Hollow at the Core? Greek
Prime Ministers and the
Constraints on Governing.
{
Kevin Featherstone
LSE
[and D. Papadimitriou]
The ‘core executive’ around the PM.
Takes different forms:
Dunleavy & Rhodes (1990): six variants.
Where does Greece fit?
PM dominant – but not strong core executive
control over state apparatus.
But neither is it one of ‘bureaucratic coordination’;
‘cabinet government’; ‘ministerial government’.
Perhaps ‘fragmented government’.
Conceptual background
Greece as an outlier:
PM power that (formally) is near presidential,
but lacks a centralisation of resources &reach.
Relative independence of ministries, but without
Cabinet dominance.
Survived turnover of different personalities;
parties; size of majorities; factional strength.
& despite near-lack of constitutional restraint on
PM to change his Office & Cabinet system.
= Exceptionalism
How, why has this Greek core survived?
‘an imperative towards coordination’ (Davis
1997) across Western systems.
Show across different PM case studies.
Continuity suggests: deep-rooted, systemic
constraints.
Some relationship to reform failures: capacity.
= The puzzle
Limited ability of the centre – around the PM –
to exert control over government. Affects
scope to monitor and direct, as well as the
ability to develop policy and to evaluate it once
it has been implemented.
Weak mechanisms exist to establish effective
coordination across the government.
Fallacy of PM power: constitutionally Greece
has one of most powerful PMs in Europe
(primus solus) (Dagtoglou, 1986); but an
‘emperor without clothes’.
Weaknesses of structure &
process
Smaller systems: Ireland 3x; Netherlands 4x; Austria 8x
Greek PM’s Office in 2005: just over 60 staff & most ‘inactive’ –
working elsewhere.
so much of Greek bureaucracy is over-sized, while that of the PM’s
Office is under-resourced
Why assume these differences have no effect? Why no costs in
control, direction, coordination? Dysfunctionalities have
consequences.
Not assume other countries have ‘ideal’ model; nor that problems
are unique to Greece.
Go compare…
Following Goetz & Magretts 1999; Hood 1983.
Lacking:
Nodality; effective authority; organisational
capacity; resources.
CEE: a ‘solitary centre’ with centralised resources
but a lack of legal authority = reverse of Greece.
Akin to direzione plurima dissociata (pluridirectional disassociated government) in Italy.
But not a S European or small state phenomenon.
A ‘hollow core’
Personal paradox: though he believed in strong,
hands-on leadership he gave himself smallest of
staffs. Molyviatis created a PM’s Office of just 5
advisers & 5 secretaries. In Parliament, not in
Maximou. Very limited influence on policy.
Legacy: a small, personal support team – instead of
an institutionalised unit for coordination and
monitoring.
Relied on an inner circle of ministers, long-term
allies: Averoff; Papaligouras; Papakonstantinou; and
Rallis.
Fear, discipline, admiration, allies (not personal
friends).
Setting the mould:
Karamanlis
Very few meetings of Το Υπουργικο Συμβουλιο
(the Ministerial Council): short, ceremonial.
‘Headmaster’ giving a speech. No discussion.
Instead, weekly meetings of the ‘inner Cabinet’: Η
Κυβερνητικη Επιτροπι (or Government
Commission). Government by inner clique.
No regularised Cabinet process. Administrative
support came from different places – there was no
strong ‘Cabinet Office’.
Context: power with the person; ‘K. or the tanks’;
sense of threat; but ‘pre-modern’ frame had been set.
Karamanlis: a limited
Cabinet role…
Andreas: tries ‘presidentialisation’. Dominant;
charismatic; only one with previous ministerial
experience.
Anti-junta politics: aversion to matters of organisation.
Georgios Kassimatis: 5 days to create a plan. Was
radical.
Brought together all the services responsible for the
coordination of the government and it strengthened the
PM’s Office as an independent hub of advice and
monitoring. The new Law designated 102 posts in the
PM’s Office alone, including 16 senior advisers.
Outcome very different. No PM has filled anything
like 102 posts. Despite Livanis from 1983; some
disarray. PM allowed own channels on personal whim.
Improvisation. Undermined coordination.
The allaghi moment: 1981
Frequent reshuffles: average of 3 every 2 yrs.
Very few meetings of full Cabinet: average of 2
p.a.
Inner Cabinet; committees: used less than
Karamanlis.
Council Secretariat an empty shell, lacking
function.
Instability, diffusion, whim. Not a presidential
office; old wine in new bottles.
Andreas & the ‘Cabinet’.
Slim majority; constrained factional position:
different.
1st to have a regular pattern of meetings of both full
Ministerial Council & inner Cabinet.
New ‘Code of Operation’ for the Ministerial Council
(replacing Karamanlis’), stipulating frequency of
meetings etc. , by Prof. Vouloudakis.
But no significant reform of PM’s Office. Voloudakis
said that the resources available to him were rather
“comparable to those of a small rural council”.
Style: Mitsotakis first a minister in 1951. Knew how
to turn wheels. Huge network. But: micromanaging.
Interference at all levels & in everything.
Mitsotakis: wafer-thin rule
Quick start: reduction of staff; Nikos Themelis to head
Office of Strategic Planning. Small, but effective: just 7
staff. Lean.
Regularised Cabinet schedule: every 2 weeks – both
full & inner Cabinet meeting every other week. More
extensive use of cttees. More inclusive Cabinet style.
Shock of discussion. Political need: his factional
position.
Secretary of Ministerial Council: upgraded. Kosmides
oversaw preparation of legislation, all government
committees, and the resolution of inter-ministerial
conflicts.
Coordination: PM notebook; Olympics: motorcyclists.
Limited prioritisation & reach.
Simitis’ modernisation
the problems at the heart of government – of
limited central control and of lack of
coordination – have remained.
Each of 4 cases: opportunities for real change,
but change limited & not sustained. Why?
Must look at systemic conditions – cultural
roots. Tentative explanations….beyond one
case. Invite observations…
Plus ça change, plus c'est la
même chose.
Premium on personal trust & loyalty, against
perceived threats.
Special contexts of Karamanlis & Andreas: sense
of threat. Colonels? Anti-junta ‘sect’.
Small no. of advisers: trust=regular contact. Little
sense of managerial hierarchy.
Impact of clientelism, rousfetti .
Low estimation fear of lower echelons of state
administration. Get things done = small,
purposeful unit. Rational to detach.
The mind-set
Clientelism inimical to stratum of independent
technocratic expertise within government; &
outsiders labelled by party. Foreigners?
Staff of ancien regime must go quickly when
new government begins. No-one in Maximou.
Staffing & advice
Power based on personality of PM. Charisma.
Cabinet as a grand platform: neither routinized nor
central.
No PM since 1974 has had circulated minutes; no
stable pattern of use of inner Cabinet or of
committees.
Near autarky of individual ministries. Ad hoc,
narrow, superficial coordination. Napoleonic
legalism: excess of detail, penalties. Ministers:
interest avoiding too much coordination
(clientelism). Both a demand & supply problem.
Cabinet system
Task of government: law, rather than policies
that are known to be working. Little policy
evaluation; impact assessment.
System structured for frustration, failure: good
intentions thwarted by inadequate support;
lack of information; legal blockages; unrealistic
timetables. [Car]
The costs…
Weakness of the centre is result of a structure of ideas & interests
that undermine its efficacy, e.g.
Leadership mentality
Norms of trust, threat
Interests of clientelism
Prefer inner clique; lack of technocracy
Legalism & autarkic ministries
Problems neglected for too long. Crisis shows reform capacity as
issue.
Avoid populism on size. Need for cross-party support.
= Preliminary conclusions