The Iranian Muslim Community in England
Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities
www.communities.gov.uk
community, opportunity, prosperity
The Iranian Muslim Community in England
Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities
Change Institute
April 2009
Communities and Local Government: London
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Contents | 3
Contents
1
Executive Summary
1.1 Introduction and context
1.2 Migration and England’s Iranian Muslim population
1.3 Identity, religion and language
1.4 Socio economic status
1.5 Intergenerational dynamics, young people and the role of
women in the community
1.6 Cohesion and integration
1.7 Media and links with country of origin
1.8 CIvil society and civic engagement
5
5
6
6
7
8
8
9
10
2
Introduction
2.1 Objectives of the research
2.2 Report structure
12
12
13
3
Methodology
3.1 Project phases
3.2 Analysis of data
3.3 Limitations of the research
14
14
17
18
4
Country Profile and History
20
5
Migration History and Trends
23
6
Community Demography and Key Locations
26
7
Socio economic situation
29
8
Key characteristics
8.1 Identity
8.2 Ethnicity
8.3 Religion
8.4 Language
31
31
34
34
36
9
Intra-community Dynamics
9.1 Intergenerational issues
9.2 Women
9.3 Young people
9.4 Cohesion and integration
37
37
38
38
39
10 Media
42
11 Links with country of origin
11.1 Travel
11.2 Remittances
11.3 Political links
44
44
44
45
4 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
12 Civil Society
12.1 Overview
12.2 Types of organisation and services offered
12.3 Key organisations
12.4 Key influencers
12.5 Civic engagement and participation
12.6 Community issues and capacity building needs
46
46
46
47
51
51
53
13 Conclusions and recommendations
13.1 Recommendations
55
56
14 Glossary
58
15 Bibliography
59
Executive Summary | 5
1 Executive Summary
1.1 Introduction and context
This report is one of thirteen on England’s Muslim ethnic communities commissioned
by the Cohesion Directorate of Communities and Local Government to understand
the diversity of England’s Muslim population and to help enhance its engagement and
partnership with Muslim civil society.
The primary goal of the research was to detail the main population and community
locations, identify denominations and religious practices, and identify the strengths
of links with the country of origin. An overarching objective for the project was to
identify how government could best engage and work in partnership with specific
communities.
For many of these communities, there was little pre-existing research specific to the
community. Hence the research was expanded to include other areas such as identity,
language use, socio economic situations, and intra-community dynamics. Since the
country and migration contexts are important, these were also briefly detailed.
The relatively limited scope of this study in relation to individual communities means
that there is still a great deal more research needed in order to establish comprehensive
knowledge and understanding about the different communities. This study provides
first insights into the communities rather than offering firm conclusions, and hence
should be understood as a starting rather than an endpoint in getting to know the
different communities covered by the research.
This report details the research findings for the Iranian Muslim community. Individual
reports for the other twelve communities covered by the study as well as a separate
report synthesising the overall research findings are available from Communities and
Local Government.
This report focuses on the Iranian community in England and as such those
interviewed and involved in focus groups were based in England. However, some of
the existing research and data on the community refers to England; England and
Wales; Great Britain; and the United Kingdom. Thus the report refers to whichever
of these is the most relevant in the context.
6 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
1.2 Migration and England’s Iranian Muslim population
There have been three main waves of Iranian migration which correspond to the socio
economic and political conditions in Iran and immigration policies in the receiving
countries. The first phase began in 1950 and ended in 1979, with mainly middle-and
upper-class families sending their children abroad for higher education. The second
phase of largely politically motivated migration started in the run up to Iranian
Revolution in 1979, which produced one of the largest mass exoduses from Iran and
led to the creation of the ‘Islamic State of Iran’. A third wave began around 1995 and
continues to the present day consisting of two distinct populations of highly skilled
individuals and working-class labour and ‘economic’ migrants.
Since the first large influx of Iranians coming to Britain, there have been varying
estimates of the Iranian population in Britain. The 2001 census recorded 24,384
Iranian-born Muslims in England. Sixty-one per cent of the total Iranian-born
population in England (40,181).1 More recently the 2006 Labour Force Survey (LFS)
reports an estimate of around 61,000 Iranians in the UK by country of birth. The jump
in the LFS data may largely be due to the large increase in asylum applications since
2000. Most official data sources are unlikely to capture the full size of the community
as much of it is well established and British-born Iranians are not included in any figures
available. The vast majority of the Iranian population is concentrated in London, with
small population clusters spread across most parts of the country. These include
significant communities in Manchester, Birmingham, Brighton, Sheffield and Leeds.
1.3 Identity, religion and language
The reasons and patterns of migration of the Iranian diaspora in Britain have had a
significant impact on ways in which different groups within the community define
their identity. The first and second wave of migrants fled Iran either due to their
connections with the pre-revolution government and ruling monarchy or due to fears
of the increasing religious conservatism the forthcoming regime would impose. These
earlier migrants were more likely to distance themselves from their Iranian national
identity on arrival than more recent arrivals.
However, as the community has become more settled and well established there has
been a growing desire within all sections of the community to reassert and preserve its
Iranian identity and culture. The majority are Farsi speakers and lay great stress on the
promotion of the language to the younger generation. According to respondents, the
majority of Iranian people in the UK see themselves as Iranians living in Britain, and
that most people define themselves as British-Iranian. Some identify themselves by
their religion but emphasise that they are Shi’a Muslim and not Sunni, which is the
predominant denomination in the UK.
1
2001 Census, commissioned table C0644.
Executive Summary | 7
The Kurdish Iranian community has a very distinct identity which is more visible in the
British context than in Iran. This could be related to the greater freedom of political
expression in Britain and the presence of a significant Kurdish population composed of
Kurds from all over the Middle East, with a common goal of reviving Kurdish identity
and pursuing the goal of creating ‘Kurdistan’.
Identity among British-born Iranians appears to be notably more complex. Some
respondents talked about the difficulties that British-born Iranians have negotiating
their identity between two cultures, while others are developing their own unique
forms of cultural identity and expression through a fusion of the British and Iranian
aspects of their linguistic and cultural influences.
Most young respondents said that they feel more at home in Britain than Iran but
many still continue to feel a sense of not fully belonging here. Some young people
define themselves as Iranian first, in part due to a feeling of non-acceptance or
hostility from wider British society, they feel they are not being seen by the indigenous
community as a fully integrated part of British society.
The vast majority of the UK’s Iranian Muslim population are Shi’a, with a minority
following Sufi traditions. Levels of religiosity vary considerably across the community
with a large proportion considering itself as ‘culturally’ Muslim rather than as
practising Muslim. There is also a significant section of the community that sees itself
as secular or not practising any religion. However, many apparently ‘secular’ Iranians
may actually be quite spiritual in a private way. Despite varying levels of adherence,
certain events are very unifying and most Iranians try and attend programmes
associated with Muharram and Ramadan even if they do not otherwise attend
mosques regularly.
1.4 Socio economic status
Given the various waves of migration from Iran related to changing political and
economic contexts, the socio economic profile of the Iranian community in the UK is
very mixed. As well as political exiles and refugees who include highly educated and
professional people, there are many escaping difficult economic circumstances that
may have lower educational levels and skills. The older Iranian communities are very
well established and doing well in their professions and in business. People who have
arrived recently are seen to be disadvantaged through their lack of English language
skills, unfamiliarity with the working culture and environment in this country, or due to
work permit and visa problems. Some also suggested that many of these new
migrants come from smaller rural areas and hence have faced greater obstacles to
integration and employment than their more urban predecessors.
8 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
1.5 Intergenerational dynamics, young people and the
role of women in the community
As with most communities, there is some level of intergenerational difference but the
extent to which this is an acute problem is unclear and most interviewees did not
appear to think there is a significant cultural clash between generations. The relative
lack of family conflict between the generations was explained as being due to both
the length of time that many Iranians have been in the country, and due to the more
liberal attitudes among those that left Iran to escape the Islamic state in the early 80s.
There are of course those parents who are more religiously devout and do not wish
their children to follow a secular British lifestyle. These parents consciously involve
children in activities aimed at strengthening familial, linguistic, religious and cultural
links with Iran.
A significant difference between the older and younger generation is the level of
interest and involvement in politics. The generation that grew up in Iran was very
politicised and many amongst them left Iran for political reasons. Whilst young people
born and brought up in Britain have some knowledge of their parent’s views and
experiences, they are too far removed from them to be actively engaged in either
Iranian or British politics.
Women in the Iranian community are reported to play an important role in the family
and public sphere, and are noted for achieving success in business and professional
roles. While women are often absent from the upper tiers of religiously oriented
committees and bodies, they still play a major role in cultural organisations and
activities. However, despite the relatively high status women have in Iranian society,
most political organisations remain dominated by men. Even in the private sphere,
women tend to hold primary responsibility for domestic activities and childcare while
the important decisions tend to be controlled by men.
Younger respondents stressed that you cannot define their generation of Iranians as
one thing or another because of the diversity of their identities. However, a few key
themes emerged during the research in relation to young people. In addition to
intergenerational dynamics and identity issues, respondents identified a lack of
political engagement, diversity in religious adherence, and the importance of
education as key themes.
1.6 Cohesion and integration
The Iranian community is thought to be very well integrated in British society. Most
people are believed to be comfortable about socialising in mainstream environments,
although this has been harder for older people than for the younger generation. Also
those who are more devoutly religious find public environments such as clubs and
pubs very unsuitable and so tend to create their own separate social spaces for both
religious ritual and social/cultural activities.
Executive Summary | 9
Despite the high level of integration, negative public stereotypes about Iran and
Iranians can sometimes create difficulties and reinforce a sense of being outside the
mainstream. Most respondents spoke about a public perception/stereotype of Iranians
as being intolerant or holding extremist views. They strongly challenged this
perception and most believed that there is no problem of violent extremism within the
community. The experiences of a fundamentalist regime in Iran are thought to have
left a strong desire in the community to forego strong religious and political ideologies
and to be more moderate and balanced in religious and political views.
Government approaches that link cohesion and integration issues with religion,
particularly through the narrative of combating terrorism, is seen as particularly
unhelpful in the light of the different levels of religiosity and practice within the
community. There is a great deal of sceptism about whether this kind of engagement
really has anything to do with cohesion and integration.
1.7 Media and links with country of origin
A number of mass media forms are available and marketed towards a range of
political, religious and ethnic Iranian networks and specific socio economic groups in
London. Most are published or broadcast in Persian and English although those aimed
at the second generation are mostly English language based. Community perceptions
of both UK and western and Iranian media are shaped by political and ideological
differences. These differences are not only reflected across different groupings in the
communities, but can also be felt within individual families. There is also a notable
difference in the usages of other media between generations, in particular in relation
to newspapers. Internet news sites are becoming increasingly important and there are
thousands of websites and weblogs that are popular in the community. The use of the
internet is not as polarised across different generations as other communities due the
high level of computer literacy amongst the older generation of Iranians.
Iranian TV includes both Islamic and entertainment channels. There are also some
anti-government satellite channels watched by Iranians living in the UK. Iranian
newspapers in London focus on political, social and economic news from Iran as well
as advertising various services including cultural and entertainment services to meet
the needs of the Iranian diaspora. Some respondents indicated that print media can be
quite problematic and hence it is not as popular as other media forms. Papers printed
in Iran are often heavily censored, and those printed abroad can be too critical and
hence it is difficult for the community to get any balanced coverage across the
religious and political spectrum.
Most Iranians travel frequently to Iran for family, holiday or religious purposes and only
a few people who came to the UK before 1979 are believed to have cut off their
connections with Iran. Families also send remittances regularly but the level of this
from the UK is not known, especially as more than half the total sums remitted
worldwide are thought to be through the hawala system, an informal network of
money dealers that offers faster and cheaper means of transfer than formal channels.
10 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
1.8 Civil society and civic engagement
There is a vibrant and vigorous Iranian civil society sector, with over 50 UK-based
Iranian charities in London. Iranian civil society consists primarily of Shi’a Muslim
religious organisations and largely secular cultural organisations. There are also a
number of university student organisations and business/professional and other ad hoc
networks active in the community. The civil society sector represents the full range of
cultural and service, religious, secular, ideological and non-ideological organisations.
There is, however, a paucity of women’s groups and organisations aimed at meeting
the needs of women. Also, whilst there is a significant refugee population, there are
few specific organisations to support Iranian asylum seekers and refugees compared
to the Afghan, Iraqi and Somali communities. Existing civil society organisations are
also felt to not cater for the needs of new economic migrants who can experience
high levels of unemployment or problems with making adjustments to their new
environment.
One of the key issues for civil society development highlighted by respondents is the
difficulties in obtaining funding for non-religious activity. Very few organisations apply
for or access public funds and Iranians are thought to be more likely to donate to
religious organisations, which are also more likely to receive funding from the Iranian
Government. As a result, cultural organisations and organisations providing secular
youth provision and women support services remain very under-funded.
Religious figures play a key influencing role among all sections of the community, even
among those who are not religious adherents. In this respect the Iranian community
has a unique relationship with the clergy due to the existence of clerical rule in Iran
over the past 30 years. Iranian clerics therefore have both religious and political
influence, and whilst some people may not relate to them on a theological basis, they
are still accorded respect because of the position of power they have in Iranian society.
For the more secular amongst the younger generation, and for those who eschew
Iranian politics, key figures from Iranian popular culture and western popular culture
are reported to have an important influence on the community.
While there are a number of well-developed organisations in the Iranian community,
it was far from evident that this is indicative of high levels of civic engagement by the
diaspora community. Respondents highlighted a number of barriers and obstacles to
engagement ranging from attitudes towards the UK Government to the lack of
familiarity with public structures and forums for participation. Public authority
engagement with the community is also thought to be low because of a lack of
visibility of the community outside of North West London, combined with a lack of
internal coherence or representative structures for dialogue.
Executive Summary | 11
In relation to establishing future partnerships and channels for communication with
public authorities, the role of ministers of religion was highlighted as important
because of the particular leadership role they play in the community. However, it was
stressed that because of the social and religious diversity within the community, it is
unlikely that any one form of communication or organisation could ever be fully
representative or inclusive. Therefore attempts at engagement would need to involve
a broad range of organisations and methods.
Specific recommendations arising from community respondents include:
• Improved service provision for asylum seekers and new migrants, particularly in
the areas of language training, housing, immigration and employment support
• Cross-cultural psychiatry and counselling services
• Funding and support for the establishment of Iranian women’s organisations
• Increased efforts on the part of public authorities to establish channels of
communication and dialogue with the community taking into account the
significant grouping that exists within the community
• Enhanced youth provision to counter the impact of radicalising influences
• Development of government strategies to address anti-Muslim bias in the
British media.
Other recommendations:
• Further research into identity formation, attitudes and experiences of young people
• Capacity building of existing organisations and/or support for the development of
new organisations to cater for the social and welfare needs of new migrants.
12 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
2 Introduction
Communities and Local Government recognises that there is a need to enhance its
understanding and knowledge of the diverse Muslim ethnic populations in England,
particularly relating to some of the specific smaller communities of African,
Middle Eastern and other Asian countries of origin. As such, Communities and
Local Government commissioned The Change Institute (CI) to deliver the research
project ‘Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities’ (UMEC). The 13 ethnic Muslim
communities that the Cohesion Directorate was seeking more information about
were those originating from:
• Afghanistan
• Algeria
• Bangladesh
• Egypt
• India
• Iran
• Iraq
• Morocco
• Nigeria
• Pakistan
• Saudi Arabia
• Somalia
• Turkey.
Reports have been provided under separate covers for each diaspora community,
along with separate synthesis and technical reports.
2.1 Objectives of the research
There were four objectives for the research:
• Mapping: Develop population maps for each ethnic community outlining the
spread of the population and identification of high density clusters
• Identification of denominations and pathways: Collect information on the
grassroots institutions/key individuals working with ethnic communities and the
breakdown of these ethnic communities by denomination/sect/clan
Introduction | 13
• Identifying strength of links and capacity of ethnic communities: Collect
information on the strength of links between each ethnic community and country
of origin (including influential institutions/individuals/media channels/religious
influences). Also to collect information on the relative strengths and weaknesses of
civil society infrastructure for each ethnic community, highlighting where capacities
need to be developed
• Identifying how government can best engage with ethnic communities: Develop
recommendations on the ways in which Communities and Local Government
can best engage with and understand Muslim ethnic communities in England,
including recommendations on avenues of communications and delivery to
these communities.
These objectives translated into six key questions that the study needed to address:
1. Where are the key ethnic groups of the Muslim population located?
2. What are the latest estimated sizes and demographic make-up of the key ethnic
communities?
3. Which denominations and/or other internal groupings do these ethnic groups
belong to?
4. How can Communities and Local Government best engage with them?
5. What are the strength of links between the ethnic communities and country
of origin?
6. How developed is the level of social infrastructure for each group?
During the course of the desktop research and fieldwork, we obtained data on other
facets of the community such as socio economic position and intra-community
dynamics. In order to provide additional context to users of the report we have
included this information where it was felt this would be valuable to the reader.
However, it should be noted a comprehensive socio economic description or analysis
of the community was outside the scope of this study. We also took the view that the
migration and history of each community’s country of origin was important and often
offered potential explanations for the location; intra-community dynamics, including
political, social and cultural characteristics; and development of the diaspora
communities in the UK.
2.2 Report structure
The report is structured to address the key research questions set out previously.
Sections 6 and 8 are primarily based on quantitative secondary data. Sections 7 to 12
draw primarily on the qualitative research corroborated by secondary sources where
these are available. Finally, Section 13 draws together specific recommendations
arising from the research.
14 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
3 Methodology
The research questions represented a broad area of enquiry and analysis. While
quantitative data about the size, location and other demographic features of the
priority communities was a key research need, the study primarily focused on enabling
Communities and Local Government to ‘know’ these communities in depth.
To fulfil these research requirements, the methodology developed needed to combine
documentary research with processes of consultation and dialogue. Data collection
consisted of two phases which were consistent across each community.
PHASE
ACTIVITY
METHOD
1
Population mapping
Review of:
• Existing literature
• National data sources
• Local data sources and consultations
with local authority, other public
bodies and community representatives.
These were conducted to cover all
thirteen communities in this study.
2
Qualitative data collection
Community interviews (205 total, twelve
with Iranian community).
Focus groups (30 total, two with Iranian
community and four with Muslim youth
from all ethnic backgrounds).
In addition, we conducted 15 interviews with local government and voluntary
services stakeholders across England to discuss their existing experiences of working
in partnership with and supporting Muslim civil society organisations across all the
Muslim ethnic communities that we researched.
3.1 Project phases
Phase 1: Population mapping
The first phase consisted of collecting mainly secondary quantitative data but also
some primary qualitative data about locations of Muslim ethnic populations and
known civil society organisations. The main method for data collection on population
characteristics was through a comprehensive review of a broad range of secondary
data sources, including the output of migration and population think tanks and
academic research centres.
Methodology | 15
Robust and up-to-date population data is difficult to obtain outside of the 2001
Census but we were able to obtain some anecdotal information from local authorities
and community groups about migration since 2001. However, the 2001 Census data
still informs the baseline of the population figures quoted in this study. This data has
been supplemented where possible by a limited amount of additional Local Authority
information or other sources where reliable estimates have been made.
Phase 2: Qualitative data collection
Qualitative data collection has been undertaken primarily through 12 one-to-one
interviews with key respondents (‘those who might be expected to know’), and two
focus groups with individuals from the Iranian Muslim community. This phase of the
research was carried out between April and July 2008.
3.1.1 In-depth interviews
The interviews assisted in developing an overview of national and local contexts: the
make-up of diaspora communities, key issues concerning violent extremism including
perceptions, experiences and activities, current initiatives in place to counter this and
existing civil society structures and development needs. The interviews also assisted in
identification of further key contacts for the one-to-one and focus group research and
covered a range of topics including:
• Key data sources
• Denominations and pathways
• Key influencers and institutions
• Key issues and needs for the specific diaspora
• Links with countries of origin
• Civil society structures and capacity needs
• Current levels of contact and key barriers to engagement with public authorities
• Media consumption
• Appropriate communication channels for engagement and involvement.
The majority of interviews were conducted face-to-face and some by telephone
where necessary.
Respondents were chosen on the basis that they offered a range of different types
of knowledge and perspectives on community issues and dynamics.
Selection of interviewees involved drawing up a ‘long list’ of key contacts in each
community in consultation with community interviewers, expert advisers and contacts
made during the first phase of research. Shortlists were produced to ensure that there
was adequate female and youth representation and a regional spread that reflected
the distribution of the community in England. Additional names were added on the
basis of subsequent recommendations made.
16 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
Interviews for the Iranian community research were conducted by a researcher from
the Iranian community and a Pakistani researcher who has worked closely with the
community. The researchers were already familiar with many of the civil society
organisations in the Iranian Muslim community. This added legitimacy to the process
of enquiry that was critical in opening up discussion and enabled us to gather rich data.
The profile of the twelve respondents was as follows:
• Seven males and five females
• Seven from London, five from outside London (Birmingham, Coventry, Manchester)
• Two were in the 20-29 age range; four were 30-39; four were 40-49 and two
were 50+
• Six were involved in community or religious-based roles, two were in educational
roles, two were professionals and two were students.
A quality control process was used by the Change Institute (CI) to ensure consistency
and quality across each community. This involved:
• Piloting: Each community researcher was required to carry out two/three pilot
interviews in each community to refine approaches and questions where necessary.
This included a detailed discussion with each researcher following the pilot
interviews, with expert adviser involvement where necessary, as well as a review of
the interview field notes to ensure that relevant data was being used by researchers
• Each community researcher was assigned to a member of the core research team
at CI who reviewed field notes on an ongoing basis, and regular internal team
meetings were held to share findings and ensure consistency across the project.
3.1.2 Discussion groups
In addition to the individual interviews, we conducted two focus groups that allowed
for collective insights to be generated on community needs and issues, including
challenges and practical ways forward. These explored partnership issues, civil society
infrastructure and capacity development needs, media and communications. While
these focus groups were limited in number, they provided a rich and often diverse set
of views that complemented the data gathered in the one-to-one interviews.
Focus groups were designed to include a mix of participants from different community
networks and different occupational backgrounds who might be expected to hold a
wide range of views. Participants were recruited by the core research team through
local community organisations and CI networks.
One male and one female focus group was conducted. These were attended by
individuals over 35 years of age. The focus groups were conducted in London in
July 2008.
Methodology | 17
Location
Born in
the UK
Born outside
of the UK
Age
range
Group
(Female)
1 London
0
5
35+
Group
(Male)
2 London
1
5
35+
(one 20-29).
Language translation was required for some members of the female focus group.
Groups were facilitated by CI directors and analysts, with additional support from
community researchers.
In addition to the two focus groups for each community, four youth focus groups were
conducted in London, Birmingham and Bradford with youth from a range of ethnic
backgrounds. The findings of these focus groups are discussed in the summary report.
This report uses selective quotes from the interviews and focus groups to illustrate key
recurring themes and issues arising during the qualitative data collection. Where
necessary they have been carefully edited for ease of reading, or understanding what
was meant.
3.2 Analysis of data
Data analysis involved generating understandable patterns by comparing what
different respondents/focus groups said about specific themes or questions. The central
question was whether the data and information and the range of views expressed led
to the same conclusions. Findings were validated by triangulation of all data and
information collected in both project phases so far as possible, and by critical internal
reflection and review within the CI team.
The analytical process involved reviewing field notes to develop emerging themes in
line with the analytical framework, which was done in collaboration with the field
researchers; regular internal meetings to discuss findings from all communities;
dedicated internal workshops on the communities to finalise analysis; reviews from
expert advisers; feedback from ‘community reviewers’ and a formal peer review process.
Intercultural understanding of responses and non-responses was also essential in
considerations of the data generated. A set of commonly held assumptions and
understandings in any cultural group may mean that some things are simply left
unsaid – because they are commonly understood in the group and do not require
articulation. In addition, literal translation or interpretation may simply misrepresent or
miss the significance of what is being articulated. In this context in particular there will
often be a distinction between what is said, and might be noted or recorded, and
what is meant. In looking for meaning, silences and body language were often as
important as what was said. A good example of potential misinterpretation that came
up many times was body language indicating discomfort and unwillingness to pursue
a particular line of enquiry.
18 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
Finally, and most importantly, we were reflexive in our approach, critically reflecting
on the role and influence that our own research intervention may be having on key
respondents and focus groups, using critical judgment and being conscious of the
need to interpret with integrity in relation to what we were seeing and hearing.
3.3 Limitations of the research
Data analysis represents both general and particular challenges in the current social
and political context, as well as specific challenges in relation to some of these
communities. These include:
• The sample sizes for each community were relatively small and respondents were
not intended to be a representative sample of the relevant communities
• Because the interviews were not based on a random sample, the study does not
claim to provide an analysis of the Iranian population as a whole, nor was this the
intention of the study. We have analysed views and comments in the context of
existing data, knowledge of the current political and social context for these
communities, and the comments of other respondents
• Many aspects of the topic guide were designed to identify the key needs and
challenges facing the community.2 Hence the research tended to generate data
on problem areas and challenges, particularly in focus group discussions when
respondents felt they had limited time to ensure that their voices were heard. This
may not reflect many of the positive and optimistic views of respondents. However,
respondents were often aware that the discussions may come across as negative
in tone, and were quick to try and balance this by highlighting perceived positive
aspects of both their communities and their lives in the UK. We have endeavoured
to set out the ‘best’ story (in terms of explanatory power) in the context of what is
already known about why some of our respondents might express negative feelings
• In the current context, the politicisation of the research field meant that all
respondents were conscious of being part of a community under public and
government scrutiny. Respondents were made aware of the purposes of the
research through a ‘showcard’ that explained the research as well as possible uses
of the research.3 They were informed that this research would potentially be used
to inform a publication that would enter the public domain and would cover
aspects such as religion, intra-community dynamics and links with country of
origin. A climate of some scepticism within Muslim communities, discrimination,
both real and perceived, and awareness of government interest in ‘what is
happening’ on the ground, meant that respondents were often sceptical about
the use of the information that they were providing. Many will have had agendas
(for positive as well as negative reasons) when asked about issues for their
communities, which may have influenced their responses (eg representing their
community as having few or no problems, or conversely, as having many or major
needs and/or issues with public authorities)
2
3
The topic guide is included in the Technical Report, available from Communities and Local Government.
The showcard is included in the Technical Report, available from Communities and Local Government.
Methodology | 19
• This also created a number of practical difficulties in research terms, including
difficulties in getting interviews with particular types of respondents, hesitancy
and caution in some responses, and a closing off of some lines of questioning in
relation to religion, identity and differences
• The researchers’ analytical response to these difficulties was to be critically attuned
to who was speaking, their location in the community, the interests that they may
have, and to judge their comments in the light of this context. Researchers were
aware that there are dynamic and charged debates and movement taking place
within these communities on a whole range of issues ranging from religion, its
expression and orientation in the context of being Muslim minorities living in a
non-Muslim society, to negotiations about roles, responsibilities, duties, gender
relations, and relationships with country of origin. This awareness underpinned
the analysis of the data and the conclusions drawn from responses received.
For all these reasons, the research should be viewed as a ‘snapshot’ in time rather
than reflective of the full complexity or range of issues, challenges and changes
taking place in these communities (eg intergenerational relationships, gender roles,
perceptions of ethnic and religious identity, changing attitudes among the young
(both in liberal and more radical directions) and the levels of integration or tensions
within and across communities). We are conscious of the dynamism and the rapid
changes taking place in some communities, both positive and negative.
20 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
4 Country Profile and History
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
© Crown copyright 2009 Crown copyright material reproduced with the permission of the Controller HMSO.
Known as Persia until 1935, the Islamic Republic of Iran holds an important place in
the history and modern revival of Islam. It is also a country of strategic significance
due to its central location in Eurasia and because of its natural gas and petroleum
resources.4 With a population of 70 million,5 Iran is currently the fourth biggest oil
exporter in the world, and a founding member of the United Nations, Non Aligned
Movement, Organisation of the Islamic Conference and Organisation of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC).
Whilst subject to many invasions and occupations, unlike many other Middle Eastern
countries, Iran has managed to retain its distinct cultural and political identity throughout
much of its history. The spread of Islam in Persia from the 7th century onwards led to the
decline of the dominant Zoroastrian religion of the country. Under the Safavid dynasty
beginning in 1501, Iran was unified as an independent state and the dynasty promoted
Shi’a Islam as the official religion of its empire, marking one of the most important
turning points in the history of Islam. From 1501 until 1979, the country was mainly
4
5
Iran is the second largest oil producer in the Gulf and has the world’s third largest petroleum reserves and second largest natural
gas reserves.
2006 Iranian Census.
Country Profile and History | 21
governed by a monarchy ruled by a Shah (emperor). In 1953 the last Shah, Mohammad
Reza Pahlavi, supported a western-backed coup, known as Operation Ajax, to remove
Iran’s Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossedeq, who it was feared was going to nationalise
the oil industry.6 Reza Pahlavi left Iran for exile at the start of the Islamic Revolution in
1979 led by Ayatollah Khomeini.7 After a landslide victory in a national referendum
Ayatollah Khomeini declared an Islamic Republic and established a new constitution
reflecting his ideals of Islamic government. He became Supreme Spiritual Leader (Valy-eFaqih) of Iran, accountable to an ‘Assembly of Experts’ (Ulama).
During the political turmoil following the establishment of the new Republic, Iraq
invaded Iran in 1980 on the basis of a number of ongoing conflicts between the two
countries. These included territorial claims to areas in the south-west of Iran and the
Shatt el-Arab, the situation of Arab and Kurd minorities separated by the border
established after the World War I and due to fears of a Shi’a insurgency inside Iraq
following the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The war lasted eight years with huge numbers of
casualties, numbering in the millions, on both sides, and was eventually ended through
a UN sponsored ceasefire. However, the disputes between the two countries remain
unsolved to this day and continue to have an impact on the current tensions in Iraq.
Following Ayatollah Khomeini's death in 1989, President Khamenei was promoted
to the status of ayatollah and elected the new Valy-e-Faqih, and Ali Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani was elected as a president. He continued to serve as President until the
election of reformer Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad Khatami as president in 1997.
Following the election of President Khatami, Iran appeared to be entering an era
of political and social transformation, culminating with the victory of the liberals in
parliamentary elections in 2000. The new parliament initiated a campaign to foster
political reform in response to popular dissatisfaction. However, the movement soon
foundered as conservative politicians prevented reform measures from being enacted
and increased repressive measures.
Starting with nationwide municipal elections in 2003, and continuing through
elections in 2004, conservatives re-established control over Iran’s elected government
institutions, which culminated with the August 2005 inauguration of hard-line
conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president, who was elected on a populist
conservative agenda promising social justice, economic redistribution and an anticorruption campaign.8 Whilst president Ahmadinejad has expanded his influence on
the world stage through his uncompromising speeches and well-known wish to wipe
Israel off the map,9 according to the constitution the leading role in foreign policy
remains with Khamenei as the Supreme Leader.
6
7
8
9
James Risen (2000) ‘The C.I.A in Iran’, The New York Times, www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-index.html.
Khomeini requested the extradition of the Shah during a stay in the United States for the purposes of medical treatment. The
request was denied and led to the occupation of the American Embassy in Iran and the kidnapping of military and intelligence
personal – more famously known as the ‘Iran Hostage Crisis’.
FCO: www.tinyurl.com/64f7ap
Ahmadinejad’s actual words in Farsi were: Imam ghoft een rezhim-e ishghalgar-e qods bayad az safheh-ye ruzgar mahv shaved,
which means ‘The regime occupying Jerusalem must vanish from the page of time’. The words were not his own but a quote
from Khomeini.
22 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
In 2002, former US President George Bush declared Iran as part of an ‘axis of evil’ for
its alleged support for terrorism and development of weapons of mass destruction. In
subsequent years the US has increasingly called on the international community to
take strong action against Iran and its nuclear programme. Elements within the Bush
Administration had at points called for strong action that might extend to air strikes
against nuclear installations unless it stops its uranium enrichment programme. With
the election of a new administration it is as yet unclear if the official position of the
United States will change, however in a statement on 20 March President Obama said
“My administration is now committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of
issues before us”.
Since the 1979 Revolution, UK diplomatic relations with Iran have been strained and
suspended several times. In 1980, two events in particular negatively impacted on
British-Iranian relations.10 The first was the occupation of the Iranian Embassy by
Iranian Arab separatists in London in April 1980, which resulted in the SAS storming
the embassy to release the hostages, causing the death of an Iranian embassy official.
The second was a demonstration outside the American embassy in London, which
turned violent and led to scores of Iranian students being arrested and detained in a
number of prisons including Brixton and Holloway. The arrests of these students led to
demonstrations against the British embassy in Iran and its eventual closure. A host of
other events in the following decades including the taking of British hostages by
Hizbollah in Lebanon, and the fatwa against Salman Rushdie further strained relations
between the two countries.
In recent times the UK Government has aligned its foreign policy with that of the US
by supporting sanctions against Iran and echoing statements regarding the country’s
nuclear enrichment programme. Whilst showing no visible enthusiasm for military
action against Iran, it has been a strong backer of an approach which combines
offering incentives to Iran to abandon plans they might have to develop a nuclear
weapons capacity and imposing sanctions if it fails to accept them. Further UN
sanctions were mandated by the Security Council in March 2008. In terms of
incentives, this has involved offering Iran internationally agreed access to an
enrichment bond or nuclear fuel bank. However, there are currently no signs that a
diplomatic deal with Iran on this is imminent. The British Government has indicated
that it will support additional EU and UN sanctions if necessary.
10
Kaveh Farrokh and Mahan Abedin, ‘British Arabism and the bombings in Iran’, Asia Times, 3.11.2005.
Migration History and Trends | 23
5 Migration History and Trends
There have been three main waves of Iranian migration, which correspond to the socio
economic and political conditions in Iran and immigration policies in the receiving
countries. The first phase began in 1950 and ended in 1979 and was triggered by
slow economic recovery and the resumption of oil production after World War II.11
Middle-and upper-class families began to send their children abroad for higher
education, with many of these students choosing to stay in the countries in which they
studied (mainly the US and the UK) and being joined soon after by family and relatives.
In the run up to the Islamic Revolution, families closely associated with the monarchy,
members of the government, military personnel, bankers, religious minorities such as
the Baha’is, and religious-ethnic groups such as the Jews, Armenians, and Assyrians
were also part of this initial movement.
The second phase followed on from the Iranian Revolution in 1979, which produced
one of the largest mass exoduses of Iranians and resulted in large Iranian diaspora
communities settling in North America and Western Europe. Individuals from socialist
and liberal movements and young women and families escaping gender restrictions
were among the first to leave, followed by young men who had been in military
service and had fought in the Iran-Iraq War.12
A third wave occurred from 1995 to the present day consisting of two distinct
populations of highly skilled individuals leaving universities and research institutions
(continuing a previous trend), and working-class labour and ‘economic’ migrants,
often with lower education levels and less transferable skills than previous emigrants.13
In 2000, Iranians submitted 5,170 asylum applications in the UK,14 the highest number
since 1986. Unlike the two previous migrations, this wave was caused by Iran’s
economic crisis, deteriorating human rights record, diminishing opportunities and the
ongoing tension between reformist and conservative factions in the country. By 2001,
there was a 300 per cent increase in the number of Iranians seeking asylum in Britain
(see Chart 1). Iran was the top sender of asylum seekers to the UK in 2004, accounting
for 10 per cent of all applications.
11
12
13
14
Shirin Hakimzadeh (2006) ‘Iran: A Vast Diaspora Abroad and Millions of Refugees at Home’, Migration Information Source.
www.migrationinformation.org/
Iranian community interviews. Having a daughter was a decisive factor in a families’ decision to flee since the post-revolution
era forced women to wear the veil, offered decreased educational possibilities, and enforced obedience to male kin.
Iranian community respondent: Male, London, 40s.
Research Development Statistics, Home Office, 2007.
24 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
Chart 1: Asylum applications to the UK from Iran 1980-2004 (Source: Home Office)
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
Since 1980, 42,000 Iranians have been granted UK citizenship, with new applicants
steadily increasing year on year – see Chart 2.
Chart 2: Citizenship acquisition by Iranians 1980-2006 (Source: Home Office)
4,000
3,500
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Migration History and Trends | 25
Home Office figures also report 9,630 grants of settlement between 2001 and 2006 –
see Chart 3.15
Chart 3: Grants of settlement to Iranian nationals 1991-2006 (Source: Home Office)
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
1991
15
1996
2001
2006
While these figures are somewhat useful, grants of settlement can include those already in the population and do not factor in
temporary migrants who might later be given grants of settlement.
26 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
6 Community Demography and
Key Locations
Census 2001: Iranian-born Muslim population in
England: 24,384
It is difficult to reach an exact figure for the Iranian population in England. Since the
first large influx of Iranians coming to Britain in the 1980s following the revolution,
there have been varying estimates of the Iranian population in Britain. The 2001
census recorded 24,384 Iranian-born Muslims in England – 61 per cent of the total
Iranian-born population in England (40,181)16. More recently, the 2006 Labour Force
Survey (LFS) reports an estimate of around 61,000 Iranians in the UK by country of
birth. The jump in the LFS data may largely be due to the large increase in asylum
applications since 2000. Respondent estimates for the total Iranian population varied
considerably from 35,000 to around 150,000, and many quoted the Iranian Embassy
figure of around 75,000.17 Local estimates included 20,000-30,000 in London; 10,000
in Coventry and just under 10,000 in Birmingham.
Most official data sources are unlikely to capture the full size of the community as
much of it is well established and British-born Iranians are not included in any figures
available. Spellman provides additional reasons for potential undercounting of the
population:
Iranians do not live in concentrated areas; many do not appear on Census records
because they have obtained British citizenship; and because they are not a
group that poses social problems for British society therefore they do not draw
the public eye.18
The vast majority of the Iranian population is concentrated in London, with small
population clusters spread across most parts of the country. These include a
significant19 community in Manchester, where there is an Iranian community school
along with a number of religious and community centres. There is also a sizeable
Iranian university student population in Manchester, Birmingham, Brighton, Sheffield
and Leeds. 51 per cent of the Iran born Muslim population live in London followed by
the South East with 12 per cent of the total Iran born Muslim population. The North
East has the highest percentage of Iran born population who are Muslim (70%) while
the South West has the lowest (51%).
16
17
18
19
2001 Census, commissioned table C0644.
Only figures from 1999 were available from the Iranian Embassy London.
Kathryn Spellman (2004) Religion and Nation: Iranian Local and Transnational Networks in Britain, Studies in Forced Migration
– Volume 15, Berghahn Books: Oxford.
Above 500 Iranians by country of birth.
Community Demography and Key Locations | 27
Table 1 shows the distribution of the Muslim population born in Iran across England’s
nine Government Office regions in 2001.
Table 1: Distribution of Iranian-born Muslim population in
Government Office Regions in England
(Source: Census 2001, commissioned table C0644)
GO Region
% of
Iranian-born
population
who are
Muslim
Number of
Iranian-born
Muslims
% of total
Iranian-born
Muslim
population
Iranian-born
Muslims
as a % of
total Muslim
population
London
61
12,449
51.1
2.1
South East
55
2,919
12.0
2.7
North West
67
2,288
9.4
1.1
Yorkshire and
the Humber
67
1,407
5.8
0.7
East of England
55
1,328
5.4
1.7
West Midlands
64
1,214
5.0
0.6
North East
70
1,049
4.3
3.95
South West
51
995
4.1
4.2
East Midlands
63
735
3.0
1.0
Total
61%
24,384
100.0%
0.8%
In London, Iranians have traditionally settled, and continue to do so, in the west of the
capital in places such as Ealing and along Hanger Lane. Other main areas of settlement
include: Barnet, Camden, Knightsbridge, Kensington, Hampstead, Hendon, Queens
Park, Richmond North, and Swiss Cottage. There are also smaller communities in
Brent, Barnet, Hammersmith and Fulham, Westminster and Islington – see Figure 1.
28 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
Figure 1: Distribution of Iranian-born Muslim population in London
(Source: Census 2001, commissioned table CO644)
The majority of professional, wealthy Iranians are reported to live in affluent areas such
as Kensington and along Finchley Road. Table 2 lists the 10 local authorities with the
largest Iranian-born Muslim populations.
Table 2: London Boroughs with the largest number of Muslims born in
Iran (Source: Census 2001, commissioned table C0644).
Borough
% of Iranian-born
population who
are Muslim
Iranian-born
Muslims
Iranian-born
Muslims
as a % of
total Muslim
population
Barnet
63
1,916
9.9
Ealing
55
1,223
3.9
City of London and
Westminster
61
986
4.5
Brent
73
929
2.9
Kensington and Chelsea
61
857
6.4
Camden
61
723
3.2
Hammersmith and
Fulham
63
600
5.3
Harrow
62
482
3.2
Enfield
60
399
1.5
Haringey
63
365
1.5
Socio economic situation | 29
7 Socio economic situation
Given the various waves of migration from Iran related to changing political and
economic contexts, the socio economic profile of the Iranian community in the UK is
very mixed. As well as political exiles and refugees who included highly educated and
professional people, there are many escaping difficult economic circumstances that
may have lower educational levels and skills. The Institute for Public Policy Research
publication Beyond Black and White found that there are considerable differences
between early Iranian migrants and those who have arrived more recently.20 Table 3
illustrates the very different profiles of immigrants who have arrived since 1990. It
should be noted that these figures are for migrants born in Iran only, irrespective of
religion, hence they are not necessarily reflective of the Iranian Muslim population in
England as a whole.
Table 3: Annual population survey data for Iranian-born population
in the UK21.
Migrants arriving
since 1990
Migrants arriving
before 1990
Sex
55% male
62% male
Employed
32%
76%
Unemployed
14%
5%
In Education
10%
2%
Higher level education
12%
66%
These statistics were supported by focus group participants who suggested there
is a large gap in educational status between many recent and established Iranian
migrants. The key explanation was that the type of migrants who came to Britain in
the 1980s were from the professional classes, had strong links to Britain and better
English language skills, while those who have arrived more recently have, on average,
worse language ability and many are from the Iranian working class.
20
21
Sarah Kyambi (2005) Beyond Black and White – Mapping new immigrant communities, London: Institute for Public Policy
Research.
Ibid.
30 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
Respondents in this study suggested that the older Iranian communities are very
well established and doing well in their professions and in business. Medicine and
engineering are still the most popular career choices and people in these fields are
thought to be in good positions in mainstream British institutions. Many established
Iranian migrants are also reported as having done very well in business, with most
concentrated in restaurants and other catering businesses. However, some
respondents suggested that even whilst well represented in mainstream institutions,
many young people feel that they are being held back by racism from being as
successful as they believe they can be.
People who have arrived recently are seen to be disadvantaged through the lack of
English language skills, unfamiliarity with the working culture and environment in this
country, or due to work permit and visa problems. Some also suggested that many of
these new migrants come from smaller rural areas and hence have faced greater
obstacles to integration and employment than their more urban predecessors.
Key characteristics | 31
8 Key characteristics
8.1 Identity
The reasons and patterns of migration of the Iranian diaspora in Britain has had a
significant impact on ways in which different groups within the community define
their identity. The first and second wave of migrants fled Iran either due to their
connections with the pre-Revolution government and ruling monarchy or due to fears
of the increasing religious conservatism the forthcoming regime would impose. These
earlier migrants were more likely to distance themselves from their Iranian national
identity on arrival than more recent arrivals.
Due to the complex mix of religious and political factors underpinning the process
of migration, the community has remained internally stratified along these lines.
According to a research study undertaken by Spellman in 2004, there was a deep
mistrust amongst Iranians of each other, and as a consequence little effort to maintain
a collective Iranian cultural identity in the British context. She suggests that the first
Iranian migrants were driven by a desire to maintain a low profile and submerge into
British society, whilst disassociating ‘themselves with Iran because of the negative
images of terrorism, radicalism, Ayatollahs and black chadors’.22 Consequently,
attempts to integrate were characterised by a high level of inter-marriage with
Europeans and the anglicising of names to fit into Western societies.
However, as the community has become more settled and well established, there has
been a growing desire within all sections of the community to reassert and preserve its
Iranian identity and culture. According to Spellman, many parents began to worry that
their children were becoming more British and jettisoning their Iranian heritage and
language, hence conscious efforts were made from the 1990s onwards to maintain
cultural forms, promote the usage of the Persian language, and to create and maintain
community facilities that catered for Iranian cultural, religious and broader community
needs.23 This corresponds with the findings of this study. All respondents asserted a
real pride in their Iranian identity and in the resilience of the Iranian community in the
UK. They suggest however that there are still tensions between those who left Iran as
political exiles and newer arrivals, and that the children of these earlier exiles are more
likely to distance themselves from Iran and Islam.
22
23
Spellman, 2004.
Spellman, 2004.
32 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
Some respondents suggested that there is an underlying tension between Iranian and
Persian identities and that the early migrants are more likely to call themselves Persian
than Iranian. One respondent noted that some Iranians also describe themselves
as Persian in order to: Escape the whole media circus around Iran and its nuclear
activities.24 Whilst it has not been possible to confirm how widespread this opinion is
on the basis of the small number of interviews conducted, it is clear that some sections
of the community do place a specific emphasis on their Persian language and identity,
and that this is the case even amongst younger people who have been born and
brought up in the UK. According to a university student the assertion of Persian
identity is evident in the larger number of Persian rather than Iranian Societies
prevalent in London universities.
A few respondents indicated that Persians can be somewhat exclusive and dismissive
of other Iranians, though their societies are open to Persian language speakers of
other nationalities such as Afghans, Kurds, Turks and Arabs. However, most stressed
that despite some internal divisions like these, most Iranians living in Britain consider
themselves to be Iranian and do not differentiate in terms of ethnicity. A shared
national and linguistic identity is seen as a powerful unifier across the diaspora. As a
respondent with a multi-ethnic background emphasised:
The reason most Iranians consider themselves as ‘Iranians’ first and foremost is
related to the legacy of the Shah that encouraged and instilled a sense of Iranian
national identity in the citizens. Farsi also has a huge influence and is the language
associated with being Iranian.25
The exception to this reported Iranian unity is the Kurdish Iranian community, which
was thought by non-Kurdish Iranian respondents to have a very distinct identity
in Britain. It was felt that the community’s identity as Kurdish is more visible in the
British context than in Iran. This could be related to the greater freedom of political
expression in Britain and the presence of a significant Kurdish population composed of
Kurds from all over the Middle East, with a common goal of reviving Kurdish identity
and pursuing the goal of creating ‘Kurdistan’.
According to respondents, the majority of Iranian people in the UK see themselves
as Iranians living in Britain, and that most people define themselves as British-Iranian.
Additionally, depending on how religious they are, some call themselves British-Iranian
Muslims, furthermore emphasising that they are Shi’a Muslim. This religious
denomination is believed to be a unifying or associative factor in the community,
although respondents stressed that levels of religiosity vary considerably.
24
25
Iranian community respondent: Male, London, 30s.
Iranian community respondent: Female, London, 40s.
Key characteristics | 33
Identity among British-born Iranians appears to be notably more complex. Some
respondents talked about the difficulties that British-born Iranian’s have negotiating
their identity between two cultures, in part as a consequence of attempting to
appease older generations who are keen to maintain Iranian cultural values and ties
to their heritage. As one respondent explained:
Due to the pressures and expectations of the older generation many people have
great difficulties negotiating their British and Iranian identities. As a consequence
they are not able to have a functional social life, one which can mediate
both identities. Often times they are living their lives through the controlling
mechanisms of their parent’s memories and cultural values.26
However, young respondents in the study stressed that most young people are
comfortable with both their British and Iranian identities and lifestyles, especially those
who are more secular and hence not restricted in the extent to which they are able
to socialise in non-Islamic cultural environments. Female focus group participants
noted that the younger generation is also becoming more open to other migrant
communities in a way that the first generation of Iranian migrants was not. They also
noted that there is ‘a fearlessness’ about Iranian-British identity that translates to a
confident and bold young generation that is optimistic about their prospects and
future. Like young people from some other established migrant communities, young
Iranians are also developing their own unique forms of cultural identity and expression
through a fusion of the British and Iranian aspects of their linguistic and cultural
influences. For example:
This section of the younger generation has developed new ways of showing their
original identity, so for example in the music scene they have come up with certain
types of music which is a mixture of Iranian/western music. This they will then refer
to as Iranian, as they do to their identity.27
However, despite their hybrid identity, a number of respondents suggested that when
asked the question, many young people will still refer to themselves as Iranian rather
than British. As a young interviewee explained:
When they (British people) ask me where am I from, I say I’m from Iran and it’s the
same with my brother, regardless of the fact that we have been born and brought
up here. You’d never ever probably say anything bad about being brought up
British, but you’ll always be Iranian.28
26
27
28
Iranian community respondent: Male, London, 40s.
Iranian community respondent: Female, Birmingham, 40s.
Iranian community respondent: Female, London, 20s.
34 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
Most young respondents said that whilst they love Iran and love going there for
holidays, they feel more at home in Britain. However, they continue to feel a sense of
not fully belonging in either country, and that this creates an ongoing identity issue.
Some young people said that they define themselves as Iranian first in part due to a
feeling of non-acceptance or hostility from wider British society, experienced as not
being seen by the indigenous community as a citizen and fully integrated member of
British society:
From my point when you’re here you don’t feel like you are 100 per cent British
Muslim or British Iranian, because there’s always the way that they make you feel
that you are never fully part of this community. I guess if they didn’t make Iran out
to be such a, you know, an ‘axis of evil’, you’d be more encouraged to bring out
your Iranian side along with your British side. If you’re always trying to protect who
you are and defend who you are, then you’re never going to be yourself and you
are always battling to defend your identity in that sense.29
8.2 Ethnicity
Iran is ethnically very diverse. The main ethnic groups are Persian (51 per cent), Azeri
(24 per cent), Gilaki and Mazandarani (8 per cent), Kurd (7 per cent) and Arab (3 per
cent).30 The Iranian community in Britain also mirrors this diversity to a large extent.
In terms of ethnic origin, while the majority of Iranians in the UK describe themselves
as ethnic Persian, there are also communities of Azeris, Kurds, Assyrians, Turkmens
and Armenians. Religious distinctions also exists between the majority, who are Shi’a
Muslims, and the minority groups, such as the Baha’is, Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians,
and Sunni Kurds and Arabs.
8.3 Religion
Shi’a Islam is the official religion of Iran according to its constitution. Islam informs
all laws and regulations in Iran as stipulated in Article 4 of the constitution. More
specifically Iranians largely follow the Ja’afari or Ithna Ashari (Twelver31) form of
Shi’ism. However, Iran is not religiously homogenous. While 89 per cent of Iranians
are Shi’a, nine per cent are Sunni Muslims and the remaining two per cent are Baha’i,
Jewish, Zoroastrian, Christian and Sabean-Mandeans. Religious minorities, except for
Baha’is who are not considered ahl al-kitah (people of the book), are afforded religious
freedom under Article 13 of the constitution, but persecution of ethnic minorities
continues to be reported by international watchdogs.32 Conversion from Islam in Iran
is still considered apostasy and can result in criminal charges.
29
30
31
32
Iranian community respondent: Male, London, 20s.
Hussein D. Hassan (2007) Iran: Ethnic and Religious Minorities – Congressional Research Service – Report for Congress,
Congressional Research Service.
Twelver is a branch of Shi’a Islam that refers to Muslims who adhere to the 12 succeeding imams ending with the Prophet
Muhammad al-Mahdi in the 10th Century. The majority of Shi’as are twelvers.
The United Nations Special Rapporteur for the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (2006) and Amnesty International
(2007) both reported that religious and ethnic minorities are subject to discriminatory laws and practices.
Key characteristics | 35
According to the 2001 census, the religious adherence of the Iranian-born population
in the UK differs significantly from the population in Iran. Only 68 per cent of the
Iranian-born population in England is Muslim. Twelve per cent is Christian, two per
cent Jewish, four per cent from other religions, and 14 per cent stated ‘no religion’.
This difference is no doubt influenced by the persecution of religious minorities in Iran
who have fled the country as well as the number of secular Iranians who left during
and following the 1979 revolution.
The vast majority of the UK’s Iranian Muslim population are Shi’a, with a minority
following Sufi traditions. However, there are varying levels of religious adherence
and observance. In the Spellman study of the UK Iranian community, a majority of
interviewees considered themselves to be ‘cultural Muslims’.33 Iranians in the study
often stressed how threads of Islamic tradition were unconsciously woven into their
daily practices and language, and provide a framework for ceremonies and funerals.34
In this study there were numerous perspectives about the distinction between practicing,
‘cultural’ or secular Muslims from both focus group and individual respondents, without
any clear consensus about how this dynamic plays out in the community. Most agreed
that there is not much of a difference in terms of religious denominations, but that
significant differences existed in the levels of religiosity and practice across the
community. Some individuals or families can be very religious, whilst others are extremely
detached from religion. This distinction can inform day-to-day social interactions, with
some secular Iranians avoiding certain community organisations or the company of those
who wear outward symbols of Islam such as beards and headscarves.
However, it was also noted by a few respondents that many apparently ‘secular’
Iranians may actually be quite spiritual, but in a very private way. Additionally, even
though some people may not attend a mosque, this does not necessarily mean that
they are not religious. As the community is quite dispersed and some towns and cities
do not have a Shi’a mosque, many may live too far from a mosque to attend regularly.
Also some may choose to worship at home because of the perceived political
affiliations of their local mosque.
Respondents also suggested that certain events are very unifying, and that most
Iranians will try and attend for programmes associated with Muharram and Ramadan
or for the birth and death anniversaries of saints and imams, even if they do not
otherwise attend regularly. Also many people who are unable to get to a mosque on
occasion such as Ashura Day35 listen to programmes via the internet. Some occasions
such as Nowrooz (the Iranian new year) are celebrated by all religions (although it
has its roots in Zoroastrianism). However, the celebration is imbued with different
meanings for different ethnic groups. For example, in Kurdish legend, the holiday
celebrates the deliverance of the Kurds from a tyrant, and its celebration is seen as
another way of demonstrating support for the Kurdish cause.
33
34
35
Spellman, 2004.
Ibid.
Ashura Day is the tenth day of Muharram (the first month of the Islamic year). For Shi’a it is a day of mourning in
remembrance of Imam Husayn ibn Ali (d. 680AD), the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad who was killed during a battle
against the ruling Caliph.
36 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
Respondents did not seem particularly concerned about mosques being Iranian or not.
The key factor is that they need to be Shi’a mosques which are usually attended by
people of many nationalities including Turks, Kurds and some Arabs. In London there
are well established mosques, cultural and educational establishments, some receiving
funding from Iran that cater to both the Iranian Muslim population and other nonIranian Shi’a communities. In some cities there are no Shi’a mosques but people hire
venues to bring the community together for religious events or for imams to provide
guidance on domestic and other legal concerns.
8.4 Language
Persian, also known as Farsi, the official language of Iran, is spoken as a mother
tongue by 58 per cent of the population and as a second language by an additional
15 per cent. Other languages in use are Azeri Turkish and Turkic dialects (26 per cent),
Kurdish (9 per cent), Luri (2 per cent), Arabic (1 per cent), and Balochi (1 per cent).36
Most Iranians living in the UK speak Farsi. One respondent noted that approximately
98 per cent of Iranians in the UK speak Farsi but that a large proportion of them also
speak their own local dialects at home.37 A mapping study by the International
Organisation for Migration (IOM) of the Iranian community in the UK found that Farsi
is preferred by the community over English for digesting different forms of media.38
Eighty-seven per cent of respondents for their research said that Farsi was the
preferred language for reading newspapers and 72 per cent for television and radio.
36
37
38
Hassan, 2007.
Iranian community respondent: Male, London, 40s.
International Organisation for Migration (2007), Mapping Exercise – Iran, London: IOM. www.tinyurl.com/5ka2c2
Intra-community Dynamics | 37
9 Intra-community Dynamics
9.1 Intergenerational issues
Respondents recognise that all communities have inter-generational challenges and
often used the knowledge they had of family situations in Iran as a reference point.
The point of difference related to the influence of British society and culture on young
people and the need of parents to ensure that British-born Iranians are aware of their
heritage including language, culture and religion. However, the extent to which this is
an acute problem was unclear, and interviewees did not appear to think that there is a
significant cultural clash between generations. This is a typical perception:
I mean, yeah, I’ve got a few friends here who have problems with their parents
because obviously their parents were brought up in a religious environment and
their children here in London, they’re exposed to stuff like clubs, and you know,
music, heavy metal and, yeah, there are some problems from parents. I wouldn’t
even call them religious issues; it’s more cultural and social issues. A parent
wouldn’t expect their son to do certain things which in the UK they are exposed to.
But I haven’t heard of runaways or people who left their families because of this.39
The relative lack of family conflict between the generations was explained as being
due to both the length of time that many Iranians have been in the country, and often
due to the more liberal attitudes among those that left Iran to escape the Islamic state
in the early 1980s. One young respondent noted:
My parents are a lot more open-minded than my aunt who has just visited from
Iran. They are a lot closer to the way you’ve been brought up because they have
had to get involved with the life here.40
There are of course those parents who are more religiously devout and do not tolerate
their children wanting to follow a secular British lifestyle. They are said to place a real
emphasis on keeping their children involved in religious and cultural activities in order
to ensure that they do not get drawn into a completely westernised culture and
identity. For these parents, frequent trips to Iran are seen as an important way of
strengthening familial, linguistic, religious and cultural links.
A significant difference between the older and young generation is the level of interest
and involvement in politics. The generation that grew up in Iran was very politicised
and many amongst them left Iran for political reasons. Whilst young people born and
brought up in Britain have some knowledge of their parent’s views and experiences,
they are too far removed from them to be actively engaged in either Iranian or
British politics.
39
40
Iranian community respondent: Male, London, 20s.
Iranian community respondent: Female, London, 20s.
38 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
9.2 Women
Women in the Iranian community are reported to play an important role and were
widely described as being ‘independent’ and ‘headstrong, as well as noted for
achieving success in business and professional roles. As one respondent noted: They
are very much in control of their lives, and they know what they are doing. They keep
the family together.41 Female focus group respondents agreed that on the surface the
culture may appear patriarchical, but women carry a lot of clout within the family and
community. It was also noted during the focus group that change is driven by women
and hence it is important that they be engaged in important community issues.
While women are often absent from the upper tiers of religious-oriented committees
and bodies, it was recognised that in cultural organisations and activities women
played a major role. The role of women in the community was said by some
respondents to reflect the increasingly important role that women play in Iran in
professional and political roles.
However, despite the relatively high status women have in Iranian society, most
political organisations remain dominated by men. Even in the private sphere, women
are forced to take primary responsibility for domestic activities and childcare while the
important decisions are still controlled by men. As one male respondent highlighted:
Women have some freedoms in education and the work they want to do, they are
not in control of policy and decision making in the home. Men often joke about
their wives as being the ‘man’ of the house but when it comes to the important
decisions, men will stand their ground.42
9.3 Young people
The younger respondents were clear that you cannot define their generation of
Iranians as one thing or another because of the diversity of their identities. In the
words of one young respondent: You can’t really generalise and say the Iranian youth
are this or that, different people, different groups.43 However, a few key themes
emerged during the research in relation to young people. In addition to
intergenerational dynamics and identity issues outlined in earlier sections, respondents
identified a lack of political engagement, diversity in religious adherence, and the
importance of education as key themes, although more research would be required
to provide firm conclusions.
41
42
43
Iranian community respondent: Male, London, 30s.
Iranian community respondent: Male, Manchester, 30s.
Iranian community respondent: Male, London, 20s.
Intra-community Dynamics | 39
Younger Iranians were perceived by some to be less politically engaged with the
events and ongoing political dynamics in Iran and what knowledge they did have was
through their relatives rather than any direct engagement. This was perceived to be
natural and not necessarily a bad thing, however older respondents did hope that
younger Iranians would become more engaged in both Iranian and wider civil society
and politics.
Focus group participants and respondents all stressed the importance of education
within the Iranian community. They suggested that parents make a strong link
between education and status, and have high expectations for their children with
respect to educational attainment:
Generally speaking, Iranians very much stress the importance of education. They are
very proud of it and insist to be educated at the top level. They all think of getting a
PhD and even lie that they have got one! It is thought to be the key to paradise.44
9.4 Cohesion and integration
A number of respondents stressed that the Iranian population is generally well integrated
into society and that people are often involved in organisations that do not necessarily
have an Iranian community focus. This was thought by some to be a good indicator of
integration and necessary for any migrant community that wants to progress and be part
of the wider British community. Some respondents suggested that the strong desire for
integration also stems from a tendency amongst Iranians to not want to stand out from
the general public. Most people are believed to be comfortable about socialising in
mainstream environments, although this has been harder for older people than for
the younger generation. Also those who are more devoutly religious find public
environments such as clubs and pubs very unsuitable and so tend to create their own
separate social spaces for both religious ritual and social/cultural activities. Such groups
often hire rooms in mosques or community centres of the more established Muslim
ethnic minority communities to use for their separate programmes and events.
It was suggested by some respondents that ethnic-specific civil society organisations
can be important for integration and cohesion, and that assisting such organisations
with funding can help individuals establish themselves economically and socially,
which in turn enhances their integration into mainstream society. It was also
mentioned by many respondents that the provision of cultural and historical
knowledge as well as Farsi to British-born Iranians is critical to help them understand
their identity in Britain. Rather than serving to marginalise, this education is perceived
to assist with their social and economic integration into the wider society. However,
whilst the provision of activities and services specific to the community are seen as
important, it was noted by some respondents that there is a need to prevent this
enhancing isolation and segregation. In the words of one respondent:
44
Community counsultee: Male, London, 30s.
40 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
It’s good to have something from your own culture because every culture has got
particular issues that have to be addressed. However, people have to be more
integrated and more active with the general society. It’s not good to be isolated
only for a particular community, because this community at the end of the day has
to interact with the mainstream, the general community.45
The importance of economic integration was stressed by many respondents and it was
felt that this element is absent from the Government’s discussions about cohesion and
integration. For some respondents familiar with the needs of recent asylum seekers and
refugees it was suggested that initial assistance with basic skills to aid with economic
integration would assist eventual social integration into the wider community.
Procedures related to employment that are perceived to be ‘taken for granted’ by most
people are often unfamiliar to many of the new arrivals and this can hinder their
development. One respondent reported the effects this can have on the community:
The system here is different from anywhere in the world, so to enter into this
system needs lots of knowledge and understanding. So as a community coming
from a different culture, especially if it’s not established, it’s very important to get
familiar with the system here, like for example filling in applications for funding, or
for jobs or approaching organisations and getting things going. I think this could
be a barrier, and I have seen many Iranians here they just establish their own
businesses, mainly in the food areas, because they feel that they can control this
and they don’t need to go to fill out applications or deal with this organisation or
that where it is more controlled.46
According to many respondents, whilst most Iranians are comfortable in British society,
which they see as generally multiracial and tolerant, negative public stereotypes about
Iran and Iranians can sometime create difficulties and reinforce a sense of being
outside the mainstream. This can make some people seek refuge in their Iranian
identity and hinder attempts at integration and cohesion. This feeling cuts across all
generations of Iranians. Some young respondents also highlighted problems stemming
of a lack of acceptance and their inability to fully express themselves in mainstream
society. They felt that they have to repress many aspects of their Iranian identity, and
that they have a great sense of relief when they are in company with other young
Iranians where they are free to express both aspects of their shared mixed heritage.
Some thought that this comfort could lead to some people becoming more
segregated and ultimately preferring only to be with other Iranian friends.
45
46
Iranian community respondent: Female, Birmingham, 40s.
Communtiy consultee: Male, London, 40s.
Intra-community Dynamics | 41
Most respondents spoke about a public perception/stereotype of Iranians as being
intolerant or holding extremist views. They strongly challenged this perception, and
most believed that there is no problem of violent extremism within the community.
Some also suggested that the community sees extremism as more of a Sunni and Arab
issue than an Iranian Shi’a problem. According to some respondents, the experiences
of a fundamentalist regime and of terrorism in Iran have left a strong desire in the
community to forego strong religious and political ideologies and to be more moderate
and balanced in religious and political views. Furthermore, the entry of the UK
Government into religious life, particularly through the narrative of combating
terrorism, was viewed by some respondents as particularly unhelpful in the light of the
different levels of religiosity and nature of religion within the community. Most were
sceptical that this kind of engagement has anything to do with cohesion and
integration.
However, despite the overriding view that young Iranians are not susceptible to radical
ideologies, some respondents felt that there are a few ministers of religion that
promote extremist rhetoric which can influence a small minority of young people.
They spoke about the need for the community to be vigilant in order to ensure that
such ideologies do not take root within the community and suggested that religious
leaders and mosques need to work alongside secular organisations to promote
counter extremist views and guidance. Some respondents suggested that there is a
need for the community to develop a better understanding about identity and attitude
formation among young people, and of the routes and activities that can be utilised
by both religious and secular centres to offer counter radicalism messages and
constructive activities for young people. At the same time, they also felt that there
needs to be strong pressure on the media from government to stop it from promoting
hatred of Muslims, and that the government needs to allocate significant amounts of
funding for youth provision if the problem is to be tackled effectively.
42 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
10 Media
A number of mass media forms are available and marketed towards a range of
political, religious and ethnic Iranian networks and specific socio economic groups in
London. Most are published or broadcast in Persian and English although those aimed
at the second generation are mostly English language based. According to the IOM
mapping study on the Iranian community the preferred sources of information are
television (56 per cent), newspaper (51 per cent) and radio (49 per cent). Leaflets in
Farsi (38 per cent), the Internet (36 per cent) and word of mouth (31 per cent) are
also popular.47
There was a feeling from respondents that community perceptions of both UK and
western and Iranian media are shaped by political and ideological differences. These
differences are not only reflected across different grouping in the communities, but
can also be felt within individual families:
My Iranian uncle being quite liberal he would listen to the American version of the
Iranian channels. Within my family, my dad’s side and my uncle’s sides they would
have passionate arguments about the King and other political issues. They would
sit there and banter over the TV.48
Older Iranians are avid consumers of Iranian TV, including Islamic channels such as
Jam-E-Jam as well as PMC which is perceived as more western: every household I
know here has a connection to Iranian TV. Young people tend to watch British TV and
American channels and this can end up in minor clashes over what is viewed in the
home. One young respondent described the situation in her family:
At home it’s mostly Iranian TV. To be honest it’s all Iranian TV and it’s a battle
between us and our parents and the two channels. I am constantly trying to
watch ‘East Enders’ and they are trying to watch their soap.49
Other media outlets include Rangarang TV,50 a USA-based 24-hour satellite channel
broadcast since 1999 and available online. National Iranian Television is based in the
USA but broadcasts to Iranians around the world via satellite. There are also many
anti-government satellite channels watched by Iranians living in the UK. Additional
stations identified by the IOM report are: Iran TV Network (London and US), Pars TV
(US) and IRIB (Iran). Iranian Arabs also watch Al-Alam, which is an Arabic language
news channel funded by the Iranian government.
47
48
49
50
IOM, 2007.
Iranian community respondent: Female, London, 30s.
Iranian community respondent: Female, London, 20s.
www.rangarang.us/
Media | 43
Iranian cinema and music is very popular across the diaspora and seen by many as
offering a window into current affairs and social issues prevalent in Iran. These are
either downloaded from the Internet or bought in Iran and Iranian outlets in the UK
in DVS format.
Radio stations mentioned included Press-TV (on Hanger Lane) that broadcasts in
English and is regarded as being pro-Iranian Government, Simorgh radio51 (UK-online)
and Radio Farda which is broadcast in Farsi. The IOM media mapping exercise also lists
Voice of America (US), BBC Persian Service (UK) and Radio Sedaye Iran (US) as popular
among the community in the UK.
Iranian newspapers in London focus on political, social and economic news from Iran
as well as advertising various services including cultural and entertainment services to
meet the needs of the Iranian diaspora. Newspapers mentioned by respondents
included Nimrooz52 (c30,000), Ettelaat53 (c30,000), Bazare Hafteh (c2,500), Kayhan54
(c1,200) and Nohbahar. Some respondents indicated that print media can be quite
problematic and hence it is not as popular as other media forms. Papers printed in Iran
are often heavily censored, and those printed abroad can be too critical and hence it is
difficult for the community to get any balanced coverage that is not polarised across
the religious and political spectrum.
Respondents also noted shifting usages of media between generations, in particular in
relation to newspapers:
We have Iranian newspapers and magazines because there are lots of Iranian
shops who sell them and they even have them in English versions. Your standard
newspapers are loved by your mums and dads. The younger generation would be
mostly into internet and TV.55
Internet news sites are becoming increasingly important in providing information and
insight. Spellman notes that the internet is a very important forum for communication
and identity construction among Iranians. There are tens of thousands of weblogs,
with bloggers active both in Iran and among the diaspora, which often has strong
political leanings. Officials, including President Ahmadinejad, have launched blogs.
www.iranian.com is an online magazine set up in the US by Jahanshah Javid in 1995
and is now a popular site for posting articles on culture, politics and identity conflicts.
Other websites identified include: taktaz.com, rooz.com and gooya.com.
51
52
53
54
55
www.simorghradio.com
www.nimrooz.com/. Print run estimate is from IOM, 2007.
www.ettelaat.com/
www.kayhannews.ir/
Iranian community respondent: Male, London, 40s.
44 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
11 Links with country of origin
11.1 Travel
Khatami’s 1997 election victory was interpreted externally as a turning point for Iran’s
political climate, and represented a move from a repressive to a more liberal political
climate.56 There was a large increase in numbers of people travelling back and forth
between Iran and London.57 The more recent resurgence of conservative forces and
political leaders in Iran, as well as international political tensions and pressures is believed
to have created a more uncertain climate for the Iranian community in the UK.
Despite this, most respondents indicated that they continue to travel back frequently,
some saying they go two or three times a year. Some suggested that only a few people
who came to the UK before 1979 have cut off their connections with Iran, but that
for the majority, no matter what government is in power, Iran will always remain the
motherland to which they have a deep connection. Extended family networks remain
important and are for many the main reason for travel. However, some respondents
indicated that many people go for holiday or religious purposes rather than to visit
family. Iran is said to offer many interesting activities for holidaymakers such as sea
and skiing resorts, and religious people have many key religious site for pilgrimage.
Though the majority of marriages in the community are between British-born people,
some people, especially from the smaller dispersed communities outside London, are
reported to seek marriage partners from Iran.
11.2 Remittances
Based on World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) data, Iranian workers’
annual remittances, compensation of employees, and migration transfers back to Iran
increased from $536million in 2000 to $1.2billion in 2003 and stood at $1billion in
2004.58 For the most part, official figures leave out all transfers occurring through
informal channels. However, a 2003 International Monetary Fund paper estimated
that more than half the total remittances to Iran were transmitted through the hawala
system, an informal network of money dealers that offers faster and cheaper means of
transfer than formal channels.
56
57
58
Spellman, 2004.
Spellman, 2004.
Hakimzadeh, 2006.
Links with country of origin | 45
11.3 Political links
Khatami’s government stimulated a renewed interest in the political, economic and
social situation in Iran among the Iranian diaspora, however the more recent
resurgence of conservative forces and political leaders in Iran, and international
political tensions and pressures has created a more uncertain climate for the Iranian
community in the UK. Respondents indicated that the community here remains very
interested in Iranian politics and that different affiliations can cause some conflicts. For
example, many people are said to be totally opposed to the current government and
are said to unfairly assume that anyone who is religious is pro-government.
46 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
12 Civil Society
12.1 Overview
In spite of the fragmentation within the community, there is a vibrant and vigorous
Iranian civil society sector, with over 50 UK-based Iranian charities in London.59 The
civil society sector represents the full range of cultural and service religious, secular,
ideological and non-ideological organisations. There is however a paucity of women’s
groups and organisations aimed at meeting the needs of women. Very few receive
public funds and are either supported by member donations or by the Iranian
government – especially the large religious organisations.
12.2 Types of organisation and services offered
Iranian civil society consists primarily of Shi’a Muslim religious organisations and
largely secular cultural organisations. Religious organisations include mosques, Islamic
cultural and welfare centres and educational establishments. As well as providing
places of worship, religious organisations offer a wide range of services and support
for the community. These include organising events on key anniversaries and festivals
as well as seminars and talks by clerics from various countries. The larger ones also
provide sports activities for young people as well as marriage services, family
mediation and counselling. They also provide facilities for individuals to consult with
imams on matters of Shariah as it relates to their personal problems or concerns.
Mosques and religious establishments are also valuable meeting places for new
migrants, especially those who have arrived as single men and have very few family
and social networks in the UK.
Secular organisations span a wide range of activities including promoting Persian
language, history and culture, professional and business network, student’s
organisations and charities. Some activities can cut across the boundaries of religious
and secular organisations such as the teaching of Farsi, youth provision and charitable
fundraising. Secular organisations have more of a focus on social and cultural activities
such as music and the arts, sports and education. Restaurants are also popular
gathering places for parties and musical gatherings. There are also medical charities
that focus on specific illnesses, social service organisations that address the needs of
refugees and political asylum seekers, libraries, social networking organisations for
specific professional groups as well as dating services.60
There are also a number of university student organisations that organise events for
UK Iranian students. These organisations mainly run cultural and entertainment
events, however it was mentioned that they can often be exclusionary because of the
type of activities that they run. For example, one young respondent noted that it is
59
60
Iranian community respondent: Male, London, 50s.
Iranian community respondent: Male, London, 50s.
Civil Society | 47
common for Persian societies to have club nights that are mixed sex with various forms
of Persian entertainment, but that these can be divisive, with the more religious
students abstaining from these events.
In addition to formally constituted organisations, respondents also noted a number of
ad hoc groupings, particularly in cities with no Iranian specific organisations such as
Birmingham, which may join to celebrate certain events of the Shi’a calendar or for
one-off lectures and cultural events. These groupings are often innovative responses
to a lack of more developed infrastructure and arise out of the need to maintain
solidarity while preserving cultural traditions and knowledge.
While there is a significant refugee population, there are few specific organisations
to support Iranian asylum seekers and refugees compared to the Afghan, Iraqi and
Somali communities. This is an area of concern given that the number of Iranians
seeking asylum has increased significantly in recent years. There is also thought to be
a limited capacity for youth provision and women-specific support both in London and
in other cities with significant Iranian populations.
12.3 Key organisations
The Islamic Centre of England61 and the Al Khoei Foundation in London were
mentioned by virtually all Iranian Muslim respondents as being influential and important
to the Iranian Muslim diaspora in England. These were mentioned even by respondents
from outside London. While there was a consensus that these organisations are
important to Shi’a Iranians in both a religious and social sense, it was also emphasised
that any understanding or engagement with the community must take into account the
range of organisations that exist to serve the community, especially those that are more
popular with young people and women.
• The Al-Khoei Foundation: is an international Islamic charitable organisation
focusing on the welfare of the Shi’a, and some non-Shi’a, Muslim communities
in the UK and abroad.62 A large proportion of its service users are Iranian.
The Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB) has been working
with the Al Khoei Foundation. Shi’as have about 20 per cent representation on
the MINAB advisory board.
• The Islamic Centre of England: The Islamic Centre of England in Maida Vale,
London was opened in 1998 to cater for the spiritual, cultural, social and
emotional needs of the Shi’a community.63 The Centre was funded by the Iranian
government and the Head of the Centre is the official representative of the
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei in England. In addition to religious and
educational activities, it offers a wide range of leisure, sports and social services,
including the performance of Islamic marriages and mediation in divorce or
domestic disputes.
61
62
63
www.ic-el.com
www.alkhoei.org
www.ic-el.com/users/English/English/index.asp
48 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
• British Iranian Business Association (BIBA): The British Iranian Business
Association (BIBA) is an independent organisation which promotes British-Iranian
business interests in the UK.64 The British-Iranian Business News is the trade journal
of the association. BIBA’s website contains information on the economy, arts,
technology, medical and educational interests.
• Cambridge Persian Community (CPC): is a non-political, non-religious and notfor-profit volunteer organisation.65 It organises Persian social and cultural events
and is the focal point for the Persian Community in Cambridge and its surrounding
areas. The organisation celebrates special Iranian calendar events such as New Year
(Nowrooz) and the Longest Night of the year (Shabe Yalda) as well as other local
events throughout the year.
• Forum Iran: was established in 1998 by a group of Iranian professionals in Britain
and in 2001 applied to become a registered UK charity.66 It is an independent and
not-for-profit cultural organisation which has been established to raise awareness
about Iran and to promote dialogue within and for Iranians living in Britain. The
Forum does not support or promote any particular political views or political groups
or parties. It welcomes participation of all who share its aims regardless of their
views and political affiliation.
• Harrow Iranian Community Organisation (HICA): was formed in 1991 with
the primary objective of assisting Persian speaking residents of Harrow and its
neighbouring boroughs with their education, health, settlement, family, benefits
and housing problems.67 It provides a wide range of programmes including Persian
language classes to 5-16 years, a women’s social group, children’s sport, help to
refugees, and consultation on domestic matters. The organisation works closely
with local community organisations and charities to share resources. A partnership
with Harrow College and the Women’s Portfolio of the Ismaili Council for England
helped provide ESOL classes for the elderly and refugees.
• Imperial College London Iranian Society: is the oldest established Iranian
society in the UK.68 Its aim is to promote and encourage an awareness of Iranian
culture and to act as a means for Iranian students at the university to socialise. The
society celebrates traditional Iranian festivals. It has informal weekly meetings and
poetry sessions as well as nights out at Iranian restaurants, Persian concerts and the
movies. It also hosts several talks and speeches in relation to Persian literature and
ongoing issues in Iran.
64
65
66
67
68
www1.bibauk.com/
www.campercom.org.uk/
www.forum-iran.org
www.hica.org.uk
www.union.ic.ac.uk/osc/iran/
Civil Society | 49
• Iran Heritage Foundation: is a non-political UK registered charity founded
in 1995.69 The organisation includes scholars, artists, writers, journalists and
filmmakers on its board. Its mission is to increase awareness about and to promote
and preserve the history, languages and cultures of Iran. The objectives of the
Foundation are pursued by means of organising and supporting research,
publication of books, establishment of fellowships at major academic institutions
and diverse activities of cultural or scholarly merit in a variety of ways on a
worldwide basis. The organisation is secular and is open to all.
• Iranian & Kurdish Women’s Rights Organisation: was set up in 2002 and is a
secular organisation for Iranian, Kurdish, Turkish, Afghan and Arab women.70 For
its first five years it was run by a group of 10 volunteers and now has two paid
workers. The organisation works with women who face forced marriages,
domestic violence, divorce, honour crimes and female genital mutilation. It has a
number of current campaigns running both in the UK and internationally. In the UK
it has actively campaigned against the integration of the Sharia into UK law and
around two cases of honour crimes. Campaigns also take place in Iraq, Syria,
Kurdistan and Iran. Service providers speak Farsi, Arabic and Kurdish. The
organisation is mainly supported by two trusts with some funding received from
local authorities.
• Iranian Association: was set up in the early 1980s by a few volunteers in
response to the needs of Iranian refugees.71 The Association became a registered
charity in 1985. During the 1980s the Association offered advice on issues such as
immigration, housing and benefits for refugees and organised cultural events.
Having identified a need for Skills For Life courses, in 1990 the Association applied
to the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham for a grant to offer
Information Technology Training with English language support. Since then it has
developed a diverse range of services in response to the needs of the ethnic
minorities and refugees in London. Services include welfare and immigration advice
service, housing, benefits and women’s issues.
• Islamic Universal Association – Majma-e Eslami: is a non-governmental
organisation based in London catering for the needs of the Shi’a community.
• Islamic College for Advanced Studies: Affiliated to Middlesex University in
Willesden, the college is claimed by respondents to be financially supported by the
Iranian government.72 It offers full-time, part-time, and distance-learning A level,
degree and open learning courses on various aspects of Islam, including study of
philosophy, Hadith, the Qur’an, Islamic law and history, and theology through
online learning.
69
70
71
72
www.iranheritage.org/
www.ikwro.org.uk/
www.iranianassociation.org.uk/
www.islamic-college.ac.uk/
50 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
• Kanoon-e-Tawheed: was reported to be an organisation based in Hammersmith
set up by young Iranians that organises social and cultural events as well as debates
about contemporary social and political issues.
• Kings College London Iranian Persian Society: provides a society to celebrate
and enjoy the cultural heritage of Iran through a range of social and cultural
events. The society is non-political and non-religious and aims to bring everyone
together to promote the Persian culture, traditions, language, history, music and
hospitality.
• Popli Khalatbari Charitable Foundation (PKCF): The organisation classifies itself
as a non-religious and secular foundation and was formed by a partnership of the
family and friends of the late Popli Khalatbari, who wished to honour her memory
by distributing the funds from her estate.73 The organisation is involved with
vocational training of young people in Iran. In 2005, PKCF completed a vocational
school in Tehran to assist underprivileged adolescent children. After the 2003
earthquake in Iran, PKCF also started the “Bam Fund” to build a school for 400
children. In the UK, PKCF is involved with three other organisations; Crisis which
works with the homeless; Kids Company, founded by Camila Batmangheldjh which
works with disadvantaged young people from the inner city, and the Chicken Shed
Theatre, now an active performing arts space.
• Shabeh Jomeh:74 is a monthly gathering of Iranian professionals living in the
metropolitan areas of major cities, notably London, NYC, Atlanta, Washington
D.C., San Francisco, Boston, Chicago and Sydney. It meets in London every third
Thursday. The event is designed to improve upon existing professional and social
relations and is intended to be a platform for exchanging ideas and improving
Iranians’ professional standing. The gatherings are non-political, non-religious
events that are open to all professionals.
• The Friends of Omid: is a UK-registered charity and its activities are supported
through private funding. The charity was created for the purpose of raising funds
to use for the operation of the ‘Omid-e-Mehr’ foundation, and is registered in Iran
to operate current and future centres. The organisation raises funds for Omid-eMehr, enabling it to continue working with disadvantaged girls.
• The Omid-e-Mehr Foundation: was established in 2004 in Iran and is a nonpolitical organisation that is run through a charity in the UK and Iran. Two years
later the Friends of Omid Foundation was established in the UK. Both organisations
were founded by Marjaneh Halati, a London-based social psychologist and
psychotherapist, who has worked with vulnerable Iranian and Afghan women in
Iran. The organisation focuses on a 5-18 month educational development
programme, professional training, job placement and monitoring and therapeutic
intervention. It is privately funded through donations received from charitable
trusts, agencies, corporations, organisations and individuals.
73
74
www.pkcf.com/
www.shabehjomeh.com/
Civil Society | 51
12.4 Key influencers
Most respondents were clear that religious figures play a key influencing role among
all sections of the community, even among those who are not religious adherents.
In this respect the Iranian community has a unique relationship with the clergy due to
existence of clerical rule in Iran over the past 30 years. The head of the Islamic Centre
of England for example is the UK representative of the Supreme Leader. Iranian clerics
therefore have both religious and political influence, and whilst some people may not
relate to them on a theological basis, they are still accorded respect because of the
position of power they have in Iranian society.
For the more secular amongst the younger generation, and for those who eschew
Iranian politics, key figures from Iranian popular culture and western popular culture
are reported to have an important influence on the community. For the more religious
young Iranians, Kanoon Towhid (see 12.3) is thought to be important and influential
and was noted to be independent from local religious authority. Whilst many
professional and business networks exist for mutual support for specific
constituencies, they are not seen as influencing the wider community in any way.
International figures were also mentioned and different figures were thought to be
important to different sections of the community. For example Ayatollah Khamenei is a
prominent and influential religious figure as is Ayatollah Sistani, even though he is Iraqi.
President Ahmadinejad was also thought to be influential by some respondents because
of the political and economic reforms he has brought to Iran. However, as with any
political figure he is not considered a universal figure of influence in the community.
12.5 Civic engagement and participation
While there are a number of well-developed organisations in the Iranian community
it was far from evident that this is indicative of high levels of civic engagement by the
diaspora community. Respondents generally felt that the community has felt quite
‘comfortable’ within itself and to date has had little interest or perceived motivation
for getting involved in UK politics and public life. Some also suggested that the strong
culture of self-sufficiency and wanting to maintain its independence also results in the
community keeping very much to itself.
Some respondents suggested that as large numbers of Iranians have fled from a very
politicised country, many have developed a strong anti-political stance and hence want
to stay out of politics. However, this is by no means true for the whole community
and most respondents themselves stressed the need for more engagement and
involvement.
52 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
Respondents highlighted a number of barriers and obstacle to engagement ranging
from attitudes towards the government to the lack of familiarity with public structures
and forums for participation. Many people in the community strongly believe that the
British government is anti-Iran and pro-US in all matters, and this is believed to create
a high level of mistrust and a lack of desire to engage. The stance of the US and the
UKGovernments on the Iranian nuclear programme was seen by virtually all
respondents as a case of double standards:
Iran is making nuclear power for peaceful means, just like you have here and
across the world. Israel has nuclear weapons and does not sign up to any of the
international treaties but yet somehow it has a right to technology but Iran
doesn’t.75
Older people are thought to be more anti-western in their attitudes and some young
people said that they feel particularly constrained by this. There was a strong feeling
amongst them that any attempts on the part of young people to engage with the
government and local authorities would cause a lot of disapproval and condemnation
from the elders.
One respondent made an interesting point about the government and authorities in
this country having very little impact on people’s day-to-day lives and felt that because
of this there is little motivation to get involved. By contrast, in Iran where political
decisions can affect every aspect of people’s lives, even how they dress, worship or
socialise, people are seen as more concerned and engaged in trying to make sure that
the right kind of government is elected.
Virtually all respondents felt that the key barrier to engagement with public authorities
relates to the lack of basic awareness within authorities about the community, and
within the community about public engagement systems and communication
channels. Most individuals and organisations are thought not to know how to
approach government or local authorities to get activities and partnerships started,
and respondents thought that these are specialist skills that the community lacks.
Public authority engagement with the community is also thought to be low because of
a lack of visibility of the community outside of North West London, combined with a
lack of internal coherence or representative structures for dialogue. Hence divisions
within the community stand in the way of articulating common concerns and needs.
As one respondent noted:
I don’t think the Iranian voice is heard as much maybe because they are not as big
as the other communities. You don’t ever get them uniting on all fronts together,
the religious side and the non-religious side. I don’t think we have that much of a
strong community.76
75
76
Focus group participant, male.
Iranian community respondent: Female, London, 20s.
Civil Society | 53
In relation to establishing future partnerships and channels for communication with
public authorities, the role of ministers of religion was highlighted as important
because of the particular leadership role they play in the community. However, it was
stressed that because of the social and religious diversity within the community, it is
unlikely that any one form of communication or organisation could ever be fully
representative or inclusive. Therefore attempts at engagement would need to involve
a broad range of organisations and methods. For example one respondent based in
Birmingham but familiar with the community in London noted:
Iranians are from very different social backgrounds, politically, religiously, so you
can’t just rely on, for example, one centre. You have to go across the board and
find different types of establishments and talk with a certain type of people in their
own type of language. If you go to the Islamic Centre and send a group of people
who came here 30 years ago who are not very religious and are anti-government,
then they won’t even let them talk, so you have to find the key people within their
own group with the same mindset.77
Most respondents also stressed that dialogue is a two-way activity and that the
authorities need to take the lead and come out to communities rather than the other
way round, especially if communities are unfamiliar with British forms of engagement
and participation. However, they believed that until recently since the government has
started to consult the Al Khoei Foundation, it has concentrated all its energies on
Sunni-dominated organisations such as the Muslim Council of Britain rather than
proactively reach out to the Iranian Shi’a community.
12.6 Community issues and capacity building needs
Focus group participants in London were particularly critical of the number of Iranian
organisations that are politically and religiously focused, which they felt excluded large
parts of the community. The majority of respondents noted that there is a not only a
split between the religious and the secular, but also between established and middle
class Iranian communities and newer refugees and asylum seekers. The established
and well-funded civil society organisations predominantly cater to the more affluent
sections of the community, which is reflected in the range of religious or more socially
and culturally focused services and activities.
Organisations outside of these groups are perceived to be under-resourced and undervalued. The absence of such organisations was thought to impact most on Iranian
asylum seekers and refugees who require culturally-specific support services. The
plight of Iranian asylum seekers is of particular concern as highlighted by the recent
death of an asylum seeker who hanged himself in a public park in Manchester. Issues
of poor housing, destitution and the time taken for processing asylum applications are
key areas of concern relating to this group.
77
Iranian community respondent: Female, Birmingham, 40s
54 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
Existing civil society organisations are also felt to not cater for the needs of new
economic migrants who can experience high levels of unemployment or problems
with making adjustments to their new environment. Additionally, many new arrivals
also have significant language and interpretation needs that are not adequately
catered for by the established civil society organisations or public service providers.
Another area identified as significant and lacking in mainstream provision for all
sections of the community was the lack of culturally appropriate therapy and
counselling services.
While the religious organisations play a key role in the community for many, it was
noted by respondents that there is not much input from young people or female
members of the community in the running of these organisations. Young people and
women are felt to be quite active in artistic, sports and cultural activities offered by
these organisations and respondents suggested that an increased involvement in the
management and decision-making role by women and young people would improve
both the services offered, as well as make them more attractive to these groups. One
respondent noted that this explained the attraction of Kanoon Towid for young people.
One of the key issues mentioned by respondents was that funding for non-religious
activity is difficult to obtain. It is perceived that Iranians are more likely to donate to
religious organisations, which are also more likely to receive funding from the Iranian
government. As a result, cultural organisations and organisations providing secular
youth provision and women support services remain very under-funded.
Many organisations, both religious and secular, facilitate participation in sport activities
but are themselves unable to provide the facilities due to lack of venues and funding.
These problems are more acute outside London. Even though many religious
organisations may be self-sufficient in terms of reliance on public funds, they can also
still experience capacity issues. One respondent noted that the mosque in Holland Park
is often so busy that people are sitting in the corridor. They suggested that this lack of
adequate community inhibits the communities from becoming more united.78
78
Iranian community respondent: Female, London, 20s
Conclusions and recommendations | 55
13 Conclusions and recommendations
Due to the complex mix of religious and political factors underpinning the process of
migration, the Iranian community has remained internally stratified along these lines.
The majority of the population is concentrated in London but is very diverse in its
internal make up. This has largely hindered any interest or effort to maintain a
collective Iranian cultural identity in the British context. Civil society organisations and
their political/religious inclinations reflect many of the political and religious divisions
that have marked Iranian politics for many years.
There is a distinct difference between those who migrated just before or after the
1979 Revolution and later migrants, many of whom are economic rather than political
exiles, as was the case with the earlier migrants. Between these groups there are
significant differences in socio economic status and levels of integration into
British society.
Whilst most Iranians are comfortable in British society, which they see as generally
multiracial and tolerant, negative public stereotypes about Iran and Iranians can
sometimes create difficulties and reinforce a sense of being outside the mainstream.
This feeling cuts across all generations of Iranians. Some young respondents also
highlighted problems stemming from a lack of acceptance and their inability to fully
express themselves in mainstream society.
The majority of the Iranian community is Shi’a Mulsim, but other religions are
represented at much higher levels in the UK than their make-up in Iran. This is thought
to be due to the large numbers of people from religious minorities who left Iran out
of a fear of religious persecution following the Islamic Revolution. Within the Muslim
community there is a broad continuum of religiosity and religious practice ranging from
the very devout to those who consider themselves only culturally Muslim. There is also
a significant proportion of the population that does not align itself with any religion.
Despite the diversity within the community, Iranians are bound together by the Persian
language, shared experiences of Iran and to a large extent by their religion. In spite of
the fragmentation between communities there are over 50 UK-based Iranian
organisation in London. A large proportion of the services offered include Persian
language, social and cultural events.
56 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
Few of these organisations have funding from, or strong links with, public authorities
and civic engagement is relatively low. One of the key factors inhibiting further
engagement by the community is the lack of formal political representation and
representative community forums that can advocate on behalf of the community to
central government and local public bodies.
While the research indicates a proud, resilient and relatively self-confident community,
with significant status for women and young people, there are still some concerns
that more needs to be done for these groups. There is also an indication that public
authorities need to develop basic awareness and understanding of the community,
particularly of the needs of new migrants. The plight of Iranian asylum seekers is of
particular concern.
Despite the overriding view that young Iranians are not susceptible to radical
ideologies, a few ministers of religion are thought to promote extremist rhetoric which
can influence a small minority of young people, and hence the community feels that
there is a need develop a better understanding about identity and attitude formation
among young people, and of the routes and activities that can be utilised by both
religious and secular centres along government approaches to offer counter radicalism
messages and constructive activities for young people.
13.1 Recommendations
There has been very limited previous research on the Iranian Muslim community to
date and this and the other UMEC reports should be seen as a starting point in the
process of understanding England’s diverse Muslim and ethnic minority communities
in greater detail. Many areas are highlighted in this report as community concerns but
require further enquiry to draw firm conclusions.
The UMEC Overview report provides detailed recommendations for engagement
with and development of Muslim civil society organisations. The following specific
recommendations for public authorities are in relation to responding to the Iranian
community:
Glossary | 57
Specific recommendations arising from community respondents include:
• Improved service provision for asylum seekers and new migrants, particularly in
the areas of language training, housing, immigration and employment support
• Cross-cultural psychiatry and counselling services
• Funding and support for the establishment of Iranian women’s organisations
• Increased efforts on the part of public authorities to establish channels of
communication and dialogue with the community taking into account the
significant grouping that exists within the community
• Enhanced youth provision to counter the impact of radicalising influences
• Development of government strategies to address anti-Muslim bias in the
British media.
Other recommendations:
• Further research into identity formation, attitudes and experiences of young people
• Capacity building of existing organisations and/or support for the development of
new organisations to cater for the social and welfare needs of new migrants.
58 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
14 Glossary
Ahl al-kitah: People of the book.
CI: The Change Institute.
Muharram: First month of the Islamic calendar. Shi’as fast during Muharram and
commemorate the death of Imam Hussein, grandson of the Prophet Mohammed,
at Karbala in AD680.
Nowrooz: Iranian New Year.
Shah: Emperor.
Shi’a: Muslims who believe that succession to the political and religious leadership of
the Muslim community should be hereditary through Muhammad’s daughter Fatimah
and her husband, Muhammad’s cousin Ali. Although Shi’as do not believe that these
successors (imams) are prophets, they do believe that they are divinely inspired and
infallible. Approximately 15 per cent of all Muslims are Shi’as.
Sunni: Muslims who emphasise the importance of the actions and customs of
Muhammad and the first generations of Muslims, viewing as legitimate the
establishment of the caliphate, in contrast to Shi’a beliefs. About 85 per cent of all
Muslims are Sunnis.
Twelver: a branch of Shi’a Islam that refers to Muslims who adhere to the twelve
succeeding imams ending with the Prophet Muhammad al-Mahdi in the 10th Century.
The majority of Shi’as are twelvers. Also known as Ja’fari or Ithna Ashari.
(Source: Esposito, 2008)
Bibliography | 59
15 Bibliography
Esposito, J.L. (ed) (2008) The Oxford Dictionary of Islam (online edition), Oxford:
Oxford University Press
Farrokh, K. and M. Abedin, ‘British Arabism and the bombings in Iran’, Asia Times,
3.11.2005
Hakimzadeh, S. (2006) ‘Iran: A Vast Diaspora Abroad and Millions of Refugees at
Home’, Migration Information Source. www.migrationinformation.org/
Hussein D. Hassan (2007) Iran: Ethnic and Religious Minorities – Congressional Research
Service – Report for Congress, Washington DC: Congressional Research Service
International Organisation for Migration (2007) Mapping Exercise – Iran, London: IOM
Kyambi, S. (2005) Beyond Black and White – Mapping new immigrant communities,
London: Institute for Public Policy Research
Spellman, K. (2004) Religion and Nation: Iranian Local and Transnational Networks in
Britain, Studies in Forced Migration – Volume 15, Oxford: Berghahn Books
60 | Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities – The Iranian Muslim Community in England
Bibliography | 61
This report presents a picture of the Iranian Muslim community in England. It is one of a
series of thirteen reports on different Muslim communities in England.
It has been commissioned by the Department for Communities and Local Government
to enhance the understanding of the diversity of England’s Muslim population and as an
effective route to engagement.
Price: £25
ISBN 978-1-4098-1269-2