Iowa conventions
had participated
in theprecinctcaucusesheldon 21 January
1980 and had been
selectedto thestateconventions
at countyconventions
heldin Marchand April.Strictly
speaking,
thedatado notconsistof samplesof theconventions
so muchas an imperfect
censusof theconventions.I report
oftheresultsas an additional
thestatistical
checkwhichtakesintoaccount
significance
thesometimes
rather
smallsamplesize underanalysis.
The questionsused fromtheprenomination
surveyareas follows:
a. PresidentialPreference:"Please rankyourpreferences
forPresident
amongthefollowing
candidatesfrom(1) mostfavored,to (6) leastfavored."The presidential
preference
measureused
throughout
theanalysiswas a simplecomparison
oftheserankings:
ifa DemocratrankedCarterabove
he or shewas scoredas preferring
and so on.
Kennedy,
Carter,
Walter
J. Stone
377
b. Ideology:"How wouldyoudescribeyourownpoliticalphilosophy?"
Responsesrangedon a
scale from"veryliberal"through
Elsewhereon thequestionnaire,
five-point
"veryconservative."
wereasked, "How wouldyou ratethe politicalphilosophy
respondents
of each of the following
withthesame five-point
presidential
candidates?"Theywerepresented
scale, and ratedsix candidates.
c. PartyAttachment:
The strength
of partyidentification
resultedfromanswersto thequestion
"How wouldyou describeyourown partyaffiliation
in nationalpolitics?"Answersrangedon a
scale from"strongDemocrat"to "strongRepublican."The officeholding
seven-point
dummyvariableresulted
fromanswersto "Please indicatewhich,ifany,ofthefollowing
positionsyounowhold
or haveheldin thepast?(Checkas manyas apply.)"The officesincludedwerememberof a local
chairofa local partycommittee,
otherlocal partyoffice,member
partycommittee,
ofcongressional
district
member
of statecentralcommittee.
partycommittee,
d. Past CampaignActivity:
"Whichof thefollowing
activities,if any,haveyouperformed
in
politicalcampaigns?"Activities
includedin calculatingthepast activityindexwereclericalwork,
door-to-door
coffeesor socials,fundraising,
canvassing,
telephone
canvassing,
ads
arranging
writing
orpressreleases,andplanning
strategy.
e. Inter-and Intraparty
Senate Preference:"Please indicateyouropinionabouteach of the
stateand nationalpoliticalfigures."AmongleadersincludedwereJohnCulver,Charles
following
ratedeach leaderon a five-point
scale rangingfrom"very
Grassley,and TomStoner.Respondents
favorable"through
"veryunfavorable."
ThePostelection
Wave
Respondents
to theprenomination
surveywereoffered
theopportunity
to requesta reportsumIf theyrequestedthatreport,theywereaskedto providetheir
marizingtheresultsfromthesurvey.
nameand address.Sixty-seven
oftheDemocratsand45 percent
percent
oftheRepublicans
provided
namesandaddresses.Immediately
theelection,theserespondents
following
weremailedthesummary
reportalongwitha questionnaire
in thegeneralelectionand their
askingabouttheirinvolvement
attitudes
towardthecandidates
andparties.The responserateforbothpartieswasjustover30 percent
of thoseoriginally
surveyed.Of the Democratsproviding
theirnamesand addresseson the first
46 percent
to thepostelection
mailsurvey(N = 505), while67 percent
questionnaire,
responded
of
theRepublicans
whogavetheiraddressesresponded
to thesecond-wave
instrument
(N = 335).
Becauseofthelowresponseratetothepostelection
survey,
a chi-square
goodness-of-fit
testwas
runon a number
of variablesof interest
to thisstudy,
testing
thehypothesis
thatthoseresponding
to
thesecondwaveare a randomsubsetof thoseresponding
to theprenomination
survey.Analysisof
theprincipal
independent
variable,candidatechoice,is reassuring.
AmongtheDemocrats,thepostelectionsampleis almostperfectly
representative
oftheprenomination
sample.AmongRepublicans,
Bushpartisans
tothepostelection
responded
at a slightly
survey
ratethantheReagansupporters
higher
oftheprenomination
(47 percent
overReaganwhile53 percent
samplefavored
ofthepostelection
Btush
Bushon thesameprenomination
samplefavored
betweenthetwowaves
questions),butthedifference
was notstatistically
at the .10 level. On severalothervariablessignificant,
significant
thoughstill
weredetected.AmongtheDemocrats,respondents
small,differences
closerto Kennedy
ideologically
on theprenomination
measuresweresignificantly
morelikelyto respondto thepostelection
survey
oftheprenomination
(42 percent
samplewereclosertoKennedy;
49 percent
ofthepostelection
sample
hadbeencloserto Kennedy),a difference
at the.05 level.Republicans
significant
to the
responding
secondwaveweresignificantly
morelikelyto haveheldpartyoffice(74 to 80 percent),
andtherewas
a slighttendency
(tau = .10) forrespondents
to thesecondwaveto havebeen moreactivein past
elections.On no othervariabletestedwas therea significant
difference
betweenthepostelection
and
prenomination
samples.
Questionsincludedfromthepostelection
surveyare:
a. Activity:
"Please indicatewhichofthefollowing
generalelectioncampaignsyouwereactively
involvedin duringthefallof 1980 (checkas manyas apply)."The activity
indexeswereconstructed
fromanswersto thequestion"Whichofthefollowing
ifany,didyouperform
on behalfof
activities,
thecampaignslistedbelow,betweenthesummer
conventions
andtheNovember
election?"Activities
378
BEHAVIOR OF 1980 IOWA PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVISTS
canvassing,
arranging
coffeesorsocials,
listedwereclericalwork,door-to-door
canvassing,
telephone
fundraising,writing
ads orpressreleases,andplanningstrategy.
election?"Responseswere,
b. Voting
Behavior:"How did you votein the 1980 presidential
"IReagan,"""Carter,"
"Anderson,""Other,""Didn't Vote."
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