ISDP, Stockholm, ht -11
Parallel structures to the Six-Party Talks
Introduction
The Six-Party Talks broke down in April 2009, when North Korea declared its permanent withdrawal from
the process, as a response to the UN Security Council’s criticism of Pyongyang’s rocket launch and order
to impose further sanctions.1 The Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents the following year heightened
tensions and threatened an escalation of the long-term conflict between the two Koreas.2 However, the
year of 2011 have proved the parties’ willingness to return to the negotiation table with a series of
bilateral talks, according to the Chinese three-step proposal, between North and South, as well as
between US and the DPRK.3
Despite these positive signs, significant obstacles remain to resume permanent nuclear talks, i.e. the
parties to the conflict lack basic mutual trust. In this paper, we propose measures to be taken in the
short-term perspective, i.e. the so-called “low hanging fruits” or trigger points are available to establish
1
“Angry N Korea quits nuclear talks”, BBC News, 14 April 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/7997481.stm (Accessed on 29 November 2011)
2
Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun, “CHEONAN AND YEONPYEONG: THE NORTHEAST ASIAN RESPONSE
TO NORTH KOREA‟S PROVOCATIONS”, Rusi Journal, April/May 2011, Vol. 156, No. 2, p. 74,
http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/201104SnyderandByun.pdf (Accessed on 29 November 2011)
3
Daniel Pinkston, “A Revival of the Six-Party Talks? Four Steps the DPRK Can Take to Resuscitate Diplomacy”,
International Crisis Group, 26 July 2011, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/north-korea/arevival-of-the-six-party-talks.aspx (accessed on 29 November 2011)
confidence and speed up the resumption of negotiation? Bilateral or multilateral dialogue should first of
all deal with less sensitive issues and areas of common interest, e.g. maritime, transportation and energy
issues, as well as business and trade, where the parties can seek to cooperate.
Next, we need to consider the long-term perspective and what type of CBMs that can prevent deadlocks,
like the one of the Six-Party Talks from taking place in the future. The main issue with past talks has been
the narrow approach of only focusing on denuclearizing North Korea. Nevertheless, this is not the only
source of instability in Northeast Asia, as the incidents in 2010 clearly demonstrated. Therefore, a future
negotiation structure should also include other security-related issues - it could be, again, maritime,
environmental, economic, territorial and energy issues.4
Existing parallel structures to the Six-Party Talks
In the absence of the Six-Party Talks, there are no established parallel structures dealing with the North
Korean nuclear problem, in particular, or regional security, in general, in Northeast Asia.
However, formal regional organizations with other security-related goals and member constellations do
exist in the Asia-Pacific region. The Shanghai Organization Cooperation (SCO) is focusing mainly on
threats such as terrorism, separatism and extremism.5 The ASEAN security community (ASC) is another
structure that aims to preserve and strengthen regional stability, peace and security and the U.S. Pacific
Command (USPACOM) is a US military authority operating in the Asia-Pacific region to improve
cooperation on regional security. In one of USPACOM’s two channels, i.e. within the Asia Pacific Center
for Security Studies (PACOM), a setting for track two dialogues is provided, where military officers from
countries across the region can discuss security issues.
4
Mel Gurtov, “Averting War in Northeast Asia: A Proposal”, The Asia-Pacific Journal Vol 9, Issue 2 No 2, January
10, 2011, http://japanfocus.org/-Mel-Gurtov/3467 (accessed on 29 November 2011)
5
Dick K. Nanto, (2008), „East Asian Regional Architecture: New Economic and
Security Arrangements and U.S. Policy‟, CRS Report for Congress, pp. 24-25
In addition to the official security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region, there are a number of informal
track two dialogues, e.g. the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, the University of
California’s Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) and the International Institute for Strategic
Studies’ Shangri-La Dialogue.6
The fact that a permanent security dialogue mechanism does not exist and that communication between
the key parties to the nuclear issue has been close to dead since the Six-Partly Talks collapse should be
taken very seriously. Not least, the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents last year demonstrated the
precarious situation on the Korean Peninsula proved the urgency of putting such CBMs of crisis
prevention and crisis management in place.7
General view of the parties
The interest and goals as regards the Six-Party Talks can, in general, be described by dividing the six
parties in two groups; the former and present communist countries (China, North Korea and Russia) vs.
the US its allies South Korea and Japan.
China, the DPRK and Russia believe that the Six-Party Talks is the only means by which a resolution on
the nuclear issue can be reached, and therefore, they prefer a resumption of the Talks as soon as
possible.
6
7
Ibid., p. 27
Snyder and Byun, p. 74
North Korea has suggested a return to the Six-Party Talks, but ‘without any pre-conditions’8 and that the
2005 Joint Statement has to be the core for such talks on its nuclear program.9 It is highly unlikely that
Pyongyang merely trade its nuclear weapons program with economic aid. One needs to bear in mind
that North Korea began research on nuclear weapons in the 1950s, as a response to US’s establishment
of nuclear tactical weapons in South Korea. Therefore, a permanent security guarantee must be
established first.10 However, a major reason why Pyongyang has hitherto found it difficult to trust
democratic states like the US is their regular shift of government, meaning that it simply does not know
whether the next US leadership will stick to earlier crucial agreements.11
In contrast, the US, South Korea and Japan have expressed an increasing scepticism of whether the SixParty structure is really useful to achieve its intended goal, i.e. a denuclearization of North Korean and
establishment of peace on the Peninsula. This is mainly due to the fact that Pyongyang has repeatedly
demonstrated a reluctance to alter its stance on its nuclear weapons program.12 All three parties
continue to claim that a dismantlement of nuclear weapons and materials in a verifiable and irreversible
manner must come prior to economic and security guarantees.13 What further complicates the situation
are the upcoming US and South Korean presidential elections in 2012, as well as the North Korean power
transition. These circumstances postpone real progress of negotiation, as the parties put increased focus
on domestic issues.14
Hence, the main reasons of past talks’ failure to resolve the nuclear issue and the current deadlock, are
the underlying differences of interests among key actors as regards the nuclear issue, in particular, and
8
“DPRK's KCNA rejects pre-conditions for resuming six-party talks”, 4 October 2011, Xinhuanews,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-10/04/c_131173993.htm (accessed on 29 October 2011)
9
Stephanie Nebehay, „U.S. says N. Korea talks positive, issues remain‟, Reuters, 24 October 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/24/us-korea-north-us-idUSTRE79N7GV20111024 (accessed on 30 October
2011)
10
Heo Mane, “6+EU talks: new look into denuclearization”, The Korea Times, 30 October 2011
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2011/10/137_97591.html (accessed on 29 November 2011)
11
Ingolf Kiesow (2011), No Confidence in Korea: A Regional Problem in a Global Context, Institute for Security
and Development Policy, p. 131.
12
Sangsoo Lee & Stina Bergman, “Future Prospects for the Six-Party Talks”, ISDP Policy Brief, 9 November 2011,
p. 1-2, http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2011_bergman-lee_future-prospects-for-sixparty-talk.pdf
13
Mane, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2011/10/137_97591.html
14
Lee & Bergman, p. 2
security, in general, in Northeast Asia.15 Instead, the Talks have formed an ad hoc organization, coming
into existence only when a problem has been so severe, such as with the North Korean nuclear issue,
that all parties have been willing to temporarily set aside strategic interests and rivalries.16 With the time
and absence of progress in the nuclear talks, confidence in the Six-Party Talks has decreased. Therefore,
in order to break the deadlock and finally reach solution to the nuclear issue, questions have been raised
among some of the parties whether we need supplementary or parallel negotiation structures.
Policy recommendations
Short-term perspective: low hanging fruit
The year of 2011 has shown some positive signs that the member states within the Six-Party Talks are
keen to return to the negotiation table. However, significant obstacles remain to permanently resume
the Six-Party Talks.
The main issue of is the lack of mutual trust between the participating countries, which then has to be
established before holding the Six-Party Talks. Accordingly, which so-called low hanging fruits are
available to establish the confidence needed to speed up a resumption of nuclear talks? We suggest that
the parties need to start dealing with less sensitive issues and areas of overlapping interests, where
some degree of consensus is already in place, such as terrorism, maritime issues, business and trade,
transportation security, infectious diseases and energy. A similar process establishing lines of
communication and confidence building took place in Europe and the OSCE.17
When it e.g. comes to maritime issues, CBMs need to be taken to avoid future incidents like the sinking
15
Ibid.
Dick K. Nanto, (2008), „East Asian Regional Architecture: New Economic and Security Arrangements and U.S.
Policy‟, CRS Report for Congress, pp. 24-25
17
Ibid., p. 27
16
of the Cheonan vessel and Yeonpyeong attacks. The parties need to realize that they have to offer
mutual concessions and actions if trust is to be established. This includes the necessity of ending USSouth Korean military drills in the Yellow Sea, which North Korea views as a direct threat to its security
and therefore will continue responding to with force as long as it proceeds.18 Hence, a long-term
ceasefire agreement should first be settled where both sides commit themselves not to provoke the
other side.
Military to military relations are perhaps the most important
one between the North and South, why more bilateral exchange and dialogue on a military level should
be established.19 Moreover, South Korea and the US could seek cooperation with North Korea on
maritime issues, e.g. hold joint naval exercises and safeguarding in the Northeast Asia region.
Another area of common interest would be business and trade. Today, economic cooperation between
North and South does hardly exist, but the latter has recently accepted to send medical aid to its
neighbour in the North.20 Moreover, the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) that continued to work and
expand regardless of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents in 201021 is a sign that cooperation
between the North and the South is feasible.
When the parties realize that collaboration on these issues progress, they can move to more sensitive
and crucial problems, such as nuclear weapons. Yet, who is going to initiate negotiation on these less
sensitive issues? At this point, a third neutral party could act as mediator. It could be individual diplomats
or organizations with good international reputation and genuine long-term experience of difficult
negotiation processes. With its reputation and experience, this party could draw the international
attention needed to gain momentum of the nuclear talks.
Long-term perspective: Northeast Asia Security Mechanism
18
Niklas Swanström, “ARTILLERY EXCHANGE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA”, ISDP Policy Brief, No. 44,
23 November, 2010
19
Ibid.
20
“South Korea to send medical aid to North Korea”, BBC News, 8 November 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15633440 (accessed on 29 November 2011)
21
Mark E. Manyin & Dick K. Nanto, ”The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial Complex”, April 2011, CRS
Report for Congress
Can we learn from outside? OSCE-type CBMs
Proposals have been put forward that Northeast Asia could draw on CBMs from the European model, i.e.
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Such a mechanism would not entirely
imitate the goals and means of the European framework, mainly because the European and Asian
contexts fundamentally differ. Rather, one could pick out some aspects, such as OSCE’s approach to crisis
management, talks and negotiations, confidence and security-building, peacekeeping and advancing
technology and economic exchange and cooperation. Moreover, suggestions have been made to
establish corresponding OSCE-regional structures, such as Summit Conferences, a Forum for Security
Cooperation, Permanent Council, the Ministerial Council and Senior Council/Economic Forum. In
addition, one can learn from political security documents, e.g. the Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation concerning Emergency Situations, the European Conventional Armed Forces Treaty and the
Vienna Declaration on the member’s fundamental views on economic cooperation, security and
environmental protection.22
6+EU Talks?
Another idea is to include the European Union in the nuclear talks, as an increasingly important global
actor, that could help breaking the current deadlock. Within such a formation a different approach to the
nuclear issue needs to be taken, than was the case in the Six-Party Talks. All original parties + EU must
provide North Korea with security guarantees and a normalization of diplomatic ties has to reached. 23
Establish a Northeast Asia Security Dialogue Mechanism
Mel Gurtov presents an interesting idea about a Security Dialogue Mechanism (NEASDM) that can work
as a corresponding regional institution on conflict prevention and crisis management in Northeast Asia.
Such a mechanism was in fact already agreed on during the Six-Party rounds in 2005 and 2007 and would
then be a product of the old structure.
22
Liu Ming, “Towards a northeast Asia security mechanism”, China.org.cn, 27 April 2011,
http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2011-04/27/content_22453433_3.htm (accessed 28 November 2011)
23
Mane, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2011/10/137_97591.html (accessed on 29 November 2011)
Gurtov develops the argument of a NEASDM as follows. The main problem with the Six-Party Talks is that
they have focused on only one issue, i.e. a too narrow approach on disarming North Korea in exchange
for economic aid and security guarantees. Nevertheless, Pyongyang’s NWP is not the only source of
insecurity in the region. A viable, long-term mechanism in Northeast Asia must take on a wider approach
and include other security matters, such as economic, territorial, environmental and maritime issues.
One could e.g. discuss code of conduct to manage territorial disputes, weapons transfers and
deployments, piracy and terrorism. This institution should also prioritize normalization of ties among the
parties involved, where especially the US, South Korea and Japan must fully recognize North Korea in
order to engage the country in the security issues.
Conclusion
The series of bilateral talks this year has showed some positive signs of the six parties’ willingness to
return to the negotiation table on the nuclear issue. Nevertheless, important obstacles to permanently
restart nuclear talks unfortunately remain.
In order to speed up this process, basic mutual trust among the six parties has to be established.
Accordingly, in the short-term perspective, identify the low hanging fruits, i.e. start communicate and
cooperate on issues of overlapping interest that are simultaneously less sensitive than nuclear weapons,
such as maritime and economic issues, before moving on to more crucial issues, such as a
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In the long-term perspective, there is a necessity of
establishing CBMs that can prevent deadlocks like the current one of the Six-Party Talks.
We have suggested that such a mechanism can draw lessons from the OSCE-model. Most important is
that such a mechanism, contrary to the Six-Party structure, employs a wider approach on regional
security than merely resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. Another suggestion is to include the EU
as a strong and influential global actor that can put additional pressure on the other parties to act.
References
- “DPRK's KCNA rejects pre-conditions for resuming six-party talks”, Xinhuanews, 4 October
2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-10/04/c_131173993.htm
- Gurtov, Mel, “Averting War in Northeast Asia: A Proposal”, The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 9, Issue 2, No.
2, 10 January 2011, http://japanfocus.org/-Mel-Gurtov/3467
- Kiesow, Ingolf (2011), No Confidence in Korea: A Regional Problem in a Global Context, Institute for
Security and Development Policy, pp. 137
- Lee, Sangsoo & Bergman, Stina “Future Prospects for the Six-Party Talks”, ISDP Policy Brief, 9 November
2011, http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2011_bergman-lee_future-prospects-forsixparty-talk.pdf
- Mane, Heo, “6+EU talks: new look into denuclearization”, The Korea Times, 30 October 2011
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2011/10/137_97591.html
Manyin, Mark E. & Nanto, Dick K, ”The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial Complex”,
April 2011, CRS Report for Congress, pp. 25
- Ming, Liu, “Towards a northeast Asia security mechanism”, China.org.cn, 27 April 2011,
http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2011-04/27/content_22453433_3.htm
- Nebehay, Stephanie, „U.S. says N. Korea talks positive, issues remain‟, Reuters, 24 October
2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/24/us-korea-north-us-idUSTRE79N7GV20111024
- Nanto, Dick K. (2008), “East Asian Regional Architecture: New
Economic and Security Arrangements and U.S. Policy”, CRS Report
for Congress, pp.
41
- Pinkston, Daniel, “A Revival of the Six-Party Talks? Four Steps the DPRK Can Take to
Resuscitate Diplomacy”, International Crisis Group, 26 July 2011,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/north-korea/a-revival-of-the-six-partytalks.aspx
- Snyder, Scott and Byun, See-Won,”CHEONAN AND YEONPYEONG: THE NORTHEAST
ASIAN RESPONSE TO NORTH KOREA‟S PROVOCATIONS”, Rusi Journal, April/May
2011, Vol. 156, No. 2 pp. 74–81, p. 74,
http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/201104SnyderandByun.pdf
- “South Korea to send medical aid to North Korea”, BBC News, 8 November 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15633440 s
- Swanström, Niklas, “ARTILLERY EXCHANGE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA”, ISDP
Policy Brief, No. 44, 23 November, 2010