Ministry of Foreign Affairs Denmark
Technical Advisory Services
Review of the Danish Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP)
Final Report
Ref. no. Arabiske lande.14-7
July 2014
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS .............................................................................. II
1
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1
2 CONTEXT AND STRATEGIC APPROACH ............................................................. 1
2.1 Theory of change ....................................................................................................................... 1
2.2 Contextual analysis .................................................................................................................... 5
2.3 Incorporation of key Danish policy priorities ....................................................................... 8
3 ASSESSMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE........................ 11
3.1 Portfolio of development engagements and implementing partners ............................... 11
3.2 Implementation modalities ..................................................................................................... 14
3.3 Quality of the implementation framework and processes ................................................. 20
4 PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT .............................................................................. 25
4.1 Planning tools and M&E ........................................................................................................ 25
4.2 Division of labour .................................................................................................................... 26
4.3 Financial management ............................................................................................................ 27
4.4 Risk management ..................................................................................................................... 28
4.5 Exit strategies ........................................................................................................................... 29
4.6 Process Action Plan................................................................................................................. 30
ANNEX 1 – Terms of reference .................................................................................................... 31
ANNEX 2 - List of persons consulted........................................................................................... 37
ANNEX 3 – Additional observations and suggestions for EGJC (Thematic area IV) .......... 42
ANNEX 4 – Suggested template for Country Strategy Document ........................................... 47
ANNEX 5 – DAPP Process Action Plan 2014-2016 .................................................................. 48
ANNEX 6 – Summary of review recommendations and suggestions ...................................... 50
ABREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AHDR
AfDB
CJD
CISU
DAPP
DEDI
DEVCO
DI
DIHR
DUF
EEAS
EGJC
EMHRN
EU
HCP
HRBA
HQ
IFC
ILO
IMS
JTMR
KCA
KVINFO
LO/FTF
MENA
M&E
MFA
MSME
NGO
OEP
PID
RAM
RT
SFD
SME
TAO
TAS
TOR
UNDP
UGTT
UTICA
VNGI
Arab Human Development Report
African Development Bank
Centre des Jeunes Dirigeants d’Entreprise
Civilsamfund i Udvikling
Danish Arab Partnership Programme
Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute
Development and Cooperation – European Commission
Confederation of Danish Industries
Danish Institute for Human Rights
Dansk Ungdoms Fællesråd - Danish Youth Council
European External Action Service
Economic Growth and Job Creation
Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network
European Union
Humanitarian Action, Civil Society and Personnel Assistance (MFA)
Human Rights Based Approach
Headquarters
International Finance Corporation
International Labour Organisation
International Media Support
Human Rights Department (MFA)
Knowledge Centre for Agriculture
Køn Viden Information Forskning
Danish Trade Union Council for International Development
Middle East and North Africa
Monitoring and Evaluation
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise
Non-Governmental Organisation
Office de l’Elevage et de Pâturages (Tunisia)
Programme Implementation Document
Review Aide Memoire
Review Team
Strategic Framework Document
Small and Medium Enterprise
Technical Advisory Offices
Technical Advisory Services Department
Terms of Reference
United Nations Development Programme
Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail
Union Tunisienne de l’Industrie, du Commerce et de l’Artisanat
International Cooperation Agency of the Association of Municipalities
of the Netherlands
ii
Executive summary
This review of the Danish Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP) provides an assessment of the
new Strategic Framework Document (SFD) 2013-2016 and of the Programme Implementation
Document (PID) 2013-2014 through which the DAPP has moved towards greater conformity
with the Danida Aid Management Guidelines (AMG). It is conceived as the mandatory mid-term
review, but is carried out early so as to feed into the programming exercise for 2015-2016, while it
also collates lessons learned and provides recommendations to be considered in the preparation of
the next strategic framework and programme. The findings are based on a review of relevant
documentation, consultations with stakeholders in Denmark followed by country visits to
Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia.
The DAPP recently celebrated its 10th year of existence and a few years after the historic popular
upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) began, although the democratic reform
processes have experienced setbacks in several countries in the region, the overall relevance of
the programme appears indisputable. Building on the solid foundations laid down by
longstanding support to partnerships between Danish and Arab organisations, the DAPP has
provided a flexible framework to respond quickly to major developments in the MENA in critical
moments of transition. As a consequence, in 2011 it was decided to increase the annual budgets
from DKK 100M to DKK 275M, a new thematic focus on Economic Growth and Job Creation
(EGJC) was added to the programme and the geographic scope for bilateral activities was
expanded to include Egypt, Tunisia, Lybia and Syria – in addition to the three existing focus
countries Morocco, Jordan and Yemen.
These changes have had major implications for the management, the intervention logic and
the coherence of the DAPP. The portfolio of development engagements expanded substantially
and combined with short one-year grant cycles, this led to a major increase in the number of active
financial commitments raising from 36 to 74 from 2009 to 2012 as well as a significant backlog of
open accounts under the DAPP. The review notes that following the adoption of the new SFD
and PID this trend was reversed which reveals the positive effects of the process of
streamlining and aligning the DAPP to the AMG. In addition, commendable efforts have been
made by the DAPP team, with support from the MENA management and in close collaboration
with KVA, to further rationalize the financial management of the programme.
Yet, the review also points to some more fundamental challenges for the DAPP, related to its
strategic focus, the highly volatile and difficult contexts that it operates in, and a quite complex
organizational set-up working at different levels and in different countries. While acknowledging
the circumstances that the current SFD and PID were born under characterized by urgency to
respond swiftly to a reform momentum, the review emphasizes the importance of giving these
matters thorough consideration in order to make better use of the DAPP as political instrument in
the future.
Despite the profound contextual changes that the MENA region has undergone, the overall
conceptual framework of the DAPP, for the most part, remains unchanged. This includes its
double strategic objective: i) To promote reform and democratization processes; and ii) To
improve dialogue, understanding and cooperation between Denmark and the MENA region, as
well as the three original thematic focus areas drawn from the 2002 UNDP Arab Human
Development Report. Only the fourth thematic focus on EGJC was added to the existing
framework. However, the SFD and the PID do not clearly present the DAPP theory of change,
demonstrating how the programme is expected to bring about change, a turbulent decade after it
iii
was initially conceived. Hence, the review indicates a need for becoming more explicit about the
programme’s basic assumptions, adjusting them if needed, and on that basis developing realistic
pathways for achieving results laying out a roadmap for monitoring and evaluation. These
reflections would include clarifying the use of the concept of dialogue, and the concepts of reform
and democratization, as well as outlining principles for prioritizing efforts in specific countries.
This could strengthen the rationale for working both in countries where more rapid systemic
change is likely to happen and countries where large-scale political reform is not imminent.
In this regard, the review also notes that the SFD could be clearer in setting out the main
policies for Denmark’s cooperation for the MENA region and the role of the DAPP in
furthering them, as well as in presenting the programme’s relationship and complementarity with
other Danish development and foreign policy instruments. There are large areas of potential
overlap, not least with the Peace & Stabilisation Fund, and it would be useful to clarify the DAPP’s
comparative advantage and limitations, particularly in contexts with difficult security environments.
The review raises the question of whether the DAPP is appropriate to use as a key instrument in
countries where such a situation prevails and highlights the relevance of weighing the more
incremental and long-term objectives of DAPP activities against immediate risks, including in
terms of operational capacity.
The review views institutional cooperation between Danish and Arab organisations as a
determining factor of the success of the DAPP as a programme with a certain originality
distinguishing it from other interventions in the region. The move towards a more limited number
of strategic partners with long-term agreements is likely to further strengthen the added value of
this modality as a core feature of the DAPP. However, the security environment in the focus
countries has a significant impact on the extent to which Danish partners can or are willing to
operate. Moreover, the strategic partners enjoy a high degree of autonomy in defining their own
interventions. The review thus acknowledges the relevance of opening up for more diversified
support modalities within the DAPP with a view to becoming more effective in reaching the
programme’s overall objectives, and not least to support democratic transition assistance when
opportunities arise.
Two new categories of support, Direct Democratic Assistance and Support to EGJC have
explicitly been reserved to countries experiencing opportunities of democratic breakthrough. These
two categories of support comprise engagements implemented through multilateral organisations,
international NGOs as well as private organizations (Arab and Danish). While this attempt to
simplify the programme design is understandable, recent developments in the MENA region
clearly demonstrate how difficult it is to foresee which modalities will be most appropriate to
different countries. Therefore, the review suggests more flexibility with regard to the use of
support modalities, but with a more systematic use of the standard quality criteria for
development assistance (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability) in the
identification and implementation of engagements. This should include careful consideration about
the manageability of the programme, e.g. overall size of the portfolio and complexity of the DAPP,
as well as procurement rules. Indeed, support provided under the Direct Democratic Assistance
category accounts for the highest number of commitments in 2013-2014, including stand-alone
activities which are not necessarily planned in a coherent manner with a focus on the programme’s
overall strategic priorities.
As regards support to EGJC, the review also finds it relevant to explore opportunities to
geographically expand activities beyond the current focus on Tunisia and Egypt, including in the
iv
fields of social dialogue/labour market reforms, improving preparedness and access of youth to
job markets through private sector initiatives, as well as job creation in the field of green growth.
However, it will be important to take the lessons learned from the initial phase of support into
consideration in future programming, in particular when it comes to the choice of implementing
partners for different types of interventions. The portfolio reflects a clear commitment to respond
to the challenge of job creation, but its strategic focus has been insufficient and missing
considerations on how to incorporate domestic private actors to support SMEs, thus not giving
enough attention to potential impact and sustainability. Furthermore, linkages and
complementarities between job creation initiatives and reform agendas could be better utilized.
The review underlines that the process of ‘normalization’ of the design and mode of
implementation of the DAPP in accordance with the AMG is an important and necessary step
to ensure a higher degree of consistency in approach and to get a firmer grip on
programme results. There is still room for improvement though, notably when it comes to
planning processes and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. In order for these to become
useful as a tool for strategic management, it will require a strengthened focus and a clearer
prioritisation. In addition, efficiency gains should be pursued e.g. through global agreements with
Danish strategic partners receiving funding from other MFA units. The DAPP team must be
commended for taking measures to address some of these challenges and the extension of the
programme implementation period from the current one-year to two-years in 2015-2016, and
thereafter a suggested three-year period will constitute a major improvement in this relation.
It will without doubt require a lot of discipline to develop and maintain a firmer strategic focus,
but the review finds that this would contribute considerably to enhancing the impact of the DAPP
as a political instrument. This would also help enhancing the visibility of the DAPP,
contributing to raise awareness about the continued relevance of the programme and providing a
strengthened platform for joint actions with other donors and dialogue with national stakeholders.
In this connection, the field presence available through embassies and technical advisory
offices provides a unique, but under-exploited opportunity to ensure that technical support
provided through the DAPP is linked to political dynamics at the national level. This can
potentially give some leverage in the political dialogue which should be utilised in a structured and
strategic manner. However, it will require a clarification of the division of labour between the units
involved in the DAPP both in the MENA department and at the decentralised level, and fostering
more ownership and active involvement of the embassies.
The review provides recommendations and suggestions that are intended to give guidance on
measures and steps, both in the short and the medium term, to ensure that ongoing efforts to
strengthen the focus of the DAPP and its alignment to the AMG are carried on. However, the
tasks required for these improvements to be achieved in a timely and effective manner are
comprehensive. It will thus require that a coordinated and systematic planning process, taking into
account the capacities and resources available, is rigorously followed.
v
1
INTRODUCTION
This Review Aide Memoire (RAM) presents the major findings and recommendations of the
Review of the Danish Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP). The review takes its point of
departure in the new Strategic Framework Document (SFD) 2013-2016 and the Programme
Implementation Document (PID) 2013-2014 through which the DAPP has moved towards greater
conformity with the Danida Aid Management Guidelines.
The Review constitutes the mandatory mid-term review although it is carried out early in the
programme cycle so as to feed into the programming exercise for 2015-2016. Consequently, there
is limited basis for assessing concrete results of the DAPP development engagements. Instead, the
focus of the review is mainly on drawing more generic programmatic lessons based on an
assessment of the overall aid management framework, as per the questions raised in the Terms of
Reference (TOR) in Annex 1.
It should be emphasised that most of the DAPP-related reviews and studies referenced in the
TOR were still ongoing when this RAM was written. It is especially important to note that the
Review of the Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute (DEDI) was expected to be conducted
simultaneously, but has been postponed. Therefore, the present report will not analyse the specific
role played by DEDI in the programme. It is also worth mentioning that the review has not
examined specific engagements relating to the sub-theme on ‘Independent quality academia’ as
partnerships from previous phases are currently coming to an end and are expected to be replaced
by a new grant scheme which is currently being designed.
Besides a quite extensive document review, the Review Team (RT) has based its analysis on
consultations with key stakeholders in Denmark followed by country visits to Morocco, Egypt and
Tunisia. A full list of persons met is presented in Annex 2.
The core RT consisted of Anne-Catherine Legendre (team leader) and Mette Bastholm Jensen,
Senior Advisors, Technical Advisory Services (TAS), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Jakob
Mathias Wichmann and Claude Mauret, external consultants. They were assisted by a support team
composed by Alexander Kjærum and Na’akin Pintado, external consultants. Reda Bajoudi (DAPP
coordinator, Danish Embassy Rabat), Lars Vogtmann Sørensen (Deputy Head of Mission, Danish
Embassy Cairo), Anne Margrethe Rasmussen (Technical Advisor, Tunis) and Jørgen G. Jensen
(DAPP Growth and Job Creation Coordinator, Copenhagen) acted as resource persons during the
three country visits.
The RT would like to extend its thanks to the resource persons and all persons met and consulted
during the mission for their kind contributions to the review.
The report presents the findings of the RT and does not necessarily represent the views of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2
CONTEXT AND STRATEGIC APPROACH
2.1 Theory of change
This section looks into the clarity of the theory of change which is supposed to provide guidance
on how and why the programme is expected to work. It will make observations and
recommendations which will be useful to consider in the programming of interventions for the
1
next two years (PID 2015-2016). However, it mainly looks ahead to the next Strategic Framework
Document by suggesting ways to strengthen the SFD’s focus and coherence as a document that
sets out the main policies and strategic objectives for Denmark’s cooperation with the MENA
region and the broad framework of DAPP thematic programmes and objectives that will
contribute to achieving these strategic goals. Developing a clearer DAPP theory of change will be a
key part of this strengthening, and the DAPP team must be commended for already
commissioning studies to inform this process. This concept was not yet in vogue when the current
SFD was developed, but is useful shorthand for explicating the expected causal links between
development engagements and outcomes, thematic objectives, and strategic objectives
2.1.1 Reform and dialogue
The DAPP has a double strategic objective: “To promote reform and democratization processes”
and “to improve dialogue, understanding and cooperation between Denmark and the MENA
region.” The SFD lays out four thematic areas that all contribute to both of the strategic objectives.
The current SFD also describes in some detail a level of “interventions”, which is defined at a
somewhat higher level of generality than “engagements” under the new country and large-project
guidelines.1 A causal chain is implied between each intervention area (or each engagement, to use
current parlance) and reform as well as dialogue. At the same time, dialogue also figures at the
intervention (or outcome) level, contributing to the “knowledge-based societies” thematic area.
This unusual construction combines with a lack of definition of key concepts to confuse the
overall objective and focus of the programme and, by extension, of the particular role envisioned
for each of the strategic partners and other engagements
Firstly, by introducing a double strategic objective, the current SFD appears to imply a relationship
between reform and dialogue, but doesn’t explain the nature of this relationship. Secondly, it is left
unsaid how the four thematic areas are envisioned to contribute to reform and dialogue.
This confusion is compounded by the fact that neither reform, nor dialogue is a particularly welldefined concept. As is, partners (as well as DAPP team members) develop their own
interpretations of what constitutes dialogue and reform in order to connect and meet both
strategic objectives. Without a shared understanding of concepts – and, by extension, a shared
vision of the programme – the DAPP risks insufficient focus and logical coherence, impeding the
programme’s overall impact: As later sections will discuss, there are indications that the DAPP has
become spread somewhat thin, as some engagements appear to have been included on an ad hoc
basis, with little justification beyond a thematic “familiarity.”
For a more stringent theory of change and a stronger focus, the next strategic framework would do
well to elaborate the DAPP conception of dialogue. While historically the definition of the
strategic dialogue objective centers on Danish-Arab dialogue, the current SFD delineates an
additional two levels of dialogue as fully within the scope of the programme, namely inter-regional
New Danida guidelines for country programmes and projects above DKK 35 million have been introduced since the
formulation of the current SFD. These guidelines employ somewhat different terms to denote elements and levels of
results frameworks. In particular, the new guidelines revolve around objectives and outcomes, defined at the strategic
level in the country policy paper and at the thematic and engagement (contract) levels in programme documents. In
contrast, the SFD defines strategic objectives, thematic areas with intermediate objectives, and interventions. This
latter concept is described in terms of broadly defined activities, e.g. “promoting transparent and responsible media.”
In contrast, the engagement level under the guidelines describes outputs and outcomes at the level of individual
contracts or projects.
1
2
and inter-religious/ideological dialogue at the national level.2 This elaboration is likely meaningful
and relevant in the context. However, the SFD provides little guidance regarding the nature of
dialogue. Conceptually it “integrates” dialogue across all DAPP activities through professional
exchanges among organizations with shared reform interests, apparently assuming that
partnerships lead to or constitute dialogue. Yet the SFD also implicitly acknowledges a qualitative
difference between such dialogue among peers and DAPP activities that “have…intercultural
dialogue as their stated objective.” The differentiation has significant implications.
At a minimum, the two types of dialogue/activities would seem to make quite different contributions
through different causal chains to the objectives of reform and/or dialogue, that is, they play quite
different roles in the theory of change. By implication, these different activities should also be
measured against different qualitative and quantitative standards3 – and, the RT would suggest, not
all engagements can be expected to drive change towards dialogue as well as reform (though some
may).4
As is, many partners struggle to find more or less contrived ways to translate their dialoguefocused activities into drivers of reform or, conversely, to operationalize dialogue in a way that is
manageable in the context of reform-focused activities. This not only risks pushing partners into
activities that are not their forte, with little impact as a result; it risks being counterproductive. For
example, the reform objective does not benefit from a partner involving a Danish expert over a
more appropriately skilled international expert; likewise, potential reform impact suffers when
opportunities for co-funding are missed because other donors have little interest in funding
Danish-Arab dialogue.5
Like dialogue, reform and democratization are nebulous concepts that the next SFD would do well
to clarify. The Arab uprisings raised expectations of rapid and wide-ranging systemic, democratic
change across much of the MENA region. By now, however, opportunities for reform again
mostly resemble the early days of the DAPP, where reform ambitions were conceived as
incremental, long-term efforts. Besides the temporal dimension, a DAPP concept of reform might
also clarify the “level” of ambition; for example, at this point the most promising entry points may
not (only) be at the national or systemic levels, but rather at more local or grass-roots levels.
However, to maintain a focus, the DAPP and its partners must carefully elaborate their theory of
change to explain how otherwise scattered, low-level interventions and outcomes contribute to
long-term, systemic impact and reform. The current SFD describes its objective as reform and
democratization, an expansive point of departure that the RT appreciates for recognizing that
much reform in the MENA region will continue within the general parameters of non-democratic
states. That said, a rights-based approach to reform might usefully contribute to defining and
focusing the concept somewhat. Likewise, the definition of reform might also usefully indicate in
The expanded definition of dialogue is included in the explanatory text of the SFD, though not in the actual strategic
objective. Future SFDs should make the inclusion of additional levels explicit.
3 For example, the level of ambition of dialogue activities might more usefully be measured in terms of reach and
attitudes, that is, their ability to achieve impact beyond those individuals directly involved in DAPP activities, e.g.
through cascading approaches and promotion of the adoption of dialogue methods in other contexts, etc.
4 There are reasons why dialogue was perceived as politically important in the first place, and certainly dialogue
remains politically relevant in a context of deepening sectarian and religious-secular fault-lines. In other words, the
suggestion here is not to exclude dialogue as a strategic objective altogether, but rather to differentiate the two strategic
objectives more clearly, including the expected contributions of individual thematic areas and engagements.
5 The recommendation to differentiate obviously does not mean that opportunities for professional Danish-Arab
exchanges and dialogue should be disregarded; rather, the theory of change should clarify the expected contribution of
different types of partners and, by implication and where relevant, prioritize reform vs. dialogue considerations.
2
3
what contexts reform can reasonably be pursued under the DAPP, for example, whether reforms
or the “foundations” of a hoped-for democratic transition might be pursued in outright conflict
environments where no national government or political process currently exists, such as Syria.
2.1.2 Connection of thematic areas to strategic objectives
The DAPP theory of change should offer a compelling explanation for the relevance of thematic
areas and their link to one or the other strategic objective. Three of the four current thematic areas
are derived from key challenges to human development identified in a 2002 UNDP Arab Human
Development Report (AHDR). The SFD does not offer analyses to demonstrate that these areas
were and remain key drivers of reform and democratization (as opposed to human development
writ large), and more than a tumultuous decade later at that; nor does it explain the causal links
between each thematic area and the strategic objective(s) (see also section 2.2 below). Thematic
objectives such as promoting human rights, good governance, and women’s rights can relatively
readily be linked with a strategic reform and democratization objective, but the coherence and
contribution of the “knowledge-based societies” thematic area is less apparent. The SFD
description emphasizes primarily the significance of free and independent media to democracy and
good governance (and indeed media support is often included under these thematic objectives in
other programmes), but little attempt is made to explain logically how dialogue and academia are
envisioned to feed into what strategic objective(s). The RT would encourage the DAPP to rethink
the current key challenges in the MENA region and more explicitly explain the causal logic
connecting thematic objectives to strategic objectives.
The fourth thematic area, growth and employment, was added in late 2011 to address the challenge
posed to “new democratic processes and institutions” by widespread unemployment and economic
stagnation. While these are certainly critical development issues, it is less clear how this thematic
area contributes to promoting reform and democratization (or dialogue), or what comparative
advantage the DAPP has to offer in this area. There may well be relevant linkages, but these must
be clarified and made more explicit. A useful point of departure may be to consider a rights-based
approach and opportunities to elaborate Danish priorities in the area of social and economic rights,
just as Danish partners working on social dialogue and social protection might help explicate
connections between the thematic area and strategic objectives.
Recommendations:
1. Clarify the concept of dialogue, and the concept of reform and democratization In particular,
differentiate the contributions and expectations of activities with an explicit dialogue objective
vs. more reform-oriented activities.
Medium-term
a. Differentiate the reform and dialogue strategic objectives: Not all thematic areas/objectives
and engagements/outcomes should be expected to contribute equally to dialogue and reform.
b. Re-think thematic objectives to ensure coherence and relevance. In particular, reconsider the
“knowledge-based societies” thematic area and explain how “economic growth and job
creation” contributes to driving reform.
4
2.2
Contextual analysis
2.2.1 General observations
The thematic focus areas of the DAPP are based on the contextual analysis provided in the 2002
AHDR which was the first Human Development Report on the Arab region. Through a
comparative study the 2002 AHDR identified three main deficits: the freedom deficit, women's
empowerment, and the knowledge deficit.6
Since 2002 the MENA region has undergone profound contextual changes that have altered the
situation related to these three deficits. For example, the 2002 AHDR highlights the low level of
access to the internet in the Arab region as an indicator of the lack of access to knowledge. In 2013
40 % of the Arab population were internet users, higher than both Africa and the Asia Pacific
region.7
These developments, in turn, have also had significant impacts on the opportunities for achieving
the strategic objectives to promote reform and democratisation processes and to improve dialogue,
understanding and cooperation between Denmark and the MENA region. Using these objectives
as a starting point, the DAPP partner countries can be classified along the two dimensions of
reform and dialogue:
-
Extent to which there are opportunities for dialogue between Denmark and the MENA
region. This is particularly related to security threats that inhibit opportunities for dialogue: On
the one hand it becomes more difficult for Danish strategic partners to work in the countries;
on the other it produces an environment where other priorities take precedence over engaging
in dialogue for civil society and the government.
-
Extent to which there are opportunities for reform. This is particularly related to whether
contextual developments indicate a window of opportunity for reform and positive change in
the four thematic areas.
Accordingly, the DAPP focus countries could be classified as exemplified in the table below. This
mapping – although simplified – may be helpful in thinking about the contextual approach to
working in the countries, prioritization of resources, the strategic focus (on reform or dialogue or
both) and the temporal dimension of the programme.
Table 1: Classification scheme of DAPP focus countries
Low
Opportunities for
rapid systemic
reform
Opportunities for Dialogue
(linked to the security threat in the country)
Low
High
Morocco
Syria
Jordan
Yemen
Egypt
High
Libya
Tunisia
6 (UNDP, 2002)
7 http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/publications/wtid.aspx
5
2.2.2 Opportunities for dialogue
The strategic objective of dialogue is closely related to the modality of strategic partnerships,
whereby the DAPP supports direct collaboration between Arab and Danish partners as well as the
partners’ work with regional and in-country dialogue. As noted above and evidenced by the
presence of strategic partners across countries, the security environment of the focus countries has
a significant impact on the extent to which Danish partners can or are willing to operate.
Therefore, security is an important determinant of the extent of dialogue opportunities in the focus
countries. Since the Arab uprisings security has been unpredictable at best and dangerous at worst,
presenting severe challenges in several of the focus countries.
There are limited opportunities for dialogue in Libya, Yemen and Syria, where the adverse security
environment makes it difficult for partner organizations to operate (as well as for the MFA to
apply its normal quality procedures for aid management). Yemen is facing an unprecedented
confluence of crises, which threaten to overwhelm the beleaguered Yemeni government. Only two
of the eleven strategic partners (IMS, DIHR) are currently working in the country, and with
significant difficulty as internationals are currently prevented from travelling to the country due to
high security risks. The country’s problems include international terrorism, violent extremism,
religious and tribal conflict, separatism, and transnational smuggling. Making matters worse, the
country has porous borders, a heavily armed population, and a historical absence of much central
government control. As in Yemen, the nationwide authority of the government and parliament in
Libya is challenged in practice by autonomous regional militias and underdeveloped state
institutions. At the core of Libya’s insecurity is the power of its non-state armed groups. A recent
rise in violent clashes, especially in Tripoli, led most international NGOs working in the country to
evacuate their staff for several weeks; some NGO’s have yet to return to the country. The situation
in Syria constitutes by far the worst example of how the security situation restricts operational
possibilities.
In Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia there are still good opportunities for dialogue, even though
some of the countries have experienced periods with high levels of insecurity, particularly in Egypt
in the aftermath of the change of power in July 2013, when mass protests erupted in support of
deposed Muslim Brotherhood President Mursi. However, despite sporadic episodes of violence the
general security situation in Egypt has not been a significant impediment for Danish NGOs to
operate in the country, although other factors have proved restrictive such as severe limits to
media freedom, the pending approval of a restrictive NGO law and significant difficulties in
channelling funding to civil society in Egypt. Smaller episodes of violence have been witnessed in
Tunisia. Particularly the assassinations of two political leaders of secular leftist parties shook the
country in August 2013. The assassinations triggered massive protests against the Ennahda
government. Tunisia managed to ride out the storm by initiating an inclusive dialogue resulting in a
new constitution, and the country’s transition has to a large extent been peaceful and non-violent.
Jordan has not experienced the massive demonstrations for regime change seen elsewhere in the
region, but the country has been affected by crisis on its borders. Especially the conflict in
neighbouring Syria continues to impact Jordan, as an influx of refugees, cross-border fighting, and
a thwarted Al-Qaeda plot raise fears of insecurity. Like Jordan, Morocco did not undergo a
sweeping transition in the political environment of 2011 and Morocco remains one of the most
stable security environments in the region
2.2.3 Opportunities for reform
Despite the security concerns in many countries in the region, the reform processes have
continued – albeit at a higher pace in some countries than in others. Generally the region has seen
6
some progress in terms of political rights and women’s rights and empowerment. In contrast, only
very sporadic economic reforms have been initiated in the DAPP focus countries, despite
economic concerns, especially youth unemployment and corruption, being at the centre of the
uprisings in 2011. Youth unemployment in particular constitutes a major challenge in the region.
In Egypt, for example, sixty-nine percent of unemployed people were aged between 15 and 29, and
some 82 percent of those held diplomas and university degrees, according to the national statistics
bureau CAPMAS. The countries also face bloated public sectors, and there has been no progress
in formulating a strategy for promoting sustainable, diversified, private sector-led economic
growth. Lastly corruption remains a widespread challenge.
Opportunities for systemic reform in Tunisia and Libya. Tunisia’s civil liberties have improved across the
board, from academic freedoms, the establishment of new labour unions, to the lifting of travel
restrictions. Tunisia rose from a political deadlock with a new progressive constitution, which was
adopted in 2014 following a national dialogue process that included the ruling political parties,
leading labour unions and other civil society organizations. In Libya – despite being severely
challenged by deteriorating security – a number of positive reforms were initiated following the
overthrow of the Gaddafi-regime, opening space for free political association and participation.
The country has now successfully implemented two elections deemed free and fair by outside
observers. Both Libya and Tunisia have introduced “zippered” gender quota systems for their
national and local elections ensuring greater representation of women in politics. Despite a rather
harsh environment for women, Libya’s 2012 parliamentary election saw a very progressive
horizontal and vertical zipper quota which ensured the election of 32 women out of 80 seats. In
the June 25 parliamentary election 15 % of the parliamentary seats will be reserved for women.
Reform processes in these countries are likely to continue, especially in Tunisia, and there are good
opportunities for external actors to engage in the process, though security will be a factor in Libya.
Longer-term reform prospects for Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco. As short-term rapid reform is not likely in
these countries, focus should be on incremental long-term reform. With the transition of power in
Egypt in June 2013 some of the political rights gained during 2011 and 2012 have seen a decline.
In addition, the Egyptian economy continues to face severe challenges with lack political will to
implement much needed reforms (e.g. subsidies). However, the most recent constitution saw a
number of changes in favour of women’s rights compared to the 2012 edition, including women’s
right to participate in government and to be protected from gender-based violence. King
Mohammed introduced the 2011 Moroccan constitution to satisfy popular demand, but
implementation of the amendments into law has been slow and has not yet produced the promised
changes. Under the 2011 constitution, the monarch can dissolve Parliament, rule by decree, and
dismiss or appoint cabinet members. However, public opinion does appear to play a new and
increasing role in the political process (e.g. through social media) and has in some cases effectively
challenged the authorities. Jordan has taken a few reform steps focusing on the election law,
political parties’ law as well as an overhaul of a public sector rife with corruption and nepotism.
However, generally the country has not made any significant progress towards political reform - as
also observed in the DAPP country strategy (January 2013) - and civil rights and liberties have not
improved in the country. Observers generally believe the King’s top-down reform process is more
politically expedient than substantively effective. Press freedoms continue to be restricted in all
three countries, where those who violate unwritten rules, or red lines, face prosecution and
harassment.
7
However, despite the current lack of major reform efforts, there have been some achievements in
areas such as women’s rights8 as well as opportunities to strengthen youth participation and an
increased recognition of the freedom of association which has opened up space for independent
trade union to operate more freely. The latter has particularly been seen in Egypt, but Morocco
and Jordan have also introduced constitutional reforms which include guarantees for the exercise
of trade union rights.
Syria and Yemen constitute special cases. The current situation in Syria and Yemen is distinct from the
other DAPP focus countries. Despite the overthrow of the previous regime in Yemen progress
across the DAPP thematic areas has been very limited, with particular concerns related to women’s
rights and widespread poverty. Syria’s descent into civil war has also halted any reform processes
and a solution to the crisis does not appear likely in the short-to-medium term. Hence, in Syria the
DAPP can, at best, provide support to actors that may play a constructive role when/if Syria enters
some form of actual transition. This makes Syria fundamentally different from other DAPP
countries where at least some form of national political process is currently underway, however
contested.
The RT suggests defining more clearly what is meant by “reform” in order to strengthen the
rationale for working both in countries where more rapid systemic change is likely to happen and
countries where large-scale political reform is not imminent. In the second scenario, relevant levels
and sub-themes where reform opportunities can be supported in the medium-to-long term should
be specified in country strategies (e.g., employment, women’s rights, youth participation).
Recommendations:
2. Consider more thoroughly the appropriateness of the DAPP as a key instrument in countries
with difficult security environments, including its purpose and role in comparison with the
Peace & Stabilisation Fund.
3. Given the particular objectives of the DAPP, prioritize which countries to focus what efforts
on and complement with a clearer strategy on the use of regional activities.
Medium term
c. Consider a reconceptualization of the thematic objectives for the future strategy development.
2.3
Incorporation of key Danish policy priorities
2.3.1 DAPP as a political instrument
The current SFD was born under difficult circumstances, characterized not least by urgency
stemming from political determination to respond to rapid and major contextual developments in
the MENA region. Despite these challenges, the current SFD pushed the DAPP in a direction of
greater coherence and normalization of the design and mode of implementation. While
recognizing the DAPP as a product of history and politics, the RT would suggest that the
programme’s use as a political instrument, its focus and coherence could be further strengthened in
Women’s rights is opposed by certain societal groups in the countries and remains a controversial topic, but generally
authorities have not opposed increasing women’s rights both before and after the uprisings as witnessed by e.g.
introduction of more gender friendly personal status code (Morocco 2004) and constitutional amendments (With 2014
Constitution in Egypt women saw a clearer language on equality of the sexes through article 11, and a quota of one
quarter of the seats for women in the elected local councils). Women’s social and economic rights are other areas were
some progress can be observed.
8
8
the future by a more strategic and programmatic approach and by a greater differentiation between
the SFD and the Implementation Document.
The DAPP presents significant, but under-exploited opportunities as a political instrument. At the
conceptual level, the SFD’s context analysis is largely void of a discussion of key Danish political
objectives in the region and the programme’s role in furthering them – including in DAPP
countries where Denmark has no representation to otherwise promote Danish policy objectives.
Similarly, the SFD makes no mention of the programme’s relationship to other Danish
development and foreign policy instruments employed in the region. For example, activities
funded under the Peace & Stabilisation Fund as well as humanitarian interventions are currently
underway in several DAPP countries. Although these instruments are generally understood to play
different roles, there are large areas of potential overlap. Elucidating the comparative advantages
(and disadvantages) of the DAPP would help sharpen the programme’s focus, both in substantive
and geographic terms: What, if any, are relevant DAPP contributions in countries where other
instruments are focused, in particular contexts with challenging security environments? By
implication, clearer answers to these strategic questions would also help ensure consistency in
spending: As later sections will discuss in greater detail, DAPP funding by country currently does
not reflect the presence and level of activity of strategic partners. A final point for elaboration at
the strategic level concerns the DAPP’s utility as a regional political instrument. At present, the
DAPP appears to be “regional” primarily by virtue of strategic partners’ presence in multiple
countries, as opposed to any strategic vision.
It is the strategic questions outlined above in conjunction with a context analysis of the key drivers
of change that should determine the DAPP’s strategic and thematic objectives and thus set the
stage for developing the programme’s theory of change. Partly because the policy-level analyses are
largely absent from the current SFD, the difference between the SFD and the Implementation
Document appears primarily as one of level of detail. Hence, for the next strategic framework the
RT suggests a clearer differentiation, focusing the SFD on the DAPP’s role as a political
instrument and the theory of change connecting its strategic and thematic objectives. In contrast,
the elaboration of the theory of change at the intervention/engagement level should be reserved
for the Implementation Document.
The implementation level offers further opportunities to strengthen the DAPP’s utility as a
political instrument. As interviews show, representations in the region are currently insufficiently
aware of DAPP activities to fully exploit them as concrete reference points and levers to advance
policy objectives and, conversely, to support activities’ reform agenda with political dialogue. In
other words, synergies and impact could be enhanced by greater involvement of representations.
That said, the DAPP must strike a balance in its use of engagements for political purposes,
especially where fairly self-directed strategic partners are concerned – including perhaps at times
foregoing a political opportunity in order not to become a liability to partners. For example,
partners may weigh a political desire to engage more with Islamists against reputational risks in a
context such as Egypt, where perceptions are widespread that Denmark is overly sympathetic to
the Muslim Brotherhood. This point also emphasizes the importance of engaging strategic
partners in continuous policy dialogues and a consultative strategy formulation process.
More generally, the RT finds that the visibility of the joint outcomes of the DAPP could be
enhanced in order to strengthen its impact as a political instrument. This could notably contribute
to supporting awareness about the continued relevance of Denmark’s support to the MENA and
provide a strengthened platform for Denmark to engage in joint actions with other donors
9
operating in the MENA region as well as dialogue with national stakeholders. The type of visibility
should obviously be adapted to the nature of the engagement as well as the context, meaning that
in some cases visibility should be avoided due to insecurity or local political sensitivities concerns.
Recommendations:
4. Consider ways to strengthen the DAPP’s utility as a political instrument. In particular, review
opportunities to strengthen synergies between DAPP activities and political dialogue in the
region.
Medium term
d. Clarify the DAPP’s use as a political instrument: Explain how the DAPP furthers key Danish
policy priorities and delineate the particular role of the DAPP in relation to other Danish
development and foreign policy instruments employed in the region.
e. Consider and clarify the operationalization of the DAPP as a regional initiative.
f. Focus the SFD more clearly on the policy level, elaborating primarily the strategic and thematic
objectives, and leaving the further elaboration of the theory of change at the engagement and
outcome level to the Implementation Document.
2.3.2 Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA)
While acknowledging that the Human Rights Based Approach has not been systematically applied
in the design of the DAPP, the SFD stresses that many features of the DAPP have a ‘HRBA
mindset’. The RT agrees with this statement, but is also of the opinion that it could be useful for
the DAPP to apply HRBA in a more structured manner. Reflections on the human rights situation
based on universal standards, including in the field of economic and social rights, as well as the
mapping of the most relevant duty bearers and rights holders in the different focus countries (not
least as regards thematic area IV) could probably help the DAPP become more precise and
focused in its strategy. As regards the HRBA principles, there are some clear overlaps between
some of the DAPP’s existing principles when it comes to inclusion and involvement (participation)
and gender equality and youth participation (non-discrimination). Both these principles appear to
be fairly strongly embedded in the programme although it still appears to be a challenge for many
partners to reach beyond urban elites/middle classes to a broader range of society, particularly to
the most marginalised groups. Transparency and accountability are also likely to be promoted
through the DAPP through e.g. strengthening of independent media and interventions that focus
on vertical accountability (elections), horizontal accountability (e.g. parliament strengthening) and
social accountability (empowerment of independent CSOs). However, there is still room for
improvement in terms of working with these principles in a more deliberate manner.
Recommendation:
5. Use the human rights standards, HRBA principles and the concepts of duty bearers /rights
holders more systematically to frame the strategic approach and to provide a better articulation
of the intervention logic.
2.3.3 Green growth
The Strategic Framework for Natural Resources, Energy, and Climate (NEC Strategy, September
2013) together with the 2011 Strategic Framework for Growth and Employment (GE Strategy) set
the priorities and define the instruments for Denmark’s commitment to promote sustainable and
inclusive growth and employment through development cooperation.
10
Thematic area IV of the DAPP i.e. support to economic Growth and Job Creation (EGJC) takes
into account the key elements of the GE Strategy, i.e. improving local frameworks for economic
growth, advancing access to new technology and innovation, and increasing production and
processing (value chains). However, the RT suggests to develop a clearer relationship between the
DAPP’s objective of promoting EGJC and the thematic priorities of the NEC, i.e. climate change,
energy (clean and resource efficiency), sustainable management of natural resources, water and
land, sustainable agriculture and food production (as an example: the Climate Change/Green
Growth multi-year programme through IFC). The economies and development of the DAPP
focus countries are highly dependent on these areas, and they could be used more explicitly in
defining support areas under thematic area IV when new opportunities will be identified in coming
programming phases or possibly if ongoing initiatives are adjusted. This should, however, be done
with due consideration to the overall manageability of the portfolio.
With regard to the GE Strategy’s focus on improving access to global and regional markets, the RT
suggests that the DAPP focuses more on ensuring that: i) Complementarity with other Danish
business instrument is promoted, e.g. Business Project Development, Danida Business Finance,
Danida Business Partnerships and GoGlobal; and ii) The African Guarantee Fund for Small and
Medium Enterprises (SMEs), supported by Danida, could be promoted especially through the
support provided by IFC. However, the extent to which such synergies can be fully exploited will
be highly dependent on resources available, but as a minimum it would be useful to ensure that
partners are informed about the availability of such opportunities. In addition, a certain level of
exchange of information could be promoted across different Danish supported instruments to
strengthen private sector initiatives in the DAPP focus countries, particularly through the
embassies.
The green growth strategy is closely linked to the HRBA strategy. In relation to thematic area IV,
the RT notes that DAPP’s current development engagements tend to have a more targeted focus
on rights holders than duty bearers. This makes sense from the perspective of job creation and
direct support to SMEs. However, the RT suggests that the DAPP works towards better targeting
of duty bearers in relation to support to reform processes and social dialogue. Existing national
roadmaps for economic reforms may serve as a basis for identifying the most relevant duty
bearers.
3
3.1
ASSESSMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE
Portfolio of development engagements and implementing partners
3.1.1 Overall portfolio development
Since 2008, the DAPP portfolio has become increasingly complex, with growing numbers of active
commitments. Following the adoption of the new SFD the trend reversed and numbers have
declined. Thus, the total number of commitments with activity in the form of disbursements, reimbursements or new commitments rose from from 34 to 74 between 2008 and 2012, but declined
to 58 in 2014. Following the same trend the number of small commitments (below 2 M DKK)
also increased from 6 to 20 in the period from 2008 to 2012, but declined in 2014 to the same level
as in 2008. The figure below summarises the data.
11
Overview of portfolio of engagements
80
Total number of commitments with activity (new commitments,
disbursements, re-imbursements)*
Number of commitments < 2 mio DKK
74
70
58
57
60
50
50
40
70
35
36
30
20
20
10
13
12
12
6
8
6
2013
2014**
0
2008
2009
2010
4 July, 2014
2011
2012
* Commitments also includes to TAOs, DAPP review, Q&A assistant and M&E
Review, which in total amounts to 6 commitments
**Planned commitments for 2014
Source: Overview of annual commitments 2008-2014
No. 13
3.1.2 Type of implementing partners
The portfolio of engagements has mainly been implemented by four different types of actors:
 Strategic partners or other Danish NGOs
 International NGOs
 International Organizations
 Public institutions, including universities, governmental agencies, etc.
Strategic partners and Danish NGOs have been the main recipients of funding through the DAPP
under the new strategic framework with a total of DKK 227 M in planned commitments in
2013/2014. The second largest group of recipients is international organizations, which has
received DKK 195 M in planned commitments in 2013/2014. The international organizations
receiving the largest funding are UNDP (DKK 41 M), Deauville Transition Fund (DKK 38 M)
and the World Bank (DKK 26 M). The data is summarised in the table below.
Table 2: Type of implementing partners and funding levels
Partner type
Strategic partners
or other Danish
NGOs
International
NGOs
International
Organizations
Planned
commitment 2013
(DKK M)
Planned
commitment 2014
(DKK M)
Total planned
commitments
2013/2014
(DKK M)
227
Share of total
commitment
124
103
40%
37
19
56
10%
113
81
194
35%
3.1.3 Regional balance
According to the PID a certain balance between the seven focus countries is sought, understood as
a need for a minimum critical mass in each focus country. Despite this central criterion there is an
imbalance between the seven countries in terms of funding, with Syria, Tunisia and Yemen
receiving 13-19 % of the total planned commitments, Egypt and Jordan receiving 8 % and 5 %
12
respectively, and Libya and Morocco receiving only 3 % of the funding. An imbalance is also
evident in the country presence of strategic partners, who seem to have greater engagement in
countries with good opportunities for dialogue (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia). Conversely,
only a few strategic partners operate in countries with limited options for dialogue (Libya, Syria
and Yemen), likely due to the poor security environment.
That said, a large part of the funding is not country-specific, but rather given to regional
programmes. Hence, it is difficult to accurately determine the precise amount of funding spent in
each country.
Table 3: Countries’ funding levels
Countries
Egypt
Jordan
Libya
Morocco
Syria
Tunisia
Yemen
Regional
Admin.
Total
Planned
commitment
2013
(DKK M)
16
11
7
7
43
54
44
90
12
284
Planned
commitment
2014
(DKK M)
29
16
7
8
30
52
40
81
12
275
Total planned
commitments
2013/2014
(DKK M)
45
27
14
15
73
106
84
171
24
559
Share of total
commitment
(DKK M)
8%
5%
3%
3%
13%
19%
15%
31%
4%
100%
Number of
strategic
partners
working in
countries
10
7
2
7
2
8
2
/
/
/
3.1.4 Thematic balance
Similar to a country balance the PID also stipulates that “a central criterion for the selection of proposed
DAPP interventions is to ensure a certain balance between the four thematic areas, in order to ensure that all of
these politically prioritized areas are sufficiently addressed.” However, similar to the distribution of activities
and funds across countries, there is also an imbalance among the thematic areas with, women’s
rights and empowerment receiving the least funds. The total planned commitments for 2013-2014
for the thematic area women’s rights and empowerment amounted to DKK 37 M, representing
only 7 % of the total planned commitments.
Within the thematic area of economic growth and job creation it is also worth noting that mainly
three commitments (AfBD / Souk Attanmia, MENA MSME Facility / IFC-IBRD-IDA and VNG
International Development Centre for Innovative Local Governance) consist of direct support to
SME initiatives, notwithstanding the SFD’s stated emphasis on the need to stimulate private sector
driven growth. Overall, the portfolio of engagements under theme 4 reflects the commitment of
the DAPP to promote rapid responses to the challenge of job creation, but its strategic focus
appears insufficient to lead to real impact and it does not clearly take into account the potential
linkages and complementarities between job creation and reform.
13
Table 2: Funding for thematic areas
Thematic area
Human rights, human
freedoms and good
governance
Women’s rights and
empowerment
Knowledge based
societies
Economic growth and
job creation
Crosscutting9
Total
Planned
commitment
2013 (DKK
M)
160
Planned
commitment
2014 (DKK
M)
85
Total planned
commitments
2013/2014
(DKK M)
245
Share of total
commitment
(DKK M)
Number of
strategic
partners
44%
5
10
27
37
7%
2
20
49
69
13%
2
85
70
155
28%
2
7
284
44
275
51
559
9%
100%
/
/
Recommendations
6. Continue efforts to streamline the portfolio to improve manageability and strengthen strategic
focus. This includes striving towards a reduced number of engagements/partners (should aim
for no more than 30 active engagements, as per guidelines for country programmes) and not
adding new sub-themes to the programme in the current strategic period.
7. Clarify the targeted levels of funding per country and thematic area and consider revising the
stated objective of a regional and thematic balance in the Project Implementation Document.
8. If job creation is pursued as an objective for new interventions, SMEs should be supported
directly through banks/microfinance or professional organizations, provided that the right
modalities can be identified. Explicit exit strategies promoting domestic private actors should
be developed for existing SME initiatives implemented through multilateral organisations and
municipalities.
3.2
Implementation modalities
3.2.1 Use of modalities
The PID presents four implementation modalities - which in the RT’s understanding should rather
be characterised as categories of support, as will be explained below: i) DAPP Partnership
Agreements, a.k.a. strategic partnerships; ii) Direct Democratic Assistance to countries in
transition; iii) Support to Economic Growth and Job Creation to countries in transition; iv)
Secondments to international institutions.
The primary category of support since 2013 for planned commitment of funds has been strategic
partnerships, which accounts for 39 % of the total planned commitments for 2013-2014. Despite
this, direct democratisation assistance had the highest number of commitments with activity in the
form of new commitments, disbursements or re-imbursements, indicating a greater administrative
burden than the strategic partnerships.
9
Including, among other, strategic reserve, review and evaluation, secondments, TAOs, etc.
14
Table 3: Funding across modalities/categories of support
Modalities/Categories
of support
Strategic Partnerships
Direct democratization
assistance to countries in
transition
Support to economic
growth and job creation
Secondment of experts
No modality10
Total
Planned
commitment
2013 (DKK
M)
117
99
Planned
commitment
2014 (DKK
mM)
103
43
Total planned
commitments
2013/2014
(DKK M)
220
142
Share of total
planned
commitment
(%)
39%
25%
Number of
commitments
with activity in
2013
22
31
60
66
126
23%
10
7
.5
284
10
54
275
17
54
559
3%
10%
100%
1
6
However, it should be noted that a number of agreements entered before the development of the
SFD and the PID remain. These do not necessarily fit the logic behind the four categories of
support. This includes Danish organisations that have not been selected as strategic partners.
Nevertheless, it is the understanding of the RT that no new commitments were to be made unless
they fit within the four defined categories of support.
While this attempt to simplify the programme design is understandable, the RT finds this
framework for use of aid modalities inadequate for the following reasons:
 Confusion between modalities and thematic focus areas. The definition of modalities does not
clearly capture the specific methods used to channel funds from the DAPP and implement
programmeme activities, and it causes confusion that two of the modalities are associated
with specific thematic areas (democratisation defined as a sub-theme under thematic area 1
and complete overlap between thematic area IV and the corresponding modality). In
practice, these so-called modalities comprise engagements currently implemented through
different channels: i) Multilateral/international organisations; ii) International NGOs; iii)
National private organisations; iv)Twinning between Danish (non-state) and Arab
organisations.
 Unnecessary rigidity can end up being at the expense of quality. As emphasised by the Danida
Programme Guidelines, it is not possible to define a programme design that is suitable for
all circumstances. The essential principle with regard to maintaining high quality standards
is to consider the five standard quality criteria for development cooperation, regardless of
the choice of modalities. In general, contextual differences tend to significantly influence
the choice of aid modalities and it will often be necessary to combine modalities with due
consideration of the national and sector-specific circumstances. Recent developments in
the MENA region clearly demonstrate how difficult it is to foresee which modalities will be
most appropriate to different countries.
The sections below will provide a more detailed assessment of each of the four selected DAPP
categories of support. The External Grant Committee in December 2013 recommended that the
mid-term review consider the possibility of extending bilateral interventions aiming at enhancing
economic growth and job creation beyond the two existing focus countries (Egypt and
Tunisia).This will be included in section 3.2.4. In addition, the RT has specifically been requested
10
Including among other, strategic reserve, review and evaluation, TAOs
15
to look into the use of twinning as a possible additional implementation modality (see TOR) which
will be done in section 3.2.5.
3.2.2 DAPP Partnership Agreements
The establishment of long-term engagements with a reduced number of partners offers a number
of benefits for the DAPP:
 Opportunity for a more strategic effort, combined with flexibility to adjust geographical
focus according to needs and a mixture of national and regional efforts.
 Reliable and trusted intermediaries; particularly valuable in contexts where donors find it
difficult to support CSOs directly.
 Builds on Denmark’s longstanding support to developing expertise and collaboration in a
number of priority areas.
 Can serve as a good entry point for political dialogue by providing evidence of good
practices which can be used to push for systemic change in specific areas.
Overall, there seems to be a good complementarity between the selected partners which are all
expected to offer a unique comparative advantage. This means that partners should differentiate
themselves from a technical/professional perspective, but also possess project management
capacity and experience in collaborating with partners in the MENA. All but one of the strategic
partners were supported by DAPP prior to the establishment of this new modality; hence, they
generally appear to meet these criteria. That said, the RT finds it debatable whether the new
consortium led by the Women’s Council in Denmark meets the basic requirements for strategic
partners, as defined in the PID. While consortium members clearly possess a unique expertise in
preventing violence against women, with a focus on domestic violence, their capacity to manage
partnerships in the DAPP focus countries seems inadequate. There is also evidence to suggest that
the consortium members could work under the auspices of the agreement with KVINFO as they
have previously done.
The RT also notes that the DAPP could make better use of its prior collaboration with the
strategic partners by drawing more explicitly on lessons learned from previous phases, including
follow-up on reviews and other performance assessments. There are examples of inconsistencies
between plans and reporting of partners that have been allowed to persist over several years along
with little, if any follow-up on major, planned management and performance improvements.
The mini pools that are managed by three of the partners (KVINFO, MS-ActionAid and DUF)
offer an opportunity to have a broader outreach in the dialogue between Danish and Arab
organisations. However, the value-for-money of these mechanisms could be questioned as
transaction costs11 seem very high and the impact is uncertain. DUF’s mini pool may differ from
the two others though, as its mini pool constitutes a core operating model for DUF to work with
its members.
3.2.3 Direct Democratic Assistance
The characteristics of this modality are somewhat unclear. According to the PID it is “simply a
budget line available for Danish contribution and response to urgent priorities for transition
assistance to the transitional countries in the MENA region.” It is further specified that standalone bilateral activities may be supported. In this respect, there seems to be some confusion
11
Costs include administration, technical advice/counselling of grantees as well as functioning of grant committees.
16
between this modality and the strategic reserve: Whereas the latter comprises unallocated funds
that can be used for unforeseen interventions, no specific budget is allocated to the Direct
Democratic Assistance modality. The majority of funds categorised under this modality does seem
to have been used for urgent responses to transition processes such as elections and constitutional
processes managed by multilateral organisations, e.g. UNDP. Nevertheless, there are also examples
of engagements where the urgency of providing Danish funding in the given context is not as
obvious (for example, interventions implemented by international NGOs such as political party
support in Libya, support to national radio, as well as dialogue processes in Tunisia). This does not
per se entail that these initiatives are irrelevant, but given the urgency of mobilisation of funds,
there is a risk of slackening normal programme design requirements and of quality standards being
set aside.
While the RT acknowledges that it might be valuable that Denmark is able to mobilise rapid
support to selected countries in critical moments of transition through the DAPP, the RT also
considers it a considerable challenge to the coherence of the programme if the DAPP serves as a
funding instrument for transition initiatives which are not based on an overall strategic analysis
prioritising areas of particular relevance to the programme as a whole. This can lead to a quite
scattered portfolio, making it difficult for the DAPP to maintain its specific features as a
programme with concrete objectives and a consistent strategic approach and theory of change. It
may be justified to provide immediate support to transition initiatives for various reasons, but
generally the RT suggests the DAPP to limit stand-alone agreements which are not considered as a
more integrated part of the programme, particularly if normal quality assurance mechanisms
cannot be applied due to timing and security reasons. On the other hand, the RT sees
opportunities for complementing strategic partnership agreements with other support modalities
with a view toward strengthening reform initiatives, not just within the scope of urgent transition
assistance, but in any of the DAPP focus countries where it might prove relevant. Furthermore,
pending the upcoming review of the European Endowment for Democracy (EED), the RT
suggests the DAPP to envisage expanding its support to this funding mechanism which aims at
providing rapid and flexible support to actors of democratic change and may thus provide a mean
to cater for new needs emerging in relation with political transition processes.
3.2.4 Support to Economic Growth and Job Creation
Thematic area IV consists of a broad range of development engagements aimed at promoting
economic reforms and the development of a more favourable business environment, on the one
hand, and job creation, on the other hand. The engagements are implemented through different
funding channels/modalities with strengths and weaknesses as outlined in the table below (a more
detailed assessment and suggested adjustments is available in Annex 3)12. The RT is conscious of
the considerable challenges confronting the DAPP in quickly identifying relevant areas of
intervention as well as implementation modalities that were both adequate in terms of achieving
the objectives and manageable given the limited human resources available. The RT is also aware
of the fact the External Grant Committee decided in May 2013 to channel more funds through
multilateral organisations. Nevertheless, it appears relevant to reflect carefully on the extent to
which the current modalities influence the quality of the economic growth and job creation
engagements and to take the lessons learned from the initial phase of support into consideration in
future programming.
The synthetic overview of strengths and weaknesses provides a summary of some of the key features noted by the
RT, but each of these features can exist to varying degrees for each of the partners under the three categories.
12
17
Table 7: Strengths and weaknesses of funding channels used for support to growth/job
creation
Modality /funding channel
Strategic partnership
(DI,
LO/FTF)
Strengths





Multilateral organisations





NGOs, private organisations




Unique experience/expertise
Peer to peer approach
Regional
and
national
interventions
Close monitoring/dialogue with
DAPP
More focus on DK-MENA
dialogue and exchange
Credibility of implementing
partner
Reliable planning, M&E/
reporting and lower
administrative burden for DAPP
team
Potential for more impact on
national processes and high
absorption capacity
Some direct support to
SMEs/job creation
Regional and national
interventions
Expertise and/or context
knowledge of implementing
partner
Direct support to SMEs/job
creation
Context specific interventions
More direct involvement of local
partners and beneficiaries
Weaknesses
 No direct impact on economic
reforms and job creation
 Project approach could limit
local ownership and
sustainability
 Limited number of French
speaking experts in Danish
resource base









Support outside implementing
partner’s core missions in some
cases (e.g. AfDB , ILO)
Danish influence can be more
limited
Insufficient focus can limit
impact on economic reforms
(especially when wide scope e.g.
WB-MDTF)
Limited effect on job creation
and no exit strategies
Insufficient complementarities
between regional and national
initiatives
Procurement regulations can
constitute a challenge
Limited impact on job creation
in terms of volume
No exit strategies
More monitoring and
administration by DAPP
The RT finds it particularly important to reflect on the role of the implementing partners in the
development engagements. For example, is it appropriate for multilateral organisations to function
as direct implementers of projects that promote job creation/SMEs, an issue also linked to
questions of sustainability and exit strategy? This concern is also relevant when it comes to
development engagements implemented by NGOs and private organisations. These pilot initiatives
can promote interesting dynamics, provided that links are made to broader national processes and
reform agendas.
Support to strengthen youth’s ability to seize job opportunities constitute an example of an
important area where small scale initiatives under thematic area IV can be linked to larger reform
agendas. The RT agrees with the assessment that the quality of education across the region is
inadequate to ensure the employability and entrepreneurship competencies required for engaging
in private enterprises. Providing business training support, including critical thinking skills, to
young men and women at grassroots level thus appears very relevant to prepare them for working
life. At the same time, this kind of training is likely to contribute to a more general empowerment
process enabling the beneficiaries to participate constructively in public life as citizens. The
experience from the Tunisia in promoting careers in areas that are under-valued by young people
18
(Wajjahni initiative implemented by CJD) is an interesting case in this regard, providing useful
learning that can be used at a larger scale. But besides the issue of competencies, enterprises also
need to have access to resources (land/natural resources) and capital (own capital, credit, etc.)
which illustrates that a more holistic approach should be pursued to address different types of
challenges to promote job creation.
In light of the limitations of the existing modalities, the RT suggests that other channels to support
job creation be explored through closer cooperation with other donors, including contribution to
formal basket funds, delegation to other donors, etc. This could be particularly relevant in Tunisia
where more donors are established by now13. A challenge fund modality could potentially also be
looked into to support private organisations and their collaboration with counterparts
(NGO/professional organisation; Danish or non-Danish). Complementarities and possible
overlaps with other existing Danish instruments would, however, have to be considered carefully
as well as costs efficiency if the volume is limited.
Given the contextual developments in Egypt, the RT finds it relevant to explore opportunities to
geographically expand bilateral support to economic growth and job creation – with due
consideration of the overall manageability of the portfolio. In this regard, it would be relevant to
consider possible synergies across the region as well as synergies between engagements at the
national levels. Potential for this seems to exist, e.g. in the fields of social dialogue/labour market
reforms and better matching between job seekers and labour markets (including the field of
technical and vocational education). The RT has also noted that opportunities for job creation
activities in the field of green growth could be considered in Morocco, which could complement
other activities that the embassy is engaged in outside of the DAPP.
3.2.5 Secondments to International Institutions
The RT notes that in practice it has been difficult to ensure direct linkages between the
secondments and the objectives of the DAPP, while at the same time considerable resources have
been used on the administration of this modality. One challenge is the relevance of the positions to
the core activities of the DAPP – at the EU HQ level there has been more emphasis on positions
at the programmatic level (DEVCO) than on policy (EEAS), while all positions in the EU
delegations have been at the policy level. In terms of ensuring synergies at the operational level this
may not have been an ideal match. This does not mean that the secondments haven’t been
valuable to the EU, but a more direct effect on the DAPP and/or injection of DAPP experiences
into EU processes requires a more strategic approach. This would include consideration of the
level of seniority required for the seconded staff to actually have a chance of influencing the
agenda and/or be involved in key strategic processes. The MENA Department has already taken
stock of the initial experiences of secondments and has adjusted its approach accordingly, aiming
at fewer, but more relevant positions, as well as clearer communication on expectations. The RT
supports this approach and suggests that the DAPP team takes concrete steps to ensure more
systematic exchange of information in order to avoid missed opportunities for Denmark to
influence important processes and to utilise concrete possibilities of synergies at the programmatic
level14. It will furthermore be of critical importance to reduce the administrative burden of this
modality on the DAPP team, so that resources can be invested in technical collaboration instead.
The RT met the Swiss cooperation and EU in Tunis which both expressed interest in collaborating on support to
SMEs, while Switzerland also supports Technical and Vocational Education and the EU has just provided a grant to
UGTT i.e. areas where there seems to be a potential for closer collaboration.
14 One joint meeting in Copenhagen for all seconded experts has been held. This appears to be a relevant measure
which could be repeated on an annual basis, but it could also be supplemented with more regular contacts e.g. a regular
cadence of phone meetings with each of the seconded experts.
13
19
3.2.6 Twinning
In prior phases of the DAPP twinning was used as a support modality through which Danish
institutions could cooperate directly with similar institutions in the MENA focus countries.
Initiated in 2010, a collaboration between the Danish Prison and Probation Service
(Kriminalforsorgen) and the Moroccan Ministry of Justice on alternatives to prison punishment is
still ongoing. The case illustrates that this kind of professional exchange can offer a unique entry
point for dialogue with government on concrete reform areas which can link up to the work of the
DAPP strategic partners (e.g. EMHRN in the Moroccan case, and in the future possibly Dignity)
as well as support provided by other donors.
Nevertheless, there are also some challenges related to this modality. Twinning agreements will
usually be relatively small in financial terms, but may require considerable involvement/facilitation
by embassies/TAOs. The benefit of such smaller agreements should also be weighed against
limitations on the overall number of development engagements in the programme. Moreover, the
Danish institutions may need to outsource part of the work to consultants, particularly when there
are language barriers, which could potentially reduce the direct involvement of the Danish
institution and thereby the value of the twinning arrangement. It should also be emphasised that as
a general rule only Danish state institutions can be exempted from entering into direct agreements
without tenders (for more details on tender regulations, consult Danida Business Contracts).
All in all, the RT believes that in some cases twinning can constitute a key element to leverage
change, based on the particular expertise held by Danish institutions and the benefits of peer-topeer collaboration. Beyond the DAPP, there is an enhanced focus on twinning arrangements
within Denmark’s recent promotion of Economic Diplomacy. This could create new
opportunities, but is also likely to create congestion in certain areas. Hence, the RT suggests that
twinning arrangements could be envisaged as a support modality as long as the standard quality
criteria for development cooperation are carefully considered, including any effects it may have on
the manageability of the programme, and taking into account procurement regulations.
Recommendations:
9. Maintain core DAPP intervention areas around strategic partnerships between Danish and
MENA organisations. Complement these with other support modalities which can enhance
efforts in specific reform areas with due consideration of public procurement rules.
Medium term
g. All strategic partnership organisations that have not been reviewed during the last 4-5 years
(including joint reviews) should be subject to a performance review prior to an extension of
support beyond 2016. New strategic partners should undergo a capacity assessment
h. A review of the mini pools supported by the DAPP should be undertaken prior to an
extension of support beyond 2016 with a focus on value for money. This could include
exploring the possibility of transferring the management of pool funds for small MENA
dialogue projects to CISU.
3.3 Quality of the implementation framework and processes
This section provides a summarised assessment of the quality of the DAPP implementation
framework and the way it has been operationalised through concrete development engagements,
with a particular focus on the DAC criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability.
20
3.3.1 Effectiveness
A general observation regarding the effectiveness of the programme relates to the discussion in
section 2.1 on the need to clarify the DAPP’s theory of change and the overall results framework.
Indeed, if the basic assumptions regarding causal linkages and objectives are not clearly defined
and shared with implementing partners, it will be difficult to assess the extent to which the
development engagements are contributing to achieving the expected outcomes and objectives.
The RT thus supports the measures taken by the DAPP team to address this challenge with
ongoing commissioned work on M&E and the concept of dialogue. This is yet another important
step in the DAPP’s ongoing efforts to re-structure its interventions into a more coherent
framework and to improve its work processes.
Building on the solid foundations laid down by longstanding support to professional partnerships
between Danish and Arab organisations in a number of priority areas, the DAPP has offered a
unique opportunity for Denmark to seize the positive momentum to support democratic reforms
early on in the process of political turnover in the MENA region. Thereby, the DAPP appears to
have been instrumental in promoting critical areas for transition. This comes out most clearly in
Tunisia, which also presents the current best-case scenario. Aside from various distinctive
contextual factors, there are indications of specific DAPP-features having had a positive influence
on the overall effectiveness of DAPP activities in this country. This includes the flexibility to
reshuffle resources and allowing Danish partners as well as the TAO to start working on the
ground in the early stages of transition15.
The RT acknowledges all these positive elements, but it also notes that the implementation of the
DAPP has been characterised by a number of challenges which may have affected its overall
effectiveness. The political need to show commitment and swift responses to positive
developments towards democratisation in the MENA has not always been coupled with realism
about the kind of results that were actually achievable and sustainable within the framework of the
DAPP. This has created a major pressure on the MENA department and particularly the DAPP
team which is still in the process of adjusting the programme to the political changes that the
region has undergone and the related decisions about widening the scope of the DAPP.
From the outset, the DAPP’s focus on dialogue and reform was mainly conceived as a long term
endeavour, but this basic assumption shifted somewhat with the wave of popular uprisings in the
region, drawing attention towards more rapid and radical reforms, particularly in Egypt and
Tunisia, but also Libya and Syria. This development challenged the ‘traditional’ modus operandi of
the DAPP, where bilateral activities were essentially implemented through Danish organisation. As
a consequence the programme opened up for a more extensive use of other modalities. The RT
supports this adjustment, but finds that the new framework’s four core modalities/categories of
support, of which two are reserved to countries experiencing rapid change, are too rigid to really
allow for continuous adaptations to contextual changes. Indeed, whenever changes in the
contextual settings occur and opportunities arise, the DAPP should provide the most adequate
response – and Danish organisations may not always be the most suitable partners in this situation.
In this regard, the RT is of the opinion that the DAPP can become more effective by being more
conscious about using partner organisations - whether strategic partners, multilateral or others - in
their core areas of competence, where they are more likely to produce good results.
The RT notes that the local presence is generally seen as a key strength for ensuring effective implementation as it
allows for identification of more relevant activities and closer collaboration with stakeholders on the ground. As
indicated in sections 2.1 and 4.2, this means that it is a factor that has to be considered carefully when prioritising
where the DAPP should focus its efforts.
15
21
Having said this, the strategic partnerships and collaboration between Danish and Arab
organisations still appears as a determining factor of the success of the DAPP as a programme
with a certain originality distinguishing it from other interventions in the region. Many of the Arab
partners which the RT met during the country visits emphasised that although their Danish
partners did not necessarily contribute the largest amounts of funding, the collaboration was very
valuable to them because it provided practical knowhow in areas of relevance and ‘the power of
good example’ to aspire towards. At the same time, Arab partners appreciated the benefit of access
to strategic partners’ well-developed networks in the region and beyond. Several interlocutors also
stressed that it is often easier to establish a trustworthy relationship with Danish organisations
because Denmark is not perceived as pushing its own agenda in the region16.
Finally, the RT notes and fully supports the move towards longer agreements and financial
commitments which enhance the predictability for partners to plan their work in a more strategic
manner and thereby become more effective.
3.3.2 Efficiency
As reflected above (section 3.1), the DAPP has been able to reduce the number of commitments
with the introduction of three-year agreements with a limited number of strategic partners. This
represents an important step towards a more cost-effective approach. However, the RT finds that
efficiency appears to be given insufficient attention in the assessment of proposals submitted by
partners and in the overall portfolio management. The DAPP focuses a lot on the importance of
building long term partnerships and dialogue, but the value of the contribution of partners in these
areas can be difficult to assess. At the same time, the information provided in the budgets and
financial reports often makes it difficult to get an overview of the cost of partner organisations’
contribution to different results as well as the level of funding managed directly by the strategic
partners’ Arab partners. More generally, limited incentives seem to exist for strategic partners to
work in a performance-based manner that ensures the most efficient use of resources. In the case
of the selection of the Danish Women’s Council-led consortium as a new strategic partner, from
an efficiency perspective the RT finds it difficult to justify that resources are used for building up
the capacity of a new Danish partner when there is evidence to suggest that the intervention could
be managed by an existing partner that already possesses the capacity to implement this type of
intervention.
3.3.3 Impact
The short one-year grant cycles which have characterised the DAPP until now, combined with the
constant political urge, especially since 2011, to respond to various pressing needs in the MENA
region, have constituted major challenges to adopting a more strategic and LEAN approach.
Hence, the RT sees it as a major improvement that the grant cycle period is progressively being
extended, i.e. 18 months for the first phase under the current SFD and 24 months for the second
phase covering 2015-2016. As a response to the recommendation of the External Grant
Committee that the DAPP should further adapt to the general guidelines for Danish development
assistance, the RT suggests that the programme should move towards an alignment between the
timeframe of the next strategic framework and the programme implementation period. The
Although this might seemingly contradict with the fact that the DAPP is conceived as a political instrument, this has
generally not affected the perception of Danish support provided through the DAPP as key areas of Danish interest
are generally seen as related to promoting global agendas in the field of e.g. human rights and climate/environment
rather than promoting narrow commercial or strategic advantages for Denmark.
16
22
current three years’ duration of the strategic framework is in line with the usual timeframe for
Danish bilateral programmes in fragile and conflict-affected countries and would appear a realistic
timeframe in MENA as well17.
Apart from the general challenge of short time horizons, the assessment of the likely impact of the
DAPP is impeded by the insufficient clarity of the two equally important objectives of the DAPP
and of how they are expected to be achieved, as described in section 2.1. Indeed, initiatives that
contribute to advancing dialogue between Denmark and the MENA may not necessarily lead to a
maximal impact in terms of promoting reforms in the focus countries. In some situations, joint
donor efforts and intra-regional activities have proven to provide better responses, and the DAPP
has been sufficiently flexible to accommodate emerging needs. However, these changes in the
DAPP have at times occurred as a reactive response and without clear reference to the
programme’s overall priorities for the region, rather than as the result of a more pro-active
approach where identification of intervention areas, partners and implementing modalities are
based on more thorough analysis and strategic considerations. Hence, while each development
engagement may deliver the expected outputs, the RT considers that the expected impact of the
DAPP could be optimised in the future by working in a more focused manner with the
assumptions behind each development engagement as well as by further exploring potential
synergies across the programme.
This could include cross-cutting reflections on how to reach out to broader sections of society and
promoting the experiences and knowledge gained through various engagements in political
dialogue processes. This should of course take place with due consideration to the difficult
environment that many local partners work in. Some issues will be more controversial than others,
and depending on local political sensitivities it might be necessary to avoid visibility of the work of
some partners. In any case, the DAPP could provide a good framework for sharing information
and knowledge and working towards more inclusive policy processes.
It is worth mentioning in this regard that the strategic partners have a tendency to work mainly
with like-minded civil society organizations which could limit dialogue with broader segments of
society (e.g. Islamic organizations, but also just reaching out to less urban areas). The RT
acknowledges the value of working with more established CSOs which can play important roles as
catalysts in reform processes, but a more diversified outreach is critical to ensuring, through
dialogue, that these processes are considered legitimate and embedded in society at large. The
DAPP team is conscious of this challenge, but it is an issue that deserves continued attention.
Concerning thematic area IV, the RT finds that the current impact of the DAPP on job creation is
relatively low, whereas it is likely to be higher in the field of social dialogue and economic reform,
primarily thanks to some of the more targeted engagements. If the DAPP wishes to create more
substantial results in the field of job creation, it should adjust its strategy as suggested above. In
addition, seeking more complementarity between pilot initiatives related to job creation and
national reform initiatives could contribute to furthering positive dynamics in favour of more
lasting change. Links could also be developed between regional initiatives and local activities in
focus countries, e.g. IFC regional support and AFDB/ Souk Attanmia in Tunisia.
More generally, the DAPP’s utility as a political instrument could be enhanced, cf. section 2.3
above.
17
It is also the timeframe for the Danish regional programme in Sahel for example.
23
3.3.4 Sustainability
The DAPP emphasises the promotion of reciprocal relations and equal partnerships through the
programme. At the same time, an inherent imbalance in the relationship must be acknowledged,
since funding is not provided directly from the DAPP to MENA partners, but is always channelled
through a Danish or international intermediary organisation. However, the basic assumption of
equal partnerships seems to have led to minimising explicit considerations about capacity
development, although in practice it does constitute a core element in most partners’ activities.
Consequently, little attention seems to be given to assessing and discussing the DAPP partners’
approach to supporting the organisational strengthening of their Arab partners. The RT has noted
that some DAPP partners may not work in a sufficiently aligned manner. In some cases, the local
partners directly manage only limited funding for earmarked activities, and the focus of the DAPP
partners seems to be on ensuring that outputs are forthcoming rather than in assisting local
partners in developing their own systems and tools which are adapted to the national context. This
may in turn have a negative effect on the local ownership and sustainability.
The RT has also noted that the focus on dialogue between Denmark and the MENA region may
hamper the strategic partner’s ability to seek co-funding and thereby diversify their funding. The
RT suggests that the DAPP explores how dialogue between Denmark and MENA can be
incorporated in the organisations’ planning in a manner which allows for co-funding of activities
that are not directly related to bilateral exchange.
Concerning economic growth and job creation, several engagements supported by the DAPP
consist of training and preparing young entrepreneurs (business plans, marketing, accountability,
etc.). In order for these actions to be sustainable it will be important for young entrepreneurs or
SMEs to have access to finance to implement their projects. In this regard, the RT finds it
necessary to promote better linkages between the different actors supported through the
programme.
Recommendations:
10. The flexibility and ability to respond swiftly to emerging needs should be maintained but
tempered with a more systematic use of standard quality criteria in the programme design and
implementation. This includes:
o Not predetermining which partners and modalities should be applied in different
situations, but rather selecting these according to their ability to provide results in an
efficient and sustainable manner and based on opportunities to promote reform.
o Having an enhanced focus on value-for-money in partnership agreements, including more
transparency about funds managed by partners in the MENA region
o Working on a better mapping of relevant actors on the ground that impact change and
initiate dialogue with strategic partners on broadening their partner portfolios.
o Working more systematically on ensuring that the capacity of MENA partners is enhanced
through the partnership by strengthening their own tools and methods.
o Promoting more alignment to national reform processes and closer cooperation with other
donors in prioritised interventions areas, and notably in the field of economic reform.
24
4
4.1
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Planning tools and M&E
4.1.1 Overall planning and M&E
In general, the RT finds that the planning of the DAPP is seriously challenged by multiple and
competing demands which hinder a well-prepared process in compliance with normal
programming principles.
Working in a highly volatile context, the programme has been met with emerging requirements,
short notice adjustments and very short and fragmented planning phases with annual
commitments. Furthermore, the programme is composed of partners who enjoy a high degree of
autonomy to define their own interventions. At the same time, the DAPP team is expected to
ensure a certain level of strategic guidance and coherence in order to demonstrate that all of the
supported engagements contribute to concrete outcomes that indicate progress towards the overall
objectives. Add to this that development engagements are implemented in several countries and
that limited resources are available for the day-to-day management of the DAPP, and it becomes
essential that the overall theory of change and results framework are relatively simple and clearly
defined.
The current reporting and M&E mechanisms do not provide sufficient oversight to fully exploit
the strategic opportunities of the DAPP. The standardised reporting format that the strategic
partners must use focuses on the lower level of the results chain (outputs/activities) and does not
provide an overview of progress towards outcomes (including use of baselines and annual targets).
Similar information is provided by other partners supported through other modalities. The result is
very large amounts of information which are difficult to process and use in the overall
management and strategic guidance of the programme. For modalities other than the strategic
partnerships, monitoring from the MENA department seems to be rather inconsistent and it is not
clear to what extent information provided in reports is used.
In relation to thematic area IV, the RT notes that it is very difficult to obtain accurate data on the
number of jobs created (and permanent jobs) and outcomes of support to social dialogue and
economic reforms. The RT suggests the DAPP to : i) promote the use of the DCED results
measurement standard (http://www.enterprise-development.org/), ii) As a first step, promote the
use of universal indicators of change recommended by DCED in order to aggregate impact across
programmes (indicators focus on scale, net income, net additional jobs created).
The DAPP team is conscious of the need to improve planning and M&E and has taken measures
to address it, as indicated above. These efforts should lead to the development of a proper
programme results framework in line with Danida programme guidelines, including a revision of
the DAPP key indicators so as to move away from the tendency to focus on activities and outputs
rather than outcomes. This will require a clearer prioritisation (i.e. lower degree of dispersion and
complexity) to move towards more realistic expectations of what can be achieved by the DAPP
through a more rigorous articulation of strategic outcomes, taking into account the resources and
capacity required to support the achievement of these outcomes.
4.1.2 Managing the DAPP partnership agreements
Seven of the current eleven strategic partners receive funding from units in the MFA besides
MENA (HCP and JTMR). A focal point scheme was initiated in July 2013 to promote a more
coherent and consistent approach to the MFA’s collaboration with these organisations through
25
one overall strategic dialogue. The initiative also envisioned replacing different partnership
agreements with one global agreement with different sub-chapters linking up to each of the
relevant appropriations. The expected benefit of this approach is to reduce the administrative
burden for partners as well as relevant MFA units and to enhance the quality of the dialogue. The
RT views this model as a good opportunity for the MENA department as it would reduce the
work pressure on the DAPP team and free some time for more strategic discussions with the
partners. For strategic partners who do not have any other agreements with the MFA, the RT
would also suggest a more aligned approach where partners are encouraged to use their own
planning and reporting tools instead of standardised MFA formats. The DAPP would then limit
itself to define relevant assessment areas that the partners’ tools should take into account. In order
to ensure adequate follow-up on the incoming reports and oversight, the DAPP team could
furthermore envisage requesting assistance from external consultants for more detailed reviews of
the reports and consolidation of information from partners.
Recommendations:
11. Efficiency gains should be pursued through global agreements for Danish strategic partners
that work with other MFA units and use of consultancy assistance for detailed review of
progress reports, when needed.
Medium term
i. Plan for sufficient time to undertake thorough preparation of the next strategic framework and
a three-year programing phase starting in 2017, including updated situation analysis and broad
consultations with relevant stakeholders.
j. Together with embassies and TAOs, and with assistance from external resources, develop a
simpler tool18 for identifying country priorities within the framework of the SFD to ensure
consistency across DAPP focus countries and to provide guidance throughout programme
preparation and implementation.
4.2 Division of labour
Overall, the RT finds that the field presence through embassies and TAOs – and in some cases
also staff of strategic partners – provides a very valuable, but often also an under-exploited
opportunity for a more strategic use of the DAPP as a political instrument, cf. also section 2.3.
The number of persons who are involved in the DAPP within the MFA at HQ level and
decentralised units is quite high. This represents a potentially big asset, but it also constitutes a
challenge in terms of ensuring a clear division of labour. The main programme management
responsibilities rest with the MENA Department where the DAPP team leader is in charge of the
overall management of the programme and coordination across all DAPP engagements. The core
DAPP team also comprises desk officers with responsibilities for each their thematic areas and
management of strategic partnerships, and one desk officer responsible for the entire portfolio for
thematic area IV. In addition, for Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Syria, the respective country desk
officers (not in core DAPP team) are responsible for those development engagements under
thematic area 1 which are not implemented through strategic partnership agreements. This division
of tasks at HQ level may require more systematic coordination and information sharing about the
DAPP country portfolio. The technical advisors in Tunis and Amman both cover a wide range of
tasks to support the implementation and monitoring of activities on the ground, while the national
advisor in Sana’a plays a similar role for activities in Yemen under the supervision of the advisor in
18
The RT has attached a template in Annex 4 which can be used as inspiration.
26
Jordan. At the embassy in Rabat, a national programme officer assumes the role of DAPP
advisor/coordinator. The embassy in Cairo currently does not have staff assigned to provide
support to DAPP implementation in Egypt, although most strategic partners are active in Egypt.
The embassy is in the process of recruiting a national political affairs officer, who could potentially
become involved in issues related to DAPP, but the position is detached from the programme. All
these different levels should ideally work together to achieve common goals, but this requires clear
communication about expectations, opportunities and limitations.
In this respect, the RT notes that the administrative guidelines for the DAPP (Guide for Desk
Officers), which include a description of the division of labour between HQ and decentralised
units, have not been updated to reflect the extension of the DAPP to new focus countries and
forms of implementation. The same is true for the TOR for advisors. The PID states that the
relation between the MENA Department and the embassies is established on a ‘case by case basis’,
but also specifies that clearer guidelines should be prepared and that a higher level of
decentralisation could be envisaged. This process of clarification of roles has not been properly
initiated yet. In practice then, a number of uncertainties surround the practical division of labour
which may cause misunderstandings and ineffective use of human resources. There is an especially
urgent need to promote a more structured collaboration between the embassies and the MENA
department (especially as regards focus countries where there is an embassy) and to take concrete
measures to strengthen the embassies’ sense of ownership of the DAPP. The RT suggests that
meetings between relevant staff in HQ, embassies and TAOs take place with a fixed cadence to
discuss developments in the context and programme-related issues.
Increased ownership can be fostered by ensuring that the embassies play a more direct role in the
dialogue on the intersection between the policy level and technical support provided through
DAPP, e.g. adjusting the strategic priorities, identifying new potential areas of support and playing
a key role in facilitating cross-fertilisation and synergies between the different engagements at the
national level. The RT suggests that mechanisms adapted to the local context be established at the
decentralised levels (embassies and TAOs) to reinforce the interaction with partners for mutual
benefit, with a focus on the strategic level as opposed to a detailed level of implementation. In
addition, in the next strategy cycle the RT suggests to consider establishing a programme steering
committee composed by the relevant ambassadors in the region and by the Head of the MENA
department to set forth the programme’s strategic line19.
Recommendations:
12. Guidelines, TORs and key principles of division of labour in relation to the DAPP should be
completed and regularly updated, and mechanisms established to enhance coordination
between stakeholders at headquarters and decentralised levels as well as for reinforcing
strategic dialogue between decentralised units and DAPP partners at country level.
4.3 Financial management
It has proved impossible for the RT to get an overview of the status of financial implementation.
As indicated in section 3.1, the increase in funding and scope of the DAPP in 2011 lead to a drastic
increase in the number of annual commitments in 2012. At the same time the programme had a
large backlog of projects with ongoing activities, including an especially huge number of open
accounts (this number has been reduced to 181 as of May 2014). Many of these active projects are
not coherent with the new structure of the programme. However, it should be noted that since the
development of the SFD the DAPP team in collaboration with KVA has made commendable
19
Experiences from the Danish Regional Sahel Peace and Stabilisation Programme could be used as inspiration.
27
efforts to rationalise the financial management. In this regard, it clearly constitutes a huge
improvement to move towards multiannual agreements. The positive effect of this change is
already visible in terms of a reduced portfolio of engagements.
Another challenge for the financial management relates to the fact that many partners do not
submit output-based budgets. It is therefore very difficult to assess results achieved against
financial implementation.
It is also difficult for the DAPP team to accurately monitor the funding flow of the programme on
a number of important variables, including, sub-thematic area, types of organisations receiving
funds (i.e. strategic partners, multilaterals, international NGOs, etc.). The DAPP team has
developed a simple tool to monitor the funding flows of the programme, but this the tool can be
improved in terms of ensuring better consistency with the budgets of the strategic partners (e.g. on
country splits) and categorization. In order to enhance the tracking and monitoring of the DAPP
funding, the RT suggests the financial management tool of the programme to include thematic
objectives and organisation type as key variables. This may necessitate updating the requirements
for financial reporting of the strategic partners
The strategic reserve, i.e. unallocated funds, has followed the procedures for approval of
appropriations. However, as per the new guidelines for programme, it would seem appropriate to
provide clearer guidance for the use of unallocated funds in order to promote their more strategic
use.
Recommendations:
13. Provide clearer guidance for the identification and selection of development engagements
funded through the strategic reserve/unallocated funds.
Medium term
k. Promote the use of output-based budgeting among strategic partners so as to facilitate the
assessment of results against financial progress.
4.4 Risk management
The DAPP has been an early adopter of new developments in risk management, and the SFD
provides a risk matrix that systematically describes risks and management strategies for contextual,
programmatic and institutional risks. As the SFD notes, however, the character and levels of risk
vary significantly across DAPP countries, arguably to a point where the utility of one unified risk
matrix is questionably. Very difficult security environments, for example, would have quite
different risk profiles and warrant qualitatively different (as opposed to simply graduated)
management strategies than more stable countries. Likewise, thematic areas under the DAPP are
diverse and are impacted quite differently by contextual, programmatic and institutional risks. For
example, restrictions on civil society activities in Egypt challenge human rights organizations in a
variety of ways, but have little, if any impact on the operations and impact of growth and
employment interventions. Hence, to provide more useful analytical and operational guidance for
DAPP managers, the RT suggests developing separate risk matrixes for countries where access and
freedom and movement are/are not affected by security and conflict. Similarly, an assessment
should be made whether the four thematic areas are sufficiently differently impacted by different
types of risk to warrant separate risk matrixes for one or more of the four thematic areas.
The SFD notes that the DAPP is considered a high-risk programme. However, it provides little
further guidance to weigh potential impact against risk. At the strategic level, the generally
28
acceptable level of risk should be weighed against the particular role of the DAPP and the
relatively modest size of the Danish engagement. Reference – and differentiation – may also be
made to other instruments, whose focus on e.g. short-term stabilization impact may justify
different “risk thresholds” than the more incremental and long-term objectives of DAPP
activities.20
As noted in the DAPP note on security-related adjustments to the DAPP engagement in Yemen,
co-funding with other donors can be a useful way to share risk as well as some of the challenges
(including cost!) of monitoring activities in difficult security environments. However, the DAPP
does not appear to have systematically considered when and where this option might be pursued.
The RT suggests to consider more systematically where co-funding with other donors might be a
relevant way to spread and share risk.
Finally, the SFD and PID have not incorporated the desk appraisal’s recommendations to
accompany risk matrixes with explanatory texts, to include a discussion of risk management in the
PID, and to provide guidance in the PID for programme managers on “practical” management of
identified risks. The TR agrees with the appraisal that these would be worthwhile elaborations of
the SFD and PID, especially as a consistent source of guidance for DAPP programme managers
challenged by frequent turnover.
Recommendations:
14. Implement appraisal recommendations to elaborate risk management in both SFD and PID.
15. Given the particular role of the DAPP, consider and provide strategic guidance for weighing
potential impact against risk, e.g., weighing activities intended to affect incremental change
towards impact over the long term against immediate risks.
4.5 Exit strategies
Exit strategies are not explicitly integrated into the programme design, whether at the overall
DAPP level or at the development engagement level. One explanation may be the programme’s
use historically of annual commitments and agreements which gave all the interventions a more or
less ad-hoc character, although many of the partners were supported over a number of years and
the long-term partnership approach was always emphasised.
As part of the on-going adaptation to normal programme guidelines and more long-term planning,
it would be appropriate for the DAPP to incorporate more explicit considerations about exit
strategies to ensure a more planned and sustainable exit. At the overall programme level, this could
include reflections about criteria (e.g. performance/good track record of added value, strategic
value, etc.), principles and approaches for exiting such as scenarios (e.g., reduction of complexity,
partners, intervention areas, etc.), or types of exit (gradual end of activities, withdrawal, handing
over, etc.).
As in other strategic areas, individual instances may of course vary; the point here is to define more explicitly the
DAPP’s generally acceptable risk threshold, deviations from which should at least be explicitly explained. For example,
the DAPP has provided a cogent argument for continuing some dialogue and other activities in Yemen, despite
significant risks, as long-established relationships combined with the particular needs of national processes to create
potential for critical impact. Clearer guidance on the DAPP’s general approach to risk tolerance would ensure greater
consistency in decision-making. This could include defining triggers e.g. occurrence of specific security-related events
relating to direct threats or shrinking operational capacity that prompt management to assess the degree to which
actions to respond to the risks should be taken.
20
29
The DAPP should also encourage partners to think about exit strategies as part of a sustainability
plan. Reflections about exit can help clarify and define the role of each partner, reducing the
potential for misunderstandings and future dependency. As indicated in the analysis on
sustainability above, the RT has noted that little attention seems to be given to assessing the
capacity of local organisations, which are expected to assume responsibility for sustaining
programme outcomes. This would also include reflecting on benchmarks and timelines.
Recommendations:
16. More systematic principles and approaches for exit strategies of DAPP development
engagements should be reflected in the next PID, and exit strategies should be part of the
strategic dialogue with implementing partners, including criteria used for exiting and
discussions on how they prepare their local partners to exit.
4.6 Process Action Plan
The DAPP team has prepared a Process Action Plan (PAP) attached in Annex 5 which outlines
the main steps relating to preparation and approval of the 2015-2016 PID, and subsequent
milestones for presentation and approval of the coming SFD and PID. The PAP reflects that the
DAPP team is still in the process of catching up with delays accumulated as a consequence of the
challenge of having had very short annual funding and programming cycles until now combined
with the programme’s progressive alignment with the standard guidelines which are designed for
cycles of at least three years. Hence, the formulation of the 2015-2016 programme will still not
follow a normal programme design process. It will, however, to a large extent consist of a
continuation of ongoing support which constitutes an attenuating circumstance. Furthermore, the
RT acknowledges that at this stage it is difficult to postpone the submission of the programme to
the External Grant Committee, given that many of the partners rely the funding from early 2015.It
should nevertheless be emphasised that this process represents quite an anomaly from the point of
view of the AMG and that this situation should be avoided in the future.
Therefore, the RT suggests to plan for an earlier start of the programme formulation process of
the next PID (covering period from 2017) in order to allow for time for a regular appraisal mission
instead of a desk appraisal. The appraisal mission should take place no later than August 2016. As
indicated above, it is also suggested that the next programme period should cover a three-year
period to reduce the work load and increase the likelihood of achieving more substantial results.
The RT also suggests the DAPP team to clarify procedures and timelines to be applied for
presentation and approval of the next SFD as well as the PID as policy frameworks and
programme documents are normally both to be presented to the Programme Committee which is
not clearly reflected in the PAP. More detailed planning of each of these key processes should be
initiated shortly in order to allow for sufficient time for the different steps e.g. preparatory studies,
stakeholders workshops, recruitment of consultants, etc.
In addition, the DAPP team should incorporate relevant follow-up of the recommendations of the
present review in the PAP. Many of the short term recommendations provided in the report do
not require separate actions but are guidelines to issues that should be considered in the
preparation of the 2015-2016 PID as well as in the dialogue with partners in relation with entering
into the new programme phase. As regards the medium term recommendations, although they
relate to the period beyond 2016, some of them will require fairly rapid follow-up as they may be
more time consuming e.g. undertaking reviews of strategic partners and mini-pools.
30
ANNEX 1 – Terms of reference
Terms of Reference
Review of the Danish Arab Partnership Programme 2013-2016,
May-June 2014
1. BACKGROUND
The Danish Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP) has since 2003 been a central pillar in Danish foreign
policy in relation to the MENA-region. The double strategic objective of DAPP is to promote reform
and democratisation processes in the MENA-region; and to improve dialogue, understanding and
cooperation between Denmark and the MENA-region.
With regard to the reform objective, the thematic focus of the DAPP has since the inception of the
programme in 2003 been framed by the 2002 UNDP Arab Human Development Report which
identified three key challenges for human development in the region, namely the enhancement of: 1)
Human Rights, Human Freedoms and Good Governance; 2) Women’s Empowerment and Gender
Equality, and 3) Knowledge-based Societies. The need to halt the economic downturn and to spur
economic growth and employment has since November 2011 been made a corner stone in meeting
the key DAPP strategic objectives of promoting democratization and reforms. Therefore the fourth
challenge identified is: 4) Economic Growth and Job Creation. Furthermore, new implementation
modalities were included and yearly budgets increased from 100m DKK (2010) to 275m DKK.
A regional approach is applied in order to promote synergies and exchange of lessons learned across
countries, but the DAPP also maintains its geographic focus on a selected number of countries, either
drawing on year-long experiences of collaboration (in Jordan, Morocco and Yemen) or in order to
support on-going and highly challenging processes of transition (Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Libya). Due to
this expansion of the DAPP, the number of partners and separate agreements/contracts between the
MFA and third parties has further multiplied and the complexity increased.
On this background and in order to secure resource efficiency of such a complex initiative, a new
Strategic Framework Document (SFD) 2013-2016 was developed with a view to provide a more longterm and robust frame. This was complemented with a Programme Implementation Document (PID)
2013-2015 providing an overview of envisaged areas to be funded regionally and country wise,
support modalities21, management and organisation as well as monitoring mechanisms.
With these two documents, the DAPP has moved towards a ‘normalisation’ of the design and mode of
implementation in accordance with Danida Aid and Programme Management Guidelines (AMG). In
line with these guidelines, a mid-term review of the DAPP will be undertaken by the Technical Advisory
Services (TAS). Given the particular challenges related to aligning the DAPP to the regular Danida
guidelines and the current limited duration of appropriations for the DAPP, it has been decided to
bring the review forward in order to allow for follow up on the recommendations in preparation of the
next Programme Implementation Document (PID) 2015-2016 as well as the coming strategic
framework. This means that the review will focus less on progress in implementation of specific
programme interventions, since few of them have had time to achieve any substantial results yet,
while more attention will be given to an assessment of the adequacy of the overall instruments and
21
The following four implementation modalities are specified for the DAPP: 1) Partnerships between professionals in organisations and institutions
in Denmark and the MENA region working jointly to promote reform agendas (DAPP strategic partnership agreements); 2) Direct democratization
assistance to transition countries; 3) Direct support to economic growth and job creation to countries in transition, and 4) Secondment of experts to
international institutions.
31
modalities of the programme and possible adjustments that could be made in this regard, both in a
short and a medium-long term perspective.
Other recent reviews, studies and evaluations of DAPP-supported interventions will feed into the
review and/or complement the work of the DAPP review. These include:
- Review of ActionAid Denmark (AADK) which will include the `Young women and men’s action
to address injustice in the Arab region’ and two other programs implemented by AADK with
funding from the DAPP;
- A planned consultancy to strengthen the DAPP M&E framework.
- Evaluation of Media cooperation under the Danish Arab Partnership Programme (2005-2012)
- Upcoming review of the LO/FTF Council, the Danish trade union council for international
development co-operation
- Study on dialogue processes
- Review of the Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute (DEDI)
2. OBJECTIVES
The overall objective of the review is to undertake an assessment of programme performance
(progress, challenges, developments in risk factors, need for adjustment) and of developments in the
programme context. The review also serves as quality assurance of the overall monitoring.
While the review will not undertake a systematic and detailed assessment of progress compared to
implementation plans and indicators for all interventions, the assessment of performance will focus on
the adequacy of mechanisms, procedures and systems established within the DAPP and its partners. It
will also make an assessment of the strength and weaknesses of their practical application based on a
more thorough review of preliminary results within selected interventions.
It should be noted that the review will not undertake a comprehensive assessment of the financial
management of the DAPP and its interventions as the Department for Quality Assurance (KVA) has a
more extensive and direct involvement in this area in the DAPP compared to regular Danida
programmes. However, the review will consider overall administrative and financial management
procedures and will make a general assessment of effectiveness and efficiency, as well as of the overall
benefits of the programme and interventions relative to the resources used.
The specific objectives of the review are:
 To review the current strategic framework and programming with a view to building on good
experiences and making adjustments and/or suggestions for the next implementation phase
covering 2015-2016. Minor adjustments of the 2013-2016 strategic framework could also be
considered, notably when it comes to the organisational set-up and management procedures.
 To provide general recommendations to be considered for the development of the next DAPP
strategic framework.
3. SCOPE OF WORK
The review team shall address, but not necessarily be limited to, the following areas:
32
General issues
As per the Guidelines for Programmes and projects of the MFA, the review will make an overall
assessment against the five DAC criteria (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and
impact), including the following elements:
- Assessment of the general political, social, economic and human rights developments relevant for
the implementation of the programme (i.e. primarily related to the targeted countries and
thematic focus areas of the DAPP). This should include major changes in political-economy and
drivers of change.
- An assessment of the development in the strategic linkages between the overall objectives as
defined in the relevant policy papers and the objectives at the programme level as well as the
inherent theory of change.
- Assessment of developments in strategies of key partners.
- Assessment of the application of a human rights-based approach in the programme.
- Thematic developments, including progress in relation to key indicators.
- Assessment of developments of assumptions and risks defined in the DAPP Strategic Framework
Document.
- Assessment of exit strategies for interventions supported by DAPP.
- Assessment of disbursements and expenditures against objectives and targets at the overall
programme level.
- Assessment of aid modalities applied.
- Assessment of programme management, including overall financial management of the DAPP. This
assessment will mainly consider the clarity and adequacy of procedures and systems established.
- Assessment of the results framework, without duplicating the work of the planned M&E
consultancy.
- Progress in capacity development, including possible advisors.
- Assessment of the procedures and principles guiding the use of unallocated funds and reallocation of funds.
Specific issues concerning the current strategic framework and implementation programmes
The review will particularly look into the following issues with regard to the current SFD and PID:
- Assessment of the current planning instruments for the DAPP, including the DAPP country analysis
and country strategies as well as more operational annual planning instruments.
- Assessment of current M&E systems and procedures (without duplication of M&E consultancy),
including day-to-day monitoring, periodic reporting and reviews of selected
interventions/partnerships as well as of the overall programme.
- Assessment of the effectiveness of the current organisation and management of the DAPP,
especially the division of work and responsibilities between the DAPP team in MENA/MFA and
embassies and TAOs. This will include a specific focus on opportunities and challenges of having
DAPP programme staff based in embassies versus TAOs. The review will also consider the extent to
which further decentralisation of responsibilities could be envisaged with due respect to formal
limitations on advisor positions.
- Assessment of the added value and challenges related to the DAPP’s specific approach to
partnership and reciprocity, with a strong emphasis on Danish partners’ role in the dialogue and
learning process as well as intraregional dialogue.
33
-
-
-
Assessment of the strengths and weaknesses related to the new implementation modalities
initiated in 2011 within the DAPP, i.e. Direct Democratic Assistance, Support to Economic Growth
and Job Creation, and Secondments to International Institutions.
Assessment of opportunities and challenges related to a possible fourth implementation modality,
i.e. twinning between Danish and MENA institutions.
Assessment of how the programme incorporates standard requirements for the programme to be
as effective and lean as possible and to support alignment and division of labour with other
development partners, while at the same time preserving its specific characteristics and its ability
to operate in very volatile contexts which often require a high level of flexibility.
Assessment of the capacity of current partners under the Economic Growth and Job Creation
thematic area to absorb additional funds for new initiatives in line with Danish priorities, including
in the field of green growth, and possibly expanding to other DAPP partner countries than Egypt
and Tunisia. Opportunities for further incorporation of the reciprocity between Danish and MENA
partners in this thematic area could also be considered.
Specific issues concerning the future strategic framework
The review will make preliminary observations and recommendations for further consideration for the
next strategic framework with a focus on:
- The need for further rationalisation, including the adequacy of the current thematic areas, partner
portfolio, support modalities and management.
- Strategic considerations for a new phase of the programme including prospects for continuing
support to the current focus countries, the balance between regional and country specific support
as well as between the two objectives of the DAPP i.e. reform processes and dialogue.
- Flexibility of the program to also address new developments in the region, including more limited
activities/projects that were not foreseen at the time of programme design.
- Exit strategies.
4. OUTPUTS
The expected outputs are:
1) A mission preparation note (MPN) of approx. 5 pages, outlining the main issues of concern within
the framework of the review. The MPN will be submitted and discussed with the DAPP team in
MENA/MFA before the country visits.
2) Debriefings with embassies/TAOs highlighting key findings of the review team to be shared and
discussed prior to departure from the field. The de-briefings shall serve to facilitate a common
understanding of key review findings and their implications as well as joint reflections on possible
tentative recommendations.
3) Debriefing with the DAPP team in MENA/MFA upon return from country visits to discuss key
findings and preliminary recommendations.
4) A Review Aide Memoire (RAM) of 15-20 pages (excl. annexes) outlining key developments affecting
the programme, presenting achievements made, and providing recommendations for adjustments
needed as well as general recommendations to be considered for the development of the next
DAPP strategic framework.
34
5. METHODOLOGY
The methods utilized in the review will include:
 Review of key program documents, including program documents, grant proposals, progress
reports, general background documents (see list of documents);
 Consultations with the DAPP team in MENA/MFA as well as relevant embassies and TAO’s;
 Dialogue with teams responsible for conducting DAPP related reviews, studies etc. e.g. Review
of AADK, review of DEDI, M&E consultancy, study on Danish-Arab dialogue.
 Meeting with implementing organisations and other relevant stakeholders. This could involve
in-person meetings, telephone/skype interviews and if relevant an e-survey for partners.
 Country visits will be undertaken to Tunisia and Egypt as these two transition countries are
facing some specific challenges and opportunities that the DAPP has had a special focus on
addressing. In addition, the review team will include a visit to Morocco as an exponent of the
countries that have been part of the DAPP from the outset and which have been maintained
among the focus countries, although reforms have been more modest.
 Debriefing sessions will be organised at the end of each of the country visits to discuss
preliminary findings with the embassies/TAO. A debriefing presentation will take place in
Copenhagen to discuss key conclusions and recommendations.
6. TEAM COMPOSITION
The review team will consist of:
 Anne-Catherine Legendre, Senior Adviser, Technical Advisory Services/Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Denmark (team leader).
 Mette Bastholm Jensen, Senior Adviser, Technical Advisory Services/ Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Denmark.
 Two external consultants.
The international consultants should have the following profiles:
 An international expert in democratic transition in the MENA
- At least 10 years of relevant experience of work on human rights and democratic reform
processes.
- Specific experience with democratic transition as well as issues pertaining to media
support and/or women’s rights.
- Experience with support to various non-state actors e.g. CSOs, universities and research
institutes, religious associations, etc.
- Solid professional experience from the MENA region.
- Professional working proficiency in English and French. Arabic will constitute an
advantage.
 An international expert in private sector development
- At least 10 years of relevant experience with private sector development, value chain
development and employment/labour market issues
- Specific experience with organizational and capacity development as well as financial
management
- Knowledge of Danida development policies and programming will be an asset.
- Previous professional experience from the MENA region or alternatively other countries in
transition/weak states.
- Professional working proficiency in English and a good command of French. Arabic will
constitute an advantage.
35
Consultants should disclose previous affiliation to any of the current strategic partners of DAPP.
The budget estimate should include the following:
 The financial proposal shall include a lumpsum of DKK 10,000 for local travel (car rental) during
country visits as well as DKK 10,000 for interpretation services (reimbursable costs).
 Work during weekends for the team members during country visits
 A provision for other expenses in accordance with standard Danida rules.
 Per diems provided according to standard rules and rates
7. TIME FRAME
Phase 1: Document review and initial consultations
The assignment will start on 12 May 2014 with the document review, initial consultations (mainly with
stakeholders in Denmark) and preparation of the Mission Preparation Note. The external consultants
are expected to provide inputs to the MPN by 16 May 2014. A pre-mission meeting with the DAPP
team at the MFA will take place before the country visits. The external consultants will each be
allocated 7 days for this initial phase.
Phase 2: Country visits in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco
The country visits are expected to take place in the period 1 June – 14 June 2014. The mission
programmes could include a few days’ field trip within the visited country (ies) as relevant (security
considerations will be taken into account). It is foreseen that one consultant will concentrate more on
DAPP interventions in Tunisia and Morocco, while the other will spend more time on interventions in
Egypt. However, some overlap should be foreseen. The external consultants are each expected to
spend 10 days on the country visits. In addition, two days will be allocated for international travel.
Phase 3: Report drafting
The external consultants will each be allocated 6 days for report writing and debriefing after the
country visits. Final decision on the number of days required for reporting will be taken by the team
leader at the end of the country visits. The draft review aide memoire will be submitted on 23 June
and the final version no later than 4 July.
8. KEY BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS
- Strategic Framework Document, Danish Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP), 2013-2016.
- Implementation Document, Danish Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP), 2013-14.
- Appraisal of Strategic Framework Document, Danish Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP).
2013.
- Appraisal of interventions aiming at enhancing economic growth and development under
the Danish Arab Partnership Programme. 2013.
- Notes to the external grant committee, May & December 2013.
- TOR for various relevant studies mentioned above
- DAPP Country Analyses and strategies for Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen,
- DAPP – Seconded national experts. Note for the file on main objectives and principles.
Currently being updated.
- Evaluation of media cooperation under the DAPP. 2013.
- Programme and Partner documents, including progress reports, financial reports – number
and nature to be decided
36
ANNEX 2 - List of persons consulted
Name
Thomas Nikolaj Hansen
Country
Belgium
Yogita Mumssen
Belgium
Jens Otto Horslund
Nikolaj Harris
Pernille Mortensen
Julie Pruzan-Jørgensen
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Trine Storm
Rasmus Høgh
Jørgen G. Jensen
Peter Eilschow Olesen
Yildiz Arslan
Michael Schou Olsen
Jakob Haugaard
Birgitte Søgaard Lauta
Jens Juul Petersen
Nik Bredholt
Katrine Bødiker
Niels Tanderup
Kristensen
Giorgio Caracciolo
Søs Nissen
Adwan Mohamad
Anne Nybo
Helene Horsbrugh
Marc Schade-Poulsen
Ashraf Mikhail
Annali Kristiansen
Michael Irving Jensen
Thora Gehl
Cecilie Mehyar
Katarina Blomqvist
Lene Ingvartsen
Henrik Als
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Rikke Haugbølle
Denmark
Pernille Dahler Kardel
Lars Vogtmann
Sørensen
Sam Grout-Smith
Kim Sitzler
Egypt
Ambassador
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
First Secretary
First Secretary Arab Partnership
Advisor, Democratic Transition
and Human Rights
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Position
Programme Manager, External
Relations
Programme Manager, MENA
Head of Department
Deputy Head of Department
DAPP Team leader
Chief Advisor, former DAPP
Team leader
Head of Section
Head of Section
Senior Advisor
Head of Section
Head of Section
Head of Section
Special Advisor
Regional Manager
Programme Coordinator
Program Director
Consultant
Deputy Director
Programme Coordinator, MENA
Program Manager
Consultant
Programme Coordinator, MENA
International Director
Executive Director
Project Manager
Advisor, Rule of Law
Head of Department
Head of Department
Programme Manager
Acting Head of Department
Finance and Programme Advisor
Head of Asia & MENA
Departments
Research Assistant and Project
Manager
Organization
Civil Society & Local
authorities Unit, DEVCO
The World Bank, Brussels
Office
MENA, MFA
MENA, MFA
MENA, MFA
MENA, MFA
MENA, MFA
MENA, MFA
MENA, MFA
MENA, MFA
MENA, MFA
KVA, MFA
JTMR, MFA
Danmission
Danmission
Danmission
DI
DI
DIGNITY
DIGNITY
DUF
DUF
DUF
EMHRN
DIHR
DIHR
IMS
IMS
KVINFO
KVINFO
KVINFO
LO/ FTF Council
Dialogue study project,
Global Studies, Roskilde
University
Embassy of Denmark
Embassy of Denmark
British Embassy
Embassy of Switzerland
37
Kristina Bünde
Egypt
Karen L. Andersen
Andrea Zaki
Egypt
Egypt
Head of Section, Governance,
Human Rights and Civil Society
Human Rights Adviser
General Director
Samira Luka
Yousri Tinawy
Egypt
Egypt
Director for Dialogue
Executive Director
Bimen Eltahawy
Egypt
Priest
Heba Wanis
Egypt
Public Health Researcher
Yassmen Elsayed Hany
Ahmed Kamal Abdel
Moneim
Marwa A. Hussein
Egypt
Egypt
World editor
Egypt
Mohammed Khaled
Raffaele Boldracchi
Rapti Gooneskere
Yehia El Husseiny
Nashwa Belal
Yousef Qaryouti
Amira Salah-Ahmed
Khaled Hassan
Mohamed
Amal Abdel Hachi
Samar Raushely
Marawan Badr
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Communication and Social
Responsibility Coordinator
Programme Manager
Senior Operations Officer
Principal Economist
Corporate Governance Officer
Senior Programme Director
Director
Deputy Editor
Imam, preacher and teacher
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Head of Department/Founder
Wafaa Osama
Maissan Hassan
Egypt
Egypt
Regional Programme Adviser
Programs Manager
Omaima Abou-Bakr
Egypt
Founding Member
Kholoud Gomaa
Egypt
Coordinator
Martha Adly
Egypt
Researcher
Mohamed Fadil
Egypt
Lawyer
Salma El Naqqash
Egypt
Trainer
Jens Haarløv
Jordan
Technical Advisor
Michael Lund Jeppesen
Reda Bajoudi
Morocco
Morocco
Ambassador
Programme Officer
Executive Director
Ambassador
Delegation of the EU
Delegation of the EU
Coptic Evangelical
Organization for Social
Services (CEOSS)
CEOSS
Chamber of Food
Industries
Church of St. George in
Minya
Egyptian Initiative for
Personal Rights
El Akhbar journal
Federation of Egyptian
Industries
Federation of Egyptian
Industries
IFC
IFC
IFC
IFC
ILO
ILO
Madamasr
Mosque in Alexandria
New Woman Foundation
New Woman Foundation
Office of Minister of
International Cooperation
LO/ FTF Council
Women and Memory
Forum
Women and Memory
Forum
Women Political
Participation Academy
Women Political
Participation Academy
Women Political
Participation Academy
Women Political
Participation Academy
DAPP Technical Advisory
Office/MFA
Embassy of Denmark
Embassy of Denmark
38
Hanane Khaoua
Ian Cramman
Sylvie Millot
Mohamed Neshnash
Morocco
Morocco
Morocco
Morocco
Projects Manager
Political Team
Head of Cooperation
President
Mustapha Znaidi
Morocco
Secretary General
Imane Ennasri
Zazouli Saadia
Morocco
Morocco
Coordinator
Chairwomen
Mohamed Adil
Embarch
Morocco
Chef de Division des Pays
d'Europe
Amal Reghay
Morocco
Director of employment
Mr. Zalou
Morocco
Advisor
Mohammed Baâllal
Morocco
Mohammed Bounoua
Morocco
Asma Jtitou
Morocco
Head of the International
Cooperation Division
Head of the Department for
Bilateral Cooperation
Labour Inspector
Anne Margrethe
Rasmussen
Najla Abbes
Tunisia
Technical Advisor
Tunisia
Co-founder, board member
Imene Cherif
Tunisia
Project Coordinator
Lamia Chehabi
Sofie Okkels Birk
Mohamed Hachicha
Tunisia
Tunisia
Tunisia
Lars Flocke Larsen
Regis Meritan
Ramy Salhi
Anne-Sophie
Jouanneau
Neila Akrimi
Tunisia
Tunisia
Tunisia
Tunisia
Head of Country Office
Advisor
Second Vice-President,
Treasurer
Programme Manager
First Counsellor
Regional Director
Regional Coordinator
Tunisia
General Director
Federica Ricaldi
Tunisia
Consultant
Sonia Barbaria
Tunisia
Communication Expert
Younes Blagui
Tunisia
Grant beneficiary, Souk
Antanmia
British Embassy
British Embassy
Delegation of the EU
Organisation Marocaine
des Droits de l'Homme
Organisation Marocaine
des Droits de l'Homme
KVINFO
Maison Familiale Rurale
D'Ouled Said
Ministère des Affaires
Etrangères et de la
Coopération
Ministry of Employment
and Social Affairs
Ministry of Employment
and Social Affairs
Ministry of Employment
and Social Affairs
Ministry of Employment
and Social Affairs
Ministry of Employment
and Social Affairs
DAPP Technical Advisory
Office/MFA
Ligue des Electrices
Tunisiennes
Ligue des Electrices
Tunisiennes
Dignity
LO/FTF
CJD
Delegation of the EU
Delegation of the EU
EMHRN
Euro-Mediterranean
Human Rights Foundation
International
Development Centre for
Innovative Local
Governance
African Development
Bank
African Development
Bank
Industrie, déchet, Etude,
Environnement (IDEE)
39
Mokhtar Hammami
Tunisia
Myriam Dabi
Tunisia
Mohamed Othmen
Torki
Tunisia
Souheil Jamel
Abdelhamid Abdellah
Najla Brahem
Tunisia
Tunisia
Tunisia
Samia Kamoun
Tunisia
Hamdi Charfi
Sana Bouzaouech
Tunisia
Tunisia
Azza Oun
Tunisia
Ahmed Banasr
Tunisia
Lylia Haddad
Tunisia
Amira Mimouni
Rafika Bacha
Mohamed Hachicha
Khaled Zibri
Hajlaoui Dridi Naziha
Sana Zitouni
Tunisia
Tunisia
Tunisia
Tunisia
Tunisia
Tunisia
Hamdene Moonis
Torjemane Imed
Khemiri Fethi
Gharbi Najsua
Chokri Zairi
Tunisia
Tunisia
Tunisia
Tunisia
Tunisia
Birgitte Wiedemann
Tunia
Tunisia
Tunisia
Tunisia
El Hreth Kastalli
Maher Trabelsi
Slim Guizani
Anis Khelifi
Barbara Dätwyler
Scheuer
Nejla Ghachem
Jonathan Murphy
Director of Local Authorities
Dept.
Senior Advisor
Attached to the Minister's office
- in charge of the vocational
training strategy
Coordinator
Human Rights Advisor
Planning and Programming
Expert
Director of International
Cooperation
Director, Human Rights Dept.
Deputy director, Human Rights
Dept.
Deputy Director,
Documentation Dept.
Professor; Advisor to the
Minister of justice regarding
reforms to counter torture
Programme Manager
Tunisia
Tunisia
Tunisia
Manager
Coordinator
Treasurer of CJD
Chairperson
Evaluation Director
National coordinator of the
project
Regional director OEP Béja
Service director OEP Béja
Technician OEP Béja
Technician OEP Béja
Engineer ; international
cooperation
Advisor
Council members
Nursery tree enterprise
Project manager, Head of
Partnerships & foreign Relations
Volunteer
Programme Manager
Director
Tunisia
Tunisia
Programme Manager
Chief Technical Advisor
Ministry of Interior
Ministry of vocational
training and employment
Ministry of vocational
training and employment
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of
Justice/Medical Faculty of
Tunisia
Tunisian Association of
Management and Social
Stability (TAMSS)
Wajjahni Project
CJD Wajjahni Project
CJD
CJD
OEP
OEP
OEP
OEP
OEP
OEP
Ministry Agriculture
KCA
Municipality of Béja
Private entreprise
Tunisian Scouts
Tunisian Scouts
Swiss Cooperation Office
Swiss Cooperation Office
Swiss Cooperation Office
United Nations
40
Kais Sellami
Najla Brahem
Tunisia
Tunisia
Hamdi Charfi
Tunisia
Azza Oun
Samia Bouzaouech
Tunisia
Tunisia
Mohamed Aiech
Fatma A. Awadh
Tunisia
Yemen
President
Responsible for planning and
programming
Director Human rights
department
Documentation department
General director for
international cooperation
Human rights department
Technical Advisor
Development Programme
UTICA
Ministry of Human Rights
Ministry of Human Rights
Ministry of Human Rights
Ministry of Human Rights
Ministry of Human Rights
DAPP/MFA
41
ANNEX 3 – Additional observations and suggestions for EGJC (Thematic area IV)
 Strategic partners (DI, LO/ FTF): The peer-to-peer approach is relevant and should be
encouraged; it allows local actors to strengthen their capacity to influence reforms processes
and social dialogue. This is especially evident when the context is favourable for such an
approach as in Tunisia. The Danish experience with consensus-building among social partners
and other stakeholders seems to attract broad interest in the region and in Tunisia there is a
clear potential for this to become a valuabe source of inspiration. The labour union (UGTT)
and employers’ organisation (UTICA) have played an important role in the national dialogue
and democratic transition and the dialogue between these two forces constitutes a special a
feature of the Tunisian context. Thus, interventions of DI and LO/FTF seem very relevant to
pursue, including in other countries in the region where things may be more challenging. It
would also appear relevant to explore synergies with other interventions within DAPP and
beyond, not least ILO.
 Multilateral organisations: Chances of impacts on reforms are improved when the
multilateral actor concentrates on its core field of competence; this is the case of IFC
supporting reforms in the banking sector and microfinance in the sub-region. IFC also
strengthens financial institutions to adapt to the specificities of SME. On the other hand the
dispersion of multilateral organisations into subjects outside its key areas of expertise may
have the unintended effect of reducing the overall impact on reforms processes22. The support
provided through trust funds is fragmented and this affects both activities related to reforms
and support to SMEs with no real coherence between them. In addition, it is not always clear
if the support is at the initiative of the host country or if it is driven by the multilateral
organisations. This may limit the impact and ownership of the supported actions.
The RT suggests that:
- Support for social dialogue and economic reform becomes more integrated with national
strategies and roadmaps for reform where they exist. In this regard, the DAPP should
encourage supported trust funds to develop more coherent activities and greater alignment
aligned with key national priorities as well as a sequencing of reform measures.
- The DAPP should as a general principle support multilateral actors within their core
competences and avoid initiating new projects where funds to SMEs are channeled through
multilateral organisations.
Specific interventions implemented by multilateral organisations
Regarding the MENA MDTF Bank Multi-Donor Trust Fund
It is worth noting that the trust fund has a quite broad scope both geographically and
thematically.
14 projects were granted by 31 October 2013 of which half were regional i.e. covering more
than one country in the MENA(7), while the other half were grants targeting one specific
country: Yemen (3), Morocco (1), Tunisia (2), and Egypt (1) . The figure below shows the
total distribution of funding according to country which interestingly enough indicates that the
As indicated by the DAPP team, government institutions may in some cases have reservations against working with
multilateral organisations, as they find them extremely slow in reacting, and may thus prefer to work more directly with
bilateral donors. This has to be taken into consideration, however, as long as support is provided in areas where
organisations such as IFC and ILO are working within their key missions, such support generally appears relevant and
appropriate as these organisations have strong credibility.
22
42
largest share of bilateral support by far goes to Morocco with 22%. This may seem as a
paradox as the stated objective of the MTDF is to provide catalytic funds to countries
undergoing transition and reform in response to the Arab Spring, and as described in section
2.2 of the present report, Morocco can generally speaking not be considered to be that
progressive in terms of reforms.
Source: MENA MTDF, First Annual Report, November 2013
Thematically, the MENA MDTF supports interventions within four areas: i) Strengthening
governance; ii) Ensuring economic and social inclusion; iii) Accelerating economic growth; iv)
Creating jobs. Approximately half of the funding of the trust fund goes to broad governance
initiatives, which is important to note as this engagement is categorised under thematic area IV
within the DAPP, while in fact a large share of the support provided may not be directly
connected to EGJC. In addition, support provided to activities related to both reforms and
support to SMEs is quite fragmented as each initiative is assessed individually and the MDTF
emphasises that the grants are ‘demand driven’.
Finally, the majority of the projects are implemented by the bank (11 on 14). Only three of the
14 grants awarded are recipient-executed. This makes it particularly difficult to appreciate the
extent to which sustainability aspects are considered.
While each of the grants may be relevant given the huge needs and demands for support in
general in the region, the RT finds that the very scattered support provided makes it difficult
to assess the outcomes of the support. The linkage to other DAPP engagements and partners
also appears to be very limited, although there could potentially be synergies if partners were
aware of the MTDF support. In addition, see the general RT suggestion above on the need to
promote more alignment and strategic focus in support to trust funds.
Deauville Partnership Programme – MENA Transition Fund
As the WB MDTF, the MENA Transition Fund has a quite broad scope i.e. promoting more
accountable governance, broad-based sustainable growth, and greater employment
opportunities. However, it does have somewhat stronger focus on issues that are directly
43
linked to thematic area IV. Geographically, there is a good overlap with DAPP focus countries
i.e. Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen. A broad range of implementing
partners (ISAs) are involved23 in the 28 projects approved for all six countries as of October
31, 2013 voering cover areas such as: support to MSMEs (Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco,
Yemen); energy sector reform (Egypt, Tunisia); access to water (Jordan); targeted social
assistance (Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia); labour market policies (Jordan); public-private
partnerships (Tunisia); civil society dialogue (Yemen); leadership development and governance
(Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen); and regional integration through trade and transport (Egypt,
Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia)24
The three recommendations made by the appraisal team before approval of the DAPP
support to the fund have to be followed and implemented. The DAPP team made important
suggestions to the steering committee meeting in December 2013 (include a results
framework, risk management). An important recommendation of the appraisal is to follow up
on ensuring links and complementarities and how the fund affects thematic area IV. The
DAPP will be in a better position to influence implementation of the trust fund once
contributions have reached USD 5 M and the DAPP team should be prepared to take on this
role.
Regarding “Decent Jobs for Egypt’s Young People Project – Tackling the Challenge in Qaleyoubeya and
Menoufeya” managed by ILO:
The RT has noted that according to the DAPP team: i) ILO’s involvement in this project is
based on a request from the selected governorates (survey and selection part of the planning),
ii) at the time of the identification, ILO was one of the few international partners working
actively on ground level, and with little delay, and iii) ILO shares the wish to cooperate with
other Danish business instruments, targeting the private sector directly. Nevertheless, the RT
reiterates the appraisal mission’s assessment (November 2013) that the ILO should be
encouraged to be realistic in planning such projects on the ground.
-
In the short-term perspective, the RT suggests continuing funding to the current project
within the newly revised and simplified log-frame proposed by ILO and making sure that
an appropriate exit strategy is developed.
For future interventions (mid-term perspective), DAPP should encourage ILO (and other
multilateral organisations) to focus on their core competences (e.g. rights at work,
promotion of decent employment opportunities, enhancement of social protection and
strengthening dialogue on work-related issues, etc.) and delegating non-key competences
(direct support to SMEs, creation of enterprises, provision of vocational training) to other
local actors such as private professional organisations
Regarding AfBD/Souk Attanmia, the RT suggests the DAPP to work for the development of a
sustainability plan/exit strategy for the project which could build on the following elements:
- Identifying (or selecting via an open tender) a local private sector actor to manage the
project (preferably an existing actor to avoid creating a new structure) to manage the
project.
African Development Bank, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Arab Monetary Fund, European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European Investment Bank, International Finance Corporation,
International Monetary Fund, Islamic Development Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, OPEC Fund for International Development and the World Bank.
24 Source: Annual Report, October 2013.
23
44
-
-

In order to separate the functions, this actor could play the role of moderator/facilitator
and financial management could be provided by a financial institution. The implication of
a local structure representing the private sector in this role should be explored and
evaluated based on a capacity assessment.
Support to SMEs to finance their projects should progress from a 100% subsidy grant to a
co-financing scheme between the SMEs (own capital) i.e. a subsidy-credit (from financial
institution); the support through subsidy should not exceed 50% of the total project cost,
especially for traditional investments. It should be noted, however, that according to the
DAPP team, in the new phase, it is no longer possible to receive a 100% subsidy grant and
own capital is now required.
NGOs:/private organisations: the RT appreciates the role and capacities that NGOs and
private organisations can play to develop concrete projects to prepare and contribute to
discussions on reforms and policies at national level. It is therefore necessary to ensure
links between these pilot projects and national reforms.
CJD
It is important to highlight the important work of private organizations (CJD and Wajjahni for
Tunisia) as well as multilaterals such as ILO (in Egypt) to promote careers in areas that are
under-valued by young people (agriculture, construction, mechanics etc.). CJD has a sister
organization in Morocco and it might be interesting to explore if learnings from the Tunisian
approach could be promoted in Morocco as well, although CJD in Morocco is already well
established.
VNGI
The VNGI project should be examined further in order to clarify the relationship between
decentralization and private sector support. The VNGI projects was initially primarily intended
as a decentralisation project to which job creation was added, as a way of strengthening local
economic development, and thereby improve the relationship between municipalities and
communities. While, the RT acknowledges the importance of decentralisation as a strong
element of strengthening democratic governance and a key reform area in Tunisia, it also notes
that it is not among the topics prioritised under thematic area 1. This means that in practice it
may not be as easy to ensure synergy between these two areas within the programme as it may
have been envisioned25. From a job creation perspective, experience shows that municipalities
tend quickly to undertake private activities generating financial resources to the detriment of
the private sector. The RT thus finds it important to keep in mind that the role of
municipalities is to promote a good business climate at the local level, but not to enter into
private activities that could be done by private companies.
The RT suggests that:
- The DAPP should clarify conditions for the promotion of support to SMEs within the
context of decentralisation with VNGI.
- Public-private partnerships at decentralized levels should be promoted in areas normally
considered as public service delivery e.g. collective/public infrastructure, vocational
training, etc.
Decentralisation is part of the constitutional reform process supported through Direct Democratic Assistance
support, however, it would require a more much more targeted effort to monitor this complex reform area properly.
25
45
-
SMEs should be supported directly (through banks/microfinance or professional
organisations) and the DAPP should avoid channelling funds to SMEs through
municipalities/local government.
DAIRY SECTOR
The RT finds that the dairy project is highly relevant and can integrate some of the main challenges
raised by Denmark’s Green Growth strategy. The project is also a good example of an opportunity
to generate reflections for reform and job creation.
However, the relevance of establishing a twinning between the Danish Knowledge Centre for
Agriculture (KCA: private organisation) and the OEP (public agency) can be questioned. The role
of the OEP is to facilitate and promote the dairy industry and to serve as regulator and controller
according to its core mission. The RT thus finds that the actual implementation of a concrete
project as the one that is supported by the DAPP should in principle rather be managed by the
private sector. In this respect, the twinning of the Danish KCA with a professional organization of
farmers would have made more sense. Yet, according to the DAPP team, this was not viewed as a
possible option as a study of private and public organisations in the agricultural sector in Tunisia
revealed that there were no such private organisations able to manage the project from start. The
RT is of the opinion that twinning between private organisations should be encouraged with a
focus on the peer to peer approach i.e. between similar organisations. This could be done by
facilitating the development or strengthening of such private organisations and leaving the actual
consulting to private operators or farmers´ own organisations, once they become strong enough.
Actors in the value chain of cow milk (cow milk) are all private from producer to the processing
factories. In the short term perspective, it is therefore important to focus on a "business" approach
and develop win-win situations between these actors. This should be based on economic analysis
and productivity gains and value. As an example, at the producer level, the composition of food
ration for animals is based on imported soya; this significantly limits the profit margin for farmers.
Therefore reflection on basic food rations with local cheaper products should be developed.
Support to farmers' organizations wishing to invest in the collection of milk to sell directly to
processors or consumers is an important issue to be addressed by the project. Support to private
collectors is also a relevant entry point to develop the value chain. In this regard, successful
experiences from Senegal can serve as inspiration.
It is too early to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the project, but the limited availability of
French speaking resources within KCA constitutes a real challenge for the development of
dialogue and business relations with actors of the value chain. This could influence efficiency.
In a medium term perspective:
In terms of sustainability, the RT suggests to explore the transfer of implementing activities to
existing private actors and win-win partnerships with the actors of the value chain. It is also a
challenge for the project to promote investments for the private actors of the value chain. The
project only has funds for financing innovative investments. The RT suggests encouraging
complementarities and combined actions with matching grant (as Souk Attanmia) and credit from
banks supported by IFC.
46
ANNEX 4 – Suggested template for Country Strategy Document
The country strategy paper should set out the overall policy approach to DAPP focus countries as
well as priority areas of intervention within the programme. The template below presents a
suggested outline of the document which can be used as inspiration. The document should
normally not exceed 20 pages excluding annexes.
1. Introduction
 Presentation of overall rationale for including the country as a focus country for the DAPP
2. Strategic vision for the partnership
 Reference to previous support and experiences when relevant
 Overall strategic direction for the period covered, including when relevant explanation of
linkages between Denmark’s different instruments and how these can contribute to
greater results.
3. Context analysis




Overview of national political, social, economic and human rights situation;
Overview of relevant national stakeholders/drivers of change;
Overview of national policies in relevant reform areas;
Overview of other donor engagements in the country in relevant areas.
4. Strategic priorities and focus areas
 Presentation and justification of DAPP strategic priorities in the country;
 Guiding principles for DAPP engagements (including HRBA, etc.);
 Description of how the DAPP will address challenges and opportunities in a selected
number of focus areas;
 Considerations about harmonisation with other development partners and alignment to
national partner processes;
 Considerations about exit strategy
5. Management and Coordination
 Presentation of overall management and coordination of DAPP engagements in the
country.
6. Risk management
 Assessment of potential impact and consequence of key risks in relation to context,
programmatic and institutional level (with a particular focus on how DAPP engagements
may be affected by limited access, freedom and movement);
 Scenarios and their consequences for DAPP engagements may be relevant to consider.
Annexes: Portfolio of engagements, etc.
47
ANNEX 5 – DAPP Process Action Plan 2014-2016
Danish Arab Partnership Programme – main timelines 2014 – 2016
2014
Date (month, day)
July, 4th
August, 18 – 22nd
September, 1st
September, medio
September,
ultimo/October, primo
October, 1st
October, medio
October, 23rd
November, 11th
November, 12th
November, medio
November, ultimo
November
(ultimo)/December
(primo)
November/December
Event
Final MTR report
M&E seminar with
partners
Partners to submit
revised rolling plans
1st draft DAPP
Implementation
Document (2015/2016)
Appraisal of
Implementation
Document (2015/2016)
Draft Dialogue Study
Final Implementation
Document (2015/2016)
Note for External Grant
Committee (DAPP
Programme 2015/2016)
External Grant
Committee
Submission of DAPP
Programme 2015/2016
for Ministers approval
Dialogue seminar with
partners
Tender Academic Grant
Facility
Submission of
components of DAPP
programme to the
Finance Committee
Preparation of
partnership agreements
(to be signed 2015)
Responsible
TAS
DAPP team (PM)
Status/comments
DAPP team (all)
DAPP team (PM + all)
TAS (NB)
DAPP Team (PM)
DAPP Team (PM)
DAPP Team (PM)
DAPP Team (PM)
DAPP Team (PM)
DAPP Team (PM)
DAPP Team (RH)
DAPP Team (PM)
DAPP Team (all)
2015
January, primo
*January, ultimo
February
*February (date tbd)
Finalizing partnership
agreements/appropriation
/disbursements
External Grant Committee
Document
Finalize remaining
agreements/appropriations
/disbursements
External Grant Committee
(remaining programme)
DAPP Team (all)
DAPP Team (PM)
DAPP Team (all)
DAPP Team (PM)
48
February, 28th
March
PPO
DAPP Team (all)
Status meetings Strategic
DAPP Team (all)
Partners
April – September
Concept Note Strategic
DAPP Team (PM)
Framework Document 2017 –
2020
 Programme
Committee (April, date
tbc)
 UPR (May/June, date
tbd)
 Ministers approval
(ultimo June)
 URU to be informed
(August, primo)
 KLF to be
informed/approve
(August)
 Public (September)
*= If needed depending on outstanding programme
2016
March
Final Strategic
DAPP Team (PM)
Framework Document
2017 – 2020
April
URU/UPN to be
DAPP Team (PM)
informed
May – September
Programming 2017 –
DAPP Team (all)
2018
September, primo
Draft Implementation
DAPP Team (PM + all)
Document (2017 – 2018)
September
Appraisal
TAS
Implementation
Document
October, medio
Note for External Grant DAPP Team (PM)
Committee
November, primo
External Grant
DAPP Team (PM)
Committee
49
ANNEX 6 – Summary of review recommendations and suggestions
The table below provides an overview of recommendations as well as suggestions contained in the review report (detailed suggestions regarding
thematic area IV can be found in Annex 3). Recommendations are categorised into immediate/short term follow up i.e. actions and processes
linked to the preparation and implementation of the 2015-2016 programme activities, and medium term follow up relating to preparation and
implementation of the next SFD as well as PID.
REVIEW RECOMMENDATIONS
Immediate/short term follow up
Medium term follow up
Sub-section
preparation/implementation of 2015-2016 programme
2.1 Theory of
change
1.
Clarify the concept of dialogue, and the concept
of reform and democratization In particular,
differentiate the contributions and expectations
of activities with an explicit dialogue objective
vs. more reform-oriented activities.
preparation/implementation of 2017-2020 strategy
a.
b.
2.2
Contextual
analysis
2.
Consider more thoroughly the appropriateness
of the DAPP as a key instrument in countries
with difficult security environments, including
its purpose and role in comparison with the
Peace & Stabilisation Fund.
Given the particular objectives of the DAPP,
prioritize which countries to focus what efforts
on and complement with a clearer strategy on
the use of regional activities.
c.
4.
Consider ways to strengthen the DAPP’s utility
as a political instrument. In particular, review
opportunities to strengthen synergies between
DAPP activities and political dialogue in the
region.
d.
5.
Use the human rights standards, HRBA
principles and the concepts of duty bearers
/rights holders more systematically to frame
e.
3.
2.3
Incorporatio
n of key
Danish
policy
priorities
KEY REVIEW SUGGESTIONS
Differentiate the reform and dialogue
strategic objectives: Not all thematic
areas/objectives and engagements/outcomes
should be expected to contribute equally to
dialogue and reform.
Re-think thematic objectives to ensure
coherence and relevance. In particular,
reconsider the “knowledge-based societies”
thematic area and explain how “economic
growth and job creation” contributes to
driving reform.
Consider a reconceptualization of the
Thematic objectives for the future Strategy
development.
Clarify the DAPP’s use as a political
instrument: Explain how the DAPP furthers
key Danish policy priorities and delineate the
particular role of the DAPP in relation to
other Danish development and foreign policy
instruments employed in the region.
Consider and clarify the operationalization of
the DAPP as a regional initiative.
Seek better targeting of duty bearers in relation to
economic reforms and social dialogue e.g. on the
basis of national roadmaps for reforms.
Develop a clearer relationship between the DAPP’s
objective of promoting EGJC and the thematic
priorities of the NEC with due consideration to the
50
overall manageability of the portfolio.
the strategic approach and to provide a better
articulation of the intervention logic.
3.1 Portfolio
of
development
engagements
and
implementin
g partners
6.
7.
8.
3.2
Implementat
ion
modalities
9.
Continue efforts to streamline the portfolio to
improve
manageability
and
strengthen
strategic focus. This includes striving towards a
reduced number of engagements/partners
(should aim for no more than 30 active
engagements, as per guidelines for country
programmes) and not adding new sub-themes
to the programme in the current strategic
period.
Clarify the targeted levels of funding per
country and thematic area and consider
revising the stated objective of a regional and
thematic
balance
in
the
Project
Implementation Document.
If job creation is pursued as an objective for
new interventions, SMEs should be supported
directly through banks/microfinance or
professional organizations, provided that the
right modalities can be identified. Explicit exit
strategies promoting domestic private actors
should be developed for existing SME
initiatives implemented through multilateral
organisations and municipalities.
Maintain core DAPP intervention areas around
strategic partnerships between Danish and
MENA organisations. Complement these with
other support modalities which can enhance
efforts in specific reform areas with due
consideration of public procurement rules.
f.
Focus the SFD more clearly on the policy
level, elaborating primarily the strategic and
thematic objectives, and leaving the further
elaboration of the theory of change at the
engagement and outcome level to the
Implementation Document
Focus more on ensuring complementarity with
other Danish funded instruments supporting private
sector development in the DAPP focus countries as a
minimum through enhanced exchange of
information and dissemination of information to
partners on opportunities.
g.
All strategic partnership organisations that
have not been reviewed during the last 4-5
years (including joint reviews) should be
subject to a performance review prior to an
extension of support beyond 2016. New
strategic partners should undergo a capacity
assessment.
Limit stand-alone agreements which are not a not
considered as a more integrated part of the
programme, particularly if normal quality assurance
mechanisms cannot be applied due to timing and
security reasons.
h.
A review of the mini pools supported by the
DAPP should be undertaken prior to an
extension of support beyond 2016 with a
focus on value for money. This could include
Pending the upcoming review of the European
Endowment for Democracy (EED), envisage
expanding support to this funding mechanism
which aims at providing rapid and flexible support
51
exploring the possibility of transferring the
management of pool funds for small MENA
dialogue projects to CISU.
3.3 Quality
of the
implementat
ion
framework
and
processes
10. The flexibility and ability to respond swiftly to
emerging needs should be maintained but
tempered with a more systematic use of
standard quality criteria in the programme
design and implementation. This includes:
o Not predetermining which partners and
modalities should be applied in different
situations, but rather selecting these
according to their ability to provide results
in an efficient and sustainable manner and
based on opportunities to promote reform
and dialogue.
o Having an enhanced focus on value-formoney
in
partnership
agreements,
including more transparency about funds
managed by partners in the MENA region
o Working on a better mapping of relevant
actors on the ground that impact change
and initiate dialogue with strategic
partners on broadening their partner
portfolios.
to actors of democratic change and may thus
provide a mean to cater for new needs emerging in
relation with political transition processes
In light of the limitations of the existing modalities,
other channels to support job creation should be
explored through closer cooperation with other
donors, including contribution to formal basket
funds, delegation to other donors, etc. A challenge
fund modality could potentially also be looked into
in the longer term.
Take concrete steps to ensure more systematic
exchange of information with seconded experts in
order to avoid missed opportunities for Denmark to
influence important processes and to utilise
concrete possibilities of synergies at the
programmatic level
Twinning arrangements could be envisaged as a
support modality as long as the standard quality
criteria for development cooperation are carefully
considered, including any effects it may have on the
manageability of the programme, and taking into
account procurement regulations.
The DAPP should move towards an alignment
between the timeframe of the next strategic
framework and the programme implementation
period i.e. a three-year programme cycle.
52
o
o
4.1. Planning
tools and
M&E
Working more systematically on ensuring
that the capacity of MENA partners is
enhanced through the partnership by
strengthening their own tools and
methods.
Promoting more alignment to national
reform processes and closer cooperation
with
other
donors
in
prioritised
interventions areas, notably in the field of
economic reform.
11. Efficiency gains should be pursued through
global agreements for Danish strategic partners
that work with other MFA units and use of
consultancy assistance for detailed review of
progress reports, when needed.
i.
j.
4.2 Division
of labour
12. Guidelines, TORs and key principles of division
of labour in relation to the DAPP should be
completed and regularly updated,
and
mechanisms
established
to
enhance
coordination between stakeholders at HQ and
decentralised levels as well as for reinforcing
strategic dialogue between decentralised units
and DAPP partners at country level.
Plan for sufficient time to undertake thorough
preparation of the next strategic framework
and a three-year programming phase starting
in 2017, including updated situation analysis
and broad consultations with relevant
stakeholders.
Together with embassies and TAOs, and with
assistance from external resources, develop a
simpler tool for identifying country priorities
within the framework of the SFD to ensure
consistency across DAPP focus countries and
to provide guidance throughout programme
preparation and implementation
Explore how dialogue between Denmark and MENA
can be incorporated in partner organisations’
planning in a manner which allows for co-funding of
activities that are not directly linked to bilateral
exchange
Partners should be encouraged to use their own
planning and reporting tools instead of standardised
MFA formats.
Promote the use of the DCED results measurement
standard (http://www.enterprisedevelopment.org/). As a first step, promote the use
of universal indicators of change recommended by
DCED in order to aggregate impact across
programmemes (indicators focus on scale, net
income, net additional jobs created).
Meetings between relevant staff in HQ, embassies
and TAOs take place with a fixed cadence to discuss
developments in the context and programmerelated issues.
Consider establishing mechanisms adapted to the
local context at the decentralised levels (embassies
and TAOs) to reinforce the interaction with partners
for mutual benefit, with a focus on the strategic level
as opposed to a detailed level of implementation.
53
4.3 Financial
management
13. Provide clearer guidance for the identification
and selection of development engagements
funded
through
the
strategic
reserve/unallocated funds.
4.4 Risk
management
14. Implement appraisal recommendations to
elaborate risk management in both SFD and
PID.
15. Given the particular role of the DAPP, consider
and provide strategic guidance for weighing
potential impact against risk, e.g., weighing
activities intended to affect incremental change
towards impact over the long term against
immediate risks.
16. More systematic principles and approaches for
exit strategies of DAPP development
engagements should be reflected in the next
PID and exit strategies should be part of the
strategic dialogue with implementing partners,
including discussions on criteria used for
exiting and how they prepare their local
partners to exit.
4.5 Exit
strategies
4.6 Process
Action Plan
k.
Promote the use of output-based budgeting
among strategic partners so as to facilitate the
assessment of results against financial
progress.
Consider establishing a programme steering
committee composed by the relevant ambassadors
in the region and by the Head of the MENA
department to set forth the programme’s strategic
line.
financial management tool of the programme to
include thematic objectives and organisation type as
key variables. The tool should also be updated to
track the funding across recipient countries better.
This may necessitate updating the requirements for
financial reporting of the strategic partners.
Plan for an earlier start of the programme
formulation process of the next PID (covering
period from 2017) in order to allow for time for a
regular appraisal mission instead of a desk
appraisal. The appraisal mission should take place
no later than August 2016.
Clarify procedures and timelines to be applied for
presentation and approval of the next SFD as well as
the PID.
54