'The European Dream' of the '(ex)Eastern Bloc':
Understanding European Values from a Central and Eastern
European Perspective
Orsolya Nemeth-Kilinc
Ankara University
[email protected]
Abstract
On 1 May 2004, the European Union (EU) welcomed eight states from the so called “Eastern
Bloc”, namely the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and
Slovenia. With this enlargement the EU accepted countries that have different historical, political
and –in some aspects– cultural identity. While the underlying values of human rights, the rule of
law and democracy should have been the catalyst for the democratic transformation of many of
these Member States, their historical identities and ‘understanding’ of the democratic values have
been preventing successful integration and the birth of ‘The European’ identity. For many, this is
associated, rightly or wrongly, with these Member States’ struggle between their national
interests and ‘EU interest’, both at the national and the international level. For instance, the
current migration crisis in Europe and the failure of solidarity policy on the part of Hungarian
government well represent the impact of ‘memory politics’. In this context, this paper examines
how and why the historical memories, narratives and identities cause a gap between the “old” and
“new” Member States. It will further look at how diverging interpretations of the Soviet past and
concomitant debates on recognition have given rise to a split in the EU identity both at the
national and international levels, and at how these interpretations shape the conception of
European identity. Finally, this article will seek for new ways that can trace patterns toward a
construction of a common ‘European identity’.
Keywords
European identity, Central and Eastern Europe, memory politics, mutual incomprehension, soviet
period
Introduction
First of all, it is important to determine the notion of ‘European identity’ which in this article will
cover all common moral and political values, namely ‘the European community of values’. It
seems like going back and referring to the Christian past completed by Jewish and Islamic values,
but it would be contradictory if we think about the facts that Europe is the least religious
continent and its political system is one of the most secular in the world. As Kende (2014) notices
the ‘European identity’ can be determined easily as the gist psychological tendency to
consciously overcome fanaticism. In light of this definition, this article will examine how and
why the historical memories, narratives cause a gap between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States
and how these interpretations shape the conception of ‘European identity’. Finally, it will trace
patterns toward a construction of a common ‘European identity’.
The Undeniable Historical Differences between Western and Eastern Europe: How
and why the historical memories, narratives and identities cause a gap between the “old” and
“new” Member States?
As it is commonly recognized the so-called European integration was the development of the
Second World War, moreover it was a choice of values. Simplistically, the ‘big’ European
nations realized that it is impossible to continue history based on ‘old national frameworks’,
therefore decided to establish a ‘supranational framework’. This process was assisted by Europe’s
intellectual fathers, such as Churchill, Jean Monnet, Adenauer, Spaak, and De Gaulle. Without
their charismatic personality, this value creation would never happen. One of the most important
values was peace, which meant that after 1945 the conflict resolution by war as an option was
eliminated. Was it only the value choice of Western Europe? This question needs further
investigations but it is sure that this atmosphere was favorable to establish also the Security
Council of the United Nations, an international organization which is capable to enforce peace.
Furthermore, the view considering that civilizational similarities are more important than national
differences had gained recognition. In this process the Western Europeans ‘discovered’ that their
region had gone through a particular development process which resulted a unified civilization
that have common legal, cultural and political thinking. In addition, the sense of identity, namely
that they all belong to the same unique civilization was more important to these nations than their
linguistic differences. Jean Monnet well understood that the approach, the first step of integration
must begin with little steps based on common interests. Therefore, the integration started with
approaching the economic interests of these nations as it will imply a political cluster.
While the ‘big’ Western nations gave up their previous roles after the decolonization, they did not
keep aloof, instead ‘opened their arms’. In this light, they have been admitted massive migration
to their countries. They changed their relations toward different cultures, civilizations. These days
they do not claim to be the propagators of civilization, rather large ‘cultural centers’ which
welcome all world cultures. Therefore London, Paris, Berlin or Amsterdam can be such
cosmopolitan cities. Simply, the West accepted a new ‘open-arm’ liberal policy after the Second
World War. Unfortunately, this is historically missing from the Central and Eastern European
countries’ development.
Therefore, the integration of Eastern Europe has been always problematic. We must highlight the
three main reasons of this issue. First of all, the historical background of the nation state building
which led to grievance policy and frustration in Central and Eastern Europe. That is already an
inconvenient starting point. Secondly, though Central and Eastern Europe added a lot to the
European culture, it could not get rid of the sense of being only a silent partner, an outsider. This
feeling of the outsiders created a sense of inferiority which these countries attempt to countervail
with exaggerating the role of national culture. It seems like a defensive attitude when they are
trying to prove compulsively that “we also know something” or “we are also good in something”.
The third reason can be found in ‘comprehension difficulties’ between West and East Europe,
namely what the West learnt from the decolonization period, the East did and could not learn.
Therefore, unfortunately we are witnessing a racist wave against foreigners, the extraneous.
Central and Eastern European people have never learnt how to live together with people coming
from completely different species and/or cultures. The anti-Western propaganda during soviet
period constantly spoke about the persecution of black people in America but never even
mentioned how warm France, Belgium or the Netherlands welcomed different people coming
from their (ex)colonies. They have never seen how these western citizens learnt to live together
in peace with these people coming from totally different cultural and civilizational background,
therefore the Central and Eastern European countries did not have a chance to learn from this
process. What we can witness today from the part of these countries regarding the current wave
of migration is also caused by the deficit of this historical learning process.
If I go one step forward, this is a mutual incomprehension between Western and Eastern Europe.
The Western Europeans are not able to understand the national (and nation state building)
problems of the Central and Eastern European region due to the fact that they are mostly happy,
satisfied nations. They do not remember their history with frustration, though they also have
some lost battles, as a whole, their story is a successful state building. The only exception is
Germany with its unique historical background; therefore Germany can better understand these
Eastern nations. The problem is that the western nations cannot really understand that the eastern
countries have never been in a lobbying position, in a potent situation.
In turn, the Central and Eastern Europeans are not able to understand and/or accept that the West
is not omnipotent. Many people think that the West can and must solve every kind of problem,
like it is its main task to do so and in case of failure they blame it for negligence and hostility.
Unfortunately, this is not true and this is not how it works. The main virtue of the West is its
predictability because its political system serves the society and not the opposite.
Reconquer the National Past: How these interpretations shape the conception of European
identity?
What we have witnessed since the fall of the Berlin wall was a kind of intellectual emancipation
in Central and Eastern Europe; the society reconquered its national past. Is this an escape from
impotency or a political renaissance? From the West it is seen as a return to the national past
which is only known by hearsay therefore poorly processed. Return to the national past which
was repressed and misinterpreted during the soviet period. It is almost understandable why these
national pasts are overvaulted, like a counteraction against the communist internationalism and
the historical approach against nations coming from it. If we examine the political
communications in these countries we can see that the past is in revival. Nevertheless, the return
to national traditions has several barriers: as this national past is clearly not evident, most of
these countries do not know which one to go back. The Central and Eastern European nations lost
their power over their own history which merged with the soviet history. This gives the
opportunity for the current political parties to create their own approach of national past and use
it for their own interests. Secondly, it is meaningless to speak about the return to the unclear
theory of the past as it only results conflict of traditions in the region. Every nation draws lessons
from the recent events according to its political and philosophical choice of value. Last but not
least, a barrier lay down in the social trauma and its long-term consequences caused by the soviet
period. Todays, every Central and Eastern European nation tries to draw an image about this
period as if it was a period of physical and moral violence, an unacceptable domination of an
alien nation. The society needs a scapegoat, possibly in an alien, in those whose belief is
different, or in the neighboring nation. For instance, it is well represented in the political
communication of the current government of Hungary which has currently found the scapegoat in
the European Union. However, what is more interesting how the behavior patterns from the
communist period live on (moreover dominate) in the region. Work ethics, civil courage, relation
with the power, and interpersonal relations’ style are all the same like during the soviet period.
The question is: how these nations can break out and break up with the soviet ‘traditions’?
After the accession to the European Union these nations seemed to commit themselves to the
European aims and values, however when they realized that the European Union is not a ‘charity
organization’, this process turned back to the hunting for an approach of national past. As Kende
(2014) emphasizes it: ‘do not confuse the past returning with the return to the past’.
Identification with the common values of the European Union: New ways that can
trace patterns toward a construction of a common ‘European identity’
As István Bibó (1986) put it, a federation is like a marriage, and those who knows the life and the
human soul, “they know that both for federation and marriage one can only enter if all pending
issues are arranged, or these issues soon or later will get out and will undermine the strength of
the whole federation”. With the previously analyzed historical background one must ask: in 2004
were the Central and Eastern European nations ready to join the European Union, were all the
issues arranged before the accession? To put it another way: Were they ready to identify
themselves with the ‘European identity’?
This paper will only examine how these nations have been struggling to identify themselves with
European values. The identification means here that they regard themselves part of the European
Union, accept and follow the common aims and principles of it.
For the ‘big’ Western European nations have a unique approach to this identification process:
they do not identify themselves with the EU, rather they identify the EU with themselves. If we
take it as a base, we will get three different Europe. For France the ideal picture of the future
Europe is like an ‘enlarged France’, for the Germans it would be like the miniature of the Federal
Republic of Germany and for the United Kingdom it would be only a free trade zone. So that the
French are pleased with the status quo, the Germans would like to see an actual continental
federation and the English would bring back the Europe of yesterday.
What about the smaller Central and Eastern European nations? First of all, obviously they will
always have less influence on the ‘design of the whole’ than the others. They cannot or should
not have dreams about a Europe in their own image which means that the ‘whole’ will be always
more alien for them than for the ‘big’ ones. However, if we think about it more, we can see that
they, these fragile Central and Eastern European nations are the real winners of this whole
integration process. They definitely need the shield of a more powerful entity, or a contract
system in which the ‘big ones’ control each other.
Just to go back to the difficulties of identification with the whole, a good example can be the first
speech of the ‘tens’ in the European Parliament when almost every of them ostentatiously chose
the national language. With this act they indicated that though they integrate politically, they do
not give up their cultural dignity. In any way the European Union does not require it, moreover in
the name of equality the EU recognizes all their members’ state language.
Along with this, considering the power lines of international politics and the necessity of the
globalizing world economics this integration is the best that could happen to these Central and
Eastern European nations, moreover the identification with the EU should be easier to them than
to the big ones. Although one can think that in general the new nations, especially the smaller
ones are more committed and more enthusiastic supporters of Europism, this is not the case and
the experience shows that it is just the opposite, the distrust of common public institutions is
stronger, also the Euroscepticism based on national selfishness is higher in these countries.
Today, more than a decade after the accession we must conclude that we are still far from the
total identification with the whole. To understand this, it is worth to mention again Bibó (1994)
who underlines that the nation states (in this region) as democratic communities could
everywhere achieve to gain that attention and emotional warmth which was previously dedicated
to the smaller, local communities. But (if it is possible) when the European Union, as a political
family will be able to gain the same attention that connects the European people to their nations?
Nowadays we can certainly conclude that this day will not come any time soon, as in the Central
and Eastern European countries we are witnessing the revival of the past with rising ethnic
nationalism. One of the common characteristics of the national aspirations in this region is that in
all of them can be historically found the roots of ethnic discrimination. In the ethnic concept of
the nation the origin, the alleged blood community and the cultural background all have
prominent places. Therefore, in this meaning the culture has a dissociative character, which also
contrasts the originally different groups of people living on the same territory. Unfortunately, the
soviet period did not weaken this perception; moreover it gave new impetus to it. The children of
socialism learnt already in the school that the ‘nation’ is only a form which can be found by
distinguishing cultural differences. In addition, one of the main characteristics of ethnic
nationalism is the convulsive return to the past. These Central and Eastern European countries
prefer to escape to a past from which they have eliminated all uncomfortable and disturbing
factors. Of course this means that the critical-minded intellectuals or the official scientific
historiography are in disagreement (and therefore regarded as the enemies of the power) with the
fanatics of the ‘glorious national past’. Coloring the past has become a social need; this is how
these trampled and humiliated small nations try to cope with everything unpleasant and painful in
their history, all that can threaten their self-esteem. Therefore, it is generally accepted that the
national past is glorious and exemplary, and all the bad were made by foreigners. For instance,
the policy of the current Hungarian government well represents the impact of ‘memory politics’
where the different interpretations of the national history are not tolerated and it is not allowed to
critically analyze it, because the slogan is: ‘we are not guilty nation’.
How can we trace patterns toward a construction of a common ‘European identity’? Obviously,
the turn toward the West and the accession to the European Union solely were not enough for
these nations. First of all, it is time that these Central and Eastern European nations learn how to
deal with all grievance of the national past. In order to build a normal and successful nation-state
these nations must learn how to draw lessons from the past and how to open a new page in their
history. Secondly, the majority of the European political communities are ‘micro-worlds’,
consisted of smaller multicultural groups which shows that the tendency of this century may not
be the classical nation. One can dislike the direction of the way of this development, but does not
acknowledge it is simply living in a fool’s paradise. This means that these smaller Central and
Eastern European nations must form political communities which are more appropriate for
reformation and for the acceptance of new civic groups. Last but not least, the main responsibility
of the Western nations is to help these nations in this process with their best knowledge and
patience.
Conclusion
To briefly summarize the main conclusions of this paper: the Central and Eastern European
countries are lost in the search for their national past which is unclear; and therefore can be
manipulated according to the interests of the government in power. While the main values of the
‘European identity’, namely human rights, the rule of law and democracy should have been the
catalyst for the democratic transformation, the historical identities of these nations have been
preventing their successful identification with the EU and the birth of a common ‘European
identity’. For many, this is associated, rightly or wrongly, with these Member States’ struggle
between their national interests and ‘EU interest’, both at the national and the international level.
However, the main problem is the mutual incomprehension between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’
Member States.
The main question for the future is: How can this mutual incomprehension be unlocked?
Obviously, the more than ten years period since the accession was not enough and/or well used
for the dialogue to better understand each other. Moreover, when it was revealed that the
‘European Dream’ of the (ex)Eastern Bloc, namely the high quality of life standards, economic
well-being, political and social satisfaction cannot be selected from an EU catalog, the
government of new Member States have disappointedly turned to create a new national policy.
This new national policy unfortunately led to the strengthening of ethnic nationalism, to the
scapegoat in the guise of the European Union, and to the (re)appearance of authoritarianism in
the region.
Disillusionment and disappointment in the European Union from the part of these nations
strengthened by the national government propaganda in the new Member States cause dangerous
damages in the formation of a ‘European identity’. In order to give a right direction to the
formation of a ‘European identity’ there is a need for social dialogue between the ‘old’ and ‘new’
Member States which can elaborate the painful memories of the past and redirect to a new period
of understanding and acceptance.
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