PRISONERS OF WAR—COLD WAR ALLIES: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
RELATIONSHIP WITH WEHRMACHT GENERALS
A Dissertation
by
DEREK RAY MALLETT
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
August 2009
Major Subject: History
PRISONERS OF WAR—COLD WAR ALLIES: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
RELATIONSHIP WITH WEHRMACHT GENERALS
A Dissertation
by
DEREK RAY MALLETT
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Approved by:
Chair of Committee,
Committee Members,
Head of Department,
Arnold P. Krammer
Joseph G. Dawson III
David Vaught
Adam R. Seipp
James Hannah
Walter Buenger
August 2009
Major Subject: History
iii
ABSTRACT
Prisoners of War—Cold War Allies: The Anglo-American Relationship with Wehrmacht
Generals. (August 2009)
Derek Ray Mallett, B.A., Culver-Stockton College;
M.A.; M.A., Truman State University
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Arnold P. Krammer
This study examines the relationship between British and American officials and
the fifty-five Wehrmacht general officers who were held as prisoners of war in the
United States during World War II. This relationship transformed as the war developed
and new national security concerns emerged in the immediate postwar era. As largely
evidenced by the records of the United States War Department and the British War
Office, the transformation of this relationship illustrates two important points.
First, despite some similarities, the respective priorities of British and American
authorities regarding their POW general officers differed significantly. British officials
consistently interrogated and eavesdropped on all of their senior officer prisoners,
primarily seeking operational and tactical intelligence to aid the Allied war effort. By
contrast, American officials initially had little regard for the value of Wehrmacht general
officer POWs.
Second, by the end of the war, admiration for the prowess of German officers
and the German military tradition in particular, coupled with anxiety about Soviet
iv
intentions and the strength of the Red Army, drove Washington into a collaborative
relationship with many of the Wehrmacht general officers in its custody. The evolution
of America’s national security concerns in the years immediately following the end of
World War II impacted its policy governing the treatment of high-ranking prisoners of
war.
v
DEDICATION
For Lula, Mildred, Matthew, Malcom, and most of all, for Susan.
vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank my committee chair, Dr. Krammer, and my committee
members, Dr. Dawson, Dr. Vaught, Dr. Seipp, and Prof. Hannah, for their guidance,
critical analysis, advice, suggestions and support throughout the completion of this
project.
Thanks also go to my students and colleagues and the department faculty and
staff for making my time at Texas A&M University an enjoyable and rewarding
experience. I also want to extend my gratitude to the History Department, the Melbern
G. Glasscock Center for Humanities Research, and the German Historical Institute for
their generous financial support.
Finally, thanks to my family and friends for their invaluable love and support.
My mother and father; Doug, Brenda and Drew; Jimi, Lenae, Alex, Wade, and Leah;
Chad; and the Feistel family all contributed a great deal to my work. And last, but most
certainly not least, to Adrienne, who meant more to this project than she knows.
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT ..............................................................................................................
iii
DEDICATION ..........................................................................................................
v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.........................................................................................
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..........................................................................................
vii
CHAPTER
I
INTRODUCTION................................................................................
1
II
FROM NORTH AFRICA TO NORTH LONDON .............................
32
III
HITLER’S GENERALS IN AMERICA..............................................
77
IV
“GUESTS” OF THE BRITISH............................................................ 121
V
THE CAROUSEL AT CAMP NO. 11................................................. 166
VI
THE SEEDS OF THE AMERICAN TRANSFORMATION.............. 218
VII
RE-EDUCATING HITLER’S GENERALS?...................................... 267
VIII
COLD WAR ALLIES.......................................................................... 312
IX
CONCLUSIONS.................................................................................. 364
REFERENCES.......................................................................................................... 394
APPENDIX A ........................................................................................................... 402
APPENDIX B ........................................................................................................... 404
APPENDIX C ........................................................................................................... 405
APPENDIX D ........................................................................................................... 406
VITA ......................................................................................................................... 408
1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Any discussion of German generals in the Second World War usually brings to
mind names like Erwin Rommel or Heinz Guderian. Undoubtedly, these men and
commanders like them played significant roles in the conduct of the war. Less attention
has been paid to the fates of hundreds of senior German officers taken prisoner by the
Allies, unless perhaps it is the fate of Wehrmacht officers in Soviet hands, those issuing
anti-Nazi propaganda from Russian prisoner of war camps being of particular note.
What seems to have been of least interest are the general officers captured by the
Western Allies and who spent anywhere from a few months to a few years in England or
North America. Indeed, little has been written about the fifty-five German general
officers who were held as prisoners of war in the United States during World War II.1
Yet, the collective story of these men’s experiences as prisoners of war reveals a great
deal about the different American and British perceptions of these men, and even more
about the different national security concerns of the America that first brought
Wehrmacht generals officers to the United States in the summer of 1943 and that which
repatriated the last of them in the summer of 1946.
__________
This dissertation follows the style of The Journal of Military History.
2
From the earliest stages of the war, providing for captured enemy soldiers
became an increasingly burdensome issue. When General Hans Jürgen von Arnim
surrendered the Axis’s North African forces in May 1943, 250,000 German and Italian
soldiers became the responsibility of the British and American governments. This
represented the first massive influx of POWs into Allied custody. These prisoners
included not only the usual German and Italian enlisted men and lower-ranking officers
but seventeen German general officers as well, including General von Arnim himself.
Washington and London engaged in a great deal of discussion regarding who should
take responsibility for these select prisoners. The two allies agreed that Britain’s
Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (CSDIC), the agency charged with
interrogating important prisoners of war in England, “should act as advanced echelon”
for their collaborative effort. But the ultimate question of “ownership” of these
prisoners was immaterial as transfers of some of the generals to the United States could
be easily effected. As if to demonstrate this, CSDIC sent four generals and a colonel
awaiting promotion to the United States on the first of June, a little more than two weeks
after their capture in North Africa, with more to follow as the war progressed.2
The U.S. War Department most likely deferred to the British in dealing with the
general officer prisoners because London had far more experience handling prisoners of
war. During the First World War, the British learned a great deal about caring for war
prisoners that laid the groundwork for an efficient and well-managed treatment of POWs
during World War II. Britain graduated from temporarily housing the Kaiser’s men
aboard ships in the winter of 1914-1915 to the establishment of land-based camps both
3
in the British Isles and in France the following year. Prisoners of the British enjoyed a
bountiful food allotment of 4600 calories a day through most of the war, and even when
Britons themselves struggled with food shortages in the spring of 1917, POWs still
consumed 3000 calories a day.3
Other staples of World War II British POW policy developed during the trials
and errors of the Great War as well. The use of prisoner labor, while not utilized at all
until the spring of 1916, quickly expanded until almost one-third of the German
prisoners in Britain were working at various agriculture jobs by war’s end. And, not
unlike their successors in the Second World War, World War I German officer prisoners
found themselves in stately mansions like Donington Hall in Derby, enjoyed the use of
adjacent acres of land for regular walks and were aided by enlisted prisoners who acted
as servants and orderlies.4
Historian Richard Speed contends that “British camps [during the Great War]
more nearly matched the prewar ideal of captivity than did those of any other European
belligerent.” The British government heavily weighed the often vague requirements of
the Hague Conventions that governed the treatment of war prisoners during World War I
and sought to incorporate the spirit of this existing international law to provide humane
treatment for all POWs. At the onset of the Second World War, twenty years later, the
British simply had to reincarnate the system for accommodating prisoners of war that
they had worked out during World War I.5
The American experience with prisoners, like their experience with the First
World War in general, was unique. Where the other belligerents began dealing with
4
prisoners of war in 1914, the United States did not officially enter the war until 1917,
and even then American troops did not see their first major engagement until Cantigny
in May of the following year. Only then, almost four years after the start of World War
I, did the Americans begin to establish some kind of apparatus to handle prisoners of
war. Prior to becoming an active belligerent, however, the Americans had served as the
protecting power for the war prisoners of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great
Britain and Russia. In this capacity, American officials inspected the camps of these
respective nations to ensure humane treatment of their prisoners. Thus, when U.S.
authorities began to develop their own POW policy they at least possessed some wellformulated ideals if no practical experience.6
When the first American units arrived in France in 1917, they served under
French command and, consequently, turned any captured prisoners over to French
control. As the American Expeditionary Force fully mobilized in Europe and entered
the war as an independent entity in 1918, the Americans insisted on handling their own
war prisoners. This enabled them to better negotiate with the German government in
regard to the treatment of American POWs. Near the end of the war, American
authorities even demanded that the French transfer any prisoners captured by American
forces back to U.S. control.7
The American experience with handling World War I POWs was also unique in
that circumstances largely compelled U.S. authorities to intern the overwhelming
majority of their prisoners on foreign soil. The American Army established 10 base
camps and 76 smaller labor camps throughout France, placing the Department of the
5
Provost Marshal General and its newly-created Prisoner of War Division in charge of
overseeing the entire operation. The Provost Marshal General initially considered
sending captured German officers to the United States. But after quickly being
overwhelmed with prisoners before adequate arrangements could be made to transport
them across the Atlantic, the Americans decided to keep the officers in France instead.
They eventually established quarters for all of these men at the Chateau Vrillays at
Richelieu in November 1918. The highest-ranking 85 officers, out of a total of 874
prisoners at Richelieu, were quartered in the chateau itself, while the remaining prisoners
lived in barracks constructed on the chateau grounds. In scenes similar to World War II
POW camps in the United States, almost all of the German officer prisoners occupied
themselves by engaging in educational courses, many of them taken for credit at German
universities.8
Washington established four internment camps in the United States during the
First World War, but only one of these held prisoners of war. Fort McPherson, on the
outskirts of Atlanta, Georgia, housed 1,356 German naval officers and enlisted men.
These prisoners, mostly U-boat crewmen, had all been captured near the Atlantic coast
and, thus, could more easily be kept in the United States rather than shipping them back
to Europe for confinement.9
The Americans dealt with prisoners of war fairly well during World War I,
considering the relatively short span of time they had to develop any kind of system and
appropriate apparatus. Yet, the American use of tents to house prisoners during a rainy,
French spring in 1918 when the other belligerents had long since established permanent
6
facilities and the deaths of dozens of prisoners employed disposing of munitions after the
war marred the American effort. Furthermore, the hastily assembled American system
of camps and logistics might well have been overwhelmed had the war not concluded
only a few months after the American Army took responsibility for its own prisoners.10
With this comparatively little experience dealing with World War I prisoners of
war, it is not surprising that the United States initially followed the British lead in
handling POWs during the Second World War. Additionally, by the time America
entered World War II, Great Britain had been dealing with prisoners of war in this
conflict for over two years. Also, British authorities already had experience dealing with
German generals, the first being Major General Hans Friemel, captured in the
Netherlands in May 1940. Generals Hans von Ravenstein and Artur Schmitt soon joined
Friemel, and London sent all three to POW camps in Canada where they remained until
1946.11 The British also had established facilities in England for two other German
generals, Ludwig Crüwell and Wilhelm Ritter von Thoma, who had been in captivity for
several months prior to the end of the North African campaign.
In addition to British experience and established facilities for prisoners of war,
the Americans also sought to emulate British intelligence practices and, consequently,
the two allies increasingly combined their intelligence operations as the war progressed.
Initially, the United States and United Kingdom operated prisoner of war interrogation
teams independently in North Africa with each attempting to gather information from
their own captures. By February 1943, however, they had pooled their staff and
resources to form the Allied Captured Intelligence Centre (ACIC) in Algiers. By the
7
climax of the war in North Africa in May 1943, American authorities replicated British
methods, assigning interrogators to work with British personnel in London to gain
“practical experience” under the guidance of British operatives.12
Despite the initial American willingness to learn from their British allies, the
U.S.-British joint handling of POW matters proved cumbersome, if not contentious, at
times. P. H. Gore-Booth, a senior official in the British Foreign Office, blamed the
American State and War Departments’ administration of prisoner affairs for much of the
problem. He characterized both as “bottle-neck departments,” observing that all
American POW issues filtered through a small number of key personnel who were
greatly overworked. He observed that J. H. Keeley, Head of the State Department’s
Special War Problems Division, “always [had] more special war problems on his desk
than he [could] cope with,” and Bernard Gufler, who served as Keeley’s “No. 2,” was
“in a similar situation.” The result, according to the British official, was that neither
man could devote their attention to any particular matter.13
Gore-Booth stated that this was even more pronounced in the case of the
principal War Department representative in the joint Anglo-American meetings. He
described Lieutenant Colonel M. C. Bernays as “desperately overworked” and whose
“superiors have paid no attention to his complaints on this score.” He praised Colonel
Bernays as a “tiger for work” and a “demon for thoroughness” who considered
everything in minute detail before approving it. Unfortunately, this meticulous approach
often led to delays in the joint meetings, as compromises had to be reached regarding the
wording of documents. The British official wryly noted that all drafts had to read
8
“quaintly,” as he put it, “since they [were] written in that curious mongrel, the AngloAmerican language.”14
In assessing the relationship between the two Allied nations, Gore-Booth
ultimately concluded that the U.S.-British collaboration worked successfully, albeit
slowly, thanks in part to the American personnel not sparing any effort to make the
procedure a success. In particular, he lauded both Bernays and Gufler for doing
“everything possible within the framework of the rather rigid American official
procedure to keep things moving.” But even the Americans, Gore-Booth added, were
“acutely conscious of the difficulties which their system sometimes presents.”15
If the observations of Gore-Booth are accurate, then American prisoner of war
administration was dogged by a lack of necessary personnel and overwhelming
workloads that bred inefficiency and delay. But despite the “machinery” of Washington,
as the British official termed it, the two countries learned to work together. When the
United States entered the war in December 1941, the two Allies established the 50-50
Agreement for the disposal of prisoners of war. This meant that every few months the
two nations would simply divide all newly captured prisoners of war into two equal
halves, regardless of who captured whom, with each being responsible for the
internment of their portion. This arrangement remained in effect until September 1944
when, after being inundated with prisoners of war in the months following D-Day,
Britain could no longer properly house an equal share of the prisoners and asked the
United States to abrogate the agreement. The Americans agreed to take responsibility
for an additional 175,000 German prisoners of war on behalf of the British government.
9
Consequently, the United States returned these men to British custody in 1946 rather
than repatriating them directly to Germany, causing a great deal of resentment among
the prisoners.16
Despite these postwar complications, the two Allies established a working
relationship regarding POW matters during the war. They shared a great deal of
information and regularly passed prisoners of war back and forth. Indeed, it appears that
the British even provided American military intelligence with copies of the transcripts of
the generals’ interrogations and the conversations recorded by CSDIC personnel because
the existing CSDIC reports regarding the German generals were stamped “Most Secret
(British) – Secret (American).”17 That British intelligence offered their American
counterparts access to these files may further explain American willingness to allow the
British to take the lead in holding and interrogating the German generals. U.S.
intelligence likely saw no need to expend precious American resources to operate
eavesdropping machinery or conduct interrogations of those generals who were later
transferred to U.S. custody when CSDIC had already done a capable job for them.
Yet, this seemingly one-way transfer of intelligence highlights a major difference
in the manner in which the two Allies initially viewed the German POW generals. The
British appear to have viewed these senior officers as potentially valuable from the start.
In addition to interrogations and secretly recorded conversations, in mid November
1943, only six months after their arrival in England, the Historical Branch of the British
War Cabinet decided that there was “a wealth of valuable material . . . emanating from
the German and Italian generals” and quickly assigned an officer to go through it in
10
detail. The Americans, by contrast, interrogated only the first parcel of generals sent to
the United States in June 1943. Once these men departed the U.S. interrogation center at
Byron Hot Springs, California, American officers would barely speak to the German
generals in their custody, much less actively interrogate them, and no attempts were ever
made at Camp Mexia, Texas; Camp Clinton, Mississippi; or Camp Dermott, Arkansas,
to secretly record any of the generals’ conversations. Even American interest in the
generals for strictly historical purposes did not emerge until after the war ended in 1945.
Where the British valued the generals as important “guests,” as they referred to them, the
Americans largely viewed them much as they did ordinary German prisoners of war.18
This discrepancy between the two Allies’ views of the generals was reflected in
their treatment of these prisoners. Unlike the British, the Americans did not feel
compelled to provide these distinguished prisoners with the extra amenities that the
generals thought appropriate to their rank and status. Consequently, a great deal of
resentment developed early on among the German generals toward their American
captors. At the heart of this resentment were some inherent cultural differences that may
have initially made the British better suited than the Americans to accommodate German
generals as prisoners of war, at least in the eyes of the generals themselves.
The German officer corps evolved from a feudal tradition where gentlemen of
noble birth commanded men in the field.19 While feudalism itself had long since
declined in Germany by the time of the Second World War, a significant portion of the
aristocracy still existed and a number of individual German officers descended from one
of these aristocratic families. For example, sixteen men held the rank of
11
Generalfeldmarschall (field marshal; equivalent to a U.S. five star general) in the
Germany Army as of 1 May 1944,20 of whom ten belonged to the aristocracy. Of these
ten aristocratic generals, nine were, themselves, descended from former German
generals or high-ranking officers. Thus, not only were the elite heads of the German
General Staff aristocrats but members of an aristocracy who had also inherited a strong
militaristic tradition.21
Similarly, one-third of the Generalobersten and Generalen der Infanterie
(equivalent to four-star—general—and three-star—lieutenant general—generals
respectively) were either members of the German aristocracy or held aristocratic family
connections through their wives or mothers. Moreover, these men were highly
decorated, with 85 percent of them having been awarded the Knight’s Cross of the Iron
Cross. Even the lower echelons of the cadre of German general officers,
generalleutnants and generalmajore (equivalent to American two- and one-star generals
respectively) reflected German aristocratic traditions. Of the 470 generalleutnants in the
German army in May 1944, 152 or 29 percent descended from aristocratic families.
Similarly, 176 or 31 percent of the 565 generalmajore held aristocratic family ties. This
same proportion of approximately 30 percent is represented by the five aristocrats
among the seventeen German general officers taken prisoner by the Allies in May
1943.22
As prisoners of the British, the aristocratic German generals found themselves in
the hands of similar gentlemen. Prior to the First World War, professional military
castes had influenced the development of both the German and the British officer corps
12
to a great extent. At the turn of the twentieth century over 80 percent of German and 40
percent of British generals and admirals had been noblemen, demonstrating that the
move toward more middle-class officers had only begun following World War I.
Further illustrating the similarities between the two nations’ military leaders, British
officers, like their German counterparts, often inherited their military tradition. From
1870 until the end of the 1950s, almost 40 percent of British generals and admirals had
fathers who had been military officers themselves, most of them holding the rank of
lieutenant colonel or above.23
Historian Correlli Barnett contends that during the 1940s and 1950s “the social
gulf—the gulf in status—between the British officer and his non-commissioned officers
and men . . . remained far wider than in European or North American armies.” Indeed,
the British officer corps developed from much the same feudal military traditions as did
the German. British general officers, like their German counterparts, came from the
upper and upper-middle classes. In the 1930s half of the general officers in the British
Home Army still hailed from the aristocracy or landed gentry. Even after the Second
World War, as late as 1952, the percentage of British general officers with aristocratic
heritage remained at almost 40 percent at a time when the rest of the officer corps had
been professionalized and become almost entirely middle class in nature.24
Therefore, during World War II, German prisoner of war generals and their
British captors had a great deal more in common, at least in terms of the social heritage
of the military, than did either group with the Americans. Perhaps these men could
understand each other on a social and cultural level that neither shared with their Yankee
13
counterparts. The British decision to devote significant resources and attention to their
German general officer prisoners and provide them with special privileges does not
appear to have been controversial. It was simply assumed that British authorities would
accommodate their social equals in a manner they thought befitting their own aristocratic
general officers.
The Americans, by contrast, shared neither their enemy’s nor their ally’s
aristocratic officer corps traditions. Thomas Jefferson founded the U.S. Military
Academy at West Point on the basis of the “natural aristocracy,” military cadets
ostensibly chosen mostly by talent and natural intelligence and not by wealth or social
status. Dr. Andrew Goodpaster, former NATO commander and West Point
commandant, once observed that “since [the founding of the USMA] America has never
had a military caste, either social or political. The officer corps has been drawn from all
corners and all levels of society. If the academy admitted enough sons of high officials,
civil and military, to raise the hackles of a few, it always also included a significant
number of lads whose fathers were cobblers, mechanics, and farmers.”25
During the American Civil War, many officers gained appointments for political
reasons as well as out of necessity when both the Union and Confederacy created more
military units than could be accommodated by graduates of the Military Academy. But
the U.S. officer corps further professionalized in the late nineteenth and twentieth
centuries as an increasing percentage of peacetime army and Marine Corps officers
obtained their commissions by graduating from a federal military school and not by
political appointments. The social origins of the American officer corps during its war
14
with Spain in 1898 reflected this more democratic composition. At a time when 40
percent of German military officers could tout their noble birth, more than half of U.S.
Army officers in the Spanish-American war had been appointed from the ranks of
enlisted men or as veterans of volunteer units. Four decades later, this democratic
heritage prompted one U.S. Marine Corps major to brag that “the professional soldiers
and sailors of this country are . . . connected in no way with any one region or caste, but
constituting in fact a cross section of the whole population.”26
The perception has long existed, at least among members of the American
military establishment, that the U.S. officer corps reflected the democratic ideals of the
civilian population. Historian Russell Weigley describes America’s first army,
Washington’s Continental Army during the Revolutionary War, as “a product of a
middle-class society,” and distinguishes it from contemporary European armies that
“remained largely the products of a feudal age.” He argues that “this distinction made
for profound differences of spirit, discipline, and organization.” In regard to officers in
particular, Weigley concludes that from its inception “the American officer corps came
from the same general social strata as the American soldiery, while European officer
corps were composed overwhelmingly of noblemen, or among the British at least of
members of the gentry.”27
In addition to the unique social composition of the U.S. military officer corps,
American perceptions of German generals during the Second World War may well have
been influenced by America’s long-standing societal distrust of professional militaries in
general. The American colonies inherited a citizen-soldier tradition from England in the
15
form of popular militias. The militias in England fell out of favor after the English Civil
War, much as they did in the rest of Europe, and by the early eighteenth century the
European powers relied almost exclusively on professional armies. But the United
States continued to utilize short-service militia and volunteers who only served during
wartime. These “citizen soldiers” proved useful time and again in American wars,
fighting to win American independence, routing British troops under Andrew Jackson at
the Battle of New Orleans, or defeating a Mexican army under Colonel Alexander
Doniphan—a volunteer himself—during the U.S.-Mexican War.
American suspicions of professional militaries even affected the development of
the U.S. Military Academy. Not only was admission to West Point structured to admit a
cross section of the American population, the school’s curriculum was designed as much
for practical concerns as it was for strictly military ones. As Russell Weigley observes,
“in a country not immediately imperiled by foreign enemies and jealous of standing
armies, the academy had to justify itself by preparing officers who could do useful work
in peace, so it became largely a school of civil engineering.”28
Despite going through a period of military professionalization in the late
nineteenth century, the United States entered World War II with its belief in a small
regular army and the virtues of citizen soldiers intact. This does not solely account for
the differences between American and British treatment of German generals. But it does
illustrate the potential for American military personnel to be reluctant to pay homage to
what they saw as an unnecessarily aristocratic and professional German military
hierarchy by providing these German officer prisoners with special privileges.
16
The cultural and intellectual climate of the two decades preceding U.S. entry into
the Second World War may have further aggravated American skepticism of
professional military institutions, the officer corps in particular. Widespread
disillusionment following the First World War bred a generation of antiwar writers and
intellectuals in Europe and the United States, including Erich Maria Remarque, Henri
Barbusse and Ernest Hemingway. During the 1920s and 1930s, the portrayal of U.S.
military officers by American intellectuals and professional academics reflected this
sense of disillusionment. Historian C. Robert Kemble argues that some American
writers and filmmakers in the two decades leading to the Second World War attacked the
quality of West Point as an academic institution and, thus, the quality of officers it could
produce. Yet, simultaneously, critics of American military officers expressed their fear
of an “undemocratic military caste,” labeling the American officer as “a Prussianistic
professional who had been trained to his autocratic ways . . . rather than the nineteenthcentury ersatz aristocrat who was despotic by class instinct.”29
Kemble contends that John Dos Passos’ novel Three Soldiers, originally
published in 1921, established the prototype that two decades of novelists followed. Dos
Passos’ antimilitary formula, according to Kemble, portrayed “sensitive, humanitarian,
intelligent” men of peace, frequently represented as Ivy League graduates, beaten down
by cruel, military authoritarians, often portrayed as West Point graduates. Kemble notes
that despite the later proliferation of American military heroes in World War II era films
and novels, the most preferred protagonist was a “patriotic but uncontaminated civilian
at heart,” rather than a professional soldier. Indeed, a New York Times Book Review
17
summation of American World War II novels written throughout the decade of the 1940s
found the common assumption that “all officers are cads, or worse.” The analysis
continued by observing that in most of these novels “the rule is that an officer’s capacity
for evil is in direct ratio to his rank; the higher the rank, the greater the scope for
villainy.” The reviewer concluded that “the officer caste in [American] World War II
fiction [fulfilled] a symbolic function: In these antifascist novels the officer is the fascist,
the authoritarian.”30
Consequently, Americans seemed predisposed to distrust professional military
officers, whether their own or those of another nation. In the American mind, who best
exemplified autocratic militarism if not an aristocratic, “Prussianistic professional”
general? If Americans heavily criticized the “undemocratic military caste” of their own
officer corps, one that had not developed from an aristocratic tradition, they would
undoubtedly oppose providing German general officers with what they may have viewed
as aristocratic treatment in the form of privileges that often exceeded the basic
requirements of international law.
Nevertheless, the German generals arrived in Allied custody expecting to be
treated like aristocrats. They encountered fellow gentlemen in England. The similarly
aristocratic British officer corps provided the generals with extra amenities and paid the
prisoners considerable respect and attention. The Americans, on the other hand, whether
because they lacked an aristocratic tradition, were influenced by a long-standing
suspicion of professional militaries, or simply because they allowed their anti-Nazi
18
animosity to temper their judgment, initially refused to offer the generals anything more
than that required by the Geneva Convention.
This discrepancy between British and American treatment of their German
general officer prisoners slowly began to change following the successful Allied
invasion of Normandy in June 1944. The slow steady advance of Allied troops across
Western Europe brought thousands more prisoners of war into Allied hands, including
dozens of German generals. Along with these prisoners came the realization that Allied
victory was likely and that the end of the war would leave the fate of Europe in the
hands of Britain and the United States.
Allied authorities, aware of the prominent status of the prewar German military,
believed that German prisoners of war might wield considerable influence in the postwar
years. Thus, it behooved the Allies to “re-educate” the well over half million German
men in their custody, some of whom undoubtedly still subscribed to the tenets of
National Socialism. In the fall of 1944, the British War Office and the American
Provost Marshal General’s Office initiated “intellectual diversion” programs designed to
subtly introduce German prisoners of war to the merits of western democracy.
If ordinary soldiers were being prepared for leadership roles in a new, democratic
German society, how much more important and influential might the general officers be?
In conjunction with the intellectual diversion program, a great deal of discussion ensued
in the fall of 1944 regarding the potentially influential roles these men might be able to
play in postwar Germany. For the first time, Allied perceptions of which general officer
prisoners were “Nazis” and which “anti-Nazis,” something CSDIC had been eager to
19
determine during the first two years of the generals’ stay in England, now became a
paramount concern.
One of the first tests of the political orientation of the generals had come in the
form of the National Committee “Free Germany” and its affiliated organization, the
League of German Officers, created in the Soviet Union during the late summer and
early fall of 1943. After Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus surrendered the German Sixth
Army at Stalingrad, the Soviet Union sought to make use of the twenty-three general
officers and the thousands of newly-captured German POWs in their custody to
undermine morale among German troops still fighting on the Eastern Front and to
encourage active resistance to the Hitler regime among the German population. The
National Committee and League of German Officers, collectively known as the Free
Germany Committee, consisted of German political exiles, enlisted prisoners of war and
about a hundred Wehrmacht officers headed by General Walter von Seydlitz. They
published a newspaper, Freies Deutschland, broadcast anti-Hitler appeals on the radio,
worked to recruit German prisoners in the Soviet camps, and even broadcast to German
troops at the front via loudspeakers.31
The Committee’s overall effect on German troops, the German homefront and
the outcome of the war was negligible. But British officials utilized their own captive
generals’ reactions to news of the Committee’s activities to gauge each individual
prisoner’s level of sympathy to the Nazi regime, as well as to evaluate the possibility of
creating a similar organization in Britain. While no such organization emerged from the
prisoners of war in either Britain or the United States, the possibility provoked a great
20
deal of discussion about the generals’ individual political views and potential value to
Allied plans for postwar Germany.
The end of the war in Europe transformed the American perception of the
importance of the German generals. The Grand Alliance of Britain, the United States
and the Soviet Union had been an uneasy one at best. While the three nations
successfully worked together to defeat Nazi Germany, mutual distrust and suspicion had
plagued their relationship from the beginning. With the war coming to an end in the
spring of 1945, those suspicions resurfaced and led the Americans and British to
question who actually posed the greatest threat to Western Allied interests.
The British, likely because of larger concerns about rebuilding their own wartorn nation, now allowed the Americans to take the lead in their relationship with
Wehrmacht generals. Despite a lack of interest in these senior officers during the war,
U.S. authorities suddenly began to appreciate their potential value to U.S. national
security. Thus began a relationship between U.S. civilian and military officials and
German general officers that would eventually see the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency make use of former
Wehrmacht officers for intelligence, leadership roles in the Federal Republic of
Germany, the writing of a comprehensive history of the Second World War, and even a
revision of U.S. Army policy.
The American perspective of the German generals who had come and gone from
the United States between June 1943 and June 1946 changed from one of neglect and
disregard to one of respect and admiration. Curiously, these senior officers became far
21
more valuable to American interests after the war ended than they had been before.
Indeed, these prisoners of war emerged as allies in the early years of the Cold War.
A great deal has been written about Germany’s World War II military officer
corps, including numerous books about Hitler’s generals. But the overwhelming
majority of these works focus on particular generals’ leadership in specific battles or
their participation in the plot against Hitler’s life and largely neglect the generals as
prisoners of war. Only two books offer significant treatment of the generals in British
custody. British historian Matthew Barry Sullivan devotes two chapters to the British
treatment of German generals in his comprehensive study of German prisoners of war in
Britain during the Second World War. Sullivan provides basic descriptions of the camps
at Trent Park, Wilton Park, Grizedale Hall and Bridgend, all housing German general
officer prisoners at some point during or immediately after the war, as well as a handful
of very colorful stories. Sullivan’s work, however, was published in 1979 before the
files of the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre had been opened by the
British National Archives (formerly the Public Records Office). Thus, it lacks the
detailed description of the generals’ experiences or any analysis of the generals’ taped
conversations made possible by the availability of these records.32
German historian Sönke Neitzel subsequently published a fascinating look at the
British internment and interrogation of German generals during the war. Neitzel utilizes
the CSDIC files that were unavailable to Sullivan and analyzes the generals’ views on
select topics during the three years that the British housed German generals at Trent
Park. As the title indicates, the majority of the book consists of the transcripts of a select
22
number of the POW generals’ conversations, secretly recorded by CSDIC operatives
without the generals’ knowledge. Neitzel provides solid background information on the
British intelligence operation and the running of the camp and his selection and analysis
of the transcripts address some very interesting questions. Yet, considering the total
volume of these files still largely unused, the author obviously intends to foster further
research more than to provide any conclusive word on the subject.33
Similarly, little has been written in regard to the German generals in American
hands. Judith Gansberg’s Stalag: U.S.A. briefly mentions the use of facilities in Byron
Hot Springs, California, to interrogate a few German generals, their subsequent passage
through Camp Mexia, Texas, and their final home in Camp Clinton, Mississippi. But
Gansberg provides no description or analysis of the American treatment of these men.
Arnold Krammer offers the only substantive history of German generals in American
custody. He briefly discusses the generals held at Camp Clinton in Nazi Prisoners of
War in America, and focuses exclusively on the American treatment of German generals
in the United States in a January 1990 article in the Journal of Military History.
Krammer covers substantial ground, including the initial American interrogation of the
generals in California and some of the generals’ experiences in Camp Clinton. He
suggests that American authorities missed opportunities to utilize these men for
intelligence and propaganda purposes and criticizes U.S. War Department officials and
camp commanders for simply ignoring these men during the time they spent in
American camps during the war.34
23
The discussion of Allied interest in German generals in the postwar era is largely
limited to two articles that focus exclusively on the U.S. Army Historical Division’s
German military history program. Historian Kevin Soutor traces the impact of the series
of reports prepared by the program’s former Wehrmacht generals on the development of
American military policy in the early years of the Cold War. Soutor ably demonstrates
that these reports, totaling over 200,000 pages, led to changes in U.S. Army policy. His
article offers detailed descriptions of the doctrinal changes the U.S. Army made and how
the former generals influenced these changes, including a revision of U.S. Army Field
Manual 100-5 completed by six of the most prominent German generals in the
program.35
Historian James A. Wood also looks at the U.S. Army Historical Division’s
German military history program following World War II. He demonstrates how
heavily the official history of the U.S. Army in World War II series, as well as numerous
subsequent historical monographs, relied on these reports. In doing so, Wood argues
that allowing former Wehrmacht generals to prepare operational reports and “lessons
learned” from the war also allowed these men to shape historians’ perceptions of the
German officer corps and their relationship to Adolf Hitler.36
In regard to the influential roles of former German generals in the postwar era,
historian Jay Lockenour examines the influence of Wehrmacht officers in the Federal
Republic of Germany. He contends that the success of the West German state can be
attributed, in part, to the former officer corps’ decision to support representative
democracy rather than to undermine it as their predecessors had following the First
24
World War. Lockenour focuses on the entire officer corps, not just the generals,
although he does analyze the leadership roles of particular former general officers in
veteran’s organizations in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Overall, his study covers only
the officers’ participation in West German politics and public debate and does not deal
with their potential influence in other arenas.37
German historian Alaric Searle provides the most comprehensive examination of
the influence of Wehrmacht generals in the Federal Republic of Germany. He argues
that the generals played numerous key roles in the new state, including but not limited to
the debate on rearmament in the early 1950s.
His specific focus on general officers
includes detailed discussion of the positions attained by former generals such as Adolf
Heussinger and Hans Spiedel, as well as Reinhard Gehlen and the formation of the
Bundesnachtrichtendienst, the FRG’s intelligence agency. Like Lockenour, Searle also
deals with postwar veterans’ leaders such as Ludwig Crüwell and Hermann Ramcke,
demonstrating their influential positions in West German society.38
The case of Wehrmacht General Reinhard Gehlen is exceptional. Historian Mary
Ellen Reese traces Gehlen from his position as chief of Fremde Heer Ost (German
Eastern Front Intelligence Service), through his relationship with the U.S. Army and the
Central Intelligence Agency, and then to the subsequent re-establishment of his
intelligence organization in postwar Germany. Reese’s account provides detailed
coverage of Gehlen’s professional career and maintains that Gehlen was the first and
most significant Wehrmacht officer with whom the American authorities developed a
relationship after the war ended, one predicated on suspicions of the Soviet Union.
25
Reese offers sparing analysis of some key issues, however, particularly the discrepancy
between the value American intelligence placed on the information Gehlen provided
them about Soviet activities in Eastern Europe and Soviet-occupied Germany and the
actual quality of the intelligence his organization supplied.39
This dissertation focuses on those generals who were at some point prisoners of
war in America and looks at American and British treatment of these men from initial
capture in 1943 until the last of them were repatriated in 1948. Because the
overwhelming majority of these men spent time in the respective camps of both Britain
and the United States, they serve as an interesting comparison between American and
British treatment and perceptions of these prisoners of war. Furthermore, these men also
best illustrate the dramatic American change of heart in the postwar era. Having been
largely disregarded as POWs during the course of the war, the relationships these
generals developed with American authorities after the war demonstrate the evolution of
American national security interests in the immediate postwar years and the impact this
evolution had on U.S. POW policy.
The dissertation is divided into two sections. The first covers the period from
May 1943 through May 1944 when the greatest discrepancy between British and
American treatment of the generals existed and the Americans placed very little value on
these senior prisoners. This section includes chapters that deal with the establishment of
the generals’ camps in Britain (Chapter II) and the United States (Chapter III),
respectively. Brief biographical sketches of each of the generals captured in North
Africa are included and the early differences between the Allies’ views of these
26
prisoners are highlighted. Chapter IV further addresses the issue of Allied perceptions
of the generals and evaluates early British and American attempts to discern the
prisoners’ political orientations.
The dissertation’s second section deals with the transformation of Allied policy
regarding the general officer prisoners. Chapter V introduces the generals captured in
the months following the Allied invasion of France and examines the developing British
interest in German war crimes and their prisoners’ views of each of the Allied powers.
Chapters VI and VII evaluate Washington’s reconsideration of the generals’ value, the
American re-education program for its general officer prisoners and the programs’ lack
of direction and ultimate abandonment. The eighth chapter analyzes the American
return to interrogating and eavesdropping on German general officers and the
establishment of a secret military intelligence project designed, in part, to provide Allied
authorities with information about Soviet military capabilities. The ninth and final
chapter discusses Allied repatriation of the general officer prisoners, emphasizing the
strong American relationship with former Wehrmacht generals in the early years of the
Cold War, and summarizes the dissertation’s conclusions.
My interpretative approach deals in part with issues of perception. Both the
British and the Americans attempted to discern how much each individual prisoner
adhered to the tenets of National Socialism and subsequently made decisions based on
these assessments. Unfortunately, the accuracy of these determinations was highly
debatable, and ultimately difficult to adequately assess. Allied intelligence operatives
often associated Prussian militarism with Nazism, and easily classified any prisoner who
27
refused to cooperate with camp authorities as a devout follower of Hitler. The Allies’
perceptions of the prisoners as “Nazi” or “anti-Nazi” may, in fact, say more about the
British and American captors than they do about the German captives.
Yet, how much did considerations of families living under the Nazi regime affect
prisoner behavior? Did the Allies recognize any difference between German patriotic
loyalty on the one hand and an actual belief in National Socialism on the other? How
much did Allied perceptions of who was and who was not a Nazi influence their
decision-making? And, were the prisoners that Allied authorities deemed to be the most
open to a democratic message and perhaps the best suited for postwar leadership
positions really the most democratically-minded or were they simply opportunists?
The broadest of the questions to be addressed and the structural thesis of the
dissertation addresses why Allied authorities changed their ideas about the value of the
German generals in their custody, and how these changes impacted the respective Allied
relationships with these prisoners. Almost immediately when the war ended, the British
seemingly lost interest. While they retained custody of these senior officers for another
three years, the British moved the generals’ camp to a different location and ceased all
eavesdropping and interrogation operations. The Americans, by contrast, found German
generals far more useful after the war than they ever had before. Unlike the British,
American perceptions of the value of the generals directly correlated to changes in
American beliefs about who the “enemy” was at war’s end. For the United States, the
“German question” had been answered and a new threat had emerged.
28
Notes
1
See Arnold Krammer, “American Treatment of German Generals during World War II,”
Journal of Military History 54 (January 1990), 27-46, for the only study of German prisoner of
war generals in the United States.
2
War Diary, May 1943, WO 165/ 41, the National Archives of the United Kingdom (hereafter
TNA), Kew, Richmond, Surrey, United Kingdom.
3
Richard B. Speed III, Prisoners, Diplomats, and the Great War: A Study in the Diplomacy of
Captivity (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 98-100.
4
Speed, Prisoners, Diplomats, and the Great War, 101-103.
5
Ibid., 31, 105.
6
For more on the United States serving as a protecting power during the First World War, see
Speed, Prisoners, Diplomats, and the Great War.
7
Speed, Prisoners, Diplomats, and the Great War, 123-126.
8
Ibid., 126-135.
9
Ibid., 156.
10
Ibid., 138.
11
Matthew Barry Sullivan, Thresholds of Peace: Four Hundred Thousand German Prisoners
and the People of Britain, 1944-1948 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1979), 219-220.
12
F. H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and
Operations, Volume Two (London: HMSO, 1991), 32-51; War Diary, April 1943, WO 165/ 41,
TNA.
13
Letter from P. H. Gore-Booth, 14 March 1944, FO 916/ 886, TNA.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
29
16
Ibid.; Sullivan, Thresholds of Peace, 22.
17
Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (CSDIC) reports of interrogations and
conversations between the German prisoner of war generals are housed in the Records of the
War Office: Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence, and Directorate of Military
Intelligence; Ministry of Defense, Defense Intelligence Staff: Files (WO 208) at the National
Archives of the United Kingdom; Duplicate copies of some of the reports can be found in the
files of the U.S. War Department’s General and Special Staffs at the National Archives and
Records Administration in College Park, Maryland.
18
Letter from P. H. Gore-Booth, 14 March 1944, FO 916/886, TNA; War Diary, November
1943, WO 165/41, TNA.
19
For an examination of the German officer corps see Karl Demeter, The German Officer-Corps
in Society and State 1650-1945 (New York: Praeger, 1965).
20
1 May 1944 was the last publicly accessible rank list of the World War II German Army—
Nikolaus v. Preradovich, “Die militärische und soziale Herkunft der hohen Generalität des
deutschen Heeres am 1. Mai 1944,” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 20 (1970), no. 1, 44.
21
Ibid., 45-55.
22
Ibid., 45-55; Preradovich, Nikolaus v., Die militärische und soziale Herkunft der Generalität
des deutschen Heeres, 1. Mai 1944 (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1978), 43, 51; The five
aristocratic generals in Allied custody in 1943 were von Arnim, von Sponeck, von Broich, von
Liebenstein, and von Hülsen, C.S.D.I.C., G.R.G.G. 70, 14 August 1943, WO 208/5016, TNA.
23
George A. Kourvetaris and Betty A. Dobratz, Social Origins and Political Orientations of
Officer Corps in a World Perspective (Denver: University of Denver, 1973), 2-4, 21-22, 60.
24
Correlli Barnett, Britain and Her Army, 1509-1970: A Military, Political and Social Survey
(London: Allen Lane the Penguin Press, 1970), 487-488; P. E. Razzell, “Social Origins of
30
Officers in the Indian and British Home Army: 1758-1962,” British Journal of Sociology 14
(September 1963), 253.
25
Garry D. Ryan and Timothy K. Nenninger, eds., Soldiers and Civilians: The U.S. Army and
the American People (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 1987),
7.
26
Edward M. Coffman, The Regulars: The American Army, 1898-1941 (Cambridge: Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 50, 288; Kourvetaris and Dobratz, Social Origins and
Political Orientations, 60.
27
Russell F. Weigley, Towards an American Army: Military Thought from Washington to
Marshall (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 6.
28
Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy
and Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 81.
29
Charles Robert Kemble, “Mutations in America’s Perceptions of Its Professional Military
Leaders: An Historical Overview and Update,” Armed Forces and Society Online First (InterUniversity Seminar on Armed Forces and Society – http://afs.sagepub.com, 4 April 2007), 6-8;
see also Charles Robert Kemble, The Image of the Army Officer in America (Westport, Conn:
Greenwood Press, 1973).
30
Ibid., 8-9; George MacMillan, “A Decade of War Novels: The Accent Has Been Political.”
New York Times Book Review, 9 December 1951, 235.
31
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, “The Free Germany Committee: An Historical Study,” Review of
Politics 14, No. 3 (July 1952), 346-366; See also Bodo Scheurig, Free Germany: The National
Committee and the League of German Officers (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press,
1969).
32
See Sullivan, Thresholds of Peace.
31
33
See Sönke Neitzel, Tapping Hitler’s Generals: Transcripts of Secret Conversations, 1942-45
(Barnsley, S. Yorkshire: Frontline Books and St. Paul, MN: MBI Pub., 2007); original title:
Abgehört: Deutsche Generäle in britisher Kriegsgefangenschaft 1942-1945 (Berlin: Ullstein
Buchverlage GmbH, 2005).
34
See Judith M. Gansberg, Stalag, U.S.A.: The Remarkable Story of German POWs in America
(New York: Crowell, 1977); Arnold Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America (Lanham, MD:
Scarborough House, 1996 [1979]); Krammer, “American Treatment of German Generals,” 2746.
35
See Kevin Soutor, “To Stem the Red Tide: The German Report Series and Its Effect on
American Defense Doctrine, 1948-1954,” Journal of Military History 57 (October 1993), 653688.
36
See James A. Wood, “Captive Historians, Captivated Audience: The German Military History
Program, 1945-1961,” Journal of Military History 69 (January 2005), 123-148.
37
See Jay Lockenour, Soldiers as Citizens: Former Wehrmacht Officers in the Federal Republic
of Germany, 1945-1955 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001).
38
See Alaric Searle, Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on
Rearmament, 1949-1959 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003).
39
See Mary Ellen Reese, General Reinhard Gehlen: The CIA Connection (Fairfax, Va.: George
Mason University Press, 1990).
32
CHAPTER II
FROM NORTH AFRICA TO NORTH LONDON
The first large group of German generals to arrive in Allied hands came from the
massive German surrender in Tunisia in May 1943. In September 1940, Italian Fascist
dictator Benito Mussolini had initiated a campaign against the British in North Africa.
He met with only limited success before British forces drove the Italians out of Egypt
and into western Libya by early 1941. In an effort to save his ally, German Chancellor
Adolf Hitler sent German forces to North Africa under the leadership of General Erwin
Rommel, who promptly regained most of the territory the Italians had lost. The
subsequent struggle between British General Bernard Montgomery’s Eight Army and
the “Desert Fox’s” Afrika Korps is well-documented. The British drove the Germans
back through Libya by January 1942 only to have Rommel, freshly reinforced, conquer
much of British-controlled Egypt over the next five months. But with Montgomery’s
victory at El Alamein in November, Axis fortunes finally began a decline from which
they could not recover.
The Allies initiated a pincer movement in November 1942 with Operation Torch,
landing 65,000 men at Oran, Algiers and Casablanca on the western coast of North
Africa. The Germans initially responded well to the Allied offensive, crushing
previously untested American forces at Kasserine Pass in February 1943. However,
insufficient resources and a dispute between Rommel and General Hans Jürgen von
Arnim, commander of the Fifth Panzer Army, halted the German advance. Following
33
the British attack on the Mareth Line in March and Rommel’s departure from North
Africa because of his declining health, von Arnim’s remaining Armee Gruppe Afrika
found itself hemmed into a small area around Tunis and Bizerte. Short of supplies and
unable to retreat any further, Von Arnim finally capitulated on 12 May 1943,
surrendering all of Germany’s forces in Tunisia.
Along with the surrender of a quarter million German and Italian soldiers came
seventeen German generals as well. The first of these was Lieutenant General Gustav
von Vaerst, a recipient of the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross, one of the highest honors
bestowed by the German military. Von Vaerst had only been in command of the Fifth
Panzer Army for two months when he was forced to surrender his unit to American
General Omar Bradley on 9 May 1943. Accompanying von Vaerst was his chief of
staff, August Victor von Quast. Von Quast, while only a colonel, insisted that his
promotion to brigadier general was pending from German authorities and demanded that
he be treated as a general officer while in captivity. (Indeed, he received his promotion
to generalmajor (brigadier general)1 on 1 August 1943, although American skepticism
about his rank followed him for the rest of the war.)2
The surrender of von Vaerst and his staff signaled the beginning of the end for
German forces in North Africa. Later the same day, Brigadier General Fritz Krause,
commander of the 334th Infantry Division, sent three members of his staff bearing a
white flag to the headquarters of the American First Armored Division. The American
divisional commander instructed some of his men to accompany the Germans back to
General Krause’s headquarters to deliver American demands: “Unconditional surrender,
34
no sabotage and no attempt to evacuate troops by sea. We will kill all who try to get
out.” Given twenty minutes to decide, the German artillery commander quickly
accepted the terms and drove back, along with his staff, through the American lines to
formally surrender, pausing en route only to order some of his men to stop destroying
equipment.3
Krause arrived at American headquarters shortly ahead of one of his colleagues,
Major General Willibald Borowietz. Borowietz had earned rapid promotion as
commander of the Fifteenth Panzer Division due to his superb leadership during the last
days of the German Tunisian campaign. He was promoted to brigadier general on 1
January 1943 and then major general a scant four months later on the first of May.
Already a decorated soldier bearing the Knight’s Cross, he received the Oak Leaves on
10 May 1943 for having counterattacked and destroyed two-thirds of a large British tank
force in Tunisia with a depleted tank force of his own. Yet, despite this earlier success,
he now found himself a prisoner of war.4
Unlike Krause who sent staff officers to enquire about surrender terms,
Borowietz drove a car with a red cross affixed to the front to American headquarters,
walked 150 feet through a wheat field to the American major general’s tent, clicked his
heels, saluted and announced that he had come to surrender. When asked if he
understood that the surrender must be unconditional, Borowietz nodded his
acknowledgment. After surrendering, however, Borowietz broke down and wept while
speaking with an American army chaplain. “I am a general without a command,” he
lamented. “I have seen my division split in two and my panzers wiped out. I have no
35
panzers, no artillery, not even a grenadier.” He then went on a tirade, chastising the
United States for allying with the Soviet Union, claiming that the Germans were beating
the Russians and that the Americans would lose the war because of their alliance with
the U.S.S.R. Not surprisingly, he garnered little sympathy or any serious attention from
his captors.5
Allied attention now turned to Major General Karl Robert Max Bülowius, who
had temporarily served as commanding officer of the Afrika Korps in February 1943.
Despite Rommel’s criticism of his leadership during the German offensive at Kasserine
Pass, Bülowius assumed command of the Manteuffel Division in April 1943, which he
subsequently surrendered to the Allies. On 9 May, he joined von Vaerst, Krause and
Borowietz as an Allied POW. Clearly, the North African campaign was collapsing, and
over the next three days other German generals from Armee Gruppe Afrika arrived in
Allied hands as well, including Major General Karl Peter Bernard Köchy, Luftwaffe
general and Afrika Korps air commander. His previous experience in the German Navy
made him a particularly interesting and potentially valuable prisoner. Communications
specialist and former commandant of Tobruk, Brigadier General Ernst Schnarrenberger,
and the Austrian Captain Paul Meixner, Chief of Staff for the German and Italian Naval
command in Tunisia, also found themselves prisoners of war of the British and
Americans.6
Two German generals whom Allied interrogators later found to be of great
importance were Brigadier General Kurt Freiherr von Liebenstein and Major General
Theodor Graf von Sponeck. The well-heeled Von Liebenstein, with his prominent
36
mustache and Knight’s Cross, surrendered to the Allies in the final hours of the North
African campaign. He served as chief of staff for the renowned panzer leader Colonel
General Heinz Guderian earlier in his career and commanded the 164th Light Division
from December 1942 until he too was forced to surrender to the Allies on 12 May.7
Von Sponeck, whose uniform was also adorned with a Knight’s Cross, had
assumed command of the 90th Light Africa Division in September 1942. He “performed
brilliantly” in the German retreat, fighting “nearly 2,000 miles from Egypt to
Enfidaville.” On 12 May, after being informed that he must surrender unconditionally,
von Sponeck first replied that his men would fight to the last bullet. Given time to
further contemplate his alternatives, however, von Sponeck surrendered to the British
Eighth Army’s New Zealand Division. He later explained, “Most of my tanks were
immobile through lack of fuel and our air support was negligible. I held out for 48
hours, but by then, we had received such a terrific battering, that I thought ‘Hitler or no
Hitler,’ I will surrender. There’s no sense in prolonging this needless slaughter.”8
Heinrich-Hermann von Hülsen also joined this distinguished group of prisoners.
He had recently assumed command of the 21st Panzer Division near the end of April
1943 and only received a promotion to brigadier general a few days later on the first of
May. Unfortunately for von Hülsen, he was forced to surrender after having been in
command of the 21st Panzer for less than two weeks. Likewise, Gotthard Frantz had
recently been promoted to major general at the time of his surrender in May 1943 as
well. Frantz, however, had commanded the 19th Flak Division for six months before its
surrender on 13 May 1943.9
37
The biggest catch and the senior officer among the generals captured in North
Africa was Colonel General Hans Jürgen von Arnim. At the time of his surrender, he
was one of the most prominent German prisoners of war in Allied hands, second only to
Rudolf Hess who had parachuted into England on a mysterious mission. Von Arnim
descended from a long line of Prussian military officers. A highly-decorated veteran of
both fronts in the First World War, he remained one of the four thousand officers of the
Reichswehr—the German army after the Treaty of Versailles—following WWI.
Whether he was as devoted to National Socialism as the British later suspected is
questionable, but von Arnim did appear to be one of Hitler’s favorite officers. In spite of
having no previous experience with armor, he was nonetheless given command of the
17th Panzer Division in autumn 1940 and distinguished himself on the Eastern front.
Field Marshall Ernst Busch praised von Arnim’s “strong relationship with the troops”
and his ability to remain “unruffled and strong-nerved . . . in the most difficult
situations.” He too was awarded the Knight’s Cross in September 1941 and promoted to
full general a little more than a year later. Upon being given command of the Fifth
Panzer Army in North Africa, Hitler promised von Arnim that he would receive all the
supplies necessary for his operations in the desert, a broken promise that von Arnim
would not forget.10
Despite von Arnim’s earlier success in Russia, the North African campaign
revealed the limits of his leadership skills and is generally considered his poorest
performance in the war. Indeed, historian Correlli Barnett characterizes von Arnim as an
“excellent tactician” who was responsible for a number of “important local victories,”
38
but an overly conservative officer who “had been promoted above his ceiling.” Part of
the problem was the aristocratic von Arnim’s relationship with Erwin Rommel. Rommel
intended to use their combined forces in an offensive strategy against the Allies in the
spring of 1943. Von Arnim, who envied the success and notoriety of the Desert Fox
while disdaining his middle-class background, refused to cooperate. Complicating
matters, a clear chain of command had not been established before von Arnim arrived in
North Africa. Consequently, on the third day of their coordinated attack in February
1943, von Arnim withheld parts of the 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions instead of
following the pre-arranged plan. Despite Rommel’s pleas to the German military
command and their subsequent reprimand of von Arnim, the Prussian still would not
release all of the tanks necessary for the operation and Rommel’s offensive had to be
aborted. Von Arnim’s subsequent “ill-conceived and unsuccessful” Operation Ox Head
resulted in heavy losses, and only served to further delay Rommel’s attack against the
British. Eventually, having been stymied by both von Arnim and the British Army,
Rommel departed North Africa on 9 March 1943, exhausted and in poor health.11
This left von Arnim, Rommel’s replacement, outnumbered and without the
necessary provisions—Hitler’s promises notwithstanding—to face the Allies in
command of Armee Gruppe Afrika. Von Arnim notified Berlin that he would require
140,000 tons of supplies per month to mount a successful defense against the Allies in
North Africa. In January 1943 von Arnim had received approximately 46,000 tons of
supplies, considerably less than he had expected. This figure dropped even further to
about 33,000 tons the following month, owing to Allied bombing of Axis supply ships in
39
the Mediterranean and Hitler’s focus on the Eastern Front. When Berlin criticized von
Arnim for “squinting over [his] shoulder,” referring to the general’s conservative retreat
in Tunisia, von Arnim bitterly replied that he was “squinting at the horizon” for ships
that never arrived.12
After the Allies launched their final offensive on 6 May, Hitler sent word that
von Arnim’s forces were to fight to the last man. The general chose to interpret this
directive as requiring them to fight to the last bullet, or more specifically, the last tank
shell. Thus, with the supply of tank shells exhausted on 12 May 1943, von Arnim
destroyed what was left of his tanks and guns and surrendered. For the official
ceremony, von Arnim donned his finest uniform and submitted his pistol and knife—
although grudgingly and in French, despite his proficiency in English—to the British.
He packed his remaining personal items, delivered a brief speech to his subordinate
officers and concluded by shaking each of their hands and exchanging salutes. He was
then escorted through long lines of his devoted men chanting “von Arnim! Von Arnim!
Von Arnim!”13
The British initially received von Arnim with a great deal more cordiality than
did the Americans. In fact, von Arnim’s surrender serves as an interesting comparison
of the two Allied nations’ initially differing attitudes toward their captive German
generals. American General Dwight Eisenhower broke with customary protocol and
refused to meet von Arnim or accept his sword in surrender, citing Germany’s wartime
atrocities and apparent unwillingness to resist the leadership of a man like Adolf Hitler
as justification. By contrast, British Field Marshall Harold Alexander hosted von Arnim
40
in his tent, and even later expressed regret that he had not been “more chivalrous” and
complimentary of the German general’s forces.14
Von Arnim and his subordinate generals remained in temporary camps in North
Africa for three days awaiting their transportation to England. Due to the AngloAmerican arrangement regarding the German general officers, the British first took
custody of all of these senior prisoners of war. During these first few days, British
escorting officers noted that Generals von Vaerst and Krause appeared “shaken and
depressed,” while others, Bülowius in particular, quickly resigned themselves to their
fate. Bülowius even began preparing a list of demands for his captors. Before departing
North Africa, the generals enjoyed a three-hour excursion through a valley famous for its
wildlife and a tea party at the residence of an anonymous English lady. General von
Sponeck later recalled how much the generals appreciated these friendly gestures.15
Despite this indulgence, some of the generals were indignant about their initial
treatment as prisoners of war. They claimed that the “English did not know how to treat
a commanding general,” and labeled their temporary camp a “prison” that was
“impossible” for men of their rank. The generals’ complaints involved their initial
accommodation in tents on rocky, unshaded ground. Von Sponeck described how the
constant heat and midday sun made him feel as though he was “gasping for air like a fish
on dry land.” But these brief conditions were almost unavoidable considering the
volume of POWs suddenly flooding the Allies. British officials quickly transferred the
generals to better locations and the grumbling soon stopped. In fact, some of the
generals would have complained no matter how they were treated. British camp
41
authorities later discovered that the prisoners planned to “contrast the magnanimity of
the Americans with the small shopkeeper mentality of the British” in the international
press to further the German propaganda scheme of planting seeds of dissension between
the two allies.16
Whatever the generals’ intentions, the British ignored their complaints and began
transferring them from North Africa to England on 15 May 1943. While en route, they
passed through Gibraltar, where the military governor, Lieutenant General Frank
Macfarlane, accommodated von Arnim in the governor’s palace. The other generals
stayed in rooms prepared for them in the local military hospital. The following day von
Arnim proceeded to England alone with his fellow officers scheduled to follow within a
few days. He arrived on 16 May, a day when Britain happened to be celebrating the
Allied victory in Tunisia by ringing church bells all over England, Scotland and
Northern Ireland. It must have added insult to von Arnim’s injury to be driven from
Hendon Airport south of London to Trent Park in the north part of the city to the sound
of a national celebration honoring his defeat.17
Once in England, the British interned the German generals at Camp No. 11
located at Trent Park, a private estate in the north London suburb of Cockfosters. British
authorities organized Camp No. 11 as part of the Combined Services Detailed
Interrogation Centre (CSDIC), the agency charged with the interrogation of important
prisoners of war. Considering the number of potentially valuable German and Italian
prisoners of war, CSDIC commandeered several splendid homes including Wilton Park
and Latimer House. The British hoped these stately mansions would lull prisoners into
42
relaxing and cooperating. German general officers sometimes temporarily transited
through Wilton Park, but Trent Park remained the generals’ designated residence
throughout the war.18
The Trent Park estate, a remnant of the once vast Enfield Chase royal hunting
grounds, featured a stately mansion dating to the end of the 18th century. Numerous
renovations and additions over the years had enlarged the mansion and the estate,
culminating in the luxurious touches added by Philip Sassoon, the owner for almost
three decades before his death in 1939. Sassoon constructed a terrace and a swimming
pool, and located Renaissance statutes around the grounds to complement the existing
airfield and nine-hole golf course. The palatial grounds had hosted the likes of Winston
Churchill, George Bernard Shaw, Charlie Chaplin, Lawrence of Arabia, numerous
members of the English royal family and the King and Queen of Belgium, as well as
once serving as a honeymoon retreat for the Duke and Duchess of Kent.19
The generals, fresh from Tunisia, joined distinguished company upon their
arrival in England. Lieutenant General Ludwig Crüwell had been in British custody
since May 1942 when his plane was shot down over the Italian lines in North Africa.
Before his capture, Crüwell had earned a reputation as an excellent tactical commander.
He first led the Eleventh Panzer Division in Yugoslavia where he was credited with the
capture of Belgrade in April 1941. For this he was awarded the Knight’s Cross and later
became the first divisional commander to be awarded the additional Oak Leaves on 1
September 1941 for his command of the Eleventh Panzer on the Russian front. This
distinction elevated Crüwell, along with his colleague General Borowietz, into elite
43
company. These men were two of less than nine hundred recipients of the Knight’s
Cross with Oak Leaves during the entire war.20
At the personal request of Erwin Rommel, Crüwell had assumed command of the
Afrika Korps on the first of September 1941. Crüwell held this position until March
1942 when he briefly replaced Rommel, commanding officer of Panzer Armee Afrika,
who had been sent to Europe on sick leave. Upon Rommel’s return, Crüwell also
journeyed to the continent for a time to recuperate from jaundice caused by a lack of
fresh fruit, a common affliction among German troops in North Africa. When he
returned to North Africa in May 1942, he was placed in charge of a combined German
and Italian force.21
In a meeting with Hitler in 1942, Crüwell expressed concern about the condition
and morale of his Italian forces in North Africa. Curiously, his apprehension about the
Italian contingent would be his undoing. With his new position came the responsibility
to monitor the Italian Front. He arranged to be flown in a Fieseler Storch reconnaissance
plane over the Italian lines on 29 May 1942, with soldiers on the ground charged with
lighting flares to indicate the front’s location. In a bizarre turn of events, the officer in
charge of lighting the flares was called to the telephone moments before Crüwell’s plane
flew over, and the flares were never lit. By the time Crüwell figured out that he had
overflown his intended target, his Storch was rocked by three British shells, his pilot
killed, and Crüwell sent into a crash landing. Miraculously, the plane held together well
enough for the general to emerge relatively unscathed, although now a British prisoner
of war. His capture was a substantial loss to Rommel’s effort in North Africa.22
44
Crüwell’s British captors first housed him near Cairo in a single room with a
balcony, but transferred him to Trent Park in early September 1942. A few weeks after
his arrival, Crüwell informed a Swedish camp inspector that he did not have the slightest
grounds for complaint with his treatment by the British. The inspector noted that Trent
Park offered the general a “spacious cottage” situated on extensive grounds and adorned
with beautiful trees and a “well-kept park.” He also complimented the large,
comfortable, well-furnished bedroom, bathroom, living room and dining room and
praised British willingness to allow the general two-hour, daily walks around the estate
and occasional sightseeing trips outside the camp. The inspector was most impressed,
however, with the level of respect which the British guard detail treated the
distinguished prisoner.23
Also a “guest” of the British in May 1943 was General Ritter von Thoma who
had been captured in North Africa two months after Crüwell’s arrival at Trent Park.
General Montgomery, the British victor at El Alamein, had invited von Thoma to dine
with him after the opposing general’s capture. The two discussed their moves of the
preceding battle over dinner and von Thoma later graciously thanked Montgomery for
the chivalry that the British general had displayed. He even invited Montgomery to join
him on his estate in Germany following the conclusion of the war. Upon learning of
this, the British press heavily criticized Montgomery for having been too cordial with the
enemy. But Prime Minister Winston Churchill stemmed the controversy with a snide
remark to the British House of Commons: “Poor von Thoma,” he said, “I too have dined
with Montgomery.”24
45
The primary function of CSDIC at Trent Park was, of course, gathering
information, and this they did with proficiency. The Cockfosters estate allowed the
British government to house its German generals in rather grand surroundings, albeit
surroundings which had been enhanced to allow British officers to glean important
information from the prisoners; the generals’ rooms were bugged with microphones in
the light fixtures. These listening devices all connected to a central “switchboard” where
the British eavesdroppers at Camp No. 11, nicknamed “Mother” by the staff,
surreptitiously listened to conversations between their respective guests. Von Thoma
and Crüwell, hungry for news, quickly greeted incoming POWs to discuss the latest
battles and war developments. Consequently, both were of “considerable value to the
British.” Crüwell’s conversations with U-boat commander Wolfgang Römer in late
1942, for instance, provided the British with valuable information about German
submarine tactics.25
Von Thoma and Crüwell had also previously been interrogated at the London
District Cage, a somewhat notorious British military intelligence interrogation center in
Kensington Palace Gardens. Here the two generals, during a “bugged” conversation,
discussed their surprise at seeing most of London still standing. One explained to the
other about the German testing of unmanned flying machines that could inflict very
heavy damage. This admission prompted an investigation by British intelligence who
eventually uncovered the existence of the German research program developing the
deadly V-1 and V-2 rockets.26
46
These two were far from the only generals to provide the British with valuable
information about German leaders, German military organization, or, later, interesting
divulgences about war crimes or the generals’ views on the German resistance. In
addition to simple eavesdropping, the British obtained such information in part because
of their ingenious techniques to loosen the prisoners’ tongues. The most interesting of
these was “Lord Aberfeldy.” In reality a Scot named Ian Munroe, Aberfeldy lived at
Trent Park with the prisoners, ostensibly as an interpreter. He acted the part of a British
officer and aristocrat who not only took the generals on long walks around the
Cockfosters estate but also occasionally on dining or shopping trips into London. He
also ran errands for them, making regular trips into the city to purchase items for the
generals that they could not obtain at the camp canteen. Along the way, Munroe, an
agent of MI19, the British intelligence division responsible for enemy prisoners of war,
won the generals’ trust and successfully maneuvered them into conversations that often
led them to inadvertently offer information of value to British intelligence.27
Aberfeldy’s efforts among the prisoners facilitated “Mother’s” work behind the
scenes. German and Austrian refugees manned “Mother’s” eavesdropping equipment
and subsequently translated the German text of the generals’ recorded conversations into
English for dissemination.28 These agents monitored daily conversations from the time
of Crüwell’s arrival in 1942 until the end of the war in Europe in May 1945. During this
time, CSDIC routinely circulated reports on information received from the generals to
the intelligence departments of the three branches of the British military. Some of these
reports also made their way to U.S. military intelligence officers as well.
47
With playing cards, board games, table tennis and billiards, or painting and
reading as their only distractions, the generals at Trent Park had a great deal of time for
conversation. CSDIC operatives learned the generals’ feelings on an array of topics
including the reasons for the failed German offensive in North Africa, the current state
of the war, and the generals’ respective views of the Allies, Hitler and the German High
Command. Many of the comments recorded during their first weeks at Trent Park are
the generals’ attempts to justify their recent surrender, mock their Italian allies or
disparage the Allied victors. General von Arnim complained that by early 1943 Italian
transport ships supplied only one-seventh of the “barest minimum” of required supplies.
General Crüwell, who had not been in the North African theater since May of the
previous year, stated that “the English and American show in North Africa was badly
muddled,” insinuating that the Allies won because of “overwhelming equipment” and in
spite of poor tactics. General Krause agreed with Crüwell’s assertion that the Germans
were “the better soldiers,” claiming that Allied success had been thus far “achieved by
brute force.” He stated that the African campaign was “decided in the air and at sea by
the cutting of our supply line . . . bravery in the field was of no avail.”29
The apparent consensus among the generals that the North African campaign had
been lost owing solely to lack of supplies fed their optimism about the ultimate outcome
of the war. Crüwell flatly stated that he didn’t believe the “fortress of Europe” would be
overrun. Arnim viewed Germany’s chances of winning the war in a “favorable light,”
although he conceded that it would certainly be a long war. He and Crüwell agreed that
48
dissension, hopefully between the Western Allies and Russia, would eventually
undermine the Allied war effort, allowing Germany a chance to emerge victorious.30
The generals also appeared to be optimistic about conditions at home. General
von Vaerst, who had spent a brief period of convalescence back home shortly before the
German surrender in North Africa, admitted that the German defeat at Stalingrad
“brought home the real seriousness of the situation to everyone.” Yet, he concluded that
morale on the home front was “very good.” Crüwell, von Arnim, and von Thoma agreed
that while the Allies produced a staggering number of aircraft, their bombing of
Germany had largely only succeeded in hitting “dummy factories,” and that production
continued twenty-four hours a day in factories relocated to the east. General Krause
observed “a general feeling of confidence” in Germany and he was “pleasantly
surprised” at the orderliness, traveling conditions, and the “punctuality of the trains.”
Krause also made a curious remark which illustrated the aristocratic nature of the
German officer corps. He stated that due to the war his wife had been forced to give up
her maid and that this demonstrated the way in which mobilization “affects everybody.”
Krause also informed Crüwell that the food situation in Germany was “quite good . . .
very much better than in the last war.”31
The generals’ optimism may have been in part predicated on their negative
opinions about their enemies, particularly the Americans. Curiously, General von Arnim
remarked that there was “an Italian theatre of war and an American theatre of war and
the Germans and the English did the fighting!” In response to Crüwell’s question about
how the Americans fought, fellow General Hans Cramer responded, “very badly! It was
49
remarkable how little part they took in [the fighting].” General Krause contended that
“the war would last until America realized one couldn’t do good business out of it,” to
which Crüwell replied that Krause had taken the words right out of his mouth. The
generals seemed to agree that if the United States suffered heavy casualties in any
proposed invasion of Europe, they would withdraw from the war. Von Arnim even
doubted that the U.S. would take part in an Allied invasion of Europe. He opined that
the Americans would concentrate on Japan because “a war against Japan throws
Australia into their laps,” suggesting that territorial designs drove American policy. Von
Arnim, Crüwell, and von Vaerst later decided that the U.S. only stayed in the war
because they were “making money on their war contracts” and because they stood to
gain “by inheriting the British Empire and the French colonies.”32
General von Arnim and his fellow prisoners did not reserve their animus entirely
for the Americans. The British army, for instance, was “astonishingly slow,” and the
German defeat in North Africa was worse than Stalingrad because it gave the British a
“great victory when so far they hadn’t accomplished anything.” Crüwell stated that “the
English are far worse soldiers than we are.” Krause agreed, asserting that “there is no
doubt at all that the English never show the spirit and courage which we [do].” Krause
continued the criticism, albeit while acknowledging some redeeming American and
British qualities, by claiming that “the English infantry never played any decisive part,
[but] their tank troops weren’t bad. The Americans were cowardly and petty, but their
artillery was extremely good.” In furthering the generals’ belief that dissension among
the British, Americans, French and Russians would eventually fracture the Allied cause,
50
von Arnim also took a stab at the French by predicting an “uproar . . . when the French
realize that they’re not going to be allowed to keep even a square meter of North
Africa.”33
The generals not only held a low opinion of their enemies, but one of their allies
as well. Generals von Arnim and Crüwell exchanged humorous stories suggesting
cowardice on the part of the Italians. Von Arnim told of a German platoon conducting
maneuvers while on leave in Rome. An Italian unit apparently mistook them for
invading British soldiers and surrendered. Crüwell offered a similar anecdote from his
experience as commander of the German 33rd Reconnaissance Unit. While the Germans
were advancing toward the front in North Africa, an Italian unit marching along the
same road rounded a corner, saw the Germans and “immediately the whole column
threw away their weapons and held up their hands.”34
It is reasonable to suspect that the generals might have been aware that their
conversations were being bugged by British intelligence. Berlin had previously issued
strict rules of conduct for German prisoners of war in British hands that specifically
mentioned the possibility of hidden microphones and stool pigeons.35 The generals’
justifications for their defeat in North Africa, as well as their defiant criticisms of both
the British and American character and fighting ability, could easily have been intended
to inform their enemy that if the Germans had had sufficient supplies they would have
bested the “astonishingly slow” Allied army.
Yet, the generals did not appear to be aware of the presence of CSDIC
microphones in their quarters. Once ensconced in the stately Trent Park mansion, they
51
offered substantial amounts of detailed information about not only the North African
campaign, which had obviously already concluded, but also about the ongoing German
offensive against the Soviet Union. Had they suspected they were being recorded, they
would certainly have realized that statements about German commanding officers and
the German order of battle, logistics and their Romanian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian
allies, could easily have been transmitted to the Allied army general staff. Moreover, the
prisoners also offered some fairly revealing comments about Adolf Hitler and certain
members of the German High Command, which it is highly doubtful they would have
wanted recorded.
For example, General Krause insinuated that Hitler would be “obstinate” and
“stupid” not to consider uniting with either the British and Americans against the
Russians or vice versa, even though this would mean “modifying his demands
considerably.” Von Arnim and von Quast referred to the German failure in North Africa
as “this whole catastrophe” which occurred “because no one really dared to say: ‘It just
won’t work.’” They declared the Nazi military motto ‘Nothing is impossible to the
German soldier’ to be a “catastrophic axiom.” In other words, it allowed Hitler and the
German High Command to shift the responsibility for failure entirely to the troops in the
field even when they had not been properly supplied. The two officers contended that
battlefield commanders felt they had no choice but to simply follow the orders they
received from higher authorities without question because disagreeing with the Führer
was not tolerated. They cited the example of General Franz Halder, Chief of the German
52
General Staff, who had openly disagreed with Hitler and been subsequently removed
from his post.36
On one occasion, von Arnim and von Thoma discussed Captain Paul Meixner, a
fellow POW at Camp 11, who had been in charge of all German and Italian naval
matters in Tunisia. Meixner had been responsible for providing his superior officer,
General Albert Kesselring, with a detailed breakdown of the supply situation in every
sector of the North African campaign. According to von Arnim and von Thoma,
Meixner told Kesselring that “a totally different procedure must now be adopted [for
transferring supplies across the Mediterranean to North Africa], otherwise we shall get
no more across.” Allegedly, Kesselring’s only response was that he couldn’t tell Hitler
such information or the Führer “wouldn’t sleep for four days.”37
Sometimes the stories were simply humorous, or a complaint that could possibly
have been made in some fashion about every military bureaucracy in the Second World
War. General Gotthard Frantz, for instance, told General von Arnim that his
commanding officer, Ernst Udet, required him to begin using telescopic aircraft sights
when extensive German testing had already demonstrated the superiority of the reflector
sights already in use. According to Frantz, he simply swapped sights with an Italian unit
that was looking for an upgrade. General von Hülsen complained that many officers had
been promoted without merit because of improperly prepared or even fictitious reports,
noting sarcastically that “everyone lies!” Generals von Arnim and Bülowius also made
derogatory remarks about the Hitler Youth, observing how it made them sick to see their
53
own children marching with the “H.J.s,” and that they were beginning to “realize the
stupidity of it.”38
However, instances abounded where prisoners who refused to provide British
interrogators with information promptly returned to their rooms and told their fellow
officers exactly what information they had withheld.39 As the war progressed, the
generals at Trent Park also turned their conversations to discussions of war crimes in
which some of them admitted to questionable, even criminal behavior. Surely, these
admissions and the valuable information and technical details provided during private
conversations would not have been offered had the prisoners known they were speaking
into British microphones and that their remarks would be sent to British and American
military authorities. The generals do not appear to have even suspected Lord Aberfeldy.
In his memoirs, von Sponeck described the “special advantage” of having an English
officer who was fluent in German and who obliged the generals’ special requests on his
frequent shopping trips to London. Aberfeldy earned the generals’ trust, according to
von Sponeck, and they did not learn of his real identity until some years after the war.40
Comfortable that the information the generals provided was legitimate, CSDIC
operatives continued their work unabated. Moreover, the composition of the camp
population stabilized during the month of June and remained so for almost a year.
Generals von Vaerst, Borowietz, Bülowius and Köchy and Colonel von Quast departed
for the United States on 1 June 1943 and four more German generals from North Africa
took their place at Trent Park. These four generals, Schnarrenberger, von Liebenstein,
von Sponeck, and von Broich, had journeyed from Gibraltar to London aboard the
54
British battleship HMS Nelson and had been temporarily interned a few miles away at
Wilton Park until space could be made available for them at Camp No. 11. Their arrival
brought Trent Park’s total population of German prisoner of war generals to thirteen,
eight of whom would also eventually be transferred to American custody.41
Aside from a report in The London Star that General von Arnim suffered from
delusions and was under the care of a psychiatrist for treatment of anxiety, the prisoners
began to resign themselves to their fate. As they settled down and began acclimating to
their new home, they also began to divide themselves into cliques that CSDIC labeled
“anti-Nazi” and “pro-Nazi.” The two cliques centered around the two men who had
been in camp the longest, Ritter von Thoma and Ludwig Crüwell, respectively. British
intelligence labeled von Thoma’s group “Anti-Nazi and Defeatist,” and it included
generals von Sponeck, Cramer, Bassenge, Neuffer, von Liebenstein, and von Broich.
Von Thoma openly espoused “violent anti-Nazi views” and took great pains to
antagonize his pro-Nazi opponents by verbally chastising them as well as circulating
German-language, anti-Nazi literature that had been supplied to him by British camp
authorities.42
Not surprisingly, British intelligence at Trent Park viewed the members of von
Thoma’s anti-Nazi clique in a significantly more favorable light. A CSDIC report from
June 1943 noted, “The defeatist section comprises all those who are most intelligent,
most traveled and who have [the] most culture. They never complain about conditions
in the camp and continue to tell us how grateful they are for the excellent treatment
which is meted out to them here.”43 These types of statements illustrate as much about
55
the British observers as they do about the German prisoners and reveal a common Allied
misperception. Throughout the war, British and American officials alike confused
prisoner cooperativeness with anti-Nazi views and vice versa. Consequently, Trent Park
officers would certainly have seen von Thoma’s clique as more intelligent, cultured and
politically savvy simply because they showed gratitude and did not complain.
Also indicative of British perceptions are the revealing character studies of each
of the generals compiled by CSDIC officers at Trent Park in June and July 1943. These
studies provided the foundation for some of the later Allied decisions about the generals,
including why some were later chosen for “re-education” and groomed to be potential
leaders for postwar Germany. Curiously, the evaluations again demonstrate some Allied
misperceptions and exaggerations. For instance, the “pro-Nazi” generals are largely
portrayed as buffoons or insidious agitators, while the members of the “anti-Nazi” clique
appear as intelligent, educated men of culture. Undoubtedly, these early character
sketches influenced American perspectives of these prisoners after their transfer to the
United States, especially considering that American officials did not bother to actively
interrogate or eavesdrop on these men for themselves.
The first such study described Major General Theodor Graf von Sponeck as
“somewhat neurotic and very moody.” According to the British, “one day he will be
exceedingly talkative and amusing and the next he snoops around the place like a dog
with his tail between his legs.” His aides-de-camp portrayed him as “the most popular
general in North Africa,” beloved by his junior officers and enlisted men. Yet he could
also be extremely insulting to subordinates when they did not meet his expectations. He
56
humiliated one of his aides in front of a large group of the general officer prisoners and
British guard officers at Trent Park on one occasion because he believed the man had
been careless in his assigned duties. Von Sponeck was also a very talented painter. He
spent a great deal of time engaged with his work or sleeping, and said he enjoyed “a
quiet life whenever possible.” The British labeled him a “defeatist, anti-Nazi and a
monarchist.” Perhaps his anti-Nazi and monarchical views should not be surprising
considering his aristocratic bearing: the “Graf” in his name translates to “Count” or
“Earl.”44
Count von Sponeck openly expressed his anti-Nazi views from the earliest days
of his tenure at Trent Park. He refrained from openly castigating his pro-Nazi
counterparts in the manner that von Thoma did, rather utilizing the privacy of his or his
colleagues’ rooms as more subtle political forums. After only a few weeks at Camp No.
11, the Count indicted the Nazi regime for falsifying history, as he put it, as the “results
of investigations are being forged. We are living in a time where there is no justice at
all.” He continued by admitting that he “used to be a follower of Hitler and National
Socialism,” but after realizing the nature of the party he said “quite openly that [he was]
one no longer.” Weeks later von Sponeck resumed the attack by quietly confiding to his
colleagues how much he abhorred the Nazi persecution of the Jews, characterizing the
Nazi campaign against European Jewry as “absolutely medieval.”45
Not unlike the young, aristocratic von Sponeck, Brigadier General Kurt Freiherr
von Liebenstein was also an aristocrat: “Freiherr” translates to “Baron.” The British
officers at Trent Park characterized von Liebenstein as having “a broader political
57
outlook” than most of his POW colleagues and believed him to be a confirmed antiNazi. This may be due, in part, to the time von Liebenstein had spent in England and
France before the war. His uncle was Baron Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg, who served
as the German Military Attaché in London during the mid-1930s. Von Liebenstein spent
some time with his uncle in England during this period, including a month in Scotland in
1935. Von Liebenstein had also lived in France for two years, attached to the German
Military Attaché in Paris, where he developed an admiration for French culture, food,
wine and women. Along the way the young general also learned to speak “quite good
English” and “fairly fluent French.”46
Baron von Liebenstein openly, yet cautiously, expressed his anti-Nazi views.
British intelligence noted that he possessed “a keen sense of humor, which [he]
frequently applied against the Nazis.” Moreover, he took up studying anti-Nazi
literature after only a couple months in captivity, despite General von Arnim’s
admonition against this kind of “unpatriotic” activity. His British captors observed that
he admired British traditions and detested “dictatorship in all its forms.”47
The British officers at Camp No. 11 were quite taken with the Baron. He was
very popular among the prisoners and British officers alike, and was “worshipped by his
batmen.” Because of his love of horses, the British provided him with English hunting
scenes with which he decorated his room. And like his colleague von Sponeck, he was a
talented artist who could often be found painting “very creditable water colors.” Von
Liebenstein also took a significant role in camp politics. Von Arnim, the senior officer
58
and prisoner spokesman, initially appointed the Baron deputy camp leader and relied on
him heavily.48
Politically opposite from the artistic von Sponeck and the cultured von
Liebenstein, the British labeled Ludwig Crüwell’s clique “Anti-Defeatist” and pro-Nazi.
In addition to Crüwell, this group included generals Frantz and von Hülsen. Trent Park
authorities found these three to be a nuisance, noting that they were “always moaning
and demanding the impossible. They seem to consider this a sanatorium for tired
German generals rather than as a [prisoner of war] camp. They even go out of their way
to complain.”49
In an evaluation that epitomized Allied perceptions of the “pro-Nazi” generals,
British intelligence offered a particularly scathing indictment of Lieutenant General
Crüwell as a prisoner who had “shown himself to be an ignorant, stupid, sentimental,
narrow-minded, conceited and self-satisfied type of Prussian senior officer. He seems to
regard himself as a second Frederick the Great. He never tires of boasting about his
capture of Belgrade, five days after the invasion of Yugoslavia, and the fact that he was
promoted [Lt. General] over the heads of about 130 [major generals]. He is convinced
that had he not been taken prisoner he would by now have been a Field Marshall.”50
CSDIC rated Crüwell’s technical abilities as “practically nil,” despite being a
highly-decorated German officer, and determined that he knew “almost nothing about
affairs in Germany and still less about the outside world.” The British belief that
Crüwell adamantly supported Hitler and the Nazi regime certainly influenced their
assessments of him. Crüwell’s constant complaining to camp authorities did not help
59
matters. As “one of the greatest sources of unrest” in the camp, he seemed to annoy both
British officers and his fellow German prisoners alike. British intelligence noted
sarcastically that he perpetually sought “someone whom he can impress with his own
importance and great knowledge but he has been seen through by most of the other
prisoners here, who spend much time trying to avoid him.” Crüwell also expended a
great deal of his energy seeking to gain influence with the camp leader and senior
officer, but even von Arnim quickly grew “a bit tired of all the nagging.”51
CSDIC held a similarly negative view of Crüwell’s confidante, Major General
Gotthard Frantz. They described him as “perpetually moaning” and as being “the most
difficult to get on with in the camp.” Upon first arriving, Frantz tried to “lay down the
law to the British officers,” insisting, for example, that it was the British officers’
responsibility to scour London shops to find him some reddish brown boot polish. Only
slowly did he learn that this tactic would not be successful. British camp personnel
found General Frantz particularly annoying in part because he held the same political
convictions as did General Crüwell. CSDIC characterized Frantz as “one of those
unfortunates who have hitherto believed all that the German propaganda machine has
told them and are at last realizing that they have been misled. He doesn’t dare admit
that, however, even to himself.” Frantz also suffered from a “terrible fear” of being sent
to the United States, although British records offer no explanation why.52
Frantz’s petty obsession with decorations and sensitivity to perceived slights
made him “most unpopular amongst his fellow prisoners of all ranks, including the
batmen,” according to British assessments. The general was frequently alone in his
60
room and walked unaccompanied during the generals’ nightly stroll around the
courtyard, which the British officers nicknamed the “after-dinner parade.” He insisted
on wearing every decoration he had ever earned, sometimes even duplicating the same
award on his uniform by wearing both the ribbon and medal he had received. Trent
Park’s British officers described his uniform as a “mass of decorations of all sorts.”53
Frantz’s fellow prisoners took a great deal of amusement from an incident
involving the awarding of Frantz’s Ritterkreuz, or Knight’s Cross. Frantz had previously
been extremely self-conscious about the fact that he had not been honored with the
Knight’s Cross despite having obtained the rank of major general. He made excuses for
this oversight, as he saw it, by insinuating that the Knight’s Cross was “often awarded to
those who had the right connections.” Upon learning that he had finally received this
honor, Frantz refused to patiently wait for the medal to arrive from Germany. Instead,
he temporarily borrowed one from one of the other prisoners and then had his World
War I Iron Cross First Class converted into a Ritterkreuz. Once donned, it “never left his
neck,” his fellow generals joked.54
British intelligence saw the third member of the Nazi clique, Brigadier General
Heinrich Hermann von Hülsen, as an instigator. From his first few days at Trent Park,
von Hülsen continually urged Crüwell (and anyone else who would listen) that it was
their duty to annoy the British officers and cause as much trouble as possible. Crüwell,
of course, relished this kind of encouragement and did all he could to oblige. After
several weeks at Camp No. 11, CSDIC officers noted that von Hülsen was “perpetually
moaning about something, legitimate or not, and every letter or card he writes to his wife
61
has some sly dig at conditions here.” The British speculated that perhaps von Hülsen
believed that if these comments survived British censors they would lead to reprisals
against British generals in German custody. Needless to say, British censors classified
von Hülsen’s complaints “pure fabrications” and they were stricken from his letters.55
What the British officers found most annoying about von Hülsen, aside from his
support for National Socialism and his self-appointed mission to aggravate his hosts, was
the manner in which he went about it. They admitted that von Hülsen was “always
correct in his behavior, he always [said] the most petty and annoying things in the
politest possible manner.” The British saw him as a “hanger-on of the worst type” for
his perpetual attempts to impress von Arnim. He could often be found in von Arnim’s
room playing bridge with the senior general.56
Early in his career, Von Hülsen had served the German royal family, first as a
page and later as an aide-de-camp, which the British officers thought contributed to the
young general being “a complete snob.” Yet, despite his service to German royalty, he
harbored no sympathies for the monarchy, unlike aristocrats such as von Sponeck and
von Liebenstein. Rather, Von Hülsen appeared to be a committed National Socialist.
CSDIC interpreted comments he made while being driven through parts of London to
visit a dentist as illustrative of his political orientation. According to his British guard,
“he made absurd comments on how badly the people were dressed and how decrepit the
houses looked—all due to the war, in his opinion.” Not realizing it was “early closing
day and most of the shops had their blinds down . . . von Hülsen carefully explained to
the escort officer that this was because they had nothing to sell.” The prisoner also
62
assumed that the trolley buses must be running on electricity because of the “serious
shortage of petrol.”57
Not all of the generals were so forthright about their political views. Indeed, the
British found the remaining three generals, Krause, Schnarrenberger and von Arnim,
more difficult to assess. Brigadier General Fritz Krause was a “nonentity” as far as the
British were concerned. They characterized him as being “rather unintelligent” and
“certainly not a man of wide interests.” The British officers also thought Krause’s
political views were “something of a mystery” as he mixed with both cliques and offered
virtually no comments on anything but the table tennis, chess and bridge tournaments in
which he was “always in charge.” They suspected, however, that he might be
developing some “leanings” toward the anti-Nazi faction because he shared a room with
von Liebenstein.58
The Baron also wielded a great deal of influence with Brigadier General Ernst
Emil Schnarrenberger. CSDIC had originally labeled Schnarrenberger “apolitical”
because he did not involve himself in the political strife among his colleagues, despite
the fact that he could frequently be found in the company of members of the anti-Nazi
clique. Gradually, however, he became very friendly with von Liebenstein, since the
Baron was teaching him English, and the British eventually changed their assessment
and placed Schnarrenberger in the anti-Nazi camp.59
Part of the confusion surrounding Schnarrenberger’s politics may have stemmed
from the condition of his mental health. He had suffered a slight nervous breakdown
while serving on the Eastern Front during the winter of 1942-1943 and its effects still
63
plagued him. Schnarrenberger became somewhat of a recluse as a prisoner of war,
spending much of his time by himself creating pen-and-ink drawings, which were
apparently quite good. His personal mental health notwithstanding, British military
specialists considered him “intelligent” with “very keen eyes,” and described him as a
“good conversationalist” with a strong sense of humor.60
General von Arnim, the senior general at Camp No. 11, may have been the
greatest enigma of all the prisoners. During his first month in camp, von Arnim
understandably struggled to assess his own level of responsibility for the failure of the
North African campaign. He expressed to one of the British officers that he thought his
fellow generals held him unjustly to blame for what he called the “debacle in Tunisia.”
Unfortunately for von Arnim, he was correct. Some of his fellow prisoners stated that
“he made a good divisional commander but was not fitted for a higher command.” Von
Thoma stated that von Arnim “owed his high position to the fact that he was on good
relations with the Party.” General Neuffer referred to von Arnim as an old fool and
others said von Arnim possessed “very limited intelligence,” was simply a “blockhead,”
or were ashamed because they assumed the British must be questioning the quality of all
the German commanders, knowing that “this man here was the C-in-C Africa.”61
The weight of past responsibilities and the second-guessing of his decisions
certainly may have contributed to von Arnim’s unwillingness to make decisions as camp
leader once he arrived at Trent Park. British officers noticed that the general was “most
uncomfortable when asked to [make] decisions on any questions regarding the camp,”
and began relying on General von Liebenstein, whom von Arnim appointed his deputy
64
camp leader, to deal with any minor affairs. Even when greater issues required his
attention, von Arnim still insisted on having von Liebenstein at his side.62
Von Arnim’s personal demeanor puzzled British intelligence as well. Upon first
arriving at Camp No. 11, he attempted to assert his authority over both his fellow
prisoners and the British officers alike. While he never seemed to forget that he was the
senior officer in the camp and always conducted himself correctly, he quickly mellowed
and proved to be “very friendly” and, on occasion, even “entertaining.” He often played
chess or bridge, and, like the rest of the generals, he enjoyed his evening ‘after dinner
parade,’ marching solemnly around “his” camp.63
Yet, his political views remained a mystery. CSDIC placed him in the “proNazi” camp in part because he most often associated with the members of this group,
particularly Crüwell and von Hülsen. But von Arnim’s favorite walking companion was
the openly anti-Nazi General Cramer and his dependence on the assistance of an openly
anti-Nazi general like von Liebenstein undermined the initial assessments of von Arnim
as pro-Nazi.
In the midst of British attempts to assess the character and political orientation of
their general officer prisoners, one additional officer, Naval Chief of Staff in Tunisia,
Captain Paul Hermann Meixner, arrived on 26 June 1943. Labeled an “ardent antidefeatist” by British intelligence, Meixner immediately settled into the Crüwell camp
and exacerbated the political divide among the prisoners. The captain, Crüwell and von
Hülsen began canvassing for supporters among their fellow inmates and stepped up their
65
pestering of von Arnim to use his position as the senior officer to reign in the anti-Nazi
clique.64
The British found Meixner, like von Arnim, a somewhat enigmatic character.
Curiously, he looked much older than any of his new companions, despite being only
fifty-two years of age, and his fellow prisoners of war treated him as if he were their
senior because of his appearance. He was actually younger than both Frantz and von
Arnim, and all of the general officer prisoners outranked the Captain.65 The British
officers also noted that Meixner’s “first impression is one of benevolence. His shiny,
rosy face and white hair heighten this impression. On closer acquaintance, however, this
prisoner tends to be rather too polite and too gushing, and he has turned out to be one of
the members of the pro-Nazi clique.” CSDIC noted that Meixner and von Hülsen shared
a room and that they “suit each other perfectly,” suggesting that Meixner was a
disingenuous, pro-Nazi snob and an agitator like his roommate.66
Unlike his pro-Nazi colleagues Crüwell, Frantz and von Hülsen, however, the
British noted that Meixner was extremely well-liked by all of his fellow prisoners,
regardless of their political persuasion. Even von Thoma, who prided himself on being
vehemently anti-Nazi, praised Meixner’s “very fine character.” Meixner’s popularity
may have stemmed, in part, from his showmanship. He spoke English well and spent
two nights before an assembled crowd of fellow officer prisoners translating British
Field Marshal Archibald Percival Wavell’s Generals and Generalship. Even British
observers noted that Meixner’s running translation was an “amazing performance.” The
captain’s status at Trent Park was further elevated when it was learned that he had been
66
moved to Camp No. 11 at the “express request” of von Arnim. CSDIC was mystified
but suspected that von Arnim’s motivation was to provide Meixner with “as much
comfort as possible on account of his age,” or in this case, apparent age.67
Typically, naval prisoners were held separately from army prisoners, though both
the British and Americans, at times, made exceptions for high-ranking officers.
Moreover, the only prisoners at Trent Park below the rank of general officer were the
aides and orderlies of the generals. Meixner was neither an army prisoner nor a general
officer, placing him in unusual company.
Moreover, he was a political chameleon. Despite CSDIC’s determination that
Meixner was an “ardent anti-defeatist” and “pro-Nazi,” his political views could be
somewhat ambiguous. When in the company of Crüwell or von Hülsen, the captain
thundered his pro-Nazi opinions, even actively proselytizing among his fellow prisoners.
Curiously, he stopped playing the role of “ranting politician,” as the British officers
described him, when none of his pro-Nazi colleagues were present and sought to “fit in
with whatever company he [happened] to be with.” Even more puzzling, Meixner was
caught reading some anti-Nazi literature on one occasion and scrambled to hide the book
after being surprised by a British officer.68 Meixner’s behavior, not to mention the level
of respect he received from his fellow prisoners, raises questions about his political
beliefs as well as those of his colleagues.
These early British evaluations of the generals provide valuable snapshots of
their behavior in captivity and reveal some interesting idiosyncrasies. Yet, they never
address the potential influence of simple German patriotism, as distinct from adherence
67
to National Socialist beliefs, on the behavior of the prisoners. After all, these men were
the highest-ranking officers held prisoner by their enemies. Would one really expect
them to totally abandon their allegiance to the Germany military and openly side with
enemy officers at a POW camp?
Perhaps Meixner secretly harbored views antithetical to National Socialism,
which would explain his interest in anti-Nazi literature, but felt compelled as a German
military officer to at least display a facade of loyalty to the German government. And it
seems a little harsh to judge General Crüwell, a bearer of the Knight’s Cross with Oak
Leaves, as “ignorant,” “stupid,” and devoid of technical ability. Perhaps some of these
men had other concerns that may have provided some motivation for their behavior,
including Crüwell and von Hülsen’s combined nine children still living under the Nazi
regime.
Also noteworthy in evaluating these British character studies are the German
Army evaluations of specific prisoners’ political orientations conducted prior to their
capture. German historian Sönke Neitzel discounts these assessments as “not
particularly useful,” citing a criticism by Major General Rudolf Schmundt, head of the
German Army High Command Personnel Office, in 1943 about the overuse of vague
expressions like “he stands on National Socialist ground.” Undoubtedly, evaluations
like that of General Schnarrenberger as possessing a “positive attitude toward National
Socialism” fall into this useless category. However, a few comments may be more
illustrative of the difficulty to adequately assess the generals’ real political views. For
example, von Hülsen’s German Army assessment supported the British impression that
68
his Nazi bearing was “irreproachable.” Von Liebenstein, on the other hand, whom both
the British and Americans came to greatly admire, had been described by his German
superiors in October 1942 as an officer who “epitomizes the greater ideals of National
Socialism” and “communicates this body of thought to others.”69
Perhaps von Liebenstein’s superior officer simply chose to embellish in an effort
to win the Baron favor with the German High Command. Perhaps von Liebenstein
intentionally chose to communicate the greater ideals of National Socialism to his
superiors in an effort to gain promotion. Ultimately, what the generals’ views on
National Socialism actually were may be of less importance than what the British
thought them to be. British perceptions of their general officer prisoners influenced
American perceptions, which in turn influenced later American decision-making about
which generals to engage in the postwar reconstruction of Germany and which to
marginalize. By the 1950s, von Liebenstein must have come to epitomize the ideals of
representative democracy because he obtained a position as major general in the
Bundeswehr with the blessings of the United States government.
These British evaluations of the early general officers prisoners compiled in 1943
laid some of the groundwork for the American relationship with the Wehrmacht general
officers as prisoner of war. Indeed, until May 1945, most of the general officer prisoners
sent to the United States had first been assessed by CSDIC at Trent Park. And the group
of senior officers who were the focus of these character studies would be the next parcel
of general officer POWs delivered to the Americans, even though it took almost a year
before this occurred. Without doubt, these initial British judgments influenced
69
American perceptions of the generals at least to some degree, especially considering that
the Americans expended no time or resources evaluating these men for themselves. It is
unlikely to have been pure coincidence that two of the five generals later chosen by
American officials for re-education, von Sponeck and von Liebenstein, were two British
favorites from the beginning.
Notes
1
German army and air force ranks for general officers equated to U.S. ranks as follows:
Generalmajor (German)—Brigadier General (U.S.); Generalleutnant—Major General; General
der Infanterie, der Artillerie, etc.—Lieutenant General; Generaloberst—General; and
Generalfeldmarschall—General of the Army—see Andris J. Kurseitis, The Wehrmacht at War,
1939-1945: The Units and Commanders of the German Ground Forces during World War II
(Soesterberg, the Netherlands: Aspekt, 1999), 7.
2
Von Quast had been a prisoner of war in U.S. custody for almost three months by this time and,
considering that subsequent American documents continue to refer to him as “Colonel von
Quast,” it appears American authorities were reluctant to treat him as a general officer; Arnold
Krammer, “American Treatment of German Generals during World War II,” Journal of Military
History 54 (January 1990), 30; MSg 109, “v. Quast,” Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg i.Br.
(Hereafter, BA-MA).
3
Paul Carell, Foxes of the Desert: The Story of the Afrika Korps (Atglen, PA: Schiffer
Publishing, 1994 [1960]), 168; Roger James Bender and Richard D. Law, Uniforms,
Organization, and History of the Afrikakorps (Mountain View, California: R. James Bender
Publishing, 1973), 79; “Enemy Gets His First Taste of ‘Unconditional Surrender’: Germans in
70
Bizerte Area Yielded to American General Who Offered No Terms and Vowed to Kill All Who
Tried to Escape.” New York Times, 11 May 1943.
4
Bender and Law, Uniforms, 62; John R. Angolia, On the Field of Honor: A History of the
Knight’s Cross Bearers, Volume II (San Jose, California: R. James Bender Publishing, 1979),
204-205.
5
“Enemy Gets His First Taste of ‘Unconditional Surrender’: Germans in Bizerte Area Yielded to
American General Who Offered No Terms and Vowed to Kill All Who Tried to Escape.” New
York Times, 11 May 1943; Harold Y. Boyle, “Crack Nazi Troops Weep in Surrender: Americans
Find It Hard to Count and Feed Captives,” Los Angeles Times, 11 May 1943; “Says U.S. Made a
Mistake,” New York Times, 11 May 1943.
6
Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943 (New York: Henry
Holt and Company, 2002), 371-372; Bender and Law, Uniforms, 89-90; Krammer, “American
Treatment of Germans Generals,” 30; Curiously, Meixner was promoted to Kapitan zur See
(Captain) on 1 April 1943 and then to Konteradmiral (Rear Admiral) effective 1 June 1944,
apparently without ever holding the rank of Kommodore (Commodore)—Hans H. Hildebrand
and Ernest Henriot, Deutschlands Admiral 1849-1945: die militärischen Werdegänge der See-,
Ingenieur-, Sanitäts-, Waffen- und Verwaltungsoffiziere im Admiralsrang (Osnabrück: Biblio
Verlag, 1988-1990), 462-463.
7
Bender and Law, Uniforms, 79-80, 134; Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (Costa Mesa,
California: Noontide Press, 1988 [1952]), 107; Dermot Bradley, Karl Friedrich-Hildebrand and
Markus Rövekamp, Die Generale des Heeres, 1921-1945 (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1993),
513-514.
8
Samuel W. Mitcham, Jr., Hitler’s Legions: The German Army Order of Battle, World War II
(New York: Stein and Day, 1985), 409; John Thompson, “War Over in North Africa: Allies
71
Capture 150,000; Seize Gen. Von Arnim,” Chicago Daily Tribune, May 13, 1943; “Lecture for
OATS Course,” MSg 1/4133, BA-MA.
9
Bender and Law, Uniforms, 68, 186; Mitcham, Hitler’s Legions, 229,377; Bradley, Friedrich-
Hildebrand and Rövekamp, Die Generale des Heeres, 183-184; Karl Friedrich Hildebrand, Die
Generale der deutschen Luftwaffe 1935-1945: Die militärischen Werdegäng der Flieger-,
Flakartillerie-, Fallschirmjäger-, Luftnachricthen- und Ingenieur-Offiziere einschließlich der
Ärzte, Richter, Intendanten und Ministerialbeamten im Generalsrang (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag,
1990), 309-310.
10
Correlli Barnett, ed., Hitler’s Generals (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), 352, 335-341;
Bender and Law, Uniforms, 127.
11
Barnett, Hitler’s Generals, 342-349.
12
Barnett, Hitler’s Generals, 349; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 489.
13
Barnett, Hitler’s Generals, 351-352; Carell, Foxes of the Desert, 355, 362; Atkinson, An Army
at Dawn, 528-529.
14
Günter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose, ed., Eisenhower and the German Prisoners of War:
Facts Against Falsehood (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 30; Sullivan,
Thresholds of Peace, 221.
15
Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (CSDIC) report, G.R.G.G. 2, 24 May 1943;
CSDIC G.R.G.G. 3, 24 May 1943, WO 208/5016, the National Archives of the United Kingdom
(hereafter TNA), Kew, Richmond, Surrey, United Kingdom; Theodor Graf von Sponeck, Meine
Erinnerungen, 173, MSg 1/3329, BA-MA.
16
Ibid.
72
17
“Gen. Von Arnim Taken to Palace at Gibraltar,” Los Angeles Times, 16 May 1943; James
MacDonald, “British Bells Hail Victory in Tunisia: Celebration at Its Peak when von Arnim,
Axis Commander, Arrives as a Prisoners,” New York Times, 17 May 1943.
18
Krammer, “American Treatment of German Generals,” 28.
19
Patrick Campbell, Trent Park: A History (London: Middlesex University Press, 1997), 36-43.
20
The Knight’s Cross was one of seven in a series of iron crosses awarded to members of the
German military for acts of bravery. The first Iron Cross to be awarded for a single act of
bravery would be the Iron Cross-second class, followed by the Iron Cross-first class, for
additional acts of bravery. Next came the Knight’s cross for still further bravery, then the Oak
Leaves, followed by the Swords, Diamonds, and the Knight’s Cross in Gold respectively, each
award contingent upon earning the previous one—Mitcham, Jr., Hitler’s Legions, 363-364;
Angolia, On the Field of Honor, 17-18, 45-46; Dermot Bradley, Karl Friedrich-Hildebrand and
Markus Rövekamp, Die Generale des Heeres, 1921-1945 (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1993),
480-482.
21
Bender and Law, Uniforms, 101.
22
B.H. Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the Hill: Germany’s Generals Their Rise and Fall, With
Their Own Account of Military Events 1939-1945 (London: Cassell and Company, 1951 [1948]),
243; Carell, Foxes of the Desert, 169; Matthew Barry Sullivan, Thresholds of Peace: Four
Hundred Thousand German Prisoners and the People of Britain, 1944-1948 (London: Hamish
Hamilton, 1979), 223.
23
“Report of visit with General Crüwell, Cairo, 9 September 1942;” “Report of visit with
General Crüwell, Camp No. 11, 28 September 1942,” PERS 6/114, BA-MA.
24
Sullivan, Thresholds of Peace, 221.
25
Sullivan, Thresholds of Peace, 223; Neitzel, Tapping Hitler’s Generals, 26.
73
26
Richard Garrett, P.O.W. (London: David and Charles Publishers, 1981), 167.
27
Sullivan, Thresholds of Peace, 51-52; Neitzel, Tapping Hitler’s Generals, 20.
28
Sullivan, Thresholds of Peace, 52.
29
CSDIC, S.R.G.G. 1, 16 May 1943; CSDIC, S.R.G.G. 5, 16 May 1943; CSDIC, S.R.G.G. 12,
16 May 1943; CSDIC, S.R.G.G. 18, 16 May 1943, WO 208/4165, TNA.
30
CSDIC, S.R.G.G. 5, 16 May 1943; CSDIC, S.R.G.G. 22, 17 May 1943, WO 208/4165, TNA.
31
CSDIC, S.R.G.G. 3, 16 May 1943; CSDIC, S.R.G.G. 9, 16 May 1943; CSDIC, S.R.G.G. 11,
16 May 1943, WO 208/4165, TNA.
32
CSDIC, S.R.G.G. 1, 16 May 1943; CSDIC, S.R.G.G. 10, 16 May 1943; CSDIC, S.R.G.G. 12,
16 May 1943; CSDIC, S.R.G.G. 23, 17 May 1943; CSDIC, S.R.G.G. 73, 28 May 1943; CSDIC,
S.R.G.G. 74, 29 May 1943, WO 208/4165, TNA.
33
CSDIC, S.R.G.G. 56, 24 May 1943; CSDIC, S.R.G.G. 50, 23 May 1943; CSDIC, S.R.G.G.
16, 16 May 1943; CSDIC, S.R.G.G. 22, 17 May 1943, WO 208/4165, TNA.
34
CSDIC, S.R.G.G. 35, 21 May 1943, WO 208/4165, TNA.
35
For further discussion of the guidelines issued by Ausland-Abwehr and the disregard for these
rules by numerous German personnel see Neitzel, Tapping Hitler’s Generals, 25.
36
CSDIC, S.R.G.G. 12, 16 May 1943; CSDIC, S.R.G.G. 53, 24 May 1943, WO 208/4165, TNA.
37
CSDIC, S.R.G.G. 64, 24 May 1943, WO 208/4165, TNA.
38
CSDIC, S.R.G.G. 65, 24 May 1943; CSDIC, S.R.G.G. 67, 26 May 1943; CSDIC, S.R.G.G.
89, 31 May 1943, WO 208/4165, TNA.
39
See Neitzel, Tapping Hitler’s Generals, 25.
40
Theodor Graf von Sponeck, Meine Erinnerungen, 176, MSg 1/3329, BA-MA.
41
War Diary, June 1943, WO 165/41, TNA; Theodor Graf von Sponeck, Meine Erinnerungen,
173, MSg 1/3329, BA-MA; As of 1 June 1943 the following thirteen generals were interned at
74
Camp No. 11 at Trent Park: von Arnim, Crüwell, von Thoma, Cramer, von Sponeck, Frantz,
Bassenge, Krause, Neuffer, von Liebenstein, von Broich, Schnarrenberger, and von Hülsen –
Report on the German Senior Officer P/W at No. 11 P/W Camp for the Month of June 1943, WO
208/5622, TNA.
42
“VON ARNIM REPORTED ILL: London Star Says General is Under Care of Psychiatrist,”
New York Times, June 22, 1943; Report on the German Senior Officer P/W at No. 11 P/W
Camp for the Month of June 1943, WO 208/5622, TNA.
43
Report on the German Senior Officer P/W at No. 11 P/W Camp for the Month of June 1943,
WO 208/5622, TNA.
44
Brief character study of Generalleutnant Theodor Karl Anton Graf Sponeck, WO 208/5622,
TNA.
45
Conversation between General der Panzertruppen von Thoma and Generalleutnant von
Sponeck, S.R.G.G. 103, 4 June 1943; Conversation between two German senior officer P/W
including Generalleutnant von Sponeck, S.R.G.G. 216, 12 July 1943, WO 208/4165, TNA.
46
Brief character study of Generalmajor Freiherr Kurt von Liebenstein, 11 July 1943, WO
208/5622; Report on a conversation between Generalmajor Freiherr von Liebenstein and a
British Army Officer, G.R.G.G. 7, 5 June 1943, WO 208/5016, TNA.
47
Brief character study of Generalmajor Freiherr Kurt von Liebenstein, 11 July 1943, WO
208/5622, TNA.
48
Ibid.
49
Report on the German Senior Officer P/W at No. 11 P/W Camp for the Month of June 1943,
WO 208/5622, TNA.
50
Brief character study of General der Panzertruppen Ludwig Crüwell, G.R.G.G. 42, 15 July
1943, WO 208/5016, TNA.
75
51
Ibid.
52
Brief character study of Generalleutnant Gotthard Frantz, G.R.G.G. 52, 10 July 1943, WO
208/5016, TNA.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.
55
Brief character study of Generalmajor Heinrich Hermann von Hülsen, G.R.G.G. 45, 15 July
1943, WO 208/5016, TNA.
56
Ibid.
57
Brief character study of Generalmajor Heinrich Hermann von Hülsen, G.R.G.G. 45, 15 July
1943; CSDIC, G.R.G.G. 56, 22 July 1943, WO 208/5016, TNA.
58
Brief character study of Generalmajor Fritz Krause, 10 July 1943, WO 208/5622, TNA.
59
Report on the German Senior Officer P/W at No. 11 P/W Camp for the Month of June 1943;
Brief character study of Generalmajor Ernst Emil Schnarrenberger,” 14 July 1943, WO
208/5622, TNA.
60
Brief character study of Generalmajor Ernst Emil Schnarrenberger, 14 July 1943, WO
208/5622, TNA.
61
Brief character study of Generaloberst Hans Jürgen von Arnim, G.R.G.G. 54, 9 July 1943,
WO 208/5016; Conversation between Generalmajor Neuffer and Generalleutnant Frantz,
S.R.G.G. 147, 23 June 1943; Conversation between Kapitän z. See Meixner, General der
Panzertruppen Cramer, Generalmajor Krause, and Generalmajor von Broich, S.R.G.G. 221, 12
July 1943, WO 208/4165, TNA.
62
Brief character study of Generaloberst Hans Jürgen von Arnim, G.R.G.G. 54, 9 July 1943,
WO 208/5016, TNA.
63
Ibid.
76
64
Report on the German Senior Officer P/W at No. 11 P/W Camp for the Month of June 1943,
WO 208/5622, TNA.
65
In June 1943, Meixner held the rank of Kapitän zur See, which equated with the U.S. Naval
rank of Captain, or Colonel in the U.S. Army. He received promotion to Konteradmiral in June
1944 as a prisoner of war, which equated with the U.S. Naval rank of Rear Admiral, or Brigadier
General in the U.S. Army; Angolia, On the Field of Honor; Hans H. Hildebrand and Ernest
Henriot, Deutschlands Admirale 1849-1945: die militärischen Werdegänge der See-, Ingenieur-,
Sanitäts-, Waffen- und Verwaltungsoffiziere im Admiralsrang (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 19881990), 462.
66
Brief character study of Kapitän zur See Paul Hermann Meixner, G.R.G.G. 43, 15 July 1943,
WO 208/5016, TNA.
67
Ibid.
68
Ibid.
69
Neitzel, Tapping Hitler’s Generals, 15; Evaluation of Emil Ernst Schnarrenberger, 12
February 1943, Document No. 31, PERS 6/1876; Evaluation of Heinrich Hermann von Hülsen,
15 December 1942, Document No. 100, PERS 6/1415; Evaluation of Kurt von Liebenstein, 1
October 1942, PERS 1/294, BA-MA.
77
CHAPTER III
HITLER’S GENERALS IN AMERICA
The American experience “hosting” Wehrmacht general officers as prisoners of
war in the United States began much like that of their British Allies. U.S. officials
initially took a keen interest in the generals and attempted to emulate British practices by
placing the generals in a lavish environment enhanced with secret microphones and
gleaning as much candid information from the unsuspecting prisoners as possible. Yet,
the Americans quickly lost interest in this arrangement. After gathering little useful
information, they abandoned the process and transferred the generals to camps where
they were treated more like ordinary prisoners of war.
The first “parcel” of Wehrmacht generals to arrive in the United States included
Gustav von Vaerst, Karl Bülowius, Willibald Borowietz, Peter Bernard Köchy and
Colonel August von Quast, who was still awaiting his promotion to brigadier general.
Upon notifying the Americans of their intent to transfer these men to American custody,
British authorities emphasized that in their experience the prisoners took “time to settle
down” and that interrogation did not produce optimum results until “full realization of
captivity and incipient boredom settle in.” The British also expressed their delight that
British and American authorities saw “eye-to-eye on all these interrogation matters,”
indicating that the Americans either intended to follow the British model of treatment for
German prisoner of war generals, or had at least led British authorities to believe that
they did.1
78
Understandably, given the status of these high-ranking prisoners, American
authorities utilized one of their top interrogators, Major Duncan Spencer, to supervise
the exchange of these prisoners and to assist in the initial formulation of American
procedure in accommodating and interrogating these men. Spencer had been attached to
M.I.19, the branch of British military intelligence responsible for prisoners of war, since
March 1943. He was familiar with both the British “operational plan” and the prisoners’
“individual characteristics,” and the British lauded his “efficiency” and “thorough grip
of interrogation organization.”2
Besides utilizing their top personnel, U.S. officials also sought an appropriate
location to place the generals once they arrived in America. In mid-1942, American
authorities had anticipated the need for secluded locations to interrogate prisoners of war
of special importance, such as U-boat officers and enlisted men with special technical
skills. Ideally, they sought two locations, one on each coast. Washington decided to
house the most important German military personnel at Fort Hunt, Virginia, a former
Civilian Conservation Corps facility located near Mount Vernon in the Washington,
D.C. area. Particularly valuable Japanese prisoners would be sent to a renovated resort
hotel at Byron Hot Springs, about fifty miles from San Francisco near Tracy, California.
Because of Japanese cultural taboos against surrendering, however, the Allies captured
few Japanese soldiers. Consequently, Byron Hot Springs had few occupants in the early
stages of American involvement in the war and the War Department quickly opted to use
this facility to interrogate German POWs as well, including this first parcel of
Wehrmacht general officers.3
79
Byron Hot Springs had been a popular playground for Hollywood celebrities in
the years before the Second World War. While having served as a regular getaway for
actors like Clark Gable, the opulent resort was tailor-made for a high security, secret
operation. The elite hotel complex could not be seen from the passing road and the 210acre property’s relatively flat terrain allowed for easy construction of fencing and clear
fields of fire for guards should any prisoners attempt to escape. The grounds also
included a five-acre palm tree park, cement walkways connecting all the buildings, and a
tennis court. Its finest feature, of course, was the hot springs. Byron Hot Springs had
developed a reputation similar to that of a hot springs resort in Carlsbad, Germany,
something which American authorities believed might be helpful in getting German
prisoners to talk.4
In addition to its amenities and secluded location, the resort also came at the right
price. The War Department originally estimated that it would cost over $300,000 to
acquire and adequately renovate any potential interrogation center property. Mrs. Mae
Reed, the owner of Byron Hot Springs in 1942, donated the resort complex to the U.S.
Army for the duration of the war as a patriotic act in honor of her son, a medical corps
officer who had been killed in the First World War. Consequently, the cost of
renovating the resort, which included the construction of fences and guard towers as well
as the installation of important technical equipment, totaled only $173,000.5
The Byron Hot Springs interrogation center had only been in operation for five
months at the time of the generals’ arrival in June 1943. The U.S. government had
acquired the hotel and surrounding property from Mrs. Reed in June 1942 and then took
80
six months preparing the complex to accommodate prisoners of war. For security
reasons, the site’s official address was simply “Post Office Box 651, Tracy, California,”
and its existence was kept from the American public until well after the end of the war.
Camp authorities established the hotel manor as the center of operations, with prisoners’
quarters located on the third floor of the former resort. American officers’ quarters and
interrogation rooms occupied the building’s lower stories, and the other buildings in the
complex housed additional officers and military police, a dental clinic, laundry, barber
shop, recreation room, and other necessities. The facilities accommodated 173 German
and 71 Japanese POWs during 1943, but during the month of June the American staff
and complex devoted its sole attention to von Vaerst, Bülowius, Borowietz, Köchy and
von Quast. Indeed, the interrogation of German prisoners from U-203 had to be
expedited to meet the War Department requirement that all prisoners of war be removed
before the generals arrived.6
The generals first arrived in the United States at Fort George Meade, Maryland,
on 3 June 1943 and almost immediately departed for Byron Hot Springs in a plush
Pullman car. During their long train ride west, as well as throughout their internment in
American prisoner of war camps, they rigidly adhered to their military precedent and
traditions. For instance, during meals, all the officers sat at the tables in order of rank,
and in the evenings, the four generals routinely shared a bottle or two of scotch whiskey,
occasionally including the colonel and other lower-ranking officers in their social
gatherings. Each general had his own valet who had accompanied him since capture.
One of the generals’ orderlies, Sergeant Albert Lauser, confided that “most of the
81
generals [were] partial to their liquid refreshment.” He noted that most of the German
generals under whom he had served were heavy drinkers, although they usually did so
discreetly, typically in the late evening, and that the generals’ drinking was “often
apparent the next morning in the savage humor with which they rise to meet the cares
and responsibilities of a new day.”7
Part of the preparation for the arrival of prisoners of war at Byron Hot Springs
included the installation of twenty-five recording devices and one hundred microphones
in the prisoners’ quarters, something the Americans had likely learned from their British
Allies.8 And like their fellow prisoners in England, the five senior officers in California
do not appear to have felt inhibited in their discussions. In fact, considering the nature
of the information the generals revealed in “private,” it is doubtful that they realized that
their conversations were being recorded by microphones in their rooms.
One evening, as Generals von Vaerst and Borowietz finished listening to a news
broadcast, both expressed pessimism about Germany’s chances in the war. Von Vaerst
remarked that “[Germany needs] everything, everything is needed. It is going very
badly for us—very badly.” The two men discussed the Allied bombings of Hamburg,
Bremen, Luebeck and other German cities; and speculated that the number of bombers
that the United States could supply for the effort would only increase. Interestingly,
when Major von Meyer entered the room, the pessimistic conversation between his two
superior officers quickly changed.9 Clearly, the generals thought it important to keep up
morale for their subordinates and attempted to conceal their real views of the war. Had
82
these two men remained in England, these pessimistic comments alone might have
landed them in the “anti-Nazi” clique at Trent Park.
American authorities also obtained information from the generals through direct
interrogation. These conversations generally took place with two or more of the
generals present. An early interview with all four of the generals revealed that, prior to
von Arnim’s surrender in May 1943, arrangements had been made to attempt to evacuate
many of the highest ranking officers. Heavy casualties among Germany’s generals in
both North Africa and Russia necessitated that Germany attempt to conserve as many
experienced military leaders as possible. While General von Arnim offered to facilitate
the escape of several of his men from North Africa, most declined. Interestingly, the
generals intimated that fear of an “unfavorable popular reaction” from the home front
compelled most of the senior officers to stay put.10
American authorities regarded von Vaerst and Köchy, in particular, as the most
intelligent and experienced of the four generals at Byron Hot Springs. Von Vaerst,
being the highest-ranking of the generals then in American custody, was the recognized
leader among the German prisoners. He and his colleague General Bülowius both
indicated their “astonishment” that with so many Germans in the United States, the two
countries should be at war. They insisted that the Germans had “no feeling against [the
United States]”—Germany’s declaration of war on 11 December 1941 apparently
notwithstanding—and they looked forward to a time when Germany and the United
States could be allied.11
83
Von Vaerst reserved his hatred and suspicion for the Russians, indicating his
surprise that the British—of whom he had nothing critical to say—and the Americans
could be allied with the Russians in any fashion. He noted his belief that the German
Command’s biggest mistake was invading Russia in June 1941, stating that “only after it
was too late” did the Germans realize the size of the Russian army. He later indicated
that the severity of the Russian winter was “the only thing that had saved the Russians
thus far.” Von Vaerst and all his colleagues consistently portrayed the Russians as “little
better than beasts” and emphasized “the peril of the Russians to western civilization.”
This bred suspicion among the American interrogators that the generals were attempting
to justify German brutality against the Russians, both military and civilian, on the
Eastern Front. Von Vaerst ended his last interrogation at Byron Hot Springs by noting
that “even though we cannot make any further invasion of Russia, we can and must hold
the Russians away from Germany.”12
The former German Air Field Regional Commander in Tunisia, Brigadier
General Karl Peter Bernard Köchy, like his colleague von Vaerst, impressed American
authorities as “a very intelligent man” and one of “imagination and thoughtful
character.” Indeed, Köchy was a prize catch, having served both in the German army
and navy, before transferring to the air force. With regard to the German war with
Russia, Köchy did not believe that defeat was inevitable, although he felt it to be likely,
and he did not share von Vaerst’s conviction that the Germans could continue to hold the
territory they then possessed in western Russia. Like von Vaerst, however, Köchy saw
84
the Eastern Front as the crucial theater of the war for Germany, characterizing the
German hatred for the Russians as unparalleled in history.13
Köchy possessed a fairly realistic view of the international scene at the time,
stating that “no matter the outcome of the war,” Britain “had long ceased to be the
dominating influence in the world” and that the United States would “fall heir to that
world-wide influence.” He felt that if defeat became inevitable, Germany would
surrender to Britain and the United States unconditionally, if necessary, noting that “if
Germany’s wagon became small and broken, her only hope would be to hitch it to a
star.”14
Köchy’s comment about Germany potentially surrendering “unconditionally, if
necessary” refers to the conclusion of the First World War in which the Germans signed
an armistice but did not officially surrender. This suggests that Köchy, and likely
numerous other German general officers, realized by this point that the war could not be
won but maintained hope that they could possibly extricate themselves without entirely
capitulating. As both his and von Vaerst’s comments attest, their biggest concern by
June 1943 was not winning the war but keeping the Soviets out of Germany.
In contrast to Generals von Vaerst and Köchy, American authorities viewed
General Borowietz as a man of “limited outlook,” characterizing him as having “had
neither the time nor the inclination to think,” and whose “statements and opinions on
world affairs are therefore of very small importance compared with those of General
Köchy.” The American interrogators further noted that Borowietz was the most openly
85
pessimistic of the generals about Germany’s chances in the war. Indeed, Borowietz
stated frankly that Germany would definitely lose the war.15
Borowietz’s seemingly confused and uninformed views on the development of
new weapons perhaps contributed to the Americans’ negative view of him. The general
confirmed that “very serious study had been devoted to, and considerable progress made,
in new types of rockets,” but scoffed at the idea of developing large rockets as he
believed their size would make them impossible to control. He stated, however, that a
small rocket could be effective as an “anti-personnel projectile,” as he believed that
because of the terrifying sound it produced “men had actually died of fear when heavily
attacked by this weapon.” In regard to the development of new explosives, Borowietz
stated his belief that nothing “radically new was likely to emerge in this war.”16
Curiously, Camp Tracy officials did not appear interested in General Bülowius.
While they interrogated him along with his fellow generals, they offered no discussion
of his personal beliefs and experiences or any assessment of his intelligence or character.
Von Vaerst, Borowietz, and Köchy were even interrogated together at one point without
Bülowius present, resulting in a detailed report of the information they provided. This
obvious exclusion of Bülowius suggests that he was of less significance to American
authorities than were the other three. Perhaps American interrogators took less interest
in Bülowius because he had commanded the Manteuffel Division for only a short time
before surrendering, and because he had been criticized for performing poorly in his
previous position as commander of the Afrika Korps.
86
In addition to seeking technical information and the generals’ perspectives of the
war, the Americans also attempted to gauge each general’s political views—at least von
Vaerst, Borowietz, and Köchy; again, Bülowius was excluded. General von Vaerst
stated that he and his colleagues were Nazis and “strong believers in Hitler,” although
adding that “it took the [Nazis] a considerable time to convince them that the ideals,
plans, and aims of the Party would be the only thing that would restore a united and
strong Germany.” Conversely, Köchy and Borowietz did not share von Vaerst’s
opinions. American authorities reported that neither of these two generals was
concerned with “political or ideological conditions.” Köchy made only casual
references to Hitler and Borowietz never did, giving their American captors the
impression that they viewed Hitler only as “a means to an end.” In fact, Köchy appeared
quite critical of the Nazi regime, noting that he felt strongly that “the present Nazi
hierarchy is to a great extent composed of men unfitted for the position, and unworthy of
their tasks, and that they are there almost solely because of having shared Hitler’s early
struggles.” He noted his strong disapproval of the concentration camps and “gangster
methods” that he believed were responsible for arousing worldwide hatred of Germany
and that would likely lead to Germany’s defeat in the war.17
In light of later developments, it seems unlikely that von Vaerst’s stated loyalty
to the Nazi regime accurately reflected his personal convictions. Rather, it is more likely
that as the highest-ranking German officer at Byron Hot Springs he sought to set a
proper example of loyalty to the German state for his subordinates. Like Von Arnim at
Trent Park, von Vaerst’s position of leadership among the prisoners in California and his
87
sometimes contradictory statements made his political views difficult to adequately
ascertain. That the Americans later chose him as a candidate for re-education, however,
suggests that he either must have changed his views while in captivity, or, more likely,
initially masked some fairly strong anti-Nazi sentiments. Considering that the American
staff at Byron Hot Springs held von Vaerst in high regard suggests that they did not take
his early pro-Nazi statements too seriously.
Köchy, whom the American interrogators also highly regarded and who initially
appeared to be the most openly anti-Nazi among this first group of general officer
prisoners, later fell under a great deal of suspicion by Allied officials in postwar
Germany. His name appeared on several Allied lists of suspected “militarists” to be
watched by occupation authorities after his repatriation. After the war, the Allies
distinguished between potential militarists and Nazi sympathizers despite the fact that
they had often confused these two during the prisoners’ wartime captivity. Either way, it
still seems surprising that a prisoner like Köchy, initially held in such high regard, would
eventually find himself the object of such skepticism.
Regardless of what von Vaerst, Köchy, and their colleagues at Byron Hot
Springs actually believed, American authorities stamped the files of all of these German
generals, as well as those of their accompanying subordinates: “Nazi sympathies
undetermined.”18 The Americans made no further attempts to determine any of their
captive generals’ political views until well after the success of the Allied invasion of
Normandy and the emergence of American concerns about the postwar reconstruction of
Germany made these types of concerns more relevant. American emulation of British
88
treatment of general officer prisoners abruptly ended as well. Camp authorities at Byron
Hot Springs notified the Provost Marshal General’s Office on 29 June 1943 that the
prisoners should be transferred to a suitable internment camp and all interrogations
ceased.
Notably, Washington had already decided before the generals had been
transferred to California that their stay at Byron Hot Springs would be brief. On the very
day the generals first arrived in the United States—3 June 1943—the U.S. Provost
Marshal Generals Office had authorized the construction of a compound at the existing
prisoner of war camp in Clinton, Mississippi, specifically for the long-term internment
of German general officer prisoners. While the “generals’ camp” was not scheduled to
be completed until early fall, American authorities could not wait that long. Presumably,
the American interrogators believed little further information of any value could be
obtained from these prisoners and it was no longer worth the expense to keep them at
Byron Hot Springs. Furthermore, because American military intelligence only operated
two interrogation facilities, they needed to make room at Byron Hot Springs for other
prisoners possessing potentially valuable information.
Consequently, the generals and their aides were temporarily transferred to Camp
Mexia, Texas, to await the completion of their designated home in Mississippi. The use
of elegant accommodations like those in California for general officer prisoners
obviously represented the exception rather than the rule. In fact, aside from the three
weeks when von Vaerst and his colleagues occupied Byron Hot Springs, the elite
interrogation center almost exclusively housed enlisted men and non-commissioned
89
officers. None of the other German generals who were later transferred to the United
States ever came to this facility. Unlike in Britain, America’s finest prisoner of war
accommodations were barely seen by its highest-ranking prisoners.
Aside from the brevity of the endeavor, the approach taken by U.S. interrogators
toward their captive German generals also calls into question the seriousness of the
American effort. The British interrogation team who sent these generals to the United
States informed the Americans that prisoners took “time to settle down” and that
optimum interrogation results occurred only after “full realization of captivity and
incipient boredom settle in.” Yet, American authorities only held the generals at Byron
Hot Springs for a little over three weeks before transferring them to a regular internment
camp. Furthermore, American interrogators speculated midway through the internment
and interrogation process that “pessimism is not expressed when more than two [of the
generals] are present.”19 Since the Americans clearly suspected that these men would
not reveal their real feelings about the war in the presence of their colleagues, and
certainly not in the presence of subordinate officers, it would be reasonable to assume
that they would have interviewed each one individually. There is no evidence that they
did; in fact, the generals were almost always paired for interrogations and frequently
interviewed in groups of three or more.
Perhaps the Americans felt the information they received was not worth their
time and expense. Indeed, most of the information appears to have been less than vital
to the Allied war effort. Nevertheless, the nature of information received from a
prisoner is in part a function of the questions and approach of the interrogators. Despite
90
the initial oversight provided by Major Spencer, an American officer who was highlyregarded by the British and experienced in CSDIC interrogation procedures, it appears
that the Americans did not see eye-to-eye with the British on all these interrogation
matters after all. With the first group of generals revealing little useful information and
the British supplying American military intelligence with information on the generals in
England, Washington saw no need to continue the operation.
Unfortunately for the generals in the United States, not only did the two Allies’
respective policies regarding interrogation diverge, but significant discrepancies in the
manner in which the two nations accommodated their captured German generals
emerged as well. Where the British continued to host their “guests” in a stately mansion
like Trent Park, the Americans began providing their general officer prisoners with
poorly-insulated bungalows that simply met the minimum requirements of the Geneva
Convention. And where British intelligence maintained its interrogation efforts and
surveillance of the generals’ conversations throughout the war, American authorities
abandoned the process entirely and made no further attempts to gather intelligence from
their captive generals. For all intents and purposes, the Americans viewed these men as
they did any other prisoners of war.
After their transfer to Texas in July 1943, the generals in the United States
angrily complained about the accommodations provided for them at Camp Mexia, a far
cry from the opulence to which they had quickly become accustomed at Byron Hot
Springs. Their complaints, however, fell on deaf ears. More German general officers
arrived in the United States in 1943 and 1944, but American authorities took little
91
interest in them. Camp Mexia’s accommodations, spartan by the generals’ standards,
provided a foretaste of much of the rest of the time these prisoners spent in America.
On 2 July 1943, the four German generals and Colonel von Quast departed
California by train. They arrived in Mexia, Texas, on 8 July, the first day of hundredplus degree temperatures in the summer of 1943. A little over two weeks later on 24
July, Mexia experienced a record high temperature of 105 degrees. This trend continued
through August with a new record high of 107 degrees established on 16 August. In late
August, when morning temperatures finally dipped into the mid seventies, the Mexia
Weekly Herald exuberantly noted that “Hope Springs in Hearts of Heat Weary
Sufferers.”20 The temperatures of northern California must have instantly become a fond
memory for men plunged into the sweltering humidity of a hot, Texas summer,
particularly in an era predating the widespread availability of air conditioning.
Camp Mexia was a typical large prisoner of war camp in the United States during
the Second World War. It was built on land already owned by the federal government
about three miles outside of Mexia, a small Texas town east of Waco and about eighty
miles south of Dallas. The Provost Marshal General’s Office commonly chose small
towns like Mexia because any prisoners who managed to escape would have a difficult
time sabotaging industry in places where little existed. The town’s relatively close
proximity to a major city like Dallas also offered easy access to necessary supplies,
equipment and personnel. Moreover, placing POW camps in the American South was
cheaper because it relieved the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers from having to insulate
the numerous barracks necessary to accommodate all of America’s prisoners of war
92
The prisoner of war camp at Mexia contained two sections: one large enclosure
comprised of four compounds, each capable of accommodating up to 1600 enlisted
prisoners; and a smaller enclosure built to house up to 1000 officer prisoners.
Eventually, Camp Mexia would become the largest POW camp in the state of Texas
when it reached its full capacity of over 6000 prisoners. When the generals arrived in
July 1943, however, the camp had only been occupied for about a month and there were
fewer than 4000 prisoners residing there.21
An area several hundred yards wide divided the officers’ enclosure from that of
the enlisted men. The American guard companies’ quarters were located in this open
space. The two sections were connected by a barbed wire corridor through which select
enlisted prisoners were allowed to enter the officers’ enclosure to fulfill their
responsibilities as orderlies for the senior officers. American army doctors, with the aid
of German doctors who were themselves prisoners, provided medical care to the POWs
and American personnel alike at the camp hospital, a modern facility with X-ray
equipment and operating rooms. The enlisted prisoners prepared food for the entire
camp as well as doing laundry for the officers. Furthermore, because the camp had only
recently been built, other enlisted prisoners busied themselves constructing sidewalks
and gardens within the officer’s compound as well as around the camp administration
barracks.22
Fortunately for the generals and the other officer prisoners, they had better
quality barracks than did the enlisted prisoners of war at Camp Mexia. The officers’
apartments were constructed of sheet rock, rather than the tar paper walls the enlisted
93
POWs were forced to endure, and while the officers still shared quarters, there were only
two officers assigned to an apartment and each man had his own bedroom. The generals
were also regularly allowed to take strolls outside of the camp accompanied by an
American officer, but only after giving their words of honor not to escape.
Unfortunately for the generals, there wasn’t much to look at outside the fence.
According to Rudolf Fischer, a representative of the Swiss government who inspected
the camp in September 1943, Camp Mexia “leaves much to be desired in the way of
beautification. It has not been possible to get grass to take root and in high winds the
camp is very dusty.”23
Despite the swirling dust and the oppressive heat and humidity of Camp Mexia,
American commanding officer Colonel Thomas Bays fostered a very “cordial”
relationship with his prisoners, including the newly-arrived generals. Indeed, General
von Vaerst applauded Colonel Bays’ gentlemanly approach, stating that the camp
commandant was “always correct” in his manners. A camp inspector from the
International Committee of the Red Cross who visited Camp Mexia in August 1943 also
commended Colonel Bays’ leadership, noting that overall the prisoners’ morale was
“excellent.”24
Colonel Bays strove to provide adequate recreation areas and facilities for the
prisoners, including the construction of several tennis courts, the remodeling of some
existing buildings into theaters equipped with raised stages and sloping seats, and he
even obtained a 35mm. movie projector and some radios for prisoner use. Bays also
encouraged the development of a prisoner educational program that included plans for
94
courses in architecture, political science, physics, chemistry, medicine, botany, and law,
among others. Unfortunately, book shortages and censorship rules hindered attempts to
get the school system up and running during the prisoners’ first few months at Camp
Mexia. While these early obstacles were eventually overcome, the generals were
transferred to Mississippi before they could take advantage of this program.25
In spite of Colonel Bays’ efforts to provide adequate facilities for the prisoners at
Mexia, the generals, in particular, were dissatisfied. Admittedly, two main problems
existed, the first being that no amount of minor remodeling could make Camp Mexia
into a resort like Byron Hot Springs or an estate like Trent Park. The generals, miserable
from the sweltering heat and comparatively unattractive surroundings, quickly compared
their previous camps in England and California with their new, if temporary, home in
Texas and found American treatment sadly wanting.
In Camp Mexia’s defense, it had not been intended as a long-term stay for the
generals. Facilities specifically designed for these men had been under construction at
Camp Clinton, Mississippi, since the generals had first arrived in America.
Unfortunately, construction delays postponed the transfer of the generals to Clinton.
The generals’ camp was originally slated to open on 1 September 1943, but it was
delayed until the first week of October. But even had the generals been transferred as
originally planned, the damage to American prestige, in the generals’ eyes, would
already have been done. In fact, by the end of July, when the generals had yet to spend a
full month in Mexia, the headquarters for the Eighth Service Command (which included
Camp Mexia) sent the following telegram to the Provost Marshal General in
95
Washington, DC: “German General Officers at Prisoner of War Camp Mexia, Texas,
Protesting Present Accommodations. Recommend Transfer at Earliest Practical Date to
Clinton, Mississippi.” All that Camp Mexia personnel could do was assure the generals
that accommodations more appropriate to their rank were being prepared for them.26
The sub-par housing, the scorching sun of mid-summer in Texas, and the dusty
wind of Camp Mexia caused the generals a great deal of consternation. Yet, the second
main problem at Mexia and what may have galled the senior prisoners the most was the
insolence, as they saw it, with which many of the American officers treated them.
General von Vaerst, according to Rudolf Fischer of the Swiss Legation, was
“considerably perturbed by the treatment which he has received in the United States.”
Von Vaerst claimed that the British treated general officer prisoners “more
appropriately” than did the Americans. He complained to the Swiss Legation that, with
the exception of Colonel Bays, “he had not been treated with the chivalry and civility
which he believed he had a right to expect.” The general was offended that “many
American officers had not exhibited confidence in his word as a German officer and that
the treatment accorded him was similar to that accorded to a criminal.”27
American treatment of von Vaerst and his fellow generals, as well as the rest of
the German prisoner population in America, was founded almost entirely upon the
dictates of international law in the form of the 1929 International Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, otherwise known as the Geneva Convention. The
United States strictly adhered to the 1929 Geneva Convention in the hope that this would
compel Nazi Germany to treat American soldiers held in German prisoner of war camps
96
accordingly. The treaty required that POW camps be constructed to the same standards
as military installations for the home nation’s own soldiers. In other words, the POW
camps in America were required to offer German prisoners of war the same conditions
as did American base camps for U.S. military personnel. American observance of the
law went to such extremes that in some camps where not enough barrack space existed
to house both prisoners and American guards, both had to live in tents and the barracks
sat empty until more could be built and the problem rectified.28
This was certainly not the case with Camp Mexia, or any camp in the United
States that housed German generals. General officer prisoners enjoyed their own
furnished apartments, aides de camps and batmen to service their immediate needs, and
forty dollar per month salaries29 without being required to work. They lived in
enclosures segregated from the enlisted and non-commissioned officer compounds, and
while the Geneva Convention required that they salute American officers, this
requirement only applied to U.S. officers of equal or higher rank. Since few American
generals ever wandered through U.S. prisoner of war camps, and most American POW
camp commanding officers were not general officers, the German prisoner of war
generals rarely had to do anything except enjoy a life of leisure, however boring,
engaging in artistic pursuits and recreational activities, or simply complaining about
their living conditions.30
There is a difference, however, between providing a safe, comfortable
environment with life’s basic necessities as required by international law and
accommodating gentlemen in a manner to which they are accustomed to living. The
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German generals were aghast to discover that U.S. military installations offered
American generals accommodations similar to theirs and that Camp Mexia met the basic
housing requirements of the Geneva Convention. Furthermore, considering the lack of
respect for aristocratic institutions that many of the American officers and guard
personnel at Mexia apparently exhibited, the German generals likely felt more at home
in an English prisoner of war camp than they did in the United States. Fortunately for
them, their stay in Texas was brief. But they soon found an even worse environment in
Mississippi.
On 3 June 1943, U.S. Army Service Forces Headquarters authorized the
construction of “General officer prisoner of war compounds at Clinton, Mississippi, and
Monticello, Arkansas.” Washington designated Clinton for German general officers and
Monticello for Italians. The directive called for each compound to hold up to thirty-one
generals and as many as thirty-two lower-ranking officers who could serve as aides-decamp. It also called for future expansion to accommodate a total of fifty-one generals
and fifty-six aides of the appropriate nationality in each location.31
American authorities initially strove to provide what they believed to be superior
accommodations for their general officer prisoners. Like the officers’ compound at
Camp Mexia, the generals’ compound at Clinton offered more amenities than did the
enlisted men’s quarters. During construction in July 1943, the initial camp commandant,
Colonel Charles C. Loughlin, arranged to have the total area of the generals’ compound
enlarged by moving the north fence line about one hundred yards farther out. This
allowed the compound to include “a small brook and grove of trees which would add to
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the beautification of this area.” Once completed, the generals’ compound consisted of
eighteen residential buildings. The ranking general officer enjoyed his own small house,
composed of a living room and dining room, two bedrooms, a kitchen and a bath.
Fifteen other houses, built in a fashion similar to the ranking officer’s home, each
accommodated two lower ranking generals who shared quarters. The two additional
barracks in the compound housed the generals’ aides-de-camp.32
The generals’ homes were well-furnished. The living room of each house
contained a polished wooden desk, two wooden chairs and a matching settee, all of
which were upholstered in red leather. A table and other smaller furnishings were also
provided to complement the living rooms. The Provost Marshal General’s Office also
allowed German prisoner of war officers to have radios and newspapers, provided they
met the approval of U.S. government censors. The YMCA and the International
Committee of the Red Cross provided additional books, recreational equipment, and
supplies for hobbies and artistic endeavors. One of the earliest German generals to
arrive at Camp Clinton was reported to have been a talented artist who adorned the walls
of his living room with his own water color creations.33
The generals’ compound also included an officer’s club and a canteen where all
of the officers could purchase toiletries and food items in addition to the daily meals
provided by the camp. The generals, like all German POWs in American camps, were
allowed to purchase two bottles of beer per day and the meals provided for the generals
consisted of the same quantity of field rations as those provided for American officers
and enlisted men. For help with domestic chores, Clinton’s stockade commander, Major
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Harry Miller, assigned each general his own orderly, chosen from among the camp’s
enlisted prisoner population. These prisoners tended to the generals’ daily needs such as
doing laundry, cleaning and fetching supplies, leaving the lower-ranking officers who
served as the generals’ aides to deal with weightier tasks. In case these facilities and
services were unsatisfactory, the generals could send official messages or complaints to
the camp’s commanding officer by placing their written statements in a mailbox located
in the compound. These messages were then routinely carried by one of the camp
guards to the commandant’s office.34
The first generals to arrive at Camp Clinton were Gotthard Frantz and Ernst
Schnarrenberger. They boarded a train at Ft. George Meade, Maryland, the typical point
of arrival for German prisoners of war coming to the United States from England, and
arrived in Clinton, Mississippi, on 7 October 1943. They were quickly joined by the
senior officers from California whose transfer by train from Camp Mexia had finally
been authorized on 5 October. These generals arrived a few days after Frantz and
Schnarrenberger, likely owing to delays in preparing the men for transfer and the travel
time required to traverse the four hundred miles from north Texas to central Mississippi.
These seven prisoners, six generals and one colonel, and their lower-ranking aides would
be the sole occupants of Camp Clinton’s officers’ compound for over eight months until
the British began sending other generals from Trent Park to Mississippi in the weeks
before the Allied invasion of Western Europe in June 1944.35
The transfers of these senior prisoners and their initial adjustment to life at Camp
Clinton appear to have been effected fairly easily. This may be due, in part, to the
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quality of the guards initially assigned to the camp. An inspection report issued by the
Provost Marshal General’s Office, dated 18-19 July 1943, praised the “excellency [sic]”
of the 458th & 459th Military Police Escort Guard Companies stationed at the camp.
These American MPs had been stationed there since 4 July 1943 in preparation for the
arrival of the first enlisted prisoners near the end of the month. The 487th MPEG
Company arrived in September to help prepare the camp to open the newly completed
officers’ compound. All of these guard units had been specially trained to handle
German general officer prisoners before their arrival in October.36
Despite American preparation and training, the first problem arose only a few
days after the generals arrived. Gustav von Vaerst, as the highest ranking general,
became the camp spokesman for the officers’ compound. In this capacity, he notified
the U.S. War Department in a letter dated 13 October 1943 that the aides of two of the
“generals,” Karl Köchy and August von Quast, had not been transferred with them. Von
Vaerst’s letter, sent through Camp Clinton’s new commanding officer, Colonel James L.
McIlhenny, requested that the two aides, Captain Albert Giesecke and Lieutenant
Gerhard Runge, be immediately transferred to Clinton from Camp Mexia, Texas. The
dispute centered on von Quast’s rank. While von Vaerst referred in his letter to
“Colonel in General von Quast,” American officials still insisted that he was simply a
Colonel. Consequently, the War Department responded to von Vaerst’s letter almost
three weeks later by declaring that von Quast was “a colonel and not a general officer,
and, therefore, is not entitled to an aide.” Their reply explained that von Quast himself
101
had only been sent to Camp Clinton because he served as an aide to one of the other
generals and not because of any impending promotion.37
At the time of his capture, August von Quast had notified both the British and
American authorities that he was awaiting promotion to brigadier general. However,
due to the German military’s attempts to promote large numbers of its enlisted soldiers
to non-commissioned officers, both immediately prior to capture and during the course
of their interment as prisoners of war, in an effort to take advantage of the Geneva
Convention’s prohibition against forcing NCOs to work, the United States War
Department balked at most prisoners’ claims of last-minute promotion. These
circumstances eventually resulted in the War Department’s issuance of Prisoner of War
Circular No. 11 in December 1943, which stated that “no evidence of promotion of a
prisoner which is received by the War Department after the prisoner has come into the
custody of the United States or previous Allied detaining power, will be recognized by
the United States as accomplishing the promotion of the prisoner of war.” Thus, while
the German generals at Clinton repeatedly requested American recognition of “General”
von Quast’s promotion and treated him as one of their own, American authorities did
not. They did eventually acquiesce in the transfers of Giesecke and Runge, although not
until July 1944.38
Other problems between the generals and their captors in Mississippi soon
followed. Like their colleagues in England, the generals at Camp Clinton requested
permission to take walks outside of the camp. While British authorities at Camp No. 11
required the generals to sign “paroles,” written oaths not to escape once outside the
102
fence, American authorities initially objected to allowing the generals out of the camp at
all. Major General G.V. Strong, Director of Military Intelligence for the War
Department, stated that “due to the numerous cases of brutality toward American
prisoners by the Germans,” he did “not feel that a relaxation of treatment on our part
[was] warranted.” General Strong did not specify to what cases of brutality he was
referring, but his objection to offering the generals parole was obviously intended as a
punitive measure.39
The American general and his colleagues quickly had a change of heart,
however, and offered the German general officers at Camp Clinton a similar opportunity
for parole as did the British. The Americans demanded that certain conditions be met,
however, including the requirements that each general must sign his own individual
parole form, “all paroles must be for a specified period of time” and include the written
consent of the senior German officer, the paroled generals must be “accompanied by an
American officer,” and the generals could not travel farther than five miles from the
camp or enter any populated areas.40
Surprisingly, after finally receiving permission from the U.S. War Department to
walk outside the confines of Camp Clinton, the generals refused to sign any parole forms
promising not to escape. Consequently, while their aides took weekly walks with
American officers in the Mississippi countryside, those who would not sign the forms
remained in the camp. Seven months later, in May 1944, a camp inspector reported that
the generals’ were still requesting permission to walk outside the camp without having to
sign the parole and these requests were still being denied.41
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Other routine misunderstandings or simple oversights occurred. For instance,
von Vaerst filed a complaint on behalf of Generals Frantz and Schnarrenberger claiming
these two men had not been paid from 21 August 1943, when they departed England,
until 10 October 1943, shortly after they arrived at Camp Clinton. The archival records
do not indicate whether this matter was resolved to the generals’ satisfaction.42
Certainly, these types of problems, simple logistical difficulties that did not involve legal
or ideological disputes, must have occurred in the prisoner of war camps of all the
belligerent nations during the Second World War. Of greater interest, a series of reports
filed by camp inspectors from the Swiss Legation and the U.S. War and State
Departments revealed the development of much more serious concerns which had arisen
by early 1944.
Dr. Edward Feer of the Swiss Legation, the protecting power charged with
ensuring that American officials followed all of the provisions of the Geneva
Convention, visited Camp Clinton for three days in February 1944. He was
accompanied by Bernard Gufler, chief of the Internees Section of the U.S. State
Department’s Special War Problems Division. Where the War Department acted as the
custodian of prisoners in the United States, the State Department took responsibility for
the foreign relations aspects of the operation. Gufler and the Internees Section oversaw
this task.43
The two men filed a damning report of American treatment of the prisoner of war
generals, insisting that “immediate attention” to this issue by American authorities was
“imperative.” Feer and Gufler first called attention to the generals’ lack of sufficient
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clothing. During the winter of 1943-1944, the prisoners had only their thin khaki Afrika
Korps uniforms, designed to be worn in hot, desert service. They had not even been
issued more appropriate underwear. The only garments Clinton authorities provided
“were of abnormally large size and fitted only the tallest” of the generals. Furthermore,
the shoes provided for the generals by the camp administration were “in such a worn out
and dirty condition that their acceptance was refused [by the generals] as inconsistent
with the high rank of the prisoners.”44
Similar complaints were issued about the bedding. The cotton comforters
provided for the officers had been previously used and were dirty and torn. The Swiss
inspector stated that “on cold and windy days the officers [were] literally freezing.”
Making matters worse, when the officers attempted to alleviate their discomfort by
ordering desired items from American mail order firms, a privilege allowed the prisoners
as long as they could pay for the items from their monthly salaries, the orders were
processed extremely slowly by camp personnel. Indeed, the inspection report claimed
that “only ten per cent of all the orders placed during the last four to five months [had]
been carried out.” The Swiss inspector concluded in regard to the clothing situation that
“the German generals at Camp Clinton and the accompanying officers [were] worse off
than the enlisted men in any American P.O.W. camp visited so far.”45
Poor assessments of the clothing and bedding were only the beginning. Feer and
Gufler continued their litany of criticisms, contending that the generals’ also suffered
due to the poorly insulated flooring that made their houses unnecessarily cold in the
winter. After fighting in the North African desert, even a comparatively mild winter in
105
Mississippi would not have been comfortable for men sitting idle in poorly insulated
homes and without proper attire and blankets.46
In addition to being cold, the generals apparently also suffered from boredom.
Feer and Gufler observed that the officers lacked a sufficient quantity of books and
recreation equipment. Where American POW camps typically provided common
libraries for enlisted prisoners, the general officers were allowed to obtain their own
individual books. The officers would then often share their collections with each other
to augment the amount of reading material available. According to the inspectors,
however, von Vaerst, who was the senior general and who had been in the United States
for over seven months, had only been able to acquire three books. The generals had
turned to wood-carving, painting and gardening, due to the dearth of reading material
and because these were apparently the only activities for which they could obtain
adequate supplies. But even some of these activities had met with frustration, as the
American guards in the generals’ compound had “carelessly trampled the gardens”
during their daily patrols.47
Yet, what most troubled the Swiss inspector and his State Department
counterpart was a visible discrepancy between the treatment provided for the generals
and that provided the enlisted prisoners in the adjacent compounds. The two inspectors
lauded “the atmosphere of the enlisted men’s stockade” and the “excellent
administration” and “relationship between the commanding officer and his staff with the
enlisted men held prisoner.” Astonishingly, the inspectors stated that the generals’
compound “makes an impression so sharply in contrast to the impression made by the
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enlisted men’s stockade as to be startling.” They were convinced that “the generals
[had] been placed at a long distance from the camp administration and forgotten.”48
This obvious discrepancy in accommodations and amenities between the
compounds, something the generals could easily observe through the barbed wire, stirred
a great deal of resentment among them. They expressed their belief to the Swiss
representative that “the Camp Commander had probably been ordered by Washington to
isolate them in their ‘village’ and humiliate them by systematic neglect.” They felt
“abandoned.” They further bemoaned the fact that on the rare occasion when an
American officer visited them, he almost always began by mentioning how busy he was,
giving the “impression that it would be inadvisable for them to take up anything with
him except the most extremely vital matters.”49
The Swiss representative made special note of the complaints of General Frantz,
who was “particularly bitter” about the treatment he had received while in American
custody. Frantz had worked for an American company for many years before the war
and deplored his current conditions, particularly when contrasted with the lavish
treatment he received while on earlier business trips to Detroit. Moreover, Dr. Feer
reported that all the general officers felt “abandoned to the care of privates and noncommissioned officers, many of whom [had] apparently handled them in an exceedingly
rude and ill-considered manner.”50
This kind of behavior contrasted sharply with the “most flattering attention” that
had been paid to these officers by the British. Generals Frantz and Schnarrenberger,
who had transferred directly to Clinton from Trent Park, claimed that “considerate
107
treatment [had] stopped abruptly when they were handed over to the American military
authorities in England.” The other generals fondly recalled American Major Spencer,
who had “handled them with tact and consideration,” and the lavish accommodations
they had enjoyed at Byron Hot Springs. But there was a striking contrast between the
treatment they had previously received from the British and from American personnel in
California and the treatment they now received. This discrepancy convinced the
generals that “their present state [was] the result not of neglect but of a deliberate desire
on the part of the War Department to humiliate them.”51
Making matters worse, the Swiss representative feared the generals’ suspicions
might be correct. He was “greatly upset by the manner in which the Generals were
being treated.” Both Feer and Gufler questioned how well America could understand
European problems if they treated “Europeans of rank and culture” in this manner. “A
good many tricks have been missed in the handling of the German Generals,” Gufler
stated, noting his impression that “the United States is decidedly not putting a good foot
forward in its treatment of them.” The inspectors recommended providing more reading
material, clothing and recreational equipment. Most importantly, they advised Clinton
authorities to appoint some American officer personnel “to pay more attention to this
side of the camp’s activities,” referring to the need to build some kind of relationship
between the American camp personnel and the general officer prisoners. Feer and
Gufler suggested that “some attention paid to the Generals might in the future bear
valuable fruit to the United States.”52
108
Feer and Gufler’s condemnation of Camp Clinton’s officer compound was only
the first in a long series of complaints, by both camp inspectors and the generals
themselves, about American treatment of these men. The strongest indictment of Camp
Clinton’s treatment of the German generals came three months later, in May 1944. After
a follow-up inspection by Bernard Gufler, this time accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel
M.C. Bernays of the U.S. War Department’s Personnel division, the two men
condemned American treatment of these senior prisoners, singling out Clinton
commanding officer James McIlhenny for criticism. The two inspectors characterized
Camp Clinton as “superficially attractive but otherwise [leaving] a good deal to be
desired.” They laid the blame for Clinton’s shortcomings squarely at the feet of
McIlhenny and his staff by noting that “the prisoners have a number of complaints not
heard in other camps, most of which could probably be straightened out if someone in
authority in camp administration would show more energy and imagination than hitherto
has been displayed by this camp administration.”53
Regarding the general officer prisoners, Gufler and Bernays issued a now
familiar list of complaints, noting that many of these were requests that the generals had
already made when Gufler visited the camp three months prior. These requests included
the assignment of orderlies for Köchy and von Quast, American recognition of von
Quast’s promotion to brigadier general, the generals’ petition to take walks outside the
camp without signing formal parole forms, the “necessity of insulating their houses,
especially the floors,” and the prisoners’ wish for tennis courts and possibly a swimming
pool. The generals also wanted to send pictures of themselves and their bungalows, as
109
well as some portraits of the camp painted by Schnarrenberger and Borowietz, to their
families and friends in Germany.54
With the exception of insulating the generals’ quarters, the two inspectors
recognized that some of these complaints were minor. Their overall assessment of the
camp, however, remained highly critical. As representatives of the American
government, Gufler and Bernays’ impression of the generals’ compound was that “we
[the United States] still continue to miss tricks at every turn in our handling of these high
officers. They still speak highly of their excellent treatment by the British and of the
excellent treatment some of them had in the United States prior to their arrival at Camp
Clinton. [The generals] still appear to feel neglected and ignored and apparently are in
truth neglected and ignored.” The inspectors observed that the camp failed to provide
“many little things” that the generals desired to purchase with their own money, despite
the fact that these items could easily be obtained in Jackson, a short drive away.55
Significantly, especially for two Americans inspecting one of their own nation’s
prisoner of war camps, Gufler and Bernays suggested that their government might be illsuited for the job of handling high-ranking prisoners of war. They concluded that
“unless we can learn to play a cleverer game with these general officers it might appear
advisable to turn them back to the British who know how to play the game.” The two
inspectors recommended transferring the generals to Camp Crossville, Tennessee,
“unless some arrangements can be made to manage matters better from a point of view
of our long term interest at Camp Clinton.” They believed it would be worth the cost
and trouble of relocating these prisoners because they felt Crossville’s commanding
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officer, Colonel Dudley, would be “capable and willing to handle the problems
presented by those general officers much more to the credit and profit of the United
States than it is being handled at Clinton.”56
A large part of the problem stemmed from the War Department’s choice of
commanding officers. Considering the American need for qualified officers overseas, a
significant portion of prisoner of war camp commandants consisted of U.S. Army
officers who were either brought out of retirement, were close to retirement or were
unqualified in some fashion for other positions. Furthermore, these commanding
officers exercised a great deal of autonomy in the running of their respective camps.
Thus, the atmosphere of an American POW camp largely reflected the character and
ability of its commanding officer who had almost certainly been chosen more for
convenience that qualifications.
Unfortunately for the generals at Camp Clinton, the U.S. War Department had
entrusted the care of these prisoners to a commanding officer, Colonel McIlhenny, who
the American camp inspectors found unimaginative, lacking in energy and negligent.
Moreover, the Colonel did not appear particularly concerned about addressing any of the
issues raised by the various inspectors who had visited Camp Clinton. McIlhenny kept
the inspectors waiting, delayed appointments and generally displayed a strong disregard
for what these men were trying to accomplish.
Further complicating the problem of poor leadership, the needs of American
combat forces overseas required the services of the crack military police guard
companies who had originally been stationed at Clinton. Beginning in the spring of
111
1944, the inability to find men suitable to serve as camp guards became a common
problem at the prisoner of war camps in the United States. A memorandum prepared by
the U.S. State Department in December 1944 summed up the situation by observing that
“most camp commanders [were] handicapped by the assignment of soldiers as guard
personnel who have certain handicaps, mostly of a mental nature.” Most all of the
young men physically and mentally fit for combat duty were sent to Europe or the
Pacific, leaving only those deemed unfit in some fashion with responsibility for the
POW camps.57
The problem became so acute that it spurred a U.S. War Department
investigation into the “Status of Training and Physical Condition of Men Assigned to
Clinton, Mississippi,” in August 1944. Following the investigation, Director of Military
Training John P. Clegg concluded in regard to Clinton’s guard personnel that “these men
seem to have had sufficient training to do functional duty here if they have properly
assimilated it. In some instances this is doubtful.” Indeed, the investigators assessed
each of the 262 guards then assigned to Camp Clinton and produced a report entitled
“Partial List of Enlisted Men Suffering from Mental Disturbances Employed by Prisoner
of War Camp [Clinton] During Month of August 1944.” This list included sixty nine
men assigned to guard duty at Clinton who averaged almost three transfers each before
assuming their positions in Mississippi. Some of these men had been previously
transferred as many as eight or ten times, suggesting that these guards had been
reassigned to Camp Clinton due to prior poor performance at other camps.58
112
Furthermore, from the total list of 262 American guards at Clinton, thirty-four
were diagnosed with “psychoneurosis,” seven with “hysteria,” nine with “anxiety,” and
seven as being in a “constitutional psychopathic state.” Other common diagnoses
included “inadequate personality,” “mental deficiency,” “emotional immaturity,”
“emotional instability,” “low mentality,” “alcoholism,” and “moron.” The report
identified one private as suffering from “borderline mental deficiency with mild
antisocial tendencies, mild psychopathic trends and mild neurotic tendencies.” The list
goes on.59
No aspect of the accommodation of the German prisoner of war generals better
epitomizes the differences between the American and British treatment of these men
than the quality of the respective camp guard personnel after the summer of 1944. The
highly-qualified and well-trained men of the first three MPEG companies had been
replaced by limited duty soldiers possessing far less ability, and in many cases severe
weaknesses. Generals Frantz and Schnarrenberger had arrived in the United States after
a summer at Trent Park where they regularly interacted with British officers, including
the aristocratic Lord Aberfeldy, who displayed exemplary military courtesy. Generals
von Vaerst, Borowietz, Bülowius, Köchy and Colonel von Quast arrived from Camp
Mexia expecting treatment that American authorities had promised would be more
suitable to their rank. Upon arriving in Mississippi, these generals found drunkenness,
idiocy, and incompetence among the American personnel with whom they would have
the most daily contact.
113
British authorities reserved the finest men available to serve as officers and
guards on the estates housing their general officer prisoners, while the guards at
American camps seem to have been some of the worst lot available. Throughout the
generals’ stay at Camp Clinton, a number of other problems and complaints would arise,
but none of these exceeded the absurdity of placing America’s highest-ranking prisoners
of war in the hands of some of the U.S. military’s least qualified personnel. Moreover,
this problem lasted throughout the war. Regardless of the changes that the War
Department would eventually make in its treatment of the German generals, these
prisoners continued to deal with a significant portion of their guard personnel who were
not fit to serve in this capacity.
The criticisms that Gufler and Bernays leveled at the American treatment of
German general officers demonstrated that the problems largely resulted from the
dictates of an uncooperative camp commandant and the behavior of his largely
unqualified personnel, rather than systemic War Department policies intended to isolate
or humiliate the generals. It is understandable that American combat forces required the
best personnel available, even at the expense of the overall quality of personnel at
installations in the United States. However, one questions why the War Department did
not take greater care to provide for its senior officer prisoners by finding a more suitable
camp administrator and staff for at least this one camp. That they did not do so, and that,
in fact, the Provost Marshal General allowed Colonel McIlhenny to remain in his post
for months after the inspectors indicted his leadership suggests American disregard for
the importance of these prisoners. U.S. War and State Department officials eventually
114
reconsidered the value of the general officers in their custody and made policy changes
accordingly, but not until compelled to do so by the success of the Normandy campaign
and the consequent emergence of American concerns regarding the postwar
reconstruction of Europe.
Notes
1
Letter from Major General Davidson to Major General G.V. Strong, 1 June 1943, Record
Group (Hereafter RG) 165, Entry 179, Box 364, National Archives and Records Administration
(Hereafter NARA), College Park, Maryland.
2
Ibid; War Diary, March 1943, WO 165/41, the National Archives of the United Kingdom
(hereafter TNA), Kew, Richmond, Surrey, United Kingdom.
3
For more on the American interrogation programs at Fort Hunt and Byron Hot Springs see John
Hammond Moore, “Getting Fritz to Talk,” Virginia Quarterly Review 54, No. 2 (Spring 1978),
263-280.
4
Carol A. Jensen, Images of America: Byron Hot Springs (Charleston, SC: Arcadia Publishing,
2006), 103-114.
5
Memorandum for the Budget Officer, War Department, 15 April 1942; Byron Hot Springs
Project, 12 August 1942, RG 389, Entry 452C, Box 1410; Inspection of “Byron Hot Springs,”
undated, RG 389, Entry 439A, Box 3, NARA.
6
“Interrogation Center, P.O. Box 651, Tracy, California;” Memorandum for Commander John
L. Riheldaffer, RG 165, Entry 179, Box 364, NARA; Krammer, “American Treatment of
German Generals,” 29.
115
7
Interrogation of Unteroffizier Albert Karl Lauser, 11 June 1943, RG 165, Entry 179, Box 364,
NARA.
8
Technical Apparatus for the Second Interrogation Center, 27 April 1942, RG 389, Entry 452C,
Box 1410, NARA.
9
Room Conversation – Generals Borowietz and Von Vaerst, RG 165, Entry 179, Box 364,
NARA.
10
Interrogation of General Gustav von Vaerst, Generalleutnant Buelowius, Generalmajor Köchy,
Generalmajor Borowietz, 11 June 1943; Information from two recently captured German
Brigadier Generals (Brigadier Generals Köchy and Borowietz), 12 June 1943, RG 165, Entry
179, Box 364, NARA.
11
Interrogation of General Gustav von Vaerst and Generalleutnant Karl R. M. Buelowius, 28
June 1943, RG 165, Entry 179, Box 364, NARA.
12
Interrogation of General Gustav von Vaerst and Generalleutnant Karl R. M. Buelowius, 28
June 1943; Notes on Information Derived from German Ps/W; Late Information from Ps/W (7-9
June), 15 June 1943, RG 165, Entry 179, Box 364, NARA.
13
Information and views of 3 German general officers recently captured in North Africa, 15 June
1943; Report of Interview with Generals Borowietz and Köchy, 8 June 1943,” RG 165, Entry
179, Box 364, NARA.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
18
Memorandum for Brigadier General B. M. Bryan, Jr., 29 June 1943, RG 165, Entry 179, Box
364, NARA.
116
19
Room Conversation – Generals Borowietz and Von Vaerst, RG 165, Entry 179, Box 364,
NARA.
20
Letter from the PMGO to the Commanding General, Ninth Service Command, 2 July 1943;
Letter from Internal Security Division to Director, POW Division, 8 July 1943, RG 389, Entry
461, Box 2483, NARA; “Little Relief in Sight for Hot Texans,” Mexia Weekly Herald, 9 July
1943, 1; “New Record Temperature Set Here by Saturday Heat,” Mexia Weekly Herald, 30 July
1943, 6; “Hope Springs in Hearts of Heat Weary Sufferers,” Mexia Weekly Herald, 20 August
1943, 3.
21
Inspection report, Camp Mexia, 23-25 September 1943, RG 389, Entry 461, Box 2667,
NARA.
22
Ibid; Inspection report, Camp Mexia, 19 August 1943, RG 389, Entry 461, Box 2667, NARA.
23
Richard P. Walker, The Lone Star and the Swastika: Prisoners of War in Texas (Austin: Eakin
Press, 2001), 12; Inspection report, Camp Mexia, 19 August 1943, RG 389, Entry 461, Box
2667; Inspection report, Camp Mexia, 23-25 September 1943, RG 389, Entry 461, Box 2667,
NARA.
24
Inspection report, Camp Mexia, 23-25 September 1943; Inspection report, Camp Mexia, 19
August 1943, RG 389, Entry 461, Box 2667, NARA.
25
Ibid.
26
Letter to Commanding General, Eighth Service Command, 23 August 1943; Telegram from
Donovan, CG, 8SC, to Provost Marshal General, 30 July 1943, RG 389, Entry 457, Box 1420;
Inspection report, Camp Mexia, 23-25 September 1943, RG 389, Entry 461, Box 2667, NARA.
27
Inspection report, Camp Mexia, 23-25 September 1943, RG 389, Entry 461, Box 2667,
NARA.
28
Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War, 27.
117
29
The Swiss Legation, the protecting power for both German POWs in America as well as
American POWs in Germany, discovered in September 1944 that German authorities paid
American officer prisoners more than American authorities paid German officer prisoners and
“urgently requested” that the U.S. government address this discrepancy – “The reports of the
Protecting Power in Washington reveal that German officer prisoners of war in the United States
receive monthly pay at the following rates,” 22 September 1944, Farrand Papers, Box 1, Hoover
Institution Archives.
30
Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War, 50, 84.
31
General Officer Prisoner of War Camps, RG 389, Entry 457, Box 1420, NARA.
32
Inspection report, Camp Clinton, Mississippi, 18-19 July 1943, RG 389, Entry 461, Box 2658,
NARA; Gene Wirth, “High-Ranking Nazi Generals Now Arm-Chair Strategists on Mississippi
Hillside Here,” Clarion-Ledger, 31 October 1943, 9, 14.
33
The author believes this general to have been either Gustav von Vaerst or Ernst
Schnarrenberger because they are the only two who fit the description of the general described in
this October 1943 newspaper account. However, the American press was not allowed to print
the generals’ names for reasons of security so this cannot be substantiated; Gene Wirth, “HighRanking Nazi Generals Now Arm-Chair Strategists on Mississippi Hillside Here,” ClarionLedger, 31 October 1943, 9, 14.
34
Ibid.
35
Archival sources from neither the British nor the American National Archives report Frantz
and Schnarrenberger’s whereabouts from 21 August until 6 October 1943. It can be assumed
that part of this time involved passage, likely by ship, across the Atlantic as well as a couple
weeks processing time at Ft. George Meade, Maryland, before transfer to Camp Clinton,
Mississippi. However, this remains the author’s conjecture and cannot be substantiated; Report
118
of POWs Aboard Train, 6 October 1943, RG 389, Entry 451, Box 1258, NARA; “Two Nazi
Generals Held Prisoners Here: 4 German Officers at Clinton Camp,” Clarion-Ledger, 9 October
1943; Transfer of German General Officers, Prisoner of War, 5 October 1943, RG 389, Entry
461, Box 2477, NARA.
36
Inspection report, Camp Clinton, Mississippi, 18-19 July 1943, RG 389, Entry 461, Box 2658,
NARA; Michael A. Allard, “A History of the Clinton Prisoner of War Camp, 1942-1946,”
Masters thesis, Mississippi College, August 1994.
37
Letter from General d. Pz. Tr. von Vaerst to the War Department, 13 October 1943, RG 389,
Entry 461, Box 2477; Letter from Army Service Forces, PMGO to the Commanding General,
Fourth Service Command, 2 November 1943, RG 389, Entry 461, Box 2477, NARA.
38
Prisoner of War Circular No. 11, 3 December 1943, Stephen M. Farrand Papers, Box 1,
Hoover Institution Archives; Memorandum from Provost Marshal General’s Office to
Commanding General, Fourth Service Command, 2 November 1943, RG 389, Entry 461, Box
2477; Inspection of Camp Clinton, Mississippi, by Lt. Col. M.C. Bernays and Mr. Bernard
Gufler, 5-7 May 1944, RG 165, Decimal File, 1942-June 1946, 383.6 Reorientation, Box 590;
Adjutants for German General Officer POWs, 10 July 1944, RG 389, Entry 461, Box 2477,
NARA.
39
“Parole of German Generals Who Are Prisoners of War,” 1 November 1943, RG 165 (War
Department General Staff), Entry 179, Army Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence Division, Captured
Personnel and Material Branch, Enemy POW Interrogation File (MIS-Y), 1943-1945, Intg CenPOW (Audacious to Byron), Box 364; “Prisoner of War Circular No. 11” – December 3, 1943,
“The Administration of Prisoner of War Matters in the Continental United States During World
War II so far as They were the Staff Responsibility of the Provost Marshall General’s Office,”
119
historical monograph, United States Prisoner of War Operations Division, RG 389, Entry 461,
Box 2477, NARA.
40
“Parole of German Generals Who Are Prisoners of War,” 1 November 1943, RG 165 (War
Department General Staff), Entry 179, Army Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence Division, Captured
Personnel and Material Branch, Enemy POW Interrogation File (MIS-Y), 1943-1945, Intg CenPOW (Audacious to Byron), Box 364; “Prisoner of War Circular No. 11” – December 3, 1943,
“The Administration of Prisoner of War Matters in the Continental United States During World
War II so far as They were the Staff Responsibility of the Provost Marshall General’s Office,”
historical monograph, United States Prisoner of War Operations Division, RG 389, Entry 461,
Box 2477, NARA.
41
Inspection report, Camp Clinton, Mississippi, 5-7 May 1944, RG 165, Decimal File, 1942-
June 1946, 383.6 Reorientation, Box 590, NARA.
42
Letter to U.S. Department of State from the Provost Marshall General, 28 December 1943, RG
389, Entry 467, Box 1518, NARA.
43
Graham H. Stuart, “War Prisoners and Internees in the United States,” American Foreign
Service Journal 21 (October 1944), 530-531.
44
Memorandum from the Legation of Switzerland, 18 February 1944, RG 389, Entry 461, Box
2658, NARA.
45
Ibid.
46
Memorandum on Visit Made 10-12 February 1944, Camp Clinton, Mississippi, by Dr. Edward
Feer, Counselor of the Swiss Legation, accompanied by Mr. Bernard Gufler, of the Department
of State,” RG 389, Entry 461, Box 2658, NARA.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid.
120
49
Ibid.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid.
53
Inspection of Camp Clinton, Mississippi, by Lt. Col. M.C. Bernays and Mr. Bernard Gufler, 5-
7 May 1944, RG 165, Decimal File, 1942-June 1946, 383.6 Reorientation, Box 590, NARA.
54
Ibid.
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid.
57
War Problems Memorandum, 16 December 1944, Farrand Papers, Box 1, Hoover.
58
Status of Training and Physical Condition of Men Assigned to Clinton, Mississippi, 19 August
1944; Partial List of Enlisted Men Suffering from Mental Disturbances Employed by Prisoner of
War Camp During Month of August 1944, RG 389, Entry 461, 2658, NARA.
59
Ibid.
121
CHAPTER IV
“GUESTS” OF THE BRITISH
While American interest in the handful of German generals in the United States
ebbed in late 1943 and early 1944, CSDIC continued monitoring the conversations and
behavior of the captive generals at Trent Park. Indeed, British intelligence maintained
their secret observation of the general officer prisoners until May 1945 when the war in
Europe concluded. During this time, the senior German officers proved valuable to the
British, in part by offering revealing information about numerous German military
leaders. The generals’ conversations and interaction shaped British perceptions of these
men and laid a foundation for Allied postwar policy.
Like their American allies, British accommodation of the German general officer
POWs met with some complaints. Barely over a month after their arrival, the prisoners
at Trent Park staged an open protest of British policies. On 25 June 1943, British camp
authorities informed the generals that any of the prisoners under the rank of
generalleutnant (two-star general) would be required to share a room with another
prisoner. This order affected seven of the thirteen generals, all of their aides-de-camp,
and Captain Meixner, who arrived the following day. Simultaneously, the British War
Office also decreed an immediate reduction in prisoner rations.1
The prisoners were completely taken aback. Camp leader von Arnim and his
senior generals attempted to bully the Trent Park guards into giving them access to some
unused areas of the manor. When this tactic did not work, von Arnim announced that
122
the prisoners planned to sleep in the hallway in protest of the new policy, rather than
submit to sharing rooms. Considering the cliques that had already developed among the
prisoners, this protest illustrated a remarkable degree of solidarity, particularly since six
of the generals who took part in the protest were three- or four-star generals and,
consequently, not affected by the revised room policy.2
Trent Park officials responded by reminding the prisoners that the treatment
British generals received in German camps paled by comparison to that accorded them at
Trent Park. Furthermore, the camp interpreter, speaking for the British, also delivered a
veiled threat. He reminded the prisoners that Britain was “a Democracy where
Parliament still had a say and questions were already being asked in the House [of
Commons] about the very comfortable life led by the German Generals [in Britain].”
The implication, of course, was that the generals should be thankful that shared rooms
and reduced rations were their only concerns. Should Parliament or the British public
choose to scrutinize the treatment they received at Trent Park, their present level of
accommodations might be considerably reduced.3
Even more effective for the British, however, was the declaration that if the
generals wished to sleep in the hallway they would “not be permitted to remove any
furniture from their rooms.” In other words, they would be sleeping on the floor.
Following this revelation, a lengthy conversation ensued among the generals, in what
they thought was the privacy of their rooms, and they agreed to concede. Notably, they
also agreed that conditions at Trent Park were “excellent,” suggesting that the British
interpreter’s comparison of their circumstances with those of British generals in German
123
hands was effective. The generals also admitted amongst themselves that even after the
rations were reduced, the “food [was] still very good and ample.” General Krause even
wrote in a letter home that the food at Camp No. 11 consisted of greater quality and
quantity than anything to which he had been accustomed since 1914! This admission
did not stop the pro-Nazi clique, of course, from crowing to British officers that the
reduced prisoner rations illustrated the toll Germany’s war effort was taking on
England.4
Besides this short-lived act of prisoner resistance, minor instances of sabotage
also occurred. In late November and early December 1943, some of the batmen took it
upon themselves to waste as much electricity as possible by leaving lights turned on all
night in unoccupied rooms of the house. Some of the senior officers, likely members of
the pro-Nazi element, got into the act as well, turning on the hot water and leaving it to
run indefinitely. Fearing that this kind of activity would “make them liable to unpleasant
reprisals,” von Arnim attempted to dissuade his fellow prisoners from this kind of
behavior. His admonitions appeared to have had little effect. A CSDIC report from the
last week of December indicated that the wasteful abuse of electricity and water
continued.5
Sometimes prisoner resistance looked more like frustration with daily camp
routine than it did active protest. Von Hülsen began defiantly disregarding camp rules.
In violation of the requirement to notify camp authorities by 1230 hours each day that he
wished to take walks in the afternoon, von Hülsen simply showed up at walk time and
expected to go. Despite the innocuous nature of this offense, the anti-Nazi generals at
124
Trent Park had come to loathe von Hülsen, and his unannounced appearance one
afternoon incited an argument. After an exchange of insults led to a full-fledged quarrel
between the camp’s two cliques, British camp authorities threatened von Hülsen with
“special treatment” if he continued disregarding orders. Given the prisoners’ everpresent fears of being transferred to Soviet custody, and speculation that was what the
British meant by “special treatment,” the threat proved effective.6
Besides a little wasted electricity and water, the prisoners’ largely confined their
protests to simply complaining. As camp leader, General von Arnim issued petty
complaints to whomever among the British and international authorities would listen.
He first asked for a meeting with the Trent Park camp commandant in order to request
that a German cook, a German tailor and a German dentist be transferred to the generals’
camp from one of the dozens of German prisoner of war camps in Britain. He criticized
British methods of dentistry as “old fashioned.” The senior general also grumbled about
the “quantity of the rations” and the number of cigarettes, cigars and tobacco issued to
the prisoners. The British camp commandant paid little heed to von Arnim’s criticisms,
reminding the general that most of the prisoners had expressed their satisfaction with the
food and that the generals at Trent Park were receiving far more tobacco products than
they would under the rationing system then in place in Germany.7
General Crüwell, not surprisingly, echoed von Arnim’s complaints regarding an
alleged lack of food, claiming it was “making him thin.” He also insisted that, according
to letters he had received from Germany, his friend Major General von Ravenstein was
“treated far better in Canada” than Crüwell was in England. A British officer replied
125
that the general benefited from slightly less food because he was “less flabby” and
“much healthier.” The officer also suggested that Crüwell was welcome to join von
Ravenstein in Canada if he preferred. The general “showed no enthusiasm” for this
idea.8
Most of the prisoners’ complaints can be attributed more to boredom or
homesickness than to any real dissatisfaction with camp conditions. Major General Sir
Arthur Francis Smith, general officer commanding (G.O.C.) of the British Army’s
London District, visited the camp one morning to inspect the guards and basic camp
conditions. Camp authorities asked the prisoners to remain in their rooms, so as to be
out of the way while the G.O.C. conducted his guard inspection in the courtyard and so
the generals could be available if the commander chose to view their accommodations.
Von Arnim apparently forgot that following the previous guard inspection months earlier
he had personally suggested that the prisoners remain in their rooms during subsequent
inspections so they were out of the way. During Smith’s visit, von Arnim angrily
complained about the “restriction on their freedom of movement.” The G.O.C.’s
decision at the end of his inspection not to meet individually with any of the prisoners,
including von Arnim, only further incensed the senior general. It also disappointed
Meixner and von Hülsen, who had concocted a scheme to hide all of their cigarettes in
an attempt to make the British commanding officer believe they were not receiving
necessary items.9
Fortunately for von Arnim and his colleagues, they only had to wait three days
for a chance to air their criticisms to a representative from the Swiss Legation. Von
126
Arnim and his colleagues prepared a litany of complaints to present to the camp
inspector, including their objections to the British demand that the prisoners sign a
parole form, promising in writing not to escape, in order to be allowed to take walks
outside the camp. The generals also criticized the constant presence of armed British
officers, and British unwillingness to provide German doctors, dentists, and lecturers
from other camps. Moreover, the generals objected to the “unequal treatment of
batmen,” because these orderlies were not being allowed to obtain the same array of
products as the generals from the camp canteen and were prohibited from sending the
same volume of mail.10
Dr. Preiswerk, the Swiss representative, took the wind out of von Arnim’s sails
by firmly explaining the reasoning behind each of the circumstances that prompted the
generals’ complaints. As for the required paroles, the Swiss representative simply
remarked that “the German Government would probably not let [British] officer
prisoners of war take walks even with parole if there was as much exercise space behind
the wire” as there was at Trent Park. He explained to von Arnim that the British
assigned armed officers to the generals to protect them, as required by the Geneva
Convention, and keeping these guards with them was in their own best interest. Dr.
Preiswerk cited the potential breaches of security that could result from having German
POWs from other camps coming and going from Camp No. 11, and that the mail
restrictions on the batmen had, in fact, been set by the German government, “whose
censorship could not cope with a greater flow of mail.” Regarding access to the canteen,
he reminded von Arnim that internal canteen arrangements at Trent Park, to which all of
127
the senior officers had been a party, including von Arnim himself, allowed the generals a
number of items not permitted to lower-ranking prisoners, and, thus, were prohibited for
batmen.11
Von Arnim appeared most convinced, however, by Dr. Preiswerk’s insistence
that the authorities most at fault for any actual deficiencies at the generals’ camp were
German, not British, as Berlin had repeatedly failed to reply to any of the Swiss
telegrams addressing issues at Trent Park. Because of this, the Swiss representative
discouraged von Arnim from pressing his complaints too vigorously, as “it might start an
investigation which would turn out to be unfavorable to the Germans.” This comment
suggested that the British treated German officers significantly better than the Germans
did their British counterparts and that the Nazi government would not want this made
public.12
The camp leader must have found the Swiss inspector’s arguments and
explanations compelling. Following dinner that evening, the general announced his
approval of signing paroles in order to walk outside the camp and dropped his other
complaints. Not to be fully appeased, however, von Arnim turned his rage against the
“lying press” in Britain. The general became “most indignant” about an article alleging
that he enjoyed five-course meals at Trent Park, claiming that he did not want other
German POWs in Britain to think he was receiving luxurious treatment. British officers
found von Arnim’s reaction puzzling, considering that they had regularly heard the
general’s demands that his rank entitled him to better treatment than ordinary prisoners
of war.13
128
While at times overreacting to changes in policy or inundating the British with
petty complaints, the prisoners also occasionally surprised their captors at how easily
they accepted other restrictions without incident. On 20 August 1943, the British
informed the generals that two of them were being transferred. Generals
Schnarrenberger and Frantz, along with their two aides-de-camp, were being sent to the
United States and were scheduled to leave the following day. Instead of expressing
horror because of his previous fears of being sent to America, Frantz arrogantly
proclaimed that the Americans wanted him so they could obtain the prestige associated
with holding the most “senior Luftwaffe General ever captured.” He flippantly
contended that the other three prisoners were being traded for some American
machinery. His aide speculated that they were probably being traded for “another forty
old destroyers,” a clear reference to the “Destroyers-for-Bases” agreement brokered by
Churchill and Roosevelt in May 1940.14
Like Frantz, the other departing prisoners, as well as the twelve generals
remaining at Trent Park, accepted the announcement with surprisingly little complaint.
The only real fear expressed by the four prisoners about to depart was that they might be
“paraded through the streets of New York” or that they “might fall into the hands of the
Jews in America.” The two generals and the two colonels departed on 21 August 1943
for Bourton, a British prisoner of war camp about 90 miles northwest of London. From
there they flew to the United States and joined the five senior German officers who had
been in American custody since early June.15
129
Following the departure of Frantz and Schnarrenberger, little changed at Trent
Park for the next nine months. Few prisoners arrived or departed until the eve of the
Allied invasion of Normandy in June 1944. During this time, the routine of POW camp
life and the continually declining fortunes of the German military bred melancholy and
frustration among the generals. Some attempted to alleviate the stress with levity. One
of the prisoners drafted a mock advertisement for Camp No. 11 as if it were a health spa.
The humorous brochure for the “Park Sanatorium” lauded the “first class
accommodations” and the opportunity for “regular walks under expert guidance.” In
poking fun at both British censorship and the differing accommodations for different
ranks of officers, the author praised the “large library of carefully chosen literature,” and
explained that the “sanatorium” featured “moderate terms, varying according to social
position.” The sanatorium’s promoter even added, “Alcoholism cured without extra
charge.”16
The ability to laugh about their conditions may be indicative of the prisoners’
realization that they were well-treated, at least for prisoners of war. In fact, despite their
grumbling, the prisoners, as well as numerous camp inspectors, agreed that British
treatment of the generals at Trent Park was excellent. Dr. M. Haccius of the
International Committee of the Red Cross visited Trent Park on 13 January and issued a
positive assessment of the camp. He reported that the German officer prisoners took
daily, three-hour walks escorted by an unarmed British officer with no limitations on the
number of prisoners who could join the group. The camp library had been expanded to
approximately four hundred volumes and the British interpreters at the camp offered
130
English classes for the generals two to three times each week. The canteen, or cafeteria
as the Red Cross inspector referred to it, offered an abundance of items for sale at prices
identical to those in the British army. At the time of his visit, the prisoners’ only
complaint concerned the delay in receiving letters at the camp, and the British had little
control over the receipt of mail from Germany.17
The prisoners requested a number of small items including some wristwatches
and art supplies, as well as an opportunity to send some photographs to their families in
Germany. Von Hülsen asked to be able to send twenty dollars to his son, a prisoner of
war in Bizerte. Despite these minor requests, Dr. Haccius stated that this visit only
confirmed his previous impression that the prisoners at Camp No. 11 received excellent
treatment, in terms of both physical accommodations and relations with their British
hosts. Even the cantankerous von Arnim commended the “considerate and correct
attitude” of the camp’s administration and guard personnel.18
What makes this positive assessment even more significant is that the British
suspected Dr. Haccius of being “more pro-German than neutral.” In fact, British
intelligence criticized the Red Cross inspector for not observing a “strictly neutral
attitude,” because he shared information with the prisoners in private regarding other
camps, censorship and prisoner of war exchanges that the British found inappropriate.
Furthermore, after the prisoners asked to send more photographs to their families, Dr.
Haccius told them that he would bring his own camera with him on his next visit, take
individual photographs of all of the prisoners, and then personally send the pictures to
their relatives in Germany. The inspector insinuated that this could all be done without
131
British knowledge, clearly violating the bounds of acceptable behavior for ostensibly
neutral camp inspectors.19
Astonishingly, this was not the first time a camp inspector had violated British
trust in regard to the prisoners at Trent Park. Reverend Bengt Hoffman, a Swedish
representative from the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), inspected Camp
No. 11 in late September 1943. During his visit he gave information to some of the
generals about possible prisoner exchanges that the British did not intend to reveal.
Even more brazen, the inspector offered to “carry messages to Sweden on behalf of the
German generals.” While angry, British intelligence officers were not surprised. Prior
to the visit, they had been reluctant to allow Hoffman to be included in the YMCA
inspection party because he had previously “offered his services as an intermediary
between prisoners of war and their friends.” Unfortunately for CSDIC, they could not
confront the YMCA about his behavior without revealing the source of their
information, which was, of course, the secret microphones in the generals’ rooms.20
Despite the underhanded activity of two foreign camp inspectors, the British
consistently received high marks for their treatment of the prisoners at Trent Park.
Indeed, these commendations may carry even more weight coming from two inspectors
whom the British believed to harbor pro-German sympathies. Even the most negative,
pro-Nazi prisoners conceded in private interviews with various camp inspectors that the
British provided them with superior accommodations, and they appreciated the level of
respect and courtesy regularly paid to them by the camp administration and personnel.
Before his transfer to the United States, Gotthard Frantz had reassured some of his
132
fellow prisoners that “the English officers here are very correct and show no signs of
hate towards us, and above all there’s nothing of the political agitator in their points of
view, you notice that at every turn.”21 This comment came from the general whom the
British officers at Camp No. 11 once called the most difficult prisoner to get along with
in the entire camp. By all accounts, the CSDIC operation at Camp No. 11 set the
standard for treatment of general officer prisoners during the Second World War.
Even though they enjoyed superior accommodations, the prisoner of war generals
still suffered the melancholy and interpersonal conflicts common to wartime captivity.
None of the prisoners struggled more in this regard than the senior prisoner and camp
leader. Von Arnim’s discomfort stemmed in large measure from his lack of standing
among his fellow prisoners. Despite being the senior officer, he garnered little respect
from the other generals who openly dismissed his warnings and admonitions. This is
particularly curious considering that many of von Arnim’s suspicions proved to be
correct.
Almost from the time von Arnim and his subordinates from North Africa arrived
at Trent Park, some in the pro-Nazi element had been badgering him to address all of the
POW generals about proper conduct. Crüwell, in particular, encouraged von Arnim to
silence the members of the anti-Nazi clique and condemn their defeatist attitudes. While
initially hesitant to act, von Arnim finally obliged following dinner on 9 July 1943,
offering what the British Army officers at Trent Park labeled his “pep talk.”22
Von Arnim directed his remarks at the defeatist group but the speech was
anything but a condemnation. The general encouraged the men to take pride in what
133
they had achieved in North Africa and not to feel ashamed for the failure of the Tunisian
Offensive. He addressed the issue of defeatism by empathizing with his fellow officers,
saying “each of us has his own private troubles to bear, no matter what they are, and
from a purely human standpoint I do not think it right for us to aggravate these by
talking about them too much, although it is quite understandable.” Von Arnim informed
his fellow prisoners that they were housed in a “former interrogation camp,” and
presciently pointed out that none of them could be sure that the listening devices were
not still active. Indeed, the general made the point that senior officers should “do
nothing wittingly or unwittingly . . . which might give the enemy any weapon which he
could use in the propaganda war.”23
Von Arnim closed with an “urgent request,” as he put it, for his fellow officer
prisoners to cease engaging in conversations of a defeatist nature. However, he once
again adopted a benevolent tone, assuring his men that he would be “the last person not
to sympathize” with anyone who needed to get some things off their chest. In this case
he counseled the men to confide in a comrade whom they trusted and to do so in the
“corner of the garden where no one can listen,” rather than in the manor where British
microphones might hear them. He concluded by appealing to their military loyalty,
stating “I need not remind you, gentlemen . . . soldiers we remain.”24
The substance and style of von Arnim’s speech raise questions about his
motivation. British officers at Trent Park concluded following the “pep talk” that it was
“very doubtful if von Arnim himself really had his heart in his speech.” The general did
not attempt to rally his senior officers to the Nazi cause and made no mention of Adolf
134
Hitler. Indeed, British intelligence thought von Arnim offered his speech more because
he was tired of Crüwell’s nagging than because of any personal conviction or loyalty to
the Nazi regime. The gist of his argument was that defeatist speech should cease in
order to keep from giving the British ammunition for their propaganda, a very
reasonable request from the highest-ranking officer in a group of prisoners of war.25
Surprisingly, considering the empathetic and professional nature of his approach,
von Arnim’s remarks had the opposite effect from what he had intended. Rather than
deterring the defeatists, it actually emboldened them. Anti-Nazi literature, previously
circulated surreptitiously, was now read in the open. Colonel Borcherdt, one of the
general’s aides-de-camp, defiantly read Otto Braun’s Von Weimar zu Hitler in the camp
courtyard in front of the generals, including von Arnim. Borcherdt was not alone.
Social Democrat and former Prussian Prime Minister Braun’s criticism of Hitler’s
dictatorship in Germany was widely circulated around the camp. Von Liebenstein, who
was reading Braun’s book in his room the day following the “pep talk,” even quoted
particular passages to a British officer in front of his batman.26
The generals not only continued their defeatist conversations, they now shouted
them down the hallway. General Cramer had been speculating with one of the British
officers about possible leaders for a potential German revolution. Following von
Arnim’s speech, Cramer “shouted loudly to [the officer] in the corridor that he was
looking forward to continuing the discussion.” And the fiercely anti-Nazi von Thoma
escalated his attack on the pro-Nazi opposition with a quip regarding “old men who
blind themselves to blatant facts,” a clear reference to von Arnim.27
135
Perhaps the anti-Nazi generals at Trent Park simply resented being chastised
about their behavior, if only mildly so, by an officer that few of them respected.
Otherwise, it seems surprising that they would react so obstinately to a seemingly
innocuous reminder that their captors might be secretly listening to what they said and
could possibly use it for propaganda purposes. That the generals flippantly dismissed
von Arnim’s warnings about the possible presence of microphones in their quarters,
something about which they had repeatedly been warned by German military authorities
prior to their capture, suggests a total disregard for von Arnim’s leadership. That von
Arnim’s premonitions were entirely correct makes his fellow generals’ disrespect even
more poignant.
What is also puzzling is that von Arnim’s political orientation was not so clear
cut at the time. This was not a case of a strident Nazi lecturing his less enthusiastic
subordinates. In fact, CSDIC questioned von Arnim’s ostensibly anti-defeatist stance
because he maintained ties with both cliques in the camp. His existing friendship with
General Cramer appeared to grow even stronger in the week following his speech on 9
July despite Cramer’s complete and open defiance of the tenets of von Arnim’s message.
Von Arnim insisted on including Cramer in his regular activities, particularly games of
bridge that usually involved the ‘pro-Nazis’ von Hülsen and Meixner. Furthermore, von
Arnim chose the ‘defeatist’ von Liebenstein to assist him as Deputy Camp Leader rather
than Crüwell who would have eagerly assumed the position. Perhaps von Arnim found
Crüwell’s persistent supplications particularly annoying and certainly no one questioned
von Liebenstein’s excellent professional abilities. Yet, it is surprising that von Arnim
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would offer a speech “urgently” requesting that his men cease their defeatist talk while
offering a position of authority and leadership to one of the most openly defeatist men in
the camp.28
Some comments von Arnim made prior to his “pep talk” may shed light on his
motivations. He exclaimed to Crüwell in a private conversation that he could understand
“perfectly well” why those who had been early members of the National Socialist Party
might be “unhappy now when they see what a racket it [had] become.” He went so far
as to assert that the present Nazi leadership was “a thousand times worse” than the
“unscrupulous bosses under the previous regime,” and admitted to pondering “the great
question of how [Germany could] get rid of all that rabble” after the war ended. Yet,
von Arnim consistently expressed his belief that because Germany was at war they must
“unquestionably” put up a united front.29 Clearly, the senior general harbored some antiNazi sentiments but his strict military bearing would not allow him to make any public
comments that might be construed as defeatist or disloyal to Germany. Ironically, von
Arnim did make these types of comments within range of British microphones, clearly
violating his own policy against speaking candidly within the generals’ quarters.
Likely angered by the response to his first speech in July, von Arnim made a
second attempt to quell the defeatist talk among his fellow prisoners a month later. On
Sunday, 15 August 1943, the senior general once again warned his subordinate generals
against defeatist talk that might offer the British some propaganda value. He proclaimed
his suspicions that Lord Aberfeldy listened to their conversations from his room on the
first floor of the manor and undoubtedly reported any valuable information to the British
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officers. Von Arnim also warned the group that some of their batmen might be working
for the British.30 This time, the senior general’s suspicions were incorrect. Lord
Aberfeldy did not eavesdrop on the generals or report the substance of their
conversations to CSDIC operatives because he obviously did not need to. The generals
provided the information to the British on their own, sometimes at Aberfeldy’s
instigation, via the microphones in their rooms. Remarkably, von Arnim appears to have
been the only general to suspect Lord Aberfeldy’s actual role at Trent Park. Von
Arnim’s accusations about the batmen were completely off the mark. There is no
evidence that any of the generals’ aides were in league with the enemy.
Curiously, this speech took a significantly more strident tone than had the
previous one. In fact, von Arnim concluded his remarks by castigating the “defeatist”
generals as “curs.” The prisoners found this name calling so objectionable that even
some of the pro-Nazi generals protested, prompting von Arnim to address his fellow
prisoners again the following day. This address became an even bigger disaster.
Whether he was attempting to explain the previous day’s comments or simply lashing
out in anger, the camp leader exacerbated the situation by implying that he was trying to
“save the defeatists from a court-martial on their return to a victorious Fatherland.”
Even some of the most vocal Nazi sympathizers objected to von Arnim’s threats of
postwar punishment. The affair eventually blew over, but largely because the majority
of the generals chose to dismiss von Arnim as suffering from some kind of psychosis.
Crüwell, who had been egging him on all along, was now considered “unbalanced” as
well.31
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Nothing epitomized the lack of respect for von Arnim’s leadership among the
Trent Park generals more than the prisoners’ dispute over listening to British radio
broadcasts. On the night following Frantz and Schnarrenberger’s departure, one week
after his second “pep talk,” von Arnim discovered several of his colleagues listening to
the British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) German News Service. The senior
general characterized this news as pure propaganda because it originated with the BBC
but was broadcast in German, obviously intended for German listeners. For this reason,
the general discouraged his fellow officers from listening to it. Upon finding his
subordinates openly defying his directive, von Arnim stormed out of the room
exclaiming “I can’t understand this!”32
In the following weeks, von Arnim refused to put his foot down and forbid his
subordinates from listening to the BBC’s German-language news broadcast, likely
because he feared they would continue to openly defy him. Instead, the senior general
stayed in the common room where the radio was kept until midnight each night when the
program aired, and then changed the station to keep anyone from listening to the BBC
program. As if this did not make him enough of a “laughing stock” among his
colleagues, he also took to scribbling “rude and sarcastic comments” in the margins of
books that had been loaned to the generals by the German Embassy in London. This
adolescent behavior infuriated his fellow prisoners, in part because the books he defaced
were works by old German military authorities who were still revered by many German
officers. British intelligence observed that even von Arnim’s “pro-Nazi” colleagues had
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grown tired of his “stupid and tactless behavior” and feared that he was “a very bad
advertisement for the Germany Army.”33
He continued issuing orders and chastising those who did not follow them, but
few paid attention. Some even began to ridicule the senior general. British authorities
permitted the generals to read all available German newspapers and listen to German
radio. On 22 August 1943, while the generals were listening to one such radio news
broadcast from Germany, von Arnim and Crüwell confused the report of a freighter
(“Frachtschiff”) sunk by the Italian Air Force in the Mediterranean for a warship
(“Schlachtschiff”). Their colleagues found the two mistaken generals’ excitement over
the announcement amusing, with von Thoma remarking to a British officer that “these
two were so stupid they couldn’t even hear the news properly!”34
The relationship between von Arnim and Crüwell and the rest of their colleagues
at Camp No. 11 continued to deteriorate. On 23 Augus1943, von Liebenstein
thoughtfully asked the British camp authorities if they could do anything to “brighten the
day” for Crüwell who was “celebrating” the completion of his first year at Camp No. 11.
One British officer graciously invited Crüwell, along with his friend von Arnim, to join
the officer in his room for a drink on this “auspicious occasion.” After much ado, von
Arnim ultimately refused the invitation and instructed Crüwell do the same. Upon
hearing of the incident the following day, a group of the generals led by von Liebenstein
personally apologized to the British officer for von Arnim’s “insulting behavior.”
CSDIC found it rather amusing that a group of German generals apologized to a junior
British Officer for the rudeness of a German four-star general.35
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Some of the prisoners even resorted to sophomoric pranks. While strolling
outside the camp, one of the aides, a Colonel Reimann, suggested to one of the British
guards who did not speak German that he should go up to Crüwell and say: “Halt’ die
Schnauze und leck’ mich am Arsch,”36 a highly offensive remark. The British guard
playfully, but innocently, did what the German colonel had suggested. Crüwell must
have been able to tell that the guard had no idea what he had said to the general as he
never mentioned the incident to camp authorities. He must also have known that one of
his colleagues had put the man up to it, and what that indicated about the level of respect
in which his fellow prisoners of war held him.37
The British officers at Trent Park eventually developed concerns about both von
Arnim’s and Crüwell’s mental health. They observed that both of the generals were
“heading for mental disaster” if they did not change their attitudes. Crüwell “opened his
heart” to one of the British officers one day, complained of depression, blaming his
imprisonment and a lack of vegetables, and feared that he was “getting into a nervous
state.” He continued by saying that the war and the fate of his children added to his
anxiety. Crüwell unsuccessfully petitioned for a parole in Sweden, perhaps because he
believed that he had become “the most unpopular man in the camp” and was ostracized
by the other POW officers. Von Arnim stopped eating breakfast or lunch with the other
generals, although he continued to take his evening meal in the common dining room,
and he often remained in his room “staring into space or fumbling with patience
cards.”38
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The departure of General Cramer, who was repatriated in February 1944 because
of his asthma, further undermined the two generals’ attitudes. The announcement of
Cramer’s impending repatriation most affected Crüwell, however, who had long thought
he would be the most likely candidate for early repatriation because he was the oldest
general in the camp. He and von Hülsen had petitioned for repatriation as early as
October 1943 on the grounds that they had “large families requiring a father’s aid and
guidance.” Crüwell’s claim, in particular, held a certain amount of validity. His wife
had died during the summer of 1942, shortly after the general had been captured by the
British, leaving their four children without a custodial parent. Hermann Göring’s wife
temporarily cared for the children until more permanent arrangements could be made.
Eventually, the children were moved to a boarding house where a niece of Crüwell’s
lived who agreed to take responsibility for them.39 While comforted by the knowledge
that his children were together and being cared for by a relative, these were obviously
not ideal circumstances. Understandably, the welfare of his children constantly worried
Crüwell throughout the war. Unfortunately for him, the British did not recognize
abandoned children as legitimate grounds for early repatriation.
Consequently, Crüwell still found himself at Trent Park in February 1944
watching his colleague prepare to return to Germany instead. He determined to take
more drastic measures by making himself ill enough that the British would be forced to
send him home. He embarked on a regimen of dieting, exhaustive walks and frequent,
cold baths to exacerbate his nervous condition, and he methodically scratched the
eczema on his legs in the hope that it would spread all over his body. He made himself
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miserable but he failed to convince the British that his condition was desperate enough
for early repatriation.40
The ostracism of von Arnim and Crüwell, leaders of the “pro-Nazi” faction
among the prisoners, also highlighted the ongoing division between the two cliques
within the camp. At times, the rivalry between these two groups reached the point of
absurdity. In early November 1943, the “guests,” as the British hosts continually
referred to them, had a group photograph taken to be sent to their families in Germany as
Christmas presents. Even with something as innocuous as a photograph, the generals
lined themselves up according to their political orientations. The “pro-Nazi” clique of
von Arnim, Crüwell, Hülsen, Meixner and their subordinates stood to one side, the antiNazi group of von Liebenstein, von Sponeck, von Broich, Bassenge, Neuffer, Krause
and their supporters to the other. British intelligence took delight not only in watching
these men arrange themselves in such a fashion, but also that von Thoma refused to have
his picture taken at all. He fussed that he “did not want to be seen with these old
blimps.”41
The animosity did not stop there. After months of grousing about one another,
the respective leaders of the two cliques squared off in what British intelligence labeled
the “Crüwell-Thoma Incident.” The conflict began with a conversation between von
Thoma and Lieutenant Hubbuch, one of the aides at Trent Park. Von Thoma openly
condemned the Nazi regime, as he had done many times before, stating emphatically that
Hitler’s leadership in the war would so destroy Germany that there would be nothing left
upon which to rebuild. Crüwell, who overheard the conversation, took particular
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exception to von Thoma’s statement and confronted him. When von Thoma refused to
back down, Crüwell sought help from the other generals behind von Thoma’s back,
hoping to elicit an apology or at least shame von Thoma into ceasing his anti-Nazi talk.
Crüwell first convinced Bassenge to speak to von Thoma, but this achieved nothing.
Crüwell then circulated a statement condemning von Thoma’s comments but could not
convince anyone to sign it. Finally, he coerced several POW colonels into approaching
von Thoma as a group to discuss the affair but they were all cowed by von Thoma’s
“strong defense” and meekly let the matter drop.42
Crüwell’s intrigues did not affect von Thoma in the least. Nor did the other
generals take the disagreement seriously, especially considering that von Thoma had
been making these kinds of statements for months. Von Sponeck mocked Crüwell for
his ridiculous attempt to try a general in a court full of colonels. The incident only
added to the negative atmosphere and generally low morale among the prisoners.43
While CSDIC officers certainly found these intra-camp disputes amusing, they
placed more value on the prisoners’ behavior than perhaps it warranted. First, the
British personnel who manned “Mother’s” eavesdropping machinery were largely
German and Austrian exiles. That these men had been forced out of their homeland by
the National Socialist government of Germany may have clouded their perspectives of
the general officer prisoners, particularly those espousing support for the Nazi regime.
British assessments of the allegedly “pro-Nazi” generals illustrate a remarkable
correlation with portrayals of these men as unintelligent or even buffoons. Descriptive
words like “moron” or “nitwit” were reserved for the staunchest Nazi supporters only,
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where virtually all of the members of the “defeatist” clique were portrayed as men of
education and culture. Second, it does not appear that British personnel at Trent Park
attempted to look beyond the prisoners’ behavior for possible motivations. Had they
done so, they might have found mitigating factors, family concerns in particular, for
seemingly extreme behavior like Crüwell’s, rather than simply assuming that his antidefeatism and uncooperative nature automatically equated with sincere adherence to the
tenets of National Socialism.
One aspect of prisoner behavior that CSDIC scrutinized was the prisoners’
reactions to news of the war. The generals learned on 25 July 1943 that Italian Fascist
leader Benito Mussolini had been stripped of power two days earlier, eliminating one of
Germany’s staunchest allies. This news shattered the anti-defeatist generals. British
observers noted that “on the morning of the 26th, it would have been difficult to have
found a gloomier collection of people than our guests here.” Even the previously selfproclaimed National Socialist Crüwell threw up his hands and uttered with despair, “I
am no Nazi!”44
Equally distressing to the residents of Trent Park was the Moscow Conference, or
at least the resulting Four-Nation Declaration’s “Statement on Atrocities.” The Allies
condemned Nazi brutality in occupied territories and promised to return those members
of the German military who had perpetuated these offenses to the areas where they had
occurred so they could be held accountable for their crimes. The “war criminal clause,”
as the British Officers at Trent Park referred to it, had a sobering effect on the generals,
particularly those who had commanded troops in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
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Crüwell, who had boasted numerous times about his role in the capture of Belgrade and
who had also fought in Russia, worried that “the British public believed all they read in
the newspapers about ‘Hun’ atrocities, war criminals, etc.”45
Some of the generals amused British officers with their “vain and violent efforts
at counter-propaganda,” attempting to justify decisions made in the Eastern European
theater of the war. Indeed, following news of the Moscow Conference, the generals
spent countless hours trying to convince themselves that only the Gestapo and the S.S.
had committed any war crimes. They maintained that the only executions carried out by
the Army had been for legitimate reasons, such as espionage or sabotage. They did
admit, however, that Russian commissars had been shot by some Wehrmacht officers
according to Hitler’s orders, but labeled the practice a “disgrace” that was “universally
condemned.”46
This reaction to the “Statement on Atrocities” suggests that even if these
prisoners had not committed any war crimes themselves, they must have been aware of
the crimes of some of their colleagues. The Trent Park generals likely reacted so
defensively to news that German military officers would be tried for war crimes because
they knew that numerous offenses had been committed. This too would explain their ongoing paranoia about being turned over to the Russians during or after the war. They
knew what the Wehrmacht had done on the Eastern Front, including the widespread
executions of Soviet commissars, a practice that was anything but “universally
condemned.” The generals obviously feared that the Soviets intended to reciprocate
against German prisoners of war.
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Curiously, the generals also assumed that Prussian officers in particular would
automatically be suspected of war crimes. Thus, many of the Prussians attempted to
“deny their Fatherland” by claiming to be from somewhere else. Out of the blue, one
such general stated to a British officer that he was not actually Prussian but Silesian,
“which although it is a Prussian province really has none of the Prussian characteristics.”
The non-Prussian generals found these attempts highly amusing, as the Prussians had
taken great pride in their heritage prior to the announcement of possible war crimes
trials.47
Despite their many desperate attempts to defend their actions and those of their
colleagues, the thirteen generals at Trent Park in the fall of 1943 had little to fear from
war crimes accusations. In fact, after several weeks of listening to the generals’
conversations, British intelligence determined that there was “little or no evidence in the
conversations that any of these [prisoners of war had] participated in, or even seen,
serious war crimes.” This didn’t stop the British officers, however, from taking delight
in the generals’ anxious attempts to convince them of their innocence.48
Nothing sparked more British interest in the German generals’ views, however,
than news of the organization and activities of the Free Germany Committee.
Originating among German exiles and prisoners of war in the Soviet Union in the late
summer of 1943, this group openly advocated the overthrow of the Nazi regime. They
actively recruited other POWs to their cause and began publishing their own newspaper,
Freies Deutschland, to disseminate their ideas. London began to consider organizing
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their own anti-Nazi organization among the prisoners of war in England and solicited the
perspectives of their captive generals for such a possibility.
Baron von Liebenstein, whom British intelligence believed to be one of the most
adamantly anti-Nazi generals at Trent Park, expressed skepticism about the Free
Germany Committee’s professed spontaneity in Russia. While he proclaimed that the
movement had the right idea, he doubted that German officers would voluntarily
organize in this manner in a Russian prisoner of war camp. He assured the British that
“however much these [German] officers may have hated the present German regime, and
there is no doubt that the majority of them [did], they would not let themselves be used
as pawns in Russia’s game. As soon as they have fulfilled their purpose,” the Baron
speculated, “they will be dropped or liquidated.”49
All the generals agreed that the British government would be wise not to
recognize this movement, describing its membership as “mostly Jews” or “unknown
characters who would have no influence whatsoever even for propaganda purposes.” In
a reference to the political exiles involved with the Committee, some of the generals
observed that these were “the very people who had been sent out of Germany with the
approval of everyone not only the Nazis.”50 The generals at Trent Park dismissed the
leadership of a fellow general, Walter von Seydlitz, in the Committee’s work. They
likely assumed, as von Liebenstein’s comments suggest, that the Russians coerced
membership in the League of German Officers and that none of these men participated
voluntarily. Regardless, the Free Germany Committee garnered little interest among the
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POW generals in England, and British intelligence did not explore the issue any further
at Trent Park for another six months.
It was not just the Free Germany Movement that motivated British interest in the
generals’ political views. Beginning in January 1944, CSDIC renewed their effort to
assess the character of each of the German general officers at Camp No. 11. They
compiled a report, simply entitled “The Generals,” with an eye toward the end of the war
and potential postwar political arrangements. The report began by observing that “the
more intelligent generals and senior officers seem to feel that the war is as good as lost
and wonder how complete collapse can best be avoided.” Indeed, von Arnim and
Crüwell appear to have been the only general officer POWs who expressed any belief
that Germany could still win the war. These two malcontents, as the British viewed
them, continued to “express horror at the ‘disloyal’ and defeatist attitude of their
colleagues” and even agreed that some of them might be shot when they returned to
Germany.51 Again, whether these two men honestly believed this or were simply putting
on a front for their colleagues was not assessed.
Crüwell and von Arnim aside, CSDIC valued the generals’ evaluations of various
German military leaders. The report lauded the assessments the generals had provided
the British of men like Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, Germany’s Commander-inChief South; Field Marshal Erwin Rommel; Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, C-in-C
of the Luftwaffe; and his second in command, deputy Reich commissioner for aviation,
Erhard Milch, among others.52 But the British report did not state exactly what they
learned about these German leaders or how the information was used. Clearly, the
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British believed that the resources they had dedicated to eavesdropping and interrogating
these prisoners had produced some valuable information, but no overall assessment of
the success of the operation was provided.
Of even greater value to the British were the generals’ views of the postwar
balance of power. The report stated the importance of the generals’ comments in
shaping British postwar policy. In some ways, British intelligence officers admired the
German generals. They remarked on their “strong sense of duty,” praised them as “good
leaders of men with a feeling of responsibility for the welfare of those under their
command,” and acknowledged the generals’ widespread condemnation of Nazi brutality,
sincere or otherwise. Yet, CSDIC cautioned that despite their “superficial quarrels and
personal animosities” the generals were united in one fundamental belief: “the greatness
of the German Reich.” What made the generals potentially dangerous, as the British saw
it, was their ability to inspire this belief in generations of Germans to come. British
intelligence recognized that the German officer corps as a whole had for generations
been “the most influential body of men in Germany, representing one of the few
cohesive traditions of leadership in the country.” The generals’ influential status,
coupled with their grandiose aims, made it imperative that something be done to prevent
yet another re-emergence of German militarism like that which had occurred after the
First World War. The British report of January 1944 placed the generals at the forefront
of British postwar concerns by declaring that it was “impossible to read this series of
conversations without feeling that the question of how to handle these men in such a way
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as to prevent them from leading yet another attempt at world domination [was] one of
the most important of those to be faced after the war.”53
Clearly, the British had no intention of allowing the general officers to play
substantial roles in the postwar reconstruction of Germany. Because of the long-term
observations of the German generals in their custody, the British realized as early as
January 1944 that allowing any of these men to obtain positions of leadership, or
allowing Germany to extricate itself from the war without an unconditional surrender,
was out of the question. CSDIC observed that “however defeatist the talk of the
prisoners may appear, however hopeless about the outcome of the war and angry and
even ashamed at the actions of the Nazis they may be, [the generals] are still thinking of
the next war and how to prepare for it.” In this regard, British intelligence placed von
Arnim and von Thoma, who seemingly represented opposite ends of the political
spectrum, in the same category. Both hoped that Germany could achieve a stalemate or
armistice arrangement, similar to the one that had ended the First World War, as
opposed to being forced into unconditional surrender and foreign occupation. This
would allow Germany to maintain some kind of foundation upon which to rebuild.54
Von Thoma had made a statement to this effect, the very one that led to the row
with Crüwell in mid-December. In fact, the British believed that German patriotism
supplied the roots of von Thoma’s opposition to Nazism. His criticism of the Nazi
regime was that it “would get Germany smashed up so completely that she would not
even have a framework on which to build, which she had in 1918.” In other words, von
Thoma opposed National Socialism because he believed it would lead to a greater defeat
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for Germany than in the First World War. The British officers at Trent Park called von
Thoma “a greater [German] patriot than the Nazi group imagine themselves to be”
because he was “always thinking of Germany’s ultimate recovery.”55
Remarkably, considering their personal animosity and seemingly opposite views,
British intelligence stated that von Arnim was “really no less pessimistic than the others,
and von Thoma in particular.” They believed that von Arnim’s staunch anti-defeatism
was predicated not only on his “somewhat exaggerated interpretation of his duty to keep
up morale” as the senior officer, but also his belief, like von Thoma, that Germany’s
only hope of remaining a military power was to extricate itself from both the war and
National Socialism before greater damage to Germany had been done. Von Arnim had
quietly made statements to this effect in the past. Months earlier, during a conversation
with a British officer about the fate of Europe, von Arnim had suggested that “Germany
and England should come to some agreement and form a bloc against the danger from
the East.” When the British officer replied that this was out of the question as long as
Hitler’s regime controlled Germany, von Arnim declared that Hitler and his “band”
would “soon have to go,” as they “had outlived their usefulness.” Von Arnim faulted
Hitler and the Nazis for going to excess and for having “no tradition of government
behind them.” When pressed to answer how the Hitler regime could be removed from
power, von Arnim simply replied “death.”56
These veiled anti-Nazi sentiments, contrasted with his publicly anti-defeatist
stance, support General Cramer’s assessment of von Arnim that he “felt that outwardly
he had to support the Nazi regime although his real feelings were definitely against it.”57
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Von Arnim’s comments also illustrate his overarching German patriotism. By early
1944, when German fortunes had grown bleak, von Arnim privately turned on the Hitler
regime out of concern for Germany’s future and not ideological opposition to National
Socialism.
Curiously, the British did not seem so optimistic about Crüwell. CSDIC
operatives lamented that the “intellectual level of men like [him]” made them incapable
of appreciating the finer points of a patriotic argument like von Thoma’s. Where CSDIC
explained von Arnim’s anti-defeatism as underlying his hopes to preserve Germany’s
status, they dismissed Crüwell as a “nitwit” to whose opinions “little attention need be
paid.”58
Given CSDIC’s evaluations of the generals, London gradually lost interest in
using the prisoners for anything but information purposes. Despite numerous
discussions about the prospect of establishing a Soviet-style Free Germany Committee in
England, the British never did so. Nor did they make any attempt to utilize their captive
generals for propaganda purposes, or psychological warfare as the Americans referred to
it, by having them speak on the radio or issue public statements in the manner that the
Soviets did. The British did organize a plan to have von Thoma attempt to persuade the
German command in the Channel Islands to surrender by using a loudspeaker from a
boat near the shore, but the operation was aborted.59
British observations of the generals also reveal the senior officers’ pragmatism.
Both von Arnim and von Thoma, as well as most of their fellow generals, founded their
concerns about preserving Germany’s influential political position on their fear of the
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Soviet Union. The British report observed that discussions of the Russian threat were
the “most persistent theme of the [generals’] conversations.” The German generals at
Camp No. 11 feared, somewhat presciently, that if the Allies agreed to allow the Soviets
to establish control over part of Germany the Russians would “never let go.” The
German generals foresaw the coming Cold War struggle between Communist Russia and
Western capitalism and believed that Germany’s greatest chance of retaining its
influential position in the world, and the only hope of survival for the German officer
class, was to support the West.60
British intelligence realized that most of the German prisoner of war generals
based their political views more in pragmatic concerns than in ideological adherence.
By the time analysts compiled the report in January 1944, the British observed that there
seemed to be “an almost unanimous anti-Nazi feeling among the generals.” But they
believed that this anti-Nazism sprang from wartime frustration, not from any real
ideological opposition. Like von Arnim, the animosity most of the generals felt for
Hitler and the Nazis could be attributed to the regime’s handling of the war and,
consequently, Germany’s impending defeat. General von Broich summed up the
feelings of most of the generals in placing the blame squarely on Hitler and the Nazis.
He stated that by the spring of 1942, the German Army “realized that Germany could not
win and should endeavor to negotiate, but [Hitler] and the Party would not hear of it.”61
By early 1944, the German general officers in British custody already harbored
thoughts of allying themselves in some capacity with the Western Allies. Given the
opportunity, the German officers of course preferred rebuilding the Fatherland and
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reoccupying a prominent position on the global stage. Yet, if faced with the prospect of
Soviet domination at the end of the war, the “Nazi” generals indicated that they were
already prepared to throw in their lot with the British and Americans well over a year
before the war in Europe had ended.
The generals revealed their growing opposition to Nazi leadership on Hitler’s
birthday. On the morning of 20 April 1944, the batmen assembled in their dining room
attired in their finest dress uniforms. At 1230 hours, von Arnim and Meixner appeared,
joined the batmen in toasting Hitler, and von Arnim offered a few remarks. A short time
later, von Arnim again toasted Hitler and presented a short speech, this time to the
officers who had gathered for lunch. The casual dress of the nonchalant officers
provided a sharp contrast to that of the batmen. Crüwell, who had fretted for several
days leading up to 20 April that von Thoma or one of the other anti-Nazi generals might
ruin his well-planned events by refusing to toast Hitler’s health, must have been relieved
that disinterest was all that he had to endure.62
The generals’ widespread fears by April 1944 that the war was lost most likely
motivated their collectively chilly reception of Hitler’s birthday. By this point, many of
them, including some of the ostensibly pro-Nazi prisoners, had conveyed their desire to
take up residence in the British-occupied part of Germany after the war. Likely due to
their time confined at Trent Park, most of the generals expected fair treatment from the
British. They also expressed their usual fear of the Russians and a notable dislike and
lack of respect for the Americans. These revelations, coupled with von Thoma’s request
for copies of Freies Deutschland, the newspaper issued by the National Committee
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“Free Germany” in the Soviet Union, encouraged London to re-examine the possibility
of creating a similar organization among the German prisoners of war in Britain.63
British authorities at Camp No. 11 distributed copies of Freies Deutschland as
requested and analyzed each individual prisoner’s reactions to its content. These
reactions, combined with previous observations and assessments of the prisoners,
allowed British intelligence to gauge the potential for such an organization at Trent Park.
Not surprisingly, von Arnim, Crüwell, Meixner and von Hülsen disapproved of the
paper’s circulation in the camp and “would never countenance any Free German
Movement.” The remaining generals, all of whom British intelligence classified as
potential supporters, offered varied reactions.64
CSDIC viewed Krause as supportive of circulating Freies Deutschland in the
camp but highly unlikely to commit to any kind of political movement. He “has little
character,” stated a British officer in assessing Krause, “and would entertain no thought
of making any open move.” On the other hand, British intelligence judged Von Thoma,
von Broich and Bassenge as “the most openly militant of the anti-Nazis” and likely to be
the first to support an anti-Nazi organization. Interestingly, the British assessment also
recognized that two of these generals were bachelors and none of the three had any
children, thus giving them a freer hand to openly proclaim their political views without
fear of Nazi reprisals against their families in Germany.65
The same family theme figured into evaluations of the other three potential
supporters as well. The British believed von Liebenstein also potentially would become
involved with a British-style Free Germany Committee. British officers considered him
156
an “extremely intelligent and cultured man” and one who had “made no attempt either to
hide the fact that he [was] very anti-Nazi or that he [read] the propaganda material
supplied.” The Baron’s fondness for the British and their style of government, gained in
part during his travels in Scotland before the war, made him an ideal candidate.
Moreover, like so many of his anti-Nazi colleagues at Trent Park, he had no children
who were likely to suffer for his political choices.66
Count von Sponeck, in Britain’s estimation, was more enigmatic in regard to
how openly he might support any kind of political movement opposing the Nazi regime.
Like von Liebenstein, CSDIC described him as intelligent and cultured but he had
“practically no record either of political conversations with [British officers] or with
other prisoners of war.” The defeatist clique at Camp No. 11 considered von Sponeck
“one of their strongest supporters,” and prisoners of war at other camps even mentioned
his name as “the man to lead an anti-Nazi movement.” Yet, British intelligence pointed
out that he had a wife and several children in Germany that he would have to consider
before making any decision about involvement with a Free Germany Movement.67
Ultimately, Trent Park authorities believed that, with strong encouragement from
von Thoma, von Broich and Bassenge, von Liebenstein and von Sponeck might be
willing to commit themselves to a movement in Britain as well. The basis of their
support would likely be their German patriotism. They all held strong anti-communist
beliefs and their fears of a “Russian-dominated and communist Germany” might induce
them to work with the Allies if only to save the Fatherland from the Soviet Union.68
157
Most significantly, the British attempt to gauge the potential level of support for
a Free Germany Movement among the generals at Trent Park highlighted the enormous
influence of family concerns. It is certainly more than coincidence that the most vocal
anti-Nazi generals in the camp—von Thoma, von Broich, von Liebenstein and
Bassenge—had no children. These prisoners had much less to fear from openly
expressing their opposition to Hitler and his regime, who frequently targeted opponents’
families. Conversely, the most ardent supporters of the Nazi regime—von Arnim,
Crüwell and von Hülsen—all had family concerns. Von Arnim had a daughter,
Elisabeth, whose husband had served as one of the general’s subordinate officers in
North Africa. With a daughter in Germany and a son-in-law serving in the Wehrmacht,
not to mention a family name that symbolized generations of respected military service,
von Arnim had a great deal to lose by making an enemy of the Nazis. Likewise, both
Crüwell and von Hülsen had large families. Crüwell’s four children, of whom Nazi
authorities were well aware because of his wife’s death early in his captivity, and von
Hülsen’s five children certainly gave these men more to consider in regard to the
ramifications of openly opposing the Hitler regime.
The British evaluations of those generals deemed to be “on the fence,” so to
speak, also exemplify these family concerns. British intelligence was convinced, as
were the other prisoners at Trent Park, that Count von Sponeck was thoroughly antiNazi. Yet, he was the least likely among the “anti-Nazi” clique to support a Free
Germany Movement because he had a son and two daughters in Germany. Krause,
whom the British appear to have dismissed because of an alleged lack of character, had
158
three sons. Even more interesting, CSDIC judged General Neuffer to be potentially procommunist. He was strongly anti-Nazi, but unlike his colleagues, he was the “most leftinclined” of the generals, spoke Russian and openly admired the achievements of the
Soviet Union. But in spite of any potential common interests with the existing National
Committee “Free Germany” in the Soviet Union, British intelligence highly doubted if
Neuffer would commit to openly opposing the Nazis “because of his wife and two small
sons.”69
Perhaps because of a lack of any real commitment from any of the prisoners, the
British opted not to attempt a Free Germany Movement among the general officers. Yet,
what is most valuable about their efforts to gauge the generals’ potential interest is the
striking correlation between family concerns and professed loyalty, or lack thereof, to
the National Socialist government. Perhaps Crüwell engaged in what the British viewed
as annoying and even moronic behavior in hopes that any reports that filtered back to
Berlin would portray him as a staunch supporter of the Nazi regime and thereby protect
his four children in Germany whom Frau Göring had looked after for a time during his
captivity. Crüwell’s postwar leadership of the Afrika Korps veterans’ organization, one
that supported the West German government’s relationship with the United States,
suggests this as a strong possibility. Conversely, Ritter von Thoma, a bachelor with no
children, was in the safest position, allowing him to openly criticize the Nazi regime.
Despite opting against a Free Germany Movement in Britain, CSDIC continued
its meticulous observations of the generals’ conversations, interactions and evolving
perspectives of the Nazi regime. In the meantime, Allied commanders prepared for the
159
invasion of Normandy. Successful operations would mean the capture of more enemy
generals and the need to find room for them at Camp No. 11. Consequently, beginning
in late May, London decided to transfer more of its distinguished “guests” to American
custody. Washington had yet to learn how to play as clever a game with the German
generals as the British had; Camp Clinton paled by comparison with Trent Park. But as
new faces arrived in Mississippi and the success of Operation Overlord began to make
victory in Europe appear probable, American authorities also began to consider the
potential importance of these generals to their postwar plans.
Notes
1
Report on the German Senior Officer P/W at No. 11 P/W Camp for the Month of June 1943,
WO 208/5622, the National Archives of the United Kingdom (hereafter TNA), Kew, Richmond,
Surrey, United Kingdom.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Weekly notes compiled by British Army Officers in contact with the German Senior Officer
P/W at Camp No. 11,” G.R.G.G. 105, 28 November-4 December 1943; Weekly notes compiled
by British Army Officers in contact with the German Senior Officer P/W at Camp No. 11,
G.R.G.G. 110, 26 December-1 January 1943, WO 208/5016, TNA.
6
Weekly notes compiled by British Army Officers in contact with the German Senior Officer
P/W at Camp No. 11, G.R.G.G. 114, 16-22 January 1944, RG 165, Entry 179, Box 649, NARA.
7
CSDIC, G.R.G.G. 61, 26 July 1943, WO 208/5016, TNA.
160
8
Ibid.
9
CSDIC, G.R.G.G. 65, 31 July 1943, WO 208/5016, TNA.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
CSDIC, G.R.G.G. 72, 21 August 1943, WO 208/5016, TNA.
15
CSDIC, G.R.G.G. 72, 21 August 1943, WO 208/5016; War Diary, August 1943, WO 165/41,
TNA.
16
Weekly notes compiled by British Army Officers in contact with the German Senior Officer
P/W at Camp No. 11, G.R.G.G. 103, 7-13 November 1943, WO 208/5016, TNA.
17
Prisoners of War Camp No. 11, Inspection report by the International Committee of the Red
Cross, 13 January 1944, FO 916/908, TNA—all original ICRC French language documents
translated into English by Linda Lelo.
18
Prisoners of War Camp No. 11, Inspection report by the International Committee of the Red
Cross, 13 January 1944, FO 916/908, TNA.
19
Visit of Dr. Haccius to No. 11 Camp, 13 January 1944, 15 January 1944; Extract from S.R.
Draft 549, 13 January 1944, WO 208/5622, TNA.
20
Extract from S.R. Draft No. 7142, 29 September 1943; M.I.19 (a)/662/1f, 16 October 1943,
WO 208/5622, TNA.
21
Generalleutnant Frantz talking to a number of newly arrived German senior officer P/W,
S.R.G.G. 94, 2 June 1943, WO 208/4165, TNA.
22
CSDIC, G.R.G.G. 56, 22 July 1943, WO 208/5016, TNA.
23
CSDIC, S.R.G.G. 204, 9 July 1943, WO 208/4165, TNA.
161
24
Ibid.
25
CSDIC, G.R.G.G. 56, 22 July 1943, WO 208/5016, TNA.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29
Conversation between General der Panzertruppen Crüwell and Generaloberst von Arnim,
S.R.G.G. 130, 12 June 1943, WO 208/4165, TNA.
30
CSDIC, G.R.G.G. 72, 21 August 1943, WO 208/5016, TNA.
31
Ibid.
32
Weekly notes compiled by British Army Officers in contact with the German Senior Officer
Ps/W at No. 11 Camp, G.R.G.G. 74, 21-27 August 1943, WO 208/5016, TNA.
33
Weekly notes compiled by British Army Officers in contact with the German Senior Officer
P/W at Camp No. 11, G.R.G.G. 106, 5-11 December 1943, WO 208/5016, TNA.
34
Weekly notes compiled by British Army Officers in contact with the German Senior Officer
Ps/W at No. 11 Camp, G.R.G.G. 79, 12-18 September 1943; Weekly notes compiled by British
Army Officers in contact with the German Senior Officer Ps/W at No. 11 Camp, G.R.G.G. 74,
21-27 August 1943, WO 208/5016, TNA.
35
Weekly notes compiled by British Army Officers in contact with the German Senior Officer
Ps/W at No. 11 Camp, G.R.G.G. 74, 21-27 August 1943, WO 208/5016, TNA.
36
The phrase roughly translates in American English to “Shut your mouth and bite me!”
37
Weekly notes compiled by British Army Officers in contact with the German Senior Officer
Ps/W at No. 11 Camp, G.R.G.G. 74, 21-27 August 1943, WO 208/5016, TNA.
38
Weekly notes compiled by British Army Officers in contact with the German Senior Officer
P/W at Camp No. 11, G.R.G.G. 115, 23-29 January 1944; Weekly notes compiled by British
162
Army Officers in contact with the German Senior Officer P/W at Camp No. 11, G.R.G.G. 114,
16-22 January 1944, RG 165, Entry 179, Box 649, National Archives and Records
Administration (Hereafter NARA), College Park, Maryland.
39
Weekly notes compiled by British Army Officers in contact with the German Senior Officer
P/W at Camp No. 11, G.R.G.G. 93, 10-16 October 1943, WO 208/5016, TNA; Letter to “Herrn
Chef Ag P 2,” 31 July 1942; “Vortragsnotiz, den 10.September 1942,” Document No. 74, PERS
6/114, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg i.Br. (Hereafter, BA-MA).
40
Weekly notes compiled by British Army Officers in contact with the German Senior Officer
P/W at Camp No. 11, G.R.G.G. 123, 20-26 February 1944; Extract from G.R.G.G. No. 122, 3
May 1944, WO 208/5016, TNA.
41
Weekly notes compiled by British Army Officers in contact with the German Senior Officer
P/W at Camp No. 11, G.R.G.G. 103, 7-13 November 1943, WO 208/5016, TNA.
42
Weekly notes compiled by British Army Officers in contact with the German Senior Officer
P/W at Camp No. 11, G.R.G.G. 108, 12-18 December 1943; Summary of S.R. Material on the
Crüwell-Thoma Incident, G.R.G.G. 107, 15-19 December 1943, WO 208/5016, TNA.
43
Summary of S.R. Material on the Crüwell-Thoma Incident, G.R.G.G. 107, 15-19 December
1943; Weekly notes compiled by British Army Officers in contact with the German Senior
Officer P/W at Camp No. 11, G.R.G.G. 111, 2-9 January 1944, WO 208/5016, TNA.
44
CSDIC, G.R.G.G. 65, 31 July 1943, WO 208/5016, TNA.
45
Weekly notes compiled by British Army Officers in contact with the German Senior Officer
P/W at Camp No. 11, G.R.G.G. 101, 31 October-6 November 1943, WO 208/5016, TNA.
46
Weekly notes compiled by British Army Officers in contact with the German Senior Officer
P/W at Camp No. 11, G.R.G.G. 103, 7-13 November 1943, WO 208/5016; “The Generals”:
Views of German Senior Officer P.W’s., 5 January 1944, WO 208/5550, TNA.
163
47
Weekly notes compiled by British Army Officers in contact with the German Senior Officer
P/W at Camp No. 11, G.R.G.G. 96, 17-23 October 1943, WO 208/5016, TNA.
48
“The Generals”: Views of German Senior Officer P.W’s., 5 January 1944, WO 208/5550,
TNA.
49
Report on a Conversation between Generalmajor von Liebenstein and a British Army Officer,
11 October 1943, WO 208/5016, TNA.
50
Weekly notes compiled by British Army Officers in contact with the German Senior Officer
P/W at Camp No. 11, G.R.G.G. 96, 17-23 October 1943, WO 208/5016, TNA.
51
“The Generals”: Views of German Senior Officer P.W’s., 5 January 1944, WO 208/5550,
TNA.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid. For more on the historical social status of the German officer corps, see Karl Demeter,
The German Officer-Corps in Society and State, 1650-1945 (New York: Praeger, 1965); and
Preradovich, Nikolaus v., Die militärische und soziale Herkunft der Generalität des deutschen
Heeres, 1. Mai 1944 (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1978).
54
“The Generals”: Views of German Senior Officer P.W’s., 5 January 1944, WO 208/5550,
TNA.
55
Ibid.
56
Conversation between Generaloberst von Arnim and a British Army Officer,” G.R.G.G. 89, 4
October 1943; Weekly notes compiled by British Army Officers in contact with the German
Senior Officer P/W at Camp No. 11, G.R.G.G. 90, 3-9 October 1943, WO 208/5016, TNA.
Unbeknownst to von Arnim at the time of his remarks in October 1943, Colonel Count Claus
von Stauffenberg and his accomplices were in the preparation stages of a plot against Hitler’s
life, although the particulars of the July 20th Plot were yet to be devised—see Pierre Galante,
164
Operation Valkyrie: The German Generals’ Plot Against Hitler (New York: Harper and Row,
1981).
57
Conversation between Generaloberst von Arnim and a British Army Officer,” G.R.G.G. 89, 4
October 1943; Weekly notes compiled by British Army Officers in contact with the German
Senior Officer P/W at Camp No. 11, G.R.G.G. 90, 3-9 October 1943, WO 208/5016, TNA.
58
“The Generals”: Views of German Senior Officer P.W’s., 5 January 1944, WO 208/5550,
TNA.
59
Sullivan, Thresholds of Peace, 221; Henry Faulk, Group Captives: The Re-Education of
German Prisoners of War in Britain, 1945-1948 (London: Chatto and Windus, 1977), 70.
60
“The Generals”: Views of German Senior Officer P.W’s., 5 January 1944, WO 208/5550,
TNA.
61
Ibid.
62
Weekly notes compiled by British Army Officers in contact with the German Senior Officer
P/W at Camp No. 11, G.R.G.G. 130, 17-23 April 1944; Weekly notes compiled by British Army
Officers in contact with the German Senior Officer P/W at Camp No. 11, G.R.G.G. 129, 10-16
April 1944, WO 208/5016, TNA.
63
Weekly notes compiled by British Army Officers in contact with the German Senior Officer
P/W at Camp No. 11, G.R.G.G. 130, 17-23 April 1944, WO 208/5016; War Diary, May 1944,
WO 165/41, TNA.
64
Report by a British Army Officer on the Possibilities of the Formation of a Free German
Movement amongst the German Senior Officer PW at No. 11 Camp, G.R.G.G. 132, May 1944,
WO 208/5017, TNA.
65
Ibid.
66
Ibid.
165
67
Ibid.
68
Ibid.
69
“Von Arnim, Jürgen;” “Crüwell, Ludwig;” “Von Hülsen, Heinrich-Hermann;” “Krause,
Fritz;” “Graf von Sponeck, Theodor,” National Archives Collection of Foreign Records Seized,
RG 242, German General Staff Officers Files (From A-Z) (H6.26 a-i), T-78, microfilm rolls 883895, NARA; Report by a British Army Officer on the Possibilities of the Formation of a Free
German Movement amongst the German Senior Officer PW at No. 11 Camp, G.R.G.G. 132,
May 1944, WO 208/5017, TNA.
166
CHAPTER V
THE CAROUSEL AT CAMP NO. 11
The Allied invasion of northwest France in June 1944 reshaped Camp No. 11.
Most significantly, an influx of new prisoners in the months following D-Day and
continuing throughout the remainder of the war necessitated the departure of many of the
existing internees. Eventually, CSDIC had more occupants than they could
accommodate at Trent Park and a second camp, Grizedale Hall, was established a short
distance away. Moreover, as Allied victory became more likely, the British focus
extended beyond simply gathering military intelligence. British authorities also
augmented their efforts to determine the prisoners’ political orientations by sizing up the
generals’ views on the individual Allied powers and gathering information about
potential war crimes.
The first and most obvious change at Camp No. 11 involved an influx of more
general officer prisoners and the departure of men who, by this point, had been in British
custody for over a year. On D-Day, ten German generals resided at Trent Park. By the
end of the 1944, the camp had become home to twenty-six more generals, five admirals
and twenty-one of their aides-de-camp.1
The British took the opportunity created by the need to make space at the English
camp to first rid themselves of some troublemakers. Having been transferred to
American custody, von Arnim and Crüwell departed on 17 June 1944 for Clinton,
Mississippi. Refusing to depart quietly, Crüwell speculated that he and von Arnim were
167
being removed to allow von Thoma to establish a “Free German Movement” at Trent
Park. Failing to comprehend the Allies’ joint custody arrangement, Crüwell contended
that their transfer violated the Geneva Convention because he and von Arnim were
prisoners of the British, not the Americans. He found this transfer particularly
frustrating because it meant that his attempts to feign illness had failed to obtain an early
repatriation. Surprisingly, von Arnim expressed no objection, stating that it would make
for a nice change of scenery. Besides, the British had no say in the arrangement,
according to the general, because they had “to dance to the American tune.”2
Taking their place at Trent Park were senior officers captured at Cherbourg in the
early days of the Allied invasion. The first of this new crop of senior German officers
was Rear Admiral Walter Hennecke, the commander of German naval forces in
Normandy, and Brigadier General Robert Sattler, the second in command at Fortress
Cherbourg. The Allies captured Admiral Hennecke on 26 June 1944, the day after
Berlin honored him with the Knight’s Cross for his defense of the French coast. General
Sattler surrendered the following day.3
A sense of impending German defeat accompanied these men to Trent Park.
British camp personnel observed how the Allied invasion weighed heavily on their
prisoners of war and “led to considerable pessimistic talk during these days.” Sattler,
whom the British believed “would be swayed by any wind that blew provided little
mental or physical activity was called for,” admitted that he “no longer had any faith in
victory, though in 1943 he had still believed in it.” Hennecke shared his belief that
“things will collapse within the next few weeks.” “It can’t go on like this,” he stated,
168
expressing his concern for the German homefront. “Just imagine it,” Hennecke
continued, “in three days there have been three thousand [bombers] over Munich and so
on, just imagine the damage that is being done there and how it is increasing the chaos
that will come later.”4
Adding to the prisoners’ growing malaise, a flood of other senior officers soon
joined them. On 8 August, the American First Army captured Major General Karl
Spang, commanding officer of the 266th Infantry Division, near Brest. His capture
marked the first of a flurry of general officers taken prisoner during August and
September as the Allies advanced east from the Normandy coast into the French interior.
One week later, Brigadier General Ludwig Bieringer surrendered. Bieringer had spent
most of his career in the supply branch of the German Army. By mid-1944, he was
serving as field commander of the military administration headquarters at Draguignan in
southern France, about twenty miles from the Mediterranean coast. After receiving
word of the approach of French partisans early on the morning of 15 August, Bieringer
and his staff barricaded themselves into the headquarters villa. They held off the
resistance forces until the following day. But, fearing that the French were “out for
blood,” Bieringer quickly abandoned his original order to fight to the last bullet and
instructed a member of his staff to immediately surrender at the first sight of American
troops.5
On the same day, the French partisans had also driven Lieutenant General
Ferdinand Neuling, commander of the 62nd Reserve Corps, out of Draguignan into the
hills north of town. American airborne troops surrounded Neuling’s headquarters early
169
on the 17th and cut off all communications to his subordinate units. At eight in the
morning, as a show of good faith to his American captors, General Bieringer arrived in
the company of an American officer, informed Neuling of his own surrender the
previous day and advised the latter to follow suit. Neuling “wildly proclaimed his
intention to hold out and then kill himself with his last bullet.” Even after American
artillery shelled his position, he still refused to capitulate. But by the next morning, with
all of his ammunition exhausted and an American tank advancing on the house in which
he was holed up, Neuling finally gave in. “I knew that my position was hopeless,” he
explained to his American captors, “but I had orders to hold all positions to the last
cartridge. One must do one’s duty. Besides, a general who does not obey such orders
nowadays is shot out of hand, so I simply had to hold on until all my ammunition was
gone.”6
During the next three days, three more senior Wehrmacht officers, Brigadier
General Hans Schuberth and Major Generals Kurt Badinski and Erwin Menny, joined
Neuling and Bieringer as Allied prisoners of war. Schuberth commanded
Feldkommandatur 792 in southern France and surrendered in Digne, about an hour’s
drive north of Draguignan. Badinski, with previous experience on the Russian Front and
in Norway, commanded the 276th Infantry Division holding a small sector of northwest
France. With morale problems rampant among his men in the face of the continued
Allied advance in August 1944, Badinski reportedly declared “rumor-mongering”
punishable by death. He had little time to put his draconian measures into practice,
170
however, as he was captured on 20 August at Bailleul, about ten miles south of
Abbeville, near the Normandy coast.7
Erwin Menny managed to fight in all three of the German Army’s main theaters
of combat in World War II. He had briefly—literally two days and three days
respectively—commanded the 90th Light Africa Division and the 15th Panzer Division,
and won the Knight’s Cross for his service in North Africa. He was still in the fight
there as late as August 1942. The following month, he took command of the 18th Panzer
Division in Russia, and went through a succession of commands before being transferred
to the Western Front and taking responsibility for the 84th Infantry Division. Menny was
captured at Magny in northwest France on 21 August 1944.8
The capture of Bieringer, Neuling, Schuberth, Badinski and Menny highlighted a
noteworthy change in Allied procedure regarding high-ranking Wehrmacht officers.
After D-Day, CSDIC in England no longer took the primary role in interrogating
captured general officers as they had done in the past. American and British intelligence
now cooperated on the effort through a joint operation in France labeled “CSDIC West.”
Important military intelligence could be immediately gleaned from these prisoners while
they were still at the front where the information was most needed. While “Mother”
continued listening to the generals’ conversations at Trent Park, prisoners now arrived
there having already been interrogated by combined Allied personnel.
As part of the new Allied POW procedures, Bieringer, Neuling and Schuberth
immediately departed for the United States, while Badinski and Menny joined their
colleagues in England. Curiously, Badinski and Menny arrived in Allied hands
171
displaying a great deal more optimism about Germany’s chances in the war than did
most of the general officer prisoners. Badinski impressed the intelligence officers of
CSDIC West as “a typical professional soldier who refuses to admit to himself that
Germany has lost the war.” He was anti-Nazi, according to the officers, “but refused to
express himself directly as opposed to the regime, feeling that his honor as a soldier does
not allow him to express such an opinion outside his own home.”9
Likewise, Menny’s faith in Germany’s ultimate victory appeared unshakable, as
he claimed that the Germans had “one or two things up their sleeve.” This was mostly
wishful thinking emanating from his fear of the Russians whom he described as “a
fearful enemy who, if ever permitted to occupy Germany, will cause the country to turn
communist.” Notably, Menny was one of the few residents of Camp No. 11 who had
had direct contact with General Seydlitz and the Free German Movement in Russia. At
one point during his service on the Eastern Front, Soviet forces encircled Menny’s unit.
Captured German soldiers arrived under a flag of truce and delivered a hand-written
letter from General Seydlitz. The letter read: “Dear Menny, you must realize yourself
that it’s no use. You know the Russians are already in your rear; tomorrow you’ll be cut
off and no one from your ‘division’ will escape. Surrender. The whole war is senseless
and should be brought to an end as soon as possible to enable us to spare a great number
of people’s lives.” Perhaps because of his fear of the Russians, Menny was unfazed by
Seydlitz’s pleas for surrender. Amazingly, Menny escaped, but he was the only person
from his division who did.10
172
At the time of the capture of Badinski and Menny in August 1944, the Allies had
almost reached Paris. Commander of Allied forces, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and
his staff originally planned to skirt the city and continue their eastward advance, forcing
the capital’s German occupiers to continue providing food and fuel for its French
residents. At the last minute, however, Eisenhower opted to re-take Paris after all, both
because of an uprising by French resistance forces within the city and because of the
actions of the German military governor of Paris, Lieutenant General Dietrich von
Choltitz.
General Wilhelm Burgdorf, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) chief of
personnel, had personally recommended von Choltitz to Hitler as the man best able to
take command of Paris because he was “an officer who had never questioned an order no
matter how harsh it was.” As a lieutenant colonel in May 1940, von Choltitz had been
responsible for the destruction of the Dutch city of Rotterdam. After seizing control of
the city’s essential bridges, he tried to encourage the city’s military commander to
surrender by sending Dutch civilians in to persuade him. When the commander could
not be found, von Choltitz grew impatient and ordered a large-scale bombing attack.
The Germans virtually obliterated the heart of the city, killing over 700 people and
leaving almost 80,000 civilians wounded or homeless.11
Two years later, in July 1942, von Choltitz had taken the Russian city of
Sevastopol with similar destructiveness. Afterward, he reputedly bragged about the
humor he found in requiring Russian prisoners of war to load the cannons that were used
to destroy their own homes. Even after German fortunes on the Russian Front turned
173
against them in 1943, von Choltitz observed that it was his fate “to cover the retreat of
our armies and to destroy the cities behind them.” Subsequently, von Choltitz took part
in the Battle of Kharkov and the Kursk Offensive as commanding officer of the 48th
Panzer Corps in 1943 and led the 84th Army Corps in France in 1944 before assuming
command of the German occupation of Paris in early August 1944. He replaced
Lieutenant General Hans Wilhelm Freiherr von Boineburg-Lengsfeld, who had been
relieved of his command for refusing to destroy the Parisian bridges over the Seine
River. Hitler was confident that he would not face this kind of insubordination from von
Choltitz.12
Yet, upon taking command in the French capital, von Choltitz, the reputed
“destroyer of cities,” appears to have been transformed. He took command of Paris as
the Allies were closing in and received orders from Hitler on 14 August to destroy all
forty-five of the Seine River bridges as well as most of the city’s industrial capacity and
public utilities. Von Choltitz refused, for the practical reason that he and his fellow
Germans, who were still occupying the city, required utility service as well. Three days
later, on 17 August, he again received orders to detonate the charges that had previously
been set on the bridges and again he refused, contending that this action would make it
impossible to maintain control of the Parisians. Hitler had also reportedly instructed von
Choltitz to “stamp out without pity” any acts of rebellion or sabotage. On 19 August,
von Choltitz spurned this directive as well by aborting a planned attack against the
French resistance movement who had initiated armed resistance to German control
earlier in the day.13
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Twice more, von Choltitz’s superiors ordered him to initiate the destruction of
Paris and twice more the general refused or simply ignored the command. Von Choltitz
even prodded the Swedish Consul General, Raoul Nordling, to travel through the
German lines outside Paris in the hopes that the Swede would contact Allied command
and encourage them to liberate Paris before von Choltitz was forced to follow orders or
risk Hitler’s wrath.14 Why would von Choltitz develop such reluctance to carry out the
demolition of the French capital when he had so eagerly carried out Hitler’s previous
orders to destroy cities in Holland and Russia?
The general later claimed that he was “simply appalled” by the order to destroy
Paris. He believed that the wanton destruction of one of the most beautiful cities in
Europe lacked any military justification. Moreover, von Choltitz now suspected that
Hitler was insane and that the Führer wanted von Choltitz to destroy the French capital
“and then sit in its ashes and accept the consequences.” It also seems likely that, by mid1944, von Choltitz saw the handwriting on the wall. He must have seen the end of the
war approaching and realized that the unnecessary destruction of Paris would win him
no favor from the Western Allies. His fellow prisoners at Trent Park later summed up
von Choltitz’s political persuasion by noting that he had been “very much ‘Third Reich’”
earlier in the war but had “become something quite different in the meantime.” He knew
on “which side his bread [was] buttered.” Likewise, British camp personnel not only
found von Choltitz to be “a cinema-type German officer, fat, coarse, bemonocled and
inflated with a tremendous sense of his own importance.” More importantly, they also
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quickly realized that the general was “very much concerned with appearing in the most
favorable light possible.”15
In spite of von Choltitz’s apparent change of heart, he nonetheless continued to
defend Paris against the Allied advance. By late August, however, French resistance
forces had completely taken over the city, according to von Choltitz, and “were even
driving about in tanks in front of his hotel,” and the Americans and French were on the
outskirts of the city. Lacking the manpower and inclination to continue the struggle, and
having satisfied his soldier’s honor by putting up token resistance, von Choltitz
surrendered to General Jacques Philippe Leclerc of the French Second Armored Division
on 25 August.16
Upon arriving at Camp No. 11 in late August 1944, the garrulous von Choltitz
claimed that he had been a defeatist for a couple of years because he had “spent too
much time at HQ” and, he explained sarcastically, “seen the masterly way in which
difficult problems [were] solved there.” The British did not find von Choltitz’s
contributions to be “of any tremendous value,” although they did find the conversations
with his fellow prisoners entertaining; he was apparently somewhat of a comedian.
Notably, his descriptions of meetings with the German high command showed “the
incredible state of mind of Hitler” and gave the impression that Germany was now a
“mad house.”17
As the Allies advanced eastward following von Choltitz’s surrender of Paris,
they quickly captured dozens more Wehrmacht general officers including Brigadier
General Hans-Georg Schramm. Schramm served as field commander of German forces
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at Troyes, southeast of Paris, and was captured on 26 August, the day after the fall of the
French capital. Three days later, Brigadier General Alfred Gutknecht, commander of
motorized units on the Western Front, was ordered to bring important documents and
report to his superiors in Soissons. While on the road from Rheims on 29 August, he
rounded a curve only to find himself in the middle of an American brigade. Despite his
attempts to turn his car around and flee, he was quickly captured and slightly wounded
in the process. Gutknecht represented an important source of information about German
motorized vehicles and the Wehrmacht’s ability to replace and repair them. The papers
in his possession included information about recent relocations of maintenance parks,
tables detailing the location and capacity of available supply and repair depots, lists of
the types of vehicles that could be repaired in particular depots and the number of
personnel available in each location.18
Also on 29 August, the American 36th Infantry Division captured Brigadier
General Otto Richter. Richter, an engineering officer, commanded the 198th Infantry
Division in southern France. Following the loss of Bieringer and Neuling in Draguignan
in mid-August, OKH ordered Richter to withdraw northward from the Mediterranean
coast. Pausing to attend to a wounded officer, Richter surrendered to the Americans
near Loriol-sur-Drôme, about two hours north of Marseille. Richter, like his colleagues
Bieringer, Neuling and Schuberth, went directly to the United States, bypassing any
British interrogation or eavesdropping at Trent Park.19
Lieutenant General Erwin Vierow, military commander of northwest France and
commanding general of the newly-formed corps, Generalkommando z.b.V. Somme, fell
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into Allied hands on the first of September. The Allies captured him south of Arras,
about an hour from Calais on the Normandy coast. The British characterized Vierow as
“deeply steeped in Prussian militarism” and observed that he strongly disapproved of the
Nazis because “they [were] not gentlemen.” Like most of his fellow general officer
prisoners at this point in the war, Vierow spoke freely of impending German defeat and
his fear of the “Bolshevik Menace.”20
Three days later, the British captured Brigadier General Christoph Graf zu
Stolberg-Stolberg in Antwerp where he served as military commander. Prior to his
appointment in Antwerp, Stolberg had commanded Special Employment Division Staff
136, responsible for battalions largely composed of Soviet prisoners of war who had
offered their services to Nazi Germany either out of a strong conviction to fight
communism or simply to escape a German POW camp. This group had fought in France
in the spring of 1944 before retreating to the Netherlands where Stolberg had taken
command in Antwerp. Stolberg epitomized the type of German militarist that aroused a
great deal of Allied suspicion in the years immediately following the war. The
intelligence officer who first interrogated Stolberg described him as a “violent German
nationalist, whose sole idea [was] the greater glory and power of the German Reich.”
The officer characterized Stolberg as “anti-Nazi” but only because the general believed
that Hitler’s leadership had led Germany to defeat. Stolberg would have been “quite
satisfied to tolerate and, in fact, support the Nazis so long as they were winning.”
Stolberg clearly appeared to be an opportunist who denied German responsibility for the
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war, claiming they had “taken every military and aggressive step solely in the interests
of self- defense.”21
At about the same time, the Allies also captured Brigadier General Hubertus von
Aulock, Major General Rüdiger von Heyking and Major General Paul Seyffardt. Von
Aulock served as chief of staff for General Erwin Vierow before assuming command of
Kampfgruppe von Aulock, charged with the defense of Paris. After von Aulock managed
to elude capture in the French capital, American Captain Walter I. Berlin and the 36th
Armored Infantry Regiment captured him and his entire staff a week later at Mons in
Belgium, less than hour southwest of Brussels. Von Heyking, a German Air Force
officer in both world wars, commanded the 6th Parachute Division at the time of his
capture on 3 September, also near Mons. Allied interrogators found von Heyking “quite
friendly and to a great extent cooperative in his attitude.” He definitely believed the war
to be lost and, perhaps largely because of this, had become disillusioned with the
German High Command. The seemingly apolitical Seyffardt previously led the 205th
Infantry Division in Russia before assuming command of the 348th Infantry Division
stationed along the coast of Calais. He was captured in the same general area as von
Aulock and von Heyking, having retreated to Marbaix, about an hour south of
Brussels.22
CSDIC assumed responsibility for both von Heyking and Seyffardt and sent them
to Trent Park. Von Aulock, on the other hand, was quickly transferred to the United
States. He visited Camp No. 11 for a few hours to see his brother, Andreas von Aulock,
the “Mad Colonel of St. Malo,”23 who was a resident of Trent Park at this time. But
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General von Aulock did not remain at the camp and only spent a few weeks in British
custody before being transferred to Camp Clinton by the end of September.24
Brigadier General Detlef Bock von Wülfingen and Rear Admiral Hans von
Tresckow also surrendered in early September. Von Wülfingen had served in Russia
and Romania, initially at his own request, before being placed in command of the
Belgium city of Liege. The general, whom the British described as “egocentric and not
very bright,” seemed most interested in “the survival of the German nobility.” The
intelligence officers suspected that von Wülfingen, who had descended from an old
Hessian army family, had joined the Nazi Party for his own survival as the general
pleaded with the British “not to kill all Party members after an occupation of Germany.”
Nazi ideology, according to von Wülfingen, opposed both the nobility and the
professional officer corps and the general claimed that there were many within the Party
who opposed its social policies. Admiral von Tresckow served as German naval
commander along the northwest coast of France between the mouths of the Seine and the
Somme Rivers. Thus, he had overseen naval operations between Le Havre, where he
was captured on 13 September, and Abbeville to the northeast.25
The biggest prize for the Allies in the month of September was the capture of the
Fortress of Brest and its “fanatical defender,” Lieutenant General Bernhard-Hermann
Ramcke. Called “Papa” by his men, Ramcke was one of the most decorated German
officers captured by the British and Americans. Ramcke began his military career as a
marine in the German Imperial Navy of the First World War. He finished the war as a
second lieutenant, having earned the Iron Cross, both first and second classes, as well as
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the Prussian Military Service Cross for his bravery. After serving in the Reichswehr
under the Weimar Republic and obtaining the rank of colonel, Ramcke volunteered for
parachute training school in 1940 at the age of fifty-one. Completion of this training
normally required six jumps in six days; Ramcke did all six in three days.26
Ramcke parachuted onto Crete with what he thought were five hundred
paratroopers to restore order to an ongoing German invasion of the island in May 1941.
Upon landing, he discovered that he only had half this number of men and that the ship
bringing most of the Mountain Division to support him had been sunk by the British
Royal Navy. Displaying his usual ingenuity, Ramcke and his small force captured an
airfield and used an abandoned British tank to clear the runway for German planes
bringing reinforcements, munitions and supplies. The Germans subsequently captured
the island, including over 17,000 prisoners of war, on 2 June, and, in August, Ramcke
received the Knight’s Cross for his role in the operation. Interestingly, Ramcke
condemned the brutal treatment he believed his men had received at the hands of the
New Zealanders and the Cretans, and admitted taking revenge against the people in
villages where mutilated German paratroopers were found. He believed this behavior
was justified to maintain order among the Cretan civilian population.27
After a brief stint as a parachute instructor, Ramcke assumed command of the
parachute brigade bearing his name in the spring of 1942. Although originally intended
for use in an invasion of Malta, the Ramcke Parachute Brigade was sent to support
Rommel in North Africa in July, and it was in North Africa where Ramcke added to his
reputation. During the German retreat following the Battle of El Alamein, Ramcke’s
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brigade was separated from Panzer Armee Afrika and forced to proceed on foot for
several miles through hostile terrain. During this trek, Ramcke and his men happened
upon a British tank supply column that included vehicles, fuel, water and a large supply
of food and cigarettes. Crawling to the vehicles under the cover of darkness, Ramcke’s
unit hijacked the entire column without firing a shot. One can only imagine the reaction
that Ramcke must have received from Rommel and the rest of the North African army
when he and his men proudly rolled up in British vehicles. For this bold move and for
returning his men to safety, Ramcke deservedly received the Oak Leaves to his Knight’s
Cross on 11 November 1942.28
In the spring of 1943, Ramcke formed the 2nd Parachute Division and was
promptly sent to Rome to oppose the Allied invasion of Italy. He then led this unit to the
Russian Front and fought at Zhitomir and Kirovograd in the Ukraine in the winter of
1943-1944. Following the successful Allied landing at Normandy in early June 1944,
the Americans needed the French port city of Brest, located on the tip of the Breton
Peninsula, as a conduit for supplies to their men in western France. Consequently, Hitler
sent Ramcke and thirty thousand men to shore up the city’s defenses in mid-June.29
During the last week of August, the Americans began their assault of the French
port city that would last for over three weeks. During this time, Ramcke and his chief of
staff, Brigadier General Hans von der Mosel, who had been the commandant of the
Fortress of Brest before Ramcke’s arrival, refused American demands to surrender. The
two sides conducted fierce house-to-house fighting in the city streets before the
Americans finally forced the Germans back into the fortress. In notable contrast to his
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callous conduct on the island of Crete, however, Ramcke reached an agreement with
American Major General Troy H. Middleton to evacuate thousands of local French
civilians over a four-day period to avoid unnecessary casualties.30
By 13 September, American forces had surrounded the fortress and offered the
Germans a chance to surrender “with honor,” but the fanatical Ramcke steadfastly held
out for another week. Finally, having exhausted all avenues for victory or escape,
Ramcke chose to surrender rather than risk the lives of any more of his men.
Remarkably, considering his dogged defense of the French fort, Ramcke seemed wellprepared to be a prisoner of war when he emerged to officially surrender to General
Middleton on 19 September 1944. As if expecting a luxurious vacation, the general
arrived with “eight large, well-packed suitcases, a complete set of delicate china, an
elaborate box of expensive fishing tackle together with four long rods, and a
thoroughbred setter dog.”31
In an interesting twist, on 19 September, Ramcke became both the ninety-ninth
recipient of the Swords and the twentieth of only twenty-seven recipients of the
Diamonds to add to the Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaves he had already earned. Hitler
decorated Ramcke both for his bravery and his “continuous tenacious struggle” to hold
Fortress Brest. The Führer normally awarded the Diamonds personally but, considering
Ramcke’s situation at the time, ordered that they be parachuted into the fortress and
awarded to Ramcke there.32
Upon arriving at Trent Park, Ramcke and four of his accompanying subordinates
became the most vocal Nazi supporters that British officers had seen since the departure
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of von Arnim and Crüwell. Like their commander, Major General Erwin Rauch,
Brigadier General Hans von der Mosel, Vice Admiral Alfred Schirmer and Rear Admiral
Otto Kähler had been captured following the surrender of Brest. The British described
Rauch, who commanded the 343rd Infantry Division at the time of his capture, as “the
standard type of German professional soldier, haughty and arrogant.” Von der Mosel
made a similar impression. He greeted his new captors by clicking his heels and
offering a straight-armed Nazi salute that punctuated his claim that he “was 100%
behind the Nazi regime.” Likewise, Schirmer, an engineering officer in the
Kriegsmarine, irritated many of his fellow prisoners of war and British officers alike by
insisting on the Hitler salute. CSDIC also classified him as “a complete Nazi” because
of his political sympathies and “unhelpful attitude.” The general officers already living
at Trent Park immediately began to anticipate the eruption of “a grand National Socialist
row” after the arrival of these men from Brest.33
British officers at Trent Park viewed Kähler, the naval commander of Brest, in
much the same light as the other senior officers in this group. They characterized him as
having a “similar Nazi bearing and outlook” as his fellow admiral. Yet, the British also
seemed to admire Kähler’s skill as a seaman. The intelligence officers described him as
“a fine sailor, who [handled] his auxiliary cruiser Thor with dash and skill and achieved
considerable success against Allied merchant shipping.” Indeed, before arriving at
Brest, the admiral had been responsible for sinking an impressive 100,000 tons of Allied
ships and cargo in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. He earned the Knight’s Cross for this
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success and added the Oak Leaves for his defense of Brest. Despite his unpleasant Nazi
attitude, the British admired his skill as a naval officer.34
The attitudes of Rauch, von der Mosel, Schirmer and Kähler likely reflected that
of their commanding officer. The American officer who interrogated Ramcke in France
following his surrender summed up the general as “an egotistical, conceited Nazi.” The
officer found the general to be “a firm believer in Hitler and greatly inclined towards the
[Nazi] Party.” Ramcke espoused the belief that Germany was “a clean, innocent nation
greatly wronged by other nations” and that, following the war, Germany would “rise
again in 10 to 30 years.” He defiantly stated that he would return home and prepare his
five sons “to revive and free Germany again.” The British officers at Trent Park gained
the same “deplorable impression of him as a man.” They agreed that “if there [was] to
be such a thing as a list of especially dangerous men to be kept under surveillance [after
the war], General Ramcke ought to qualify as one of the very first candidates.”35 They
would not realize how correct their impressions were until several years after the war
had ended.
There seemed to be little doubt that Ramcke genuinely supported the Nazi
regime. Aside from his political orientation, he also benefitted from financial ties to
Hitler and Göbbels. The propaganda minister ordered that each German mayor purchase
a copy of Ramcke’s book, Vom Schiffsjungen zum Fallschirmjäger-General (“From
Cabin Boy to Paratroop General”) for his city. The book had been published by Eher
Publishing, the Nazi Party press that controlled the overwhelming majority of German
publications, including the infamous daily party newspaper, Völkischer Beobachter.
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When 400,000 copies of the book sold, both Ramcke, who earned 2 RM per sale, and
Hitler, who owned a significant interest in Eher, profited handsomely.36
At the end of September, following Ramcke’s surrender of Brest, the Allies also
captured Rear Admiral Carl Weber and Brigadier General Botho Elster. Weber had
been apprehended in the vicinity of Beaugency, France, located part way between Paris
and the coastal city of Bordeaux where Weber had served as commandant of the German
arsenal. Upon capture, he joined the senior Wehrmacht officers at Trent Park in
England. The following day, 17 September 1944, and in the same area of the Loire
Valley, the Allies also captured General Elster. He served as commanding officer of
Feldkommandatur (Field Command) 541, which oversaw the transfer of Spanish
supplies through France to Germany. Elster, who had been dogged for some time by the
French resistance, ceremoniously surrendered his pistol, as well as munitions, machinery
and twenty thousand men to American Major General Robert C. Macon of the 83rd
Infantry Division on Beaugency Bridge on the Loire River. For deciding to capitulate
rather than unnecessarily send hundreds more men to their deaths, a Nazi court
condemned Elster to death in absentia in March 1945. Elster’s decision and the Nazi
court’s subsequent sentence proved to be a bone of contention between the general and
his fellow high-ranking prisoners when he arrived in the United States. Despite being
interrogated by CSDIC at Wilton Park along with Generals Ramcke and von Heyking
and Admiral Weber, Elster did not accompany his colleagues to Trent Park. Rather,
after two days, he was transferred to Camp Clinton, Mississippi, by American request.37
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Elster did not go alone. A week after his capture, on 23 September 1944, ten of
the generals from Trent Park departed for the United States. Three of these officers—
von Sponeck, von Liebenstein and Krause—had long been residents of the English
camp. The other seven—Vierow, Spang, Menny, Badinski, Sattler, Schramm and
Stolberg—had only briefly been at Camp No. 11. A month later, on 25 October, the
British transferred nine more senior officers from Trent Park to America. This group
included Generals Seyffardt, Rauch, von Wülfingen, Gutknecht and von der Mosel, and
Admirals Schirmer, Kähler, von Tresckow and Weber.38
There does not appear to have been any special Allied criteria for choosing which
senior officers to transfer to the United States. These two groups constituted a mix of
cooperative “anti-Nazis” and uncooperative “Nazis,” as well as others who had been in
England for some time and many who had only recently arrived. It appears most likely
that the British chose to send those prisoners from whom they had already gathered as
much information as they thought possible as well as those in whom the Americans
expressed particular interest.
November 1944 added only a few new faces to Trent Park. The first was
Brigadier General Knut Eberding, commander of the 64th Infantry Division. This
division, nicknamed the “leave division,” was haphazardly composed of 2350
infantrymen and 8500 support and service troops drawn from men home on leave from
the Russian, Norwegian, or Italian theatres. The Allies captured Eberding on 2
November 1944 at Knokke, Belgium, in the Battle of the Scheldt Estuary. The Germans
doggedly defended this coastal area of Belgium to prevent the Allies from capturing
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Antwerp, the port that was essential for supplying their advance into German territory.
Eberding was an “efficient, ruthless officer” who chose to fight the Canadian Second
Corps rather than surrender, inflicting significant casualties and considerably delaying
the Canadian advance to Antwerp, although he destroyed his own division in the
process.39
After arriving at Trent Park, Eberding reflected on his decision not to surrender
earlier. His response illustrates the dilemma that many German generals faced between
saving as many of their men as possible on the one hand and obeying Hitler’s directive
to fight to the end on the other. Eberding claimed that when his division had been
reduced to about a thousand men, he pleaded with his superiors that he be allowed to
withdraw. He received a “very cold answer,” according Eberding, in which he was
ordered to fight to the last man. “I had to look on,” stated Eberding, “while one
Kompanie after another was thrown in and destroyed and more and more men were
sacrificed and there was the conflict with my conscience, because I said to myself: ‘If
you were an honorable and decent fellow and followed the dictates of your own
conscience, you would have to capitulate,’ but on the other hand there was the thought of
the solemn pledge I had given in writing.”40
Major General Wilhelm Daser, commander of the 70th Infantry Division,
accompanied Eberding to Camp No. 11. He surrendered his unit on 6 November, four
days after Eberding’s capture, stating that had he not done so, “he would have felt
responsible for the deaths of the thousands of civilians concentrated in Middelburg.”
Daser serves as an interesting contrast to Eberding. Middelburg, where Daser
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surrendered, lies a short distance across the West Scheldt Estuary from Knokke, where
Eberding had devastated his division fighting to the bitter end. Defending the same area,
both received the same orders from their superiors: “Negotiations quite out of the
question; fight until the last; in case of desertion relatives [will be] made responsible.”
Yet, Daser chose to surrender, citing potentially high civilian casualties, and Eberding
adhered to his orders despite the destruction of his unit and the deaths of hundreds of his
men. Eberding even later admitted into British microphones that he had issued an order
that “the next of kin of all deserters would be called to account at home.”41 Either
Eberding acted out of strict devotion to the Nazi German government or hid behind
blanket orders from above to assuage his guilt for having sent so many men to their
deaths.
Two weeks later and two-hundred fifty miles away, members of the American
Tenth Regiment, Fifth Division, captured SS Brigadeführer and Generalmajor der
Polizei (Brigadier General) Anton Dunckern, commanding Gestapo officer for AlsaceLorraine in the city of Metz, France. The Americans did not realize at first that
Dunckern was such an important catch, as he “crawled out from behind a beer barrel” in
a saloon where he had been hiding. Dunckern had been sent to Metz to organize the
city’s defense after many of the German soldiers garrisoned there had abandoned it. He
had apparently established himself as a small-time dictator in the city, regularly having
people sent off to Germany, or threatening to do so, if they did not cooperate. Indeed,
using such threats, Dunckern appears to have both enlarged his personal art collection
and indulged his taste for French women.42
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American soldiers reported that Dunckern was arrogant and rude upon his
surrender, and immediately began to complain about having to stand outside in the rain.
As he then began walking to a nearby shelter without a word to anyone, American GI
Leonard O’Reilly remembered, “We told him to stand still and he kept going, so we just
slapped our rifles on him and he stopped.” American Lieutenant Harry Colburn stated
that, “[Dunckern] looked like he could spit at me. We had to push him into line because
he didn’t want to go with the other prisoners. He acted like he was insulted being taken
by a bunch of guys as ratty-looking as us.” Finally, after Dunckern entered the prisoner
of war enclosure, American Major Edward Marsh realized who they had captured and
asked for Dunckern’s pay book to confirm it. Upon establishing Dunckern’s identity
and rank, one of the American officers chastised him by asking if Gestapo officers were
allowed to surrender. Dunckern retorted that he only surrendered because he had had a
gun in his back. The American officer sarcastically suggested that “maybe [he] should
have resisted them” and given the Americans an excuse to shoot him.43
Dunckern’s die-hard attitude did not soften once he arrived at Trent Park. The
British officers respected him as “an officer of first class ability” with “exceptional
powers of observation” and “a prodigious memory for detail.” But they stated that
Dunckern “met his interrogators with steady recalcitrance and evasiveness which he
sustained with a skill and determination fully in keeping with his experience and
abilities.” Despite the difficulty in gathering information from the Gestapo general, he
proved useful nonetheless. Perhaps inadvertently, he supplied the Allies with
information about the command structure and personnel of both the Sicherheitspolizei
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(SiPo) and Sicherheitsdienst (SD) under his command, as well as the specific duties and
organization of the units in the Alsace-Lorraine region.44
Another group of German general officers arrived in England in December 1944,
having been captured in the latter part of November.45 Two days after the capture of
Dunckern, when the Americans completed the sweep of Metz, they also captured Major
General Heinrich Kittel, commander of the 462nd Volksgrenadier Division and
commandant of the city. Kittel had originally ordered Dunckern to evacuate Metz
because he believed that the Gestapo general possessed too much sensitive information.
Having received orders to the contrary from SS commander, Heinrich Himmler,
however, Dunckern stayed. Both generals became British, and eventually American,
prisoners of war.46
On the same day, 22 November 1944, that Kittel fell into American hands in
Metz, the Allies also captured Brigadier General Hans Bruhn. Bruhn commanded the
553rd Volksgrenadier Division when he surrendered in Saverne, a French city located
about a hundred miles southeast of Metz, near Strasbourg. Bruhn quickly revealed some
anti-Nazi sympathies even before his arrival at Trent Park, telling British intelligence
officers of his opinion that the attempt on Hitler’s life on 20 July “might well have been
placed by Himmler, with the deliberate intention of discrediting the officer class in the
eyes of the German worker.” Yet, after later listening to Hitler’s New Year’s speech on
1 January 1945, Bruhn confessed to a fellow officer that “one cannot entirely escape the
influence of his powerful words, his faith and his vigor. At heart one is a German and
would so dearly love everything to go well for us. That makes such a speech very
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moving, because it always puts into words the things which to us are holy. But in spite
of all that, there is such in it to which circumstances give the lie, so that one finds
oneself continually torn in different directions.”47
Two final generals were captured in Strasbourg, on the French-German border.
On 23 November 1944, the French captured Brigadier General Wilhelm Ullersperger.
He had served as commanding officer of fortress engineers in Vosges, France, a city
about 80 miles west of Strasbourg, before retreating eastward. Some of Ullersperger’s
fellow prisoners described him as “an old National Socialist dating back to 1921 in
Munich.” He claimed to still believe that Germany would win the war because of their
“inherent invincibility” and because of the “new V-weapons,” even though he seemed to
know little about them. Ullersperger’s optimism and his faith in National Socialism may
have been driven by the fear that if Germany lost the war the country would be overrun
by Bolshevism, a concern that many of his colleagues obviously shared. Unlike
Ullersperger, the British found Brigadier General Franz Vaterrodt to be “a pleasant,
defeatist, anti-Nazi type.” Vaterrodt had originally been assigned commandant of
Strasbourg in March 1941 because of ill health and he remained in this position until his
capture on 25 November 1944.48
Because of the continual turnover of prisoners between June 1944 and the end of
the war in May 1945, the environment at Trent Park became somewhat of a carousel.
Despite this obstacle, CSDIC and “Mother” continued their interrogations and
eavesdropping on the senior Wehrmacht officers in their custody. In many respects, the
same conflicts that the British observed among their prisoners prior to D-Day re-
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emerged, albeit with different casts of characters. The first and most obvious of these
was the animosity between those generals who supported the Hitler regime and those
who did not.
In October 1944, a group of pro-Nazi prisoners, headed by Ramcke, Kähler and
von der Mosel, complained about some of their colleagues listening to the BBC news
broadcast in German and reading pro-Allied newspapers, just as von Arnim and Crüwell
had done months earlier. Von der Mosel labeled the radio broadcasts “provocative
propaganda” that “ought to be forbidden completely here” and characterized one
newspaper as a “filthy rag.” Ramcke and Kähler agreed, saying that it was better to put
the papers “straight into the fire” before they left some unwelcome ideas behind. Yet,
unlike their pro-Nazi predecessors von Arnim and Crüwell, Ramcke and company
appear to have influenced their fellow officers. Following their complaints, the
prisoners at Trent Park began devoting their attention more to radio broadcasts from
Germany and shying away from the Allied ones like the BBC.49
A month later, the new crop of generals also experienced a row reminiscent of
the Crüwell-von Thoma affair from the spring of 1944. The conflict again involved the
outspoken von Thoma who still resided at Camp No. 11 and remained the most vocal
opponent of National Socialism among the general officer prisoners. Von Choltitz, who
was often outspoken himself, criticized von Thoma and Bassenge for “sucking up to the
English” and accused them of “making ‘surprise attacks’ with anti-Nazi talk on
newcomers to the camp.” Von Choltitz warned that German authorities had already
been informed of von Thoma’s political stance in the English camp.50
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Von Thoma and Bassenge demanded an apology as well as a detailed description
of exactly what information had been transmitted to Germany and how it had been sent.
Eventually, other prisoners agreed to serve as intermediaries and the “internal strife,” as
the British called it, was resolved. But while Von Choltitz agreed to apologize to
Bassenge, he reiterated his position that von Thoma was guilty of “unpatriotic conduct”
and should be more careful about what he said to the British officers. Von Choltitz also
confirmed, in confidence, to a couple of fellow officers that Admirals Schirmer and
Kähler had indeed sent information about von Thoma back to Germany via naval
prisoners, but claimed not to approve of these tactics.51
Six months later in April 1945, new arrivals at Trent Park continued to complain
about the behavior of von Thoma and Bassenge. General Kittel suggested that he and
his colleagues “ought really to inform them in Germany, by code or somehow, as to the
way in which Bassenge, von Thoma and company are behaving, or we should put it in
writing and leave it with some lawyer.” Notably, Kittel also remarked that “the admirals
are said to have done something of the sort already,” perhaps alluding to von Choltitz’s
earlier claim about Schirmer and Kähler transmitting information.52
Despite the political animosity and recurrent confrontations among the prisoners,
the British gleaned a large volume of intelligence from the generals by continuing to
eavesdrop on their private conversations. Obtaining information that could positively
impact the outcome of the war remained Britain’s primary intelligence goal in regard to
the monitoring of its German generals. Between D-Day and the German surrender in
May 1945, CSDIC gathered information about the German order of battle in the
194
Balkans, German fortifications on the eastern front, strategic reserves in France, the staff
and defense of “Fortress Cherbourg,” information about delayed-action mines in
Cherbourg harbor and the morale of German troops in various regions, to offer just a few
examples.53 Given the amount of resources devoted to gathering this information and
the fact that CSDIC consistently maintained its eavesdropping efforts at Trent Park from
the arrival of its first prisoner, Ludwig Crüwell, in August 1942 until Germany’s
surrender, the British obviously gained valuable intelligence.
Not surprisingly, the British noted a significant difference between their first
group of general officer prisoners, those captured in North Africa, and the officers taken
in Western Europe after D-Day. The majority of the Wehrmacht generals in North
Africa had long and distinguished careers in the German military prior to the rise of the
Nazi regime. Moreover, the Allies captured them at a time when German fortunes had
not yet sunk to such an abysmal level. By contrast, Hitler had rapidly promoted some of
the generals captured in Western Europe out of necessity and many of these men had
less impressive credentials. Indeed, CSDIC operatives observed that “those recently
captured are not such good types, physically or mentally, and have by no means the
same degree of culture. None of them is what has become known as the German officer
type.”54
Regardless of their qualifications, the successful Allied invasion of northwest
France facilitated London’s interest in what its captive generals could tell them about
other aspects of the war. Driven by a burgeoning sense of impending victory, CSDIC
devoted a significant amount of attention to the generals’ perceptions of the individual
195
Allied powers, their beliefs about the Hitler regime and how the generals viewed
Germany’s potential postwar fate. Most all of the generals by this point in the war, a
few Nazi stalwarts notwithstanding, realized that German defeat was only a matter of
time. What intrigued their British observers was which side, Soviet or British and
American, the generals believed held the most promise for successful postwar German
reconstruction.
Trent Park officers witnessed a new kind of political divide among the prisoners
by August 1944. Two distinct parties emerged, one pro-British and the other proRussian. Von Sponeck confided to one of his fellow prisoners that he would “give
anything to see the whole show in France collapse and the [Western] Allies advancing
100 kilometers a day.”55 He stated that he was “much more scared of the Nazis than of
the Bolshevists,” but preferred the British and Americans to both.56 Seyffardt professed
that he would not only “make no bones at all about fighting together with the English . . .
but would immediately offer his services in a fight against Russia.”57 Even the German
patriot Stolberg proclaimed that he would “agree to any settlement which [avoided] a
Russian occupation of Germany;” this came from an officer who contended that “Hitler
[would] always remain a great German figure.” The Führer had Germany’s best
interests in mind, according to Stolberg, “but he was unlucky.” Stolberg even went so
far as to assert that Hitler’s ideas would live on in postwar Germany.58
On the other side of the issue, Hennecke professed to have a “burning hatred of
the [Nazi] Party” but maintained that the British had “never, never been anything other
than [Germany’s] arch enemies!”59 He later took to reading Freies Deutschland, the
196
newspaper produced by the Free German Movement in Russia, and suggesting the
Soviets might make more natural German allies.60 Von Choltitz believed that “75% of
German officers [favored] Russia rather than the Western Democracies,” although he did
not place himself in this majority category.61 Indeed, von Choltitz often vocalized
support for the Allied cause, although at times only for personal reasons. For example,
he cheered the American advance in March 1945 because he wanted the Americans to
“hurry south and so save his possessions in Baden.”62
Yet, at times, the opportunistic von Choltitz expressed both anti-collaborationist
and anti-Western sympathies as well. He warned that he would “utterly despise any of
the senior officer prisoners of war who offered his services to the Allies for postwar
collaboration.” Similarly, he argued that, despite the likelihood of a German defeat,
Germany would never be a state “which had to submit to dictation by the victor powers,
by those swine whom Germans are bound to hate.”63 Perhaps he included the Russians
in this condemnation along with the British and Americans. But he certainly expressed
particularly anti-Western views following Churchill’s suggestion in September 1944 that
a Jewish Brigade should be formed and used as part of the postwar army of occupation.
Von Choltitz labeled the idea “appalling” and adamantly stated that, if faced with a
postwar Jewish occupation of Germany, he “would rather work for a communist
Germany than for a Germany oppressed by the Allies.”64 The die-hard Nazi Ramcke of
course agreed, for the same anti-Semitic reasons. He defiantly claimed that he “would
never fraternize with the English. Germany must either win or suffer the vengeance of
the Jews.”65
197
In July 1944, the British again tested the waters regarding the possibility of
organizing a Free German Movement among its own POWs by asking the generals
individually if they would be willing to present a radio broadcast to the German public
on the latest developments in the war. No one revealed any willingness to do so. Von
Sponeck, who had often made anti-Nazi comments, refused out of fear of Nazi reprisals
against his children in Germany. Von Liebenstein, another general who had often
expressed strong anti-Nazi sympathies, and Hennecke both flatly refused without
offering any explanation.66 Hennecke later confided to a fellow officer that it was
“ridiculous to commit treason on top of being captured” and that giving speeches on the
radio was “madness” because “the moment Mr. Stalin no longer needs those people he
will throw them on the scrap-heap.”67 This is a curious explanation coming from an
officer who had earlier speculated that the Soviets might make better allies for Germany
than would the British. Also peculiar, the seemingly anti-Western von Choltitz
approached von Thoma in early September about heading up a “Seydlitz Club” at Trent
Park. But like earlier British attempts, von Choltitz met with no success either.68
After learning of one of General Seydlitz’s public, anti-Nazi proclamations in
February 1945, Eberding and Ramcke summed up their opinions of the Free German
Movement and the Allied powers in general. Eberding declared that they “must remain
loyal to the man to whom we swore our oath of allegiance. It’s a question of conscience;
one person has it, another hasn’t.” Ramcke stated that his sympathies were “now more
and more with Stalin and the Bolshevists, who in their way mean well, who at any rate
say what they want and what they are, rather than with those damned hypocrites and
198
democrats.” He declared that he would “prefer to join forces with the Russians,” but this
appears to have been little more than bluster. Following his capture, Ramcke had
petitioned Hitler to award him an estate in Germany for the service he had rendered to
the nation. It is noteworthy, considering Ramcke’s vocal preference for the Soviets, that
he specifically requested that his new lands be located in western Germany.69
Ultimately, the Free German Movement, especially the involvement of a German
general like von Seydlitz, appeared to have had at least some impact on the prisoners at
Trent Park. The British noticed that the newly-arriving prisoners were more likely to
side with the pro-Russian than with the pro-British clique. They believed this was due,
in large measure, to Seydlitz’s influence.70
Few of the war’s developments engendered more passionate responses from the
general officers at Trent Park than the attempted assassination of Adolf Hitler on 20 July
1944. Remarkably, many of the generals voiced the suspicion that the July 20th plot
against Hitler was a “put up job, on the lines of the Reichstag fire, to serve as a pretext
for a purge of unreliable elements.”71 In a reference to the number of high-ranking
members of Hitler’s staff present on the day of the attempt, von Sponeck stated his belief
that “putting all those people there was simply a frame-up job done by Himmler” as it
was “an alibi which [was] too water-tight.” He also observed how the assassination
attempt benefitted Hitler and the Nazis by conveniently diverting German public opinion
away from the dire war situation and providing a “miracle” that saved Hitler from
certain death. Von Sponeck later sarcastically remarked that he was glad that Hitler had
199
been saved from sudden death, preferring that the Führer be shot in the stomach and
have to suffer before he died.72
Regardless of their views of the July 20th plot, few of the generals at Trent Park
openly condemned the conspirators. Indeed, the generals overwhelmingly objected to
the Nazis hanging the alleged culprits rather than shooting them. They believed
execution by firing squad to be a more honorable death and one more befitting highranking Wehrmacht officers.73 Krause and Sattler, neither of whom was known for
having strong political passions, “burst into a violent anti-Nazi tirade” with the British
officers upon hearing news of the executions.74 When the news reached Camp No. 11
that the Nazis had also executed the families of some of the July 20th conspirators, even
apparent Nazi stalwarts like Eberding were “disgusted at the killing of the Generals’
wives and children.” He objected that “these killings would create no love for the
[Hitler] regime. On the contrary, they would bring about a change of heart in its
supporters.” The execution of family members was obviously more than Eberding and
the others could stomach, likely because of the fear that their own families could
potentially be in danger as well.75
Discussions of the July 20th conspirators’ attempt to stop the Nazi regime
prompted a few of the generals to evaluate their own level of responsibility for the
excesses of the National Socialist government. Hennecke suggested that the German
generals would be held accountable for not curbing the excesses of the Nazi Party. He
contended that it would have been possible to stop the Nazis if the senior German Army
officers had unanimously protested and refused to participate in Hitler’s “dirty work.”
200
Hennecke stated that the lack of opposition from the general officers when “such things
were possible will puzzle world historians!”76 Von Choltitz castigated his fellow general
officers, including himself, even more harshly. He chastised the generals for allowing
the Nazis to advance their agenda “without a murmur” of protest. “I’ve persuaded my
men to believe in this nonsense and caused those people who still regarded the officer
corps as something worth respecting to take part without due consideration,” von
Choltitz confessed. “I feel thoroughly ashamed. Maybe we are far more to blame than
those uneducated cattle who in any case never hear anything else at all.”77
By the end of the war, the British observers at Trent Park also took great interest
in the generals’ discussions and, occasionally, admissions of criminal behavior during
the war. Many of the generals admitted knowledge of criminal activity perpetrated by
German personnel but claimed that the SS, SD and the Gestapo were solely responsible
for this type of behavior. For instance, British officers confronted Sattler with an alleged
order by Hitler to execute “commandos,” enemy soldiers engaged in secret operations
behind enemy lines. Sattler informed his interrogator that he had no knowledge of such
an order and subsequently corroborated his own testimony by denying any knowledge of
the order to a fellow prisoner in what he believed to be a private conversation. Yet,
Sattler reiterated stories he had heard about German atrocities during the war, saying
“the soldiers were disgraced by all those shootings and murders perpetrated by the
Gestapo and the SS. When I think of the numbers that were shot in Poland according to
the rumors I heard, then the Hungarian Jews, and the massacres in the Balkans, there is
[probably] a lot of truth in the stories of shootings, etc., in France.”78 Clearly, Sattler
201
was either unaware or unwilling to admit any knowledge of the thousands of murders
committed by ordinary Wehrmacht soldiers.
Sattler also confirmed, again in private, that he had some direct knowledge of
Nazi murders, as did von Sponeck. Sattler complained that the SS had begun murdering
civilians as early as the invasion of Poland and that when German generals accused them
of criminal behavior, Himmler had protected them by moving their cases out of regular
Army jurisdiction. Von Sponeck concurred, offering the example of the director of
music for the Leibstandarte, a special division of the Waffen-SS. According to von
Sponeck, the music director was court-martialed by the German Army “because he had
shot so many Jews in a mad lust for blood.” But German higher authorities immediately
extricated the man from an ongoing army court-martial, briefly sent him to Berlin and
then returned him to his regular post without further incident.79 In a similar vein, Menny
claimed to have personally witnessed the executions of Canadian prisoners of war by the
SS.80
Before his arrival at Camp No. 11, Von Choltitz informed an American Army
officer about a prison in Paris run by the Sicherheitsdienst (SD)—Nazi Party Security
Service. According to von Choltitz, there were “thirty ladies, the wives of the very
industrialists who had run our war industry in Paris for the last two years” imprisoned
there as hostages. Even worse, when von Choltitz’s staff took responsibility for the
prison from the retreating SD agents, they found four of the women stripped, raped and
murdered and the ranking SD officer remarked that all of the women were pregnant,
obviously suggesting widespread sexual abuse.81
202
Some of the generals admitted that regular Wehrmacht units had committed
massive war crimes as well. Seyffardt cited an order by Hitler that no prisoners were to
be taken on the Eastern Front. “They were all killed, all of them,” according to
Seyffardt. “They captured about 600,000 prisoners in that one pocket near Gschatsk,
and, of these 600,000, 400,000 were said to have died on the march from Gschatsk to
Smolensk alone.”82 Seyffardt never specified how he knew this.
Vierow and Gutknecht discussed atrocities they had seen personally. Vierow
related how one hundred political prisoners, including French, Russians, English and
Americans, were crammed into a single rail car for transport. He intervened and insisted
that the prisoners be placed in at least two trucks, fifty people in each. Still, the
prisoners were forced to travel for ten days in these conditions, according to Vierow,
unable to even fall down since they were so closely packed together. Remarkably,
Gutknecht responded with a story about the removal of Jews from Antwerp beginning in
1942, confirming that the German generals were well aware of the barbarities of the
holocaust by the fall of 1944. Gutknecht stated that once the Jews were loaded into
“cars with furniture vans attached . . . only a few survivors arrived. The general public
will have to pay for things like that,” he added cryptically.83
Likely because of guilt or fear of Allied retribution, some of the generals
privately confessed to their colleagues, and British microphones, potentially criminal
behavior of their own. Spang expressed a terrible fear of being handed over to the
French resistance because he had taken “ruthless action” against what he called “the
terrorists” in Brittany, in northwest France. He repeatedly stated that he would poison
203
himself if the Allies decided to transfer him to French custody because he had “signed
so-and-so many death warrants.” On the other hand, he claimed that “in the eyes of the
Germans, who had officially disbanded it, the French Army no longer existed.
Therefore, there was no call for them to acknowledge the [French Resistance] as soldiers
and right was on the German side in the measures they took.” Furthermore, Spang
argued that he had not systematically destroyed any villages, but rather had only directed
his reprisals at individual French “terrorists.”84
Kähler and von der Mosel also engaged in a suspicious dialogue about their
activities at Brest. “Just wait and see,” said Kähler, “I can tell you there will be a terrific
row if they find the fifty-five corpses in Brest harbor.” “Or if they find the corpses
which haven’t been cleared out of the galleries,” replied von der Mosel. “The people
collapsed in the carbon dioxide.”85 Perhaps these two men again took their cues from
their commanding officer, Ramcke, who candidly admitted to committing a war crime
by completely destroying the city of Brest. He stated that since the Americans had
bombarded the town, he considered them just as much to blame as the Germans.
Ramcke thought it important at the time of his surrender that “those swine [should] not
be allowed to establish themselves here on any account; they mustn’t be allowed to use
the town as a harbor and must be prevented from quickly establishing quarters for
reconstruction personnel.” He explained to von Choltitz that he had simply not
extinguished any fires started by American bombs or artillery, and then further fanned
the flames by having kindling material thrown in all the homes and creating a draught by
opening doors and windows all over town.
204
“Did you destroy the town completely?” asked von Choltitz.
“It was entirely wiped out!” replied Ramcke.
“But that’s a war crime! . . . why did you destroy civilian houses?”
“I told you the reason; I blew them up whenever they were an obstruction and
whenever military necessity called for it.”
“But Ramcke, that, of course, is a war crime!”
“Of course! But I was only following the example of the English round about
1793, when Nelson burned down the whole of Toulon.”
“Why did he do that?” asked a befuddled von Choltitz.
“Because he didn’t want the French to have the use of the harbor,” replied the
exasperated Ramcke.86
Of all the discussions and admissions of guilt, however, none was more
astonishing than that of von Choltitz who conceded to von Thoma that he had taken part
in the Final Solution. “The worst job I ever carried out—which however I carried out
with great consistency,” von Choltitz admitted, “was the liquidation of the Jews. I
carried out this order down to the very last detail.”87 Unfortunately for historians and
postwar Allied war crimes investigators, von Choltitz did not elaborate. The general’s
inconsistent political pronouncements and tendency to embellish might raise some
question about the sincerity of his confession. Yet, given his callous track record in the
war, at least prior to his assignment in Paris, it would not be that difficult to believe that
he had been responsible for the deaths of thousands of civilians. Curiously, it did not
205
stop von Choltitz from describing a newly-arrived SS officer at Trent Park as being “just
as he would expect a mass-murderer to look.”88
Von Choltitz also told his Trent Park colleagues that, following the capture of the
Russian city of Sevastopol, one of his officers witnessed the execution of thirty thousand
Jews, including women and children. He did not specify who was responsible for the
killings, but the implication must have been that the order to carry them out had come
from higher authorities. The pro-Nazi Eberding expressed horror at von Choltitz’s story,
but refused to believe that Hitler might have given the order for such an atrocity.
Eberding blindly insisted that the Führer must have been enraged when he heard this
news.89
In spite of Britain’s interest in the generals’ conversations, particularly those
involving discussions of war crimes, by April 1945, CSDIC could no longer house all of
its general officer prisoners at Trent Park. London initially sent two more small groups
of generals to the United States, including von Choltitz, Ullersperger, Eberding, Ramcke
and Dunckern in early April and von Heyking,90 Daser, Vaterrodt, Bruhn and Kittel in
May.91 The departure of these last five generals, coupled with the German surrender in
early May, marked the end of British transfers to the United States. Instead, London
began sending the German generals to other locations in Britain, including Camp No. 1,
Grizedale Hall in Lancashire, where noted British military historian Basil Liddell Hart
forged an amicable professional relationship with some of these men.
The volume of prisoners arriving in England forced the British to choose these
alternative accommodations. Of the 302 German generals held in Britain at some point
206
during or immediately after the Second World War, 248 arrived after April 1945.
Furthermore, the British lost interest in most of these men once the war in Europe had
concluded. Within five months of the German surrender, CSDIC had ceased to monitor
any of the German general officers in Britain. Its supplemental homes soon closed,
Latimer House in August and Wilton Park in November, and CSDIC transferred all of
the generals out of Trent Park and closed that camp on 19 October 1945. Many of the
generals remained prisoners of war in Britain for almost three more years. Special Camp
No. 11 at Bridgend in Wales became the home for German general officers on 9 January
1946, but since CSDIC did not operate this particular camp there were no interrogations
or eavesdropping on the men who resided there.92
With the war in Europe coming to a close, British focus quickly shifted to simply
gathering information about war crimes. The London District Cage became the official
War Crimes Interrogation Unit and most senior German officers endured at least a few
days of interrogation in the LDC for this purpose.93 This changed focus and the abrupt
loss of interest in the German generals when the war ended suggests that the primary
purpose of Britain’s accommodation of senior Wehrmacht officer POWs had been
military intelligence that could aid Allied victory in the war. Once Germany had been
defeated, the generals were no longer of much value and were set aside until such time
as they could be safely repatriated.
Yet, British intelligence did not lose interest in Wehrmacht generals entirely.
The British and their American Allies developed a different relationship with dozens of
these officers after the war. By this time, however, the Anglo-American relationship had
207
changed. The Americans now took the lead in fostering the Western Allied partnership
with the German generals and the British appeared content to play a secondary role.
Britain had achieved its all-important wartime goal and now let the Americans take
center stage in the early years of the Cold War. It is to the transformation of U.S.
national security concerns and the subsequent development of American policy
regarding its general officer prisoners that we now turn.
Notes
1
Index of Subjects Discussed by the Senior Officer PW at Camp No. 11, Published in the
S.R.G.G. and G.R.G.G. Series from D-Day to 31 December 1944, G.R.G.G. 243, 31 December
1944, WO 208/5018, the National Archives of the United Kingdom (hereafter TNA), Kew,
Richmond, Surrey, United Kingdom.
2
Summary of S.R. Information Concerning the Departure of Generals Arnim and Crüwell,
Oberste Egersdorf, Hauck and Annacker and Oberleutnant von Glasow, 17 June 1944, WO
208/5622, TNA.
3
MSg 109, “Sattler,” Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg i.Br. (Hereafter, BA-MA);
Hildebrand, Deutschlands Admirale, 59-60; Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer
PW, G.R.G.G. 156, 8-10 July 1944, WO 208/5017, TNA.
4
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 152, 1-2 July 1944; Report
on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 156, 8-10 July 1944; Report on
Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 159, 15-16 July 1944, WO 208/5017,
TNA.
208
5
First Detailed Interrogation of Brig-Gen Bieringer, Ludwig, RG 165, Entry 179, Box 656,
National Archives and Records Administration (Hereafter NARA), College Park, Maryland.
6
First Detailed Interrogation of General of Infantry Neuling, Ferdinand; First Detailed
Interrogation of Brig-Gen Bieringer, Ludwig, RG 165, Entry 179, Box 656, NARA.
7
“Schuberth,” MSg 109, BA-MA; Milton Shulman, Defeat in the West: Germany’s Greatest
Battles As Seen By Hitler’s Generals (New York: Ballantine, 1968 [1947]), 206-207, 213;
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 180, 25-26 August 1944,
WO 208/5017, TNA.
8
Bender and Law, Uniforms, 73, 140, 114; Mitcham, Hitler’s Legions, 101, 374; “Menny,
Erwin,” RG 242, T-78, rolls 883-895, NARA.
9
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 180, 25-26 August 1944,
WO 208/5017, TNA.
10
Ibid.
11
Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, Is Paris Burning? (New York: Warner Books, 1991
[1965]), 23-24; Telford Taylor, The March of Conquest: The German Victories in Western
Europe, 1940 (Baltimore: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991
[1958]), 200, 203-204.
12
Collins and Lapierre, Is Paris Burning?, 25; Roger James Bender and Warren W. Odegard,
Uniforms, Organization, and History of the Panzertruppe (San Jose, California: R. James Bender
Publishing, 1980), 53-54; Andris J. Kursietis, The Wehrmacht at War 1939-1945: The Units and
Commanders of the German Ground Forces during World War II (Soesterberg, the Netherlands:
1999), 302-303; Shulman, Defeat in the West, 219.
13
Michael Veranov, ed., The Mammoth Book of the Third Reich at War (New York: Carroll and
Graf Publishers, Inc., 1997), 525-527; Shulman, Defeat in the West, 219.
209
14
Collins and Lapierre, Is Paris Burning?, 192-194.
15
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 183, 29 August 1944, WO
208/5017, TNA; Collins and Lapierre, Is Paris Burning?, 180; Preliminary Report on
Information Obtained from CS/211 – General der Infanterie Dietrich von Choltitz, G.R.G.G.
181(c), 25 August 1944, WO 208/5017, TNA.
16
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 183, 29 August 1944, WO
208/5017, TNA; Collins and Lapierre, Is Paris Burning?, 312-314.
17
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 183, 29 August 1944, WO
208/5017; Confidential report from the Directorate of Military Intelligence, 7 September 1944,
WO 208/5622, TNA.
18
Preliminary Report on Information Obtained from Generals Gutknecht, Eberbach and
Schramm, G.R.G.G. 187, 10 September 1944, WO 208/5017, TNA; Report on Information
Obtained from PW CS/221 Genmaj Gutknecht, S.I.R. 901, 1 September 1944; Report on Further
Information Obtained from PW CS/221 Genmaj Gutknecht, S.I.R. 908, 4 September 1944;
Report on Further Information Obtained from PW CS/221 Genmaj Gutknecht, S.I.R. 929, 7
September 1944, RG 498, Entry ETO MIS-Y, CSDIC, S.I.R., Box 4, NARA.
19
First Detailed Interrogation of: Baumgaertel, Friedrich, CSDIC West, 13 September 1944, RG
165, Entry 179, Box 656, NARA.
20
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 189, 8-9 September 1944,
WO 208/5017, TNA.
21
Mitcham, Hitler’s Legions, 127; Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW,
G.R.G.G. 190, 10-11 September 1944, WO 208/5018, TNA.
22
Preliminary Report on Information Obtained from Generalmajor Gutknecht, General der
Panzertruppen Eberbach, Generalmajor Schramm and General der Infanterie Vierow, G.R.G.G.
210
187 (c), 10 September 1944, WO 208/5017, TNA; Bradley, Friedrich-Hildebrand and
Rövekamp, Die Generale des Heeres, 1921-1945, 126-127; United States Army, Third Armored
Division, Spearhead in the West, 1941-1945: The Third Armored Division (Frankfurt am MainSchwanheim: F. J. Henrich, 1945), 88; Preliminary Report on Information Obtained from
Generalleutnant von Heyking and Generalleutnant Seyffardt, G.R.G.G. 192 (C), 18 September
1944, WO 208/5018, TNA.
23
Andreas von Aulock was called the “Mad Colonel of St. Malo” because of his refusal to
surrender the heavily-fortified citadel in St. Malo until the city had been largely destroyed.
24
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 200, 22-23 September
1944, WO 208/5018, TNA; Letter from von Arnim to the Legation of Switzerland, 28 September
1944, RG 59, Entry 1353, Box 24, NARA.
25
Preliminary Report on Information Obtained from Generalmajor Bock von Wuelfingen and
Further Report on Information Obtained from Generalleutnant von Heyking, Generalleutnant
Seyffardt and Konteradmiral von Tresckow, G.R.G.G. 199 (C), 17-21 September 1944, WO
208/5018, TNA.
26
Sullivan, Thresholds of Peace, 350; Richard Brett-Smith, Hitler’s Generals (San Rafael,
California: Presidio Press, 1977 [1976]), 146; James Lucas, Hitler’s Enforcers: Leaders of the
German War Machine 1933-1945 (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1996), 119; Roger
Edwards, German Airborne Troops 1936-45 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and
Company, 1974), 151.
27
Lucas, Hitler’s Enforcers, 121-123.
28
Bender and Law, Uniforms, 151-154.
29
Edwards, German Airborne Troops, 151-152.
30
Shulman, Defeat in the West, 245; Lucas, Hitler’s Enforcers, 127.
211
31
Lucas, Hitler’s Enforcers, 127-128; Angolia, On the Field of Honor, 136; Shulman, Defeat in
the West, 245. Ramcke would later claim that the United States treated German paratroops
“shabbily” because it believed that only ardent Nazis would fight so fiercely; Lucas, Hitler’s
Enforcers, 128.
32
Angolia, Field of Honor, Vol. I, 93; Mitcham, Hitler’s Legions, 417.
33
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 202, 23-25 September
1944, WO 208/5018, TNA.
34
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 202, 23-25 September
1944, WO 208/5018, TNA.
35
Preliminary Report on Information Obtained from General der Fallschirmtruppen Ramcke and
a Further Report on Information Obtained from Generalleutnant von Heyking, Konteradmiral
von Tresckow and Generalmajor Bock von Wuelfingen, G.R.G.G. 198 (C), 24 September 1944,
WO 208/5018; “Gen. Ramcke,” C.S.D.I.C. (U.K.), 12 October 1944, WO 208/5622, TNA.
36
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 206, 2-4 October 1944,
WO 208/5018, TNA.
37
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 210, 11-12 October 1944,
WO 208/5018; PW Generalmajor Elster, 5 December 1944, WO 208/5622, TNA; Christian
Leitz, Economic Relations Between Nazi Germany and Franco’s Spain: 1936-1945 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1996), 143; The Thunderbolt Division: Story of the Eighty-Third Infantry
Division (U.S. Army, S.l: s.n, 1945), 7; Mitcham, Hitler’s Legions, 121; “Elster, Botho” RG 242, T-
78, rolls 883-895, NARA.
38
War Diary, September 1944; War Diary, October 1944, WO 165/41; Report on Information
Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 200, 22-23 September 1944; Report on Information
Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 216, 26-28 October 1944, WO 208/5018, TNA.
212
39
Mitcham, Hitler’s Legions, 86; Shulman, Defeat in the West, 257; Report on Information
Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 219, 4-6 November 1944, WO 208/5018, TNA.
40
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 221, 10-12 November
1944, WO 208/5018, TNA.
41
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 220, 7-10 November
1944; Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 219, 4-6 November
1944, WO 208/5018, TNA.
42
Saul Levitt, “Capturing a Gestapo General,” Yank, 3 (12 Jan. 1945), 6-7.
43
Ibid.
44
Report on Information Obtained from PW CS/771 (Allgemeine) Brigadeführer (Major
General) and General-Major der Polizei Anton Dunckern, S.I.R. 1613, 13 April 1945, RG 498,
Entry ETO MIS-Y, CSDIC, S.I.R., Box 8, NARA.
45
War Diary, December 1944, WO 165/41, TNA; Hundreds of additional Wehrmacht general
officers arrived in England as prisoners of war before and after the German surrender in May
1945 and more generals were transferred to American custody; the last group departed in April
1945. Yet, all the senior officer prisoners eventually transferred from Britain to the United
States arrived in England prior to January 1945.
46
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 2246, 8-9 January 1945,
WO 208/5018, TNA.
47
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 240, 27-28 December
1944; Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW at No. 11 Camp to Hitler’s and
Goebbel’s Speeches made at the New Year, G.R.G.G. 242, 31 December 1944 – 1 January 1945,
WO 208/5018, TNA.
213
48
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 238, 23-26 December
1944, WO 208/5018, TNA; Report on Information Obtained from PW CS/937 Genmaj
Vaterrodt, G.R.G.G. 239 (c), 2 January 1945, RG 165, Entry 179, Box 639, NARA.
49
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 210, 11-12 October 1944,
WO 208/5018, TNA.
50
Internal Strife at No. 11 Camp, 9 November 1944, WO 208/5622, TNA.
51
Ibid.
52
Extract from S.R. Draft 3137/45 (GG), 9 April 1945, WO 208/5622, TNA.
53
These examples cited in Reports on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G.
147, 149, 151 and 152, WO 208/5017 as well as CSDIC, S.I.R. 483, RG 498, Entry ETO MIS-Y,
CSDIC, S.I.R., Box 2, NARA.
54
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 171, 5-8 August 1944,
WO 208/5017, TNA.
55
Further Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 163, 21-22 July
1944, WO 208/5017, TNA.
56
Ibid.
57
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 214, 20-23 October 1944,
WO 208/5018, TNA.
58
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 196, 18-19 September
1944, WO 208/5018, TNA.
59
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 177, 22 August 1944, WO
208/5017, TNA.
60
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 173, 13-14 August 1944,
WO 208/5017, TNA.
214
61
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 218, 1-4 November 1944,
WO 208/5018, TNA.
62
“Selfless Patriotism,” 16-19 March 1945, WO 208/4177, TNA.
63
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 214, 20-23 October 1944,
WO 208/5018, TNA.
64
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 204, 27-29 September
1944, WO 208/5018, TNA.
65
Ibid.
66
Further Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 163, 21-22 July
1944, WO 208/5017, TNA.
67
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 188, 5-7 September 1944,
WO 208/5017, TNA.
68
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 185, 31 August-3
September 1944, WO 208/5017, TNA.
69
“The Seydlitz Movement,” 6-10 February 1945, WO 208/4177; Report on Information
Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 214, 20-23 October 1944, WO 208/5018, TNA.
70
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 173, 13-14 August 1944,
WO 208/5017, TNA.
71
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 162, 19-22 July 1944,
WO 208/5017, TNA.
72
Further Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 163, 21-22 July
1944; Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 167, 28-30 July 1944,
WO 208/5017, TNA.
215
73
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 169, 2-4 August 1944,
WO 208/5017, TNA.
74
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 171, 5-8 August 1944,
WO 208/5017, TNA.
75
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 224, 17-18 November
1944, WO 208/5018, TNA.
76
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 185, 31 August-3
September 1944, WO 208/5017, TNA.
77
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 211, 14-17 October 1944,
WO 208/5018, TNA.
78
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 168, 31 July-1 August
1944, WO 208/5017, TNA.
79
Ibid.
80
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 179, 24 August 1944, WO
208/5017, TNA.
81
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 179, 24 August 1944, WO
208/5017; Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 183, 29 August
1944, WO 208/5622, TNA.
82
Preliminary Report on Information Obtained from: Generalmajor Bock von Wuelfingen and
Further Report on Information Obtained from: Generalleutnant von Heyking, Generalleutnant
Seyffardt and Konteradmiral von Tresckow, G.R.G.G. 199(c), 17-21 September 1944, WO
208/5018, TNA.
83
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 186, 4-5 September 1944,
WO 208/5017, TNA.
216
84
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 171, 5-8 August 1944;
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 173, 13-14 August 1944;
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 175, 17-18 August 1944,
WO 208/5017, TNA. It should be noted that many of Spang’s colleagues suspected that he
suffered from mental illness. His ignorance of developments in both Germany and the rest of the
war along with his lack of clearly defined political views irritated his colleagues, and von
Liebenstein even suspected that Spang had developed a split personality. If accurate, this may
have affected both his decision-making in the war and his retelling of events afterwards.
85
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 205, 29 September-1
October 1944, WO 208/5018, TNA.
86
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 215, 24-26 October 1944,
WO 208/5018, TNA.
87
“Treatment of the Jews,” C.S.D.I.C. report, 13 September 1944, WO 208/5017, TNA.
88
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 227, 22-23 November
1944, WO 208/5018, TNA.
89
Ibid.
90
The War Diary for May 1945 in the British National Archives actually lists a “Rüdiger von
Keyking” as one of the five generals transferred to American custody that month. However,
considering that Rüdiger von Heyking had been at Trent Park for some time and there is no
evidence of a “von Keyking,” it can be assumed that this was simply a typographical error and
that the transferred general in question was indeed von Heyking. War Diary, May 1945, WO
165/41, TNA.
91
War Diary, April 1945; War Diary, May 1945, WO 165/41, TNA.
217
92
Neitzel, Tapping Hitler’s Generals, 18-19; War Diary, August 1945; War Diary, October
1945, WO 165/41, TNA; Sullivan, Thresholds of Peace, 237.
93
Sullivan, Thresholds of Peace, 291.
218
CHAPTER VI
THE SEEDS OF THE AMERICAN TRANSFORMATION
The success of the Allied invasion of northwest France affected the prisoner of
war camp environment in Clinton, Mississippi, as well as at Trent Park in England.
Where London’s relationship with Wehrmacht generals continued apace affected only
by the arrival of new faces and the departure of old ones, Washington finally initiated a
relationship with its senior German officer prisoners. Driven by a burgeoning sense of
imminent victory, American policymakers began thinking ahead to the postwar
reconstruction of Europe and how the men in their custody might play some role in that
process.
Change began slowly. Less than two weeks after D-Day, the British realized the
need to free space at Trent Park for the many Wehrmacht generals that would likely be
captured in the coming months and began transferring some of the generals to American
custody. CSDIC started by sending three of its biggest troublemakers; Ludwig Crüwell
and Hans Jürgen von Arnim, along with their aides de camp, departed for the United
States on 17 June 1944. One week later, after a transatlantic flight and rail passage from
Fort George Meade, Maryland, the two senior officers arrived at Camp Clinton. Within
a few more weeks, Heinrich von Hülsen joined his “pro-Nazi” colleagues as a prisoner
of the Americans at the Mississippi camp.1
A little over two months later, after a flood of German general officers
surrendered to the Allies in southern and western France, three more generals arrived in
219
Clinton, Mississippi. These three officers, Ludwig Bieringer, Ferdinand Neuling and
Hans Schuberth, were the first generals to arrive on American soil who had not first been
prisoners of the British. Rather than allowing CSDIC to take the lead in interrogating
these three generals as they had in the past, the two Allies collaborated on the effort
through a joint operation in France labeled “CSDIC West.” American interrogator
Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Duin, who would later play a prominent role in the American
postwar relationship with Wehrmacht generals in the United States, interrogated these
three generals as part of the combined operation and then immediately transferred them
to Camp Clinton.2 Considering that the British needed to make space at Trent Park and
that the interrogations took place as part of a coordinated effort, the British almost
certainly supported the direct transfer of these three prisoners to the United States. But
this arrangement represented the seeds of independent American activity that would
continue to grow until, by the end of the war, American military intelligence supplanted
CSDIC’s leadership in regard to the Anglo-American relationship with German general
officer prisoners.
In addition to the three generals arriving directly from France, Trent Park
authorities continued to transfer other prisoners to Clinton during the fall of 1944 as the
Allied advance in Western Europe brought numerous new faces to the English camp.
On 19 September 1944, Admiral Walter Henneke arrived in the United States and
quickly joined the growing number of senior officers in Mississippi. Henneke was
unique in that he was the first high-ranking German naval prisoner to arrive in American
custody, creating some difficulties for American authorities. There were no facilities to
220
accommodate high-ranking officers at any of the camps in the United States designated
for German naval prisoners of war. Consequently, War Department officials, like their
counterparts in the British War Office, chose to place Henneke with army officers in
order to keep him with men of similar rank. Therefore, the admiral found himself at
Camp Clinton surrounded by German Army generals for several months before any
fellow senior naval officers joined him in the United States.3
Henneke’s naval status also made it more difficult to assign him an aide. Clinton
officials ordinarily assigned the general officers a suitable subordinate officer from
among the camp’s prisoner population. However, von Arnim, who became the senior
officer and camp spokesman upon his arrival in June, requested that an officer prisoner
from one of the German naval POW camps be transferred to Clinton to work with
Henneke. To the credit of the American commanding officer, Colonel McIlhenny, and
his superiors in the Provost Marshal General’s Office, they complied with Henneke and
von Arnim’s request and sought a naval officer prisoner from Camp McCain,
Mississippi, as a more suitable aide for the newly-arrived admiral.4
Curiously, von Arnim also made a similar request on behalf of General Crüwell.
In Crüwell’s case, his aide was a year older than he was, and the general sought a more
energetic, younger officer prisoner with whom he might have perhaps a less awkward
relationship. Von Arnim specifically requested that the Provost Marshal General’s
Office transfer Major Anton Sinkel, who was then interned at Camp Alva, Oklahoma, to
Clinton to serve as Crüwell’s new aide. Again, Colonel McIlhenny and Washington
221
officials approved the generals’ request, perhaps indicating a slight change of heart from
their past disregard for the generals’ wishes.5
Yet, the approval of Major Sinkel’s transfer is also somewhat puzzling. Sinkel
had previously been the designated spokesman for the prisoners at Camp Trinidad,
Colorado, and had been sent to Camp Alva, a camp specifically designated for pro-Nazi
agitators, because of his involvement in some Nazi activity in the Colorado camp.6
Perhaps Sinkel’s internment at Alva was purely coincidental as not every prisoner there
would have necessarily been a hardcore National Socialist. That Sinkel spoke proficient
English and subsequently served as von Arnim’s interpreter certainly made him an asset
to the generals at Clinton. But von Arnim’s increasingly vocal support for the Nazi
regime during his stay in Mississippi, coupled with Sinkel’s prior activity and residence
at a “Nazi” camp, points to a potential connection between Sinkel and von Arnim and
suggests the influence of ulterior motives in requesting the former’s transfer to Camp
Clinton.
Following the arrangement of aides for Henneke and Crüwell, still more generals
made their way to the United States. By the end of September 1944, a large mix of
newly-captured German generals and some old hands who had been in England for some
time, made their way across the Atlantic. On 28 September, eleven new faces arrived at
Clinton: Generals Erwin Vierow, Karl Spang, Curt Badinski, Theodor Graf von
Sponeck, Erwin Menny, Fritz Krause, Kurt Freiherr von Liebenstein, Christoph Graf zu
Stolberg-Stolberg, Robert Sattler, Hans-Georg Schramm and Hubertus von Aulock.7
This group more than doubled the number of generals at Camp Clinton.
222
The new arrivals barely had time to acclimate to their new surroundings before
the Allies added even more generals to the mix. General Botho Elster and his large
entourage of aides and orderlies arrived in early November followed by six additional
Wehrmacht senior officers by the end of the month. The last parcel included Generals
Erwin Rauch, Paul Seyffardt, Alfred Gutknecht, Hans von der Mosel, Otto Richter and
Detlef Bock von Wülfingen. This brought the total population of Clinton’s officer
compound to thirty-two, including Colonel von Quast, who still awaited American
recognition of his promotion but who was allowed to live in the enclosure because he
served as an aide to General von Vaerst.8 In the six months following D-Day, the
number of general officers at Camp Clinton had quadrupled. This finally spurred
American policy-makers to take their relationship with these men more seriously.
It took a while for Washington’s changing perceptions of the importance of its
German general officer prisoners to translate into policy, and still longer for these policy
changes to produce significant changes at the camp level. An inspection report filed in
July 1944 by Werner Weingärtner of the Swiss Legation and John Brown Mason of the
U.S. State Department echoed familiar refrains. Weingärtner characterized the situation
in the generals’ compound as “deplorable,” citing the lack of a number of items and the
“attitude of the Camp Commander.” Mason concurred, saying “while promises and
assurances in regard to certain needed improvements have been given repeatedly to the
spokesman [von Arnim] by the American Army authorities since last winter, on the
whole the promises have either not been kept at all or were fulfilled only just prior to
the visit of the Swiss representative.” He observed that the generals kept a written
223
record of the exact dates of their requests and the camp administration’s responses. For
a month, camp officials had ignored the generals’ request for garden furniture to be
made by POW carpenters at Clinton. Finally, and inexplicably, the camp administration
responded that the generals should simply order these items from Sears & Roebuck or
Montgomery Ward. Unfortunately for the generals, these types of mail order requests
also typically went unfulfilled for weeks on end. Repeated appeals for cigars had only
met with success in early July, right before Weingärtner and Mason’s visit.9 However,
the U.S. Provost Marshal General’s Office did not consider these “deplorable”
conditions.
The two camp inspectors also produced a list of now typical prisoner requests
including American recognition of von Quast’s promotion to brigadier general, the
assignment of a German Protestant minister and a German Catholic priest to serve the
officers’ compound, insulation and double-flooring for their quarters, a swimming pool
and tennis courts. Colonel McIlhenny had approved a tennis court for the generals’
compound as early as December 1943 but, seven months later, construction had yet to
begin. The generals also complained that their mess room and recreation building were
too hot in the summer, suggesting that some awnings be added to provide shade over the
doors and windows. And they bemoaned the fact that a carpenter shop, some American
personnel offices and toilets for the orderlies took up valuable space in their recreation
hall.10
The inspectors viewed most of these contentions as minor, aside from the
longstanding complaints about a lack of insulation and adequate flooring in the generals’
224
quarters and some new allegations of gunshots near the generals’ compound. Von
Arnim expressed concern that a gun had been fired outside the generals’ quarters the
week before the inspectors visited the camp. Apparently, one of the newly-arrived and
inexperienced camp guards had carelessly mishandled his machine gun. What caused
even graver concern for the inspectors and the generals alike was that this wasn’t the
first time this had happened. Months earlier, a local squirrel hunter had fired a shot just
outside the fence line. This certainly raised questions about why camp officials would
allow hunting so close to the camp perimeter. Moreover, that gunshots had twice been
fired in the vicinity of the generals’ compound generated concerns about the prisoners’
safety.11
Despite these concerns, one long-standing dispute between the prisoners and the
camp administration actually brought the Swiss representative to the Americans’
defense. The generals still refused to sign paroles giving their “word of honor” as
German officers not to attempt to escape if they were allowed to walk outside the camp.
The prisoners offered to “promise” not to escape but objected to being forced to provide
a formal oath for simply “enjoying conveniences or pleasures.” They sought to reserve
their words of honor for extremely important occasions. In fact, one of the senior
prisoners noted that he had not once been compelled to offer a formal oath in his thirtyfive years in the Wehrmacht. The Swiss inspector had surprisingly little sympathy for
the general’s argument and supported Colonel McIlhenny’s decision to deny the generals
parole until they followed the proper protocol.12
225
Also surprising, considering the number of complaints the generals voiced and
the inspectors’ condemnation of Clinton’s accommodations, the prisoners expressed a
clear preference for remaining at the camp. When the inspectors asked if the officers
might like to transfer to a different camp they overwhelming stated that they preferred
the “relative spaciousness, and the quite attractive, rustic atmosphere of their
compound—dotted with many large trees—and its quiet atmosphere.” They also
appreciated the fact they could attend soccer games, theatrical productions and concerts
held in the enlisted prisoners compound and that all of their quarters had now been
equipped with large new refrigerators.13 Perhaps the generals’ had simply grown tired of
transferring from one camp to another and were willing to settle for inadequate
accommodations if it meant staying put for awhile. All inspectors’ criticisms aside, it is
also possible that the generals appreciated Camp Clinton more than they let on.
Regardless, they expressed no interest in the possibility of seeking greener pastures.
Despite the generals’ preference for remaining at Clinton, the camp inspectors
still criticized the camp’s overall accommodation of the German general officers. “The
chief and basic difficulty at Camp Clinton, as far as the generals’ compound [was]
concerned,” according to both the Swiss representative and the State Department
official, was “the attitude of the camp commander.” While they praised Colonel
McIlhenny’s administration of the enlisted prisoners’ compound, they suggested that
“running a camp for captured generals [was] a responsibility of a different character.”
The commander had inculcated his staff officers with his perspective that “an enemy is
an enemy, and a POW a POW,” insinuating that all prisoners should be treated the same
226
regardless of rank. Making matters worse, the colonel suffered from a heart condition
that necessitated his leaving much of the daily interaction with the generals to his
executive officer, Captain Winfred J. Tidwell. While the inspectors conceded that
Tidwell was a “friendly and well-intentioned” soldier, they contended that “his
background as a master sergeant for some twenty years who now holds a temporary
commission” could “hardly be considered the best preparation for dealing with highranking generals.”14
American Captain Walter Rapp spent several weeks at Clinton in the fall of 1944
and described McIlhenny and Tidwell in even harsher terms. According to Rapp,
McIlhenny’s illness affected his disposition and “neither his heart nor soul [were] in this
matter at all.” Rapp described McIlhenny as “very erratic” and he was astonished by the
colonel’s conviction that he was doing an excellent job. “He just does what he has to”
and “works only about 4-5 hours per day,” Rapp complained. “He detests improvements
and only does things now because the PMGO order him to.” Rapp’s description of the
executive officer was even more caustic. According to Rapp, Tidwell was “a lazy,
ignorant ‘yes man’ who holds his position because he has no initiative and is the
Colonel’s mouthpiece.” Rapp admitted that Tidwell was “a nice fellow, but uneducated
and crude and lacks the poise, background and interest to deal with German general
officers.”15
Not surprisingly, these officers’ attitudes influenced those of their personnel.
The generals complained to the inspectors that American noncommissioned officers
refused to salute them and, according to the prisoner spokesman for the German enlisted
227
compound, the American NCOs frequently ridiculed the German enlisted prisoners for
doing so. The Americans informed their captives that “the generals [were] only
prisoners and they need not salute them,” an almost verbatim reiteration of their
commanding officer’s attitude. Weingärtner intimated that the American NCOs at
Clinton had “no manners” and blamed a lack of proper instruction from their superiors
for this shortcoming.16
The camp commander and his subordinates displayed the same lack of regard in
their relations with the inspectors as well. On the first day of their visit, Weingärtner
asked to meet with Colonel McIlhenny early in the morning before he began his
inspection, a common request from camp inspectors. Tidwell, the executive officer,
informed the Swiss representative that McIlhenny usually did not arrive until nine or ten
in the morning and would not be available that particular day until three in the afternoon
because of a Kiwanis Club luncheon he wished to attend. Furthermore, once McIlhenny
finally arrived and decided to meet with the inspectors, he insistently called them away
from an ongoing meeting with the generals. He then advised the inspectors that they
should keep their discussion brief because he wanted to leave early to attend a ballgame.
The executive officer also displayed little courtesy or regard for the inspectors. Instead
of making himself available on the last evening of their visit, another customary
courtesy, he “excused himself early in the evening to go to a movie in town.”17
In part because of his inconsiderate attitude, Weingärtner and Mason
recommended that the Provost Marshal General replace McIlhenny as camp
commandant. They observed that “the German generals are naturally much interested in
228
the type of American officer they meet. [The United States] could make a favorable and
lasting impression [on these prisoners] and more in the future, if we put in charge an
American officer able to deal with them with tact, consideration and insight.” Echoing
the remarks of past inspectors, they concluded their report by stating that “at the present
time, the United States Government is missing a unique opportunity at Camp Clinton to
influence in our favor [these] German generals who some day will return to a Germany
that will ask them: ‘What is America like?’”18
The inspectors based their belief that American officials could favorably
influence the generals on the latter’s expressed interest in numerous aspects of American
history and culture. The Swiss representative asked the generals to prepare a list of
topics of interest to them for possible books and lectures that might be supplied by
American officials. The prisoners’ list overwhelmingly featured American topics
including the “animals, plants and geography of the Americas, especially the United
States,” “history of the American Indians,” American literature, American art, the U.S.
Constitution and biographies of famous Americans like George Washington and
Abraham Lincoln. General von Vaerst even requested works by Walter Lippmann, an
American writer whom the Nazis had bitterly criticized. The inspectors saw these as
positive signs that the generals might be open to the American message.19
This encouragement, coupled with the third highly-critical assessment of Camp
Clinton’s treatment of the German general officers in six months, finally struck a chord
with American policymakers now beginning to look to the future of postwar Germany.
For starters, the U.S. Provost Marshal General’s Office insisted that repairs and
229
improvements be made to the generals’ quarters. In doing so, however, they paid strict
adherence to the provision of the Geneva Convention that required accommodations for
POWs to match those provided U.S. soldiers of equal rank. The generals and three
separate teams of camp inspectors had all complained about cracks in the walls of the
generals’ apartments and the lack of insulation and double flooring that exacerbated both
the summer heat and the winter cold. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers repaired the
exterior siding of the generals’ homes, caulked the cracks in the walls and closed the
holes in the floors by nailing batten underneath the flooring, which brought the buildings
up to the same standards as those provided American general officers. According to
U.S. War Department policy, however, Mississippi’s southern location placed Camp
Clinton in a temperature zone that did not require insulation for American officer
housing. Consequently, War Department officials denied the generals’ quarters any
additional insulation because this would have exceeded the quality of physical
accommodations provided to American generals. If American officers in southern
climates were required to live without insulation, the German generals would have to do
the same. Likewise, the War Department refused to install awnings for the generals’
mess room and recreation hall because these items were not provided for American
officers either.20
In addition to basic repairs in the generals’ quarters, Brigadier General
Blackshear M. Bryan, the Assistant Provost Marshal General, personally met with
Colonel McIlhenny and explained to him the importance of “handling general officer
prisoners in a fashion which will reflect credit on the United States and create among the
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prisoners a favorable attitude toward this country and its institutions.” General Bryan
informed McIlhenny that the Colonel should “visit the Germans, ascertain the things
they desired, inform them whether or not he could procure them, and above all, that he
should make good his promises.” Bryan further stressed the need to provide “small
comfort items not provided for ordinary prisoners of war.”21
Following his meeting with General Bryan, McIlhenny responded immediately.
He notified his superiors that he would now have “more intimate contacts” with the
German general officers, would “acquiesce to their requests wherever possible” and
would “make a special point of obtaining small purchases for them within a reasonable
length of time.” He pledged to do so “at once with tact, consideration and insight.”22 He
proved to be a man of his word.
A little over a week after McIlhenny vowed to make changes at Camp Clinton,
two inspectors from the PMGO’s Prisoner of War Division visited the camp and already
noticed a significant difference. First, McIlhenny had finally explained to the generals
that some of their requests simply could not be fulfilled for legitimate reasons. On three
separate occasions, for instance, McIlhenny had requested in writing that the PMGO
recognize von Quast’s promotion to general officer. It was finally explained to the
prisoners that this was not going to happen because of existing U.S. War Department
regulations. The camp inspectors stated that “the generals understood.” Moreover, the
generals’ requests for the construction of a swimming pool in their compound or access
to one outside the camp would also not be possible. First, construction of a pool
required “critical material,” namely concrete, that was too vital to the American war
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effort to expend on prisoners of war or even American civilians. And, allowing
prisoners of war access to public recreation facilities like swimming pools in nearby
towns was out of the question for reasons related to both American public opinion and
the prisoners’ safety. The inspectors again stated that the generals’ understood why
these requests could not be fulfilled.23 Surely, German career military officers
appreciated the demands of wartime mobilization and the dictates of military
regulations.
Had this reasoning been explained to the generals months earlier, a great deal of
confusion and complaining might have been avoided. That McIlhenny took the time to
do so in August 1944 demonstrated the commandant’s interest in building a better
relationship with his prisoners. But what most impressed the inspectors were not
McIlhenny’s explanations but his actions. True to his word, he was now doing his
utmost to provide all he could for the generals. War Department officials had refused to
provide awnings over the doors and windows of the generals’ mess and recreation
buildings because these items exceeded the accommodations provided for American
general officers. McIlhenny circumvented this policy by placing scrap lumber and the
necessary tools at the prisoners’ disposal and permitted the generals’ orderlies to
construct and install the awnings themselves. This worked so well that awnings were
added to the officers’ quarters as well, which exceeded the generals’ original request.
And instead of denying the generals tennis courts because this too would have required
cement, McIlhenny ordered construction of clay courts, one of which was nearly
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completed at the time of the inspectors’ visit in August 1944 and another was added
shortly thereafter.24
The camp commander now sought to address virtually all of the senior officers’
concerns. He relocated the American personnel offices out of the prisoners’ recreation
hall and initiated plans to remodel the building to suit the generals’ needs. The
American guard who accidentally fired his weapon near the officers’ compound received
disciplinary punishment, and McIlhenny began allowing the generals regular walks
outside the camp after Washington reached some compromise with these men over the
wording of the parole forms they were required to sign. The commandant also promised
to show films in the prisoners’ compound and ordered a large number of books to
supplement the POW camp library. Remarkably, for the first time in McIlhenny’s
administration at Camp Clinton, inspectors reported the existence of a “very congenial
relationship” between the commanding officer and his general officer prisoners.25
McIlhenny’s treatment of the German generals only improved. When Emil
Greuter from the Swiss Legation and Charles Eberhardt of the U.S. State Department
inspected Clinton in January 1945, they found a very different camp from the one their
organizations had condemned six months earlier. Of course the most noticeable change
from the prior visit was the considerably larger number of prisoners. Fifty-three
prisoners inhabited the officers’ compound at Clinton, twenty-nine of them listed as
general officers.26 Curiously, this number reflected the departure of three of the senior
officers in the past few months. Admiral Henneke had been transferred to Camp Pryor,
Oklahoma, where he joined other high-ranking German naval officers, and General von
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der Mosel had temporarily gone to the POW hospital at Camp Forrest, Tennessee, for
unspecified health reasons. The third departure, Gotthard Frantz, was unique. Like von
der Mosel, Frantz was beset by health problems. He had spent a month in a British
hospital while a prisoner at Trent Park and his chronic ailments continued to plague him
during his time in the United States. Consequently, American authorities opted to
repatriate Frantz in early 1945 for health reasons. Unfortunately for Frantz, this
American decision brought unintended consequences. He arrived in Germany on the
first of February only to be captured by the Soviet Army two months later in April 1945.
He then spent over four years as a prisoner of war in the Soviet Union before finally
being allowed to again return to Germany on 2 November 1949.27
Other transfers out of Camp Clinton occurred in the following months, most of
these for health reasons. On the very day of Greuter and Eberhardt’s visit in January,
Clinton camp authorities began arrangements for the transfer of General Bülowius. He
too was bound for the POW hospital at Camp Forrest, Tennessee, although unlike his
colleague von der Mosel, Bülowius never returned to Clinton. Bülowius suffered from
“involutional melancholia, manifested in depression and delusions of persecution.” The
general was convinced that he had been given a death sentence by an impromptu courtmartial of his peers at Clinton. American investigations found these claims to be entirely
unfounded. Nonetheless, these delusions drove Bülowius to attempt to take his own life
by slashing his wrists. Fortunately, he failed, causing only superficial wounds. On 26
March 1945, however, the general wrote a suicide note to his friend and fellow prisoner,
Willibald Borowietz. The following day, he removed the leather straps from his
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briefcase and hanged himself from the cross bars of the window in his room at the
mental health ward of the Camp Forrest POW hospital. By the time the American
medical staff found him, he was dead.28
Bülowius was not the only German prisoner of war general to take his own life.
Ironically, Borowietz, the friend and fellow prisoner to whom Bülowius had addressed
his suicide note, followed suit a little over three months later. The local newspaper, the
Clarion-Ledger in Jackson, reported that Borowietz had “just dropped over dead” from a
“cerebral hemorrhage” on 1 July 1945. Rumors quickly spread, almost certainly
originating with American personnel who worked at the camp, that the general had
committed suicide, but camp officials refused to confirm these reports. Many years after
the war ended and the camp closed, W. P. Taylor, a member of the American guard
personnel who had been stationed at Clinton in July 1945, vividly remembered that
Borowietz “got in a bath tub filled with water and stuck his finger in a light socket. It
was instant suicide.” While the autopsy results do not appear to have been publicized,
the official records of the U.S. Provost Marshal General’s Office listed Borowietz’s
cause of death as “electric shock,” corroborating Taylor’s story of Borowietz’s death
being a suicide by electrocution.29
One other Clinton general also committed suicide, although not until he returned
to Germany. Alfred Gutknecht displayed typical, albeit somewhat extreme
characteristics of barbed-wire psychosis—the damage to a prisoner’s mental health after
months of captivity. Clinton camp officials stated that by January 1945 Gutknecht “had
reached the stage where, pacing the compound like a caged animal, continually
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crowding against the wire enclosure, he seemed in danger of being fired upon by some
guard. He refused to accompany the other officers on their daily walks, saying that they
‘walked too slowly.’” Clinton medical authorities transferred Gutknecht to Glennan
General Hospital in Okmulgee, Oklahoma, which had recently been designated as an
asylum for mentally ill prisoners of war. Unlike his colleague Bülowius, who had been
sent to Camp Forrest, Tennessee, Gutknecht recovered enough to survive his ordeal as a
prisoner of war and return to Germany. Yet, tragically, he took his own life in Berlin on
12 November 1946, shortly after he had returned home.30
Despite the temptation to assume “barbed-wire psychosis,” it is almost
impossible to determine why any of these men would have chosen to commit suicide.
American officials conducted a study comparing the suicide rate among all prisoners of
war in the United States with that of the American civilian population and found almost
identical results. Thus, it seems most likely that each of the three generals who
committed suicide probably already suffered from some form of mental illness and their
status as prisoners of war simply exacerbated their conditions.31
Aside from these suicides, only one other Wehrmacht general died while a
prisoner of war in the United States. Hans Schuberth died from a brain tumor on 4 April
1945 in Kennedy Army General Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee, where he had been
transferred a month earlier. Regardless of his service to the enemy or his status as a
prisoner of war, American authorities allowed his fellow prisoners to pay their respects
in proper military fashion. Eight days later he was buried in the cemetery at Camp
Como, Mississippi, a short distance from Memphis. His body first laid in state in the
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camp’s prisoner of war chapel, guarded by German prisoner of war officers from the
camp. For his funeral, a Nazi flag bearing the swastika was draped across his casket and
carried by the German officers through two lines of German prisoners solemnly offering
a Nazi stiff-armed salute. Three drummers and a small band, all prisoners of war, led the
procession to the cemetery, a mile away from the prisoner stockade, followed by the
hearse bearing the deceased general and lines of unguarded prisoners. The procession
returned to camp after two of the prisoners offered an oration and a eulogy in German
and a squad of American soldiers fired three volleys over Schuberth’s grave.32
These tragedies notwithstanding, Greuter and Eberhardt were also immediately
struck by the greatly improved attitude of Camp Clinton’s administration during their
January 1945 inspection. Where Weingärtner and Mason had been largely disregarded
during their two-day visit in July 1944, Tidwell met Greuter and Eberhardt early in the
morning at the front gate and escorted them to the camp commander’s office where
McIlhenny awaited their arrival. The two American officers showed the inspectors
“every courtesy and attention,” including McIlhenny joining the two men for dinner in
the officers’ mess both evenings of their visit.33
Not only were the American personnel noticeably more professional, the
generals’ living conditions also showed “marked improvement.” In fact, the inspectors’
January 1945 description of the camp illustrates that the American administration had
addressed almost every previous complaint. The generals had been enjoying the new
clay tennis court completed four months earlier in September 1944, a German minister
and priest now conducted services in the officers’ compound and camp personnel
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permitted the generals outside of the camp several a times each week. Usually, the
generals took regular two-hour walks escorted by an American officer along the roads
surrounding Clinton and two days each week the officers were allowed unescorted visits
to the Mississippi River Basin Model being constructed by the enlisted prisoners
adjacent to the camp.34
Even more remarkable, Greuter and Eberhardt commended the “good job”
McIlhenny had done in repairing the building in the officers’ compound. Denied
sufficient lumber, the commandant secured the use of a type of “tar paper linoleum” for
the floors in the generals’ quarters and had the interior walls in the apartments, mess
hall, recreation hall and the chapel repainted. Furthermore, McIlhenny had partitions
built between the toilets in the building used for showers and bathrooms despite the fact
that the generals’ prior requests to this effect had been denied by the U.S. War
Department.35 Camp Clinton’s commanding officer obviously took seriously his
superiors’ admonition to acquiesce to the generals’ requests wherever possible.
Yet, Greuter and Eberhardt continued to criticize McIlhenny’s administration of
Camp Clinton, despite their admission that the generals “had no complaints, only wishes
or requests,” and that these requests largely involved articles that were restricted for
prisoners of war. The Swiss inspectors seemed to be caught in a maze of their own
creation. Eberhardt conceded that “nothing should be allowed to detract from the really
commendable work of Colonel McIlhenny,” but the two inspectors pressed for further
improvements nonetheless. They believed that “a camp commander [who was] not toorules-and-regulations-bound, and with some initiative and imagination, could and might
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well have closer and more frequent contacts with these generals, and also make certain
concessions and possibly waivers of strict application of regulations to permit the
generals to be supplied with various articles for their personal use even though such
articles may at the moment be on the restricted list.”36 Thus, the inspectors charged that
McIlhenny lacked the proper initiative for the position of commandant at an important
post like Clinton in large measure because he refused to exceed or circumvent existing
U.S. War Department regulations in his relations with the German general officers.
American expectations had clearly risen. One year earlier, condemnations of the
generals’ compound at Camp Clinton by the Swiss Legation and the U.S. Department of
State garnered little attention. By January 1945, seven months after the successful
Allied invasion of northwest France and a point in the war when Allied officials believed
victory to be imminent, camp inspectors now criticized the very same camp
administration for failing to circumvent War Department regulations. American beliefs
that these generals might be of use after the war now compelled Washington to demand
that the generals in their custody receive treatment that paralleled that accorded to the
generals in Britain.
The International Committee of the Red Cross agreed. On the first of February
1945, Paul Schnyder and Dr. Max Zehnder of the Red Cross arrived at Camp Clinton.
These visitors reiterated the criticisms of Clinton’s treatment of the generals made the
month prior by Greuter and Eberhardt. Their inspection report stated that McIlhenny
“was informed of the desire of the officers to buy pajamas with their own money, but the
colonel refused, pursuant to instructions contained in [U.S. War Department prisoner of
239
war] circular no. 50, which forbids such purchases.” Schnyder and Zehnder continued
by observing that McIlhenny refused to authorize the generals to purchase the reading
glasses that several of them apparently needed, and the generals’ requests for cigars and
chests for the safe-keeping of their personal effects had apparently gone unfulfilled. The
ICRC inspectors concluded that “this camp makes a rather good impression, although it
appears a little neglected by the authorities.”37 That a lack of pajamas and cigars
qualified as “a little neglected” illustrates the high international expectations for the
treatment of general officer prisoners.
As early as August 1944, officials in the U.S. State Department had begun to reexamine American treatment of the German generals at Camp Clinton, likely in response
to the series of critical camp inspections during the spring and summer of 1944. Noting
the high “social standing and general prestige” of general officers in Germany, John
Brown Mason of the State Department argued that upon repatriation, “several or all of
[the German generals at Clinton were] likely to exercise considerable influence on
Germany’s life regardless of the type of German government which may then be in
existence.” Mason observed that approximately thirty German generals were already in
Soviet custody and that these prisoners were likely to “return to Germany deeply
impressed with their experiences against and inside Russia,” and “with memories of
special courtesies and opportunities extended to at least half of them.” He stressed that it
would be in the best interest of the United States if “there should be among the returned
German prisoner of war officers a strong contingent of generals who have strong and
favorable impressions of this country.”38
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With this end in mind, Mason proposed a nine-point “Course of Action.” His
plan started with treating the generals in a fashion that would impress them with the
“knowledge that they were treated as generals and gentlemen [in the United States],
more in line with the way they [had] been treated in Great Britain and in contrast with
the reception given them at Clinton.” Mason suggested that the generals be better
acquainted with the “enormous economic strength and industrial power of the United
States” as well as “certain aspects of American history, political life, education and
cultural activities.” To this end, films, books, lectures and even visits to places like
shipyards and ordnance depots or museums, historic sites and universities should be
employed.39
Mason “strongly recommended that the post of camp commander at [Camp
Clinton] be assigned to a retired American general, preferably a graduate of West Point
or other military school,” and that this officer “possess a strong sense of military
tradition and courtesy.” He believed the commandant of the generals’ camp should be
widely-traveled and well-educated so as to “present an intelligent American attitude” to
the generals in U.S. custody. Mason also recommended the appointment of a camp
educational officer of similar mindset, albeit not necessarily of the same high rank, and
the ability to speak German to assist the camp commander. He suggested that a POW
officer be assigned to teach the generals the English language and that each general be
given the opportunity to purchase his own radio so that no extremists among them could
prevent his fellow prisoners from listening to American news broadcasts. Moreover, he
suggested that the generals should be furnished with copies of both the Nazi newspapers
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Völkischer Beobachter and Der Angriff and the leading Swiss newspaper Neue Zürcher
Zeitung. The Swiss paper, printed in German and obviously not of Allied origin, was
popular with anti-Nazi Germans because of its “reputation for truthfulness” and its
informative articles by “outstanding contributors.” Mason believed the “obvious
contrast” between the Swiss paper and the Nazi papers would have “a much stronger
educational value than even the best newspaper published in the United States.” Mason
also stressed the importance of selecting an appropriate German priest and German
minister to serve the generals’ religious needs. He stated that religious guidance “by its
very nature [was] anti-Nazi, without any need for ‘political’ sermons,” and he thought
that most of the generals were religious men who were “generally respectful to the
Christian Churches.”40
Mason’s recommended “course of action” for the general officer prisoners came
at a time when the U.S. War Department was implementing an “intellectual diversion”
or re-education program for all of the German prisoners of war in the United States. The
newly-created Prisoner of War Special Projects Division of the Provost Marshal
General’s Office, led by Lieutenant Colonel Edward Davison, initiated the operation on
6 September 1944. The goals of the program included correcting “misinformation and
prejudices surviving Nazi conditioning” and convincing the prisoners to “understand and
believe historical and ethical truth as generally conceived by Western civilization.” If
the agency accomplished these goals, the German POWs “might come to respect the
American people and their ideological values” and “form the nucleus of a new German
ideology which will reject militarism and totalitarian controls and will advocate a
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democratic system of government” for postwar Germany. American camp authorities
now sought to achieve these goals by enlarging POW camp libraries, showing films,
providing prominent lecturers for the prisoners and subscribing to American newspapers
and magazines, all with an emphasis on detailing American culture and democratic
values. In effect, a propaganda offensive had begun. “Assistant executive officers”
were assigned to each of the major POW camps in the United States with the sole
purpose of implementing and supervising the re-education program.41
Mason’s proposals regarding the German generals, especially his reliance on
educational materials, newspapers and film, most likely sprang from the State and War
Department discussions of the re-education program that had taken place during the
spring and summer of 1944. Mason based his recommendations, however, on the
assumption that the general officer prisoners would play key roles in postwar German
government and society. Curiously, Colonel Davison and Major General Wilhelm D.
Styer, the Chief of Staff for the Army Service Forces, had other ideas.
Styer wrote to Davison in late September 1944 concerned about Mason’s lack of
understanding of both the enemy generals and Allied war aims, and he offered his own
recommendations for the generals’ “re-education” program. Styer’s primary concern
was Mason’s assumption that the general officers would play influential roles in postwar
Germany. Styer stated that this was “contrary to official policy towards Germany” and
declared that this could not “be made a basis for the policy of [the Special Projects
Division] in regard to German generals in our custody.” Rather, he insisted, “no Junker
general will ever be able to exercise any influence whatsoever in the future of Germany.
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That, to put it mildly, is one of the essential war aims of the Allies expressed in many
speeches by Allied leaders, and in accordance with the wishes of the majority of the
American people.” Styer did not oppose organizing a re-education program for the
generals. But he advocated one based on the assumption that any American use of
German generals after the war would only be in isolated cases where the circumstances
had been properly evaluated.42
Styer did not believe the British harbored any designs for using the generals in
postwar Germany either. In fact, he seemed perturbed by the numerous inspection
reports from Camp Clinton that took for granted the German generals’ contentions that
the British had treated them much better than had the Americans. Styer contended,
based on information he had received from American personnel who had at some point
been attached to CSDIC in England, that “the British [had] no doubt about the true
nature of a Junker general.” If the British granted their captive generals any privileges
that exceeded American treatment of these men, they did so “for psychological warfare
reasons only and not to ‘preserve them and their influence’ in Germany.”43
Styer also took issue with Mason’s characterization of religious guidance for the
prisoners as being inherently anti-Nazi and his belief that most of the generals respected
Christianity. Indeed, Styer questioned the need to provide the generals with a German
priest and minister at all, stating that German army chaplains were not Christians in the
American sense. “They indoctrinate the German soldier with Wotanism,” according to
Styer, “and close each service with a prayer for final victory and Hitler.” If the Provost
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Marshal General wanted to provide religious guidance to the generals, Styer cautioned
that they should at least be highly judicious in selecting German personnel.44
Styer’s comments highlight a fundamental issue regarding American treatment of
German general officer prisoners. The British had based their policy toward POW
generals largely on their immediate interest in winning the war. Whether this involved
surreptitiously gathering military intelligence or attempting to use the generals for
psychological warfare, the focus remained on defeating Nazi Germany. Once this task
had been accomplished, the British quickly lost interest in Wehrmacht general officers.
Conversely, American policy regarding their captive generals lacked direction until late
in the war. Washington was not motivated to gather intelligence from the generals
because the British graciously shared the fruits of their efforts with the War Department.
John Brown Mason and the State Department recommended using generals to rebuild
postwar Germany but this was at odds with existing war aims, including the elimination
of German militarism. American treatment of its Wehrmacht prisoner of war generals
proceeded haphazardly because Washington lacked a clear idea of what it wanted from
these men.
In spite of his objections to the basis for Mason’s proposal, Styer concurred that
some form of reorientation program was needed for the POW generals. He advocated
the immediate assignment of a German officer prisoner to provide English language
instruction for the generals, subscriptions to Swiss newspapers and one copy each of the
New York Times and Life for each captive general. Styer agreed that each general should
be permitted to purchase his own radio, and special lectures and tours of industrial and
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historical sites should be provided. Styer concluded by observing that it was common
knowledge that “the American personnel at Camp Clinton [were] not tops.” However,
he believed that the appointment of a well-qualified assistant executive officer for the
camp could compensate for much of the existing discrepancy.45
Styer supported the idea of a re-education program for the generals on the basis
that they might be used to influence the outcome of the war but not for any role in
postwar Germany. After the Departments of State and War weighed the proposals of
both Mason and Styer, Washington finally seemed to reach some consensus on a reeducation policy for the German general officer prisoners. The first steps included “an
affirmative program to indoctrinate the general officer prisoners at Camp Clinton with a
favorable attitude toward this country and its institutions, and, if possible, to utilize them
for psychological warfare purposes and for the purpose of favorably influencing other
German prisoners in United States custody.” The War Department left “psychological
warfare purposes” undefined. In light of references to Soviet efforts in this regard, it is
quite likely that American officials envisioned asking the generals to offer public
statements critical of the Nazi regime that might undermine morale among both German
troops fighting in Western Europe and German civilians suffering on the home front.46
But, again, this was not clearly defined.
In regard to indoctrinating the generals with a favorable attitude toward the
United States, the re-education program incorporated many of the tactics suggested by
Mason and Styer. Authorities at Clinton and their War Department superiors increased
the library holdings in the generals’ compound to over 2,000 volumes, all approved by
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American censors. The collection largely consisted of books on American history,
literature, and culture, as well as other important works dealing with democratic values
and western civilization. Most of these were in English, although Washington attempted
to provide as many German language volumes as possible. In addition to the expanded
library, the generals received subscriptions to Time, Newsweek, Life, Collier’s, Reader’s
Digest, and the Saturday Evening Post, among others, and several daily copies of the
New York Times. Clinton officials also purchased a 16mm film projector for the
generals’ recreation building where motion pictures, particularly those emphasizing the
familiar themes of American culture and democratic values, were shown twice a week.
Washington made arrangements with Harvard University to send a professor “to confer
with the German general officer prisoners of war on educational topics of interest to
them,” and created a special fund to pay for incidentals that the generals desired, such as
the pajamas and slippers, for example, that the prisoners had repeatedly requested in the
past.47
While putting this program together, Washington officials also entertained the
possibility of offering the generals a change of scenery to complement their new
intellectual diversions. Because of the myriad criticisms of Colonel McIlhenny, whom
some in the Provost Marshal General’s Office referred to as “the impossible camp
commander at Clinton,” discussions began within the War Department in the fall of
1944 about the possibility of transferring the general officer prisoners to Camp Pryor,
Oklahoma. While Pryor later housed officer prisoners, American authorities decided not
to use it for the German generals. Instead, they directed their attention to a former
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Japanese American relocation center in Jerome, Arkansas. The Japanese Americans had
been evacuated from Jerome in June 1944 and the camp had been appropriated by the
War Department and reactivated as a prisoner of war camp a few months later.
Washington initially seemed quite interested in improving accommodations for the
general officer prisoners and believed Jerome had “quarters which [compared] favorably
with the buildings occupied by the German generals in England.”48 For undetermined
reasons, the idea of transferring all of the generals to Arkansas was abandoned.
Certainly, the War Department quickly discovered that Jerome did not compare as
favorably with Trent Park as they had initially suspected. Moreover, the camp would
not be ready to receive high-ranking occupants for quite some time. Whether because of
these reasons or because the officers at Clinton did not wish to relocate, Washington
gave up the idea of moving the generals to a different camp and kept them at Clinton for
the duration of the war.
Along with favorably impressing the generals by introducing them to American
history and culture, American authorities also needed to assign to Clinton an officer with
special qualifications who could insinuate himself into the prisoners’ confidence and
secretly ascertain the suitability and willingness of any of the generals to collaborate
with American officials for the purposes of psychological warfare. The PMGO’s
Special Projects Division planned to provide a permanent assistant executive officer to
Camp Clinton to supervise the intellectual diversion program of the entire camp. But a
special officer was immediately sent for temporary duty to carry out the psychological
warfare mission.
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For this special assignment, the Provost Marshal General chose Captain Walter
Hans Rapp. Born in Germany, albeit to American parents, Rapp spoke German fluently.
He also showed “a good understanding of German soldier mentality.” He had graduated
from Stanford Law School and from the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff
College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. His military career thus far had provided him
with “considerable experience in the Mediterranean Theater as [a] military intelligence
officer, especially in the interrogation of prisoners.”49
Rapp arrived at Camp Clinton in mid-November 1944. At the time of his arrival,
Captain Tidwell, Clinton’s executive officer, was away on a special teaching assignment
at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. This allowed Colonel McIlhenny to introduce Rapp to the
prisoners and American personnel as Tidwell’s temporary replacement, which explained
his short, four-week stay in the camp. Tidwell’s responsibilities as the American liaison
with the general officer prisoners, including accompanying them on their daily walks,
provided Rapp with a great opportunity for significant daily interaction with the
generals. Moreover, McIlhenny informed the prisoners that Rapp had been “exclusively
assigned to take care of their desires and requests.” This announcement, coupled with
Rapp’s ability to converse with the generals in their own language, delighted the
prisoners, particularly von Arnim who felt that American authorities were finally making
a special effort to address the generals’ requests and concerns.50
Captain Rapp’s primary “mission,” as the Provost Marshal General’s Office
referred to his assignment, was the first attempt by American officials to evaluate the
political orientation of individual officers since the first small parcel of generals had
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been interned at Byron Hot Springs seventeen months earlier in June 1943. Obstacles
arose immediately. First, Rapp criticized the placement of general officer prisoners at a
camp that also housed German enlisted POWs. The generals’ orderlies and kitchen
personnel went back and forth between the two compounds every day, allowing the
enlisted prisoners to keep constant tabs on the generals’ activities and amenities, as well
as overhearing a great deal of their conversations. This arrangement, according to Rapp,
presented two problems. First, the enlisted men came to resent the generals for receiving
better treatment than they did. The enlisted POWs understood that certain privileges
accompanied higher rank but were angry because they believed these circumstances had
already been abused in the Germany Army prior to their capture.51
Second, and more important to Rapp’s mission, many of the generals were
unwilling to speak openly about any potential anti-Nazi sentiments due to the social
environment of the camp. Many of their aides and orderlies conducted “a kind of
espionage system,” using it to eavesdrop on the generals’ conversations and report these
comments to their own NCOs or camp spokesmen, who in turn circulated this
information back to von Arnim in the generals’ compound.52 Considering von Arnim’s
threats about postwar Nazi retribution against pessimists and defeatists and the real fear
that family members in Germany might suffer if these kinds of accusations made it back
to Germany during the war, it is not surprising that many of the senior officers wished to
stay out of political discussions.
Aside from these legitimate fears, Rapp also revealed a division among the
general officers themselves. Rapp believed that the generals divided politically
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according to when they were captured. One group of generals had all been captured in
North Africa in the spring of 1943 and, consequently, their comrades referred to them as
“Afrikaner,” or Africans. The other group, labeled “Franzosen” or Frenchmen, had all
be captured during or after the Allied invasion of Normandy beginning in June 1944.53
Rapp described the “Afrikaner” as the “least susceptible to [American] ways of
life and thought” and who “still [believed] in Hitler and his ability to win this war.” He
attributed this to the fact that these prisoners, who at this point had been in captivity for
over eighteen months, did not have first-hand knowledge of the Allied air assault on
Germany or the successful Soviet offensive on the Eastern Front. The letters they
received from their families made little mention of the hardships on the German home
front, likely in an effort to keep from exacerbating the prisoners’ fears and anxiety about
their families when there was virtually nothing they could do to help. Because of this
ignorance about the state of the war, Rapp believed the “Afrikaner” generals simply
dismissed reports from American newspapers and radio broadcasts as propaganda and
steadfastly held unrealistic hopes that new secret weapons or a great military leader,
perhaps even another Rommel, would emerge to save the day for the German
Fatherland.54
The “Franzosen” generals, by contrast, held more realistic views of the war,
according to Rapp. Unlike their “Afrikaner” counterparts, some of these men had been
in Germany within the previous few months. They had “personally felt the shortage of
food, the rule of the Gestapo and the destruction [of Germany] through air power.” A
few of these men had even seen their homes destroyed or had lost their families and
251
“such horrible experience [had] made a lasting and profound impression upon them as
far as the ultimate outcome of this war [was] concerned.” Rapp reported that if the
“Franzosen” generals dared to even describe the prevalent conditions in Germany in the
fall of 1944, their “Afrikaner” counterparts would castigate their pessimism, defeatism
and “lies.” Because of these circumstances, Rapp recommended that American officials
segregate the general officer prisoners by date of capture as soon as possible. This, he
believed, would easily separate the potentially anti-Nazi officers from the stalwart Nazis
without tainting the individual reputations of the men with whom the Americans sought
to collaborate.55
While Washington tried to determine exactly what to do with the ‘anti-Nazi’
prisoners, Rapp continued his daily interaction with the generals. The most important
part of his mission involved speaking to the officers individually, where possible, and
assessing each man’s relative willingness to collaborate with American authorities.
Given Rapp’s short stay at Clinton, he admittedly had little time to properly evaluate the
individual generals. In fact, his reports to the PMGO in Washington only provide
assessments of nineteen of the thirty-one general officer prisoners then interned in
Mississippi. Yet, Rapp’s evaluations are important because they provided the basis for
American decisions about which generals would later be transferred to the newlyestablished re-education camp in Arkansas. Rapp’s reports are also notable because they
illustrate some differences with earlier British characterizations of some of these men as
well as the fact that they sometimes undermine Rapp’s own facile categorizations of the
“Afrikaner” and the “Franzosen” generals.
252
Rapp expressed pleasant surprise at how quickly he made connections with
“four or five generals who [were] willing to throw in their fortune” with American
authorities, although he stressed the need to provide these prisoners “complete security,
treatment compatible with their honor as soldiers, and certain recommended privileges.”
The most promising among these anti-Nazi prisoners, according to Rapp, were Botho
Elster and Ludwig Bieringer. Elster immediately informed Rapp that he realized the
purpose of the American captain’s mission and that Washington “could count on him
one hundred percent.” The general pointed to his decision to surrender 20,000 men as
evidence of his German, as opposed to Nazi patriotism, which he claimed prevented him
from supporting Hitler’s “government of hoodlums.” Elster assured Rapp that a
significant number of the generals at Clinton believed as he did and that if the Americans
showed patience and did not pressure them these men would eventually come forward as
well. Elster quickly introduced Rapp to a handful of other anti-Nazi generals and
arranged to provide the American captain with “inside information” from the officer’s
compound.56 It appeared that Rapp’s mission was going to pay dividends sooner than
expected.
Rapp described Bieringer as “the most intelligent and most cultured individual of
all the generals contacted thus far” and “one of the most outspoken anti-Hitler men in
this camp.” Like Elster, Bieringer felt “ashamed sometimes to belong to a nation who
had managed to put gangsters into a government seat.” With understandable skepticism,
Rapp asked the general why he and his colleagues had not done anything to resist the
Hitler regime in Germany if they had long held this attitude in regard to the Nazi
253
government. Bieringer resorted to the now familiar refrain that “as a professional soldier
it was against rules and etiquette to delve into politics” and that the German generals had
not awoken to the dangers presented by the Nazi regime until it was too late. While
Rapp did not find Bieringer’s response entirely satisfactory, he did recommend this
general as a strong candidate for collaborative activity with American authorities.57
Rapp also suggested the possibility of working with Admiral Henneke and
Generals Seyffardt, Badinski and von Liebenstein. Rapp saw Henneke as “an
impressive individual” with “a rather broad outlook on life and a fairly good cultural
background.” Henneke convinced Rapp that he was adamantly opposed to Hitler’s
government but echoed Bieringer in regard to the Wehrmacht officer corps’ lack of
opposition to National Socialism, stating that “as a soldier one obeys and does not
criticize.” Rapp thought Henneke might be useful in influencing German naval
prisoners in the United States, and played an instrumental role in effecting Henneke’s
transfer to Camp McCain, Mississippi, where the admiral joined other high-ranking
naval officers.58
The “congenial and happy go luck” Seyffardt also favorably impressed the
American captain. While he too openly expressed profoundly anti-Nazi sentiments,
Seyffardt emphasized how impressed he was by the American prosecution of the war
and the considerate manner in which he had been treated at Camp Clinton. Like
Seyffardt, the “loudmouthed and unpolished” Badinski showed a great deal of respect
for “such an excellent foe” as the United States military and openly spoke of his antiHitler views. Rapp saw Badinski as less of a prospect for psychological warfare,
254
however, both because of his lack of education and because he demonstrated no interest
in involving himself in politics, Camp Clinton’s or otherwise.59
For the Americans, one of the most intriguing of the prospective anti-Nazi
generals was von Liebenstein. Rapp’s basic characterization of the general as a cultured
and educated man of the arts coincided with that of the general’s British captors at Trent
Park. However, where CSDIC saw von Liebenstein as second only to von Thoma in
terms of his explicit opposition to Nazism and his willingness to collaborate with Allied
authorities, Rapp found his political expressions somewhat more subdued. In fact, Rapp
described von Liebenstein as a “very cautious man” and only “moderately anti-Nazi.”
This likely indicates that the environment of Camp Clinton was less accepting of antiNazi sentiments for a variety of reasons and that attitude made von Liebenstein less
comfortable expressing his political views. Curiously, Colonel Davison, Rapp’s superior
officer in the PMGO’s Special Projects Division, had suggested that Rapp solicit
information from CSDIC regarding those generals, like von Liebenstein and most of the
others at Clinton, who had previously been in British custody.60 It does not appear that
Rapp followed this advice. Had he done so, he would likely have recognized von
Liebenstein’s cautiousness as insecurity, rather than an indication of the level of his antiNazi political views. That von Liebenstein later emerged as an American favorite
suggests that either the general later became more forthright with his political orientation
or American officials finally consulted with their British counterparts, or both.
A large part of the reason that Camp Clinton may not have been as hospitable
toward the expression of anti-Nazi sentiments as Trent Park has to do with the
255
Mississippi camp’s composition. First, by late 1944, Clinton held over thirty general
officer prisoners as opposed to the thirteen men at Trent Park during the majority of von
Liebenstein’s time there. This may well have affected individual prisoner’s willingness
to speak out. Perhaps of more significance, however, was the way senior officer and
camp leader von Arnim exercised “a very severe command over the rest of the officers”
at Clinton.61 At Trent Park, the pro-Nazi views of von Arnim and his sycophant Crüwell
had been largely opposed by the majority of their peers, with the Nazi stalwarts
comprising only about four of the thirteen generals interned in the camp. At Clinton,
von Arnim wielded a great deal more influence. First, of the eighteen generals that Rapp
had occasion to evaluate during his month at Clinton, the American captain found only
six of them willing to openly express opposition to the Hitler regime, where eight of
them were openly pro-Nazi or at least staunch defenders of the German government
regardless of who was in charge. Five were unwilling to commit themselves. This
decidedly different prisoner environment, coupled with von Arnim’s espionage network
and threats of retaliation or court-martial after the war, may have hushed a number of
otherwise vocal Nazi opponents.
Consequently, the Americans viewed von Arnim as being considerably more
sinister than did the British, who had largely seen him as pathetic. Rapp described von
Arnim as “very much pro-Nazi” and possessing “a rather genuine dislike for everything
the United States stands for.” Rapp did not find von Arnim to be particularly intelligent
or well-educated and concluded that he would never have reached such a high rank in
the Wehrmacht if he had not been such “a good Nazi and only took command after
256
everything was lost in Tunisia.” General von Sponeck concurred with Rapp’s
assessment. In his memoirs, he ridiculed von Arnim’s support of the Hitler regime and
claimed that he never understood why von Arnim had been chosen to succeed Rommel
in North Africa. “I disliked [von Arnim] from the beginning,” wrote von Sponeck.
Apparently, von Sponeck was not alone. Despite von Arnim’s control of the officer’s
compound, there appears to have been some internal resistance to his authority. Rapp
reported that “the instigations of many officers personally opposed to General von
Arnim” succeeded in having him replaced as camp spokesman with General Neuling in
late November 1944. The aging, perhaps somewhat senile Neuling, while declaring no
political affiliations whatsoever, was at least extremely well liked by his fellow generals.
He immediately improved relations with the American camp administration by cutting
down on the number of petty requests made to McIlhenny and his staff.62
This change in camp leadership, however, appears to have been an isolated
incident. The majority of the prisoners remained either committed National Socialists or
kept their political persuasions to themselves. One prisoner, von Aulock, feigned a lack
of interest in politics in order to keep a low profile. Some of his fellow prisoners
informed Rapp that von Aulock had only recently been an SS-Obergruppenführer (the
SS equivalent to a three-star general) who had been “transferred ‘in grade’ to the Army
to avoid possible detection and punishment.” Unfortunately, Rapp’s informants did not
make clear what von Aulock may have done to warrant possible punishment after the
war.63
257
Two of the generals continued to puzzle Allied observers. Carl Köchy had been
the most vocal opponent of the Nazi regime among the general officer prisoners
questioned by American interrogators at Byron Hot Springs in June 1943. At Camp
Clinton in late 1944, Köchy was still “very dignified and polished” and appeared to
“choose his friends from amongst the ‘pro United States’ generals.” Yet, Rapp
contended that the German airman had “lost contact with reality” because of the year
and a half in which he had been a prisoner of war and that Köchy had become reluctant
to share his true political opinions, if he had any at all.64
Ludwig Crüwell remained the greatest mystery. The CSDIC operatives who
evaluated him at Trent Park held him in extremely low regard, on one occasion even
using the term “moron” to describe him. They saw him as a rabid supporter of the Nazi
regime and one of the British camp’s biggest troublemakers. Curiously, Rapp’s
assessment of Crüwell was quite different. Like the British, Rapp noted that Crüwell
suffered from “barbed wire disease.” But Rapp portrayed Crüwell as “very well read”
and “very interested in English and American literature.” In contrast to his alleged
“snake-in-the-grass” instigations at Trent Park, Rapp found the general to be a “cautious
and careful man” who refused to openly proclaim his political views. And where the
British continually remarked on Crüwell’s pro-Nazi stance and his sycophantic nature
with von Arnim, Rapp wondered if Crüwell might actually harbor some anti-Nazi
sentiments and thought the general was “certainly worth watching” for potential
willingness to collaborate with the American authorities.65
258
Following the conclusion of Rapp’s secret mission at Camp Clinton, U.S. War
Department officials articulated a new program for the German prisoner of war generals
in February 1945. Washington now found it imperative to segregate the potentially
cooperative generals from those deemed uncooperative or even hostile to American
ideals. Indeed, Major General Archer L. Lerch, the Provost Marshal General, argued
that the cooperative prisoners needed to be transferred to an entirely different camp in
order for the program to be successful. While a number of possible locations for this
special camp were considered, including Logan Field Camp located on the harbor in
Baltimore, Maryland, the PMGO ultimately chose the newly-commissioned Camp
Dermott, Arkansas, in part because they believed the camp’s accommodations could
easily be made to exceed those provided at Camp Clinton.66
The next order of business involved selecting the “cooperative” prisoners to be
transferred. Washington based their general perspectives of each of the senior officer
prisoners on Captain Rapp’s earlier evaluations. Yet, considering his short stay at
Clinton and his inability to properly assess all of the compound’s occupants, the PMGO
needed further information in order to make appropriate choices. Ludwig Bieringer
must have continued to impress American authorities after Rapp’s departure. Not only
was Bieringer included in the group to be transferred to Arkansas, but Washington
officials heavily relied on his opinion in choosing which of his fellow prisoners of war
would accompany him. Ultimately, five general officer prisoners from Camp Clinton
were chosen for transfer to Camp Dermott: Bieringer, Elster, von Liebenstein, von
Sponeck and von Vaerst.67
259
Considering Rapp’s high opinion of Bieringer and Elster, their selection was not
surprising. Rapp found these two men to be the most cooperative generals at Camp
Clinton and the most vocal opponents of National Socialism. Rapp found von
Liebenstein to be cautious but likely to be cooperative as well. So, the addition of his
name to the list should be no surprise either, especially considering that he was a favorite
at Trent Park and the Americans likely consulted with their British counterparts at some
point in the selection process. The selection of von Sponeck and von Vaerst are a bit
more surprising, perhaps because neither man had been evaluated by Captain Rapp. Von
Sponeck had shown some opposition to Nazism while at Trent Park, although he had
largely restricted his comments to his closest confidants, where von Vaerst had declared
himself a Nazi while at Byron Hot Springs. The only evidence to suggest that von
Vaerst might have harbored anti-Nazi sympathies was his earlier request for books by
Walter Lippmann. The selection of these five men also undermines Rapp’s conclusions
about “Afrikaner” generals being Nazi sympathizers and “Franzosen” generals being
defeatists. Of these five, two were “Franzosen” and three were “Afrikaner.”
The final aspects of the program for the generals involved the use of “specially
selected media,” including newspapers, magazines, books and films, to politically
reorient the generals remaining at Camp Clinton. The program also involved university
lecturers, a carefully chosen prisoner of war chaplain, and a suitable officer prisoner to
conduct English courses in the generals’ compound. Curiously, as late of March 1945,
the proposal to replace Colonel McIlhenny as Clinton’s commanding officer with a more
qualified American general officer was still circulating, but it never came to fruition.68
260
The Allied victories in Normandy had brought significantly more general officer
prisoners to Camp Clinton. The quadrupling of the camp’s population had in turn
prompted Washington to reconsider its relationship with these men. Could they be
useful in ending the war more expeditiously through psychological warfare? Would
they be influential in turning the thousands of lower-ranking German POWs in the
United States away from National Socialism? American officials initially thought so.
They finally addressed the many criticisms of Camp Clinton and sought to make a more
favorable impression on the German generals in their custody. Washington even
carefully selected a handful of these men for special re-education purposes. Yet, while
the American relationship with Wehrmacht general officers would continue to expand as
the war came to an end, it would not be along the lines laid out by Washington officials
in February 1945. Instead, new faces would arrive that would push the collaborative
efforts of American captors and German captives in a new direction.
Notes
1
War Diary, June 1944, WO 165/41, the National Archives of the United Kingdom (hereafter
TNA), Kew, Richmond, Surrey, United Kingdom; Report of Visit to POW Base Camp on 20,
21, 22 August 1944, RG 389, Entry 459A, Box 1611, National Archives and Records
Administration (Hereafter NARA), College Park, Maryland.
2
First Detailed Interrogation of General of Infantry Neuling, Ferdinand; First Detailed
Interrogation of Brig-Gen Bieringer, Ludwig, RG 165, Entry 179, Box 656; Transfer of General
Prisoner of War, 30 August 1944, RG 389, Entry 461, Box 2477, NARA.
261
3
Transfer of German Officer Prisoner of War, 19 September 1944, RG 389, Entry 461, Box
2477, NARA.
4
Letter from von Arnim to Commanding Officer, P.O.W. Camp Clinton, 5 October 1944; Letter
from Colonel McIlhenny to the Provost Marshal General, 6 October 1944; Letter from Army
Services Force to Commanding General, Fourth Service Command, 13 October 1944, RG 389,
Entry 451, Box 1259, NARA.
5
Letter from Swiss Legation to Brigadier General B.M. Bryan, 26 September 1944; Letter from
Colonel Francis E. Howard to Special War Problems Division, U.S. Department of State, 25
October 1944, RG 389, Entry 451, Box 1259, NARA.
6
Captain Heinkel’s handwritten notes regarding Sinkel, 28 September 1944, RG 389, Entry 451,
Box 1259, NARA.
7
Letter from von Arnim to the Legation of Switzerland, 28 September 1944, RG 59, Entry 1353,
Box 24, NARA.
8
Prisoner of War Officers, 29 November 1944, RG 389, Entry 459A, Box 1611, NARA.
9
Memorandum on Visit to POW Camp, Clinton, Mississippi, 12-13 July 1944, RG 165, Entry
383.6, Box 590, NARA.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Handwritten notes from Captain Walter Rapp, 12 September 1944, RG 389, Entry 459A, Box
1611, NARA.
262
16
Visit of Mr. Weingärtner and Mr. Mason to Prisoner of War Camp, Camp Clinton,
Mississippi, 19 July 1944, RG 165, Entry 383.6, Box 590, NARA.
17
Ibid.
18
Memorandum on Visit to POW Camp, Clinton, Mississippi, 12-13 July 1944, RG 165, Entry
383.6, Box 590, NARA.
19
Ibid.
20
Letter from Major Howard W. Smith, Jr. to Chief of Engineers, War Department, 9 August
1944; Letter from Colonel Moses E. Cox, Corps of Engineers to Chief of Engineers, 18
September 1944, RG 389, Entry 457, Box 1420; Report on Prisoners of War Camp, Clinton,
Mississippi, 5 August 1944, RG 389, Entry 461, Box 2658, NARA.
21
Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, W.D.G.S., 26 August 1944, RG 389, Entry
459A, Box 1611; Memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands, 19 August
1944, RG 389, Entry 457, Box 1420, NARA.
22
Letter from Colonel James L. McIlhenny to Commanding General, Fourth Service Command,
12 August 1944, RG 389, Entry 457, Box 1420, NARA.
23
Memorandum for the Assistant Provost Marshal General, 7 September 1944, RG 389, Entry
461, Box 2658, NARA.
24
Report of Visit to POW Base Camp on 20, 21, 22 August 1944, RG 389, Entry 459A, Box
1611, NARA.
25
Memorandum for the Assistant Provost Marshal General, 7 September 1944, RG 389, Entry
461, Box 2658, NARA.
26
August Viktor von Quast was listed as a “General Major” in the inspection report, although the
report explained that von Quast had been “promoted after he was captured. Rank therefore not
263
recognized as ‘of right.’” Prisoner of War Camp, Camp Clinton, Mississippi, 10-11 January
1945, RG 389, Entry 461, Box 2658, NARA.
27
Prisoner of War Camp, Camp Clinton, Mississippi, 10-11 January 1945, RG 389, Entry 461,
Box 2658, NARA; Karl Friedrich Hildebrand, Die Generale der deutschen Luftwaffe 1935-1945:
Die militärischen Werdegänge der Flieger-, Flakartillerie-, Fallschirmjäger-, Luftnachrichtenund Ingenieur-Offiziere einschließlich der Ärzte, Richter, Intendanten und Ministerialbeamten
im Generalsrang (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1990), 309-310.
28
Memorandum for Director, Security and Investigation Division, 15 June 1945, RG 389, Entry
461, Box 2479; Letter from Stephen M. Farrand to the International Committee of the Red
Cross, 27 April 1945, RG 389, Entry 451, Box 1340, NARA.
29
“High-Ranking Nazi General Dies Sunday at Clinton Camp: Autopsy Performed on
Commander of Panzer Division,” Clarion-Ledger, 3 July 1945; “Ex-POW Returns to camp at
Clinton,” Clarion Ledger, 5 August 1979; German Prisoners of War Interred in the United
States, 11 October 1954, RG 389, Entry 467, Box 1513, NARA; Curiously, the official German
records state that Borowietz’s cause of death was a “fatal accident,” although this was likely
taken from the initial official reports coming from American camp authorities—Borowietz, MSg
109/263, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg i.Br. (Hereafter, BA-MA).
30
Prisoner of War Camp, Camp Clinton, Mississippi, 10-11 January 1945, RG 389, Entry 461,
Box 2658; Memorandum from General Blackshear M. Bryan regarding Glennan General
Hospital, 8 September 1944, RG 389, Entry 457, Box 1422, NARA; Dermot Bradley, KarlFriedrich Hildebrand and Markus Rövekamp. Die Generale des Heeres, 19211945 (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1993), 506-507; Gutknecht, MSg 109/886, BA-MA.
31
Homicide and Suicide Rates for Prisoners of War, 24 April 1945, RG 389, Entry 467, Box
1513, NARA.
264
32
Natural Death of German General Officer Prisoner of War, 6 April 1945, RG 389, Entry 467,
Box 1513, NARA; “Nazi General Buried in Mississippi with Full Military Rites,” Clarion
Ledger, 9 April 1945.
33
Prisoner of War Camp, Camp Clinton, Mississippi, 10-11 January 1945, RG 389, Entry 461,
Box 2658; Handwritten letter from Charles Eberhardt to Bernard Gufler, 14 January 1945, RG
59, Entry 1353, Box 24, NARA.
34
Prisoner of War Camp, Camp Clinton, Mississippi, 10-11 January 1945, RG 389, Entry 461,
Box 2658; Handwritten letter from Charles Eberhardt to Bernard Gufler, 14 January 1945, RG
59, Entry 1353, Box 24, NARA.
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid.
37
Camp Clinton, Mississippi, Visited by Mr. P. Schnyder and Dr. M. Zehnder on 1 February
1945, RG 59, Entry 1353, Box 24, NARA.
38
German Generals in United States Custody, Memorandum, Special War Problems Division, 8
August 1944, Farrand Collection, Box 1, Hoover Institution Archives.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
41
Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America, 196-197.
42
Memorandum for Major Davison, 28 September 1944, RG 389, Entry 459A, Box 1611,
NARA.
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
265
46
Reorientation, POW Camp, Clinton, Mississippi, 8 September 1944, RG 165, Entry 383.6,
Box 590, NARA.
47
Reorientation of German prisoners of war, Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1,
3 February 1945, RG 165, Entry 383.6, Box 590; Memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Service Commands, 16 November 1944, RG 389, Entry 459A, Box 1611, NARA.
48
Memorandum of telephone conversation, 20 November 1944, RG 59, Entry 1353, Box 24;
Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, from F.M. Smith, assistant to Major General
W.D. Styer, undated (likely October 1944), RG 165, Entry 383.6, Box 590, NARA.
49
Memorandum Concerning the Special Projects Branch of the Office of the Provost Marshal
General, 16 December 1944, Farrand Collection, Box 1, Hoover Institution Archives.
50
Temporary Duty of Captain Walter H. Rapp, 15 November 1944; Weekly Progress Report No.
1, Prisoner of War Camp, Clinton, Mississippi, 27 November 1944, RG 389, Entry 459A, Box
1611, NARA.
51
Weekly Progress Report No. 2, Prisoner of War Camp, Clinton, Mississippi, 8 December
1944, RG 389, Entry 459A, Box 1611, NARA.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.
55
Ibid.
56
Weekly Progress Report No. 1, Prisoner of War Camp, Clinton, Mississippi, 27 November
1944, RG 389, Entry 459A, Box 1611, NARA.
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid.
59
Ibid.
266
60
Weekly Progress Report No. 2, Prisoner of War Camp, Clinton, Mississippi, 8 December
1944; Special Progress Report No. 1, Memorandum for Captain Walter H. Rapp, 7 December
1944, RG 389, Entry 459A, Box 1611, NARA.
61
Weekly Progress Report No. 1, Prisoner of War Camp, Clinton, Mississippi, 27 November
1944, RG 389, Entry 459A, Box 1611, NARA.
62
Weekly Progress Report No. 1, Prisoner of War Camp, Clinton, Mississippi, 27 November
1944; Weekly Progress Report No. 2, Prisoner of War Camp, Clinton, Mississippi, 8 December
1944; RG 389, Entry 459A, Box 1611, NARA; Theodor Graf von Sponeck, Meine
Erinnerungen, 180, MSg 1/3329, BA-MA.
63
Weekly Progress Report No. 2, Prisoner of War Camp, Clinton, Mississippi, 8 December
1944, RG 389, Entry 459A, Box 1611, NARA.
64
Ibid.
65
Weekly Progress Report No. 1, Prisoner of War Camp, Clinton, Mississippi, 27 November
1944, RG 389, Entry 459A, Box 1611, NARA.
66
Memorandum for Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands, A.S.F., from Archer L. Lerch,
the Provost Marshal General, 20 February 1945; Memorandum for the Director, Prisoner of War
Special Projects Division, 9 February 1945; Memorandum for Record from Edward Davison,
Director, Prisoner of War Special Projects Division, RG 389, Entry 459A, Box 1611, NARA.
67
Memorandum for the Director, Prisoner of War Special Projects Division, 9 February 1945,
RG 389, Entry 459A, Box 1611, NARA.
68
Memorandum for the Director, Prisoner of War Special Projects Division, 9 February 1945,
RG 389, Entry 459A, Box 1611; Memorandum for Colonel Bernays from War Department
General Staff, 12 March 1945, RG 165, Entry 383.6, Box 590, NARA.
267
CHAPTER VII
RE-EDUCATING HITLER’S GENERALS?
With the prospect of Germany’s defeat on the horizon, Washington finally
decided to put its captive enemy generals to use. Generals Gustav von Vaerst, Ludwig
Bieringer, Botho Elster, Theodore Graf von Sponeck and Kurt Freiherr von Liebenstein
departed Camp Clinton on 28 March 1945. American personnel drove the prisoners
almost 150 miles from the generals’ compound in Mississippi to the newly-established
officers’ camp outside Dermott, Arkansas.1 Despite the intention of the Provost Marshal
General’s Office to accommodate the most cooperative German generals in a camp that
rivaled Britain’s Trent Park, these prisoners found life in Arkansas worse in some
respects than they had in Mississippi.
The transfer of these five men constituted the first step in American plans to use
German general officers for psychological warfare and for the purpose of influencing
lower-ranking German POWs in American custody. The U.S. War Department
specifically chose Camp Dermott, a former relocation center for Japanese Americans in
the custody of the WRA, because it “provided an opportunity to better the internment
conditions of these general officers without excessive expenditure.” In fact, Washington
initially believed that accommodations at Dermott compared “favorably with the
buildings occupied by the German generals in England.”2
In the fall of 1944, officials from the PMGO met with War Relocation Authority
personnel, who had previously been responsible for the camp, to develop a plan to
268
convert the existing facilities into a functioning prisoner of war camp. Camp Dermott
consisted of almost a thousand acres of relatively flat land a few miles south of Dermott,
a town of a few thousand people in southeast Arkansas. The PMGO designated thirteen
buildings, with four apartments each, “for possible future occupancy by German prisoner
of war general officers.” Each apartment consisted of one or two bedrooms, a living
room, kitchen, bathroom with a shower, hardwood floors and both a front and back door.
In light of the contentions over the condition of the generals’ quarters at Camp Clinton,
it was especially significant that the walls and ceilings of all of the apartments at
Dermott were completely insulated. Given the camp’s layout and specifications,
Dermott could easily house dozens of general officer prisoners with their aides and
orderlies in adjoining quarters. This feature appeared especially appealing considering
the trouble at Clinton with the generals’ aides moving between the compounds and
sharing information with the rest of the camp.3
Despite these features, American authorities quickly discovered that Camp
Dermott’s accommodations were not as impressive as they originally believed. The land
surrounding the buildings was unattractive, most of it having been overtaken by weeds,
and most of the wooden walkways connecting the buildings had fallen apart. The
biggest problem was that the WRA had stripped the camp of most its material and
equipment when the relocation center, previously designated “Camp Jerome,” had
closed a few months earlier. A November inspection by PMGO officials declared that,
in its present state, Camp Dermott did not compare favorably with Camp Clinton, much
269
less Trent Park, and estimated that it would take at least three months to bring facilities
up to an acceptable level for housing general officer prisoners.4
Authorities in Washington were undeterred. War Department officials believed
that Camp Dermott would make an excellent site for the cooperative general officer
prisoners and simply delayed their plans to relocate these men until the buildings and
grounds in Arkansas could be renovated. Yet, because of the number of POWs coming
to the United States in the months following the invasion of Normandy in June, the
PMGO activated Camp Dermott immediately and had placed almost 2,000 lowerranking officer prisoners there by mid-November 1944.5
Initially, Camp Dermott was a different kind of POW camp. American officials
sought to foster a more democratic environment not only through prescribed intellectual
diversions for the prisoners but also in the way the camp was constructed. Frank
Stoltzfus of the Y.M.C.A., who inspected the camp in mid-December 1944, praised
Dermott’s open atmosphere, saying that one could move “over a wide area within the
wire fence without the annoying additional blocked-off areas of barbed wire enclosures.”
The officers’ camp was divided into four compounds “but one would not know of it,”
claimed Stoltzfus, “because there [were] no fences to block passage from one to another,
and the movement everywhere [was] free and easy for one and all.”6
The Y.M.C.A. inspector was also impressed by Dermott’s commanding officer,
Colonel Victor W. B. Wales. Stoltzfus described Wales as “a person of broad
sympathies and deep understanding” and claimed that he had rarely seen prisoners of
war “express such wholehearted admiration for their camp commander.” Wales, a
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graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, had apparently won the respect of the German
officers in his custody by attending the funeral of one of their fellow prisoners and
greeting the prisoner population of over 2,000 men “face to face.” Stoltzfus was so
impressed by Wales that he arranged to have the Y.M.C.A. temporarily loan Camp
Dermott money for the purchase of some necessary supplies. Wales had cited funding
problems as the main reason that he had not done more for the prisoners by December
1944 and Stoltzfus chose to help because of his trust in Wales’ personal character,
saying that “it [was] very fortunate indeed that the conduct of this German ‘officers’
camp [was] entrusted to such a person” as Colonel Wales.7
The appointment of a commanding officer of Wales’ caliber was certainly
influenced by lessons the PMGO had learned from dealing with Camp Clinton’s
commandant, James McIlhenny. Numerous critics of McIlhenny had suggested
replacing him with an American general officer, preferably a graduate of the Military
Academy, who was cultured, well-traveled and who could deal with the German general
officer prisoners as an equal. Placing Wales, a high-ranking, academy-educated
American officer with sympathetic views of the prisoners, in charge of the operation at
Dermott addressed these longstanding concerns about McIlhenny. Despite Wales’ not
being a general officer, he epitomized in all other respects the type of commandant that
many in the War Department thought most appropriate for dealing with the German
generals.
The camp’s open physical arrangement, on the other hand, reflected the mission
of the American “re-education” program at Camp Dermott. One of the stated goals of
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the War Department’s new relationship with the Wehrmacht general officer prisoners
was using these men to influence lower-ranking prisoners in the United States in favor of
American democratic ideals. Undoubtedly, allowing the prisoner population of
Dermott’s four prisoner compounds to freely mix without barbed wire restrictions
allowed the generals to have direct contact with and presumably a strong influence on
their subordinate officers in the camp. This arrangement also promoted American
lessons about democracy by removing one of the authoritarian aspects of the camp.
Unfortunately for both American officials and sympathetic German prisoners,
this arrangement had unintended consequences. In late February 1945, Captain William
F. Raugust evaluated Camp Dermott for the PMGO’s Special Projects Division, which
was responsible for the re-education program. Raugust found the social and intellectual
environment at the Arkansas camp somewhat paradoxical. On one hand, since the chief
goal of the re-education program was to instill in the prisoners an appreciation for
democratic ideals and western civilization, Camp Dermott represented a model for
intellectual diversions. The camp’s library already held an impressive 6,500 volumes at
the time of Raugust’s visit and the assistant executive officer in charge of the program
had ordered another $25,000 worth of books to add to this collection. Moreover, a large
theater had been constructed that showed two motion pictures each week. But the most
impressive aspect of the camp and the focal point of the American operation was
“Dermott Camp University.” Astoundingly, Camp officials dedicated fourteen buildings
to an educational program that offered 600 different courses on 200 subjects and
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featured 150 professors. Of the 3,156 prisoners living at Camp Dermott, approximately
2,000, or close to two-thirds of the prisoners, had enrolled in at least one class.8
Yet, in spite of the high level of prisoner participation in the educational
program, the open and accessible nature of the camp aggravated an ongoing political
divide among the prisoners. Captain Raugust stated that there was “every indication that
an underground movement [was] in the process of being formed in both the officers’ and
enlisted men’s compound.” Camp officials believed that Nazi sympathizers were using
so-called “honor courts,” in which they tried and punished their political opponents, to
establish control of the camp’s population, and violence had broken out among the
enlisted prisoners. Indeed, American authorities tried seventeen German enlisted men
for assaulting fellow prisoners. In one such incident, the perpetrators brazenly held two
American guards in the corner of the barracks so they could not interfere with the
beating of another prisoner.9
To make matters worse, the PMGO soon planned to transfer an additional six
hundred officer prisoners to Dermott from Camp Alva, Oklahoma. The War Department
had designated Alva as an American camp for Nazi agitators, and SS prisoners
constituted a sizable portion of the camp’s population. Raugust feared that the transfer
of these six hundred potentially troublesome prisoners would only exacerbate the
circumstances at Camp Dermott. Two prisoners at Dermott, Colonel Wilhelm Ludwig
and Lieutenant Hans-Joachim Wolf, who had previously been interned at Camp Alva,
claimed to have been “subjected to considerable political pressure from Gestapo and
Schutzstaffel members” there. According to these prisoners, “super-Nazis virtually
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controlled the actions” of the other men at Camp Alva “by threatening violence to the
less fanatical prisoners and to their families in Germany.” Moreover, these Nazi thugs at
Alva had organized an underground movement to encourage escapes, sabotage and carry
on active resistance once the German military collapsed.10
The testimony regarding Nazi activity at Camp Alva and the planned transfer of
hundreds of prisoners from that camp to Dermott raise questions about American
motivations. It seems puzzling that the War Department would introduce large numbers
of prisoners from a “Nazi” camp into the population of a re-education camp specifically
established for cooperative officers. Most likely, a shortage of housing for the flood of
prisoners coming to the United States in late 1944 and early 1945 compelled Washington
to take advantage of Dermott’s potential to house up to 10,000 prisoners and forced U.S.
officials to send German officers to Arkansas regardless of their political persuasions.
Remarkably, American officials do not appear to have anticipated the danger of
placing hardcore “Nazis” in the same camp with cooperative prisoners. A special report
on the “Morale Status of War Prisoners” in February 1945 estimated that Nazi “superfanatics” already comprised about 10 percent of Camp Dermott’s prisoner population.
But the camp assistant executive officer dismissed this dangerous minority as “a
relatively small number to control effectively the remaining 90 percent to the point
where either resistance or information would not be provided by the many other groups
present.”11 Washington must have believed that the prisoners soon to arrive from Alva,
as well as the Nazi malcontents already housed at Dermott, would be positively
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influenced by the educational program and the majority population of openly anti-Nazi
prisoners.
This disregard for the potential danger of mixing pro- and anti-Nazi prisoner
elements is especially remarkable considering the time and attention paid to carefully
selecting the right general officer prisoners to be transferred from Clinton to Dermott in
March 1945. Walter Rapp devoted over a month at Clinton to evaluating the generals
and chose what he believed to be the five most cooperative senior officers. The War
Department then took the extra step of sending furniture and accumulated items with the
generals in covered trucks to make their new quarters as comfortable for them as
possible.12 This was a significant effort by American officials to carefully choose and
transfer general officers if these men were then to be placed in a camp environment that
was considerably more contentious than the one they left.
Given the influx of bad elements coming to Dermott in the spring of 1945, it is
not surprising that the camp environment deteriorated further. Captain Raugust returned
to Camp Dermott in mid-April 1945, only a few weeks after the five generals arrived, to
follow up on the problems he first observed two months earlier. By the time of his
second visit, Dermott’s political environment had changed significantly for the worse.
During the past two months, 1700 additional prisoners had been transferred to Camp
Dermott. Half of these new arrivals had come from Camp Alva as originally planned
and the other half from Camp Mexia, Texas. Astonishingly, War Department officials
had chosen the worst of the lot from both camps for transfer to Dermott. Raugust
described the approximately 850 transfers from Mexia as “Afrika Korps men who would
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not permit any of their number to either read American newspapers or listen to American
news broadcasts.” The American inspector believed these men were hardcore German
patriots who were “utterly unaware of the changed conditions in Germany since their
capture two years ago.”13
The new arrivals from Alva were even worse. Raugust reported that many in this
group were high-ranking officers who were “members of the Gestapo, SS men, and
young fanatics. These men and the Mexia prisoners of war formed secret societies such
as the Werewolves,” according to Raugust, and “their aim was to maintain discipline and
terrorize every prisoner of war in the camp.” The Alva and Mexia prisoners “attempted
rigid censorship of all reading material” and plotted to assassinate some of their fellow
prisoners at Camp Dermott. One of the men on their hit list was General Elster. Elster
had been chastised by some of his fellow generals at Camp Clinton, von Arnim in
particular, for having surrendered 20,000 men to a much smaller American force in
France. His new campmates sought to eliminate him as punishment for this “treason.”
Dermott officials had to take special precautions to protect Elster as well as other
prisoners who had been threatened, including the camp spokesman and other highranking officers.14
The War Department had placed the most cooperative German generals in a far
more dangerous environment and undermined the effectiveness of the reorientation
program. Part of the Special Projects Division’s overall re-education plan involved the
circulation of a special news magazine, titled Der Ruf (“The Call”), into German POW
camps throughout the United States. The magazine was prepared entirely by carefully
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selected anti-Nazi officer prisoners at a special camp in Rhode Island called “the Idea
Factory.” It offered realistic reports of the progress of the war, the state of the German
homefront and an introduction to American culture and democratic values. Raugust
observed that the “terrorists” at Camp Dermott had discouraged the sale of Der Ruf “to
the point where it was unsafe for a prisoner of war to be seen buying or reading that
magazine.” Furthermore, Raugust stated that “organized plots [had] been made against
American personnel, including plans to take over the camp,” and Colonel Wales “did not
feel that he could quell the anticipated disturbances by prisoners of war on V-E Day with
his present personnel.” He requested one hundred well-trained soldiers be sent to Camp
Dermott immediately and that a battalion of troops at nearby Camp Robinson be
prepared to arrive in case of emergency. The existing camp guard personnel had been
on alert for several weeks prior to Raugust’s visit.15
Apparently, where the Y.M.C.A. inspector had previously lauded the open
atmosphere of the camp, Raugust now found at least one enclosure separated by barbed
wire. As part of the plan to protect General Elster and others as well as to restore some
order to the camp, Wales and his staff segregated almost two hundred “ringleaders” into
a separate compound. They hoped that by removing these “Nazi” instigators, the
plotting and threats against other prisoners would cease. Indeed, this seemed to
ameliorate some of the harshest aspects of Nazi intimidation, but Dermott camp officials
stated that a “fanatical Nazi element in this camp” remained “significantly influential” as
late as September 1945, five months after Raugust’s report.16
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It is unclear why the War Department transferred some of the worst “Nazi”
troublemakers in the United States to what was initially intended to be a reorientation
camp for cooperative prisoners. Certainly, American officials could not have believed
that the cooperative German officers, including the five generals, at Dermott would be a
positive influence on the “terrorists” from Alva and Mexia. Indeed, it seems much more
likely that authorities in Washington changed their minds about what to do with Camp
Dermott and the general officer prisoners, or perhaps had never really made up their
minds in the first place.
As late as mid-January 1945, officers in the Special Projects Division still had no
clearly defined policy regarding how they might use the German generals. In a
memorandum dated 15 January 1945, Captain Rapp recommended to Colonel Davison
that “immediate steps be taken to outline clearly the future utilization of German general
prisoners of war.” Rapp questioned what the War Department meant by the term
“psychological warfare” and what its ultimate goals might be in this regard.
Furthermore, he recognized that a large number of enlisted POWs in the United States
were “seriously concerned about our possible utilization of German generals for
immediate or postwar use,” and suggested that some of this apprehension might be
relieved if American officials could offer a clearer picture of their intentions.17
Curiously, Washington still seemed to be struggling to decide.
The War Department had established Camp Dermott as a re-education camp for
cooperative officer prisoners in the fall of 1944. At the same time, department officials
had also planned the careful selection and transfer of the most cooperative general
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officer prisoners to join this group in Arkansas. Because of the need to renovate
Dermott, however, the generals could not be transferred until the spring of 1945.
Curiously, during this three to four month delay, the Special Projects Division solicited
the opinions of the officer and enlisted prisoners interned at the “Idea Factory” in Rhode
Island regarding potential American use of German generals in a variety of roles. The
prisoners at the Rhode Island camp had been watched for several months before their
selection for transfer to the “Factory,” and American authorities deemed these men to be
the most strongly anti-Nazi, as well as some of the most intelligent and educated
prisoners in American custody. Washington found their opinions revealing.
The prisoners at the Factory argued against the use of German generals in almost
any capacity. Lieutenant Dr. L. F. Mueller reminded his American captors that “only
those military personalities were promoted by Hitler who justified the highest claims of
political trustworthiness, indeed of energy, in a national-socialistic sense” and that this
was particularly true of those appointed general officers. Mueller also argued that the
generals would “find neither listeners nor a following in any degree among the German
people after the war and defeat.” He claimed that stalwart Nazis would be skeptical of
any collaborative general’s motives and likely brand him “a contracted traitor for the
enemy.” The German civilian population, on the other hand, would shun them,
according to Mueller, because they were likely to blame the generals for the enormous
sacrifices Germany had been forced to make during and after the war. He found “no
positive or valued ability or practical knowledge among the persons of the German
generals that one could not also find among trustworthy and irreproachable circles of the
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German people.” Mueller concluded by emphatically declaring “the use of German
generals by the Allies for any sort of task whatsoever contrary to the aims of this war,
furthermore as dangerous, unsuitable and unnecessary.”18
An anonymous group of officers, an individual officer named Lieutenant
Birkhauser, and a group of enlisted men, all prisoners at the “Factory,” also offered
separate statements regarding the German generals. All of these statements echoed
Mueller’s sentiments opposing American use of German generals for re-educating other
prisoners of war or the reconstruction of postwar German society. All three of the
statements issued by these respective groups cited the impossibility of divesting German
general officers of their militaristic beliefs. The officers contended that among
Americans “the wrong conceptions about German generals [had] been created” and that
“the exposition of generals in connection with postwar Germany and re-education of
prisoners of war [was] a dangerous undertaking.” They concluded that the previous
twelve years under Nazi rule in Germany had “definitely and unequivocally shown how
difficult it [was] to direct the steps of high ranking German military personalities
towards non-aggressive political tendencies and for international cooperation and
democratic ideas.” In a similar refrain, Birkhauser added his belief that a German
general would always remain “a man who finds the core of his life in the development
and fulfillment of military power.” Citing historical precedent, the enlisted men offered
what may have been the most cogent argument against German generals taking a role in
any kind of anti-militaristic reconstruction or re-education plan. They observed that
“after the collapse of the Bismarck Reich in 1918, the attempt was made to build a state
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which would serve the interests of the masses. It is noteworthy that generals did not
make any positive contribution to this rebuilding.” In fact, they pointed out, the generals
quickly “began to support the organized powers which were aimed against the young
republic.”19
These statements also revealed skepticism about the sincerity of any of the
generals’ professions of opposition to National Socialism. The officers at the “Factory”
observed that “a German general who declares himself in the U.S.A. as anti-Nazi
combines with such a position a definite political aim, and he will from time to time
attempt to gain a position similar to that of General von Seydlitz in Russia.” Lieutenant
Birkhauser and the enlisted men both insisted that any high-ranking officers opposed to
Nazism had already been removed by the Hitler regime prior to the war. They
determined that while the general officers “may now loathe Hitler and despise the Nazi
Party,” it was “not because [Hitler] wanted to make the Reich a world-dominating
power, but because [he] failed to do so.”20
The anti-Nazi prisoners at the “Factory” closed by asserting that the general
officers had lost the respect of their men because of their dogged allegiance to Hitler’s
policies. They opined that “millions of German soldiers [had] experienced in this war . .
. how German generals have foolishly sacrificed their men in order to execute the orders
and plans for conquest of the ‘Führer.’” This betrayal, they continued, had been “burned
deeply in the hearts of German soldiers.” And they stated that in this regard there was
“no difference of opinion between anti-Nazis and other prisoners.” The “Factory”
prisoners concluded by suggesting that “the only possibility to make use of a prisoner of
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war German general would be to use him for influencing nationalistic minded German
officers in Allied prisoner of war camps,” something the Americans were apparently
attempting to do at Camp Dermott .21
In addition to soliciting the opinions of the most trusted German prisoners of war
in American custody, the War Department also sought the opinion of Colonel Truman
Smith. Smith had spent a number of years living in Berlin in the late 1930s, serving as
the American military attaché to Nazi Germany. While he appeared less critical of the
character of German generals than did the prisoners at the “Factory,” Smith was equally
pessimistic about the program’s potential for success. Citing the “lack of a national
policy on the ultimate disposition and future of Germany as a nation,” Smith argued that
American authorities were “not in a position to offer anything to these German general
officers at this time.” Therefore, he concluded that any long term reorientation of the
generals in the United States would be unsuccessful. He did recommend, however, “the
creation of a relationship with these officers that would permit [the United States] to
achieve maximum benefits from their services once a national policy [was] established.”
To foster this relationship, Smith again suggested the appointment of an American
general as commanding officer at Camp Clinton and that other American generals make
formal courtesy calls to visit the German generals interned there. Curiously, Smith
opposed the plan to segregate some of the generals by transferring them to a different
camp like Dermott.22
By February 1945, a month before the five generals were slated to be transferred
to Dermott from Camp Clinton, the War Department had been advised against using
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even the most collaborative Wehrmacht general officer prisoners for any special
purposes. Perhaps as a consequence of these revelations, Washington never bothered to
clearly define what it meant by “psychological warfare,” and the idea of using the
generals for this purpose was dropped altogether. Similarly, War Department officials
made no plans to include any of the generals in the postwar reconstruction of Germany
and no further discussion ensued about how the generals might influence their
subordinate prisoners at Dermott or anywhere else. Indeed, it appears that Washington
simply changed its mind about what to do with the five generals being sent to Arkansas.
Obviously, the transfer of the generals to Dermott continued, as the plan had been set in
motion months earlier. But the idea of engaging these men in a collaborative
relationship with American authorities petered out. Instead, the War Department took
advantage of Camp Dermott’s unusually large supply of housing suitable for officer
prisoners, and reorientation took a backseat to logistical demands.
In addition to assessing the potential re-education program, Truman Smith’s
comments also highlighted the underlying problem with American policy toward
German general officers in the United States as a whole: Washington had not figured out
what it wanted to do with Germany after the war. President Roosevelt had done more to
obscure American policy regarding occupied Germany than to provide any kind of
unified direction. He expressed his views in a cable to Secretary of State Cordell Hull in
October 1944 writing, “It is all very well for us to make all kinds of preparations for the
treatment of Germany, but there are some matters in regard to such treatment that lead
me to believe that speed on these matters is not an essential at the present moment. It
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may be in a week, or it may be in a month, or it may be several months hence. I dislike
making detailed plans for a country which we do not yet occupy . . . .”23
What policy existed had emerged from the internal workings of the War
Department, the creation of the Civil Affairs Division in particular. War Department
officials had initially begun considering the potential occupation of Germany with the
creation of a small military government division within the Provost Marshal General’s
Office in July 1942. The division created the Military Government School, located on
the campus of the University of Virginia, to train American officers for the coming
occupation duties. In March 1943, the War Department’s newly-created Civil Affairs
Division (CAD), led by Major General John Hilldring, assumed the responsibility for
training military government officers as well as a number of other duties.24
CAD organized a similar training program at Fort Custer, Michigan, which
recruited hundreds of surplus officers from various army units. CAD also recruited
civilian applicants, largely from professional positions, who earned officer commissions.
All of these men received a month’s training at Fort Custer before departing for Civil
Affairs Training Schools at various American university campuses. They then received
more training at the Civil Affairs Center in Shrivenham, England, before being sent to
Germany to begin their assignments.25
Despite training hundreds of officers for military occupation duties, CAD
suffered from the same overall lack of direction regarding American goals for postwar
Germany. Historian Edward Peterson contends that CAD “emphasized the combat
functions of military government and how to help the advancing armies” but “relatively
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little attention was paid to the job of military government after hostilities ceased.”
Moreover, CAD officials in Washington resented State Department involvement, often
refusing to meet with State Department officials regarding military occupation policy
matters. Ultimately, CAD simply relayed messages from American commanders in
Germany to higher War Department officials, allowing U.S. occupation policy to be
largely determined by American military governor Lieutenant General Lucius D. Clay
and his subordinates in the field.26
Even during the first years after the war, authorities in Washington failed to
devise clear American objectives for the reconstruction of Germany aside from the need
for de-nazification and demilitarization. Had overall goals for Germany been
determined earlier, the Provost Marshal General’s Office could have better formulated
plans for Germany’s senior officer prisoners in America. But, lacking a unified policy
from Washington, the nature of the American relationship with Wehrmacht generals
continued to be determined on a mostly ad hoc basis as it had been from its inception.
Despite this lack of direction from above, Dermott’s assistant executive officer,
Captain Alfred Baldwin, continued praising the political stance of the generals in his
custody and promoting the educational program at the camp. He was most impressed by
Elster, von Liebenstein and von Sponeck. Baldwin described Elster as “markedly antiNazi,” “very intelligent” and “thoroughly trustworthy.” Similarly, the American officer
characterized both von Liebenstein and von Sponeck as intelligent and trustworthy antiNazi officers who had been “cooperative with U.S. authorities.”27
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Dermott’s educational program also continued to receive rave reviews from
camp inspectors. Y.M.C.A. representative Olle Axberg visited the camp in June 1945
and simply described the program as “astonishing,” the expansive curriculum in
particular. Dermott offered 439 courses taught by 286 teachers and featured a
“vivarium” that included “a hundred animal, bird and insect specimens.” Baldwin and
his staff had recently spent $54,000 on educational materials that included 300
subscriptions to the New York Times, 200 copies of the Chicago Tribune and 1000 issues
of Time. Axberg also stated that “one hundred percent of the prisoners of war” attended
the two films shown weekly in the camp theater.28
Axberg’s observations portray a camp with the overwhelming majority of the
prisoners involved in the intellectual diversions provided by the American re-education
program. Yet, it is important to note that of the courses taken by prisoners at Camp
Dermott, half of the students and almost two-thirds of the instructors were engaged in
courses studying the English language. Indeed, Captain Alexander Lakes, a field service
officer from the Special Projects Division, assessed Dermott’s program in August 1945,
the month following Axberg’s visit. Lakes criticized the lack of courses in American
history, geography and civics that were intended to be the focal point of the reorientation
program and expressed skepticism about the overabundance of chemistry and science
courses taken by the prisoners. Moreover, he stated his suspicions that the curriculum of
a course in jurisprudence, taught by one of the prisoners, involved the teaching of Nazi
ideology.29
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Lakes also questioned the absence of a camp newspaper at Dermott, another
staple of the American re-education program. These camp newspapers, written and
edited by trusted anti-Nazi prisoners, were intended to serve as a complement to the
circulation of Der Ruf by offering a local prisoner perspective. Camp officials asserted
that no POW newspaper existed at Dermott because the officer prisoners at the camp
were “of a higher than average intellectual caliber” and had “gained the most personally
from the success of the Nazi Party.” This, the officials contended, explained why “the
fanatical Nazi element in this camp, though weaker than prior to V-E Day, [remained]
significantly influential.” Dermott authorities believed that books and articles by
renowned British and American writers would appeal more to the German officer
prisoners in the camp than would essays by their anti-Nazi colleagues. Camp officials
conceded that only one “re-education” course, a 250-prisoner class on the U.S.
Constitution, had been prepared. They cited “the necessity for the utmost care in their
preparation and for the appointment of a reliable teaching and supervisory staff” as the
reason for such a dearth of courses dealing with American culture and values.30
The incongruity of a prisoner of war camp highly involved in a re-education
program, albeit overwhelmingly in English and science courses, while heavily
influenced by a “Nazi element” continued for the remainder of the prisoners’ stay in
Arkansas. When Olle Axberg returned to Camp Dermott in October 1945, along with
Louis Phillipp of the U.S. Department of State, they reported that camp officials had
spent a total of almost $200,000 on books for the large camp library, which now held
over 8700 volumes. The inspectors complimented the camp’s music and art programs.
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Dermott possessed over 200 musical instruments valued at over $30,000 and boasted the
first play, a historical production entitled “Christopher Columbus,” written and presented
by prisoners of war in an American camp. Yet, Axberg and Phillipp also reported that
the camp now had segregated compounds where an open camp environment had once
existed. Their report also indicated that the “Nazi” Colonel Rudolf Otto continued to
serve as prisoner spokesman and that most of Dermott’s prisoners had come from Camp
Alva, Oklahoma.31
Complaints surfaced as well, particularly in regard to the reduction of food for
the prisoners during the spring and summer of 1945. The Allied liberation of their own
underfed prisoners of war from German camps beginning in early 1945, along with the
discovery of the horrors of the Nazi concentration camps, caused an adverse reaction
toward German POWs by the American public. This reaction, coupled with the War
Department’s need to prepare for the invasion of Japan, prompted Washington to
significantly reduce food rations allotted to German prisoners of war in camps across the
United States and replace some items with less desirable substitutes. American
authorities abandoned this policy by the fall of 1945 due to the need for healthy POW
labor and a realization that the tenets of the American reorientation program were less
likely to be absorbed by men with empty stomachs. Yet, some damage to the prisoners’
confidence in American democratic values had been done. Many of the prisoners
viewed this brief episode as an act of American vengeance on a defeated enemy and it
set back the re-education program accordingly.
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Admiral Paul Meixner, who had been transferred to Dermott in the summer of
1945, put his English skills to immediate use serving as a translator for the camp’s
ranking general, Gustav von Vaerst. His first responsibility, as it turned out, was to relay
von Vaerst’s complaints to Axberg and Phillipp in October 1945 about the treatment of
the prisoners at Dermott. Meixner boldly stated that “the future of the world and of
Germany [rested] upon collaboration between the Western powers and Germany.” He
believed that “the Germans were ready for such collaboration and they had full
confidence in the United States.” Meixner pointed out, however, that “the treatment
which the prisoners of war had received since V-E Day was bad,” especially the
reduction in prisoner rations, and that it had shaken their positive perceptions of
American ideals. Considering that food allotments had been partially restored a few
weeks before Axberg and Phillipp’s visit, the generals’ complaints became a moot point.
Indeed, the inspectors declared that the prisoners received “fair and honorable
treatment,” despite “their repeated complaints over the size of the ration.”32
In addition to the reduction in the amount and quality of available food, a number
of other changes had occurred at Camp Dermott since Axberg’s previous visit. For
instance, the well-respected Colonel Wales had been replaced as camp commanding
officer by Colonel James H. Kuttner. Kuttner was not the West Point graduate that camp
inspectors had requested and appears to have been transferred to Dermott from a post in
the Louisiana National Guard. More importantly, the camp had assumed additional roles
in regard to housing senior officer prisoners. No longer was Dermott designated only for
cooperative general officers. By the fall of 1945, it had become home to numerous naval
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prisoners. In addition to Meixner, Walter Henneke, previously at Camp Clinton, and
fellow Admirals Alfred Schirmer, Hans von Treschkow and Carl Weber had all arrived
at the Arkansas camp. Furthermore, Generals Heinrich Aschenbrenner, Walter Vierow,
Curt Gallenkamp and Hermann Pollert had come to Dermott in the fall of 1945 after
spending a few months being observed and interrogated by American personnel at Fort
Hunt, Virginia.33
These changes illustrate Washington’s abandonment of the idea of re-educating
and collaborating with the German general officers at Camp Dermott. War Department
officials like Colonel Truman Smith and numerous inspectors of both Camps Clinton
and Dermott had suggested the assignment of a high-ranking graduate of the U.S.
Military Academy as commanding officer of any camp housing German general officers.
Yet, the well-respected Colonel Wales, who largely met these criteria, was replaced by
an officer of lesser qualifications. Moreover, some of the new transfers represented the
type of senior officers whom American authorities least desired to include in any plans
for postwar Germany. Both Curt Gallenkamp and Walter Vierow were later convicted
of war crimes. Gallenkamp had commanded the German LXXXth Corps in France in
September 1944 when it captured thirty-two paratroopers from the British 1st Special Air
Service Regiment. After first sending these prisoners of war to Poitiers prison for
interrogation by the Sicherheitspolizie (German security police), Gallenkamp ordered
that all the men be shot. Consequently, two days later, a German unit drove the British
prisoners outside Poitiers, executed them “on the orders of Hitler,” and subsequently
reported to the International Red Cross that they had all been killed in action. A British
290
military court convicted Gallenkamp of the murder of these prisoners in March 1947 and
sentenced him to death. His sentence, however, was commuted to life imprisonment and
he was released in February 1952. Similarly, Vierow was later convicted of war crimes
by a Yugoslavian court and sentenced to twenty years in prison. He too received an
early release in 1953.34
Remarkably, an “open” camp originally conceived as a haven for anti-Nazi
officer prisoners had become a nest of Nazi extremists and war criminals. Indeed, Camp
Dermott had been supplanted as the “anti-Nazi” camp by Camp Ruston, Louisiana. As
early as the spring of 1944, well before the conception of American plans to segregate
cooperative general officers, Ruston had been “designated for the internment of German
Army officers and enlisted men, POWs, who [had] been classified as Anti-Nazi by the
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2” of the War Department. By the spring of 1945,
the Louisiana camp’s one thousand prisoners consisted of a mix of officers, NCOs and
enlisted men as well as a blend of army and navy prisoners, most all of whom had been
classified as “anti-Nazi.” William Raugust examined the re-education program at
Ruston two weeks prior to his first visit to Dermott in February 1945. He observed that
the prisoners were requesting lectures on American history and American government,
and that three films were shown weekly to all of the prisoners. Significantly, Raugust
reported the absence of any type of Nazi underground at the camp.35
Like Raugust from the Special Projects Division, Olle Axberg from the
Y.M.C.A. also visited Ruston a few weeks prior to his first visit to Dermott. In May
1945, Axberg noticed that the camp possessed some unique characteristics. First, both
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the prisoner spokesman in the officers’ compound and the American assistant executive
officer in charge of the re-education program were former university professors.
Perhaps because of these impressive educational credentials, the camp offered an array
of courses for the prisoners including not only English language instruction but also
French, Russian, Spanish and Portuguese. European, German and Austrian history, the
history of art, American literature, meteorology, electrical engineering and “monetary
politics,” among others, comprised the list of ongoing classes at the time of Axberg’s
visit. Moreover, some interesting topics appeared on the list of weekly round table
discussions conducted by the prisoners. Small groups of prisoners, ranging from ten to
thirty, discussed theology, law and the “sense and purpose in gymnastics,” and a
remarkable seventy-five regularly discoursed on “traffic and commercial life in West
Africa.” Most notably, one hundred prisoners met to pour over the proposals for a
United Nations organization emanating from the Dumbarton Oaks conference. Axberg
concluded his report by observing the presence of eleven professional painters and
sculptors among the prisoners at Camp Ruston.36
Ruston appears to have been everything that Dermott was not. American
officials and camp inspectors feared a growing Nazi underground at Dermott as early as
February 1945, a month prior to the arrival of the five general officers from Clinton,
when reports proclaimed that none existed at Ruston. In regard to the reorientation
program, the fractious political divide and Nazi intimidation at Dermott paled by
comparison to Ruston’s intellectual environment replete with professional artists and
university professors. And by late summer 1945, when a “fanatical Nazi element”
292
remained “significantly influential” in the Arkansas camp, inspectors from the PMGO
reported that the “officers and enlisted prisoner compounds [at Ruston] were found to be
in an unusually neat and orderly condition” and they rated the military courtesy
displayed by the prisoners as “excellent.” And this assessment came after the Louisiana
camp’s prisoner population had grown to almost 3000 men.37
The puzzlement derives not from the fact that Washington eventually sent newlyarriving “anti-Nazi” generals to Ruston rather than Dermott, but that it had not done so
sooner. It is curious that the War Department expended considerable time and resources
choosing general officers to be transferred to Dermott and endured a months-long delay
in preparing that camp for their arrival when they could have easily sent these prisoners
to a highly-regarded, existing anti-Nazi camp at Ruston that was located even closer to
Clinton than Dermott was. That Washington officials chose to send the generals to
Dermott in the spring of 1945 instead of Ruston suggests that the War Department
initially harbored some ideas about working with the generals in some capacity at the
Arkansas camp, likely using them to influence nationalistic-minded prisoners.
Washington abandoned this idea and transferred an overwhelming number of Nazi
stalwarts to Dermott during the spring and summer of 1945. Yet, it remains puzzling
why the most cooperative generals—Elster, Bieringer, von Liebenstein and von Sponeck
in particular—were not subsequently transferred to Ruston as well, once the War
Department determined that they would not be used in the Arkansas camp.
Von Sponeck wrote a memoir about his experiences in the Second World War
and devoted a significant portion of the work to his time in Allied prisoner of war camps.
293
The general made no mention of any political strife or Nazi intimidation among the
prisoners at Camp Dermott. Von Sponeck stated that the generals and their aides-decamp dined in their own barrack and had little contact with the rest of the prisoner
population.38 Apparently, segregated, barbed-wire enclosures had been constructed at
Dermott by the time of the generals’ arrival in late March 1945. While this suggests that
the generals were in no particular danger or uncomfortable circumstances in Arkansas, it
also establishes that the generals did not engage in any kind of attempts to influence the
other prisoners in the camp. If Washington had chosen not to use them, why not transfer
these anti-Nazi generals to a real anti-Nazi camp?
Inspector Olle Axberg returned to Camp Ruston in the fall of 1945. By this time,
the War Department had transferred almost all of the prisoners interned there during the
Y.M.C.A. representative’s first visit to other locations. The Louisiana camp had become
not only a mixture of officers and enlisted men as before but a blend of nationalities as
well, including German and Italian prisoners, as well as over one hundred Russians who
had been conscripted by German forces in Northern France and subsequently captured
by the Allies. Despite these changes, Axberg again praised the commanding officer,
Colonel Thomas A. Bay, and his staff for displaying the “greatest hospitality” and stated
that they simply had “a grand time together.” Moreover, he characterized the library
facilities and services as “excellent” and observed that the educational program included
courses in English, American history and American civics, which accorded exactly with
the tenets of the American POW reorientation program.39
294
By September 1945, following the conclusion of the war, Washington began
sending senior, anti-Nazi officer prisoners to Camp Ruston. Curiously, when Military
Intelligence Service (MIS) interrogators finished with General Walter Vierow and sent
him to Camp Dermott, they sent his Fort Hunt roommates, Captain Karl Gebhardt,
Major Reinhold Koenning and Colonel Werner von Tippelskirch to Ruston. This may
best highlight the different War Department perspectives of the two camps. The war
criminal Vierow joined the Nazi-influenced crowd in Arkansas where his Fort Hunt
colleagues, obviously believed to be of different political stripes, were transported to the
anti-Nazi environs of Ruston, Louisiana. Other luminaries soon followed. Brigadier
General Hans Gaul arrived at Ruston in mid-October 1945 and Brigadier General Rudolf
Herrmann came one week later. Both prisoners had been “classified as anti-Nazi” and
the War department wanted them interned “with the other anti-Nazi German prisoners of
war” at Camp Ruston.40
In spite of Washington’s decision after the war ended to send anti-Nazi officer
prisoners to Camp Ruston rather than to Camp Dermott, there is no evidence that any
kind of special reorientation program was initiated in the Louisiana camp either. In fact,
it appears that Hans Gaul and Rudolf Herrmann were the only two German general
officers sent to Ruston. Most likely, the War Department sent these two prisoners to
Louisiana because they were openly anti-Nazi and had already provided American
authorities with any valuable information they possessed. Since they had been
cooperative and, by the time of their arrival in the United States, the reorientation
295
program at Camp Dermott had not developed, the friendly atmosphere awaiting them at
Ruston seemed liked the logical choice.
While Washington devoted a great deal of attention to Camps Dermott and
Ruston, some of the most intriguing developments occurred among the generals who
remained at Camp Clinton. Shortly after the departure of von Vaerst, Elster, Bieringer,
von Sponeck and von Liebenstein in late March 1945, five more generals had taken their
place in the generals’ compound in Mississippi. British authorities at Trent Park, in a
move to make room for yet another influx of German general officer prisoners, had
transferred these five men to American custody. Upon their arrival at National Airport
in Washington, D.C., On 12 April 1945, the PMGO transferred Generals Dietrich von
Choltitz, Hermann Ramcke, Wilhelm Ullersperger and Knut Eberding, along with the SS
General Anton Dunckern, to Camp Clinton.41
These men quickly became involved in a significant upheaval among the
prisoners at Clinton. Following the end of hostilities in Germany, Clinton’s general
officer prisoners split into two groups, one doggedly retaining their pro-Nazi sympathies
despite the collapse of the Hitler regime and the other openly denouncing Nazism. The
break was precipitated by a change in American rules. Shortly after Germany’s
surrender, Clinton camp authorities issued a directive to the prisoners “prohibiting the
possession or displaying of any Nazi insignia except those worn on the uniform.”
Spurred by this directive, one faction of the generals completely removed all swastika
insignias from their uniforms, angering the pro-Nazi clique who saw this as an act of
treason. The divide became so extensive that the two groups refused to associate, sitting
296
on opposite sides of the mess hall during meals and refusing to speak to one another in
the barracks. At one point, the disagreement became so heated that it erupted into a fist
fight between two of the generals! To quell the disturbance and prevent future
confrontations, the housing situation had to be rearranged so that only generals with
similar political beliefs shared quarters.42
This type of political divide among the generals at Clinton had occurred
previously, after the so-called “Franzosen” had arrived in the summer and fall of 1944
and found themselves at odds with the “Afrikaner.” The curious aspect of the factions in
the spring of 1945, however, was both their composition and leadership. The prisoners
split almost in half, with fourteen “anti-Nazis” and thirteen “Nazis.” Remarkably, the
supposed “Afrikaner,” those generals who had been captured in North Africa and were
alleged to be the most virulent Nazis, were evenly split between the two factions. Four
of the Afrikaner joined one group and four the other, and, curiously, the unspoken leader
of both factions was an “Afrikaner.” It is no surprise that ranking general and long-time
German patriot von Arnim continued to head up the pro-Nazi faction after the war
concluded. Remarkably, however, the new leader of the anti-Nazi faction was none
other than Ludwig Crüwell.43
British observers had once referred to Crüwell as a “nitwit” and a “moron” and
viewed him as a Nazi stalwart. They had considered him one of the biggest
troublemakers among the generals at Trent Park because of his continual complaining,
instigation of confrontations between his fellow prisoners and vocal support for Hitler.
Curiously, Crüwell did not create the same impression among American camp
297
authorities after being transferred across the Atlantic in June 1944, although the
Americans did not closely observe or eavesdrop on their general officer prisoners like
the British did. Regardless, after the fall of the Hitler regime, Crüwell emerged as an
openly defiant anti-Nazi leader among the generals in American custody, raising
questions about his motivations.
Hermann Ramcke wrote about the political divide among the generals at Camp
Clinton in his memoir, Fallschirmjäger: Damals und Danach. While he did not mention
Ludwig Crüwell specifically, Ramcke condemned those senior officers like Crüwell who
claimed after the war ended that they had always secretly opposed Hitler’s leadership.
Ramcke alleged that these prisoners were opportunists who sought early repatriation and
the potential of obtaining a good position in postwar Germany by “loudly supporting
democratic re-education” in American prisoner of war camps. He charged these men
with engaging in “all kinds of ridiculous acts” to win favor with the Americans,
including removing the swastika insignias from their uniforms.44
Considering Ramcke’s firm support for Hitler and the Nazi regime, even after the
end of the war in Europe, his view of Crüwell and other prisoners who showed some
willingness to collaborate with the Americans is not surprising. Moreover, there were
certainly a number of Wehrmacht generals who suddenly converted to anti-Nazism when
the war ended though they had previously not opposed Hitler; in some cases they had
even supported him. Yet, there may have been generals with legitimate reasons for their
change of heart other than simple opportunism. Crüwell may serve as the best example.
As previously stated, he had four children living in Germany during the war. Because of
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the death of his wife, they had been cared for temporarily by Frau Göring, the wife of
one of the most prominent leaders in the Nazi regime. The Nazis frequently targeted the
families of those they believed had betrayed them and could easily have done so in this
case, having firsthand knowledge of the identity and whereabouts of Crüwell’s children.
Perhaps his highly vocal support for Hitler was a ruse intended to protect his children.
Had he expressed opposition to National Socialism in a British or American prisoner of
war camp prior to Germany’s collapse, and news of this reached the Nazi leadership, his
kids might have been in grave danger. Von Choltitz supported the idea that Crüwell’s
pro-Nazi views were solely intended to protect his children. He expressed complete
surprise upon hearing of Crüwell’s pro-Nazi activities at Trent Park because, according
to von Choltitz, when the Nazis had first risen to power in Germany and it was still
possible to vocalize opposition to the regime, Crüwell had been a “wild and open antiNazi.”45
Both Crüwell and Ramcke maintained the positions they staked out at Camp
Clinton in the summer of 1945. Following the resumption of their lives in postwar
Germany, Crüwell enjoyed a prosperous postwar career and remained an active
collaborator with Western Allied interests in the Federal Republic of Germany. Whether
this meant that he finally felt safe revealing his genuine democratic sympathies or simply
saw the writing on the wall will likely never be determined. Ramcke, on the other hand,
became one of the West’s most vocal German critics. No one doubted his sincerity
when he labeled Allied soldiers “war criminals” in a speech before a reunion of SS
veterans in October 1952.46
299
The rift between the generals at Clinton continued for the remaining ten months
they would spend in Mississippi before returning to Europe in March 1946. Camp
officials accepted it as a permanent fixture in the camp and learned to work around it. In
August 1945, for instance, Lieutenant Louis B. Wishar, who took responsibility for
Camp Clinton’s re-education program in the spring of 1945, arranged for a series of
lectures on American history to be presented to the generals in German. Each of these
lectures was given twice, once for the anti-Nazi group of general officers and once for
the “Nazis.” The ongoing English language instruction was organized in the same
fashion. Two parallel courses were offered at each level, “less advanced” and “more
advanced,” so as to accommodate the wishes of the prisoners that the two cliques remain
separated.47
Curiously, considering the animosity that existed between the two groups of
generals, two International Red Cross inspectors who visited Camp Clinton in November
1945, together with Charles Eberhardt of the U.S. Department of State, found “no
complaints worthy of mention.” By this date, the generals seemed most anxious about
their impending repatriation, especially those whose homes were now located in the
Russian-occupied zone of Germany. They were much less concerned with the kinds of
routine matters like a lack of pajamas or slippers that had occupied their attention in the
past. Surprisingly, the inspectors stated that there were no complaints about the food
rations, which, as in all other German POW camps in America, had been reduced
following the end of the war and the news of Nazi atrocities. Eberhardt and the ICRC
representatives reported that, by November 1945, the prisoners received 3400 calories
300
per day, even more for the enlisted prisoners working on the Mississippi River Model
Project, and found the generals satisfied with this allotment.48
Apparently, not all of the generals were quite so content. Ramcke blasted
American authorities in his memoirs. He criticized the “unreasonable propaganda”
against the German people that had appeared in the American press, the “unbearable
reduction of rations” since May of 1945 that, he claimed, violated international law, as
well as the complete withdrawal of tobacco and other luxuries. Ramcke argued that this
treatment of prisoners of war by the American government undermined the ongoing reeducation program, contending that courses in American democracy would be
ineffectual if American officials refused to model this behavior themselves.49
Ramcke penned letters of complaint addressed to Bryon Price, the Director of the
U.S. Office of Censorship, and U.S. Senator James O. Eastland, Democrat of
Mississippi. Ramcke suspected that the letters would never reach these men if sent
through normal camp channels, which included U.S. Army censors, or if he asked one of
the American camp employees to mail the letters for him. Astonishingly, he decided to
leave the camp and mail them himself. Ramcke found a slight depression on the north
side of the camp that led to a large drainage pipe, an area where American personnel had
a limited view from the guard towers. He improvised a wire-cutter and a handsaw that
he used to cut through both the camp fence and the iron grate blocking entrance to the
drainage pipe. Feigning sickness during morning roll call on New Years Day 1946,
Ramcke slipped out the camp and managed to catch a ride to Jackson from an
unsuspecting driver along the nearby highway.50
301
To disguise his lack of English language skills, Ramcke claimed to have
practiced some basic American slang phrases and pretended to be hard of hearing. He
used a dollar bill given to him by an American officer as a memento to purchase stamps
at a local drugstore and enjoyed a hearty breakfast of ham, eggs, pancakes and his first
real cup of coffee in months. Because he needed to return to the camp under the cover
of darkness, Ramcke had to kill time until sunset. After venturing to the post office to
mail his letters, he spent the afternoon reading the newspaper, smoking a cigar and
watching members of Jackson’s high society celebrate the New Year at the regal
Heidelberg Hotel. The German general finally sneaked into the woods across from the
POW camp in the late afternoon and slipped back through the wire fence undetected
after nightfall.51
It was just a matter of time before camp authorities caught wind of Ramcke’s
stunt. Having signed his full name to both of the letters he mailed, Washington officials
had a relatively easy time figuring out where the letters had come from. Upon being
confronted by Colonel McIlhenny at Camp Clinton in mid-February 1946, who
happened to be holding a copy of Ramcke’s letter to Byron Price, the general confessed
that he had mailed it himself but refused to provide any details as to how he had
accomplished this feat. McIlhenny sent Ramcke to Camp Shelby, Mississippi, where he
was placed in solitary confinement and restricted to a diet of bread and water. After four
days of this treatment, Ramcke finally agreed to talk, but he told camp authorities that he
had escaped by digging under the camp fence.52 Most likely, he wanted to keep his real
escape route open in case he felt the need to exploit it a second time. It is doubtful that
302
American authorities believed this story, especially considering that there would have
been no trace of digging along the fence line, but they also likely saw no point in
continuing the restricted diet and solitary confinement. The German generals were
scheduled to be returned to Europe the following month and Camp Clinton closed down.
Further punishing Ramcke to prevent any future escapes would have been unnecessary.53
Amazingly, Ramcke’s escape was not the first time that the residents of Jackson,
Mississippi, had seen a German general walking the streets. In fact, American
authorities periodically allowed the generals to go into Jackson accompanied by an
armed American guard, which may explain why Ramcke did not seem to arouse any
suspicion despite his poor English language skills. Sergeant R. B. Howard served as a
guard at Camp Clinton from mid-1945 until the camp closed in March 1946. He
recalled that the generals were allowed daily walks outside the camp. One of them—
Howard did not provide the general’s name—rose early one morning, “dressed himself
in his finest Nazi uniform, had his aide polish his boots to a mirror finish, and started
walking.” The generals frequently walked outside the camp for several hours at a time,
so this particular prisoner did not cause much alarm when he did not return for quite
some time. He eventually re-emerged later in the day bearing a receipt for breakfast at
the Walgreens Drugstore in downtown Jackson. The general proudly proclaimed that he
had paid for breakfast with a dollar bill he had hidden in his shoe. Howard and his
fellow guards had no idea how he got into town or “how Jacksonians had allowed a
German officer, in full uniform, to stroll through the streets and visit a downtown store
unmolested.”54
303
It is possible that Howard’s story refers to Ramcke’s “escape.” The two stories
of a hidden dollar bill and breakfast at a downtown Jackson drugstore are quite similar.
Perhaps Ramcke took advantage of the opportunity provided by a daily walk to hitchhike into town and mail his letters. He may not have wanted to admit this to camp
authorities for fear that they would curtail the generals’ daily excursions.
Lieutenant Frank Venturini served at Clinton until early 1945. In regard to
Ramcke’s visit to Jackson, he stated that “earlier in the war, when things were a lot
tighter, he would not have gotten away with that.” But by 1945, however, Americans
were beginning to view German military personnel, high-ranking officers in particular,
in a different light.55 Remarkably, Harold Fonger, a member of the American 459th
Military Police Escort Guard Company stationed at Camp Clinton until mid-summer
1944, related another such incident. According to Fonger, General von Arnim requested
to see a movie in Jackson on one occasion, and Fonger was instructed to take von Arnim
into town. “I was provided with a staff car and a pistol,” recalled Fonger, and “the
general was in full-dress uniform, swastika and all.” Fonger described how nervous he
felt as he escorted von Arnim to Jackson and parked the car several blocks from the
theater. Would he be able to properly protect von Arnim, wondered Fonger, should local
residents be angered by this Nazi general’s presence in town and attempt to confront or
even assault him? Much to Fonger’s relief, the two men went to the movie, even
followed it up with a cup of coffee and a piece of pie at Walgreen’s and returned to
Clinton without incident. Astonishingly, “no one noticed,” remarked Fonger, “no one
even looked.”56
304
Apparently, Americans had grown so accustomed to German prisoners of war in
the United States by the fall of 1945 that some even invited them to public functions.
An American couple, Mr. and Mrs. W. K. von Uhlenhorst-Ziechmann, wrote the War
Department in October 1945 requesting that American officials temporarily parole
General von Choltitz so he could visit them in Shaker Heights, Ohio. Mrs. UhlenhorstZiechmann was the niece of von Choltitz’s wife and, because of this relationship, she
wanted the general to “stand as sponsor” at the baptism of the couple’s son. Colonel A.
M. Tollefson, Director of the PMGO’s Prisoner of War Operations Division, politely
informed the Uhlenhorst-Ziechmanns that it was “the policy of the War Department that
no prisoner of war held in the United States may be paroled or released into the custody
of a relative or friend for a visit, or for any other purpose.” Thus, their request was
denied.57
Following the end of the war in Europe on 8 May 1945, the general officers at
Clinton remained in the United States as prisoners of war for almost another year,
waiting for various administrative matters to be settled. The War Department, however,
reduced Camp Clinton’s status to that a branch camp subordinate to Camp Shelby,
Mississippi, in August 1945. Along with this change came a new commanding officer,
Captain Laurence O. Cherbonnier. Despite a significantly lower rank than that of his
predecessor, Colonel McIlhenny, Cherbonnier was well-received by both the camp
inspectors and the prisoner of war generals alike. In fact, the International Red Cross
inspectors who visited Clinton in November 1945 “expressed their pleasure at finding
the camp so well administered” and “paid Captain Cherbonnier the unusual compliment
305
of congratulating him.” Remarkably, they further stated that “other camp commanders
might well receive training under him.” Charles Eberhardt of the U.S. State Department,
who accompanied the ICRC inspectors, observed that Cherbonnier had “gained the
confidence and good will of practically the entire camp” and that even the irascible von
Arnim was “especially complimentary” of the treatment he had received from this new
commanding officer.58 Captain B. H. Glymph replaced Cherbonnier in January 1946
and oversaw the closure of the camp and the departure of the prisoners in March 1946.59
Ultimately, the American re-education program for German general officers
never really came to fruition. U.S. War Department officials chose not to utilize the
generals in Mississippi, Arkansas or Louisiana for any special purposes, and the
specially-established camp for cooperative generals at Dermott did not turn out any
better than the ordinary generals’ compound at Clinton. Yet, a collaborative relationship
between American authorities and Wehrmacht prisoner of war generals did develop. But
the generals that most interested Washington were not the ones who had been in
American custody during the war. U.S. officials had designs on those Wehrmacht
officers captured during the final days of the war in Europe or the weeks immediately
following Germany’s surrender. These men, brought to the United States in the summer
and fall of 1945, had the most to offer in regard to America’s burgeoning postwar
national security interests and were asked to play significant roles in American postwar
planning.
306
Notes
1
Transfer of German General Officer Prisoners of War, 27 March 1945, RG 389, Entry 461,
Box 2477, National Archives and Records Administration (Hereafter NARA), College Park,
Maryland.
2
Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, from F.M. Smith, assistant to Major
General W.D. Styer, undated (likely October 1944), RG 165, Entry 383.6, Box 590, NARA.
3
Inspection Report of Mr. Arthur M. Kruse, 28 September-2 October 1944; Special Report on
Visit to Prisoner of War Camp, Jerome, Arkansas, 2 November 1944, RG 389, Entry 457, Box
1421, NARA; Merrill R. Pritchett and William L. Shea, “The Afrika Korps in Arkansas, 19431946,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 37 (Spring 1978), 3-22.
4
Special Report on Visit to Prisoner of War Camp, Jerome, Arkansas, 2 November 1944, RG
389, Entry 457, Box 1421, NARA.
5
Theatre for Jerome Prisoner of War Camp, 14 November 1944, RG 389, Entry 457, Box 1421,
RG 389, Entry 459A, Box 1612, NARA.
6
Report on Visit to Prisoner of War Camp Dermott, Arkansas, 17 December 1944, RG 389,
Entry 459A, Box 1612, NARA.
7
Ibid.
8
Field Service Report on Visit to Prisoner of War Camp, Dermott, Arkansas, 15 March 1945;
Report on Visit to Prisoner of War Camp Dermott, Arkansas, 12-14 March 1945, RG 389, Entry
459A, Box 1612, NARA.
9
Field Service Report on Visit to Prisoner of War Camp, Dermott, Arkansas, 15 March 1945,
RG 389, Entry 459A, Box 1612, NARA.
10
Ibid.
307
11
Report on Morale Status of War Prisoners at [POW Camp, Dermott, Arkansas], 5 February
1945, RG 389, Entry 459A, Box 1612, NARA.
12
Transfer of German General Officer Prisoners of War, 27 March 1945, RG 389, Entry 461,
Box 2477, NARA.
13
Field Service Report on Visit to Prisoner of War Camp, Dermott, Arkansas, 30 April 1945,
RG 389, Entry 459A, Box 1612, NARA.
14
Ibid.
15
Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America, 200-202; Field Service Report on Visit to
Prisoner of War Camp, Dermott, Arkansas, 30 April 1945, RG 389, Entry 459A, Box 1612,
NARA.
16
Field Service Report on Visit to Prisoner of War Camp, Dermott, Arkansas, 30 April 1945;
Memorandum to the Prisoner of War Special Projects Division from Headquarters, Prisoner of
War Camp, Dermott, Arkansas, 12 September 1945, RG 389, Entry 459A, Box 1612, NARA.
17
Memorandum for Director, Prisoner of War Special Projects Division, 15 January 1945, RG
389, Entry 459A, Box 1611, NARA.
18
Memorandum for Director, Prisoner of War Special Projects Division, 13 January 1945, RG
165, Entry 383.6, Box 590, NARA.
19
Memorandum for Director, Prisoner of War Special Projects Division, 13 January 1945, RG
165, Entry 383.6, Box 590, NARA.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Comments of Colonel Truman Smith on Program for Reorientation of German General
Officers, 1 February 1945, RG 165, Entry 383.6, Box 590, NARA.
308
23
Franklin M. Davis, Jr., Come as a Conqueror: The United States Army’s Occupation of
Germany, 1945-1949 (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 34.
24
Edward Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory (Detroit: Wayne
State University Press, 1977), 31-34; Robert Wolfe, ed., Americans as Proconsuls: United States
Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952 (Carbondale and Edwardsville:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), 53-54.
25
Ibid.
26
Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany, 32-34.
27
Elster, Botho-Henning; von Liebenstein, Kurt (Baron); Graf von Sponeck, Theodor, POW
Camp Dermott, Arkansas, 16 May 1945, RG 389, Entry 459A, Box 1640, NARA.
28
Report of Visit to Prisoner of War Camp, Dermott, Arkansas, 4-6 June 1945, RG 389, Entry
459A, Box 1612, NARA.
29
Memorandum from Headquarters, Prisoner of War Camp, Dermott, Arkansas, to the Provost
Marshal General, 12 September 1945; Report on Field Service Visit, 29-30 August 1945, RG
389, Entry 459A, Box 1612, NARA.
30
Memorandum from Headquarters, Prisoner of War Camp, Dermott, Arkansas, to the Provost
Marshal General, 12 September 1945, RG 389, Entry 459A, Box 1612, NARA.
31
Prisoner of War Camp, Camp Dermott, Arkansas, 17-20 October 1945, RG 389, Entry 461,
Box 2660; Report of Visit to Prisoner of War Camp, Dermott, Arkansas, 17-18 October 1945,
RG 389, Entry 459A, Box 1612, NARA.
32
Prisoner of War Camp, Camp Dermott, Arkansas, 17-20 October 1945, RG 389, Entry 461,
Box 2660, NARA.
33
Prisoner of War Camp, Camp Dermott, Arkansas, 17-20 October 1945, RG 389, Entry 461,
Box 2660; PW Camp, Dermott, Arkansas, 2 October 1945, RG 389, Entry 461, Box 2593;
309
Transfer of German Officer Prisoners of War, 8 September 1945, RG 389, Entry 461, Box 2478;
Transfer of German Prisoners of War, 15 October 1945, RG 389, Entry 461, Box 2482, NARA.
34
Lord Russell of Liverpool, The Scourge of the Swastika: A Short History of Nazi War Crimes
(London: Cassell and Company, 1954), 35-36; Josef Folttmann and Hanns Müller-Witten,
Opfergang der Generale: Die Verluste der Generale and Admirale und der im gleichen
Dienstrang Stehenden sonstigen Offiziere und Beamten im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Berlin: Verlag
Gernard and Graefe, 1959 [1952]), 169.
35
“Camp Ruston, Louisiana, has been designated for the internment of German Army Officers
and enlisted men, POWs,” RG 389, Entry 461, Box 2484; Field Service Visit to Prisoner of War
Camp, Ruston, Louisiana, 2 March 1945, RG 389, Entry 459A, Box 1621, NARA.
36
Report of Visit to Prisoner of War Camp Ruston, Louisiana, 20-21 May 1945, RG 389, Entry
459A, Box 1621, NARA.
37
Report of Inspection of Prisoner of War Camp, Camp Ruston, Louisiana, 9 August 1945, RG
389, Entry 461, Box 2593, NARA. Curiously, Camp Ruston’s commanding officer in 1945 is
listed as Colonel Thomas A. Bay, amazingly similar to the Colonel Thomas A. Bays, the
commanding officer at Camp Mexia whom General von Vaerst had held in such high regard. It
seems likely that these two were the same man, which might further explain the efficient
operation at Ruston, although this has not been corroborated.
38
Theodor Graf von Sponeck, Meine Erinnerungen, 182, MSg 1/3329, Bundesarchiv-
Militärarchiv, Freiburg i.Br. (Hereafter, BA-MA). Unfortunately, von Sponeck’s memoir
contains some factual inaccuracies. For instance, he wrote that he was accompanied to Dermott
by General Krause, who actually remained at Camp Clinton for the duration of his time in the
United States, and General von Broich who remained in England for the duration of the war.
310
39
Report of Visit to Prisoner of War Camp, Ruston, Louisiana, 15 October 1945, RG 389, Entry
459A, Box 1621, NARA; Jason Kendall Moore, “Between Expediency and Principle: U.S.
Repatriation Policy toward Russian Nationals, 1944-1949,” Diplomatic History 24 (Summer
2000), 386.
40
Transfer of German Officer Prisoners of War, 11 September 1945; Transfer of German
Prisoners of War, 15 October 1945; Transfer of German Officer Prisoners of War, 23 October
1945, RG 389, Entry 461, Boxes 2482 and 2484, NARA.
41
Transfer of German Officer Prisoners of War, 12 April 1945, RG 389, Entry 461, Box 2477,
NARA.
42
Report from Colonel Callie H. Palmer, Director, Security and Intelligence Division, to
Commanding General, Army Services Forces, 29 August 1945, RG 389, Entry 459A, Box 1614;
Prisoner of War Branch Camp Clinton, 3 November 1945, RG 59, Entry 1353, Box 24, NARA.
43
Ibid.
44
Hermann Bernard Ramcke, Fallschirmjäger: Damals und Danach (Frankfurt am Main: Lorch-
Verlag, 1951), 89-90 [Translated for the author by Anja Schwalen].
45
Report on Information Obtained from Senior Officer PW, G.R.G.G. 184, 30 August 1944, WO
208/5017, the National Archives of the United Kingdom (hereafter TNA), Kew, Richmond,
Surrey, United Kingdom.
46
“4000 Veterans of SS Cheer Blast at Allies,” Washington Post, 27 October 1952, 3.
47
American History Course and English Language Course in PW Officers’ Compound, 23 July
1945, RG 389, Entry 459A, Box 1611, NARA.
48
Prisoner of War Branch Camp Clinton, 3 November 1945, RG 59, Entry 1353, Box 24,
NARA.
49
Ramcke, Fallschirmjäger, 91-92.
311
50
Ibid., 92-94.
51
Ibid., 94-97.
52
Ramcke, Fallschirmjäger, 97-99; Michael Allard, A History of the Clinton Prisoner of War
Camp, 1942-1946 (M.A. Thesis, Mississippi College, 1994), 119-121.
53
In his memoirs, Ramcke wrote that he chose to send one of his letters to U.S. Senator Byron
Price because President Harry S Truman had appointed him “Commissioner for German
Affairs.” In truth, Price was never a U.S. Senator, although he spent ten weeks studying
American occupation policies in Germany in November 1945 at President Truman’s behest and
issued a report to the President upon his return. His previous responsibility as Director of the
U.S. Bureau of Censorship had ended when the office was closed in August 1945.
54
“Jackson Men Recall Duty at Clinton Camp,” The Clarion-Ledger-Jackson Daily News, 20
February 1983, 8F.
55
Ibid.
56
Terrence J . Winschel, “The Enemy’s Keeper,” Journal of Mississippi History 57 (Winter
1995), 331-332.
57
Letter from Colonel A. M. Tollefson, Director, Prisoner of War Operations Division, to Mr.
W. K. Uhlenhorst-Ziechmann, 9 November 1945, RG 389, Entry 467, Box 1532, NARA.
58
Prisoner of War Branch Camp Clinton, 3 November 1945, RG 59, Entry 1353, Box 24,
NARA.
59
Report on Visit to Prisoner of War Camp Clinton, Mississippi, 1-2 March 1946, RG 389,
Entry 459A, Box 1621, NARA; Allard, A History of the Clinton Prisoner of War Camp.
312
CHAPTER VIII
COLD WAR ALLIES
In mid-April 1945, a German U-Boat embarked from Kristiansand on the
southern tip of Norway. U-234 carried Lieutenant General Ulrich Kessler, the German
Air Force Commander in the Atlantic and “Air Attaché and head of the German Air
Force liaison staff to Tokyo.” Kessler led a “mission of specialists for the purpose of
acquainting the Japanese with the latest developments in radio, radar, V and other
weapons, and aircraft and assisting them in reproducing such equipment, weapons, and
aircraft for Japanese use.”1
Kessler later claimed that he had never intended to fulfill his mission to Tokyo.
Rather, he planned to go ashore on the coast of Florida and contact American officials
about the possibility of collaborating. But en route to Japan, U-234 received word of
Germany’s unconditional surrender. So, under Kessler’s direction, the submarine’s
captain surfaced five hundred miles off the coast of Greenland, radioed his position to
the U.S. Navy and unconditionally surrendered. The U-Boat also carried two Japanese
passengers serving as part of the Japanese liaison staff. The German officers allowed
these men to destroy their documents and then buried them at sea after the two Japanese
men had entered the stateroom of U-234 and committed hara-kiri. Arriving shortly
thereafter, the U.S. Navy then escorted the submarine and its distinguish passenger to
Portsmouth, New Hampshire, where Kessler was officially taken into American custody
as a prisoner of war.2
313
Kessler’s capture marked a notable point in the American relationship with
Wehrmacht generals. Rather than placing the general with his colleagues in either
Clinton, Mississippi, or Dermott, Arkansas, American authorities sent him to Fort Hunt,
Virginia, the secret U.S. military intelligence facility near Washington, D.C. Here, the
American staff interrogated and eavesdropped on Kessler in a manner that reflected
British practices at Trent Park. The U.S. War Department’s Military Intelligence
Service had been engaged in this type of activity throughout the war, but this was one of
the few instances when their operation focused on a German general officer. In fact,
Kessler was the first German general to be targeted by this kind of activity on American
soil since the departure of von Vaerst, Köchy, Borowietz, Bülowious and von Quast
from the other secret U.S. military intelligence facility at Bryon Hot Springs in July
1943. Why, with the war in Europe over, would Washington now find it important to
initiate interrogations and eavesdrop on high-ranking Wehrmacht officers when it had
shown so little interest in the dozens of German generals and admirals who had been in
their immediate custody for months?
The answer is two-fold. First, with the war against Germany concluded, the
United States could now turn its attention to the war against Imperial Japan. Kessler had
maintained contact with Japanese Navy pilots during the war and, as Germany’s chief
liaison to Japan for the past year, he was able to provide the Americans with a great deal
of information about Japanese military capabilities. Second, Kessler also possessed
significant knowledge about German and Japanese relations with the Soviet Union.
Considering the mutual suspicion between Washington and Moscow that quickly
314
surfaced after Germany’s surrender, a high-ranking officer like Kessler who could offer
the Americans important information about their potential new enemy would be highly
valuable.
Kessler agreed to provide the War Department with information about “Japanese
capabilities in regard to the use and employment of German technical equipment,
technicians and other experts.” Indeed, he detailed the German-Japanese Liaison from
its inception in the spring of 1941, including the number and type of officers exchanged
between the two Axis powers and the specific types of information and technology
provided, such as the German air defense system and 88mm Flak gun. American
interrogators seemed particularly interested in Kessler’s “Mission to Tokyo.” More
specifically, Washington wanted to know exactly what weapons and communications
technology the Germans had shared with the Japanese. It greatly relieved the War
Department to learn that Kessler had not been able to establish a direct exchange of
technology with the Japanese owing to some dispute over the route any potential flights
would take. The Japanese objected to the most direct route over Russia out of fear of
angering the Soviets and, thus, the German cargo aboard U-234 would have been among
the first large shipments to arrive in Tokyo.3
Fort Hunt interrogators also expressed great interest in Kessler’s assertion that
“the relationship between Russia and Japan was not as cool as it appeared.” Based on
information received from the Japanese naval attaché to Germany, Admiral Koshima,
Kessler claimed that the Soviet and Japanese intelligence services had “collaborated
against the Americans in Turkey by exchanging information.” He pointed out that the
315
Japanese never made this information available to the Germans, so he could not speak to
its nature or credibility. The general also reported that the Japanese government had
executed twelve German agents for working against the Soviet Union from within Japan.
Despite Japanese claims that these agents had provided Japanese secrets to the Russians,
Kessler believed that the Japanese executed these men to appease the Russians because
“the reports on Russia received from these agents were considered to be of great value”
to the German government.4
Incredibly, Kessler also stated that “the Japanese [had] approached the Russians
as early as 1943 and carried on conferences as late as 1944 with the purpose of creating a
new Axis, incorporating Berlin, Tokyo and Moscow.” According to Kessler, the Soviets
initially approved of the idea. It never came to fruition simply because Hitler “flatly
declined any political solution” with the Soviet Union and declared that any “settlement
with Russia would be accomplished by military force.” Likewise, with victory in the
East appearing likely by the fall of 1944, the Soviets too lost interest in any kind of
reorganized Axis coalition.5
If entirely accurate, these were astonishing claims; in fact, ones that must have
contributed significantly to American suspicions of their Soviet allies. News that
Russian intelligence had collaborated with the Japanese and that Moscow had at one
point considered approving of an alliance with Germany and Japan during the course of
the war must have given American intelligence serious pause. Moreover, Washington
believed Kessler’s information to be reliable, largely because of his past relationship
with the Nazi regime. First, in September 1938, Hermann Göring had considered
316
offering Kessler the position of Chief of the General Staff of the Air Fleet, a unit
designed by the Reichmarschall himself for the purpose of attacking Britain. He
demanded that Kessler state “on his honor” his “conviction that Germany would smash
England.” When Kessler refused to give Göring what he wanted and even intimated that
invading England might be ill advised, Göring decided against offering Kessler the
position and allegedly never forgot his attitude of “inferiority toward the English.”6
Of even greater weight, Kessler had ties to Carl Goerdeler. The former mayor of
Leipzig and long-time political opponent of Adolph Hitler, Goerdeler became involved
in the July 20th assassination attempt and was later tortured and executed for his role in
the plot. Kessler’s brother-in-law, Dr. Kurt Weber, maintained constant contact with
Goerdeler because of their close friendship and similarly intense hatred of the Nazis.
Goerdeler, who planned to serve as German Chancellor once Hitler had been removed,
had apparently slotted both Weber and Kessler for important posts in his administration.
Kessler came under suspicion by the SD and later discovered that his mail was regularly
monitored by German authorities. He used this to redeem himself politically after the
July 20th Plot in letters to his family, however, by referring to the would-be assassins as
“vipers” and appearing to delight in their execution. This ploy appears to have been
effective. Kessler had remained more aloof from Goerdeler than had his brother-in-law
and he believed that the SD later dropped any serious suspicions, although he was
apparently never popular with other high-ranking Nazis, including Göring and Admiral
Karl Dönitz.7
317
As one of the first targets of renewed American interest in senior Wehrmacht
officers, Kessler provided American intelligence with some remarkable revelations. But
Kessler was not the only German general who arrived at Fort Hunt during the summer of
1945. He eventually shared a room with Major General Heinrich Aschenbrenner.
Aschenbrenner, former chief of intelligence for the German Air Command, served as
commander of foreign personnel in the East at the time of his capture in May 1945. It is
most likely this latter position, with responsibility for foreign personnel fighting the
Soviet Army, that made Aschenbrenner most valuable to American intelligence.8
Overall, the conversations between Kessler and Aschenbrenner that were
“overheard” by American microphones were of little intelligence value. At times, the
two men seem to be “playing” the American eavesdroppers to some degree. On one
occasion, American intelligence officers reported that the two prisoners spoke “in very
low voices so that it [was] impossible to understand them,” suggesting perhaps that the
generals knew they were being listened to.9 Yet, only a few days earlier in a discussion
about the causes of the war and the reasons for Germany’s defeat, Kessler boldly
proclaimed that Hitler “alone made all the decisions and he made wrong ones.” Perhaps
Kessler’s virulent anti-Nazism prompted a loud, clearly understood emotional outburst.
Or, perhaps he stressed Hitler’s responsibility for the war intentionally. Later, Kessler
made an even more curious remark by suggesting that he and Aschenbrenner “stop
reading this nonsense in English and go over to Russian. Russian is the language of the
future.” Given Kessler’s insistent pronouncements about American responsibility for the
postwar world and the U.S. obligation to establish “a democratic Pan-Europe” to fight
318
off the Bolshevist influence, this comment appears to have been either a joke or a wellplaced prod to his American listeners.10
Like Kessler and Aschenbrenner, Major General Walter Vierow had likely also
been brought to Fort Hunt because of his service on the Eastern Front. Vierow, a
general officer from the German engineering corps, had been in charge of all road and
bridge construction and repair on the South Russian front between the eastern border of
Romania and the Caucasus Mountains. Vierow had also served as the commandant of
Kiev, Belgrade and Pilsen, Czechoslovakia, where he was captured by the Americans.
Vierow devoted most of his brief stay at Fort Hunt to preparing engineering studies for
his American captors, including “Preparations for the Attack on Sevastopol,” “The Road
Net of Eastern Crimea,” “Winter Road Service in the Crimea,” “Crossings of the Don,”
“The Road Net Between Rostov and the Caucasus” and “From the Dnieper to the
Crimea.” His reports illustrated “the importance of the road net in the planning and
execution of campaigns and the difficulties of maintaining roads with local material of
untested qualities.” He also provided hand-drawn, detailed maps of the road networks in
the areas under his command.11
The American operation at Fort Hunt quickly involved other German general
officers as well. Indeed, it appears that most of the POW generals who arrived in the
United States after the German surrender in May 1945 endured at least a few weeks of
American interrogation and eavesdropping at the secret facility in Virginia. All of the
generals who arrived at either Camp Dermott or Camp Ruston in the fall of 1945,
319
including Generals Gallenkamp, Gaul, Hermann and Pollert, appear to have come
through Fort Hunt.12
The Fort Hunt operation also illustrated a significant change in the AngloAmerican relationship regarding prisoners of war. Beginning in the months following
D-Day, American military intelligence had gradually exerted more autonomy in their
relationship with senior German POWs. After the war in Europe concluded, the conduit
of intelligence information began to flow in the opposite direction. Where the British
had typically taken the lead in interrogating high-ranking Wehrmacht officers
throughout the war, they now relinquished this responsibility to the Americans. For
instance, the Royal Air Force sent a memorandum to the U.S. Military Intelligence
Service dated 21 May 1945 requesting details about the German-Japanese Liaison,
especially the Japanese development of airplanes and communications, from General
Kessler.13
Britain largely abandoned their interrogation and eavesdropping activities
and now relied on the Americans to share any valuable information gleaned from the
prisoners captured at the end of the war.
Despite significant Allied interest in Ulrich Kessler, the most prominent and
potentially valuable German general officer to arrive at Fort Hunt in the summer of 1945
was Reinhard Gehlen. Brigadier General Gehlen served as chief of Fremde Heer Ost
(German Eastern Front Intelligence Service) from April 1942 until near the end of the
war. In this capacity, Gehlen’s organization was responsible for collecting “all possible
intelligence material dealing with the military, political and economic situation existing
in the U.S.S.R. and the southeastern European countries.” After Hitler relieved him of
320
command in April 1945, Gehlen and his staff hid their most important intelligence
documents before surrendering to the Americans on 22 May 1945. Unfortunately for
Gehlen, the Americans did not at first realize who they were dealing with. The general
transited through five different locations from Fischhausen south of Munich to
Wiesbaden west of Frankfurt before American Captain John Boker finally took in
interest in him.14
Boker, whose suspicions of the Soviet Union had already been aroused,
immediately saw Gehlen as a potentially valuable contributor to American intelligence.
“The interrogations which I made of several high-ranking German officers who had
commanded units on the Eastern Front and interrogations which were made at CSDIC
(UK) had undoubtedly awakened what was already a more than latent antipathy toward
the Soviets,” Boker later stated. “It was clear to me by April 1945,” Boker reported,
“that the military and political situation would not only give the Russians control over all
of Eastern Europe and the Balkans but that as a result of that situation, we would have an
indefinite period of military occupation and a frontier contiguous with them.”
Convinced that Gehlen was able to provide essential information about the Soviet Union,
Boker reassembled Gehlen’s staff, retrieved a significant number of the hidden German
intelligence documents, and alerted his superiors to Gehlen’s potential value to U.S.
intelligence.15
Boker initially fought an uphill battle. He believed that significant resistance
existed in Washington to gathering intelligence against their Soviet allies and that
Gehlen’s work with American intelligence initially had to be kept secret, even from most
321
American personnel. Eventually, Boker convinced enough of his superiors in Europe of
Gehlen’s potential value that General Eisenhower’s chief of staff, General Walter Bedell
Smith, provided a plane to transport Gehlen, several of his subordinates and their cache
of German intelligence documents to Fort Hunt in August 1945. Yet, upon arriving in
Virginia, Boker still had to persuade the officers in the Eastern European Order of Battle
Branch at the Pentagon, to whom the Gehlen Organization had been assigned, that these
prisoners of war were valuable to the United States. Boker later claimed that
“everywhere in the Pentagon . . . there was considerable hostility to working with
Germans in any way and the feeling that the Germans could be of no use to us in any
current endeavor.” But “the extent and value of the information that Gehlen’s group
possessed became at once apparent to the Eastern European O.B. Group” once they
began working with the prisoners, according to Boker, and the American captors
“became quite enthusiastic.”16
U.S. Military Intelligence not only directly interrogated these men and bugged
their rooms, as they had done with Kessler, Aschenbrenner and the other generals at the
facility, they actually developed a collaborative working relationship with the “Gehlen
Organization.” In ten months at Fort Hunt, Gehlen and his staff, which came to be
known as the BOLERO Group, under the supervision of American Captain Eric
Waldman from the Pentagon, produced numerous reports regarding various aspects of
Soviet military capabilities. These included “Methods of the German Intelligence
Service in Russia,” “Development of the Russian High Command and Its Conception of
Strategy during the Eastern Campaign,” “Fighting Methods of the Russian Armies Based
322
on Experience Gained from the Large-Scale Russian Offensives in the Summer of 1944
and the Winter of 1945” and “Development and Establishment of the Russian Political
Commissars within the Red Army,” as well as studies of the Russian Army order of
battle, surveys of Russian Army units and equipment and the organization of Russian
commands and troop leadership. Having directed Hitler’s intelligence network against
the Russians for three years during the war, Gehlen now provided the same service for
the U.S. War Department at war’s end.17
Notably, by the time the U.S. Army transferred him back to Europe in early July
1946, Gehlen “not only prepared reports based on German records but also had access to
and commented on American intelligence reports” as well. Moreover, Waldman, who
accompanied BOLERO to Germany, observed that the reason U.S. Army intelligence
repatriated the Gehlen Organization was “to allow this group of German officers to
engage in collection of intelligence against the Soviet forces in Germany. This
decision,” according to Waldman, “was crucial since it marked a radical departure from
the concept of writing [historical] studies based on old Wehrmacht files.”18 The
Pentagon had progressed significantly from its initial skepticism of Gehlen to a fullfledged relationship with the man who eventually would lead the new West German
state’s intelligence apparatus in the mid-1950s, and all because of a mutual distrust of
the Soviet Union.
The War Department’s collaboration with the Gehlen Organization led to an even
more collaborative relationship with a group of German General Staff officers. On 25
September 1945, a little over a month after Gehlen’s arrival at Fort Hunt, twenty-seven
323
German officers and eleven German enlisted men boarded the SS West Point bound for
the United States.19 These prisoners of war had agreed to work for a coordinated U.S.,
British and Canadian military intelligence project. Kept secret from the American public
as well as from their other Allies, the “Hill Project” eventually expanded to almost 200
prisoners of war who produced over 3600 pages of documents for the Western Allied
governments. The story of these prisoners—the “hillbillies,” as their Allied captors
frequently referred to them—is perhaps the most remarkable of the relationships that
developed between American military intelligence and various high-ranking German
officers.
These Wehrmacht officers who had only recently been coordinating a war
against the Allies now willingly agreed to analyze German military documents and
prepare important studies for American, British and Canadian military intelligence.
Curiously, the publications they produced are perhaps of less importance than the
reasons why the Western Allies sought their expertise. Indeed, the impact of these
documents on American military policy cannot be demonstrated in the way that the
influence of the German military history series can on the U.S. Army in the 1950s.
What is most striking about the Hill Project is its focus on helping the Western Allied
militaries prepare for a potential future war against the Soviet army, and that the project
originated before the end of the war in Europe, even before the death of Adolf Hitler.
An informal agreement between Major General Clayton Bissell, the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2 (Military Intelligence), of the U.S. War Department, and Major
General John Alexander Sinclair, the Director of Military Intelligence in the British War
324
Office, created the Hill Project as “a skeleton German General Staff organization formed
for the purpose of conducting such research for the War Department General Staff and
the British General Staff as may be directed.” This agreement placed the operation at
Camp Ritchie, Maryland, and received the approval of the U.S. Army Chief of Staff on
22 April 1945. Exactly one month later, on 22 May 1945, the two allies concluded the
Sinclair-Bissell Agreement. This Anglo-American military intelligence accord obligated
General Bissell and the U.S. War Department to “provide necessary facilities near
Washington (near the German Military Document Section) for the handling of key
enemy specialist personnel” and delineated a fifteen point research agenda entitled
“Subjects for Research of German Documents.”20
This project outline offered three stated purposes for the Hill Project, including
research on “subjects which will aid in preserving military security in Europe, in
prosecuting the war against Japan, or in improving intelligence organization and
techniques and to other selected matters on which important lessons can be gained from
studying German methods in detail.”21 American admiration for the prowess and
efficiency of the German armed forces motivated them to emulate the German military
model, and with the war against Japan taking center stage, Allied researchers obviously
wanted as much intelligence as possible to aid in fighting the former Germany ally. But
“preserving military security in Europe” represented a much different goal for the
program: preparing for a potential conflict with their Soviet “allies.”
Before the work of the Hill Project could begin, however, the documents library
had to be assembled. This job fell to the U.S. Army’s Document Control Section in
325
Frankfurt, Germany, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel S. Frederick Gronich.
Gronich and his staff collected and catalogued the majority of the German documents
captured in the closing months of the war in Europe. Gronich’s operation maintained a
“detailed card index for all captured documents in Germany,” allocated “priorities for
research by various agencies,” shipped large volumes of documents to either London or
Washington—later Camp Ritchie—and oversaw the operations of the U.S. Third Army,
U.S. Seventh Army and Austrian Document Centers as well.22 Because of his
involvement with the exploitation of captured German documents, Gronich quickly
became involved in the U.S. relationship with the German prisoners working for the Hill
Project as well.
As early as 1943, British and American military intelligence agreed to collect and
maintain captured enemy documents. The armies in the theater of operations
immediately used important captured documents for “timely and accurate information
regarding the German order of battle and related intelligence data.” The Allied
militaries then transferred the documents to the Military Intelligence Research Section
(MIRS) in either London or Washington for safekeeping and further detailed research.
In the spring of 1945, the London MIRS was renamed the London Military Documents
Center and became a “records control and transmission organization.” The Washington
MIRS, soon to be renamed the German Military Documents Section, became the
primary “records depository.”23
On 14 July 1945, two months after the formal German surrender and the
conclusion of the war in Europe, the U.S. War Department and the British War Office
326
jointly established the German Military Document Section (GMDS) at Camp Ritchie,
Maryland. The camp’s fairly secluded location along the Maryland-Pennsylvania border
about sixty-five miles northwest of Baltimore allowed the GMDS to remain out of the
public eye. Its mission was to “establish and operate a library of captured German
documents and publications,” and to “conduct such military document research as is
mutually agreed upon” by [the Directorate of Military Intelligence of the British War
Office and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Military Intelligence) of the U.S. War
Department].24
The initial library holdings consisted entirely of previously captured German
documents transferred from the Washington Branch of the MIRS, actually located at
Fort Hunt, Virginia. The initial American staff of nineteen officers and fifty-three
enlisted men at Camp Ritchie occupied themselves in the summer of 1945 with setting
up the library and learning to file documents according to the German filing system, or
Einheitsaktenplan, albeit with several “extensive” American adaptations. GMDS
personnel even received the “full approval” of Dr. Luther H. Evans, the Librarian of
Congress, and his chief of processing, Herman Henkle, for their efficient filing system.25
The following month, the GMDS staff continued their efforts in the “sorting and
filing of captured German documents, publications, and periodicals, in preparation for
future intelligence research on the German armed forces.” The prisoners needed for the
research project and the German General Staff documents that constituted the main
focus of the operation, however, were yet to arrive. At this early stage, the GMDS
began circulating some of the German documents and publications already on hand to
327
other U.S. Government agencies, including the Air Technical Service Command, the
State Department, Army Ground Forces, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and even
the Surgeon General, and the FBI attached a permanent liaison officer to the operation.26
Despite the presence of the GMDS Library at Camp Ritchie, the U.S. War
Department did not officially notify the camp’s administrative staff of the establishment
of the Hill Project until 8 September 1945. By this time the German POW personnel for
the project were slated to arrive in less than a month. This may explain some of the
animosity that developed between the Chief of the GMDS, American Colonel George F.
Blunda, who directed the intelligence operations and Camp Ritchie’s post commandant,
Colonel Mercer Walter, who oversaw the actual prisoner of war camp.
Further complicating the two men’s relationship was the divided control of the
prisoners, which eventually undermined the productivity of the project and had to be
addressed in early 1946. When the project began in the fall of 1945, keeping the
prisoner of war camp and the secret military intelligence project under separate
command made sense. This research required special intelligence leadership and U.S.
military intelligence rightfully took control of the extraordinary arrangement.
Establishing, administering and providing security for a POW camp, on the other hand,
seemed best left to the Army Service Forces, who were responsible for all POW camps
in the United States.
Unfortunately, the problems of divided command reached the boiling point
within only a few months. Colonel Blunda sent a long letter to the War Department in
Washington detailing numerous problems with the relationship between the Hill Project
328
and Colonel Walter’s administration of the prisoner of war enclosure and the guard unit
assigned to it. Blunda requested that Walter be relieved of responsibility for the
“hillbillies,” complaining that Walter would “not take any responsibility nor any steps to
liberalize the handling of the Hill Project in order to insure complete cooperation and the
highest efficiency of the personnel therein.”27
Blunda provided the War Department with a list of grievances. Foremost among
them was Colonel Walter’s insistence that the Allied officers who served as research
project chiefs escort prisoners from their compound to the research building when
sufficient guards were not available. Blunda’s prior request that the hillbillies be
allowed to come and go without escort had “met with a flat refusal.” The GMDS Chief
contended that “such a method [resulted] in a loss of work on the Project both in the
chain of thought being disturbed and because of the psychological reaction whereby the
Chief of the Project [tried] to get along without the member from the Hill rather than go
fetch him.”28
The underlying problem was a fundamental difference in how each of these two
men viewed the prisoners at Camp Ritchie. Blunda, who worked directly with the
Germans as chief of GMDS, saw these men as colleagues whose “complete cooperation
[was] not only desirable but essential.” Walter, by contrast, perceived the members of
the Hill Project as “purely and simply prisoners of war.” On one occasion, a prisoner
was “manhandled by the guard” causing “an adverse effect on all members of the Hill,”
according to Blunda. Moreover, Walter gave the U.S. personnel on base openly
preferential treatment. For example, more than once Walter denied the Germans any
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butter or marmalade in the mess hall, despite the fact that the prisoners shared the mess
with American personnel for whom these items were always available. The camp
commandant refused to divide the items equally if sufficient quantities were not
available for everyone in the dining hall. Blunda criticized this decision as “not
conductive to good morale, particularly when it is known that the amount of butter
drawn is based on the total strength of U.S. [personnel and prisoners of war]
combined.”29
The War Department’s response to Colonel Blunda’s allegations can be inferred
from a memorandum addressed to the GMDS Chief from Colonel Walter, dated 7
February 1946. Walter informed Blunda that “effective 11 February 1946 such prisoners
of war as may be selected mutually by the Chief, GMDS [Blunda] and the Commanding
Officer, PW Guard Detachment [Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Duin] will be granted parole
privilege and will be authorized to move about the parole area while on official business
during the period 0700 to 1830 hours on normal work days.” The camp commandant
also stipulated that with proper notification parole privileges could be obtained for work
on weekends and holidays as well. Furthermore, he authorized special quarters outside
the prisoner of war compound for the general officer prisoners, provided that a GMDS
officer was “designated daily to be responsible for the General Officers during off duty
hours.”30
Despite this apparent capitulation on Walter’s part, he stressed that it was
incumbent upon Duin to provide the paroled prisoners with identification badges, devise
and maintain a system to monitor the parolees, obtain written promises from the
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prisoners to “live up to the conditions of the parole,” and thoroughly instruct the
prisoners in regard to the privileges of their parole. Walter closed the memorandum by
stating that “the Chief, GMDS, is responsible that no damage to property in the GMDS
area results from the parole of German prisoners of war.”31 This remark betrayed some
skepticism about the decision, either his or the War Department’s, to grant these
prisoners parole and laid the responsibility for any potential complications on Blunda.
Administrative issues aside, for most of the month of September 1945 the
American, British and Canadian personnel occupied themselves conducting practice
searches for “materials on specific subjects which [were] likely to be important fields of
study” in order to “train new personnel in tracing a subject through the documents
library and to test the current filing and indexing systems.” The GMDS staff still
awaited the arrival of both German documents and POW researchers, which were
scheduled to be shipped to Camp Ritchie sometime during September. Not until the last
day of the month, however, did the five railcars arrive full of captured German
documents from the Heeresarchiv (German Army Archive), the Oberkommando des
Heeres (German Army High Command) and the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht
(German Armed Forces High Command). The GMDS staff did not have adequate time
to catalog these valuable German General Staff papers before the prisoners arrived as
well.32
Among the twenty-seven German officers who had been assembled at Camp
Bolbec in Le Havre, France, and made their way across the Atlantic Ocean were four
general officers. The senior prisoner and nominal leader was Lieutenant General
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Walther Buhle, chief of the army staff within the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht
(OKW). Buhle had previously served under Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg and had
been present on July 20th when the Count’s bomb had demolished the “wolf’s lair” but
left Adolf Hitler largely unharmed. Following the July 20th Plot, Buhle had continued in
the service of Hitler’s general staff and had eventually earned promotion to Lieutenant
General for his “energetic” work.33
His fellow general officers included Hellmuth Laegeler who taught tactics at the
Kriegsakademie and held various staff positions before assuming the position of chief of
staff for the German Replacement Army near the end of the war. As members of the
OKW, he and Buhle appear to have been the more important of the first four general
officers to join the project. Franz Kleberger, director of the Oberkommando des Heeres
(OKH) and Chief Quartermaster and finance officer for the German Field Army, and
Rolf Menneking, a member of the OKH staff, served less important functions.34 Clearly,
however, all of these men would have had intimate knowledge of the newly-arrived
general staff documents and could offer valuable experience having served in Hitler’s
high command organizations.
Yet, the Western Allies compromised to a degree in choosing these men for the
project. These officers had attained high enough positions in the general staff to have
experience and expertise of value to the Hill Project. But they were lower profile
officers selected in part because they were unlikely to be tried for any war crimes or
seriously questioned by the other allies after their work had concluded. Lieutenant
General Adolf Heusinger illustrated this point. Heusinger, a high profile Wehrmacht
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officer, served as chief of the operations branch of the OKW for most of the war. He
was originally scheduled to join the Hill Project in November 1945 but Allied lawyers
called him to testify at the Nuremburg trials and he never made it to Camp Ritchie.35
Thus, Western Allied intelligence was compelled to choose perhaps less valuable
officers in order to find men available for the operation.
Eight colonels, eleven lieutenant colonels, two majors and two captains, most all
of whom were General Staff officers, completed the first parcel of “hillbillies” coming to
Camp Ritchie. A few days before their arrival, “arrangements [had] been made for the
prisoners of the Hill Project to have the same ration and laundry service as enlisted
personnel of the [U.S. Army] to permit them to perform more effective intelligence
research work.” Indeed, on 27 September 1945, the U.S. Provost Marshal General’s
Office transferred twenty-two German POWs already interned in the United States to
Camp Ritchie to serve as support staff for the Hill Project. These men assumed
responsibilities as supply sergeants, canteen operators, latrine orderlies, firemen,
painters, officer’s orderlies, and general clerks.36 Between October 1945 and April
1946, dozens of additional enlisted German POWs found themselves at Camp Ritchie
serving the growing number of German officer prisoners working for the intelligence
operation.
Prior to the prisoners’ arrival, Allied authorities also sought to ensure that any
reports produced by the Hill Project and the GMDS would be of “maximum usefulness
to the using agencies.” Officers from the U.S. War Department Personnel Division (G1), Military Intelligence Division (G-2), Organization and Training Division (G-3),
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Supply Division (G-4), Special Projects Division, New Developments Division, Army
Ground Forces and the Army Service Forces formed an informal panel of advisors “to
give the research personnel at GMDS guidance in their effort.” This advisory panel
planned to meet with the researchers at Camp Ritchie once every seven to ten days to
discuss any new research questions they wished the operation to address and receive
updates on ongoing studies.37
Brigadier General R. C. Partridge, one of the panel members from Army Ground
Forces, had studied at the Kriegsakademie in Berlin for almost a year from November
1938 until August 1939 as part of an exchange with the U.S. Army’s Command and
General Staff College. Partridge only completed one year of the curriculum when the
outbreak of the Second World War abruptly curtailed his studies. Yet, his experience
provided him unique expertise and made him “especially helpful in developing reports
of value to the War Department and the Ground Forces.”38
Following their arrival at Camp Ritchie on 8 October 1945, the prisoners, under
the direction of Allied officers, quickly set to work. The organization of these earliest
studies illustrated a remarkable level of collaboration between Allied officers and
German prisoners of war as well as between the Allied officers themselves. The major
research initiated in mid-October included a study of the German General Staff Corps
led by American Captain Robert C. Fitzgibbon. Canadian Lieutenant Colonel George
Sprung and British Lieutenant George Mowatt supervised a massive study of the
German High Command involving General Buhle and twenty-five other German
officers. Canadian Captain Clarence Doerksen and American Lieutenant Michael
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Tsouros also directed a study of German military personnel administration and German
military training. Each report relied on the expertise of German officer prisoners as well
as research in the GMDS documents by both German POWs and Allied officers and
enlisted men.39
Another important feature of the Hill Project research was that many of the
studies were prepared at the behest of one of a number of Allied government agencies.
For example, the GMDS prepared the first two special reports on “Officer Efficiency”
and “Officer Candidate Selection and Training” in response to queries from the U.S.
Adjutant General’s Office, and the first translations of German documents were
specifically prepared for study by the U.S. Army Staff. This arrangement, where
military or civilian agencies made requests for specific research to be conducted by
German prisoner of war researchers and writers, later featured prominently in the U.S.
Army Historical Division’s use of former Wehrmacht officers in Germany in the late
1940s and 1950s.40 With both the Hill Project and later the Historical Division, Allied
agencies requested specific information that could be put to use immediately.
The high level of collaboration between captors and captives as well as between
the representatives of the three Allied governments continued for the duration of the Hill
Project. Work began on several more major studies in November, including a series of
bibliographical reports charting the possibility for further GMDS research projects led
by British Major Horton Smith and American Captain Homer Schweppe. The Hill
Project and the GMDS staff also began preparing monographs on “German Manpower
and Mobilization,” “Logistics on the High Command level,” “German Fortifications and
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Defense,” “Organization and Methods of the German Army Archives,” “German
Military Administration,” and “German Operational Intelligence,” directed by four
American officers and two British officers.41
The rapid expansion of the Hill Project’s research agenda necessitated a
restructuring of the program’s administration as well as a significant increase in the
number of personnel involved, both Allied and German prisoners of war. As of 1
January 1946, a new command structure supervised the program’s activities. A new
Deputy Chief of GMDS, British Lieutenant Colonel D. A. Prater, took over direct
supervision of GMDS operations, and the coordination of all research projects now came
under the direct supervision of the Research Chief, a new position awarded to Canadian
Lieutenant Colonel George Sprung.42 This new command structure highlighted the
multinational nature of the project with a Canadian research chief reporting to a British
director of GMDS, who in turn reported to Colonel Blunda, the American commanding
officer.
The structural reorganization of the project was accompanied by the continued
expansion of its personnel. On 20 December 1945, eight German officers and nine
enlisted men from the Pikesville, Maryland, prisoner of war camp joined the GMDS
effort as translators. These men had been “screened for security and willingness to work
and their translation ability [had] been checked by a written examination.” Less than
three weeks later, on 8 January 1946, another eleven German officers and thirteen
enlisted men from the prisoner of war camp at Camp Forrest, Tennessee, transferred to
Camp Ritchie to serve as translators and lithographers.43 The Hill Project researchers
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prepared all of their reports in German since this was the prisoners’ native language and
the language of the documents in which they were conducting their research. Thus, it
fell to a large number of subordinate officers and enlisted men to translate these
manuscripts into English, necessitating the transfer of dozens of qualified prisoners to
Ritchie to serve in this capacity.
By January 1946, the number of German officer prisoners actively engaged in the
research agenda of the Hill Project had grown to forty-one, including the arrival of two
additional generals and twelve lower-ranking officers. The roster of “hillbillies” now
included Brigadier General Herbert Gundelach, chief of staff for engineering and
fortifications in the OKH. Gundelach brought additional expertise, having previously
served as Chief Quartermaster of the First Army and chief of staff for the generals in
Albania. In addition to Gundelach, Brigadier General Ivo-Thilo von Trotha, chief of the
operations branch of the OKH, also transferred to Camp Ritchie. Von Trotha had
excelled in various general staff positions. His experience in the Ukraine and later as
chief of staff for Colonel General Gotthard Heinrici and Armee Gruppe Weichsel on the
Eastern Front made him especially important to Western Allied intelligence.44
The final general officer to join the Hill Project did not arrive until 16 March
1946. Major General Wolfgang Thomale, one of the few “hillbillies” who was not a
member of the general staff, had extensive knowledge in panzer warfare. He served for
the last two years of the war as chief of staff for Colonel General Heinz Guderian, after
Guderian had been appointed Inspector General of Armored Forces in 1943. Thomale,
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who Guderian described as a “phenomenal panzer officer,” contributed significantly to
the project’s research on panzer training and armored warfare.45
The final tally of “hillbillies”—the German prisoners directly involved with the
work of the Hill Project—included thirty-five officers holding the rank of captain or
above. All of these men had been chosen because they possessed “special knowledge.”
The list also included twenty-two more officers, largely lieutenants and captains, who
were “selected for English language qualifications,” fourteen noncommissioned officers
included because of their “familiarity with the available archives and records,” and 108
enlisted prisoners chosen for “technical and language qualifications.” Hundreds more
German prisoners of war were transferred to Camp Ritchie to service the camp’s POW
enclosure and the requirements of the Hill Project inhabitants but did not actually take
part in the research. The number of support staff members grew from 646 prisoners
after the GMDS reorganization in January 1946 to as high as 1,572 prisoners at the end
of March 1946 when the project was nearing completion.46
With a continually growing number of POWs at Camp Ritchie, Allied personnel
decided to offer the prisoners some intellectual diversions. These came in the form of
weekly lectures presented in English, typically covering some period of English
literature. The lectures were designed to complement the English language classes held
in the prisoners’ enclosure four times each week. British and American officers offered
four different levels of language instruction ranging from beginner to advanced, and
while the prisoners were not required to attend the courses, they almost always did. The
language instruction served to raise morale among the prisoners, better prepare some of
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the advanced students to translate documents, allow the prisoners to speak with those
Yanks, British or Canadians who could not speak German, and “enable GMDS officers
to form a clearer estimate of the individual [prisoners’] characters.”47
This regular contact between Allied teachers and German students, not to
mention that between fellow researchers in the Hill Project, fostered genuine respect and
concern between these former enemies. In fact, the American personnel in charge of the
operation went to great lengths to help the German officers and NCOs in their custody.
General Buhle, in his capacity as senior officer and spokesman for the prisoners, directly
corresponded on at least three occasions and met once in person with American Colonel
John Lovell. Lovell, assigned to the War Department’s Military Intelligence Division in
Washington, D.C., served as overall chief of the GMDS operation and was the officer
with whom Colonel Blunda, the director of the program at Camp Ritchie, coordinated
his effort. Buhle provided Lovell with a list of each prisoner’s immediate family
members and their last known addresses. Lovell assured the German general that he
would try to obtain the whereabouts and current circumstances of these individuals.48
Lovell went further than simply locating and contacting as many of the prisoners’
families as he could find. In order to guarantee their protection and further service to the
secret project, and with the aid of Colonel Gronich in Frankfurt, Lovell attempted to
have any of the prisoners’ family members who were found in the Russian Zone of
occupied Germany moved to one of the western zones.49 This action certainly
engendered feelings of sincere gratitude among the Hill Project prisoners, as well as
easing their minds and allowing them to focus more clearly on the research tasks at
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hand. Such steps by the Allies may also indicate their concern about the possibility that
the Russians could retaliate against the prisoners’ families.
American assistance to the prisoners did not stop there. Gronich also attempted
to obtain compensation for four of the prisoners who had spent three months working for
the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) in Europe before their
transfer to Camp Ritchie. Moreover, Allied personnel kept track of the amount of
money that all of the prisoners had surrendered when captured and sent this money to the
prisoners’ families once they were located. Many of the prisoners had turned over
sizable sums. General Menneking surrendered over 2700 Reichmarks (RM), Generals
Laegeler and Kleberger each close to 1500 RM, and one NCO prisoner possessed 4000
Francs. This money provided desperately needed help to families in war-torn
Germany.50
Undoubtedly, locating and re-establishing contact between the prisoners and their
families, sending valuable funds and possessions to family members in dire need and
even rescuing prisoners’ families from the Russian Zone of occupied Germany
constitutes assistance above and beyond that normally provided to prisoners of war. The
U.S. Army in Germany also facilitated basic correspondence between the prisoners and
their families. Gronich noted that communication with the British and French Zones
was “none too good” and “virtually impossible” with the Russian Zone. The civilian
mail system had completely broken down and what mail service existed had been largely
made possible by the U.S. occupation government. In fact, Gronich asked Camp Ritchie
authorities to limit prisoner mail to one letter per prisoner per week because, due to the
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absence of any civilian mail service, delivering a single piece of mail was “not a matter
of dropping a letter in a post box but a matter of actually sending a soldier or officer to
the indicated address in a jeep.”51
In addition to limiting the total volume of prisoner mail, American authorities
imposed further restrictions in an effort to protect the secrecy of the program. Once
contact with an individual prisoner’s family had been re-established, that family was
instructed to send any mail intended for the Hill Project prisoner to a post office box in
Frankfurt, Germany. From there, the letters or packages were then forwarded to Camp
Ritchie through U.S. Army channels. A problem arose because many of the family
members addressed their letters using the prisoners’ military rank. Gronich feared that
the post office box was being watched by the French and the Russians and that receiving
letters addressed to a number of high-ranking German officers would arouse suspicion
and lead to potential complications with their nominal allies. Clearly, the Americans
were not prepared to reveal the extent and nature of their relationship with members of
the German General Staff to any but the two Allies with whom they were already
collaborating on the program. Thus, the prisoners’ families were asked to avoid using
any military ranks in future correspondence.52
American officials, who took the lead in organizing and administering Hill
Project operations, saw the research conducted by the project prisoners as being
“invaluable to GMDS.” They sought to accommodate the prisoners in numerous ways
because they believed it was “essential that members of the Hill Project work under
satisfactory conditions in order to get the maximum return from them.” To this end,
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Allied authorities further sparked prisoner morale by declaring that the program would
cease operation on 15 April l946 and the prisoners would be repatriated immediately
thereafter, provided of course that “certain research and translation projects [were]
satisfactorily completed by that time.”53
With the program’s termination date quickly approaching, the prisoners and their
Allied supervisors and co-workers completed their reports with a flourish in the spring of
1946. The only problem that intruded during the final three months at Camp Ritchie was
the health of General Buhle. Due to an unspecified ailment, Buhle was transferred to the
hospital compound at Fort Meade, Maryland, in mid-March where he remained until his
repatriation to Germany in late April. In his absence, General Laegeler became the
prisoners’ leader and spokesman.54
With most of the Hill Project’s work completed as anticipated, the operation was
officially terminated and the bulk of the prisoners repatriated to Germany beginning on
15 April 1946. The prisoner of war enclosure at Camp Ritchie, established solely for the
Hill Project and its support staff, was emptied and shut down by the end of the month,
and Allied authorities coordinated procedures for returning the prisoners to civilian life
in Germany. Considering that the “hillbillies” had been part of a top secret military
intelligence project and, as mostly former German General Staff officers were high
profile prisoners, Allied military intelligence considered them a “potential security
menace.” Consequently, the prisoners’ military personnel files, including “as much
detail as possible about family and business associations, residences, political
affiliations, and a short security estimate of [each] man,” were circulated to American
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and British military intelligence authorities in the European Theater. Allied operatives
then kept these men under surveillance throughout their occupation of Germany. Allied
officials also feared that information might be leaked by their own personnel who had
worked with the GMDS at Camp Ritchie and took steps to impress upon these men the
importance of keeping their work secret as well.55
The lengths to which American and British authorities went to stem any
“potential security menace,” not to mention the benefits they provided these prisoners of
war during the course of the operation, testify to the Hill Project’s importance to
Western Allied military intelligence. This high-level of secrecy also suggests that the
purposes of the program included more than just gathering information for the war in the
Pacific or to improve Allied military operations. Moreover, the Hill Project and the
German Military Document Section were not simply historical endeavors. Had the
operation been initiated simply to chronicle the German conduct of the war there would
have been little need to keep the project’s existence so confidential. The U.S. Army
Historical Division’s Operational History (German) Section, which utilized former
Wehrmacht officers to write a comprehensive history of the Second World War, roused
little if any resistance from the American public or local German citizens once the
program became public knowledge in the years after the war. So, why the shroud of
secrecy surrounding the Hill Project?
Allied authorities believed that public knowledge of the German prisoners’
participation in the Hill Project might have compromised both captor and captive alike.
In early March 1946, the Directorate of Military Intelligence in London learned that the
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operation might be brought before the House of Commons in a debate over a defense
measure. This possibility stirred discussion among American and British authorities
about the prospect of releasing an article themselves detailing the “proper story” to the
public to “vitiate possible adverse criticism.” No evidence of such an article was found,
suggesting that either the matter was not brought before the House of Commons after all
and, thus, no article was necessary, or the War Department simply decided against such
a pre-emptive public relations strike.56
Curiously, the proposed article would have contended that “the [Hill Project had]
been undertaken from a strictly scientific point of view in order to determine the cause
for the success of the German Military Operations in order that war in the future might
be prevented.” Despite the ostensibly “scientific” nature of the endeavor, Allied
personnel feared that the prisoners involved would be branded as traitors by the German
public had information about the Hill Project been released. Furthermore, the Allied
General Staffs did not wish for it to appear as if they and the German General Staff
“were collaborating in preparation for a future war.”57 This fear was predicated on a
longstanding distrust between the Western Allies and their Russian counterparts in the
Grand Alliance. Moscow harbored fears that American and British anti-communism
would eventually compel them to turn against the Soviet Union, possibly even siding
with Nazi Germany if it best suited their national interests. Considering the nature of the
Hill Project, Soviet fears may not have been completely unfounded.
As for fears of the prisoners being viewed as traitors, a letter from General Buhle
to Colonel Lovell dated 23 January 1946 suggests that the “hillbillies” did harbor some
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qualms about working directly for an Allied intelligence project. Buhle describes the
prisoners’ quandary by saying that “the situation which emerges from this unorthodox
and unparalleled method of work is as difficult to comprehend for our own officers as it
would be for the officers of any other nation and it requires constant control over our
minds to vindicate our conscience.” This supports the notion that the clandestine nature
of the Hill Project was intended, at least in some measure, to protect the reputations of
the German prisoners involved.58
Despite the prisoners’ concerns about working with their recent enemies, a
number of reasons exist that may explain their willingness to participate in the program.
Given the choice between languishing in hastily-prepared and often overcrowded
prisoner of war camps in war-ravaged Europe or working for the Allies in a wellfurnished camp in the United States with plenty of amenities, many a prisoner would
have easily chosen the latter. Furthermore, the “hillbillies” gained a great deal from
their service to the Allies, particularly in the manner in which the U.S. Army located and
cared for most of their family members. The prisoners likely saw the potential to benefit
their families and themselves early on and made continued attempts to better their
situations throughout their time in the United States.
For instance, the former members of the German General Staff appear to have
feared conviction as war criminals by the International Military Tribunal and insinuated
that the Americans should correct any “misconceptions” about the “criminal-of-war
question.” Buhle expressed concern because “the gravest indictments [were] being
raised in the public during the Nuremberg trial” against various elements of the German
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High Command and that “the claim has been uttered that they are to be considered
collectively as criminal organizations.” He continued by asking Lovell if it would be
possible, “on your journey to Nuremberg, to influence the appropriate officials to correct
the view on war guilt of OKW, OKH and General Staff officers as a whole, which we
feel is a misconception, so that a conviction of these groups will not be effected.”59
The International Military Tribunal chose not to pursue the idea of collective
responsibility for the German High Command organizations, and it is doubtful Colonel
Lovell could have influenced them either way. But Buhle’s request illustrates that self
interest was most likely at the core of the hillbillies’ willingness to participate in the
program, despite their contention that their “only motive” was “the desire to throw light
on the pertinent and historic development of German military leadership and
organization” and to “contribute to world peace and thus save Europe and our own
country.”60
Perhaps this last statement unintentionally reveals more about the “hillbillies’”
motivations and the purposes of the Hill Project and the German Military Document
Section in general than any stated goals regarding scientific endeavors or preventing
future wars. From what or whom would the Germans believe Europe and their own
country would need to be saved? This question directly relates to that raised by Allied
fears of being seen as collaborating with the German General Staff. Against whom
would the Allied and German General Staffs possibly appear to be collaborating in
preparation for a future war? In both cases the answer to the question is the same: the
Soviet Union.
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Allied military intelligence desperately sought to keep the Hill Project secret not
simply because they feared being seen as collaborating with the former German enemy,
but because they were in fact preparing for a potential future conflict with the Soviet
military. Colonel Gerald Duin, who was sometimes listed as the commanding officer of
the prisoner of war guard detachment at Camp Ritchie and other times as the Chief of
the Hill Project, oversaw the camp’s POW enclosure. He stated that “Colonel Lovell’s
idea in assembling the German Documents Center Project was to collect a representative
German General Staff group and put them to work writing a comprehensive history of
German Army experiences on the Eastern Front in all sectors and all branches of the
service. Results of their work were to be complete studies of combat under all types of
circumstances and conditions.”61
Duin had first served in World War II as Chief Interrogator at the U.S.
Interrogation Center at Fort Hunt, Virginia, codenamed “PO Box 1142.” The Fort Hunt
staff interrogated the majority of what the Americans viewed as the most important
German prisoners in American custody during the Second World War, giving Duin
invaluable experience for working with the “hillbillies” at Camp Ritchie. After “further
wartime interrogation work in North Africa and Europe” including working with British
personnel as part of CSDIC West, and then serving as Chief Interrogator for the 12th
Army Interrogation Center, Duin was eventually assigned to the Hill Project at Camp
Ritchie in October 1945. Clearly, Duin assumed a great deal more responsibility than
simply commanding a POW guard detachment. He organized the entire Allied
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relationship with the prisoners and had been placed in this role because of his extensive
military intelligence experience.62
Even more revealing are Duin’s statements about the connections between the
Hill Project and the American relationship with the Gehlen Organization. Duin
described numerous links between the work of Reinhard Gehlen and his staff at Fort
Hunt and that of the Hill Project at Camp Ritchie. First, Captain Boker who was so
instrumental in coordinating the American relationship with Gehlen, had once served as
a subordinate officer to Colonel Duin when the latter had been Chief Interrogator at Fort
Hunt. Thus, these two men, highly involved in the two respective projects, had at very
least a longstanding, working relationship. In addition to Boker, the GMDS “Record of
Visitors” lists both Lieutenant Eric Waldman, the American officer in charge of the
Gehlen Group at Fort Hunt, as well as his superior officer, Lieutenant Colonel Dmitri
Shimkin, as guests of the German Military Document Section at various times, and the
GMDS transferred numerous documents to Shimkin’s custody during the course of their
operations.63
More significantly, Duin revealed that the bulk of the German Eastern Front
intelligence files that Gehlen had spirited away at the end of the war and Boker had later
retrieved and brought to the United States had been transferred directly to Camp Ritchie
for use by the Hill Project. “Twenty packing cases of documents had accompanied [the
Gehlen group] to the U.S.,” according to Duin. These files included “daily Eastern Front
operational reports, daily situation maps, G-1, G-2, G-4 estimates, orders and reports,
etc.” Duin related that “Colonel Gronich after some argument had permitted the group
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to keep certain documents which they considered the most important.” However, the
“majority” of these documents went to Camp Ritchie. When the Hill Project completed
its work, these files, along with the entire German Military Document Section were sent
to the basement of the Pentagon where a member of Gehlen’s group was allowed access
and “permitted to select and take those documents which were of interest to 1142 [Fort
Hunt interrogation personnel] for use by the Gehlen staff.”64
During the Hill Project’s operation “a very strict security wall was maintained
between the group at 1142 [Gehlen’s group] and the one at Camp Ritchie [Hill Project]”
according to Duin. “It was specifically desired to keep the two groups from learning
about the presence or work of each other, particularly the Ritchie group from knowing
anything about the Gehlen [group] in order to prevent any information from reaching the
Soviets in the event that any of the Germans elected to enter the Soviet zone after being
returned to Germany.”65 American military intelligence viewed the “hillbillies” as the
graver threat solely because of their numbers. Gehlen’s staff at Fort Hunt consisted of
only a handful of men, where the Hill Project roster reached close to two hundred, plus
the numerous supplemental POWs not directly a part of the secret project.
Further solidifying the ties between Gehlen and the Hill Project, Duin stated that
on 18 April 1946, following the completion of the operation and the closure of the POW
camp, he personally escorted most of the prisoners from Camp Ritchie back to Germany.
However, a few remained behind when the bulk of their colleagues were repatriated.
These “hillbillies” were transferred to Fort Hunt for the purpose of continuing research
in special areas of expertise. Upon his return to America in May, Duin assumed the
349
position of chief of the interrogation and research unit at Fort Hunt, which included the
Gehlen group. The prisoners of war under Duin’s supervision at Fort Hunt now included
these former members of the Hill Project who had been “attached to the Gehlen group”
on 15 April 1946.66
The eleven prisoners retained from Camp Ritchie included three general officers.
General Thomale possessed special experience “in the field of training, organization, and
development of equipment.” In this regard, U.S. War Department personnel viewed him
as “probably the best qualified officer in the German Army.” They sought his expertise
in writing several further reports, including a “German appreciation of United States
armor.” General Laegeler, because of his previous experience teaching tactics at the
German Kriegsakademie, was considered a “valuable consultant in matters of major
tactics and staff procedure in the field army.” General von Trotha remained in the
United States because of his “extremely wide experience in the field” as a staff officer
and because the Americans viewed him as “without doubt one of the ablest young
generals in the German Army.”67
Accompanying these men were four colonels, two lieutenant colonels, a major
and a captain. Fort Hunt obtained these prisoners for various types of expertise
including “knowledge of the German Staff College,” “most able and experienced staff
intelligence officer available,” “expert on all questions of the organization and methods
of basic training,” “specialist in chemical warfare weapons,” specialists in organization
and personnel, and an “invaluable” consultant on “all questions of the constitutional
status of the Germany Army.” Duin claimed that two of these men, Colonel Kurt
350
Rittman and Major Walter Lobedanz, had been members of Gehlen’s organization prior
to the end of the war in Europe and that another “hillbilly,” Colonel Johannes Haertel,
had also been a member of Gehlen’s group but for unspecified reasons was repatriated
rather then being retained at Fort Hunt.68
The studies to be completed by these former members of the Hill Project now at
Fort Hunt again illustrate that the focus of the research involved American preparation
for a potential war against the Soviet military. Thomale, seemingly the most important
of the men retained, prepared two papers on “Panzer Warfare in the East.” The first
studied the effect of the “special characteristics of war on the Eastern Front” on the
organization, handling, tactics, design, armor and technical demands of panzer units and
formations. The second dealt with issues of supply for armored troops on the Eastern
Front. Thomale also undertook a “German appraisal of U.S. Armor” and a study in
“Panzer Casualties,” while Laegeler analyzed the German “Casualty Reporting System”
and von Trotha examined “Tactics with an emphasis on the last phases of the war.”69
The work of these men at Fort Hunt was kept secret, much as it had been at
Camp Ritchie. When United States Forces European Theater (USFET) cabled in late
April to ascertain the names of any German general officer prisoners of war then
interned in the United States, the Provost Marshal General’s Office concealed the work
of the former “hillbillies” still in America. The PMGO responded by including
Laegeler’s, Thomale’s and von Trotha’s names on the roster they provided to USFET
but listed them as being interned at Fort Meade, Maryland, a common point of arrival
351
and departure for German prisoners of war in the United States, rather than at the secret
interrogation center at Fort Hunt, Virginia.70
Eventually in June 1946, the U.S. State Department demanded that all German
prisoners of war in the United States be repatriated by the end of the month. Despite
protests by the War Department Intelligence Division, which wished to retain the Gehlen
Organization and the attached “hillbilly” researchers, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes
refused to budge, insisting on the original deadline. Consequently, the eleven former
members of the Hill Project along with the members of the Gehlen Organization held at
Fort Hunt were returned to Germany at the end of June 1946.71
Following their repatriation, American officials feared their appearance before
mandatory Denazification and Demilitarization courts in Germany. In November 1946,
Lieutenant General Clarence R. Huebner, USFET Chief of Staff, informed Lieutenant
General Lucius D. Clay, the U.S. Military Governor in Germany, that “possible
disclosure of certain information by these people, which would be detrimental to United
States interests, might be necessary should they have to appear before a German Court.”
Huebner was also concerned that “these persons might or might not succeed in obtaining
pardons” if they actually went to trial. Consequently, in the spring of the following year,
General Clay granted amnesty to the returning “hillbillies” for “service in the interests of
[their] own people.”72
The American’s primary concern in this circumstance was protecting U.S.
national security interests. Presumably, this meant keeping the Soviets from learning
about a secret project designed to better prepare the U.S. Army to protect Western
352
Europe from any potential invasion by the Red Army. It is also noteworthy that the
official rationale for granting amnesty was service to the German people. Given that the
nature of the Hill Project focused on opposition to the Soviet military, and that
Europeans, especially Germans, feared a Soviet invasion in the immediate postwar
years, the “hillbillies” work would have indeed been in the service of their own country.
It is also curious that American occupation authorities were unsure whether their recent
prisoners would be acquitted in denazification or demilitarization proceedings.
Apparently German courts applied stricter standards than did Western Allied military
intelligence.
During its operation at Camp Ritchie, the Hill Project produced 3,657 pages of
reports and studies for American, British and Canadian military intelligence (see
Appendices B and C). Interestingly, when the American Captured Records Section
compiled a “List of GMDS Studies” in January 1954, the titles previously listed as being
prepared by the “hillbillies” at Fort Hunt from mid-April until the end of June 1946 were
not included.73 These reports were either not satisfactorily completed or, more likely,
were highly classified and not available for circulation at that time. Even without these
reports, the studies prepared by the Hill Project at the German Military Document
Section represent an impressive body of work, especially for prisoners of war employed
by their recent former enemies and completed within only six months.
Following the conclusion of the Hill Project’s work, Colonel Richard L.
Hopkins, Deputy Chief of the War Department’s Military Intelligence Service, evaluated
the German Military Document Section. His assessment illustrates the collection’s
353
importance to Western Allied intelligence. Moreover, it further establishes the Soviet
Union as a major focus of the program. Hopkin’s evaluation stated that the GMDS was
“our richest source of factual intelligence on the U.S.S.R.,” and that “much of this
information [could] never be secured from any other source.” Hopkins observed that,
prior to the organization of the GMDS, “our existing intelligence on the U.S.S.R. [was]
extremely limited and inadequate and [was] based on information dated prior to 1940.
The German document collection provides extensive coverage for the period from 1940
to 1945. The collection includes a large amount of strategic intelligence which was used
by the Germans as the basis for military operations against the U.S.S.R.” He concluded
that “if the U.S. were to be forced to conduct strategic air operations against the U.S.S.R.
the German document collection would constitute the chief source of intelligence upon
which to base such operation.”74
Yet, what seems most significant about the Hill Project is not the volume of work
they produced. Nor is the purpose of the program really that surprising. That Western
Allied military intelligence utilized former Wehrmacht officers, even General Staff
officers, after the conclusion of the Second World War to gain information about the
Soviet Union and how to prepare a potential war against the Red Army is not new.
What is most striking is the timing of the project. Obviously, the arrival of the prisoners
at Camp Ritchie on 8 October 1945 does not pre-date the arrival of Ulrich Kessler or
Reinhard Gehlen at Fort Hunt, Virginia, in May and August 1945, respectively. But
while the “hillbillies” themselves did not arrive at Camp Ritchie until 8 October 1945,
the German Military Document Section, whose chief purpose from its inception,
354
according to Colonel Gerald Duin, was to gain insight into the German war against the
Soviet Red Army on the Eastern Front, was established at Camp Ritchie on 14 July
1945. Moreover, the initial Anglo-American agreement establishing the Hill Project to
utilize high-ranking Wehrmacht officers for this purpose was reached on 22 April 1945,
almost a full month before Kessler first arrived at the Virginia facility. This, of course,
means that American and British military intelligence authorities jointly made plans to
collaborate with German General Staff officers over two weeks before the end of the war
in Europe.
The Hill Project and the German Military Document Section at Camp Ritchie
illustrate a transformation of Western Allied policy regarding high-ranking German
officers. The operation set the stage for the American relationship with Wehrmacht
generals that became much more prominent and widespread in the late 1940s and early
1950s. The planning and establishment of this secret project suggest that, at least for
U.S. and British military intelligence, an early step toward the Cold War had been taken
by 22 April 1945.
Notes
1
Report from Captured Personnel and Material Branch, Military Intelligence Division, U.S. War
Department, 30 May 1945, RG 165, Entry 179, Box 495, National Archives and Records
Administration (Hereafter NARA), College Park, Maryland.
355
2
Report from Captured Personnel and Material Branch, Military Intelligence Division, U.S. War
Department, 30 May 1945, RG 165, Entry 179, Box 495, NARA; “Mystery Man Arrives in Big
German U-Boat,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 20 May 1945.
3
Report of Interrogation, No. 5193, 22 May 1945, RG 165, Entry 179, Box 495; Report of
Interrogation, No. 5318, 9 June 1945, RG 337, Entry 15A, Box 69; Report from Captured
Personnel and Material Branch, Military Intelligence Division, U.S. War Department, 30 May
1945, RG 165, Entry 179, Box 495, NARA.
4
Report from Captured Personnel and Material Branch, Military Intelligence Division, U.S. War
Department, 30 May 1945, RG 165, Entry 179, Box 495, NARA.
5
Report from Captured Personnel and Material Branch, Military Intelligence Division, U.S. War
Department, 30 May 1945, RG 165, Entry 179, Box 495, NARA.
6
Report from Captured Personnel and Material Branch, Military Intelligence Division, U.S. War
Department, 30 May 1945, RG 165, Entry 179, Box 495, NARA.
7
Report from Captured Personnel and Material Branch, Military Intelligence Division, U.S. War
Department, 30 May 1945, RG 165, Entry 179, Box 495, NARA.
8
Aschenbrenner’s interrogation file from Fort Hunt is still security classified by the U.S.
National Archives and Records Administration. A request for classification review under the
FOIA has been submitted and the material is currently being considered by NARA officials for
possible declassification; Hildebrand, Die Generale der deutschen Luftwaffe, 27-28.
9
The comments of an American IO after listening to the POW occupants of Room 1A further
suggest that the prisoners at Fort Hunt were aware that they were being listened to: “Judging
from the meager monitoring results of 1A, it seems probable that [the prisoners] are carefully
avoiding conversation on any topic that might be interesting to us!” - Room Conversation,
356
Vierow and von Tippelskirch, 23 July 1945; RG 165, Entry 179, Box 556; Room Conversation,
Aschenbrenner and Kessler, 24 June 1945, RG 165, Entry 179, Box 495, NARA.
10
Room Conversation, Aschenbrenner and Kessler, 21 June 1945; Room Conversation,
Aschenbrenner and Kessler, 3 August 1945; Report of Interrogation, No. 5440, 3 June 1945;
Report of Interrogation, No. 5665, 10 August 1945, RG 165, Entry 179, Box 495, NARA.
11
Record of Interrogation, Walter Vierow, 16 July 1945; Record of Interrogation, Walter
Vierow, 25 August 1945; Recommendations Concerning Interrogation of P/W, W. Vierow, RG
165, Entry 179, Box 556, NARA.
12
The roster of senior Wehrmacht officers who were sent to Fort Hunt, Virginia, is difficult to
accurately determine. Many of the transfer orders intentionally omit Fort Hunt as either a
destination or point of departure for prisoners of war. The orders often substitute Fort George
Meade, Maryland, instead, because of a perceived need for secrecy. The rare exception is Rear
Admiral Eberhardt Godt, whose presence at Fort Hunt can be verified more definitively because
he was transferred out of the camp and then recalled for an unspecified reason. Complicating
matters, there are no interrogation records for many of these men in the U.S. National Archives
and, therefore, it is also difficult to determine what kind of information, if any, was gathered
from these prisoners; Memorandum for Brigadier General B. M. Bryan, Return of Admiral Godt
to Fort Hunt, 11 January 1946, RG 389, Entry 461, Box 2482, NARA.
13
Report of Interrogation, No. 5236, 23 May 1945, RG 165, Entry 179, Box 495, NARA.
14
Mary Ellen Reese, General Reinhard Gehlen: The CIA Connection (Fairfax, VA: George
Mason University Press, 1990), 40-52; Biographic Data Report on ex-General Reinhard Gehlen,
RG 263, Entry 86, Box 17, NARA.
15
Report of Initial Contacts with General Gehlen’s Organization by John R. Boker, Jr., 1 May
1952, in Kevin C. Ruffner, ed., Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the
357
BND, 1945-49: A Documentary History, Volume I (CIA History Staff, Center for the Study of
Intelligence, European Division, Directorate of Operations, 1999), 19-34, NARA.
16
Ibid.
17
Report of Interrogation, No. 5725, 28 August 1945, Gehlen, Reinhard, volume I, RG 263,
Entry 86, Box 17, NARA; Reese, General Reinhard Gehlen, 52-58, 71-75; Preface, in Ruffner,
Forging an Intelligence Partnership, xii-xxix, NARA.
18
Debriefing of Eric Waldman on the U.S. Army’s Trusteeship of the Gehlen Organization
during the Years 1945-1949, 30 September 1969, in Ruffner, Forging an Intelligence
Partnership, 45-50, NARA.
19
Memorandum from Col. R. L. Hopkins to Col. Sweet dated 24 September 1945, RG 319,
Entry 47C, Box 1294, NARA.
20
Memorandum, Establishment of German Research Group Near Camp Ritchie, MD, 1 August
1945, RG 319, Entry 47C, Box 1292; GMDS, Report for the Month of January (1946), RG 242,
Entry 282BC, Box 135; Memorandum to Commanding Officer, Camp Ritchie, MD, 15
November 1945, RG 319, Entry 47C, Box 1294, NARA.
21
German Military Document Section (GMDS), Report for the Month of January (1945), RG
242 – National Archives Collection of Foreign Records Seized, Entry 282BC – Studies, Reports,
and Reference Material, US Military Publications, GMDS, Box 135, NARA.
22
Headquarters, U.S. Forces European Theater, Report of Operations, Period 1 July – 30
September 1945, RG 498 – Records of Headquarters, European Theater of Operation, United
States Army (World War II), Entry 681 – Historical Division Program Files, USFET, G-2,
Operations Reports, 1945-1946, Box 1, NARA.
358
23
Seymour J. Pomrenze, “Policies and Procedures for the Protection, Use, and Return of
Captured German Records,” in Robert Wolfe, ed., Captured German and Related Records: A
National Archives Conference (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1974), 14-16.
24
GMDS, Report for the Month of June-July (1945), RG 242, Entry 282BC, Box 135, NARA.
25
GMDS, Report for the Month of June-July (1945), RG 242, Entry 282BC, Box 135, NARA.
26
GMDS, Report for the Month of August (1945), RG 242, Entry 282BC, Box 135, NARA.
27
Administrative Control of the Hill Project, Camp Ritchie, MD, 14 January 1946, RG 319,
Entry 47C, Box 1294, NARA.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
30
Memorandum for Col. G.F. Blunda, Chief, GMDS, Camp Ritchie, MD, 7 February 1946, RG
319, Entry 47C, Box 1294, NARA.
31
Ibid.
32
GMDS, Report for the Month of September (1945), RG 242, Entry 282BC, Box 135; RG 319,
Entry 1206 – Military Intelligence Training Center, Box 1; The collections held by the GMDS
also eventually included Wehrkreis Libraries V, VII and XIII, as well as the Nazi Library –
Documents Shipped and Ordered Crated for Shipment, Report of Operations, July-September 30,
1945, RG 498, Entry UD 681, Box 1, NARA.
33
Roster of Officer Escorts for Prisoners of War Enroute to War Department, Washington, D.C.,
20 September 1945; The “Hill Project,” 6 November 1945, RG 319, Entry 47C, Box 1294,
NARA; Peter Hoffmann, Stauffenberg: A Family History, 1905-1944 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), 131.
34
Roster of Officer Escorts for Prisoners of War Enroute to War Department, Washington, D.C.,
20 September 1945; The “Hill Project,” 6 November 1945, RG 319, Entry 47C, Box 1294,
359
NARA; Personalakten: Das deutsche Militärwesen – Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1990
(PERS 1), “Laegeler” (Files 103928 and 2885), Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg i.Br.
(Hereafter, BA-MA).
35
The “Hill Project,” 6 November 1945, RG 319, Entry 47C, Box 1294, NARA.
36
Memorandum to Commanding Officer, Camp Ritchie, MD, 15 November 1945, RG 319,
Entry 47C, Box 1294; “Prisoners of War,” Memorandum to Col. Tollefson, Office of the Provost
Marshal General, 27 September 1945, RG 389 – Records of the Provost Marshal General, Entry
461 – Enemy POW Information Bureau, Reporting Branch, Subject File, 1941-1946, Box 2482,
NARA.
37
Memorandum from Col. Alfred McCormack, Director of Intelligence, MIS, 25 September
1945, RG 319, Entry 47C, Box 1294, NARA.
38
Timothy K. Nenninger, “Leavenworth and Its Critics: The U.S. Army Command and General
Staff School, 1920-1940,” Journal of Military History 58 (April 1994), 214; Memorandum from
Col. Alfred McCormack, Director of Intelligence, MIS, 25 September 1945, RG 319, Entry 47C,
Box 1294, NARA.
39
GMDS, Report for the Month of October (1945), RG 242, Entry 282BC, Box 135, NARA.
40
Ibid.; For more on the use of this procedure and its implications see Soutor, “To Stem the Red
Tide,” and Wood, “Captive Historians.”
41
GMDS, Report for the Month of November (1945), RG 242, Entry 282BC, Box 135, NARA.
42
GMDS, Report for the Month of December (1945), RG 242, Entry 282BC, Box 135; GMDS,
Report for the Month of January (1946), RG 242, Entry 282BC, Box 135, NARA.
43
Procurement of PWs for GMDS, 20 December 1945; Procurement of PWs for GMDS, 8
January 1946, RG 319, Entry 47C, Box 1294, NARA.
360
44
POW Roster PW Camp, Camp Ritchie, MD, 10 January 1946; Brief Notes on the Career and
Background of the Twelve German Staff Officers Selected to Remain with GMDS, 9 April 1946,
RG 319, Entry 47C, Box 1294, NARA; MSg 109, “Gundelach;” MSg 109, “v. Trotha,” BA-MA.
45
“Troops Smuggle in Boy, 13, as Mascot,” New York Times, 17 March 1946; POW Roster PW
Camp, Camp Ritchie, MD, 10 January 1946; Brief Notes on the Career and Background of the
Twelve German Staff Officers Selected to Remain with GMDS, 9 April 1946, RG 319, Entry
47C, Box 1294, NARA; MSg 109, “Thomale;” “Thomale,” PERS 1/957, BA-MA.
46
The Hill Project, 15 June 1946, RG 319, Entry 47C, Box 1294; Prisoner of War Camp Labor
Reports, Camp Ritchie, MD, 15 January-31 March 1946, RG 389, Entry 461, Box 2484, NARA.
47
The “Hill Project,” 6 November 1945, RG 319, Entry 47C, Box 1294, NARA.
48
Letter from Gen. Buhle to Col. Lovell, 15 December 1945, RG 319, Entry 47C, Box 1294;
“Statement of Lt. Col. Gerald Duin on Early Contacts with the Gehlen Organization,” in Ruffner,
Forging an Intelligence Partnership, 35-41, NARA.
49
Headquarters, U.S. Forces European Theater, Report of Operations, 16 October 1945, RG 498,
Entry 681, Box 1; Letter from Gen. Buhle to Col. Lovell, 13 January 1946, RG 319, Entry 47C,
Box 1294, NARA.
50
The prisoners initially held some unrealistic expectations. In late November 1945, many of
the officers requested that the U.S. Army provide Christmas gifts to their families in Germany.
Upon receiving these requests, Colonel Gronich in Frankfurt was “at a loss to understand how
the [prisoners] may have gained the impression that the U.S. Army was assuming responsibility
for sending Christmas packages to the families of officer POWs in [the] U.S.” While
emphasizing that the U.S. Army “would like very much to accommodate these [prisoners] in any
way possible,” Gronich pointed out that it was “virtually impossible” to obtain food, clothing
and other necessities, much less luxury items or gifts, in Germany in the fall of 1945.
361
Memorandum from Col. Hopkins to Lt. Col. Duin, 28 November 1945; Memorandum from Lt.
Col. G.H. Duin to Col. Richard Hopkins, 7 February 1946; Memorandum from Lt. Col. G.H.
Duin to Col. Richard Hopkins, 12 February 1946, RG 319, Entry 47C, Box 1294, NARA.
51
Memorandum from Col. Hopkins to Lt. Col. Duin, 28 November 1945, RG 319, Entry 47C,
Box 1294, NARA.
52
Memorandum from Col. Hopkins to CHIEF, GMDS, 15 January 1946, RG 319, Entry 47C,
Box 1294, NARA.
53
Intra-Office Memorandum from Chief, MIS to A.C. of S., G-2, 5 February 1946, RG 319,
Entry 47C, Box 1294, NARA.
54
Gen. Buhle, P/W Camp Fort Meade (Hospital), 24 April 1946, RG 165, Entry 179, Box 456,
NARA.
55
Discontinuance of Prisoner of War Camps, 9 May 1946, RG 389, Entry 461, Box 2484;
Procedures to be taken in connection with return of Prisoners for Hill Project to Germany, 5
April 1946, RG 319, Entry 47C, Box 1294, NARA.
56
Intra-Office Memorandum from Chief, MIS to A.C. of S., G-2, 14 March 1946, RG 319, Entry
47C, Box 1294, NARA. No newspaper articles can be found that directly mention the Hill
Project. Only one can be found that mentions the German Military Document Section at Camp
Ritchie, MD, and it makes no mention whatsoever of the Hill Project or the use of German
General Staff officers. See “Secret Nazi Papers Bare Economic Plans,” New York Times, 9
February 1946, 7.
57
Intra-Office Memorandum from Chief, MIS to A.C. of S., G-2, 14 March 1946, RG 319, Entry
47C, Box 1294, NARA.
58
Letter from General der Infanterie Buhle to Col. Lovell, 23 January 1946, RG 319, Entry 47C,
Box 1294, NARA.
362
59
Letter from General der Infanterie Buhle to Col. Lovell, 15 December 1945; Letter from
General der Infanterie Buhle to Col. Lovell, 23 January 1946, RG 319, Entry 47C, Box 1294,
NARA.
60
Letter from General der Infanterie Buhle to Col. Lovell, 23 January 1946, RG 319, Entry 47C,
Box 1294, NARA.
61
“Statement of Lt. Col. Gerald Duin,” in Ruffner, Forging an Intelligence Partnership, 36,
NARA; italics added by the author for emphasis.
62
“Statement of Lt. Col. Gerald Duin,” in Ruffner, Forging an Intelligence Partnership, 35,
NARA.
63
“Statement of Lt. Col. Gerald Duin,” “Debriefing of Eric Waldman on the U.S. Army’s
Trusteeship of the Gehlen Organization during the Years 1945-1949,” 30 September 1969, in
Ruffner, Forging an Intelligence Partnership, 35, 45; GMDS, Reports for the Months of
September, October and November (1945), RG 242, Entry 282BC, Box 135, NARA.
64
“Statement of Lt. Col. Gerald Duin,” in Ruffner, Forging an Intelligence Partnership, 39-41;
“Final Report on GMDS” dated 1 April 1947 lists the “Foreign Armies East documents” as part
of the German Military Document Section collections, however no date for their arrival is given,
RG 242, Entry 282BC, Box 135, NARA.
65
“Statement of Lt. Col. Gerald Duin,” in Ruffner, Forging an Intelligence Partnership, 38,
NARA.
66
Ibid., 37.
67
Data Concerning POWs To Be Retained, 15 April 1946, RG 319, Entry 47C, Box 1294,
NARA.
363
68
Data Concerning POWs To Be Retained, 15 April 1946, RG 319, Entry 47C, Box 1294;
“Statement of Lt. Col. Gerald Duin,” in Ruffner, Forging an Intelligence Partnership, 36,
NARA.
69
German Military Document Section, MB 867, the Pentagon, 7 June and 19 April 1946, RG
242, Entry 282BC, Box 134, NARA.
70
German General Officer Prisoners of War Interned in the United States, 7 May 1946, RG 549,
Entry 2202AC, Box 3, NARA.
71
“Statement of Lt. Col. Gerald Duin,” in Ruffner, Forging an Intelligence Partnership, 36,
NARA.
72
Letter from Gen. Huebner to Gen. Clay, 20 November 1946; Letter from Gen. Keating to Gen.
Huebner, 9 May 1947, Records of the United States Occupation Headquarters, World War II,
RG 260, Office of Military Government for Germany, Records of the Executive Office, The
Chief of Staff: Denazification Correspondence, Box 20, NARA.
73
List of GMDS Studies, 29 January 1954, RG 242, Entry 282BC, Box 137, NARA.
74
“Evaluation of GMDS Collection,” summary sheet, Col. R. L. Hopkins to Chief of Staff, RG
242, AGAR-S, GMDS 5:1, Folder 1, No. 1393, NARA.
364
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS
Following the end of the war, British and American authorities agreed to hold
their highest-ranking Wehrmacht prisoners until some semblance of order could be
restored to Germany. Although the U.S. War Department returned all of its German
prisoners of war, including all of the general officers, to Europe by the end of June 1946,
they were not allowed to return home. Washington turned some of the generals over to
the British and placed the remainder in various hastily-established POW camps in
Western Europe. London, in turn, established a new camp for German general officers
in January 1946 called Special Camp No. 11, or Island Farm, at Bridgend,
Glamorganshire, in south Wales, where many of Britain’s senior Wehrmacht officers
languished for over two more years until they were all finally released by the spring of
1948.
The process of returning the generals in the United States to Europe was
haphazard at best. There were no plush Pullman cars to transport the generals from
camps in Mississippi, Arkansas and Louisiana as there had been when the generals first
arrived in America.1 “Squeezed together in trucks,” recalled General von Sponeck, the
generals “rode through the country from camp to camp, always carrying [their] heavy
luggage.” When he and his fellow prisoners arrived in New York City, they were
“packed like sardines onto a liberty ship.” After their trip across the Atlantic, the senior
officers from Dermott arrived at Camp Bolbec in Le Havre, France. “Bolbec was an
365
awful camp,” von Sponeck remembered. It lacked protection from the icy winds and
rain coming from the Atlantic and the prisoners’ only shelter was “a leaky old tent.” But
even worse, camp officials provided very little food and turned a blind eye to what von
Sponeck described as the “German bastards who had basically taken over this camp,”
referring to a group of hardcore Nazi sympathizers who intimidated and harassed their
fellow prisoners.2
Fortunately for the generals at Bolbec, they were quickly transferred again. The
prisoners endured yet another truck ride, this time from northwest France to southern
Germany. “We had the impression,” recalled von Sponeck, “that the drivers had been
instructed to kill us by driving as fast and reckless as possible.” They arrived at a transit
camp in Ulm in southern Germany, before moving a short distance away to Camp
Dachau, the former notorious concentration camp on the outskirts of Munich. From
there, some of the prisoners were called to testify at the Allied war crimes trials taking
place in Nuremberg, about one hundred miles north of the camp. Eventually, von
Sponeck and his fellow prisoners were transferred again, this time to an old German
army barracks at Garmisch, a little over an hour’s drive southwest of Munich.3
The American camp at Garmisch reflected a change in American priorities. The
U.S. Army had begun to compile a history of American involvement in the war and
sought information from the enemy side. The initial idea of interrogating German
military leaders had originated with the U.S. War Department’s Military Intelligence
Division, Historical Branch. Dr. George N. Shuster led a team of American military
officers and academics to Control Council Prisoner of War Enclosure No. 32,
366
codenamed ASHCAN, located at Bad Mondorf, a few miles outside Luxembourg. In
July 1945, ASHCAN held a large group of high profile German prisoners including
Admiral Karl Dönitz, General Alfred Jodl, Field Marshals Albert Kesselring and
Wilhelm Keitel, and Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring. The Shuster Commission
sought information from them to complement the American historical record of the war.4
These initial interrogations quickly grew into a larger, more formal endeavor. By
September 1945, the Historical Branch had been established as a special staff division
headquartered at St. Germain outside Paris and under the direction of the U.S. European
theater historian. The new Historical Division, in turn, created the Operational History
(German) Section in January 1946 to exploit the “sources of combat information still
available in the theater,” and interrogate “German commanders and staff officers who
actively opposed U.S. Army operations” for historical purposes. The German History
program embarked on a full-fledged effort to locate and obtain information from as
many German generals as possible, starting with the distribution of questionnaires to
every general officer that could be located. By May 1946, over one thousand German
officers had been contacted and almost three hundred had written historical accounts for
the program.5
The Historical Division quickly found its efforts hindered by the numerous
locations where German generals were held after the war. For instance, in June 1946
there were 328 German officers preparing operational reports from ten different
locations in Germany, Britain, Belgium, Austria, France and Italy. To make the program
more efficient, the Historical Division obtained exclusive control of a U.S. Third Army
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prisoner of war camp in Allendorf, Germany, designated the Historical Division
Interrogation Enclosure (HDIE), and began transferring most of the general officers
working for the German History program to this location.6
Simultaneously, in December 1946, the 7734th USFET (U.S. Forces European
Theater) Historical Detachment established a secondary German history program at the
prisoner of war camp at Garmisch, where von Sponeck found himself in early 1947.
This program focused on World War II German operations outside of the western
European Theater, namely operations in the Mediterranean and the Soviet Union. In
July 1947, the Historical Division combined the Garmisch and Allendorf operations and
the new program, labeled Operation STAPLE, eventually relocated to Neustadt,
Germany.7
Von Sponeck had begun writing a history of the Battle of El Alamein while
interned at Garmisch. Despite the proximity of his family and their periodic visits to the
camp, American officials forced him to temporarily relocate to Allendorf to complete his
work for the German History program. Von Sponeck was finally released and allowed
to return home in November 1947 after finishing three reports totaling almost seventy
pages.8
General von Choltitz also eventually found himself at Allendorf writing for the
U.S. Army Historical Division. His journey home had begun much like von Sponeck’s,
arriving first at Camp Bolbec and transferring to New Ulm. But, unlike von Sponeck,
American officials transferred von Choltitz to a camp at Oberursel, which the general
described as “one of the most bitter memories of [his] imprisonment. The treatment was
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cruel and lacked any human dignity,” lamented von Choltitz, “we were spared no
humiliation.” One of the embarrassments von Choltitz most vividly remembered was
that the American guards confiscated the prisoners’ belts and suspenders and forced
them to carry their meals and other items through the hallway. With both hands full, the
prisoners often suffered the indignity of not being able to hold up their pants. After
enduring this humiliation, von Choltitz was eventually transferred to Allendorf where he
authored two reports regarding his leadership of the LXXXIV Corps in Normandy in
June 1944. He completed his work and was released in April 1947.9
Including von Sponeck and von Choltitz, twenty-one of the fifty-four German
generals previously held as prisoners of war in the United States contributed to the U.S.
Army Historical Division’s German history program.10 These twenty-one former
officers contributed forty-four reports totaling over 1300 pages. While this comprised
only a fraction of the program’s total output, over half of the reports written by the
twenty-one former prisoners of the U.S. were prepared at Garmisch or Neustadt after the
focus of the program had shifted to concerns about the Soviet Union. Curiously,
American authorities had spent little if any time interrogating these men when they had
been so readily accessible on American soil. For instance, Generals Gustav von Vaerst,
Fritz Krause, and August Viktor von Quast spent almost three years in the United States
and were only interrogated for about three weeks of that time. Following the war, when
American priorities had changed, these men devoted considerably more than three weeks
preparing the nine reports for which they were collectively responsible, suggesting that
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U.S. officials found these prisoners of war to be far more valuable in postwar Germany
than they had in wartime America.11
Yet, the general who played the most important role for American authorities in
postwar Germany was Reinhard Gehlen. Upon arriving in Germany, the Gehlen
Organization re-established their intelligence-gathering operation at Camp King, located
just north of Frankfurt. Camp King consisted of three houses and some apartments in a
secret compound surrounded by barbed wire. Gehlen and his subordinates worked under
the supervision of American intelligence officer, Lieutenant Colonel John Russell
Deane, Jr., and reported to the American Chief of Intelligence for the European Theater,
General Edwin Sibert. Their main responsibility was gathering intelligence on activities
within Soviet-occupied Germany and Eastern Europe.12
American support for the Gehlen Organization reflected Washington’s growing
level of concern during the early years of the Cold War. During the organization’s
initial formation at Camp King, the majority of American officials had only begun to
suspect Soviet intentions and, consequently, provided Gehlen so few resources that he
and his staff had to obtain additional operational funds by selling some of the supplies
they received from the U.S. Army on the German black market. Yet, by December
1947, with U.S.-Soviet tensions escalating, American intelligence relocated the Gehlen
Organization to Pullach, a small town located a short drive south of Munich, where the
operation greatly expanded. Under the cover of being the headquarters for a large
business, Pullach grew into a “self-contained village,” including housing for Gehlen’s
staff and their families, a kindergarten and school for the staff’s children, and even a PX
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and infirmary.13 In Reinhard Gehlen, U.S. Army Intelligence embraced not only a
former prisoner of war but a previously high-level member of Hitler’s staff. By late
1947, de-nazification clearly took a backseat to anti-communism.
American interest in Gehlen’s work only increased. As early as the fall of 1946,
Colonel Deane requested to transfer responsibility for the Gehlen Organization from the
U.S. Army to the infant Central Intelligence Group, soon to be the Central Intelligence
Agency; they initially refused. By September 1948, however, in the midst of the Soviet
blockade of West Berlin, CIA agent James Critchfield began studying Gehlen’s work.
With the United States increasingly engaged in the Cold War, the CIA formally adopted
the Gehlen Organization as an umbrella agency on 1 July 1949. The CIA continued its
support and supervision of Gehlen until West Germany gained its sovereignty in May
1955. The Gehlen Organization was then transformed en masse into the
Bundesnachrichtendienst, West Germany’s Federal Intelligence Agency, on 1 April
1956, with Gehlen as its chief.14
Reinhard Gehlen utilized the intelligence network he built as Hitler’s chief of
Eastern Front Intelligence during the Second World War to provide first the U.S. Army
and then the Central Intelligence Agency with information about the Soviet Union
during the early years of the Cold War. He parlayed his control of this organization,
along with some powerful connections within the leadership of the new West German
state, into the highest position in West German intelligence. In exchange for a decade of
substantial support, Gehlen provided the U.S. military and CIA with information, as well
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as offering the United States intimate knowledge and contacts within the new West
German intelligence apparatus.15
While lacking the same status as Gehlen’s rise from POW to West German
intelligence director, two other Wehrmacht generals and former prisoners of war in the
United States, Kurt Freiherr von Liebenstein and Hellmuth Laegeler, also assumed
positions of leadership in the emerging Federal Republic of Germany. Von Liebenstein
found himself back in Europe in the summer of 1946 where, like a number of his fellow
prisoners, the U.S. Army Historical Division co-opted him to work on the German
History program. He joined the H.D.I.E. at Allendorf where he wrote four historical
reports on German operations against American forces in North Africa. He relocated
with the program to Neustadt where he contributed one more report, this one belonging
to the “NONET” group dealing with operations against the Soviet Union. He finally
obtained his release in October 1947.16
Von Liebenstein returned home and served for over five years as director of the
city transportation office in Göppingen, east of Stuttgart, before applying for a position
in the newly-created West German military. Von Liebenstein received his commission
in the Bundeswehr in May 1956, and re-entered the German military holding the same
rank, brigadier general, with which he had departed in 1947. The reincarnated general
served the Federal Republic of Germany for five years as commanding officer of
Military District V, headquartered at Böblingen, also near Stuttgart. He retired in April
1960.17
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Laegeler also returned to Germany in the summer of 1946 after his service to the
Hill Project at Camp Ritchie and the BOLERO Group at Fort Hunt and was released
three months later. He spent over five years as a sales representative for Zweckform, a
stationery and office supplies corporation, before being admitted into the Bundeswehr in
November 1955. Like von Liebenstein, he obtained the rank he had held as an officer in
the Wehrmacht, also brigadier general. Laegeler capitalized on his previous military
teaching experience and, in 1959, he obtained a position as Commandant of the
Führungsakademie in Hamburg-Blankenese, somewhat akin to the U.S. Command and
General Staff College. He served in this capacity for three years before his retirement in
1962.18
Like von Liebenstein and Laegeler, Hermann Ramcke and Ludwig Crüwell also
rose to prominence in the newly-established West German state, although as political
figures rather than reincarnated military officers. Ramcke emerged as one of the leading
anti-Western voices in West Germany and Crüwell his most vocal opponent. Shortly
after his “New Years” escape from Camp Clinton, U.S. War Department officials sent
Ramcke to Camp Shanks, New York, where they placed the general in a transport ship to
be returned to Europe. Believing that he was being repatriated to Germany, Ramcke was
quite disappointed when he arrived in the port city of Antwerp and was promptly sent to
Camp 2226 in Belgium on 17 March 1946. After only four days in Belgium, Ramcke
was then transferred to the London District Cage and interrogated about alleged German
atrocities on the island of Crete. British authorities temporarily placed him in Special
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Camp No. 11 at Bridgend before then forwarding him to Lüneberg, a short drive
southeast of Hamburg, to testify in the war crimes trial of General Kurt Student.19
Following Student’s conviction, about which Ramcke was incensed, and a brief
stay in the British transit camp outside Münster, Germany, British officials extradited
Ramcke to France to stand trial himself for war crimes committed during his defense of
the city of Brest in the summer of 1944. The German general endured fifty-seven
months in a French prison awaiting his formal hearing. Exasperated, Ramcke finally
escape to Germany in an effort to see his family. He returned to France voluntarily,
however, in early March 1951 in order to finally stand trial. A French military court
convicted Ramcke of “war crimes against the civilian populace of Brest” on 21 March
1951 and sentenced him to five years of hard labor. But because he had already served
almost five years in custody before the trial, French law allowed him to be released
early. He returned to his hometown of Schleswig in mid-1951 after completing the final
three months of his sentence in France. Upon his return, he was greeted by some of his
fellow paratroopers, the local band, residents offering him flowers and gifts and the
adoration of what he estimated to be 10,000 people!20
Quickly, the “fanatical defender of Brest” emerged on the West German political
stage, espousing his anti-Western views. At a meeting of the Fallschirmjägerverband,
the German paratrooper veterans association, held in Braunschweig in July 1951, some
of Ramcke’s soldiers carried him into the convention on their shoulders. The former
general then addressed the five thousand men in attendance by condemning what he saw
as Western Allied defamation of both former German soldiers and the German people in
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general. He also made a plea for the release of German officers still imprisoned for war
crimes, referring to these men as the “so-called war criminals.” Not surprisingly,
Ramcke’s remarks prompted a negative reaction from the leftist press in Germany,
France and Switzerland and marked him as a potentially troublesome political figure
among many officials in Bonn.21
Over a year later, he fully established himself as a thorn in Bonn’s side by
adopting a much more controversial public stance. On 26 October 1952, veterans of
Hitler’s Waffen SS held their first postwar rally in the city of Verden, located about thirty
minutes southeast of Bremen. As one of the more popular Wehrmacht general officers
and the newly-elected president of the Fallschirmjägerverband, “Papa” Ramcke was
invited to offer a brief talk. The rally organizers asked him to simply offer greetings
from the paratrooper veterans’ organization and to limit his remarks to no more than
three minutes. Upon taking the stage, however, the old general launched into a lengthy
anti-Allied diatribe. “Who are the real war criminals?” he asked. “Those who by
themselves made the fatal peace, who destroyed entire cities without tactical ground for
doing so, who hurled atomic bombs on Hiroshima and now make new atomic bombs.”
Despite repeated written pleas passed to him by the organizers asking him first to curb
his language and eventually to stop altogether, Ramcke pontificated for twenty-five
minutes. He finally concluded by remarking that it was “an honor for us to have been on
the black list of the enemy. Time will show that this list can again be a roll of honor.”
At this, to the horror of the rally’s organizers, most of the four thousand SS veterans
assembled in Verden erupted with chants of “Eisenhower schweinehund!”22
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Following the scandalous speech, former SS General Felix Steiner, who served as
head of the veterans’ organization, disassociated the organization from Ramcke’s
remarks. But, he made no attempt to explain why virtually the entire assemblage had
cheered and chanted at the conclusion of the controversial speech. Of graver concern for
Bonn, were the pointed responses from Washington, London and Paris. In an effort to
defuse the situation, numerous representatives of the West German government
denounced Ramcke’s position. Konrad Adenauer offered what Time magazine called
the “understatement of the week” when he observed that Ramcke “should realize that his
remarks cannot bolster Germany’s reputation in the world.” And the soon-to-be West
German Minister of Defense, Theodor Blank, later stated in regard to the composition of
the Bundeswehr that “the Ramckes . . . will not return. This is the type of National
Socialist general whom the German people . . . do not want their sons to be entrusted
with.”23
In contrast to Ramcke’s Nazi rabble rousing, Ludwig Crüwell’s postwar political
career took a decidedly different path. The newly-formed Afrikakorps-Verband, Africa
Korps veterans association, which dedicated itself to “the principles of moderation and
democracy,” elected Crüwell president in July 1951. Crüwell cooperated with the Bonn
government in planning the group’s first reunion in September 1951 and even sought
contact with their former World War II enemies, namely veterans of the British Eighth
Army, whom they had fought all across North Africa. Much to the delight of the new
West German government and the Western Allies alike, Crüwell stated his hopes that the
Afrika Korps reunion in Iserlohn, outside Düsseldorf, would “take the wind out of the
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sails of Bernhard Ramcke . . . and other sponsors of nationalist veterans’
organizations.”24
When West German rearmament became a reality and plans were underway for
the establishment of the new Bundeswehr, Crüwell was considered for the position of
commander in chief. While he never returned to the German military, likely because of
his successful postwar business career, Bonn’s consideration of him for the post speaks
volumes. When the New York Times profiled Crüwell as part of a discussion about
German rearmament in December 1954, it observed that the former general “personifies
respectability,” that he had a “spotless record,” and that “he is conscious of the need to
instill in the mind of the next generation of German soldiery a respect and understanding
for the law.” This characterization of Crüwell and his consideration for the highest
military position in the new West German state was a far cry from the wartime British
assessment of him as an idiotic Nazi.25
The experiences of Gehlen, von Liebenstein, Laegeler, Ramcke and Crüwell are
exceptional. The stories of most of the generals returning from the United States are
more pedestrian, largely involving the former prisoners simply returning home and
attempting to rebuild a life for themselves and their families. In order to do this,
however, they first had to navigate the Allied camp system in Europe for anywhere from
a few months to a few years.
The most striking thing about both the American and British camps for returning
POWs in Europe after the war is the level of disorganization and poor communication.
This is perhaps understandable given the enormous tasks confronting the Allies at this
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time. With responsibility for providing food, shelter and protection for millions of
Europeans on a war-ravaged continent, organizing efficient camps and processes for
returning prisoners of war was not their top priority. At times, however, it created some
curious circumstances.
First, prisoners, even senior officers, could often be lost in the shuffle. The
Allies often did not know what prisoners were in each others’ custody. In fact, in many
cases, one U.S. Army unit often did not know what prisoners were in the custody of
another. Frequently, USFET, particularly the Historical Division, initiated searches in
European camps for prisoner of war generals who were still held in the United States.
At various times between November 1945 and March 1946, for instance, the U.S. Army
Historical Division sought Generals von Aulock, Bieringer, von Choltitz, Elster,
Neuling, Ramcke, Richter, Eberding, Daser, Rauch, Spang, Schuberth and Badinski
when most of these men could still be found at either Camp Clinton, Mississippi, or
Camp Dermott, Arkansas, and Schuberth was deceased.26
Much of the confusion stemmed from the numerous locations where the generals
were sent upon their return to Europe. Indeed, Allied, particularly American
determination of the camp where a particular POW general should be interned appears to
have been somewhat haphazard, at least until the Historical Division began requesting
prisoners first for Garmisch and then for Allendorf. Badinksi, Stolberg, Spang, Ramcke,
Richter, Elster and Gallenkamp first arrived at Camp 2226 in Zedelgem, Belgium, one of
the camps operated by the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) outside Brugge. Daser
found himself at Zuffenhausen, north of Stuttgart, and various others including von
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Sponeck, Krause, von Liebenstein and von Choltitz were sent to Bolbec in France. This
prompted USFET to cable Washington, requesting a list of the German generals who
had been interned in the United States since the beginning of the war. Only adding to
the confusion, the list that the Provost Marshal General’s Office provided was
incomplete. It provided the names of only forty-two of the German general officers who
had been interned on American soil.27
U.S. Army Historical Division priorities seemed to dictate much about U.S.
policy regarding the POW generals in Europe. They initiated searches for Generals
Erwin Menny and Franz Vaterrodt in February and March 1947, respectively, at a time
when many of the generals were being released from the history program. Moreover,
American officials released the generals at different times, depending upon their work
for the program. Badinski, Bieringer, Bruhn, von Choltitz, Kessler and Ullersperger
departed Allendorf in April 1947, after each of these officers had completed reports for
the Historical Division, while Cuno, von Liebenstein and von Sponeck were retained as
civilian internees to prepare further studies.28
For those generals not participating in the historical program, both the Americans
and the British released the prisoners according to their date of capture, with the earliest
captured being released first. Yet, further restrictions applied. The American and
British agreed immediately after the war that “a principal purpose of the Allies in
occupied Germany [was] to prevent the renascence of the German Armed Forces and to
destroy the German military spirit and tradition.” It was for this reason that the generals
had been kept out of Germany for so long after the war. Furthermore, the Allies defined
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a “militarist” as “any former regular officer of the German Navy, Army or Air Force . . .
who by reason of his disposition, past activities and professional military knowledge is
considered by the Military Governor as likely to foster or resuscitate the military
ambitions of the German nation.” Being classified as a “militarist” or “security suspect”
meant the former general officer was subject to varying restrictions on travel and
political participation, as well as other potential limitations.29
By April 1946, the British and Americans jointly maintained a “watch list” of
German generals in Europe whom they deemed to be militarists and security suspects.
This list included Alfred Gutknecht because of his “Nazi sympathies” and because he
was a former police officer. The Allies believed former policemen might be tempted to
rejoin police organizations and thereby “perpetuate military tradition and training under
cover of police activities.” Heinrich Kittel was also included because of his “Nazi
sympathies.” Notably, both of these men were soon to be working for the U.S. Army
Historical Division. Remarkably, the list also included Wolfgang Thomale, who was
characterized as having “Nazi sympathies,” being “very clever” and having joined the
Freikorps in 1919, also believed to be evidence of a potential resistance leader. At the
time the list was promulgated in April 1946, Thomale was an integral part of the Hill
Project at Camp Ritchie and soon joined the BOLERO Group at Fort Hunt, Virginia.30
Clearly, as much as a year after the end of the war in Europe, American
authorities appeared to be of two minds regarding their Wehrmacht general officer
prisoners. On one hand, many of these men were deemed to be potential threats to the
successful reconstruction of western Germany. Yet, their American captors had also
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come to view some of these very same men as valuable sources of both historical
information and military intelligence. Paradoxically, American officials trusted a
number of German officers to accurately provide sensitive information but then harbored
enough suspicions of these former enemies to keep them under surveillance for months
after their repatriation.
Despite Western Allied fears, the prisoners could not be kept indefinitely. The
U.S. Historical Division sought to retain prisoner of war status for the German historical
program participants for as long as possible in order to gather as much information from
these men as they could.31 But a U.S. European Command directive required that all
prisoners of war be discharged by 30 June 1947, forcing the Historical Division to
comply. At the time of discharge, there were 767 German officers writing reports; 401
of these remained as “civilian internees” to continue the program.32
British authorities retained their Wehrmacht generals for almost a year longer
than did their American counterparts. In October 1947, the British transferred a number
of them, considered militarists and security suspects, to a camp in Adelheide, outside
Bremen in northern Germany. Three of the former U.S. POWs were included in this
group, Karl Köchy, Hans von der Mosel and August Viktor von Quast. These men were
retained at the camp until the spring of 1948. Once released, their names were added to
a “stop list” that prohibited them from leaving Germany unless the military governor of
the British Zone agreed to remove their restrictions. The names of numerous other
generals appeared on the “stop list” as well, including Detlef Bock von Wülfingen, Knut
Eberding, Erwin Menny, Ferdinand Neuling, Robert Sattler, Karl Spang, Christophe
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Graf zu Stolberg-Stolberg, Erwin Vierow and Heinrich Aschenbrenner.33 By the
summer of 1948, British and American officials had repatriated all of their general
officer prisoners with the exception of a few, like Ramcke, who remained in Allied
prisons awaiting trial for war crimes.
During the six years in which the British and Americans held German generals as
prisoners of war, the relationship between Anglo-American officials and the fifty-five
Wehrmacht general officers considered in this study had evolved considerably. The
transformation of this relationship, wrought by the developments of the war and the
national security concerns of the immediate postwar era, illustrate two important points.
First, despite some similarities, the respective priorities of British and American
authorities regarding their POW general officers differed significantly. British officials
consistently interrogated and eavesdropped on all of their senior officer prisoners.
London primarily sought operational and tactical intelligence to aid the Allied war effort.
They believed that anything the generals could tell them about individual commanders,
their histories and habits, soldier morale or the weapons and equipment Wehrmacht
forces used in the field would be useful in the war against Nazi Germany. Moreover,
CSDIC took great interest in the possibility of organizing a Free Germany Committee
like the one that emerged among the German officer and enlisted prisoners of war in the
Soviet Union, even though they eventually determined that it would not be feasible
among the prisoners in Britain.
Once Allied victory appeared likely in the fall of 1944, British intelligence also
developed some interest in evidence of potential war crimes committed by the generals
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in their custody. Although few of the general officers in this study were tried by the
Allies after the war, London was in the best position to assess which of their prisoners
should be investigated because of the time and resources they had spent gathering this
type of information. CSDIC also unearthed evidence of collusion between some of the
general officers at Trent Park and at least one of the ostensibly neutral inspectors from
the Red Cross that violated international law. Furthermore, by the end of the war, the
British also showed considerable interest in the generals’ views of the respective Allied
powers and assessed each prisoner’s willingness to collaborate with the Allies in the
reconstruction of postwar Germany.
Yet, CSDIC’s interrogation and monitoring of the prisoners’ activities and
conversations ended immediately following Germany’s surrender. In January 1946,
London moved their general officer prisoners to Bridgend, where they held these officers
for almost two and a half years, and never again systematically sought any information
from these men. Clearly, the primary purpose of the British operation was to gather
information that could help the Allies win the war. Once this had been accomplished,
the operation no longer appeared necessary.
In sharp contrast to their British Allies, Washington initially had little regard for
the value of Wehrmacht general officer POWs. Despite briefly accommodating their
first five POW generals at the stately Byron Hot Springs resort in California, the U.S.
Provost Marshal General quickly transferred these men to Mexia, Texas, where the
generals began to voice complaints about the insolence of American personnel. In
response to these complaints, American officials assured the generals that
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accommodations more appropriate for prisoners of their high rank awaited them at Camp
Clinton. But the generals found life in Mississippi little different than they had in Texas.
Indeed, as late as August 1944, War and State Department inspectors condemned the
quality of the personnel who guarded the generals at Camp Clinton, labeling them
misfits and men collectively unqualified for the job of providing security for a highprofile camp of that nature. Moreover, for the duration of the war, U.S. War Department
officials entrusted its most distinguished prisoners to a camp commandant at Clinton
who believed these men should be treated like any other prisoners of war and regularly
turned a deaf ear to their requests and complaints.
This early American neglect and disregard for their German POW generals
sprang from the U.S. War Department’s initial lack of interest in these men. Most
officials did not believe that the officers who had been captured in North Africa could
offer them any intelligence of value to the coming invasion of Northwest France.
Besides, their British allies had a great deal more experience dealing with prisoners of
war, including general officers, and CSDIC made what valuable information they
gleaned from the generals in their custody available to American military intelligence.
Thus, Washington saw no need to expend its own precious resources. After the
generals’ first brief stay in California, the War Department did not make any further
attempts to interrogate or eavesdrop on their general officer prisoners at Camp Mexia,
Camp Clinton, Camp Dermott or Camp Ruston. American authorities appeared only too
happy to allow their British counterparts to take the lead in gathering information from
captured Wehrmacht senior officers.
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The War Department slowly began to develop a formal policy for dealing with
its senior prisoners after the success of the Allied invasion of Normandy. American
intelligence personnel began directly interrogating a select few prisoners who possessed
particular kinds of operational, technical or logistical expertise. Yet, despite this
modicum of autonomy in their handling of German general officer prisoners, U.S.
officials still continued to allow CSDIC to take the lead in interrogating most of the
senior German officers captured before the end of the war in Europe.
Next, Washington also finally began to reconsider the kind of relationship it was
developing with the Wehrmacht generals in its custody. What prompted this
reconsideration was the formulation of American ideas about what it wanted to do with
postwar Germany, something about which it had had little concern prior to D-Day.
Once American officials determined the importance of building a democratic,
demilitarized postwar German state, they began to reconsider what, if any, role the
generals in their custody might be able to play in this process.
Still, the development of American policy was slow and halting. It took antiNazi German POW collaborators to point out to the War Department the incongruity of
using German general officers to “re-educate” lower-ranking and enlisted German
prisoners of war when de-militarization was one of the primary goals of the process.
Moreover, until the end of the war, logistical concerns like finding appropriate housing
for the numerous German officers interned in the United States continued to take
precedence over establishing any kind of bona fide reorientation camp for collaborative
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anti-Nazi senior officer prisoners, as the shifting arrangements at Camp Dermott
exemplified.
Finally, by the end of the war, a new concern occupied American military
policymakers; one that demonstrated the confluence between postwar national security
concerns and wartime POW policy for high-ranking officers. Admiration for the
prowess of German officers and the German military tradition in particular, coupled with
anxiety about Soviet intentions and the strength of the Red Army, drove Washington
into a collaborative relationship with many of the Wehrmacht general officers in its
custody.
The second important point emerging from this study deals with this
collaborative relationship. The evolution of America’s national security concerns in the
years immediately following the end of World War II had consequences for its policy
governing the treatment of high-ranking prisoners of war. Seemingly overnight, U.S.
officials came to view Wehrmacht POW generals as highly valuable sources of
information. Indeed, these prisoners proved far more valuable to the United States after
the war concluded than they had during the war itself.
American officials quickly came to rely on Wehrmacht generals for a variety of
purposes. Following the end of the war in Europe, American military intelligence first
sought information about the German-Japanese alliance that could aid the American war
in the Pacific. German generals like Ulrich Kessler were now taken to Fort Hunt,
Virginia, where American interrogators questioned and eavesdropped on these men in
much the same manner as CSDIC had done throughout the war. During the final month
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of the war in Europe, American, British and Canadian military intelligence organized the
Hill Project, utilizing recently-captured German General Staff officers to provide
information about the German military that might help the Western Allied armies
improve their own mobilization, logistics, training, and efficiency, among other things.
The most significant aspect of the project, however, involved the U.S. Army’s
use of the German officer prisoners to help prepare for a potential war against the Soviet
Union. Numerous studies were conducted by the German “hillbillies” that offered
Allied military intelligence firsthand information and lessons learned from the German
war against the Soviet military. In fact, the Hill Project represented one aspect of the
first stages of the Cold War. Driven by Western Allied fears of Soviet intentions,
American and British authorities began to re-conceptualize their German prisoners of
war as “allies” against the threat of their new Soviet “enemies.” Where only a year
earlier American officials had found little use for the German generals in their custody,
changing national security concerns in the immediate postwar era now transformed
Washington’s relationship with Wehrmacht general officers. Similarly, as the generals
were returned to Europe, the U.S. Army Historical Division solicited information from
hundreds of German generals to supplement the American historical record of the war.
Eventually, the reports these generals produced began to play a highly influential role in
the development of U.S. Army policy in the late 1940s and early 1950s, particularly in
planning to defend Western Europe from a potential Soviet invasion.
British authorities had taken responsibility for the lion’s share of the effort to
gather valuable military intelligence from Wehrmacht general officer prisoners during
387
the war itself. But a change in national security concerns immediately following the war
compelled American authorities to take the lead in developing a relationship with
German generals in the early years of the Cold War. Remarkably, the relationship that
Anglo-American officials forged with Wehrmacht generals following the Second World
War endured. While driven by common fears of Soviet communism, the roots of the
relationship sprang from British and American admiration of the German military. In
June 1947, following a study of the attitudes of the German officers in their remaining
POW camps, London concluded that many British officers’ admiration for their German
counterparts heightened the potential danger of a possible resurgence of German
militarism. British officials saw the need to disabuse their military officers of the idea
that the German generals had become their allies, and warned that “the reputation of the
German Wehrmacht remains high, and the sympathy shown for its senior officers by
British officers seems to increase with time. If the core of the Germany Army is not to
be resurrected as a factor to be reckoned with, the complacency existing in many
[British] minds will have to disappear, and the notion that the German generals and
General Staff are necessarily ‘on our side’ should not be seriously entertained.”34
A similar veneration of the German military existed among American officers
and officials as well. The resources and time that American occupation authorities had
spent tracking down German generals for the Historical Division demonstrated how
important German views of the war were to the West. Moreover, respect and veneration
of the military prowess of German officers had, in part, facilitated the Allied Hill
388
Project, the work of the BOLERO Group and the influence of the German history
program’s reports on U.S. Army doctrine in the late 1940s and early 1950s.35
The comments of Heinz Guderian’s grandson, Lieutenant Colonel Günther
Guderian, epitomize the emulative nature of the Anglo-American relationship with
German generals. After serving as the Bundeswehr liaison officer to the U.S. Army at
Fort Bragg in the 1990s, Guderian stated, in reference to his grandfather, that
“sometimes, I get the impression that in the United States Army, even more officers
know the name [Guderian] than in the German army.” He also recalled that one of the
ranking officers of the U.S. Army’s Seventh Corps had two large pictures hanging on his
wall. “One was Patton,” observed Guderian, and “one was my grandfather.”36
American perspectives of the importance of German general officers had obviously
come a long way.
Notes
1
The U.S. War Department decided to disallow the use of Pullman cars to transport prisoners of
war after the war ended because the “period of redeployment and readjustment” severely taxed
American rail facilities. Moreover, “first class accommodations [were] frequently not available
for soldiers or American civilians” and, therefore, Washington feared an adverse public reaction
from using them to transport POWs, even general officers. Transportation of Prisoners of War
in Pullman cars, 30 June 1945, RG 160, Entry 1, Box 36, National Archives and Records
Administration (Hereafter NARA), College Park, Maryland.
389
2
Theodor Graf von Sponeck, Meine Erinnerungen, 186-188, MSg 1/3329, Bundesarchiv-
Militärarchiv, Freiburg i.Br. (Hereafter, BA-MA).
3
Ibid., 189-191.
4
Kenneth W. Hechler, “The Enemy Side of the Hill: The 1945 Background on Interrogation of
German Commanders,” Donald S. Detwiler, ed., Charles B. Burdick, and Jürgen Rohwer, assoc.
eds., World War II German Military Studies, vol. 1 (New York: Garland, 1979), 9-11, 20-25.
5
Ellinor F. Anspacher, Theodore W. Bauer, and Oliver J. Frederiksen, The Army Historical
Program in the European Theater and Command, 8 May 1945-3 December 1950, Occupation
Forces in Europe series (Karlsruhe: Historical Division European Command, 1951), Detwiler,
ed., German Military Studies, 1:50-53.
6
Ibid., 53-54.
7
Ibid., 81-82.
8
Complete Listing by George Wagner of German Military Studies (ETHINT, A, B, C, D P, and
T Series) held at the U.S. National Archives, with Author Index, Detwiler, ed., German Military
Studies; Theodor Graf von Sponeck, Meine Erinnerungen, 191-194, MSg 1/3329; “Von
Sponeck,” MSg 109, BA-MA.
9
Dietrich von Choltitz, Soldat unter Soldaten (Zürich: Europe Verlag, 1951), 279-284.
10
These twenty-one general officers included von Arnim, Badinski, Bieringer, Bruhn, von
Choltitz, Cuno, Daser, Gallenkamp, Gundelach, Kessler, Kittel, Krause, von Liebenstein, von
Quast, Richter, Schnarrenberger, von Sponeck, Stolberg, Ullersperger, von Vaerst and Vaterrodt
- Complete Listing by George Wagner of German Military Studies (ETHINT, A, B, C, D P, and
T Series) held at the U.S. National Archives, with Author Index, Detwiler, ed., German Military
Studies.
390
11
Complete Listing by George Wagner of German Military Studies (ETHINT, A, B, C, D P, and
T Series) held at the U.S. National Archives, with Author Index, Detwiler, ed., German Military
Studies.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid., 92-97.
14
Ibid., 90-92; 107-112. See also, James H. Critchfield, Partners at the Creation: The Men
Behind Post Germany’s Defense and Intelligence Establishments (Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 2003).
15
What is perhaps most remarkable about the American relationship with Gehlen is not that
Washington chose to work with a former high-ranking member of Hitler’s staff; rather, that they
chose one who appeared to be largely inept at intelligence work. During the three years in which
Gehlen served as chief of Fremde Heer Ost, his service was largely unremarkable, at times even
incompetent. See David Thomas, “Foreign Armies East and German Military Intelligence in
Russia, 1941-45,” Journal of Contemporary History 22 (April 1987), 261-301.
16
Ibid.
17
PERS 1/103932, BA-MA.
18
PERS 1/103928, PERS 1/2885, BA-MA.
19
Ramcke, Fallschirmjäger: Damals and Danach, 101-113.
20
Ramcke, Fallschirmjäger: Damals and Danach, 254-261; “French Convict Nazi General,”
New York Times, 22 March 1951.
21
Alaric Searle, Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament,
1949-1959 (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003), 163-165.
22
Searle, Wehrmacht Generals, 168-169; “Ex-Nazi’s Anti-West Blast Irks Bonn,” Christian
Science Monitor, 28 October 1952; “The Black Coats,” Time, 10 November 1952.
391
23
“Ex-Nazi’s Anti-West Blast Irks Bonn,” Christian Science Monitor, 28 October 1952; “The
Black Coats,” Time, 10 November 1952; Searle, Wehrmacht Generals, 286.
24
“Reunion Planned by Afrika Korps,” New York Times, 29 August 1951; Searle, Wehrmacht
Generals, 165; “Afrika Corps Chief Plans to Organize German Vet Group,” Christian Science
Monitor, 27 August 1951.
25
“Bonn Army Chief Hinted,” New York Times, 9 October 1954; “The New Look in German
Generals,” New York Times, 18 December 1954.
26
See the records of the U.S. Army, Europe, Historical Division, RG 549, Entry 2202AC, Box 3,
NARA.
27
The list of German general officers interned in the United States omitted von Aulock, Bruhn,
Cuno, Daser, Gallenkamp, Hermann, Heyking, Kittel, Pollert, Vaterrodt and Buhle; Location of
German PWs, 14 August 1946; Movement of PWs, 14 May 1946; Letter of Transmittal, 4 May
1946; German General Officer Prisoners of War Interned in the United States, 7 May 1946, RG
549, Entry 2202AC, Box 3, NARA.
28
Request for Location of Certain German Officers, 10 February 1947; Memorandum to
Commanding Officer, 7734 Hist. Det., 5 March 1947, RG 549, Entry 2202AC, Box 4; Parole of
Cooperative Prisoners of War, 2 April 1947; List of German Officers to be Retained with the
Last Group to be Transferred to Allendorf, 25 June 1947, RG 549, Entry 2202AC, Box 6,
NARA.
29
Report of Temporary Duty, Camp #11, 28 February 1948, RG 549, Entry 2202AC, Box 7,
NARA; Suppression of the German General Staff and Officer Corps, 3 June 1946, FO 1038/136;
Staff Minute Sheet, “The definition of a militarist,” 9 July 1948, FO 1038/165; Classification of
German Militarists, 10 February 1948, FO 939/194; Categorization of ex-Members of the
392
German Armed Forces, FO 1038/164, the National Archives of the United Kingdom (hereafter
TNA), Kew, Richmond, Surrey, United Kingdom.
30
Watch List of German Generals, 3 April 1946, RG 319, Entry 82, Box 3706, NARA.
31
Also, had the general officer prisoners been reclassified as civilian internees they would have
lost their military rank and accompanying pay along with 500 calories per day because German
civilians were allotted less food than were POWs.
32
A number of generals remained in the German history program long after their conversion
from prisoners of war to civilian internees. The program continued in a reorganized fashion
under the direction of the Control Group, a select number of German generals led by one-time
chief of the German Army general staff, Franz Halder. After again relocating, this time to
Königstein, near Frankfurt, in May 1948, Halder and his staff entertained requests for special
studies submitted by various U.S. government agencies through the U.S. Army Historical
Division in Washington. Control Group members then chose qualified former generals to write
the special reports, supervised their preparation, and served as liaisons between the former
German generals who wrote these reports from their homes and the German History program
authorities. Not surprisingly, an overwhelming number of these special studies dealt with issues
related to the German war against the Soviet Union. Requests for special studies came from
numerous U.S. government agencies including the U.S. Army staff and officer training schools,
the U.S. Navy, Air Force, Corps of Engineers, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Control Group
continued preparing historical reports and special studies until it was finally disbanded in 1961.
During the German History program’s fifteen years of operation, former Wehrmacht generals
prepared over 2500 manuscripts totaling over 200,000 pages. And Chief German coordinator
and former general, Franz Halder, received the United States Meritorious Civilian Service
Award for “a lasting contribution to the tactical and strategic thinking of the United States
393
Armed Forces.” Anspacher, et al, Army Historical Program, 55-56, 87-88, 100; Editor’s
Introduction, Detwiler, ed., German Military Studies, 1-2.
33
Category A (Security Suspects) for transfer to Bremen for CIC Edelheide, 8 October 1947, FO
939/194; Nominal Role of Confirmed Category II (Militarists) by Review Boards at Adelheide
as of 1 January 1948, FO 1038/164; Travel Control of Militarists/Stop List, 11 October 1948, FO
1038/165, TNA.
34
A Survey of the German Generals and General Staff, 10 June 1947, FO 393/40, TNA.
35
See James A. Wood, “Captive Historians, Captivated Audience: The German Military History
Program, 1945-1961,” Journal of Military History 69 (January 2005), 123-148; and Kevin
Soutor, “To Stem the Red Tide: The German Report Series and Its Effect on American Defense
Doctrine, 1948-1954,” Journal of Military History 57 (October 1993), 653-688.
36
For further study of the American admiration for German general officers, see Ronald Smelser
and Edward J. Davies II, The Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet War in American
Popular Culture (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). The Guderian story and
quotes appear on page 125.
394
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402
APPENDIX A
ROSTER OF WEHRMACHT GENERAL OFFICER PRISONERS OF WAR HELD IN
THE UNITED STATES
Von Arnim, Hans Jürgen
Buhle, Walter
Von Choltitz, Dietrich
Crüwell, Ludwig
Gallenkamp, Curt
Kessler, Ulrich
Neuling, Ferdinand
Ramcke, Bernhard-Hermann
Von Vaerst, Gustav
Vierow, Erwin
Aschenbrenner, Heinrich
Badinski, Curt
Borowietz, Willibald
Bülowius, Karl Robert Max
Daser, Wilhelm
Frantz, Gotthard
Von Heyking, Rüdiger
Kittel, Heinrich
Kleberger, Franz
Köchy, Carl Peter Bernard
Menneking, Rolf
Menny, Erwin
Pollert, Hermann
Rauch, Erwin
Seyffardt, Paul
Spang, Karl
Von Sponeck, Theodor Graf
Thomale, Wolfgang
Vierow, Walter
Von Aulock, Hubertus
Bieringer, Ludwig
Bock von Wülfingen, Detlef
Bruhn, Hans
Dunckern, Anton
Eberding, Knut
Elster, Botho
Gaul, Hans
Colonel General
Lieutenant General
Lieutenant General
Lieutenant General
Lieutenant General
Lieutenant General
Lieutenant General
Lieutenant General
Lieutenant General
Lieutenant General
Major General
Major General
Major General
Major General
Major General
Major General
Major General
Major General
Major General
Major General
Major General
Major General
Major General
Major General
Major General
Major General
Major General
Major General
Major General
Brigadier General
Brigadier General
Brigadier General
Brigadier General
Brigadier General
Brigadier General
Brigadier General
Brigadier General
403
Gehlen, Reinhard
Gundelach, Herbert
Gutknecht, Alfred
Hermann, Rudolph
Von Hülsen, Heinrich-Hermann
Krause, Fritz
Laegeler, Hellmuth
Von Liebenstein, Kurt Freiherr
Von der Mosel, Hans
Richter, Otto
Sattler, Robert
Schnarrenberger, Ernst
Schramm, Hans-Georg
Schuberth, Hans-Georg
Stolberg-Stolberg, Christophe Graf zu
Von Quast, August Viktor
Von Trotha, Ivo-Thilo
Ullersperger, Wilhelm
Vaterrodt, Franz
Schirmer, Alfred
Henneke, Walter
Kähler, Otto
Meixner, Paul
Weber, Carl
Brigadier General
Brigadier General
Brigadier General
Brigadier General
Brigadier General
Brigadier General
Brigadier General
Brigadier General
Brigadier General
Brigadier General
Brigadier General
Brigadier General
Brigadier General
Brigadier General
Brigadier General
*Brigadier General
Brigadier General
Brigadier General
Brigadier General
*Vice Admiral
*Rear Admiral
*Rear Admiral
*Rear Admiral
*Rear Admiral
404
APPENDIX B
LIST OF GERMAN MILITARY DOCUMENT SECTION STUDIES (PUBLISHED)
German Operational Intelligence: A Study of German Operational Intelligence (164
pages)
The German General Staff Corps: A Study of the Organization of the German General
Staff (276 pages)
German Army Mobilization: A Study of the Mobilization of the German Army (91
pages)
The German Operation at Anzio: A Study of the German Operation at Anzio Beachhead
from 22 January 1944 to 31 May 1944 (128 pages)
German Military Transportation (77 pages)
German Training Methods: A Study of German Military Training (316 pages)
The German Army Quartermaster and Finance Organization (199 pages)
Special Report No. 1: Officer Efficiency Reports in the German Army (26 pages)
Special Report No. 2: Officer Candidate Selection and Training in the German Army (18
pages)
Special Report No. 3: Ration Administration in the German Army (20 pages)
Special Report No. 4: German Army Officer Courts-Martial (7 pages)
Special Report No. 5: Screening of German Enlisted Personnel for Officer Appointments
(10 pages)
Special Translation No. 1: Infantry in the Sixth Year of the War (18 pages)
Armored Breakthrough: War Diary of German First Armored Group (121 pages)
Bibliography No. 1b: German Chemical Warfare (11 pages)
405
APPENDIX C
LIST OF GERMAN MILITARY DOCUMENT SECTION STUDIES
(UNPUBLISHED)
A Study on Anti-Partisan Warfare (10 pages)
German Appraisal of U.S. Armor (7 pages)
German Army Mobilization, 1921-1939 (656) [not translated]
German Manpower: A Study of the Employment of German Manpower from 1933-1945
(270 pages)
German Permanent Fortifications (305 pages)
German Administration of Occupied Territories (265 pages) [not translated]
Hitler as Supreme Warlord, 1939-1945 (10 pages)
Program “Otto” (10 pages)
Tactics (“Taktik”) (240 pages) [not translated]
The German High Command (492 pages)
406
APPENDIX D
ROSTER OF WEHRMACHT OFFICER PRISONERS OF WAR IN THE HILL
PROJECT (“HILLBILLIES”)
Buhle, Walter
Thomale, Wolfgang
Kleberger, Franz
Menneking, Rolf
Gundelach, Herbert
Laegeler, Hellmuth
von Troth, Ivo-Thilo
Berendsen, Friedrich
Engelter, Georg
Gaul, Hans
Haertel, Johannes
Kinitz, Franz-Josef
Kuehne, Rudolf-Theodor
Meyer-Detring, Wilhelm
Petri, Reinhard
Pollex, Kurt
Reissinger, Walter
Bogner, Dr. Josef
von Brauchitsch, Hans-Georg
Brix, Ernst
Euler, Richard
Fellmer, Reinhold
Klehr, Hans-Guenther
Linn, Hermann
Litterscheid, Friedrich-Franz
Mueller, Alfred-Johannes
Obermaier, Claus
Rittman, Kurt
Schaeder, Christian
von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, Friedrich
Lobedanz, Walter
von Luedinghausen, Horst
Schubert, Paul-Heinz
Cartellieri, Dr. Wolfgang
Dyckerhoff, Hans
Knieper, Werner
Lieutenant General
Major General
Major General
Major General
Brigadier General
Brigadier General
Brigadier General
Colonel
Colonel
Colonel
Colonel
Colonel
Colonel
Colonel
Colonel
Colonel
Colonel
Lieutenant Colonel
Lieutenant Colonel
Lieutenant Colonel
Lieutenant Colonel
Lieutenant Colonel
Lieutenant Colonel
Lieutenant Colonel
Lieutenant Colonel
Lieutenant Colonel
Lieutenant Colonel
Lieutenant Colonel
Lieutenant Colonel
Lieutenant Colonel
Major
Major
Lieutenant Commander (Navy)
Captain
Captain
Captain
407
Lorenz, Reinhold
Zuber, Hans-Georg
Benke, Heinz
von Berg, Karl-Ludwig
Buehler, Eugen
Darsow, Hans-Jürgen
Koch, Hermann
Krueger, Herbert
Rahn, Helmut
Achtelik, Walter
Gehrke, Hermann
Haeusing, Heiner
Jentsch, Dietrich
Mengler, Wolfgang
Meyer, Erwin
Naehler, Max
Oelze, Werner
Pflocksch, Gustav
Preckel, Karl
Wagner, Hans-Otto
Captain
Captain
1st Lieutenant
1st Lieutenant
1st Lieutenant
1st Lieutenant
1st Lieutenant
1st Lieutenant
1st Lieutenant
2nd Lieutenant
2nd Lieutenant
2nd Lieutenant
2nd Lieutenant
2nd Lieutenant
2nd Lieutenant
2nd Lieutenant
2nd Lieutenant
2nd Lieutenant
2nd Lieutenant
2nd Lieutenant
408
VITA
Name:
Derek Ray Mallett
Address:
Department of History, 4236 TAMU, Texas A&M University,
College Station, Texas 77843
Email Address:
[email protected]
Education:
B.A., History/Political Science, Culver-Stockton College, 1992
M.A., History, Truman State University, 1997
M.A., Education, Truman State University, 2001
Publications:
“Who Was the ‘Enemy Among Us?’: Missouri’s World War II
Prisoners of War,” Missouri Historical Review 103, No. 4 (July 2009)
Fellowships,
Grants, Awards: Andersonville National Historic Trust, Prisoner of War Research
Grant, 2009
German Historical Institute, Washington, DC, Doctoral Dissertation
Fellow, 2008
Charles C. Keeble ’48 Graduate Dissertation Fellowship, Texas A&M
University, 2007
John L. Canup Award for Excellence as a Discussion Leader or
Graduate Lecturer, Texas A&M University, 2006-2007