the pop sociology of suburbs and new towns

the pop sociology
of suburbs and new towns
Because Professor Fava, i n t h e review a r t i c l e below, discusses a very large n u m b e r
of books a n d articles, w e d e c i d e d n o t to p l a c e a t t h e h e a d of this review the
u s u a l b i b l i o g r a p h i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n . T h e r e a d e r is d i r e c t e d to h e r footnotes,
w h i c h identify t h e w o r k s u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n , a n d d i s t i n g u i s h between those
w h i c h s h e considers " p o p sociology" a n d t h o s e w h i c h s h e calls "professional." I n
this piece, in s h o r t , f r i e n d s , you c a n ' t tell t h e players w i t h o u t t h e small p r i n t .
—SGL
T h e mid-twentieth century is a sociologizing age, as the early twentieth was a psychologizing period, a n d still earlier periods were dominated
by biological and mechanical frames of reference. W e hear sociologizing
at cocktail parties a n d kaffeeklatsches, i n corporate boardrooms and in
laundry rooms—and sometimes even i n sociology classrooms. T h e household words a n d themes of p o p sociology include anomie, alienation, the
Protestant Ethnic, i n t e r g r o u p relations, the "empty nest stage" of family
life, mass society, the generation gap, participatory democracy, the "other
directed type," conflict, the role of women, the "power elite" and the
"establishment" and, of course, the u r b a n crisis.
I n many ways the world is now viewed in sociological images—groups,
affiliations, social class and social mobility, deviance and control, the
processes of change, the structure of institutions, demographic and ecological balance. W e have now reached the p o i n t w here few college freshmen have to be taught that socialization has a n o t h e r meaning than the
nationalization of steel and coal production. Sociological thinking has
become p a r t of what J o h n K e n n e t h Galbraith called "the conventional
wisdom—the structure of ideas t h a t is based on acceptability."
M u c h of the sociology we find a r o u n d us is p o p sociology. T h e overriding characteristic of p o p sociology is that it involves no suspension of
j u d g m e n t or assessment of evidence a n d is therefore stereotyped and unscientific. P o p sociology's second major feature—the ideological, moral
or evaluative tenor of its statements—is linked to its stereotyped approach
and, in fact, often explains why such an a p p r o a c h was applied. These
two defining traits of p o p sociology lead to a host of subsidiary characteristics. P o p sociology is "instant"—it never fails of an answer because
j u d g m e n t is seldom suspended. It is simple a n d clear. Indeed it is oversimplified, for it has few definitions or delineations of statements; pop
sociology is relatively untested. It is also all-encompassing; it applies
sociological approaches broadly to all areas a n d topics. Pop sociology is
r
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often geared to a wide audience in response to a social "crisis." In sum,
p o p sociology may be provocative b u t it is also superficial, often to the
point of inaccuracy or confusion. P o p sociology is not new; it is deepseated and probably as old as sociology. W h a t is new is the widespread
currency of p o p sociology.
As indicated above, the most important characteristic of pop sociology
is its lack of rigor or systematic thought. Pop sociology is seldom empirical or "factual" b u t that is not its crucial lack; whether empirical or
speculative it fails in giving a reasoned base and thorough search. These
very failings give pop sociology its virtues. Precisely because it is freeflowing and unfettered by a broad conceptual apparatus, p o p sociology
may provide useful insights. One of the uses of p o p sociology lies in
providing hypotheses for new research. Unfortunately this is not typically
the course of p o p sociology; rather it is offered, w i t h o u t caveats, to a wide
public as "answers" and conclusions.
Although usually presented in simple language, pop sociology must
be distinguished from the attempts to "translate" technical sociological
concepts, language a n d findings into layman's terms. Such "translation"
is the aim of the project, Sociological Resources for the Social Studies,
sponsored by the American Sociological Association and supported by the
National Science Foundation. T h e volume on u r b a n sociology is a notably successful attempt at clearing out the u n d e r b r u s h and presenting the
major contributions in a responsible, interesting and lucid way.
Several illustrations may clarify the n a t u r e of pop sociology. T h e
youth rebellion, particularly on campuses, is the focus of p o p sociology
that we are probably most familiar with at the present time. T h e explanations include affluence and poverty, each of which is used to "explain"
disregard of property and propriety; permissive parents who d o n ' t keep
their offspring in line and restrictive parents w h o have to be rebelled
against; rebellious youth is characterized as still struggling to find itself
via identity crises and is also characterized as exceptionally m a t u r e and
clearthinking. A year or so ago the major focus of p o p sociology was the
"culture of poverty" in which the concepts of culture and subculture were
bandied about so loosely as to be almost shapeless, particularly when they
were applied to discussion of the lower-class black family.
Pop sociology is widespread in the mass m e d i a and practiced by the
"man in the street." But it is also often found a m o n g professional social
scientists themselves, particularly when they are pressed into making
quick analyses of profound issues for a waiting public. T h u s , an issue of
the Neiv York Times Magazine
featured a symposium, "Is America by
N a t u r e a Violent Society?" in which the following analyses were m a d e :
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However repulsive a n d shocking H. R a p Brown's q u i p
may seem—"Violence is as American as cherry pie"—his motive for saying it must not obscure the fact that he was
telling it like it is.
T h e American white-collar set have so little direct experience with violence that it is difficult for them to conceive
of it as an ever-present reality—or possibility—in a person's
daily life, although they know that the Indians were herded
onto the reservations by force, that violence was used both
to keep Negroes in slavery and to free them, and that assault
and battery, rape and m u r d e r occur every now and then.
T h e older people in the labor movement know something
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of the historic confrontations between trade unionists and
the forces of law and order, though young workers know
almost n o t h i n g of the great labor struggles of the past.
Negroes u n d e r s t a n d the reality of violence better than most
Americans, for most of them have witnessed it in varied
forms, even if they have not experienced it. But all Americans need to face the fact that American society—as compared with some others in the world—is a very violent society. Self-delusion is self-defeating. W e can never lower
the level of violence unless we admit that it is omnipresent
a n d u n d e r s t a n d the forces that generate it. (St. Clair Drake)
T h e next participant in the symposium says:
I n a period which has seen the German massacre of the
Jews, the c o m m u n a l horrors of Indian partition, the convulsive destructiveness of the last days of L'Algerie Francaise,
the mass executions accompanying the Indonesian change of
regime, the terrible civil wars in Nigeria and the Congo,
and the wild riots in Sharpesville, it is difficult for the
hardiest celebrant of the American Way of Life to claim for
his country any special gift for violence. W e are, it turns
out, a people like any other. T h e r e is nothing particularly
distinctive about the ways we destroy one another.
T h e notion that "violence is as American as cherry pie"
is one m o r e cliche which we invoke to prevent our seeing
our situation for what it is . . . . (Clifford Geertz)
Why should we take p o p sociology seriously? Perhaps for somewhat
the same reasons that caused pop sociology to become prominent now:
the p r e d o m i n a n t l y social n a t u r e of many of the problems around us today: civil rights, family interaction, the aged, population growth and
redistribution; the emergence of large-scale organization and bureaucracy
in virtually every phase of life including the school, religion, and leisure;
and the very rapid social change on a scale without precedent in h u m a n
history. T h e pervading n a t u r e of these pressures leads to a sense of
urgency in u n d e r s t a n d i n g and in finding solutions.
T h e urgency of o u r concern often produces elements of pop in the
many attempts to apply social science, especially sociology, to policies
and programs on specific current issues. Since so many of these current
issues are urban-located or urban-related, approaches to u r b a n phenomena are often infected with pop. T h e pressure on sociology and other
social sciences for "answers" to the u r b a n enigma are widespread. T h e
pop approach and reform may often be related, as sociologically unsound
or half-baked programs are p u t into effect based on convictions rather
than evidence. T h u s , a belief in participatory democracy—or in the stultifying impact of s u b u r b a n life—may lead to projects or to individual and
group actions which are not well-supported by data or logic. All action
programs tend to be "arts" rather than "sciences," as administrators
know. Yet even a brief look at the community action field—whether the
war on poverty, community control of schools, decentralization of government, advocacy planning, or other instances that might be cited—suggests
that action programs often have in addition some p o p qualities, pseudoexpertise a n d ideological bias, compounded by urgency, concern and
widespread interest.
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H o w is suburbia a manifestation of p o p sociology? Suburbia has a
legitimate claim as the first of the major social changes that attracted
broad public attention and was widely disseminated through the mass
m e d i a . T h e "teenager" syndrome and the early Kinsey reports on sexual
behavior are, I believe, the other two major examples of pop sociology in
the immediate post-war period.
,
Suburbia entered the public awareness about the time W o r l d W a r II
ended, when the building-boom in outlying areas became a visible signal
of something new on the horizon. Sociologists had been studying and
writing a b o u t metropolitan development, of which s u b u r b a n development is a part, for several decades before then; United States suburbs
themselves date at least into the latter part of the nineteenth century and
had become widespread by 1920. It is neither the time lag between professional and public awareness nor the popularity of the topic which
makes suburbia " p o p , " however, although these do enhance the process.
It is the spurious accuracy and partisanship which make p o p sociology of
many public, and some professional, presentations of suburbia. T h e result is a debased public currency of suburbia.
T h e p o p image of suburbia revolves a r o u n d the related themes of a
contrast between the central city and the suburb, and stultifying, homogeneous conformity. T h u s , the suburbs are presented as bedroom
communities, residential outposts of the white, educated, affluent middle
class for which Scarsdale has become the national byword. T h e central
cities are the h o m e of the blacks, the poor, and the locales of the problems
besetting American society. T h i s stereotypical central city-suburban contrast has long since been shown false in the professional literature.
T h e r e is no one kind of s u b u r b (neither is there one kind of city),
hence there is no one central city-suburb contrast. It follows there are no
uniquely u r b a n or s u b u r b a n problems. T h e sociologist Leo Schnore, has
been working for at least a decade on detailing the various types of central
city/suburban contrast and seeking the dynamics explaining the formation of types of metropolitan area. Using education as an index of
socio-economic status, he delineated six different patterns of variation
between central city and s u b u r b . Only one of these exemplified the pattern reflected in the p o p conception of suburbs, in which the lowest
classes are overrepresented in the central city and the higher the educational status the more sub urbanized the p o p u l a t i o n . T h e New York
metropolis exhibits this classic pattern, while Los Angeles exemplifies
another and Tucson and A l b u q u e r q u e still other patterns. T h e classic
pattern appears to be associated with the larger metropolitan areas and
those which are "older," that is, which reached large size relatively early.
In the "newer" and smaller metropolitan areas suburbanization may not
be so far advanced toward the classic pattern, or population may actually
be redistributing in accord with newer, different industrial and transport
processes.
On the basis of the professional literature, then, a simple contrast
between high status suburbs and low status cities is at best only partly
true. Similarly, if we t u r n to the pop picture of the stultifying a n d conformist n a t u r e of suburban life we find that professional sociology has
shattered this image. At least as long ago as Bennett Berger's 1960 study,
there have been data available to show that suburbanites are not miraculously r e b o r n in the suburban setting. Politics and voting behavior, religion, family life, personality formation, educational goals and practices,
leisure pursuits, interactive patterns in the neighborhood and participa5
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lion in voluntary organizations have all been p u t under the microscope in
literally dozens of studies. T h e y show there is n o single way of suburban
life nor any uniform effect of the s u b u r b a n experience on those who live
in suburbs.
T h e reality of the s u b u r b a n impact on individuals' lives and thought
is far more complex t h a n p o p sociology would lead us to believe. One
study dealt with the question of whether there are distinctive suburban
psychological characteristics, particularly the assertion that suburban residence fosters anti-intellectual attitudes. T h e data included questionnaire
responses from over 83,000 college seniors graduating in 1961 from 135
colleges in the U n i t e d States. I n i t i a l comparisons showed no significant
differences in intellectual attitudes between college seniors who had been
raised in cities a n d those who h a d been raised in suburbs.
However, further analysis showed that there is a relationship between
suburban residence and anti-intellectualism, b u t that it is more complex
than commonly supposed. W h e n the items measuring anti-intellectualism
were cross-tabulated with the k i n d of communities students said they
wished to live in rather than by the communities the students had grown
u p in, then the suburb-oriented students differed significantly from the
urban-oriented students in anti-intellectualism. T h a t is, those who indicated a desire to live in the suburbs were less likely to be concerned with
access to cultural activities and less likely to think of themselves as intellectuals. T h e final analysis suggests that anti-intellectualism in suburbia
is partly a result of family-cycle (more married students prefer suburbs
and they are likely to have less time for intellectual activities), partly a
result of selectivity (the students expressing a preference for suburban
living are more anti-intellectual) a n d partly a result of the influence of
community of origin (regardless of their marital status and intellectual
attitudes, students who were b r o u g h t u p in suburbs more often expressed
a desire to live in suburbs than those who had been raised in the city).
T h e vision of a homogeneous a n d conformist suburbia has been negated by sociological research, yet the pop version remains and continues
to be spread by the mass media. Why? T h e answer, I think, lies in the
ideological aspect of popness. T h e pop sociology of the suburbs is not
only inaccurate, it is inaccurate for a reason. (In saying this, I do not
mean that there exists a conscious plot to make it inaccurate.)
T h e ideological aspect of p o p suburbia has two main components.
T h e first relates to the persistence of the myth of homogeneity. According
to one sociologist, the belief that suburbs are homogeneous operates to
sustain a belief in the "American d r e a m " of equals cooperating in a democratic society. T h e American d r e a m is u n d e r m i n e d by the realities of
long-standing economic and ethnic differentiation and by our fundamental ambivalence toward melting-pot as opposed to pluralist development.
In view of the flaws in the American dream it becomes important to
reaffirm it in the major new setting of American life, the suburbs. T h u s ,
the myth of the homogeneous, classless suburbia persists.
Although the foregoing observations were based on impressionistic
data they are lent some substance by H e r b e r t Cans' study of Levittown,
New Jersey, in which he concludes, after several years of participantobservation a n d close study that one of the shortcomings that Levittown
shares with other American communities is an
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inability to deal with pluralism. People have not recognized
the diversity of American society, a n d they are not able to
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a c c e p t other life styles. I n d e e d , they cannot h a n d l e conflict
b e c a u s e they cannot accept p l u r a l i s m . Adults are u n w i l l i n g
t o tolerate adolescent c u l t u r e , a n d vice versa. L o w e r m i d d l e
class people oppose the ways of the w o r k i n g class a n d u p p e r
m i d d l e class, and each of these g r o u p s is hostile to the other
t w o . Perhaps the inability to cope with pluralism is greater
i n Levittown than elsewhere because it is a c o m m u n i t y of
y o u n g families who are raising c h i l d r e n . C h i l d r e n are essentially asocial and u n a c c u l t u r a t e d beings, easily influenced
by new ideas. As a result, their p a r e n t s feel an intense need
t o defend familial values; to m a k e sure thai their children
g r o w u p according to parental n o r m s and not by those of
t h e i r playmates from a n o t h e r class. T h e need to shield the
children from what are considered harmful influences begins on the block, but it is translated into the conflict over
t h e school, the definitional struggles within voluntary associations whose programs affect the socialization of children,
a n d , ultimately into political conflicts. Each g r o u p wants to
p u t its stamp on the organizations and institutions that are
t h e community, for otherwise the family a n d its c u l t u r e are
n o t safe.
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T h e second ideological c o m p o n e n t of p o p suburbs relates to the allege d l y conformist, anti-intellectual features of s u b u r b a n life. Most likely
t h i s e v a l u a t i o n is a function of t h e fact t h a t most writers on suburbs are
u p p e r m i d d l e class intellectuals w h o are projecting o n t o the suburbs their
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the " b o u r g e o i s " a n d to ihem debased standards in
l o w e r m i d d l e class suburbs. Most recently this tendency has been revealed
i n t h e characterization of Spiro T . Agnew. O n e newspaper columnist,
u n d e r t h e title, " T h e Sterile Paradise of S u b u r b a n M a n , " says:
Agnew's biography sounds like W a r r e n H a r d i n g ' s might if
H a r d i n g had been a character in a novel by Sinclair Lewis
a n d Lewis had been w r i t i n g in the 19f>0s. H e [Agnew] is so
typical of the new s u b u r b a n m a n that he almost seems to
parody his class. . . . T h e p e o p l e to w h o m he speaks arc at
least as afraid of losing what they already possess as they are
eager to acquire more. For every d a y d r e a m of personal success they have two n i g h t m a r e s of a r m e d , m a r a u d i n g Negroes
w h o will burn clown their c o m m u n i t i e s . T h e y d o not want
t o nationalize the giant c o r p o r a t i o n s . . . they only want the
g r e a t businessmen they've been raised to respect . . . to
protect them and stop e n c o u r a g i n g their enemies, the black
a n d the student dissenters
And his audiences seem
eager to Live in the sterile p a r a d i s e his speeches promise. As
far as many of America's new s u b u r b a n i t e s are concerned,
Agnew, son of a poor Greek i m m i g r a n t , the luckiest Horatio
Alger in this country's history, is describing the enchanted,
protected land their p a r e n t s a n d g r a n d p a r e n t s came all this
way to find.
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A n o t h e r author says: ", . . Agnew the Vice President is no more than the
c o m m o n p l a c e made exceptional, the c o n v e n t i o n a l m a d e controversial,
i n s t i n c t promoted into intellect a n d s u b u r b i a m a d e s u b l i m e . T h i s kind
of b i a s would account for the l i n g e r i n g tendency of even professional
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sociologists to write condescendingly of suburbs. T o the upper middle
class professional the "city" is the place where civilization resides.
I n the broadest sense it appears that the suburban myth of harmony,
greenery a n d cultural kitsch is the contemporary staging ground for the
long-standing American preference for rural life. In the modern age,
when, t h r o u g h the sheer lack of farm experience on the part of the vast
majority of t h e population, agrarianism has lost its force as a normative
standard, the familiar dialogue between ruralism and urbanism may peter
out. I n place of the nineteenth-century discussions of whether the city or
the country is m o r e "civilized," we may have discussions of whether urban
or s u b u r b a n life is more "cultured." In place of the city versus the
country debate we may have the city versus the suburb. This does not
necessarily m e a n that suburbs are replacing the country in the sense of
being r u r a l ; it does mean that the suburbs, like all community forms,
have the power to arouse emotion and partisanship. As new community
forms arise, they become invested with symbolic meaning and enter the
arena of p u b l i c opinion.
After studying the political structure of suburbs, Robert Wood, a
political scientist, concluded that it represented a renaissance of the
small-town a n d village i d e a l .
Suburban governments, according to
Wood, are typically small, ineffective and expensive, unsuitable for coping
with m e t r o p o l i t a n area problems. Yet suburbanites stubbornly resist
efforts at a consolidation i n t o larger governmental jurisdictions, and
small-scale s u b u r b a n governments are, in fact, proliferating. Wood points
out that the attachment to s u b u r b a n government is ideological, stemming
from a belief that the small community produces the best life, and the
best government.
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in
Suburbia, defined as an ideology, a faith in communities of
limited size and a belief in the conditions of intimacy, is
q u i t e real. T h e d o m i n a n c e of the old values explains more
a b o u t the people a n d politics of the suburbs than any other
interpretation. Fundamentally, it explains the nature of the
American metropolis. . . . If these values were not dominant
it w o u l d be quite possible to conceive of a single gigantic
m e t r o p o l i t a n region u n d e r one government and socially
conscious of itself as one community. T h e new social ethic,
the rise of the large organization, would lead us to expect
this development "as a natural one. T h e automobile, the
subway, the telephone, the power line certainly make it technically possible; they even push us in this direction.
B u t the American metropolis is not constructed in such
a way; it sets its face directly against modernity. Those who
wish to rebuild the American city, who protest the shapeless
u r b a n sprawl, w h o find some value in the organizational
skills of modern society, must recognize the potency of the
ideology. Until these beliefs have been accommodated reform will not come in the metropolitan areas nor will men
buckle down to the task of directing, in a manner consonant
with freedom, the great political and social organizations on
which the nation's strength d e p e n d s .
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I t has become increasingly difficult to maintain the simple pop sociology view of suburbs as evidence mounts, from the 1970 census and other
sources, of the diversity of suburbs and the increasing resemblance of
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older suburbs to cities, in terms of structure and problems. Crime and
delinquency rates have been rising rapidly in many suburbs, as has the
drug problem; welfare, pollution, traffic congestion and unbalanced
budgets have emerged as major issues; office decentralization has accelerated in many large metropolitan areas and some shopping centers have
become m i n i a t u r e downtowns in the range and variety of goods and
services offered—and as locales for vandalism and burglary, as congregating places for "undesirables." "Black suburbs" have become increasingly important, although this trend does not appear to be accompanied
by racial or economic integration, despite the m o u n t i n g attack on suburban exclusionary zoning. Both the professional literature a n d the mass
media have begun to reflect this new view of s u b u r b i a .
Suburbs are now being succeeded by a new community focus of pop
sociology, New Towns, the large planned communities of which Res ton,
Virginia, and Columbia, Maryland, are often cited as e x a m p l e s .
Suburbs were the focus of community pop sociology in the period of public
awareness of metropolitan emergence; N e w T o w n s are the expression of
community pop sociology in the era of the m a t u r e metropolis.
New Towns represent a new policy for the same set of needs expressed
earlier in the image of suburbia. T h e r e is the same anti-urbanism, the
fear and distrust of the city, expressed now in the desire to control and
manage urban growth and density by carefully pre-cast new communities.
As with suburbs there is also the same concern with diversity, the containment of conflict and the maintenance of outward harmony a n d equality.
There are, however, two important ways in which New T o w n s contrast
markedly with suburbs. First, New Towns, usually called New Communities in this context, have become a legislatively-enacted goal of the
federal government. Although it has been argued that h o m e mortgage
legislation, subsidies for highway construction and other governmental
policies indirectly fostered s u b u r b a n e x p a n s i o n , there was never specific
suburban legislation.
T h e official support of the federal government for New T o w n s dates
to the passage of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1906. T h i s Act expanded F H A mortgage coverage, through
the Department of Housing and U r b a n Development, to include privately
financed New Communities. However, these provisions were hedged with
so many restrictions that the New Communities provisions were not p u t
to effective use. Many of these restrictions were removed by the H o u s i n g
and Urban Development Act of 1968, legislation which has been called
the urban equivalent of the Homestead Act of 1862. T i t l e IV of the 1968
Act, entitled "New ( i m m u n i t i e s , " e x p a n d e d the financial backing of
New Communities and this p r o m p t e d a large n u m b e r of applications to
H U D by private developers.
By 1971 five New Communities had received federal financial guarantees. T h e Housing and U r b a n Development Act of 1970, under T i t l e V I I , " U r b a n Growth and New C o m m u n i t y
Development," carries federal support of New T o w n s several i m p o r t a n t
steps further.- and has attracted widespread interest from private a n d
public developers.-- By Spring 1973 fifteen New Communities h a d received federal guarantees of the specified financial obligations.
T h e second major way in which New T o w n s in the United States
contrast with suburbs is in the explicit concern in the New T o w n s with
social issues. T h u s , Title IV of the 1968 Act includes as one of the conditions of eligibility that the New C o m m u n i t y include the "proper balance" of housing units for families of low and moderate income. T h e
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1970 Act lists a m o n g the ten reasons for developing new communities that
"continuation of established patterns of u r b a n development . . . will
result in . . . (1) unduly limited options for many of our people as to
where they may live, and the types of h o u s i n g and environment in which
they live; . . . (2) further lessening of e m p l o y m e n t and business opportunities for the residents of central cities a n d of the ability of such cities
to retain a tax base adequate to s u p p o r t vital services for all their citizens,
particularly the poor and disadvantaged; (3) further separation of people
within m e t r o p o l i t a n areas by income a n d by r a c e . "
Each New Community proposal presented by H U D m u s t contain a special social plan
indicating how it proposes to i m p l e m e n t the stated goals.
I n u n d e r s t a n d i n g the social concerns of the New Communities legislation one m u s t recognize that the N e w T o w n s movement in the U n i t e d
States gathered m o m e n t u m in the 1960's in the wake of the " u r b a n crisis."
I m p o r t a n t milestones in the m o u n t i n g u r b a n concerns of that period include the first message on cities to Congress by any President, President
Johnson's March 1965 message on " P r o b l e m s and F u t u r e of the Central
City a n d Its Suburbs," and his February 1968 message, " T h e Crisis of O u r
Cities"; a series of comprehensive r e p o r t s documenting in staggering
detail a g r o u p of urban problems: poverty, unparalleled growth, gross
housing inadequacy, racial segregation, crime and violence; and the
piecemeal recognition of the c h a n g i n g n a t u r e of the American city as
metropolitan development entered a new phase heralded by s u b u r b a n
dominance.
New T o w n s are clearly a m a t t e r of p u b l i c policy. How does our
public a n d professional view of t h e m p a r t a k e of p o p sociology? Essentially because New Towns are seen as a solution to many urban a n d
indeed n a t i o n a l ills for which critical evidence on specific social questions
involved is lacking or ambiguous. Ideology has taken the place of evidence; matters of belief have become accepted as matters of fact.
Such socially-relevant terms as " p a r t i c i p a t i o n , " "balance," "diversity"
a n d " o p t i m u m size" have seldom even been defined in the context of
New T o w n s discussion. New T o w n s involve assumptions regarding the
n a t u r e and desirability of n e i g h b o r h o o d interaction; high-rise and multifamily vs. low-rise and single-family homes; the impact of density a n d
community size on the h u m a n psyche; the importance of propinquity as
a catalyst for meaningful contact; the merits of community self-sufficiency;
the benefits of diversity and balance; the m a n n e r in which housing choices
are made; the virtues of local p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d decentralization.
An overview of the published w o r k o n New T o w n s indicates the p o p
nature of public and m u c h professional t h i n k i n g on the social goals of
New T o w n s . T h e r e is a Niagara of m a t e r i a l : for example, at least seven
bibliographies on New T o w n s in the U n i t e d States. Allowing for duplication there are several thousand separate published books, articles a n d
reports. T h e y come from a broad s p e c t r u m of national circulation magazines (Harper's,
U.S. News and World Report, Saturday Review) a n d
from the professionals journals, house organs and publications of sociologists, planners, architects, builders, large corporations, housers and p u b lic officials. T h e literature is overwhelmingly pro-New T o w n , indicating
a broad dissemination and acceptance of t h e New T o w n idea, which is
underscored by the passage of the 1970 H o u s i n g and U r b a n Development
Act a n d by the testimony in its favor from witnesses representing a wide
variety of groups.
Only a relatively small p r o p o r t i o n of t h e published work deals with
23
24
25
26
129
the social aspects of N e w T o w n s in the U n i t e d States; most treats architecture, design, finance, m a n a g e m e n t a n d legislation. T h i s emphasis
seems significant in view of the i m p o r t a n c e of social goals both in the
federal legislation and in many of the privately financed New Towns.
For the purpose of p o p sociology, there are two significant characteristics of the existing socially-relevant material. First, the empirical material is typically fragmentary, low-level description with little possibility
of generalizability. In this, the literature o n the New T o w n s resembles
the p o p sociology of suburbia. T h e two are also alike in that definitional
problems compound the difficulty of generalizing. O n e man's New T o w n
is another's satellite city and still another's "large development." Second,
much of the material has n o empirical base at all, b u t is hortatory—it
merely advises and states the desirability of N e w T o w n s to achieve social
goals and policies. Given these two characteristics it follows that the
"how" of achieving the social goals of New T o w n s is not often specified.
Behind the p o p t r e a t m e n t of suburbia lay a backlog of professional
research which needed popularization; for the New T o w n s , there was n o
such backlog. T h e central issue of racial a n d economic integration in
New T o w n s is a case in p o i n t . W h i l e this situation offers o p p o r t u n i t y
for well-focused research on major public policy implications of New
Towns, it also warns against unexamined acceptance of the p o p sociology
view of New T o w n s as the brake h a l t i n g the movement toward "two
societies." T h e r e are only two investigations of any depth related to this
matter; neither is conclusive. In one study a multiple-choice questionnaire which h a d been developed from long depth interviews, was administered to almost 800 residents of New T o w n s in two different metropolitan areas of California.
T h e results indicated that a major reason
for buying in New T o w n s was the belief that " p l a n n i n g " protected the
community against the intrusion of economic and racial diversity.
T h e other study examined a matched sample of ten new communities
differing in location, age and degree of p l a n n i n g . It concluded that degree of residential satisfaction with the community as a whole was positively associated with degree of p l a n n i n g
T h e analysis of reasons for
satisfaction with the immediate neighborhood was less clear, although
dwelling unit density, the condition of the neighborhood (whether it is
"well kept up") and compatibility of n e i g h b o r h o o d residents were important features. T h e authors stress the difficulties in measuring compatibility, which they found related to attitudes rather than to the expected
socio-economic and demographic homogeneity. "For people in our sample it appears that shared attitudes and evaluations concerning the neighborhood and community were most salient in defining neighbors as b o t h
'friendly' and 'similar.' . . . I n other words, when consensus (homogeneity) exists among neighbors a b o u t qualities of the residential environment, the neighbors themselves tend to be m o r e positively e v a l u a t e d . "
T h e matter of operationalizing the concept of "homogeneity" (and,
of course, "heterogeneity" and "balance") remains, although both N e w
Towns studies above indicate the i m p o r t a n c e of some kind of local
homogeneity, as do studies in such diverse N e w T o w n settings as B r i t a i n
and Israel.-" T h e burden of these studies is not to discourage policy
planners from aiming at racial a n d economic integration a n d " b a l a n c e "
in New Towns. On the contrary, it should p o i n t up the necessity of going
beyond the labeling of p o p sociology which simply defines " b a l a n c e " as
a goal.
T h e pop sociology of New T o w n s offers a current opportunity to
27
28
2 0
30
31
2
130
utilize the immediacy and provocativeness of the p o p approach in generating wide interest, while avoiding the instant "solutions" of p o p . If
sociology is to be useful in dealing with vital issues such as the form of
future u r b a n growth then action m u s t be taken. However, the p u b l i c
a n d the government must recognize m o r e fully the need for e x p e r i m e n t a l
approaches which permit tests of the validity of u n p r o v e d assumptions.
As we have indicated, the p o p sociology of suburbs and New T o w n s p r o vides many such assumptions. W h a t has been lacking is the spelling o u t
of assumptions and the a t t e n d a n t h i d d e n hypotheses with which p o p
sociology a b o u n d s and the systematic testing o u t of these hypotheses in a
variety of simulated or actual suburbs or New T o w n contexts. T h e result
would give us knowledge a b o u t the social processes at work and the limits
of such knowledge. W e w o u l d have laid the basis for improved decisionm a k i n g in selecting the goals for further c o m m u n i t y development. M o r e
broadly we would have substituted sociology—warts and all—for the
silicone curves of p o p sociology.
Brooklyn C o l l e g e - C U N Y
Sylvia F. Fava
footnotes
1. The Affluent Society ( B o s t o n , 1 9 5 8 ) , 18.
2. H e l e n M a c G i l l H u g h e s , c o m p i l e r a n d e d i t o r , Cities and City Life ( B o s t o n , 1 9 7 0 ) . I t is
most i n s t r u c t i v e for a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p o p s o c i o l o g y t o c o m p a r e t h e H u g h e s b o o k w i t h e v e n
a superior, r e l a t i v e l y w e l l - b a l a n c e d t r e a t m e n t of u r b a n p h e n o m e n a i n t h e p o p g e n r e : V a n c e
P a c k a r d ' s A Nation
of Strangers
( N e w York, 1 9 7 2 ) .
3 . I n c o n t r a s t to the p o p t r e a t m e n t o f y o u t h , see P h i l i p C. A l t b a c h a n d R o b e r t S. L a u f e r ,
eds., The New Pilgrims:
Youth Protest
in Transition
( N e w York, 1972). T h i s reader i n c l u d e s
historical a n d cross-cultural m a t e r i a l s a n d relates y o u t h p r o t e s t to t h e strucure of society a s a n
aspect of g e n e r a t i o n a l conflict, social class a n d r a d i c a l m o v e m e n t s ; a n a p p e n d e d b i b l i o g r a p h y
by K e n n e t h K e n i s t o n c o n t a i n s several h u n d r e d i t e m s r e v i e w i n g research a n d further i n d i c a t e s
h o w y o u t h m o v e m e n t s are i m b e d d e d i n t h e o v e r a l l s o c i a l system.
4. A p r i l 28, 1968.
5. F o r e x a m p l e i n such w o r k s as: F r e d e r i c k A l l e n , " T h e B i g C h a n g e i n S u b u r b i a , "
Harper's,
C C V I I I , 1249 ( J u n e , 1954); H a l B u r t o n , " T r o u b l e i n t h e Suburbs," Saturday
Evening
Post, C C V I I I , 12-14 ( S e p t e m b e r 17, 24; O c t o b e r 1, 1955); R . G o r d o n , K. G o r d o n , a n d M .
G u n t h e r , The Split
Level
Trap
( N e w York, 1 9 6 1 ) ; S i d o n i e G r u e n b e r g , " T h e H o m o g e n i z e d
C h i l d r e n of t h e N e w S u b u r b i a , " New York Times Magazine
( S e p t e m b e r 19, 1954); H a r r y H e n derson, " T h e M a s s P r o d u c e d S u b u r b s , " Harper's,
C C V I I , 1242-1243 ( N o v e m b e r - D e c e m b e r , 1 9 5 3 ) ;
T . J a m e s , " C r a c k u p s i n t h e S u b u r b s , " Cosmopolitan,
C L I , 4 ( O c t o b e r , 1961): J o h n K e a t s , The
Crack in the Picture
Window
( B o s t o n , 1 9 5 6 ) ; A l i c e M i e l , The Shortchanged
Children
of Suburbia ( N e w York, 1968); A. C. Spectorsky, The Exurbanites
( P h i l a d e l p h i a , 1955); W i l l i a m H .
W h y t e , The
Organization
Man
( N e w York, 1 9 5 6 ) ; P e t e r W y d e n , Suburbia's
Coddled
Kids
( G a r d e n City, 1 9 6 0 ) .
6. See for e x a m p l e , t h e articles c o l l e c t e d i n P a r t s I I a n d I V of L e o F . Schnore, The
Urban
Scene ( N e w York, 1965); also his " M e a s u r i n g C i t y - S u b u r b a n S t a t u s Differences," Urban
Affairs
Quarterly,
I I I , 1 ( S e p t e m b e r , 1967) a n d S c h n o r e a n d P i n k e r t o n , " R e s i d e n t i a l R e d i s t r i b u t i o n of
S o c i o e c o n o m i c Strata i n M e t r o p o l i t a n A r e a s , " Demography,
I I I , 2 (1966). F o r a different
a p p r o a c h w h i c h a l s o s u p p o r t s t h e diversity of t h e c e n t r a l c i t y - s u b u r b a n contrast see, A d v i s o r y
C o m m i s s i o n o n I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l R e l a t i o n s , Metropolitan
Social
and Economic
Disparities
( W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . , 1965) a n d A d v i s o r y C o m m i s s i o n o n I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l R e l a t i o n s ,
Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities,
vol. 2 o f Fiscal Balance
in the American
Federal System
(Washington,
D . C . , 1967).
7. " U r b a n S t r u c t u r e a n d S u b u r b a n S e l e c t i v i t y , " i n S c h n o r e , The Urban
Scene.
8. Working-Class
Suburb (Berkeley, 1 9 6 0 ) .
9. J o s e p h Z e l a n , " D o e s S u b u r b i a M a k e a D i f f e r e n c e , " i n S. F . F a v a , ed., Urbanism
in
World Perspective
( N e w York, 1968).
10. B e n n e t t B e r g e r , " S u b u r b i a a n d t h e A m e r i c a n D r e a m , " i n F a v a , Urbanism
in
World
Perspective.
11. H e r b e r t J. G a n s , The Levittowners
( N e w York, 1 9 6 7 ) , 4 1 4 .
12. P a u l C o w a n i n The Village Voice ( N e w Y o r k ) O c t o b e r 10, 1968.
13. P e t e r J e n k i n s , " A g n e w is t h e C o m m o n M a n M a d e E x c e p t i o n a l , " New York
Times
Magazine
( O c t o b e r 29, 1972), 94.
131
14. T h e reviews o f C a n s ' The Levittowners
h a v e already n o t e d t h a t it is t h e first m a j o r
s o c i o l o g i c a l work o n s u b u r b s w h i c h does n o t c o n d e s c e n d to t h e n e w m i d d l e classes. G a n s " d o e s
n o t find t h e m c o m i c or m e n a c i n g , barbarians to b e s u b d u e d or living corpses to be e x h u m e d , "
says M a r v i n Bressler i n h i s r e v i e w o l G a n s ' b o o k i n The Public Interest
( 1 9 6 8 ) , 102.
15. R o b e r t C. W o o d , Suburbia,
Its People and Their Politics
( B o s t o n , 1958), c h a p t e r 1.
16. Ibid., 18-19.
17. J o h n B . O n a n d F. Patrick M i c h c l s o n , The Radical
Suburb
( P h i l a d e l p h i a , 1970); Scott
D o n a l d s o n , The Suburban
Myth ( N e w York, 1969); " T h e Suburbs: Frontier of t h e '70's," special issue of City, V ( J a n u a r y - F e b r u a r y , 1971); " S u b u r b i a : A M y t h C h a l l e n g e d , " cover story i n
Time,
XCVII,
U ( M a r c h 15, 1971); " T h e O u t e r City: U.S. in S u b u r b a n T u r m o i l , " series of
five articles in the New York Times (May 3 0 - J u n e 3 , 1971).
18. A useful definition of N e w T o w n s in t h e U n i t e d States is t h a t they are ". . .
large-scale
developments
[1,000 acres or m o r e ] constructed
under single or unified management,
following
a fairly precise, inclusive
plan and including
different
types of housing,
commercial
and
cultural facilities,
and amenities
sufficient
to serve the residents
of the community.
They
may
provide
land for industry,
offer other types of employment
opportunities,
and may
eventually
achieve a considerable
measure
of self-sufficiency.
With few exceptions,
new communities
under
development
today are within
commuting
distance
of existing
employment
centers."
Advisory
C o m m i s s i o n o n I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l R e l a t i o n s , Urban
and Rural America:
Policies
for
Future
Growth
( W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . , 1968), 64. H U D h a s estimated that in 1947-1969 there were 63
n e w c o m m u n i t i e s b u i l t or u n d e r construction in the U . S . w h i c h met such a d e f i n i t i o n . V i r t u a l l y
all were b u i l t u n d e r p r i v a t e financing since t h e y p r e d a t e d the federal supports for N e w T o w n s .
" H U D Survey a n d Analysis of Large D e v e l o p m e n t s a n d N e w C o m m u n i t i e s , " Urban
Land.
X X I X (January, 1970), 11-12.
19. See for e x a m p l e , B . Weissbourd, " S e g r e g a t i o n , Subsidies, a n d M e g a l o p o l i s , " in F a v a , e d . ,
Urbanism
in World
Perspective.
20. T h e 1966 A c t h a d required d e v e l o p e r s to o b t a i n funds from p r i v a t e lenders a n d w a s
restricted to m o r t g a g e s o n l a n d ; the 1968 A c t a u t h o r i z e d H U D to g u a r a n t e e t h e b o n d s a n d
other o b l i g a t i o n s issued by developers of N e w C o m m u n i t i e s to finance l a n d a c q u i s i t i o n a n d its
d e v e l o p m e n t for b u i l d i n g .
21. Major n e w provisions: (1) the federal g o v e r n m e n t will assume responsibility for f o r m u l a t i n g a n a t i o n a l u r b a n g r o w t h policy w h i c h i n c l u d e s the e n c o u r a g e m e n t of a variety of
p l a n n e d n e w c o m m u n i t i e s ; (2) the D o m e s t i c C o u n c i l i n the Office of the P r e s i d e n t w i l l s e n d t o
Congress every two years, b e g i n n i n g in 1972, a R e p o r t o n U r b a n G r o w t h c o v e r i n g t h e p r e c e d i n g
ten years; (3) the creation w i t h i n H U D of a C o m m u n i t y D e v e l o p m e n t C o r p o r a t i o n w o r k i n g
w i t h p u b l i c bodies a n d p r i v a t e developers t o s p u r n e w c o m m u n i t y d e v e l o p m e n t t h r o u g h a
system of loans, g u a r a n t e e s , a n d t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e t o p r o v i d e for p l a n n i n g , l a n d a c q u i s i t i o n ,
d e v e l o p m e n t , public facilities a n d services; (4) l o a n s for n e w c o m m u n i t i e s t o t a l i n g $240 m i l l i o n
are authorized ($20 m i l l i o n l i m i t per c o m m u n i t y ) as are $500 m i l l i o n i n g u a r a n t e e s of o b l i gations of private and p u b l i c developers ($50 m i l l i o n l i m i t per c o m m u n i t y ) .
22. For e x a m p l e , see E l e a n o r e Carruth, " T h e B i g M o v e to N e w T o w n s , " F o r t u n e , L X X X I V ,
3 (September, 1971).
23. H o u s i n g a n d U r b a n D e v e l o p m e n t Act of 1970, P a r t B, Sec. 710 ( b ) .
24. A n i n c o m p l e t e list w o u l d i n c l u d e : N a t i o n a l C o m m i s s i o n o n U r b a n P r o b l e m s ( t h e
"Douglas C o m m i s s i o n " ) ; President's C o m m i s s i o n o n U r b a n H o u s i n g ( t h e "Kaiser C o m m i s sion"); N a t i o n a l Advisory C o m m i s s i o n on C i v i l D i s o r d e r (the "Kerner C o m m i s s i o n " ) ; A d v i s o r y
C o m m i s s i o n on I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l R e l a t i o n s , Urban
and Rural America:
Policies
for
Future
Growth.
25. T h e 1970 census s h o w e d , for e x a m p l e , t h a t in only 7 of the 25 m e t r o p o l i t a n areas w i t h
over a m i l l i o n i n p o p u l a t i o n , d i d t h e c e n t r a l c i t y p o p u l a t i o n o u t n u m b e r t h a t of the s u b u r b a n
areas s u r r o u n d i n g it; i n 1960 central city p o p u l a t i o n o u t n u m b e r e d s u b u r b a n i n 15 of t h e s a m e
25 m e t r o p o l i t a n areas.
26. Joy Akin, The Feasibility
and Actuality
of Modern
Nezv Toums for the Poor in
the
United
States ( M o n t i c e l l o , 111., 1970); J a m e s A . C l a p p , The New
Town
Concept:
Private
Trends and Public Response
( M o n t i c e l l o , III., 1970); H U D , Neiu Communities:
A
Bibliography
( W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . , 1969); T . C. P e n g a n d N . S. V e r n a , New Towns
Planning,
Design
and
Development:
Comprehensive
Reference
Materials
( L i n c o l n , N e b . , 1971); M c l v i n C. B r a n c h ,
" N e w T o w n s , " i n h i s Comprehensive
Urban
Planning
(Beverly H i l l s , Calif., 1970); H o u s i n g
a n d H o m e F i n a n c e A g e n c y , New Communities:
A Selected
Annotated
Reading
List ( W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . , 1965); Minnesota
Experimental
City Progress
Reports,
2nd edition, A p p e n d i x A,
"A C o m p e n d i u m of P u b l i c a t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o S o c i o - C u l t u r a l Aspects," a n d A p p e n d i x D , " B i b l i o g r a p h y " ( M i n n e a p o l i s , 1969).
27. T h e q u e s t i o n h a s b e e n e x a m i n e d i n d e t a i l elsewhere. See Sylvia F. F a v a , " T h e S o c i o l o g y
of N e w T o w n s in the U.S.: 'Balance' of R a c i a l a n d E c o n o m i c G r o u p s " ( p a p e r d e l i v e r e d a t
t h e A m e r i c a n I n s t i t u t e of P l a n n e r s C o n f e r e n c e , M i n n e a p o l i s - S t . P a u l , O c t o b e r 1970).
28. Carl W e r t h m a n , Jerry S. M a n d c l a n d T e d D i e n s t f r e y , Planning
cision.
Why People Buy in Planned
Communities
(Berkeley, 1965).
132
and
the
Purchase
De-
29. J o h n B. L a n s i n g , R o b e r t W . M a r a n s a n d R o b e r t B . Zehner, Planned
Residential
Environments
( A n n A r b o r , 1971).
30. Ibid., 125.
31. B . J. H e r a u d , "Social Class a n d t h e N e w T o w n s , " Urban Studies,
V (February, 1968);
a n d H e r a u d , " N e w T o w n s : T h e E n d o f a P l a n n e r ' s D r e a m , " New Society,
X I I , 3 0 2 ( J u l y 11,
1968).
32. J u d i t h S h u v a l , " R e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n E t h n i c G r o u p s , " A p p e n d i x A to " T h e I n t e g r a l
H a b i t a t i o n a l U n i t a t K i r y a t - G a t , " Ministry
of Housing
Quarterly
(Israel), III (December,
1967), 92-98.
133