INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
E
IMO
COUNCIL
93rd session
Agenda item 15
C 93/15
7 October 2004
Original: ENGLISH
PROTECTION OF VITAL SHIPPING LANES
Note by the Secretary-General
SUMMARY
Executive summary:
This document provides an initial analysis of the key issues involved
in protecting vital shipping lanes against terrorist attacks; and
information on the profile of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. It
also reports on relevant activities recently undertaken by the
Secretariat
Action to be taken:
Paragraph 18
Related document:
C 92/D (Paragraph 5.3)
Introduction
1
The Council, at its ninety-second session, in considering the report of the seventy-eighth
session of the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC 78) addressing maritime security issues, shared
the concerns expressed by the Secretary-General for the need to keep shipping lanes of strategic
significance and importance safe and open to international maritime traffic, thereby ensuring the
uninterrupted flow of traffic therethrough; and requested him to continue his work on the issue
in collaboration with parties concerned and to report developments to the next session of the
Council (paragraph 5.3 of document C 92/D).
Key issues
2
The Secretary-General, in his opening remarks at MSC 78 in relation to the work
undertaken by the Organization towards the enhancement of maritime security, stressed the need
to add the Organization’s contribution to the worldwide efforts to enhance security in order to
prevent heavy loss of life and catastrophic pollution of the marine environment while keeping
open shipping lanes, particularly those of strategic significance and importance. The
Secretary-General further advised MSC 78 that the Secretariat had identified a number of
shipping lanes of paramount importance to world trade.
3
Pursuant to the afore-mentioned decision of C 92, the Secretariat had carried out a
desk-top study of a number of security-related issues over various shipping lanes around the
world, the conclusion of which was that there was no single set of criteria which could be
collectively employed to identify the particular importance of any specific shipping lane. The
degree of the importance of each shipping lane and its vulnerability to terrorist attacks ought,
For reasons of economy, this document is printed in a limited number. Delegates are
kindly asked to bring their copies to meetings and not to request additional copies.
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therefore, to be considered and assessed individually, bearing in mind the need to ensure that
shipping lanes forming part of world trade arteries remain, at all times, open to navigation.
4
For the establishment of the strategic importance and vulnerability to a terrorist attack of
a particular shipping lane, extensive consideration of a wide range of information would be
required. Such information would, inter alia, include geographical and hydrographical data;
meteorological information; through- and cross-traffic information; information relating to the
cargoes carried through or across the shipping lane under review; and information relating to the
security measures established by the littoral States, the prevailing political and economic
situation of which should also be taken into account.
5
The collection of physical and factual data may be readily obtained from various sources
available, even in the public domain. However, reliable information relating to potential security
threats and the assessment of the capability of likely perpetrators to mount attacks against ships
and shipping lanes in a particular part of the world is more difficult to find. The evaluation of
risks to shipping activities and the meaningful and reliable estimation of the possibility of
occurrence of an incident are fraught with difficulty. In addition, the potential consequences of an
attack should be evaluated as well as the ability of local authorities to establish and maintain
emergency response procedures and mitigation measures. In conducting such an exercise,
historical facts, prevailing circumstances (e.g. political and economic) and whatever can
reasonably be foreseen for the short- and medium-term future are among factors which would
influence the eventual conclusions on the level of threat to a particular shipping lane.
6
As noted above, whilst it is possible to collect and analyse, from sources in the public
domain, a large amount of information required in order to establish the importance of a
particular shipping lane, it must be recognized that reliable information relating to potential
security threats and likely perpetrators is not publicly available. The availability of information
relating to the arrangements put in place by littoral States in order to protect a specific shipping
lane (taking into account the nature of the jurisdiction the State concerned may exercise over the
area in question), is rather limited and, in any case, it falls within the domain of the national
security of the State concerned. Thus, the ability to draw authoritative conclusions with respect to
the vulnerabilities of a specific shipping lane is rather limited and may require the disclosure of
classified information.
7
Although the Secretariat has, as mentioned before, carried out a desk-top study on a
number of shipping lanes in order to prepare this document, any discussion on the importance
and vulnerability of specific shipping lanes carried out at this stage should, within the efforts of
the Organization to enhance maritime security on a worldwide basis, take into account the
constraints and limitations inherent in any such attempt.
8
In its analysis of the situation, the Secretariat has identified two broad sets of shipping
lanes vulnerable to terrorist attacks:
-
lanes which, because of their configuration and location and prevailing political
situation, make ships passing through vulnerable to attacks; and
-
lanes whose vulnerability lies in their being cut off as a result of a terrorist attack.
Straits of Malacca and Singapore
9
Of all the shipping lanes studied by the Secretariat, particular attention has been paid to
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, which have been identified as an indicative example
highlighting various issues relevant to the discussion on the security of shipping lanes in general;
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and which, unlike other lanes, straits and canals of strategic importance and significance which
lay entirely within the territory of a single State, are bordered by four countries.
10
As a result of the re-emergence of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the South
China Sea and in the region of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (the Straits) with a
disconcerting escalation in the degree of violence exerted in certain reported cases, and in view
of the efforts of the Organization, specifically during the last decade, to enhance the safety of
navigation in the Straits, the Secretariat has prepared a profile of the Straits (attached at annex)
with a view to demonstrating the vital role and importance of the Straits to world trade and the
economy of countries lying east and west thereof. The profile may also be used, as an example,
to highlight some of the issues which are relevant to the assessment of the importance and of
possible vulnerabilities of a specific shipping lane.
11
The last few months have seen considerable media and press coverage on a range of
issues involving the Straits. Although it is acknowledged that, as for all other shipping lanes, the
uninterrupted flow of traffic through the Straits constitutes an element of significant importance
to the economies of the countries which are served thereby and which would, if disrupted, have
an equally significant impact on international trade and the economy as a whole, the attached
profile of the Straits has been compiled using publicly available information and is only intended
for the information of the Council.
12
Encouraged by the Council’s support for his initiative towards protection of vital shipping
lanes and, in pursuance of its mandate to continue his work on the issue, the Secretary-General
initiated, post C 92, a round of consultations with representatives of the three littoral States and
other States using the Straits offering his offices in the pursuit of any collaborative scheme that
would aim at ensuring safety, security and environmental protection through the Straits. At the
same time, he kept industry organizations informed of his and the Secretariat’s activities.
13
From the outset of those activities, the Secretary-General made it clear that any action to
take the issue forward by means of an international approach would, as a sine qua non condition,
be based on the consent, support and co-operation of the littoral States concerned (which would
be invited to play a prinicipal role in all developments); would take due account of any relevant
principles and conditions concerning sovereignty and territorial integrity; would observe and
comply with existing national laws and regulations; and would be consistent with international
law, including the relevant provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea.
14
The Secretary-General appreciated the understanding shown by the parties he consulted
and felt encouraged by their positive attitude towards achieving the set objective.
15
Among proposals he made to progress the issue, he offered the convening, in early 2005,
of an IMO-sponsored meeting to consider ways and means to enhance safety, security and
environmental protection in the Strait of Malacca by means, e.g., of:
-
awareness increasing;
information sharing;
personnel training;
capacity building and technical co-operation, etc.
16
It was against the background of these activities and initiatives taken by the littoral and
Straits user States that he welcomed:
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-
the invitation for IMO to participate at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Workshop
on Maritime Security (Kuala Lumpur, 22 to 24 September 2004);
-
reports on patrols in the Strait undertaken by the Navies of the three littoral States;
and the Five Power Defence Arrangement maritime security exercise, which was
conducted in the region in September 2004;
-
an invitation to address the ARF Confidence-Building Measure Conference on
Regional Cooperation in Maritime Security scheduled to be held in Singapore from 2
to 4 March 2005.
Further reports on the issue
17
The Secretary-General intends to continue working on the issue and reporting to the
Council on the efforts he has undertaken towards adding the Organization’s contribution to keep
shipping lanes of strategic significance and importance open to international navigation.
Action requested of the Council
18
The Council is invited to note the information contained in this document and the annex
hereto and take action as it deems appropriate.
***
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ANNEX
PROFILE OF THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND SINGAPORE
Geographic location and characteristics
At approximately 520 nautical miles (miles) long, the Strait of Malacca is the longest strait in the
world used for international navigation. Together with the Singapore Strait, it forms the main
seaway connecting the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea and provides the shortest route for
tankers trading between the Middle East and Far East Asian countries.
The greater part of the waterway runs through the territorial waters of Indonesia, Malaysia and
Thailand with the much shorter, narrower and navigationally complex Singapore Strait joining it
at the southern end.
The Strait of Malacca varies in width from 200 miles in the North to 11 miles in the South.
Depths within the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (the Straits) are irregular with many areas of
sandwaves on the seabed. In the main shipping channel the depths vary from over 73 metres to
less than 10 metres. A through route of 23 metres depth has been identified.
The draughts of many large ships using the Straits closely approach the controlling depths and
tidal heights are critical.
In addition, there are numerous wrecks and shoal patches reported, some being in close proximity
to the fairways.
The tidal range varies with the locality in the Straits from 3.7 metres in the vicinity of One
Fathom Bank in the Strait of Malacca to 1.6 metres in the area of Horsburgh Light at the Eastern
end of the Singapore Strait. The tidal flow is influenced by the North-Westerly current and can
vary considerably, ranging from about 1.5 knots in the North to some 3 knots in the more
restricted channels. In the vicinity of Singapore the tidal streams can attain rates of some 6 knots
with associated eddies and overfalls.
These strong tidal streams cause large uniform sandwaves on the seabed, forming at right angles
to the water flow and which can vary in height from 4 to 7 metres. Large long sand ridges also
form, running parallel with the tidal streams.
The climate of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is typical equatorial with uniform high
temperature, high humidity and copious rainfall. There are no distinct wet or dry months as rain
falls during every month of the year.
Two main seasons can be distinguished, namely the Northeast Monsoon, generally from late
November to March and the Southwest Monsoon, from May to September, with two shorter
inter-monsoon periods. Prevailing winds are generally North West to North East during the
Northeast Monsoon and South East to South West during the Southwest Monsoon. Wind speeds
on average are below 10 knots throughout the year although occasional strong gusts are likely
when showers or thunderstorms are in the vicinity.
The most significant weather phenomenon during the Southwest Monsoon is the occasional
occurrence of late night and early morning thunderstorm squalls known as "Sumatras". These
storms usually give rise to South West and North West winds gusting to 30 knots and heavy rain.
A strong Sumatra may produce winds of up to 50 knots or higher. However, although the onset
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of these storms is sudden, adverse weather conditions associated with them seldom persist more
than one or two hours although moderate to light rain may continue to fall for several hours.
The sea is almost invariably smooth or slight within the Straits. Visibility in general used to be
good over the whole area except in heavy rain showers, although haze has become a regular
occurrence, occasionally becoming very thick.
Traffic
Being the main seaway connecting the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea and the shortest
route for tankers trading between the Middle East and Far East Asian countries, transiting traffic
through the region is considerably heavy, reported to be approximately 60,000 vessels a year. In
addition, there are a considerable number of local vessels engaged in trade across the Straits and
numerous fishing vessels which can be encountered in most areas.
As a result of these factors, the risk of collision in the area is appreciable and, in addition, some
navigational aids, in the area not covered by the traffic separation schemes established by the
Organization, can be unreliable. Consequently, navigation through the Straits is difficult,
particularly for deep-draught ships, and long periods of considerable vigilance are necessary in
order to maintain safe standards of navigation.
Ship reporting system
Among various other measures to enhance navigational safety through the Straits, the
Organization has adopted a mandatory Ship Reporting System known as "STRAITREP"
(SN/Circ.201). STRAITREP came into force on 0000 hours UTC on 1 December 1998 and
masters of ships to which STRAITREP applies are requested to comply with its requirements in
accordance with regulation V/11.7 of the 1974 SOLAS Convention.
The following categories of ships are required to participate in the STRAITREP:
-
vessels of 300 gross tonnage and above;
vessels of 50 metres or more in length;
vessels engaged in towing or pushing with a combined gross tonnage of 300 and
above, or with a combined length of 50 metres or more;
vessels of any tonnage carrying hazardous cargo, as defined in paragraph 1.4 of
resolution MSC.43(64);
all passenger vessels that are fitted with VHF, regardless of length or gross
tonnage; and
any category of vessels less than 50 metres in length or less than 300 GT which
are fitted with VHF and, in an emergency, use the appropriate traffic lane or
separation zone in order to avoid immediate danger.
Shipping and trade
More than half of the world's annual merchant fleet tonnage passes through the Straits of
Malacca, Sunda and Lombok, with the majority continuing on into the South China Sea. Oil
flows through the Strait leading into the South China Sea are three times greater than those
through the Suez Canal/Sumed Pipeline, and fifteen times greater than oil flows through the
Panama Canal. Virtually all shipping that passes through the Malacca and Sunda Straits must
pass near the Spratly Islands. The other major shipping lane in the region is a route through the
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Lombok and Makassar Straits, and continues into the Philippine Sea. Except for north-south
traffic from Australia, it is not used as extensively as the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and
the South China Sea, since, for most voyages, it represents a longer voyage by several hundred
miles.
Cargo shipped (by tonnage) in the South China Sea is dominated by raw materials en route to
East Asian countries. Tonnage via Malacca and the Spratly Islands is dominated by liquid bulk
such as crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG), with dry bulk (mostly coal and iron ore) in
second place. Nearly two-thirds of the tonnage passing through the Straits, and half of the
volume passing the Spratly Islands, consists of crude oil from the Persian Gulf. Oil flows through
the Strait were 10.3 million barrels per day in 2002, and rising demand for oil in Asia could
almost double these flows over the next two decades.
South-east Asian nations are heavily dependent upon energy shipments through the South China
Sea. More than 85% of the crude oil supplies for Japan and the Republic of Korea flow through
the area from the Middle East, Africa and South China Sea nations such as Indonesia and
Malaysia. LNG and coal from Indonesia, South Africa and Vietnam are also shipped via this
route. As a result, about two-thirds of the Republic of Korea’s and almost 60% of Japan’s energy
supplies flow through this sea area.
Significance/importance of the Straits and consequences in case of closure
Because of its strategic significance and high volume of traffic, the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore remain one of the most important shipping lanes in the world, and that importance is
expected to increase - especially in terms of oil transport. About 11 million barrels per day (b/d)
currently passes through the Straits, but that is set to climb as oil consumption in developing
Asian nations rises by an estimated average of 3% per annum between now and 2025. In
accordance with some forecasts, China alone will account for one-third of that increase, which
will see demand growth doubling to nearly 30 million b/d in 2025 from 14.5 million b/d in 2000.
Much of the additional supply will be imported from the Middle East and Africa and most of this
volume would need to pass through the Straits.
Noting that the narrowest point of this shipping lane is 1.2 miles wide near Batu Berhanti, in the
Singapore Strait, this creates a natural bottleneck, with the potential for collisions and/or
groundings which may result in pollution of the marine environment. If for some reason the
Straits were closed, nearly half of the world's fleet would be required to sail some 560 miles
further resulting in the prolongation of voyage times and generating a substantial increase in the
requirement for vessel capacity. In fact, some sources have claimed that all excess capacity might
be absorbed, with the effects being strongest for crude oil shipments and dry bulk cargoes such as
coal. Closure of the Straits could be expected to immediately raise freight rates worldwide.
Piracy and armed robbery against ships
The large volume of shipping in the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
has created opportunities for attacks on merchant shipping. Oil product tankers have been among
the ships attacked, with 1999 targets including the Thailand flag tanker Tenyu, off the coast of
Malaysia; the Singapore-owned tanker Petro Ranger, sailing from Singapore to Ho Chi Minh
City; the Indonesian flag tanker Atlanta, in the Riau Straits off Sumatra; and the Honduran
tanker MT 1, off the eastern coast of Malaysia. To stem such attacks, the Straits’ littoral States
implemented co-ordinated patrols and other counter-measures in the region in 1992.
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Out of the 452 reported incidents worldwide during 2003, the South China Sea accounted for 153
and the Straits 38, i.e. a total of 190 or nearly 42 % of the total. For the year 2002, the share for
the South China Sea and the Straits was nearly 46%. Although there has since been a marginal
decrease of 4%, piracy and armed robbery attacks including attempted attacks occur regularly.
According to recent reports, a number of violent attacks on shipping have taken place in the
Straits since mid-May 2004. Persons armed with automatic weapons and grenades attacked a tug,
a barge, an offshore support vessel, and two cargo ships - all in daylight. In four cases, crew
members were kidnapped for ransom. More attacks are believed to have taken place but have
gone unreported.
Other security threats
Given the nature and volume of trade passing through the Straits, the Straits are considered by
many to be a prime target for terrorists intending to disrupt international commerce and a
strategically important shipping lane; and there have been indications that that will be the case.
The recent increase in violent and well co-ordinated pirate attacks in the Straits has been seen by
some officials as a dry run for a terror attack on shipping. Conversely, however, some terrorism
experts have expressed the view that there is no linkage between piracy and terrorism and that
there is no evidence that pirates and terrorists are linking up in the Straits to launch a terror attack
against shipping.
Regional efforts1
During recent years, various efforts have been undertaken by several countries in the region to
combat piracy and armed robbery against ships in the South East Asia region and specifically the
Straits.
Since 2002, the creation of a framework of regional co-operation in combating piracy and armed
robbery against ships in Asia has been actively pursued.
Efforts to enhance the safety of navigation in the Straits
The safety of navigation and the provision and maintenance of adequate aids to navigation in the
Straits have been the topics discussed at a number of international and regional conferences and
events including:
1
-
the IPS-IMO Conference on Navigational Safety and Control of Pollution in the
Straits: Modalities of International Co-operation (Singapore, 2 to 3 September,
1996);
-
the IMO Seminar and Workshop on Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships
(Singapore, 3 to 5 February, 1999);
-
the IPS-IMO International Conference on the Malacca and Singapore Straits
(Singapore, 14 to 15 October 1999); and
Further details are set out in paragraphs 20.29 to 20.35 of document MSC 78/26.
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-
the IMO Regional Experts Meeting on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery
Against Ships, (Singapore, 15 to 16 March, 2001).
So far, the Organization has made numerous and considerable efforts to enhance the safety of
navigation and environmental protection in the Straits and has provided a forum for littoral and
user States to discuss various pertinent issues. These have resulted in the adoption of
amendments to the existing traffic separation schemes in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
(COLREG.2/Circ.44); amended Rules for vessels navigating through the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore (SN/Circ.198); and the establishment of the mandatory ship reporting system in the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SN/Circ.201), referred to above.
The Marine Electronic Highway Project
The IMO-sponsored and pursued Marine Electronic Highway (MEH) Project for the Straits aims
at:
-
the provision of Electronic Navigational Charts for the Straits area;
-
the provision of navigational information on a real-time basis, including tidal and
current data; and
-
fitting adequate AIS shore stations in the Straits area; and
Within the project, the operation of a model MEH System with tankers equipped with ECDIS is
envisaged.
A Demonstration Phase for the MEH Project is planned for the second half of 2004 with a budget
of US$16 million for a duration of 5 years. A draft Memorandum of Understanding to implement
the MEH Demonstration Project is currently under negotiation.
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