Master thesis outline – Sofie Hove Stene – Water Scarcity in the Middle East
Introduction/Background
For several decades the question of whether water scarcity is, or could be a source of armed
conflict between states, has been disputed among social scientists (Wolf & Hammer 2000:
125). Today, the dominating perception is that the “water war1”-theorists lack empirical
evidence to support their claims. Instead the empirical data seems to point towards
cooperation between states as the main result of water scarcity-related issues2.
At the same time, several indicators suggest that water will become an even scarcer resource
in the future; at an overall level, access to water will be reduced because of increased
demands (population growth and industrialisation), reduced water quality (resulting from
pollution), uneven distribution of the resource and climate change (Macdonald 2002: 53).
Thus it is difficult to predict whether water scarcity, in the future, will become crucial to the
point of states engaging in war to secure access.
The Middle East is one of the regions in the world suffering the most from water scarcity
issues (see attachment: “A short history of water management in the MENA region”). The
region has an average supply of less than 1000 litres per person per year (Smith 2006:57).
Water availability is not expected to improve in the coming half century, and several Middle
Eastern countries are expected to face chronic shortages by 2050 (Smith 2006: 122). Most
parties involved in major water disputes maintain hard-line positions on water issues, ensuring
that for the immediate future, water distribution, supply and quality will continue to be a
major challenge.
Research question
Several actors in the region (like the Egyptian politician Boutros Boutros-Ghali and King
Hussein of Jordan) have predicted that the next great war in the Middle East will be a war
over water. Theorists in security policy (Cooley 1984, Starr 1991, Gleick 1993) claim that
1
The water war thesis says that competition for limited freshwater leads to severe political tensions and
eventually to war. Water resources are seen as military and political goals and researchers point to case studies
from the Middle East, South Asia and South America as examples of where water has been a source of armed
conflict (Westing 1986, Gleick 1993, Remans 1995, Homer-Dixon 1999 and others).
2
At least at the national level. Findings also show that geographic scale and intensity of conflict are inversely
related – which means that armed conflict is more likely to occur at the sub-national level than at the national
level (Wolf & Hammer 2000: 128).
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Master thesis outline – Sofie Hove Stene – Water Scarcity in the Middle East
water is the resource that will bring combatants to the battlefield in the Middle East in the
twenty-first century. It would be difficult to either confirm or deny these assumptions. What
can be assessed on the other hand, is whether or not water has gained importance to relations
between states in the region.
According to Wolf & Hammer (2000) transboundary water agreements play a critical role for
the stability in water scarce regions. Conversely, the World Bank (2007) states that the
MENA region has a striking absence of such agreements on its most significant transboundary
water courses. The few project-related agreements that do exist, deal largely with monitoring
and exchange of information established under external project support. “None of the
transboundary aquifers in the MENA region is managed and exploited under a multicountry
cooperative framework. The absence of such frameworks has further intensified the drive by
the countries most economically able and politically powerful to exploit the finite water
resources” (The World Bank 2007). According to Wolf & Hammer (2000) there is a current
gap of knowledge in the research field, as the processes which lead to the necessity,
negotiation and structure of international water agreements have been surprisingly poorly
studied. In order to address this issue, I will focus my thesis on the following research
question:
Has the water scarcity issue gained importance for international relations in the Middle East,
and has the deteriorating water situation led states to take cooperative measures to improve
water access?
Theory
Aaron T. Wolf is one of the most prominent theorists of the “water non-conflict”-thesis. He
argues that the historic reality has been quite different from what the “water wars”-literature
would have one believe. In modern history, only seven minor skirmishes have been waged
over international waters. Conversely, over 3600 treaties have been signed over different
aspects of international waters, “many showing tremendous elegance and creativity for
dealing with this critical resource” (Wolf & Hammer 2000: 123).
According to Wolf (2000), war over water is neither strategically rational, hydrographically
effective nor economically viable. Shared interests along a water-way seem to overwhelm
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Master thesis outline – Sofie Hove Stene – Water Scarcity in the Middle East
waters’ conflict-inducing characteristics and once water management institutions are in place,
they tend to be very resilient. “International water is a resource whose characteristics tend to
induce cooperation, and incite violence only in the exception” (Wolf & Hammer 2000).
From Wolf and other theorists supporting the “water cooperation”-thesis, as well as
knowledge about the increasingly critical water situation in the Middle East, it is possible to
deduce two main working hypotheses:
H1: If water scarcity has gained importance for international relations in the Middle East, we
should see an increased focus on water and water cooperation in bilateral agreements. 3
H2: If water scarcity eventually makes states cooperate with regards to water management,
we should see policy implementations that directly reflect the agreements. 4
Method
In order to approach the research question and the hypotheses deduced from the theory on the
field I envisage doing a focused case study with method triangulation of how the three
countries Jordan, Israel and Palestine are dealing with the situation of water scarcity and their
shared resources (see attachment 2 “Freshwater resources in Jordan, Israel and Palestine”).
A focused study of all water related agreements in the Middle East (which would be the ideal
approach) is undoubtedly beyond the scope of this thesis. But several reasons why these three
countries represent a good basis for saying something general about the region as a whole can
be presented. The Palestinian Territories is the “country” in the region that (because of
population growth) has experienced the strongest per capita decrease in access to water. At
3
One risk with this working hypothesis is that if cooperation in general increases in the period under study, it
would be normal to also see an increase in water cooperation, which is not necessarily due to the aggravating
water situation (risk of spurious effects). To avoid drawing conclusions on false basis I’m considering comparing
cooperation on the water issue with cooperation on other issues (such as trade between Israel and Jordan, and
peace talks between Israel and Palestine) – in order to see whether there is a “real” increase in water cooperation.
4
Hveem has suggested that I create a ”benchmark model” based on other/similar agreements so that I have a
basis for comparison, and a basis for saying something about what can be expected with regards to policy
implementations after international agreements.
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Master thesis outline – Sofie Hove Stene – Water Scarcity in the Middle East
the same time, relations between Israel and Palestine have always been conflictual5. This
makes the pair of Israel-Palestine a “least likely” case of the cooperation scenario. The pair of
Israel and Jordan, on the other hand can be said to represent a “most likely” case of
cooperation since the two countries have had peaceful relations ever since they signed the
peace agreement in 1994 (where the question of management of the shared water resources
was a central part)6. A part from Egypt, Jordan is the only Arab country with which Israel has
signed a peace agreement. It is also important to note that most disputes over water in the
Middle East include Israel, on one hand because of the country’s geographical location
bordering several other countries in the region as well as transboundary aquifers and rivers,
and on the other hand because of the country’s dominant military position in the region.
Including Israel in a focused case study of cooperative water management in the Middle East
thus seems inevitable, and with the inclusion of both Jordan and Palestine I will be able to say
something about water management both within a “peaceful” and “conflictual” history of
relations. It is also worth mentioning that several authors have compared Israel’s position to
the Jordan River (strong upstream riparian) to that of Egypt to the Nile, and that of Turkey to
the Euphrates and Tigris. Conclusions drawn from this study could thus be useful for saying
something general about the pattern of cooperation between “a strong upstream riparian and
its neighbours” in the region.
The case study as method (compared to quantitatively oriented approaches) has several
affinities that will be advantageous with regards to answering the research question in focus
for my study; especially when it comes to insight into causal mechanisms and the possibility
of generating hypotheses based on findings (Gerring 2007). These advantages will come in
handy when trying to establish the causal relations behind “the processes which lead to the
necessity, negotiation and structure of international water agreements” as well as the causal
relationship between the factors that lead to the implementation or non-implementation of
policy. A large amount of quantitative studies focusing on the relationship between water
scarcity and conflict as well as water scarcity and cooperation have already been executed.
These studies tell us something about the general pattern (although they in many cases draw
conflicting conclusions), but often fail to explain outcomes because regional/national
5
I am aware of the potential ”dangers” of including the Palestinian Territories as part of my case, and I will of
course discuss this problematic thoroughly taking all potential inflicting factors into consideration.
6
Note that the use of ”least likely” and ”most likely” does not imply the use of any specific method of research,
these are mere arguments for the choice of case.
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Master thesis outline – Sofie Hove Stene – Water Scarcity in the Middle East
specificities are not taken into consideration. According to Wolf (2004:10), part of the
problem lies in how the political entities in quantitative studies are treated as “homogeneous
monoliths” - “Canada feels…” or “Jordan wants…”. “Disputes need to be understood as
more than “simply” over a quantity of a resource, but also over conflicting attitudes, meanings
and contexts” (Wolf 2004:10). Within a case study approach it is possible to take all these
factors into consideration.
In order to test H1 I’m planning to look at bilateral/multilateral agreements between the three
countries and to map the occurrence of agreements and cooperation regarding water related
issues. The “International Water Event Database” (which is part of the Transboundary Water
Dispute database) contains information regarding all water related events connected to
specific water basins (including the Jordan River basin). Data covers the time lapse 19482007. I’m currently looking for the same type of information concerning the aquifers in
Israel/Palestine, but I am concerned that it could be difficult getting data on this since this was
probably considered to be internal Israeli affairs until the establishment of the Palestinian
Authority (in 1994).
With the data at hand I’m planning to look at the following issues: Are agreements on water
issues occurring more often now than before? Is water now a more central part of the
agreements? I plan to look at the time lapse 1948-2010. When it comes to measuring “the
importance of water scarcity with regards to international relations”, I’m open to suggestions
on how to do this in practice. Initially I’m planning to go through existing agreements, and to
look into which role water management plays; is water a central part of the agreement or more
peripheral? I’m also considering finding information on “failed agreements” – water
management related issues that have been discussed, but where the parties failed to establish
actual agreements. How to test this hypothesis methodologically is a question I will have to
come back to when I have a better overview of the data.
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Master thesis outline – Sofie Hove Stene – Water Scarcity in the Middle East
The Multilateral Process
The ‘Madrid Process’, launched in 1991, was based in part on United Nations Security Council
Resolution 242 and 1967 and its principle of direct negotiations between the parties concerned. The
Madrid meeting in 1991 was supplemented by a further conference held in Moscow in 1992 to
launch the multilateral process. At that time, the five Multilateral Working Groups were set to
address regional issues or ones where the involvement of the international community was required.
Executive Action Team (EXACT): Multilateral Working Group
The Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources was formed in January 1992, and the group
endorsed the Water Data Banks Project in November 1994. The Water Data Banks Project consists
of a series of specific actions to be taken by the Israelis, Jordanians, and Palestinians that are
designed to foster the adoption of common, standardized data collection and storage techniques
among the Parties, improve the quality of the water resources data collected in the region, and to
improve communication among the scientific community in the region. The project is managed by
an Executive Action Team, EXACT, comprised of water experts from Israeli, Jordanian, and
Palestinian water-management agencies. Technical and financial support to EXACT is contributed
by the European Union, The Netherlands, Norway and the United States. Former donors include
Australia, Canada and France.
Israel and Palestine's hydrological system are all part of the Jordan River watershed. As a result,
there is a common purpose to protect this resource by all nations within this watershed as it is a
tightly connected system. Specific to the water usage issues of this study there have been four
primary actors: Israel, Palestine, Jordan, and the United States.
Israel, Palestine, and Jordan have obvious connections to the limited resources within the Jordan
River watershed. Jordan has been actively involved in talks with Israel over many decades. The
principle role of United States is as mediator and has been involved in many talks and plans over
watershed issues both in the historical and modern context.
Source: http://www.exact-me.org/
In order to test H2 I’m planning to look at one specific case of multilateral cooperation
(supervised by the US) between the three core countries, which is entitled the “Executive
Action Team” (EXACT). I wish to conduct interviews of key informants in order to map the
nature of the project and to get an understanding of why the parties decided to join the project.
What are/have been the main goals of this project? Have the goals been reached? / Will they
be reached? What are the expectations of the member states and the donor states? Has the
project led to actual policy implementation? In addition to the benchmark model mentioned
earlier, that will be established in order to have a basis for evaluation of the policy
implementation, it could also be useful to look at the other four multilateral working groups
(notably on refugees, arms control and regional security, environment and regional economic
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Master thesis outline – Sofie Hove Stene – Water Scarcity in the Middle East
development) as a basis for comparison – is the pattern of policy implementation the same
here as with concerns to the agreements from the Exact project? If no, why is this? Is water a
more difficult/sensitive issue for cooperation?
Discussion/Analysis
The findings from both parts of the study will allow me to say something about how
important the issue of water has become for international relations in the region. If water
shows to be increasingly central to bilateral/multilateral agreements between these three
countries, there is reason to believe that the same trends counts for the region as a whole. The
region is relatively homogenous when it comes to water scarcity issues (Smith 2006: 132).
Findings from part 2 of the study will be especially interesting as they will allow me to say
something about the nature of the agreements. Do they lead to actual policy implementation,
or are they merely rhetorical without actually addressing the problem? If they are merely
rhetorical, why is this? What are the causal relations between cooperative agreements and the
implementation or non-implementation of policies? Agreements failing to lead to policy
implementation would represent an interesting finding because this would somehow represent
a critique of the “water cooperation”-thesis. If water becomes a severely scarcer resource, and
the issue is not addressed by implementing measures but merely by superficial “on paper”
agreements, the possibility of tension increasing between water sharing states is high.
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Master thesis outline – Sofie Hove Stene – Water Scarcity in the Middle East
Literature
Barrett, Scott (2007) Why Cooperate? Oxford: Oxford University Press
Diehl, Paul F. & Nils Petter Gleditsch (2001) Environmental Conflict Boulder: Westview
Press
Elmusa, Sharif S. (1995) “The Jordan-Israel water agreement: A model or an exception?”
Journal of Palestine Studies XXIV, no. 3, 63-73
Gerring, John (2007) Case Study Research: Practices and Principles Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press
Gleditsch, Nils Petter et al. (2006) ”Conflicts over shared rivers: Resource scarcity or fuzzy
boundaries?” Political Geography 25, 361-382
Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. (1999) Environment, Scarcity, and Violence Oxford. Princeton
University Press
Hurrel, Andrew & Ngaire Woods (1999) Inequality, Globalization, and World Politics
Oxford: Oxford University Press
Le Billon, Phillippe (2005) Fuelling war: Natural Resources and armed conflict Adelphi
Paper 373
Lonergan, Stephen C. & Brooks, David B. (1994) Watershed: The role of Freshwater in the
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Ottawa: International Development Research Center
Lowi, Miriam R. & Brian R. Shaw (2000) Environment and Security: Discourses and
Practices Basingstoke: Macmillian Press LTD
Macdonald, Hugh (2002) Geopolitics and Middle East Conflict Forsvarsstudier 6/2002
Morris, Mary E. (1998) “Water Scarcity and Security Concerns in the Middle East” The
Emirates Occasional Papers n. 14
Ravenhill, John (2008) Global Political Economy Oxoford: Oxford University Press
Lipchin et al. (2007) Integrated water resources Management and Security in the Middle East
Springer
Lonergan, Stephen C (1994) Watershed: the role of fresh water in the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict Ottawa: International Development Research Centre
Smith, Dan (2006) The State of the Middle East: An atlas of conflict and resolution London:
Earthscan
Sosland, Jeffrey (2002) ”Understandind Environmental Security: water scarcity, the 1980’s
Palestinian uprising and implications for peace” in Redefining Security in the Middle East
Jacoby, Tami Amanda & Sasley, Brent (eds.) Manchester: Manchester University Press
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Master thesis outline – Sofie Hove Stene – Water Scarcity in the Middle East
The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database
(www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database)
The World Bank (2007) Making the Most of Scarcity: Accountability for Better Water
Management Results in the Middle East and North Africa MENA Development Report.
Washington: The World Bank
Wolf, Aaron T. (2002) Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Water Systems Cornwall: MGP
Books Ltd
Wolf, Aaron T. (2004) Regional Water Cooperation as Confidence Building: Water
Management as a Strategy for Peace Berlin: Octoberdruck
Wolf, Aaron T. & Newton, Joshua T. (not dated) Case Study of Transboundary Dispute
Resolution: The Jordan River
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Master thesis outline – Sofie Hove Stene – Water Scarcity in the Middle East
Attachment 1
A short history of water management in the MENA region
Water management has been a concern throughout history in the countries of the MENA region, and societies have
grown in ways that adapt to water scarcity and variability. For millennia, societies developed elaborate institutions
and conventions governing individual behavior, and developed technologies to manage their water effectively. In
the process, the region spawned some of the world’s oldest and most accomplished civilizations, based on both
farming and trade. These communities reduced the risks of scarcity and irregular rainfall through water diversion,
flood protection, exploitation of aquifers, and elaborate conveyance systems.
Today, most MENA countries have the capacity to store a large share of surface water through major capital
investments in dams and reservoirs. Water supply and sanitation services also expanded considerably in the past
few decades as a result of major public investment, although wastewater collection and treatment has lagged behind
water supply. For water supply and sanitation services, MENA compares fairly well with other parts of the world.
Since the 1960s, decentralized, private actions have also played an important role. Because surface water supplies
are unreliable or insufficient (or both), individual users, helped by low-cost drilling technology, began pumping
water from aquifers on a large scale. MENA uses a far larger share of its renewable water resources than any other
region of the world. However, success in securing supplies and expanding services led to second-generation water
management issues. Widespread water storage provoked competing claims for rights to use the water and
environmental problems relating to reduced in-stream flows. The scale of individual actions to tap into groundwater
often overwhelmed the ability of governments to control them, with the result that aquifers are being used beyond
sustainable levels across the region. Success in delivering water supply services to a wide section of the population
led to issues of water quality associated with the discharge of untreated wastewater. Providing highly subsidized
water supply to urban communities became increasingly burdensome on public budgets because urban populations
have grown and become wealthier, but still do not pay for costs of services (with the exception of a few countries).
The absence of cost recovery led to utilities frequently facing severe cash flow constraints and, as a result, deferring
routine operations and maintenance, thereby accelerating the need for additional finance for rehabilitation. As a
result, the expensive infrastructure is not generating the expected benefits and the new issues are threatening
welfare and livelihoods in many parts of the region A system based on securing supply creates “excess demand,”
which increases costs and leads to social tensions when water is not available. Excess demand results from two
factors. First, widespread construction of irrigation infrastructure locks in a demand for water that cannot always
be met, given the priority demands of the region’s growing urban populations. This leads to economic disruption
for irrigators and reduces the returns on irrigation investments. Second, in the absence of effective regulation, those
with access to groundwater (a “common pool” resource) have an incentive to use as much of it as possible before
the water is exhausted, leading to a “tragedy of the commons.” Disputes and even conflicts over use of surface and
groundwater are already documented throughout the region.
Source: The World Bank (2007) “Making the Most of Scarcity: Accountability for Better Water Management
Results in the Middle East and North Africa”
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Master thesis outline – Sofie Hove Stene – Water Scarcity in the Middle East
Attachment 2
Freshwater resources in Jordan, Israel & Palestine
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Master thesis outline – Sofie Hove Stene – Water Scarcity in the Middle East
Attachment 3: “Timeline – Johnston Negotiations”
• 1948 "TVA on the Jordan, Proposals, for Irrigation and Hydro-electric Development in
Palestine" by James B. Hays; first Israeli plan for developing Jordan water.
• March 1951 First formal plan put forward by Jordan during post- 1948 period, presented by
Sir M. McDonald and Partners.
• 1953 U.S. becomes actively involved in Jordan water management planning. Johnston is
appointed by Eisenhower, and given the rank of ambassador.
• Oct 1955 Johnston presents "The Unified Development of the Water Resources of the
Jordan Valley Region" to Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt- was initially poorly
received. Counterproposals put forward: the Cotton Plan for Israel and the Arab Plan for the
Arab countries.
• 1955 Engineering study conducted by Michael Baker, Jr., Inc. and Harza Engineering
(American firms); concludes that less water is needed by Jordan than is thought; more water is
therefore available for negotiations. An agreement is reached by technical committees.
• 11 October 1955 Unified Plan fail to win approval by Arab League, is sent back until plan
better protected Arab interests.
• 15 October 1954 Letter from Johnston to Assistant Sec. of State Byroade urging that any
financial aid in support of the project be in addition to existing aid.
• January-February 1955 Johnston returns to the Middle East for talks. 2/19/55 (Beirut)
Johnston reaches a "preliminary understanding" concerning major elements of the proposed
plan with Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt. Tentative agreement reached on: 300 MCM dam
on the Yarmuk and diversion of Yarmuk floodwaters to Sea of Galilee for release to Jordan.
Israel would receive approximately 409 MCM/yr.
• 10 March 1955 Discussion w/Israel begins concerning the arrangement; Johnston reassures
Israel about its main concern, the nature of the neutral authority which would be established
to oversee the allocations of Galilee water.
• 14 March 1955 Meeting between Assistant Sec. of State Allen and Ambassador Eban of
Israel: Eban says that Allen threatened to withhold aid from Israel if the Israelis did not come
to terms with Johnston. In a meeting later that same day w/ Sec. of State Dulles, Governor
Stassen, Assistant Sec. Allen, and Arthur Gardiner, Johnston brings the issue up for
discussion. Allen states that he had "advised Mr. Eban that agreement on the Jordan River
problem would furnish a useful basis for aid."
• June 1955 Israel agrees to the basic terms of the plan Johnston had set up with the Arabs in
Beirut.
• 1955-56 Events begin overtaking chances of agreement: Jordanian press reported several
times in May 1955 that the project is intended to resettle Palestinian refugees. Public
opposition springs up in August 1955; the Jordan National Socialist Party puts out a memo
listing several points of opposition.
• 27 July 1955 Lebanon expresses its intent not to allow any water from the Hasbani to be
distributed.
• August 1955 Johnston returns to Middle East for talks with representatives from the Arab
states.
• 30 August 1955 Jordan states that it would accept Jordan Valley proposals on economic
grounds given certain modifications, but that a political decision would have to be decided by
a subcommittee of Arab states.
• September 1955 Meeting with Arab representatives continue, but no decision is reached.
• 1956 Israel indicates it would be willing to wait and see if Arab states would accept the plan
before beginning work on a system to divert water from the upper Jordan.
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Master thesis outline – Sofie Hove Stene – Water Scarcity in the Middle East
• October 1956 War in Sinai Desert effectively ends any explicit chance of agreement.
Implicit agreements managed through ongoing "Picnic Table Talks" between Israel and
Jordan.
Source: Wolf, Aaron T & Joshua T. Newton (not dated) Case study of Transboundary Dispute
Resolution: The Jordan River
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Water Scarcity in the Middle East – Sofie Hove Stene
2. Theory
Rival. –noun: a person or entity that is in a position to dispute another's preeminence or
superiority. Origin: 1570–80; Latin: rīvālis. Originally; one who uses a stream in common
with another, equivalent to rīv ( us ) stream + -ālis (Oxford Dictionnaries)
As the origin of the word “rival” indicates, freshwater has throughout history been the source
of many conflicts. Since the beginning of times, farmers are know to have fought, and even
killed each other over access to water, and fights over water still occur in farming
communities today. Genesis 26:17-18 in the Old Testament tells us something about how
crucial access to freshwater was to farmers 5000 years ago;
The desolate Gerar area was located on the edge of a desert. Water was as precious as gold. A
person who dug a well was staking a claim to the land. Some wells had locks to keep thieves
from stealing the water. To fill in someone’s well with dirt was an act of war; it was one of the
most serious crimes in the land.
Freshwater has always been a life-essential resource to human beings. At earlier times, as a
source of drinking water as well as being necessary for food production. Today water as a
resource in itself, as well as the irrigation and water supply services derived from it, is
important for every country. It is fundamental to human health, wellbeing, productivity, and
livelihoods. It is also essential for the long-term sustainability of ecosystems. Meanwhile,
international law concerning cross-national freshwater resources is poorly developed, viewed
as contradictory, and often unenforceable (Priscoli & Wolf 2009: 11).
Political scientists agree on the necessity of the provision of freshwater for the survival and
well-being of humans, as well as the importance of this resource for states’ economic and
social development. Meanwhile, they tend to disagree on whether, how and why the scarcity
of this resource may cause conflict, and whether there is a potential for establishing
cooperative solutions to the problem of water scarcity.
In the following I will review the three main theoretical approaches that touch upon the
subject of international conflict versus cooperation related to resource scarcity. Both neorealism and the neo-Malthusian approach predict conflict as the ultimate result of shared and
scarce resources, although using different arguments; the neo-realists argue that tension and
conflict is the most likely outcome of states seeking to reduce vulnerability and
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Water Scarcity in the Middle East – Sofie Hove Stene
interdependence resulting from scarce resources. The neo-Malthusians on the other hand refer
to the notion of relative deprivation caused by structural differences, as the key element
provoking revolts or conflict. Conversely, the neo-liberal institutionalists present cooperation
as the most likely result of resource scarcity, arguing that states as rational actors will see the
potential of mutually beneficial advantages in cooperative solutions. The neo-Malthusian and
IPE perspectives have proven to be apt for explaining the consequences of resource scarcity at
the sub-national level. The focus of this thesis on the other hand is on the inter-state level,
which makes it a necessity to include the currently dominating international relations theories
of neo-realism and neoliberal institutionalism when addressing the consequences of water
scarcity.
2.1 Neo-realism
Neo-realists point to the anarchic structure of the international system as the main factor
explaining states’ behaviour on the international arena. All states will strive to maintain their
position in the system, and any differences in policy can be explained by differences in power
or capabilities (Grieco 1995: 151, Lamy 2005:209, Waltz 1995:74).
The neo-realists would describe the situation of shared and scarce freshwater resources as a
situation of interdependence. In an attempt to reduce their vulnerability, states will take
measures to diminish dependence on other states. If one or both states attempt to secure
access to a scarce resource, tension between these states is a likely outcome, because “driven
by an interest in survival, states are acutely sensitive to any erosion of their relative
capabilities, which are the ultimate basis for their security and independence” (Grieco 1995:
161).
Even though cooperation would be the ultimate solution for all parties, neo-realists argue that
there are two barriers reducing the probability of such cooperation taking place; cheating and
the relative gains of other actors. Cooperation may produce a situation where one country
attains more than another, allowing to use these gains to inflict harm on the other state.
Because of this concern with relative gains, states may decline to cooperate even when they
are confident their partners will honour their commitments to cooperate (Lamy 2005:210).
This is because “(…) states worry that today’s friend may be tomorrow’s enemy in war (…),
achievements of joint gains that advantage a friend in the present might produce a more
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Water Scarcity in the Middle East – Sofie Hove Stene
potential foe in the future” (Grieco 1995: 153). Consequently, states must pay serious
attention to the gains of partners. The possibility of tension or conflict as a result of water
scarcity is especially relevant when the battle over the resources is perceived as a “zero-sum
game, in which one party’s gain is another’s loss” (Postel 2000: 944).
Lowi (1993) and LeMarquand (1977) refer to the hegemonic stability theory, when they state
that the only way for cooperation to take place between to riparians with a “through-border”configuration river, is if the downstream riparian is the richer and more powerful hegemon. In
this case the hegemon could be willing to pay the cost of improving water supply, because it
will be its only option to secure access to the resource. “Cooperation finds no incentive when
the upstream country uses the river’s water to the detriment of the downstream country, and
that country has no reciprocal power over the upstream country” (LeMarquand 1977: 10).
But in general, neo-realists claim, neighbours do not cooperate - they fight (Senese 1999: 147,
Hensel 1999: 138). Contiguity appears to provide a heightened opportunity for conflict, and
the actual motivation for engagement often proves to be territorial disagreements. Territorial
issues appear to increase leaders’ willingness to press their claims to the point of military
confrontation and beyond (Senese 1999: 147). Vasquez (1995: 192) states that “the reasons
for this is not entirely known (…) but this is probably related to the fact that territory provides
space, food and resources for living”.
Within the neo-realist perspective, we find the water-wars thesis, which links scarcity of
shared freshwater resources to the outbreak of war between states.
2.1.1 The water wars-thesis
In 1984 John Cooley argued that the struggle over freshwater resources of the Jordan, Litani,
Orontes and the Yarmuk had been one of the principle causes of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.
According to Cooley, the Arabs had unsuccessfully tried to divert the Jordan River
headwaters feeding into Israel. Cooley also predicted that at the time of writing, the primary
threat of war stemmed from Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon, which gave Israel
control over the lower reaches of the Litani.
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Water Scarcity in the Middle East – Sofie Hove Stene
According to Cooley, many of the problems and the tensions between countries in the Middle
East stem from their shared freshwater resources, and the fact that “all of the water
development plans of the region’s countries depend on tapping the region’s rivers” (1984:
10). This corresponds with the neo-realist view that states will seek to maximize their relative
gains, and reduce dependence on others. Accordingly, Cooley states that
(…) to the Arabs in the 1950s, the National Water Carrier became a symbol of Israel’s
aggressive expansionism. As early as 1953, Syrian artillery units opened fire on the
construction and engineering sites behind the town and lake of Tiberias, forcing the Israelis to
move the main pumping station (1984: 10).
He also predicted that “Long after oil runs out, water is likely to cause wars, cement peace,
and make and break empires and alliances in the region” (1984: 10).
In 1991 Joyce R. Starr followed in Cooley’s tracks, with the publication of an article entitled
“Water Wars”. Starr equally claimed that there is a pertinent risk of war over water in the
world, as the problem of water scarcity is aggravating. According to Starr, the Middle Eastern
region is especially exposed to an eruption of war because of its characteristics as a region
already prone to conflict, suffering largely from the lack of access to clean water. She points
to the end of the Gulf war as a potential time for the outbreak of war over water (1991:19).
According to Starr, the past record of disputes over water in the region is evident, and she
especially mentions a situation in 1975 where “Iraq and Syria came to the brink of war over
Syria’s reduction of the flow of the Euphrates to fill the Ath-Thawrah Dam” (1991: 31).
In the same line as Cooley and Starr, Elhance summarizes why, in a neo-realistic perspective,
scarcity of natural resources may lead to interstate conflict;
By itself scarcity of natural resources does not necessarily lead to interstate conflict
(…). It is when such a resource is rightly or wrongly perceived as being overexploited
or degraded by others at a cost to oneself, that states may become prone to conflict
(1999: 4).
2.2 IPE and neo-Malthusian theories
Many resource scarcity-related theories derive from the works of 19th century economist
Thomas R. Malthus, and can be placed within the IPE-branch of theories of International
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Relations. Malthus predicted that population growth would exceed food production rates and
lead to food shortages; this would eventually induce famine and conflict, and even war. The
Marxists continued in a neo-Malthusian path, by arguing that existing resources only will be
sufficient if they are distributed equally among the population. This would require a
transformation from capitalism to socialism. In this same path, political ecologists argue that
resource related conflicts are primarily motivated by structural inequalities caused by
industrialisation. These theories all rely on the assumptions of relative deprivation theory1;
renewable resource scarcity will encourage socio-economic grievances that eventually result
in conflict. Riot, rebellion or even revolution will occur as an outcome of a deep imbalance
between the people’s achievements and aspirations. Aspiration outruns achievement so far
that many people, even if they are making some progress toward their goal, are dissatisfied
because they get much less than they want (Gurr 1970: 39).
If a nation’s environmental foundations are depleted, its economy will steadily decline, its
social fabric deteriorate, and its political structure become destabilized. The outcome is all too
likely to be conflict, whether conflict in the form of disorder and insurrection within the
nation, or tensions and hostilities with other nations (Myers 1986: 251).
The neo-Malthusian theories predict conflict as the ultimate result of resource scarcity, but in
general they tend to either not specify at which level conflict will take place, or as Thomas
Homer-Dixon who can be placed within this branch of theory, focus on conflict at the subnational level resulting from structural inequalities.
2.2.1 Water scarcity and intra-state conflict
Homer-Dixon presents a model explaining how environmental scarcity and its social effects
can cause both rural and urban violence. He argues that the genesis of scarcity and scarcity’s
main negative social effects contribute to violent conflict, and explains this by referring to
group-identity theories and structural theories. He identifies three main kinds of conflict that
might arise from environmental scarcity: simple-scarcity conflicts, group identity conflicts,
and insurgencies (1999: 137).
1
Relative Deprivation is defined by Gurr (1970: 24) as ”actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value
expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people
believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of
getting and keeping.
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Water Scarcity in the Middle East – Sofie Hove Stene
Wars over river water between upstream and downstream neighbours are likely only on a
narrow set of circumstances: the downstream country must be highly dependent on the water
for its national well-being; the upstream country must be threatening to restrict substantially
the river’s flow; there must be a history of antagonism between the two countries; and, most
importantly, the downstream country must believe it is military stronger than the upstream
country. Downstream countries often fear that their upstream neighbours will use water as a
means of leverage. This situation is particularly dangerous if the downstream country also
believes it has the military power to rectify the situation (Homer-Dixon 1999: 138).
The neo-Malthusians argue that a potential for conflict is created by the necessity of access to
certain natural resources such as water. It is true that conflict between different sub-national
groups over scarce resources such as freshwater has been well documented through
aggregated data. On the inter-state level on the other hand, ne neoliberal institutionalists argue
that in the problem of water scarcity lies a potential for cooperation.
2.3 Neoliberal institutionalism
The neoliberals argue that the anarchic characteristic of the international society does not
necessarily imply conflict between states. According to the neoliberals, states actually prefer
cooperation to conflict. The main reason why states are compelled to cooperate and not
engage in conflict is that globalization has made “economic interdependence2” an intrinsic
feature of international relations. The intertwined global economic system gives each party a
stake in the economic well-being of the other. The cost of war thus makes it anachronistic
(Russett & Oneal 2001: 129).
Countries that are interdependent bilaterally or economically open to the global economy,
whether democratic or not, have an important basis for pacific relations and conflict resolution
(Russett & Oneal 2001: 155).
When states fail to cooperate, this is often due to misunderstandings and misperceptions.
States are “rational egoists” and will cooperate if they have a mutual interest in doing so.
Through cooperation, states will seek to maximize absolute gains. States are less concerned
with gains or advantages achieved by other states in cooperative agreements. Most
importantly for the discussion on cooperation and negotiation related to transboundary water
agreements, neoliberal institutionalists contend that it is the prospect of cheating, which
provokes curtailment of cooperation. However, cheating may be mitigated and cooperation
2
According to Keohane & Nye (1973: 160) interdependence can be defined on the process level as ”mutal
sensitivity: i.e. the extent to which change in one state affects change in others”.
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Water Scarcity in the Middle East – Sofie Hove Stene
facilitated, depending on the institutional arrangements among the states (Axelrod & Keohane
1985: 250, Lamy 2005: 213, Zacher & Matthew 1995: 118).
Institutions are seen as persistent and connected sets of rules and practices that prescribe roles,
constrain activity and shape the expectations of actors. International regimes and institutions
do not enforce the rules in a hierarchical manner, but they do change patterns of transaction
costs and provide information to participants, so that uncertainty is reduced. Institutions may
include organizations, bureaucratic agencies, treaties and agreements, and informal practices
that states accept as binding (Axelrod & Keohane 1985: 250, Lamy 2005: 214). In an article
reviewing the international conflict level from 1948-2006, Gleditsch (2008) shows that there
was a peak of armed violence in the middle of the 20th century, but that war and armed
conflict are a phenomena that since has been on the decline. Since the 1990s the international
conflict level has stabilized on an all-time low level. Gleditsch explains this by the change in
international institutions and norms in recent history.
We have lived through a particularly lethal combination of the old perception of war as a
useful instrument of policy with the modern technological capacity to wage war effectively.
Our technological skills have continued to improve, so we could kill each other many times
over if we applied the full range of human ingenuity to that task. A single direct nuclear
exchange between the two superpowers would have changed the picture dramatically and
created a more recent and higher peak of severity. If we do not kill each other at such a rate, it
is because our institutions and attitudes have changed (Gleditsch 2008: 698).
Within the neoliberal camp, arguing that cooperation is the norm and conflict is the anomaly
we find the theories of Aaron T. Wolf and Shlomi Dinar.
2.3.1 The water non-conflict thesis
Aaron T. Wolf is one of the most prominent theorists of the “water non-conflict”-thesis. He
argues that the historic reality has been quite different from what the “water wars”-literature
would have one believe. According to Priscoli and Wolf (2009: 11), a close examination of
the case studies cited as historic interstate water conflict shows that for one there is a problem
with “looseness of classification” and secondly there is a problem with “paucity of evidence”.
In modern history, only seven minor skirmishes have been waged over international waters.
Conversely, over 3600 treaties have been signed over different aspects of international waters,
“many showing tremendous elegance and creativity for dealing with this critical resource”
(Wolf & Hammer 2000: 123).
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Water Scarcity in the Middle East – Sofie Hove Stene
Accordingly, war over water is neither strategically rational, hydrographically effective, nor
economically viable. Shared interests along a water-way seem to overwhelm waters’ conflictinducing characteristics, and once water management institutions are in place they tend to be
very resilient. “International water is a resource whose characteristics tend to induce
cooperation, and incite violence only in the exception” (Wolf & Hammer 2000).
Priscoli and Wolf (2009: 14) also point to the fact that “The historical evidence record shows
that international water disputes do get resolved, even among bitter enemies, and even as
conflicts erupt over other issues. Some of the most vociferous enemies around the world have
negotiated water agreements or are in the process of doing so”.
Another “water non-conflict theorist”, Shlomi Dinar, argues that water scarcity leads to
cooperation more often than to conflict (1999: 11). “It becomes important, therefore, to
emphasize that just as scarcity may lead to conflict among states, it is often due to scarcity
that states tend to cooperate. States will cooperate when electing the unilateral alternative
provides few or no benefits” (2008: 18).
Dinar (2008) has focused most of his work on international river treaties, and claims that the
neo-realists are wrong to apply the hegemonic stability theory to hydro-politics over shared
river basins. Dinar argues that the geography of the river as well as the relative power of the
neighbouring states provide the background for understanding the prerequisites for
cooperation, but that a number of other factors also influence on the potential of cooperation.
Most importantly he argues that cooperation does not depend on hegemony, but on voluntary
contracting among states (2008: 16).
The geography and power-related considerations need to be linked to reciprocity, issuelinkage and side-payments. Dinar calls this “the building blocs of strategic interaction” (2008:
16). Side-payments repaying for the benefits that the upstream state creates in favour of the
downstream state can provide an important incentive to cooperation, as it contributes to
balancing the geographically asymmetric relationship between an upstream and a downstream
state (2008: 26).
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Water Scarcity in the Middle East – Sofie Hove Stene
Strategic interaction includes elements of reciprocity and issue-linkage. Countries that share
more than one river may be upstream on some rivers yet downstream on others. In this case,
countries may not wish to exploit their strategic location on the first river to the detriment of
the other state, setting precedent for the other state to act in the same manner on the second
river where it is more strategically located (Dinar 2008: 22).
Dinar also lists a number of other factors that have a facilitating effect on cooperation over
water scarcity issues. Transnational organizations and nongovernmental organizations
play an instrumental role in facilitating cooperation and international agreements because they
help persuade the parties that cooperation is a win-win situation. They build consensus, define
the negotiating agenda, and create a problem-solving atmosphere. And they may provide
financial assistance that might make an agreement more attractive to by changing the payoffs
for cooperation. “Epistemic communities” are knowledge based networks that are often
consulted on technical issues that require expertise rather than regular politicians and
diplomats do not have, are able to affect policy with their authority. These are able to exert
influence on policy innovation, policy diffusion, policy selection, and policy persistence. By
doing so, they play a role in creating norms, social realities, and perceptions among the policy
makers. In turn nation states will exert power on behalf of the values and practices promoted
by the epistemic community and will thus help in their international institutionalization (Dinar
2008: 29). Epistemic communities however, often depend on many exogenous variables,
which challenge their roles in negotiations and constructing knowledge. For example, the role
of ideas often becomes more salient and powerful at times of crisis. Epistemic communities
become more relevant when policy makers seek advice from expert communities. Then a
crisis situation may be driving the cooperative outcome or negotiations, and not the epistemic
communities (Dinar 2008: 29).
The influence of epistemic communities in fostering cooperation, or swaying governments, is
often subject to the political will and interest of those governments and the domestic support
they are able to muster for their ideas. In fact, the political will of governments to cooperate,
and the gains they anticipate from cooperation, is an essential component of agreements, often
overshadowing the role of expert groups or transnational organizations. Even when epistemic
communities, or third-party organizations, take an active role in negotiations; it is their ability
to provide side-payments or other incentives that makes otherwise recalcitrant parties want to
cooperate (Dinar 2008: 30).
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Water Scarcity in the Middle East – Sofie Hove Stene
Priscoli and Wolf (2009: 43) have developed a model explaining the different types of
cooperative solutions to water scarcity issues. They claim that procedures for collaboration
and dispute management can be placed on a continuum from more directed initiatives by the
parties towards increased involvement and to interventions by third parties that provide
various types of resolution assistance. In their figure (Figure 1), point A represents the “hot
tub” approach – all parties jump into the hot tub and somehow agree. Point B represents the
opposite extreme – parties go to war or use a highly adversarial approach. The left of the
continuum covers unassisted procedures, the middle covers assisted procedures, and the right
covers third-party decision-making procedures (Priscoli & Wolf 2009: 43).
Figure 1 (Priscoli & Wolf 2009: 43)
According to Priscoli and Wolf (2009), the search for cooperation over water in the Middle
East has included approaches across the continuum. The on-again/off-again peace process
includes traditional bilateral negotiations ant multilateral negotiations on technical areas, of
which water is one. The purpose of the multilaterals is to help professionals explore ideas and
to support the bilaterals. The early Johnston negotiations along the Jordan basin in the early
1950s can be seen as a mediation effort by a third party with technical competence and
resources. The current multilaterals have used a variety of relationship building and
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Water Scarcity in the Middle East – Sofie Hove Stene
procedural assistance measures. Study tours, joint information seminars, and other research by
a variety of donors and lenders have been surrounded by numerous other second track
dialogues and academic-related fora. All of these are activities that fall left of point C on the
continuum. They are providing an arena for expanded negotiation and even an outlet to
keep the peace process moving (Priscoli & Wolf 2009: 45).
(Critique: As Przeworski and Teune state: “The main role of a theory is to provide
explanations of specific events. These explanations consist of inferring, with a high degree of
probability, statements about particular events from general statements concerning classes of
events (Przeworski and Teune 1961: 86).)
2.4 Implications of theory and working hypotheses
The theories that argue that water scarcity does not lead to inter-state conflict, and that water
scarcity can actually induce cooperation among states have gained support as researchers have
gotten a better overview of the empirical data concerning water related incidents. Today, the
dominant perception is not the 1980s and 1990s neo-realist predictions that water scarcity
leads to war between states, but that conflict between sub-national groups is a more likely
result. When it comes to the interstate level, the chance of cooperative solutions finding their
way is seen as more prominent than the probability of conflict and war.
In focus for this thesis is the nature of inter-state relations when it comes to the handling of
water scarcity in the Middle Easter region. By using the neo-liberal theories of cooperation
between states as the most likely result of water scarcity as a starting point, it is possible to
deduce some working hypotheses. We know that the situation of water scarcity in the Middle
East has been aggravating since the 1950s. If it is true that water scarcity in general leads to
cooperation more often than conflict, we should see a pattern of increased cooperation with
regards to water related issues as the issue has become more and more pressing for the states
in the Middle East.
H1: The number of water related agreements between Middle Eastern countries is increasing
as the situation of water scarcity is aggravating.
In order for these cooperative agreements to implicate an actual solution to the problem of
water scarcity, states need to implement the measures that they agree on taking to reduce the
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Water Scarcity in the Middle East – Sofie Hove Stene
problem. If policy implementation does not occur as a result of the agreements, then the
cooperation only represents a “fictive” or temporary solution to the states’ common problem.
H2: If water scarcity leads to cooperation between states with regards to water management,
we should see policy implementations that directly reflect the agreements.
The international and transborder characteristics of shared water bodies make them a
compelling test case for the analysis of conflict and cooperation. River riparians and aquifer
sharing countries are physically interdependent because water bodies respect no political
borders. The hydrology of an international river basin or water aquifer links states together,
requiring them to share a complex network of environmental, economic, political and security
interdependencies (Dinar 2008: 9).
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