^kc^-S
i^ SMi^Aal ^^^TT^lfM^
244
NOBILITY AND THE DECLINE OF
THE MUGHAL EMPIRE
In the monarchical system, nobility formed a great source of
power and strength, as was the backbone of the empire. Their
power and strength come from the emperor, who was their sole
master. Their
ultimate
responsibility
was of the
emperor
implement administrative order and executive diplomatic
to
policy
was. But their involvement in group politics factional fights for
vested interest as clear from the study
of this work had which
resulted in administrative financial crisises, so deep that even a
more capable minister would not
have been succeed in couping
with the situation.
In a domain such as the Mughal Empire, the responsibility of
carrying out the administration, making out vast plans for defense
and reorganizing institution to meet the requirements of the day,
squarely rested on the governing class (Arkan-i- Daulat). But it was
not possible without the consent of the Emperor who were
during the period under review.
weak
As It was born pointed out
Nizamul Mulk's reply to Nadir Shah that 'the Emperor did whatever
he likes, senior and experienced noble's advices were not appealing
and
acceptable to him'^
There was other factor for the
break up of the cordial and
working relations between the Emperor and nobility. The Emperor's
success actually lay in the dissolution of difference and conflicts of
interest among
the nobles and the Emperor. The capacity of the
Later Miighals, Op. cit., vol. II, p. 353
245
central power to resolve conflicts between different sections of the
nobility over the distribution of emoluments or access to resources
diminished as the financial crisis worsened. Moreover the Emperor
could no longer afford to alienate any one group in his effort to
subdue the tension between office holders. Thus his ability to punish
those Umara, who exceeded their authority was also compromised,
a fact which caused immediate concern to the lower levels of the
administration. This significantly diminished the authority of the
Emperor and changed his position at the court as well as his
relationship with the nobles.^ It was due to failure of the Emperor,
which resulted a shift in relative weight of his power vis-a-vIs that
of factions of the nobility, which ultimately resulted in Intensification
of party politics at the court.
Growing factionalism converted the position of the Emperor at
the
centre
merely
a
helpless
spectator.
Thus
the
Mughal
mansabdar, who were dominant ruling group and commlted t o the
integration of the empire, earlier, became powerful in the changed
circumstance because they more enjoyed more power and position
at the
centre, and even they compromised to share power with
local elements.
One of the great factor which demoralized the army general
was the personal disadvantage of the Emperor to lead
the army
and conducting operations. They had simply been brought on, put
on throne and crowned by the faction of the nobles. They were not
trained in the art of governance weak in taking in decision thus,
they are unable to play any action and visible role.
" Andrea Hintz, The Mughal Empire and decline, p. 172
246
Besides this there was every possibility to persuade the ruler
by other factional group of nobles. The fear of this intrigue always
present among the talented and ambitious nobles. For example
when Nizam-ul-Muik was engaged in Gujrat and Malwa to suppress,
the revolt of Mughal Subadar Haider Quii khan and Dost Mohammad
in respective provinces, his opposition group taking advantage of
his absence at the imperial court
successfully changed the
atmosphere there and his successful actions
calculated and highlighted
were deliberately
as personal gains and
an attempt to
control all power in his hand.
In spite of group competition and conflict talented an ablest
ministers were well wisher Mughal empire. They chalked out
administrative reforms programs and there were presented to the
Emperor. For example when Nizam-ul-Mulk assumed charge of the
wizarate, he planned a detailed administrative reform, curtailing
Peshkash,
that only fit nobles and soldiers be employed, further
assignment of Jagir should be withheld and redistributed,
lands brought under khalsa-Jagir,
revenue
farming (Ijara)
more
of
Khalsa should be stopped.-^ These suggestions were also advanced
by Shah Waliullah in a letter to the Emperor."*
But these proposals were opposed by another group of
nobles, by Koki Jiu (consort of emperor), who was afraid that
implementation of these proposals means, deprivation of their
privileges, interest and gain. With the influence of this group
Emperor rejected the proposals, thus without the full support and
will power of the Emperor to improve the administrative crisis, no
^ Chapter, llird
** Shah waliullah ke siyasi Maktubat, letter No. 1.
247
Wazir was in position to execute his reform and measures. In this
way
talented, capable and ambitious nobles like Nizam-ul-Mulk,
Saadat Khan, Najib-ud-Daulah, Safdar Jang etc. Founding in the
court little chance to renovate the administration. They decided to
left the court and carved out their own principalities and therefore
devoted themselves fully
to the establishment at least a unit of
their own for good administration in areas under their jurisdiction.
No doubt they were high ranking nobles of the Mughal Empire, who
established Semi independent regional and successor states. They
had received their official appointments from the Emperor, and
never break up the loyalty and contact with the centre.
The nobility present an amiable contrast character to
each other. During a number under review of nobles had
good
character disciplined life but
other
except few
big amirs, many
did not bestow personal care on the maintenance of discipline and
drill of horsemen under their command.
Sarbuland Khan, Mir
Jumla. Amir Khan and several others kept pay of soldiers in arrears,
reducing them to an object condition. The economic insecurity
seriously affected the disciplines of soldiers and undermined their
morale. The contemporary Urdu poets and scholar^ have bewailed
the soldiers ruin that had over taken the soldiers in Delhi. They
consider it as one of major cancer responsible for the decline of the
Mughal empire.
The Mughal army's real strength lay in cavalry. It had played
a prominent role in the battles and continued to hold dominant
position till the mid eighteenth century, when infantry with rapidly
^ Shah waliullah in his letter. No.
248
firing muskets, equipped with gun-power and organized on the
European model threw it into background Nadir Shah's and Ahmad
Shah Abdali's success lay in the irresistible
power of mobile
musketry. The striking success of the Persian and Afghan general,
through the means of new weaponry and superb leadership, left a
deep impress on the minds of the Indian generals and governors.
Some of them took steps to re-organize and re-equip their troops
on new lines. For example Ali Mohammad Rohilla, Safder Jang and
Najib-ud-Daula to improve the strength and efficiency of their
respective infantry armed them with musketry and gun power.
About Najib-ud-Daulah's generalship J.N. Sarkar remarks
that he
had no equal in that age except Ahmad Shah Abdali'.^
The efficiency of Mughal army depended on the efficient
working of the jagirdari system, which provided the economic basis
for the whole Mughal empire . The mansabdar or the commanders
of the army were paid through assignment of land revenue. The
assignment system with its uniform methods of revenue collection
and effective control over manasabdar, operated successfully under
great Mughals, but when inherent defects appeared, the Mughal
emperor failed to remove them, resulted that by 1750 it collapsed.
The crisis in Jagirdah system affected the whole character of the
army and brought it to the lowest levels of efficiency and discipline.
For Nizam-ul-Mulk's measures of reforms in the system of
assignment were not carried out, and Ijara system spread widely in
jagir and khalisa area, ruining the products.
' Fall of the Mughal Empire, op. cit., vol. II p. 415
249
Although Nizam-ul-Mulk and Shah Wali-Ullah insisted on its
abolition from the khalisa Mahals, revenue farming continued to
operate on a wide scale and after the invasion of Nadir shah it
becanne rampant in large parts of the empire. The practice led to
increase the financial problem of mansabdar and the King.
The
financial
problem
of
mansabdars
endengired
the
subsistence level. In order to counter the personal effects of crisis,
the nobels started more systematically than ever before to deviate
from imperial regulations to make up for their individual losses. The
failure of the centre to assist its mansabdars in realizing its income
in times of local difficulty forced the later to
build up more the
prosperous provinces. By resisting frequent transfer of jagir and
getting on payment in name of peshkash converting offices into
hereditary holding's, the mansabdar tried to ensure a regular
income for them selves.
The crisis of jagirdari
system intensified by inducting more
mansabdar during our studied period during 1739- 1761 there was
69 mansabdar holding 5000 to 7000 mansab but it
raised to 135
by 1761. The jagirdari crisis ultimately led to the intensification of
factional feuds within the higher ranks of the nobility. The rival
factions bared on family groups, struggled for possession of fertile
and
easily
manageable jagir.
This
factionalism
was
further
aggravated by the emperor, who himself participating in this
struggle by supporting to one group instead of sorting out discord
among nobles finding difficult
holders
the solution at the court, the jagir
devoted themselves to the establishment of semi-
independent principalities in areas under their jurisdiction.
250
Thus the source of decline of Mughal Empire was clearly in
personality of the Emperor, which led to ignorance of administration
and activities of mansabdars. Ultimately it led to decadence of its
military, economic and civil institutions. The decay followed a chain
pattern, the effect of one defect transforming itself into a chain of
another. The chain started from the Emperor could not break
without a wholesale transformation of the every nature of the
Mughal regime. It may be urged that the Mughal empire could be
saved, if a change could have been brought in the ruling class from
top to bottom. The failure in this direction was not at the middle or
lower level, but the source of power, which rode to the chariot of
the imperial order.