What Women Want:
Suffrage, Gender Gaps in Voter Preferences and Government Expenditures
Patricia Funk
SITE - Stockholm School of Economics
Christina Gathmann
Stanford University
This Draft: July 2006
Abstract
This paper combines unique individual-level information on ballot votes with state-level data on
expenditures to provide new evidence on how women suffrage has affected government spending. Using
data from the last country in Europe to adopt suffrage, Switzerland, we demonstrate two main results.
First, women suffrage has changed the scope of government much more than its size. Women are more
likely to support expenditures for public goods like environment and public transport, but oppose
defense spending and subsidies for agriculture. Second, the political gender gap has shifted over time.
While women were equally likely than men to support publicly provided health and welfare services
shortly after suffrage adoption, their demand for these services has increased over the past two decades.
We calculate that ten years after women suffrage, total expenditures are around 7 percent lower than
prior to adoption, while welfare expenditures are 10 percent higher.
Keywords: Women Suffrage, Fiscal Policy, Voter Preferences, Switzerland
*Correspondence: Patricia Funk, Stockholm Institute for Transition Economics (SITE), Stockholm School
of Economics, Email: [email protected]; Christina Gathmann, Department of Economics and Stanford
Center for International Development, Stanford University, Email: [email protected]. We thank Renee
Adams, Ulf Axelson, Erik Bergloef, Doug Bernheim, Francine Blau, Tore Ellingsen, Daniel Ferreira, Mariassunta
Gianetti, Henning Hillmann, Helena Svaleryd, Michele Tertilt, seminar participants of the Stockholm Institute
of Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, University of Uppsala, University of St. Gallen,
Stanford University and the Midwest Political Science Association for useful comments and suggestions. We
are grateful to Werner Seitz, Magdalena Schneider and Elisabeth Willen from the Swiss Bureau of Statistics,
Andreas Ladner, Klaus Armingeon, Hans Hirter and Christian Bolliger from the University of Berne and Francois
Loretan from SIDOS for invaluable help in collecting the data. Patricia Funk gratefully acknowledges financial
support from the Swedish Research Council Vetenskapsradet.
1
Introduction
A dramatic expansion of the electorate occurred when women received the right to vote. Since women
suffrage roughly doubled the size of the electorate, we would expect government to take quite a different
form, if women have different policy preferences than men.1 Proponents of the anti-suffrage movement
even argued that suffrage would destroy families, decline the quality of elected politicians or have a
negative influence on the business climate (see Jones, 1991 and Banaszak, 1996).
Despite these drastic predictions, surprisingly little is known about the actual policy response to
women suffrage. For the United States, Lott and Kenny (1999) report that women suffrage caused a
substantial increase in the size of government between 1870 and 1940. In sharp contrast, Aidt et al.
(2006) find that female franchise had little effect on expenditures in several European countries in the
late 19th and early 20th century. All previous studies rely on aggregate national or state-level data,
and cover time periods with limited data availability.
This paper makes use of individual voting choices to analyze differences in political preferences
between men and women directly. The richness of the data allow us to distinguish between political
gender gaps in different policy areas, for example preferences for unemployment insurance from preferences for agricultural subsidies. We combine our individual-level evidence with a detailed aggregate
analysis of the fiscal policy responses to women suffrage. This allows us to check the consistency of
our results using two very different data sources and assess potential concerns of omitted variables in
the aggregate data.
Our empirical analysis focuses on Switzerland, which provides a unique empirical setting to analyze
voter preferences and the effects of women suffrage.2 While Switzerland was one of the first countries
1
Gender has been found to matter in India: female policy makers invested in projects directly relevant to the needs
of their own genders. Depending on the regional area, female leaders allocated resources to drinking water and roads
differently than men; see Chattophadhyay and Duflo (2004).
2
Previous studies on Switzerland have also found conflicting results. While Abrams and Settle (1999) document an
increase in federal welfare spending in Switzerland after 1971, Stutzer and Kienast (2005) find a negative correlation
between women suffrage and cantonal spending.
2
to extend the economic franchise (1848), it was the last country in Europe to extend the franchise
to women. Women suffrage was introduced at the federal level in 1971, more than half a century
later than in the United States and many European countries. Switzerland also has wide-ranging
possibilities for direct democratic participation through voter initiatives and mandatory or optional
referendums. Both late adoption and its strong direct democratic tradition provide us with rich data
to study political preferences and fiscal policy effects of women suffrage.
To analyze gender gaps in voter preferences, we use novel survey data on voting behavior in almost
200 ballots since 1981 covering policy areas like health care, unemployment insurance, defense or
subsidies for public transport. The data allow us to study actual voter support for policy projects
with predictable and often sizeable financial consequences.
Our results suggest that women are more supportive of government intervention in some areas,
but oppose them in others. Women consistently support higher expenditures for the environment and
public transport, but oppose spending for defense or subsidies for agriculture. We also document a
shift in voter preferences over the past three decades: while women are more conservative than men
in the 1970s, women turn more left-wing and men more conservative during the 1980s.3 This shift
in preferences has lead to an increase in women’s demand for government in the areas of health and
welfare.
While female political preferences had a strong influence on the types of expenditures supported
by the electorate, their effect on the size of government is small: between 1981 and 2003, women were
two percent more likely to support more government spending. Focusing on the ballots where women
actually changed the results, we calculate that women preferences increased government spending by
3
In the United States, women voted more conservative than men at least until the presidential election of 1964.
Berman (1993) also provides evidence that women in Arizona were less supportive of a progressive labor package and
the abolishment of the death penalty, but more supportive of the prohibition in 1914 to 1916. A reversal in the political
gender gap started to appear in the 1980s when women were much more likely to support Democratic candidates in the
United States. A similar shift has been observed in Europe where women became more likely to support left-wing parties
in Europe than men since the 1980s (see Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2004; Edlund and Pande, 2002; Seltzer et al., 1997 for
the United States. Inglehart and Norris, 2003 and Norris, 2003 for evidence from other countries).
3
just 1.1 percent over that period.
We complement our analysis on voter preferences with state-level data set on government spending and canton characteristics from 1950 to 2000. In line with our evidence that women are more
conservative upon adoption, we find that spending at the canton level decreased by about 3 percent
after women suffrage was introduced. The negative adoption effect is particularly large for welfare,
health and education expenditures. We also show that the long-run effect of women suffrage is consistent with our documented change in political preferences. While social expenditures decline upon
adoption, they increase with the number of years since women suffrage adoption. Even twenty years
after women suffrage was adopted, overall expenditures are lower than prior to adoption.
We perform several specification tests to demonstrate the robustness of our results. First, we show
that the negative adoption effects are not driven by endogeneity bias. An analysis of the adoption
decision at the canton level reveals that support for women suffrage is driven by a combination of timeinvariant cultural differences and an aggregate upward trend in favor of women suffrage. We provide
additional evidence that neither differential trends in male preferences nor government spending prior
to adoption can explain support for suffrage among the male electorate. In addition, we show that
our results are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables and changes in female turnout
behavior over time.
The paper makes several contributions to the literature. We show that the fiscal policy effects of
women suffrage are closely tied to the evolution of aggregate voter preferences. Both data demonstrate
that women suffrage affected the scope of government much more than its size. We also for the first
time provide evidence that suffrage resulted first in a negative and later a positive effect on health
and welfare expenditures.4
We contribute to the literature on the political gender gap in two ways. First, we provide evidence
4
Edlund and Pande (2002) trace women’s shift to the left to increasing divorce rates. Their model implies dynamic
suffrage effects that are consistent with our empirical evidence.
4
that women and men systematically differ in which government expenditures they support. Our focus
on actual policies with direct financial consequences allows us to link revealed preferences to actual
spending patterns at the state level. In contrast, the literature on political gender gaps largely focuses
on hypothetical questions from opinion polls, which makes it difficult to assess the actual consequences
of changes in electoral rules like women suffrage.5
Second, our results on the reversal of the gender gap in recent decades confirms similar findings for
other countries. However, previous studies have focused on the political gender gap measured along a
single left-right scale or as the relative support for Democratic presidential candidates. We go beyond
this literature in providing evidence that the shift in preferences has mostly affected the demand for
health and welfare expenditures with little change in other policy areas like agriculture, transport or
environment.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides some background information on the
introduction of women suffrage in Switzerland. Section 3 analyzes male and female voter preferences
for the size and scope of government using data on federal ballots. The results of women suffrage on
fiscal policy in the cantons are reported in Section 4. Section 5 shows that the canton-level results
are robust to concerns about endogeneity, the inclusion of additional controls and changes in female
turnout behavior over time, while Section 6 concludes.
2
The Long Road to Women Suffrage
Switzerland was among the last countries in Europe to introduce voting rights for women. Women
suffrage at the federal level was granted in 1971, half a century later than in the United States and
many European countries.6 A first attempt to introduce suffrage at the national level was undertaken
5
Studies on the potential sources and determinants of the political gender gap include Alvarez and McCaffery (2003),
Conover (1988), Gidengil (1995), Inglehart and Norris (2003), Norrander (1999), Schlesinger and Heldman (2001), Shapiro
and Mahajan (1986) and the papers in Mueller (1988).
6
For example, women suffrage was adopted in Finland in 1906, in Denmark in 1915, in 1918 in Germany; Austria,
Poland and Russia. Spain and Portugal followed in 1931. France and Italy adopted suffrage in 1945.
5
in 1929, when a petition signed by 250,000 citizens was sent to the federal parliament. However,
neither the government nor the parliament reacted to the petition in support of suffrage.
Since an extension of the franchise required a change in the Swiss constitution, the male electorate
had to approve it in a referendum. The first national referendum on the introduction of women suffrage
in Switzerland was held in 1959. It failed as just one out of three men voted for the adoption of women
suffrage. The second national referendum in 1971 in contrast passed with almost two-thirds voting in
favor of it. Still, in eight out of the twenty-five cantons, less than fifty percent of men voted for its
introduction.
There was also substantial heterogeneity in the adoption of women suffrage at the canton level.
First attempts to introduce women suffrage at the cantonal level failed in Neuchatel, Basle City,
Glarus, Zurich, Geneva and St. Gallen in 1920/21. The first column in Table 1 shows that women
suffrage was adopted earlier in the French-speaking parts of Switzerland. In contrast, the two Germanspeaking cantons (Appenzell-Ausserrhoden and Appenzell-Innerrhoden) introduced suffrage almost 30
years later. In contrast to the United States, the male electorate in Switzerland also had to approve
suffrage in each canton independently of adoption at the federal level. Overall, nine cantons adopted
women suffrage in their canton before or when it was introduced at the federal level. Adoption was
voluntary in all but the last one (Appenzell-Innerrhoden), where women suffrage was mandated by
the Supreme Court in 1990.
— insert Table 1 about here —
As shown in columns (2) and (3) of Table 1, cantons that adopted suffrage earlier at the canton
level were also more likely to support voting rights for women in the two federal referendums. This
congruence is important since our empirical analysis relies on data both at the federal and cantonal
level.
6
A comparison of column (2) and (3) shows that a canton’s ranking in supporting women suffrage
was roughly stable over time. The approval of women suffrage in 1971 was therefore a consequence
of increasing voter support in each canton, not by changes in a few cantons. As we will demonstrate
below, the timing of adoption at the canton level can largely be explained by a combination of timeinvariant cultural differences across cantons and a common upward trend in the support for women
suffrage in the whole country.
One explanation for the aggregate increase in voter support is that the Swiss Government wanted
to sign the European Human Rights Convention, but would do so only with restrictions (”Vorbehalt”)
because women did not have the right to vote. This resulted in a lot of media attention and ultimately
political pressure in favor of women suffrage.7
3
Political Preferences of Men and Women
3.1
Data on Voting Behavior in Federal Propositions
To study political gender gaps, we exploit the fact that Switzerland has wide-ranging possibilities for
direct democratic participation. In Switzerland, citizens may propose initiatives to change the federal
constitution or request a referendum about all laws issued by the federal government if 50,000 eligible
voters or 8 cantons require it within 100 days after their official publication. In addition, a voter
referendum is mandatory for all changes to the constitution and joining international organizations.
Our analysis uses surveys of voting behavior in 197 of the 202 federal propositions between 1981
and 2003 for a representative sample of Swiss citizens. The data have a number of advantages over
other measures of preferences: first, the votes cover a wide range of political issues, such as health
policy, changes in unemployment insurance, new environmental policies, subsidies for agriculture or
membership in international organizations. Second, we use information on voting behavior with real
7
See Seitz (2004) and Banaszak (1996) for more details on the political struggle for women suffrage in Switzerland.
7
political and financial consequences instead of relying on opinions polls about political issues. Finally,
we identify differential preferences that are representative for the whole population as individuals in
all cantons vote on the same proposition.8
The data set is a repeated cross-sectional survey of 500 to 1,000 respondents between 1981 and
2003.9 It contains detailed information on the respondent’s demographics, economic situation, canton
of residence, political attitudes as well as voting decisions in the ballots. We dropped all respondents
under the age of 21, who were not eligible to vote until March of 1991, and under 18 thereafter. We
further restrict our sample to respondents that actually voted in the federal ballot.
Table 2 reports summary statistics of the survey data separately for men and women over the
sample period. The table reflects the more traditional position of women in Swiss society: women
are on average less educated than men and have lower income available to them. The female labor
force participation rate is low compared to the United States as is the fraction of divorced people and
single parent households. Women are also more likely to live in urban areas and in the French- and
Italian-speaking cantons of Switzerland.
With respect to political preferences, women position themselves somewhat more on the left than
men during the 1980s and 1990s. Women are also on average 7 percent less likely to vote in federal
propositions than men.
— insert Table 2 about here —
A first look at the propositions with the largest gender gap shows that women were 18 percent more
likely to support an initiative for a reduction in tobacco consumption (see Table A1 in the appendix
for a list of those propositions). Not surprisingly, women were also more likely to support votes for the
8
With suffrage, women also gain access to other sources of political influence such as the right to sign or propose voter
initiatives. We analyze the responsiveness of different political instruments after the adoption of women in more detail
in related work.
9
Even though women received the right to vote at the federal level in 1971, surveys have been conducted only since
1981.
8
equal representation of women in the federal government, equal rights for men and women in general
and a reform of marital law. In addition, women were more supportive of anti-discrimination policies
in the military, environmental policy and government subsidies for disabled people.
While suggestive, the summary statistics show that men and women also differ along many other
dimensions like labor force participation or educational attainment. To address this, we now turn to
a systematic analysis of political gender gaps conditional on observable characteristics.
3.2
Political Gender Gaps across Policy Areas
We focus our analysis on seven policy areas, where we expect the largest effect on expenditures, and
discuss the other votes in footnotes. Three areas cover public goods (environment, transportation
and defense), two the public provision of a private good (education, health), and two transfers and
redistributive issues (agricultural subsidies, social security provisions). Within each category, the
propositions are defined in such a way that it always propagates either more or less of a certain
policy.10 The model we estimate is
Yesij = α + βj F emalei + γ 0 Xit + εij
(1)
where Yes ij is a binary variable equal to one if respondent i supported a vote in policy area j and zero
otherwise. Xit includes all other characteristics of the respondent such as demographics, economic
position or political preferences.
Table 3 reports marginal effects from a probit model of the voting decision in each policy area.
All specifications include year and canton of residence fixed effects. The first row includes only a
female dummy. Women vote more in favor of protecting the environment, support for the elderly and
the disabled, the use of public instead of private transportation and a reduction of military spending
10
For instance, all votes on agricultural policy concerned a reduction in agricultural subsidies. See Table A2 in the
Appendix for further information on the votes in each policy area.
9
(see also Longchamp and Bieri, 2001). In contrast, they oppose subsidies for agriculture, a nuclear
based energy policy, a further construction of roads and a relaxation of speed limits (last three votes
not reported). Men, on the other hand, are more likely to support a reform of the unemployment
insurance, which included reductions in benefits. Women and men are equally likely to support free
secondary education.
Row (2) adds controls for demographics, employment status and household income to the specification. Since women are less educated and have lower labor force attachment, gender differences
should disappear if education or employment are driving political gender gaps. However, differences
in demographic or economic characteristics only affect voting behavior on health insurance, a reduction in unemployment insurance and support for road infrastructure. Most gender gaps cannot be
explained by differences in either demographic or economic characteristics.
— insert Table 3 about here —
The bottom panel of Table 3 tests whether political gender gaps can be accounted for by a onedimensional measure of political ideology. Row (4) therefore adds a measure for party ideology to the
specification in row (2). Party ideology is measured as the respondent’s self-reported position on a
left-right scale from 0 to 10, with ten being conservative and zero being left-wing. Since a respondent’s
political ideology is only available after 1987, row (3) reports estimates for the second specification
with the sample restricted to the period 1988 to 2003.
The results in the third row show that gender gaps are more pronounced in the later sample period.
Controlling for the left-right position of the respondent, the gender gap disappears for subsidies for
health insurance, two redistributive issues (“reduce unemployment benefits”, “longer maternity leave”)
and a reduction in the military. However, a one-dimensional “left-right”indicator cannot capture
gender gaps in the area of environmental policy, transportation, agricultural policy or social security.11
11
Using the same specification, we also find the largest gender gap in votes on equal rights for men and women (11
10
Our findings are consistent with previous evidence from public opinion surveys in other European
countries. In Sweden for example, women were more in favor of publicly provided medical care,
environmental protection and gender equality than men (Eduards, 1982). Similarly, Norris (1988)
found that women in several European countries were more supportive of unemployment benefits
and less in favor of defense spending. In the US, opinion polls report similar gender gaps in the
areas of environmental care, force and violence, and compassion issues (Shapiro and Mahajan (1986)).
However, opinion polls include the whole citizenship, and not only the voting population, and can be
bad predictors for later voting behavior (Matsusaka and McCarty, 2001).
3.3
Political Gender Gaps and Government Expenditures
While gender gaps in policy issues are informative, they do not tell us whether and how women
have changed the size or scope of government. To address this, we select the ballots that would
unambiguously increase or decrease government spending. To calculate the fiscal consequences of a
ballot, we rely on detailed comments, which are published by the federal government for each initiative,
new law and executive orders. These documents include the implied expenditures and taxes in the
case of voter approval and are common knowledge before the ballot.12
We are able to identify 71 propositions, where the fiscal consequences were either an unambiguous
increase or decrease in government expenditures, taxes or subsidies. Note that the set of propositions
we analyze contains both ballots that were approved and therefore actually increased government
spending as well as ballots that were not successful. This ensures that we get a representative picture
of preferred spending for men and women, which is not affected by the ballot’s actual success. However,
we will also analyze women’s role as pivotal voters.
percent). Women are also 7 percent more likely to support public spending on culture, 6 percent less likely to support
gentechnology and 5 percent more likely to support a more liberal immigration policy. In contrast, no significant gender
gaps exist for votes on joining international organizations, regulation of the housing market and on illegal drug policy.
12
All documents by the federal council and parliamentary resolutions can be accessed online at
http://www.ads.bar.admin.ch/ADS. The comments including the financial assessment for each proposition are
sent by mail to each household prior to the vote. Table A3 in the Appendix contains a detailed list of the 71 votes with
predictable financial consequences.
11
Table 4 shows marginal effects from a probit model whether a respondent voted yes on a proposition
that would increase (column (1)) or decrease (column (2)) government spending, taxes, subsidies or
debt. The first column shows that women are 2.7 percent more likely to support projects that would
increase overall government spending. As shown in the lower part of the table, the gender gap changes
little with the inclusion of additional control variables.
— insert Table 4 about here —
However, as shown in the last section, political gender gaps vary a lot depending on the policy area
involved. Columns (3)-(9) of Table 4 therefore distinguishes propositions with increasing or decreasing
expenditures in the seven policy areas.
The coefficients show that women are more likely to support higher spending for environmental
protection, public transport or welfare, but oppose expenditures for the military or agricultural subsidies. In fact, the gender gap is particularly high for spending on environmental policy (14.3 percent).
The gender gaps are somewhat smaller for social expenditures, security, agricultural spending and
education.13
The results in Table 3 and 4 suggest that female voters have had a bigger impact on the scope
than the size of government. However, the estimates in Table 4 do not allow us to directly measure
how women voters changed actual federal spending. The latter is only affected if the proposition is
approved by the voters, and women changed the final outcome.
Among the fifteen federal votes where men and women had approved different outcomes, women
changed the result in their favor in four cases or about two percent of the 202 propositions over that
period.14 Based on the information provided by the federal government before the vote, we can get
13
The significant gender gap in the area of education is particularly driven by one vote, where women opposed a
reduction of federal subsidies for primary school.
14
Table A4 shows a list of those votes where men and women had accepted different outcomes. The lower support of
women for an “ecological and modern agriculture” as well as “easier access to real estate for foreigners” appears to be in
12
a good estimate of the financial consequences for two votes. Women’s opposition to a reduction in
unemployment benefits raised federal spending of about 70 million Swiss Francs per year. Women were
however also in favor of abolishing subsidies for parking spaces, which saved the federal government
about 20 million Swiss Francs per year.
Relative to the 46 billion federal expenditures in 1999, the change in voting outcomes by women
adds up to a mere 1.1 percent increase in federal spending. The evidence from voter preferences in
federal propositions thus suggests that the impact of women on the size of government has been small.
3.4
Changes in Voter Preferences over Time
Our results thus far show that women support government spending in some policy areas, but not in
others. Since several studies have documented changes in the political gender gap in recent decades, our
findings for 1981 to 2003 might not be representative of political preferences in the years immediately
following women suffrage.
To check for possible changes in political gender gaps over time, we use data from a survey in
1975 that included questions about four of our seven policy areas: environment, health, education
and welfare. The data was part of a cross-national survey (Political Action Study) to study voting
behavior and political attitudes for a representative sample of the adult population above 16.
For each of the four policy areas, we know how much the respondent thinks that it is an important
problem and to which degree he considers it a government responsibility. The response categories
in each area ranges from 1 (absolutely unimportant problem / no government responsibility at all)
to 4 (very important problem / an essential government responsibility). For welfare, we have two
response items: whether the government should redistribute income (column (4)) and care for the
elderly (column (5)).
contrast to our previous findings. A detailed analysis of these votes however shows that the opponents of the first vote
thought the reform did not go far enough, while environmental concerns of new construction played a major role in the
second vote. See http://www.polittrends.ch/vox-analysen for a further discussion of these votes.
13
Table 5 shows the results. As in the last section, our main parameter of interest is the coefficient
on the gender dummy. The specifications of control variables are the same as in Table 4. Without
controlling for any differences in observable characteristics, the first row shows that women consider
care for the elderly, providing health care and protecting the environment as more important problems than men. However, the significance decreases as controls are added. As for the government’s
responsibility, the lower part of the panel shows that there were no statistically significant gender gaps
in any of the four policy areas. Even though women consider protecting the environment, providing
or caring for the elderly as important problems, they do not necessarily think that it is a government
responsibility.
Adding controls for individual demographics, employment status and income, changes the picture
somewhat. Women are now less likely to consider the government responsible for the care of the elderly.
In contrast, women are now also more likely to consider education a government responsibility. The
political gender gap for publicly provided education appears to be driven by differences in household
income with more wealthy households supporting publicly provided education.
— insert Table 5 about here —
Comparing the results from Table 4 and 5 shows that women were consistently more likely to
support government activity for the environment and education both in 1975 and after 1981. In
contrast, women were less likely in 1975 to support government intervention in health care and welfare
provisions than after 1981. This suggests an increase in their demand for government in the areas of
health and welfare between the 1970s and 1980s.
However, the observed changes in preferences could be an artefact of differences in survey questions
or some other factor. We therefore turn to an analysis of the political position along a left-right
scale, which can be measured consistently over time. Figure 1 shows the fraction of women and men
14
supporting leftist parties in the federal elections since 1971. Two facts are noteworthy. First, women
were less supportive of left parties than men throughout the first decade after suffrage was introduced
at the federal level.
Second, the figure also shows that there was reversal in the political support for left parties over
time: women became more supportive of left-wing parties during the 1980s, while men became more
conservative. The documented reversal in preferences is similar to observed changes in the political gender gap in other countries (see Edlund and Pande, 2002; Norrander, 1999; Schlesinger and
Heldmann, 2001 for the United States; Inglehart and Norris, 2003 for other developed countries).
— insert Figure 1 about here —
Since there are other factors affecting political positions over time, Table 6 analyzes the political
position of men and women along a left-right scale for two points in time: 1975 and 1995. The
dependent variable ranges from zero (very left-wing) to ten (very right-wing). Columns (1) to (4)
show the results for 1975 and columns (5) to (8) for 1995.15
In 1975, women were indeed much more conservative than men in all specifications. The gender
gap increases if we control for differences in education and other demographics and decreases once we
include employment status and household income. The fourth column adds various interaction effects
to allow for different effects of women by employment and marital status. Unemployed women are
more likely to be left-wing, but marital status has no effect on the political gender gap.
— insert Table 6 about here —
The picture in 1995 looks completely different: women are now much more left-wing than men
and the gender differences become even stronger once we control for demographics, employment status
15
The data for 1975 are again taken from the Political Action Study. The data for 1995 come from the Selects Study,
which is a post-electoral survey of more than 5,000 Swiss citizens. The sample is representative of the Swiss population.
15
and income. The final column again adds various interaction effects to see if the results are driven by
a subgroup of women. Indeed, the shift to the left was concentrated among women in the labor force
and those with children.16
In sum, women were more conservative and less supportive of government intervention immediately
after women suffrage. While women are more likely to oppose spending for national defense and
agricultural subsidies, they are however more likely to support public goods such as protecting the
environment, public transport and the public provision of education. The shift to the left among
women in the 1980s and 1990s has increased their demand for government, mostly in the areas of
health care and welfare provisions.
4
Women Suffrage and Cantonal Spending Patterns
This section analyzes how women suffrage affected actual spending on the canton level.
4.1
Canton-Level Panel Data
The government sector in Switzerland is with 34 percent of GDP (1996) relatively small, far below
the average of the European Union. Cantons play a dominant role in providing public goods and
services as the constitution states that all responsibilities retain with the cantons unless they were
ceded to the federal government in a referendum.17 In 1998, 33 percent of total government spending
was undertaken by the federal government, 40 percent on the cantonal level and 27 percent on the
local level.
This decentralized structure leaves cantons with a lot of autonomy for redistribution and the
provision of public services. For example, cantons decide autonomously on resources for secondary
16
In contrast to previous results from the United States, we could not find evidence that divorced women in general
or those with medium income are more left-wing than other women.
17
While the federal government has increased its scope of operation over time, the expansion has been limited by
the fact that each redistribution of political responsibilities requires a change in the constitution and is thus subject to
mandatory referendum.
16
education, which accounts for 25 percent of all cantonal expenditures, the provision of health care
(around 18 percent of expenditures) and social security (16 percent).18 The distribution of revenues
between federal and cantonal levels is similarly decentralized. Cantons have the authority to tax labor
and capital income which account for roughly 50 percent of canton revenues. This produces substantial
variation in the tax burden and tax revenues across cantons.
To quantify the effects of women suffrage on fiscal policy, we collected a comprehensive dataset
on cantonal expenditures and revenues, demographic and economic characteristics as well as political
institutions of the 25 cantons from 1950 to 2000.19
Table 7 shows summary statistics for the canton panel data over the whole period. To analyze the
effect of women suffrage on expenditure patterns and compare it to our results on voter preferences,
we classified spending into seven policy areas: environment, transport, security, agriculture as well as
welfare, education and health. On the revenue side, we analyze overall revenues and public deficits.
As can be seen from the last two columns, there is a lot of variation on both the spending and revenue
side across cantons and also over time.
— insert Table 7 about here —
In line with our survey data in the last section, the demographic characteristics show that the
share of divorcees in the adult population, the fraction of single parents and the female labor force
participation rate are low compared to the United States or other European countries. Unemployment
rates have also traditionally been below five percent.
The education level in each canton is measured as the fraction with a university degree. The
18
Shared responsibilities between canton and federal level exist in agricultural policy, civil and criminal law and taxes.
The federal level has the sole responsibility in international relations, defense, customs and currency, atomic energy,
media, postal service, telecommunication as well railways and air traffic. In the areas of environmental policy, social
security system, roads and industrial and labor regulation, the federal government provides the legal basis while Cantons
execute the federal laws.
19
See Appendix A for a more detailed description of the data sources and variables. Our analysis excludes the canton
Jura, which was founded in 1977.
17
average is only 9 percent with the share ranging from zero percent to almost one-third of the adult
population. The language indicator is a dummy variable equal to one if the dominant language in a
canton is French or Italian and zero if it is German. About one-third of the cantons are dominantly
French- or Italian-speaking.
The share of seats in cantonal parliaments occupied by left parties averages 20 percent. While some
cantons have no left parties in their parliaments, other cantons have a majority of their seats held by
left parties. Finally, Swiss citizens have access to several direct democratic instruments on the canton
level. All cantons in Switzerland allow citizens to put a voter initiative on the ballot. The signature
requirement for an initiative varies from 0.01 percent to 17.4 percent of the eligible population. In
addition, 64 percent of the cantons have a mandatory budget referendum in place over the period,
which requires the electorate to approve projects exceeding a certain threshold. Also, 56 percent allow
for a mandatory law referendum, which requires approval of new laws and executive orders.
4.2
Suffrage Adoption Decreases Expenditures in Many Areas
To determine the effect of voting rights for women on expenditures, we estimate the following model
Yst = αs + γt + β · W Sst + δ 0 Xst + ust
(2)
where Yst denotes total (real per capita) annual expenditures, revenues or deficits or expenditures in
a certain policy area in canton s and year t. The variable W Sst is a dummy variable equal to one if
suffrage was adopted in canton s in year t and zero otherwise. The dependent variable is measured
in logs for all categories except cantonal deficit, which can take on negative values and is therefore
measured in levels. All specifications include canton and time fixed effects. These pick up aggregate
trends in canton expenditures over time as well as all time-invariant heterogeneity in spending across
cantons. The effect of women suffrage on government spending is therefore identified from cantons
18
introducing women suffrage in a specific year.
Since expenditures and revenues are affected by other time-varying factors, we also include a large
number of control variables Xst for each canton. Variables like the age structure of the canton measured
by five age categories, the unemployment rate, the fraction of individuals with higher education, the
share of commuters in the canton, the percentage of divorced people and single parents as well as the
female labor force participation rate control for differences in the demand for government like public
transport, social welfare or health care.
To control for economies of scale in the provision of public goods, we also add the average population
density in the canton. The share in federal revenues and the amount of federal subsidies adjusts
for differences in resources available to the cantons. Finally, we also include the percentage of the
population that is Catholic as a rough measure of the political ideology in a canton.
Table 8 reports the results from regression (2). The estimates show that adopting women suffrage
has a negative effect on canton expenditures, revenues and deficit though only the first one is statistically significant. The coefficient suggests that expenditures decrease by 3.3 percent. This implies that
suffrage had an economically significant negative effect on the size of government.
— insert Table 8 about here —
As shown in the last section, women are in favor of some expenditures more than others. The righthand side of Table 8 therefore shows the effect of suffrage on the scope of government. The results
imply that women suffrage has negative effects of canton expenditures for agriculture, security as well
as welfare, education and health. At the same time, suffrage increase canton expenditures for public
goods such as public transport and environmental protection though the latter is not statistically
significant.
Most coefficients on the controls are reasonable. A higher share of federal revenues or subsidies
induce canton governments to spend more as does a higher unemployment rate. The fact that higher
19
population density is associated with lower expenditures suggests that there are significant economies
of scale in the provision of public goods and services. Also, cantons with a higher fraction of Catholics
spend slightly less, which is consistent with the idea that these cantons are more fiscally conservative.
The share of single parents has a positive effect on expenditures, while female labor force participation
and the percentage of divorced people has a negative effect on spending.
The effect of adopting suffrage on spending patterns is broadly consistent with our evidence on
preferences in the last section. Women are more supportive of expenditures in the area of public
transport and environmental policy, but less in favor of expenditures for agricultural subsidies or
security. The negative effect on government size and strong negative effects on expenditures for
welfare and health also confirms that women were indeed more fiscally conservative than men when
women suffrage was adopted.
4.3
The Dynamic Effect of Women Suffrage on Fiscal Policy
Since women’s preferences shifted over time, the long-run effects of women suffrage might differ from its
short-run effect. Given our evidence in the last section, we expect this to affect primarily expenditures
on health and welfare. To capture the dynamic effect of women suffrage, we estimate the same model
as in (2) where now the variable for women suffrage are the years since adoption. The control variables
and expenditure categories are the same as before.
Table 9 shows the results. The top panel includes a linear and quadratic term for the years since
adoption. The bottom panel allows for a more flexible specification by including dummy variables for
each 5 years since adoption. The coefficients suggest that the long-run effect of women suffrage on the
size of government is negative. Suffrage not only decrease expenditures, but also canton revenues and
deficit. For example, the estimates imply that ten years after the adoption of women suffrage, overall
expenditures are 7 percent lower than prior to adoption. The bottom part of the table shows that the
negative effect dominates even 20 years after suffrage adoption.
20
Looking at the individual expenditure categories on the right-hand side shows that suffrage decreased subsidies to agriculture also in the long-run. In contrast, there are no long-run effects on
spending for the public goods environment, transport and security.
— insert Table 9 about here —
As predicted by our evidence on voter preferences, the largest shift between adoption and over time
occurs for welfare and health expenditures: while welfare spending for example declines by 5 percent
upon adoption, it is about 8 percent higher 10 years after suffrage relative to the pre-adoption period.
Similarly, we find that health expenditures decrease by almost 10 percent upon adoption, but increase
by 15 percent in the 10 years after adoption. The bottom part of the table shows that most of the
increase in social expenditures occur more than a decade after women suffrage. Finally, expenditures
for secondary education decline by a statistically significant 6.3 percent upon suffrage adoption. It is
only twenty years after adoption that education expenditures are by 0.5 percent higher than before
adoption.
5
Robustness Analysis
5.1
Endogeneity of Adoption
One important concern is that the negative effect of suffrage might be driven by omitted variables
affecting both expenditures and the adoption decision. In the absence of a good instrument for suffrage
adoption, we present several pieces of evidence showing that omitted variable bias cannot explain our
results.
Since men in each canton had to approve the extension of the franchise to women in a mandatory
referendum, the prime candidate for omitted variables is the preferences of the male electorate prior
21
to adoption. Suppose cantons differ in a one-dimensional preference parameter where higher values
indicate a more liberal attitude both towards government spending and extending the franchise.
If fiscally liberal cantons are both more likely to adopt women suffrage and have a higher demand
for government, our estimate of the adoption effect will be an upper bound and thus an over-estimation
of the true effect of women suffrage. Since all our specifications include canton fixed effects, any timeinvariant differences in voter preferences across cantons will be absorbed by canton dummies. The
only source of bias can therefore arise from time-varying heterogeneity across cantons not captured by
our observable canton characteristics.
To check for time-varying trends in male preferences prior to adoption, we again use our data on
voting behavior in federal propositions prior to 1971. As in Section 3, we select all propositions that
would have implied an increase in federal expenditures, and use the average support for costly projects
in each canton and decade as our proxy for male preferences before suffrage adoption.20
The first column in Table 10 reports the result of regressing canton fiscal preferences on an indicator
whether a canton introduced suffrage early and decade dummies. Early adopters are cantons that
adopted suffrage before it was adopted on a federal level (votes before or at the same day of the
national referendum).
The results show that cantons that introduce suffrage earlier are indeed fiscally less conservative
than late introducers. This difference in preferences will however be absorbed by canton fixed effects.
To see whether early introducers also have a different trend in male voter preferences, we add in
column (2) a linear time trend and an interaction term between the time trend and the time of
adoption. While there is an upward trend in the overall support for higher expenditures among men,
there is no differential trend in male fiscal preferences between early and late introducing cantons.
— insert Table 10 about here —
20
As discussed in a related paper, preferences measured from federal voting data are a good proxy for voter preferences
at the canton level (see Funk and Gathmann, 2005). Note that we cannot simply add voter preferences into the
expenditure regressions as the timing of adoption differed between federal and cantonal level.
22
Since cantons adopt suffrage at different points in time, it could however be the case that canton
expenditures prior to adoption influence the adoption decision, for example because they might affect
male preferences in that canton. We address this by testing whether early and late introducing
cantons had the same growth rates in expenditures prior to adopting women suffrage. The annual
growth rate in expenditures is 0.069 (0.055) percent for early introducers and 0.073 (0.067) percent
for late introducers in the ten (five) years prior to adoption at the canton level with a T-statistic of
0.38 (0.91). Though early introducers have higher expenditure overall, there is no difference in the
growth rate prior to adoption.21
What then determined the decision to adopt women suffrage? The right-hand side of Table 10
provides evidence that support for women suffrage is largely driven by the combination of timeinvariant cultural differences across cantons and a common upward trend, the latter possibly reflecting
social change. The dependent variable in the regression is the share of voters supporting women
suffrage in the two federal referendums in 1959 and 1971.22 We first test for omitted variable bias by
including our proxy for voter preferences. Column (3) shows that cantons favoring higher expenditures
at the federal level are also more likely to support women suffrage. The coefficient implies that a ten
percent increase in the support for more spending is associated with a nearly six percent increase in
the support for women suffrage. This suggests that there is indeed a component of political preferences
that drives both demand for government and extension of the franchise.
To capture the general upward trend in the support of women suffrage over time, we also include an
indicator for the referendum in 1971. Conditional on the other controls, support for suffrage was more
than 30 percent higher in the second national referendum. Our control variables are the population
density as a proxy for the degree of urbanization, the age structure of the population to capture cohort
21
Results are very similar if we first take out a common linear trend or year dummies and then test for differences in
the residual across cantons. There are also no differences in the growth rate of expenditures if we compare cantons in
the same time window, for example the 5 years prior to the federal referendums in 1959 or 1971.
22
We analyzed voting behavior in federal referendums in order to use our preference measure constructed from federal
ballots. However, we find similar results to the ones reported if we use data on the adoption decision at the canton level
instead.
23
effects and the share of university educated people in a canton. We also include whether the canton is
located at the border and the number of tourists per capita to capture exposure to outside influences
in favor of women suffrage. The results show that only the share of highly educated has a significant,
positive effect on adopting women suffrage.
Column (4) adds as control whether the dominant language in a canton is German, French or
Italian. The results show that language and cultural background is an important determinant of the
adoption decision. French- or Italian-speaking cantons (Fribourg, Geneva, Neuchatel, Ticino, Vaud
and Valais) are on average 17.1 percent more likely to support women suffrage. The preferences for
federal spending are no longer statistically significant once the language variable is included.23
The last two columns uses the same approach to test whether the growth rate of expenditures affects
adoption, which would suggest a reverse causality problem. Column (5) uses the same specification as
in column (3) where the main independent variable is now the growth rate in canton expenditures in
the five years prior to the ballot. The coefficient implies that a higher expansion of canton spending
is associated with larger support for suffrage.
Column (6) again adds the dominant language of a canton. As in the case with voter preferences,
the coefficient on the growth in canton expenditures declines. As in column (4), the language of a
canton has a strong and persistent effect on the adoption decision with French- and Italian-speaking
being again 17 percent more likely to support women suffrage.
Our evidence therefore suggests that neither male preferences nor expenditures exhibit a differential
trend prior to adoption. We also find that the adoption decision is strongly influenced by time-invariant
cultural factors together with a common upward trend in the support for women suffrage. Since timeinvariant variation is absorbed by canton fixed effects, we conclude that concerns of omitted variable
bias are small. Furthermore, any endogeneity bias would lead us to underestimate the effect of suffrage
23
Evidence from individual-level data in 1972 supports this finding at the canton level. The survey asks about the
voting behavior of Swiss men in the federal referendum on women suffrage in 1971. Our results showed that language
and thus cultural background is the strongest predictor for voting behavior with non-german speaking men being 12
percent more likely to support women suffrage.
24
adoption on canton expenditures and revenues.
5.2
Additional Controls
It could however be the case that other omitted variables bias our expenditure results. For example,
the long-run effect on expenditures might be driven by an upward trend in the demand or supply
of government independently of suffrage. To address this, we add several variables that control for
potential sources of rising demand for government services to the specification in Table 9.
Table 11 reports the results for overall expenditures (columns (1)-(3)) as well as welfare expenditures (columns (4)-(6)). The top part of the table shows the result of suffrage adoption, while the
bottom part reports the coefficient for years since adoption. The first specification (columns (1) and
(4)) adds mean cantonal income to control for rising wealth and its effect on the demand for government. The variable is available since 1965. For total expenditures, the negative adoption effect
remains negative but is no longer statistically significant. The dynamic effect in contrast is now even
more negative and statistically significant. The adoption effect for welfare expenditures is slightly
larger than in the baseline, while the dynamic effect is no longer statistically significant. This suggests
that some of the increase in welfare expenditures is driven by income effects.
Our second specification adds the share of seats in cantonal parliaments held by left parties to
control for other factors that might have increased the demand for government services or redistribution. The negative adoption effect for overall expenditures becomes even stronger, while the dynamic
effect is now somewhat weaker. For welfare expenditures, the negative adoption effect is now much
weaker and no longer statistically significant, while the dynamic effect is positive and much stronger
than in the baseline specification. Even controlling for the strength of left parties, women suffrage has
a positive long-run effect on welfare expenditures.
We also test whether changes in direct democratic instruments could account for our results. Since
the signature requirements for putting an initiative on the ballot was not adjusted in many cantons,
25
women suffrage facilitates the collection of the necessary number of signatures. In addition, several
cantons switched the provisions for budget or law referendums. This might have an effect on canton
expenditures even in the absence of women suffrage.
Columns (3) and (6) therefore add the signature requirement in percent of the eligible population
as well as indicator variables whether a canton has a mandatory budget or law referendum in place
in a given year. The results imply that this actually makes the negative adoption effect even stronger
for both overall and welfare expenditures. The dynamic effect remains unchanged in both cases. We
conclude that our results are not very sensitive to the inclusion of controls for other potential changes
in the demand for government.
5.3
Political Turnout Behavior
An alternative explanation for the difference between long- and short-term effect of women suffrage
on expenditures could be changing participation behavior of women. If women participate more in
the years following women suffrage, the long-term effect will be larger than the short-term effect. If
in addition the initial non-voters are less fiscally conservative than voters, this could explain why we
see an expansion in health or welfare expenditures over time. We address each of these arguments in
turn.
Our data suggest that the adaptation of turnout between men and women occurred quite rapidly.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the turnout gap calculated as male turnout minus female turnout
in federal ballots from 1977 to 2003. While the gender gap in political participation is 8 percent on
average, the turnout gap has been steadily declining from 16 percent in 1977 to about 2 percent in
2003.24
To analyze whether the dynamic suffrage effects might be driven by turnout behavior, we need a
measure for male and female cantonal turnout. Since data on female turnout in cantonal elections
24
In 1977, political turnout of women in federal ballots was only 40 percent and increased to 55 percent in 2003.
Separate turnout data for men and women are unfortunately not available prior to 1977.
26
are not directly available, we estimate them from overall turnout rates in cantonal elections. The
basic intuition is that we should see overall turnout rates drop sharply with suffrage if women did not
participate in elections. Under the assumption that the male propensity to vote was unaffected by the
introduction of suffrage, we can then estimate female participation rates from a regression of overall
turnout on the introduction of women suffrage.
The first column in Table 12 shows the result of women suffrage on turnout. Overall turnout
drops immediately after suffrage by more than ten percent. Over the next ten years, voter turnout
is still lower than before suffrage, but no significant effects are found after the first decade. From
these estimates, we calculate the evolution of female participation overall (column (2)) and relative to
men (column (3)).25 The estimated turnout in canton elections confirm that adjustment of political
participation occurred rapidly following a very similar adjustment pattern than turnout in federal
ballots.
— insert Table 12 about here —
We then reestimate the effect of women suffrage on cantonal expenditure where our main independent variable is our predicted female political representation to control for turnout behavior. The
specification otherwise is the same as in the first column of Table 8. Columns (4)-(7) in Table 12
shows the results for total expenditures as well as expenditures for health, education and welfare.
Total expenditures decline for about fifteen years after adoption and then start reversing. Even
more than two decades after adoption, total expenditures are not higher than when women were given
the right to vote. Health and welfare expenditures show little change initially and then start rising
25
After suffrage, turnout (defined as the number of voters relative to the number of eligible voters) is T urnoutct =
(1 − sharect ) ∗ M alect + sharect ∗ F emalect where share denotes the share of females in the electorate, M alect male
turnout measured prior to adoption (on average 62.2 percent). Under the assumption that male turnout does not change
with women suffrage, this allows us to calculate female turnout in canton c and time t, F emalect . The last step is to
sharect ∗F emalect
calculate the relative female representation. Define the variable RelativeT urnoutct = (1−share
, which is equal
ct )∗M alect
to zero before suffrage adoption and equal to one if women are equally represented than men. Note that if the overall
decline in turnout was in part due to falling male turnout, our estimate of female representation provides a lower bound
of the actual political influence of women.
27
about 15 years after adoption. Education expenditures in contrast show a decline for the first 15 years
following adoption and then a slight reversal thereafter.
We conclude from this that rising female participation rates cannot explain the positive effect of
suffrage on social expenditures over time. However, if female non-voters have different political preferences for government than voters, increased participation could still have an effect on expenditures.
To address this, we compare the self-reported political position of voters and non-voters shortly after
suffrage (in 1975) and two decades later (in 1995). The measure of political position ranges from zero
to ten with higher values indicating a more left-wing position.
In 1975, voters were not more or less left-wing than nonvoters. While voters had on average a
value of 4.96 and nonvoters a value of 4.98, the difference is not statistically significant (T-statistic:
0.08). The pattern is different in 1995: voters now report a value of 4.77 and non-voters 5.06 with a
T-statistic of 3.7. This implies female voters have actually become more conservative over time, while
female non-voters more left-wing. We would however require the opposite pattern in order to explain
the increasing effect of suffrage on expenditures over time.
6
Conclusion
This paper demonstrates how direct evidence on political preferences can be used to study the fiscal
effects of women suffrage. Both our analyses of voter preferences and state-level expenditures show
that women suffrage affects the scope of government much more than its size. While women are more
supportive of government intervention and spending for public goods like the environment, public
transport and education, they oppose spending for the military and agricultural subsidies. Our result
that women suffrage has little effect on the overall size of government is in line with cross-country
correlations of fiscal spending and women suffrage for other European countries.
We also show that the shift in the political gender gap in recent decades has lead to an increase
28
in women’s demand for publicly provided health and welfare provisions. Though Switzerland is a
more traditional society with low female labor force participation and low divorce rates, shifts in the
electoral gender gap similar to the one in Switzerland have been found in other developed countries.
This suggests that our results are valid beyond the specific Swiss setting.
Since female voter preferences have opposing effects on different expenditure categories, overall
expenditures can only provide limited insight in the effects of women’s political participation. Stepping
back and asking “What women want” helps us better understand the changes following the inclusion
of women in the political process. It would be interesting to extend our analysis as to whether and
how women suffrage has affected health and educational outcomes among children. For example, we
might expect that infant mortality to decline in countries and states that adopted women suffrage
relatively early. We leave this question for future research.
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A
Canton-Level Panel Data
The data on canton expenditures and revenues are taken from the annual collections on public finances
of Switzerland (Federal Department of Finance, various years). Data are available on paper before
1980 and electronically after that. We calculate real per capita expenditures (in 1,000 Swiss Francs
and 2000 prices) for the following categories: total cantonal expenditures, security, education, welfare, health, transportation, environment, and agriculture. For the years 1967 and 1968, no separate
expenditure data for Cantons and communities are available, but only expenditures for Cantons and
their communities together. Values for these years are obtained by linear interpolation. Expenditures
for environmental protection are only available since 1970.
Total revenue data are available for all years except the years 1968 and 1969. Cantonal shares from
federal revenues are unavailable for the years 1968, 1969 and 1990-1993. As for federal subsidies, data
are not available for the years 1950-1952, 1968-1977 and 1990-1993. The missing values after 1952 are
obtained by linear interpolation.
For the canton characteristics, most variables are from the decennial population census with intermediate values interpolated. Data for the population in rural and urban areas is only available
32
since 1970. The education variable is measured as the share of high-school graduates in percentage
of the 19 year-old population. Data on average per capita income in the cantons is available since
1965. The unemployment rate is calculated as the number of registered unemployed relative to the
active population from the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs after 1975 and as the number of
unemployed in percentage of employed persons from the population census before 1975. Population
density is measured as the log of the number of people (in 1,000) per square kilometer. Variables of the
household structure are again from the population census and include: the percentage of single-parent
households, the share of married people in the group older than 20, the group of divorced people in the
same age group. Also from the population census are data on the percentage of foreigners in the total
population, the share of Catholics and citizens in different age classes (i.e. between 0 and 19, between
20 and 39, between 40 and 64, between 65 and 79, older than 80). Female labor force participation is
measured as the share of women older than 15 who work.
Information on the existence of a mandatory budget referendum is taken from Trechsel and Serduelt
(1999), who systematically collected information for cantons without a town-meeting from 1970 to
1996. For earlier years and the town-meeting cantons, we gather data from the Public Record Offices
of all cantons and supplemented any missing information using old canton laws and constitutions.
33
Table 1: Introduction of Women Suffrage in Swiss Cantons
Women Suffrage
Adopted in
Canton (Year)
Yes Votes in
Federal Referendum
of 1959 (%)
Yes Votes in
Federal Referendum
of 1971 (%)
Neuchatel (NE)
Vaud (VD)
Geneva (GE)
Basle-City (BS)
Basle-County (BL)
Ticino (TI)
Zurich (ZH)
Valais (VS)
Lucerne (LU)
1959
1959
1960
1966
1968
1969
1970
1970
1970
51,3
52,2
60,0
46,8
37,3
37,1
36,2
30,5
21,3
83,9
82,0
91,9
82,2
79,9
75,3
66,8
79,9
62,7
Zug (ZG)
Fribourg (FR)
Schaffhausen (SH)
Aargau (AG)
Berne (BE)
Glarus (GL)
Solothum (SO)
Thurgau (TG)
1971
1971
1971
1971
1971
1971
1971
1971
29,8
24,3
31,9
22,8
35,5
19,1
30,0
19,9
71,1
59,9
56,7
50,2
66,5
41,3
64,1
44,1
St. Gallen (SG)
Uri (UR)
Schwyz (SZ)
Graisons (GR)
Nidwalden (NW)
Obwalden (OW)
Jura (JU)
Appenzell Aussenrhoden (AR)
Appenzell Innerrhoden (AI)
1972
1972
1972
1972
1972
1972
1977
1989
1990
19,3
14,6
14,2
22,4
19,5
14,3
N/A
15,5
4,9
46,5
36,3
42,2
54,8
55,8
46,7
N/A
39,9
28,9
Canton
Notes : The table reports the year women were given the right to vote at the cantonal level and the fraction of voting men that supported the
introduction of women suffrage in the two federal referendums 1959 and 1971. Since the canton Jura separated from Bern only in 1977 to
become an independent canton, no separate results for the federal referendums are available. Adoption of women suffrage was voluntary in
all cantons except one. Appenzell-Innerhoden was forced to adopt women suffrage by the Swiss Supreme Court in 1990.
Table 2: Summary Statistics, VOX-Data
Men
Std. Dev
Women
Mean
Std. Dev
Mean
Demographics
Age
Protestant
Have Kids
Single
Married
Divorced
48,39
0,47
0,41
0,19
0,66
0,05
16,38
0,50
0,49
0,39
0,47
0,21
49,98
0,47
0,33
0,23
0,71
0,03
17,41
0,50
0,47
0,42
0,45
0,17
14,92
-1,08
-13,74
15,57
16,14
-12,02
Education, Work and Income
Education: Compulsory
Education: Apprentice/Spec Schools
Education: University
Employed
Income
House Ownership
0,19
0,74
0,07
0,51
1,76
0,46
0,40
0,44
0,26
0,50
0,82
0,50
0,10
0,77
0,13
0,69
2,21
0,50
0,30
0,42
0,34
0,46
1,06
0,50
-44,52
13,54
31,86
57,72
13,34
9,88
Region of Residence
Urban
Nongerman
0,66
0,26
0,47
0,44
0,64
0,24
0,48
0,43
-6,77
-4,53
Political Position and Participation
Self-Placement Left-Right (0-10)
Turnout
4,79
54,35
1,77
49,81
5,09
62,02
1,89
48,53
22,38
32,72
T Statistic
Difference
Notes: The summary statistics are based on the sample of voters. Education measures the highest degree, which is either compulsary
school, vocational school or university (all dummy variables). Employed is a dummy variable capturing the employment status, and
income measures household income in 5 income-classes. House Ownership is a dummy variable whether the person's household
owns a house. Married, single and divorced are dummy variables describing the civil status of the respondent. Age is measured in
years, protestant, have kids, urban area and non-german speaking area are all dummy-variables. Party-Ideology is measured on a 0-10
left-right scale, where higher number indicate a more right-wing political position. The turnout variable whether the respondent voted in
federal parliamentary elections. The last column shows the T-test statistic for differences in means between men and women.
Table 3: Voting Behavior of Men and Women in Federal Propositions
Welfare
Reduce
Decrease
Support
for the
Unemployment Retirement
Benefits
Age
Disabled
Environment
Protecting
the
Environment
Transport
Against
further Road
Construction
Military
Less
Military
Agriculture
Against
Subsidizing
Agriculture
Education
Free
Education
Health
Subsidies
Health
Insurance
(1) Female Dummy
0,086
(0.015)***
0,044
(0.022)**
0,042
(0.020)**
0,098
(0.035)***
0,068
(0,059)
0,065
(0.029)**
-0,053
(0.032)*
0,063
(0.019)***
0,146
(0.045)***
0,062
(0.025)**
(2) Add Income, Job
Marriage, Demographics
0,075
(0.016)***
0,023
(0,024)
0,05
(0.025)**
0,118
(0.038)***
0,001
(0,069)
0,029
(0,032)
-0,045
(0,035)
0,05
(0.021)**
0,118
(0.048)**
0,049
(0.029)*
Observations
Log-Likelihood
4838
-2975
1969
-1156
2089
-1182
688
-412
251
-137
949
-521
952
-507
2500
-1490
508
-320
1450
-847
(3) Sample 1988-2003
0,078
(0.017)***
0,092
(0.030)***
0,058
(0.027)**
0,192
(0.047)***
0,025
(0,035)
-0,063
(0.037)*
0,052
(0.022)**
0,153
(0.051)***
0,086
(0.049)*
(4) Add Party Ideology
0,049
(0.018)***
0,082
(0.030)***
0,02
(0,028)
0,18
(0.047)***
0,008
(0,035)
-0,046
(0,038)
0,044
(0.023)*
0,116
(0.054)**
0,053
(0,053)
Observations
Log-Likelihood
3849
-2222
1487
-808
1854
-956
438
-237
801
-413
848
-423
2189
-1228
461
-261
558
-251
Longer
Maternity
Leave
Notes: The table reports estimates from a probit model, with marginal coefficients of the female dummy being displayed. The dependent variable is the voting decision, which is equal to one if the respondent supported the proposition and
zero otherwise for the propositions shown at the top. The table reports the coefficient on the female dummy. All specifications (rows (1)-(4)) include canton and year fixed effects. The first specification displays the coefficient on the gender
dummy without individual controls. The second specification adds the demographics age, education, religion, language and urban area as well as income, civil status and employment measures. Income is proxied by a dummy for houseownership. The employment and civil status variables are binary variables equal to one 1 if the individual is employed or married respectively, and zero otherwise. The fourth specification adds the party ideology, which captures self-placement
on a left-right scale, with values from 0-10 and 10 being maximally right. Since party-ideology is only reported since 1988, specification (3) estimates the second specification for the 1988-2003 period. Since the vote on free education was in
1986, no data on the left-right position is available. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4: Voting in Favor of More Government in Federal Propositions
Size of Government
More
Less
Government
Debt
More
Environment
More
Transport
Scope of Government
More
More
More
Defense
Agriculture Education
More
Health
More
Welfare
Female Dummy
0,027
(0.007)***
-0,025
(0,018)
0,143
(0.025)***
0,032
(0.020)*
-0,061
(0.018)***
-0,056
(0.023)**
0,066
(0,051)
0,075
(0.022)***
0,071
(0.015)***
Add Controls
0,024
(0.008)***
-0,028
(0,020)
0,093
(0.028)***
0,03
(0,021)
-0,065
(0.023)***
-0,077
(0.027)***
0,126
(0.060)**
0,046
(0.026)*
0,059
(0.016)***
Year and Canton Dummies
Observations
Log Likelihood
Yes
19449
-12861,6
Yes
2121
-1080,9
Yes
1529
-921,4
Yes
2429
-1371,7
Yes
2116
-1250,1
Yes
1531
-875,5
Yes
353
-224,2
Yes
1593
-921,3
Yes
4412
-2787,9
Notes : The table resports the marginal effects from a probit model whether the respondent supported a proposition, which would have increased government spending in the respective policy area or opposed it.
The classification of the financial consequences of the propositions was done using official documents of the Swiss government. Table A3 shows a list of the federal propositions underlying each column. The table
resports the coefficient on the female dummy variable in each row. The specifications (1)-(4) are the same as in Table 3. See notes to Table 3 for further details. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 5: Gender Gaps in 1975
How Important is the
Problem?
Protect the
Environment
Provide
Health Care
Provide
Education
Redistribute
Income
Care for
Elderly
0,0608
(0.0301)**
0,0763
(0.0291)***
-0,0304
(0,0329)
-0,0237
(0,0417)
0,1305
(0.0294)***
0,0353
(0,0395)
0,0195
(0,0385)
-0,0156
(0,0448)
-0,0865
(0,0527)
0,0862
(0.0382)**
3,70
Yes
1226
0,06
3,72
Yes
1230
0,07
3,65
Yes
1231
0,06
3,29
Yes
1226
0,1
3,63
Yes
1233
0,07
Female Dummy
0,0375
(0,0363)
0,0376
(0,0415)
0,054
(0,0394)
0,0487
(0,0471)
-0,0435
(0,0361)
Add Controls
0,03
(0,0463)
-0,0148
(0,0550)
0,1001
(0.0463)**
-0,0263
(0,0591)
-0,0803
(0.0452)*
3,49
Yes
1222
0,05
3,32
Yes
1229
0,1
3,34
Yes
1227
0,08
3,02
Yes
1223
0,09
3,28
Yes
1231
0,08
Female Dummy
Add Controls
Mean Value
Canton Dummies
Observations
R Squared
Is it a Government
Responsibility?
Mean Value
Canton Dummies
Observations
R Squared
Notes : The dependent variable in the upper part is whether the respondent thinks it is an important problem. The
responses range from 1 (absolutely unimportant) to 4 (very important). The dependent variable in the lower part is
whether the government is considered responsible for providing the services shown in the respective columns. The
response ranges from 1 (no responsibility) to 4 (very essential responsibility). The first rows contains only the
female dummy as well as canton dummies. The second rows adds controls for demographics (age, education,
language spoken, religion, divorced, single), employment and household income to the specification. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Source : Political Action Study, 1975
Table 6: Women Become more Left-Wing Over Time
(1)
Female Dummy
Left-Right Position in 1975
(2)
(3)
0,364
(0.127)***
0,418
(0,264)
0,271
(0.133)**
-0,232
(0,250)
0,012
(0.005)**
-0,141
(0,443)
-0,079
(0,202)
0,12
(0,139)
-0,216
(0,293)
0,04
(0,250)
-0,529
(0,754)
-0,762
(0.172)***
-0,688
(0.184)***
-0,562
(0.237)**
-0,177
(0.052)**
-0,238
(0.053)**
-0,05
(0,088)
-0,118
(0,096)
0,022
(0.002)**
-0,131
(0,096)
-0,275
(0.067)**
0,138
(0.058)*
0,027
(0,161)
-0,261
(0.054)**
-0,014
(0,090)
-0,118
(0,099)
0,02
(0.002)**
-0,083
(0,098)
-0,277
(0.068)**
0,14
(0.058)*
0,022
(0,161)
-0,174
(0.063)**
-0,207
(0,198)
-0,128
(0.065)*
0,027
(0,080)
0,496
(0.110)**
(8)
Mean Left-Right Position
5,84
5,84
5,84
5,84
5,22
5,22
5,22
Canton Dummies
Observations
R Squared
Yes
1014
0,05
Yes
974
0,08
Yes
974
0,10
Yes
974
0,11
Yes
6595
0,01
Yes
6530
0,06
Yes
6530
0,06
Yes
6530
0,06
Higher Education
Age
Divorced
Single
Katholic
French-Speaking
Employed
Unemployed
Medium Income
High Income
Refuse Answer Income
0,298
(0.153)*
0,264
(0.133)**
-0,274
(0,248)
0,011
(0.004)**
-0,134
(0,390)
-0,098
(0,161)
0,115
(0,140)
-0,217
(0,294)
-0,067
(0,168)
-1,209
(0.488)**
-0,765
(0.170)***
-0,69
(0.182)***
-0,567
(0.236)**
(5)
0,014
(0,106)
0,006
(0,090)
-0,103
(0,099)
0,018
(0.002)**
-0,105
(0,149)
-0,322
(0.102)**
0,139
(0.058)*
0,027
(0,161)
-0,041
(0,094)
0,018
(0,296)
-0,112
(0,065)
0,046
(0,080)
0,51
(0.110)**
0,036
(0,085)
0,075
(0,198)
0,006
(0,129)
-0,279
(0.118)*
-0,428
(0,393)
-0,303
(0.113)**
5,22
Medium Education
0,409
(0.127)***
0,24
(0.131)*
-0,362
(0,245)
0,018
(0.004)***
0,036
(0,382)
0,059
(0,160)
0,114
(0,143)
-0,233
(0,302)
Left-Right Position in 1995
(6)
(7)
(4)
Have Children
Female*Divorced
0,127
(0,838)
-0,043
(0,350)
-0,152
(0,329)
-1,473
(0.823)*
Female*Single
Female*Employed
Female*Unemployed
Female*Have Children
Notes : The table reports coefficients from a regression where the dependent variable is the respondent's left-right position ranging from 0 (very left-wing) to 10 (very
right-wing). Column (1)-(4) shows the result for the sample in 1975, while columns (5)-(8) for the sample in 1995. The first specification (columns (1) and (5)) contains
only the gender variable and canton dummies. The second specification (columns (2) and (6)) adds individual demographics (age, education, religion, language), while
the third specification (columns (3) and (7)) also includes controls for employment status and household income. The missing group of the employment status is
retired/housewife. The final specification (columns (4) and (8)) add interaction terms between female and employment status, female and marital status as well as
between female and having children [available in 1995 only]. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Source : Political Action Study (1975); Selects Study (1995)
Table 7: Summary Statistics for Canton-Level Data
Mean
Std. Dev
Min
Max
1247
801
1124
1251
1174
1247
1247
1247
5086
224
944
452
478
581
1064
751
3296
169
1112
273
465
562
828
782
597
0
0
0
0
35
40
15
19227
1445
12309
1717
3642
3602
4646
5140
Revenues and Deficit Per Capita (in 2000 SFr)
Overall
1246
Federal Subsidies
868
Shares on Federal Revenues
1143
Deficit
1296
4939
748
302
-62
3212
823
244
608
374
50
0
-2983
20392
6129
4457
9473
Control Variables
Age 0 to 19 (%)
Age 20 to 39 (%)
Age 40 to 64 (%)
Age 65 to 79 (%)
80 and Older (%)
Population Density (per Km2)
Unemployment Rate (%)
Foreigners (%)
Catholics (%)
Single Parents (%)
Divorced (%)
Female Labor Force Participation (%)
Education
Share Commuters (%)
Language: Nongerman
1297
1297
1297
1297
1297
1297
1297
1297
1297
1297
1297
1297
1297
1297
1297
29,3
29,4
28,7
10,0
2,5
431
0,9
13,6
58,5
5,7
3,3
41,4
9,2
4,6
0,3
5,4
2,4
2,5
1,8
1,1
1094
1,4
6,6
25,6
1,2
2,1
6,9
5,8
4,6
0,4
15,7
23,1
23,2
6,2
0,8
19
0,0
2,5
8,1
3,8
0,4
24,3
0,0
0
0,0
40,5
35,3
36,5
15,6
6,3
6350
7,8
38,1
96,2
11,6
9,6
57,8
32,7
23,2
1,0
Additional Controls (Robustness)
Rural (%)
Mean Annual Income
Signature Requirement Initiative
Mandatory Budget Referendum
Mandatory Law Referendum
Share of Left Parties in Parliament
797
896
1265
1297
1297
1195
38,7
7392
3,8
0,64
0,56
21,5
31,2
10282
3,6
0,48
0,50
12,4
0,0
82
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
100,0
78174
17,4
1,0
1,0
51,0
Observations
Expenditures Per Capita (in 2000 SFr)
Overall
Environment
Transport
Security
Agriculture
Welfare
Education
Health
Notes: The table reports summary statistics over the whole sample period (1950-2000). The unit is a canton-year observation. All
expenditures, revenues and mean cantonal income are deflated to 2000 Swiss Francs. The dummy for the mandatory budget
referendum measures whether the Canton has mandatory referendum on (ordinary) expenditures exceeding a certain threshold level.
Education is measured as the percentage of the population with a tertiary education. Nongerman denotes the fraction of cantons where
the dominant language is any language other than German (Italian, French).
Table 8: Women Suffrage Adoption and Fiscal Policy
Size of Government
Expenditures Revenues
Deficit
Women Suffrage
Environment Transport
Scope of Government
Security Agriculture Education
Health
Welfare
-0,033
(0.019)*
0,001
(0,032)
-0,032
(0,059)
0,25
(0,195)
0,087
(0.051)*
-0,037
(0.019)*
-0,055
(0,059)
-0,063
(0.023)***
-0,092
(0.045)**
-0,049
(0.029)*
0,016
(0.007)**
-0,462
(0.089)***
-0,004
(0.002)**
-0,01
(0.003)***
0,025
(0.012)**
-0,119
(0.023)***
-0,009
(0.003)***
-0,008
(0.002)***
0,001
(0,016)
0,126
(0.020)***
0,004
(0,010)
-0,554
(0.117)***
0
(0,003)
-0,006
(0,004)
0,035
(0.018)*
-0,094
(0.030)***
-0,015
(0.004)***
-0,01
(0.002)***
0,019
(0,029)
0,141
(0.022)***
-0,071
(0.030)**
-1,019
(0.557)*
0,004
(0,008)
0,029
(0.015)*
0,015
(0,071)
-0,004
(0,089)
0,006
(0,011)
-0,008
(0,007)
0,102
(0.055)*
0,03
(0,078)
0,079
(0.027)***
1,348
(0,996)
0,025
(0.013)**
-0,087
(0.023)***
-0,333
(0.126)***
-0,788
(0.125)***
-0,031
(0,030)
-0,002
(0,012)
0,027
(0,081)
0,236
(0.075)***
0,073
(0.023)***
0,012
(0,265)
-0,017
(0.006)***
-0,035
(0.008)***
0,007
(0,040)
-0,194
(0.054)***
-0,015
(0.009)*
-0,002
(0,005)
-0,03
(0,031)
0,346
(0.059)***
-0,012
(0.007)*
-0,321
(0.092)***
-0,001
(0,002)
-0,016
(0.003)***
0,011
(0,012)
-0,141
(0.015)***
0,000
(0,003)
-0,006
(0.001)***
0,001
(0,008)
-0,029
(0.014)**
0,004
(0,018)
-2,122
(0.230)***
-0,018
(0.005)***
0,004
(0,008)
0,056
(0.034)*
-0,19
(0.047)***
0,020
(0.008)**
-0,017
(0.005)***
-0,006
(0,062)
0,104
(0.038)***
-0,033
(0.009)***
0,213
(0.108)**
-0,01
(0.003)***
-0,004
(0,004)
-0,038
(0.015)**
-0,149
(0.025)***
-0,004
(0,003)
-0,003
(0,002)
0,058
(0,036)
0,07
(0.018)***
0
(0,019)
1,176
(0.261)***
0,006
(0,006)
0,014
(0,009)
0,086
(0.030)***
-0,484
(0.060)***
-0,055
(0.007)***
0,016
(0.004)***
0,081
(0.048)*
0,108
(0.037)***
0
(0,011)
-0,337
(0.154)**
0,012
(0.003)***
-0,016
(0.005)***
-0,003
(0,019)
0,009
(0,031)
0,001
(0,005)
-0,009
(0.003)***
0,041
(0.013)***
0,001
(0,022)
Age-Classes
Canton-Fixed Effects
Time-Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
R-squared
1200
0,97
1200
0,92
1200
0,55
775
0,7
1200
0,81
1200
0,97
1200
0,9
1200
0,97
1200
0,93
1200
0,97
Unemployment Rate
Log Population Density
% with Higher Education
% Commuters
% Single Parents
% Divorced
Female Labor Force Participation
% Katholic
Share Federal Revenues
Federal Subsidies
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of real per capita expenditures in the respective category. The only exception is the deficit in column (3), which is measured in levels. All expenditures are measured in 1000 Swiss
Franks at 2000 prices. Environmental expenditures are only available since 1970. The main independent variable "Women Suffrage" is equal to one if women suffrage has been introduced in the canton and zero otherwise.
Population density is measured as the log of the number of people (in 1000) per square kilometer. The unemployment rate, the share of highly educated, the share of divorced people, the share of single parents, the female
labor force participation rate and the fraction of katholics are all measured in percentage of the respective population. All specifications include canton and year fixed effects as well as controls for the age structure of the
population. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 9: Dynamic Effects of Women Suffrage
Size of Government
Expenditures Revenues
Deficit
Years since Adoption
Years Squared
R Squared
Years 1 to 5
Years 6 to 10
Years 11 to 15
Years 16 to 20
More than 21 Years
Canton Controls
Canton Dummies
Year Dummies
Observations
R Squared
F-Test Year Dummies
P-value
Environment
Transport
Scope of Government
Security Agriculture Health
Education
Welfare
-0,0113
(0.0028)***
0,0003
(0.0001)***
0,97
-0,0146
-0,0106
(0.0046)*** -0,0118
0,0001
-0,0006
(0,000)
(0.0003)**
0,92
0,56
-0,0262
-0,0233
0,0001
-0,0004
0,7
-0,0124
(0.0074)*
0,0005
(0.0002)***
0,81
-0,0034
-0,0028
0,0001
-0,0001
0,97
-0,0512
0,0193
-0,0049
0,0082
(0.0079)*** (0.0073)*** -0,0039
(0.0050)*
0,0009
0,0005
0,0003
0,0002
(0.0002)*** (0.0002)** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)**
0,91
0,93
0,97
0,97
-0,013
(0,022)
-0,076
(0.024)***
-0,102
(0.030)***
-0,111
(0.036)***
-0,058
(0,046)
-0,005
(0,026)
-0,027
(0,057)
-0,097
(0.041)**
-0,131
(0.057)**
-0,094
(0,061)
-0,077
(0,062)
-0,054
(0,087)
-0,092
(0,113)
-0,084
(0,143)
-0,204
(0,181)
0,028
(0,143)
-0,064
(0,157)
0,01
(0,186)
-0,058
(0,212)
-0,11
(0,247)
0,102
(0.061)*
-0,004
(0,062)
-0,077
(0,077)
-0,156
(0.095)*
0,019
(0,126)
-0,014
(0,021)
-0,038
(0.023)*
-0,036
(0,027)
-0,027
(0,036)
0
(0,041)
-0,056
-0,019
(0,069)
(0,048)
-0,335
-0,008
(0.069)*** (0,065)
-0,362
0,055
(0.083)*** (0,082)
-0,4
0,155
(0.098)*** (0,096)
-0,428
0,333
(0.115)*** (0.122)***
Yes
Yes
Yes
1200
0,97
7,19
(0,000)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1200
0,92
2,41
(0,035)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1200
0,55
0,72
(0,612)
Yes
Yes
Yes
775
0,7
0,61
(0,690)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1200
0,81
4,39
(0,001)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1200
0,97
2,02
(0,074)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1200
0,91
6,4
(0,000)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1200
0,93
3,76
(0,002)
-0,035
(0,026)
-0,062
(0.032)*
-0,074
(0.042)*
-0,037
(0,047)
0,053
(0,057)
-0,012
(0,031)
0,021
(0,039)
0,037
(0,052)
0,064
(0,058)
0,202
(0.073)***
Yes
Yes
Yes
1200
0,97
6,27
(0,000)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1200
0,97
5,05
(0,000)
Notes: The table shows results of a regression of per capita canton expenditures in a given year and policy area on the years since suffrage and years squared (top panel) or 5-years dummy
variables to allow for nonlinear effects of women suffrage on expenditures (bottom panel). The other control variables included are the same as in Table 8. All specifications include canton and
year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. See notes to Table 8 for a description of the variables.
Table 10: Voter Preferences and the Adoption of Women Suffrage
Voter Preferences
(1)
(2)
Early Adopters
0,072
(0.018)***
Linear Trend
Trend*Early Adopters
(3)
Suffrage Adoption
(4)
(5)
0,071
(0.028)**
0,001
(0,023)
0,002
(0,037)
Indicator 1971
0,371
(0.052)***
0,562
(0.258)**
Voter Preferences
0,339
(0.042)***
0,014
(0,219)
Growth Rate Expenditures
Border Canton
Population Density
Foreign Tourists per Capita
Fraction Higher Education
No
Yes
50
0,25
No
Yes
50
0,25
0,289
(0.085)***
0,357
(0.069)***
0,027
(0,067)
0,007
(0,032)
-0,015
(0,020)
-0,002
(0,004)
0,009
(0.005)**
0,171
(0.031)***
-0,011
(0,026)
0,03
(0.014)**
0,004
(0,003)
0
(0,003)
0,007
(0,034)
-0,026
(0,020)
-0,002
(0,005)
0,01
(0.005)**
-0,016
(0,052)
0,174
(0.025)***
-0,012
(0,026)
0,031
(0.014)**
0,005
(0,003)
0
(0,003)
Yes
No
50
0,89
Yes
No
50
0,94
Yes
No
50
0,87
Yes
No
50
0,94
Language Nongerman
Age Dummies
Decade Dummies
Observations
R-squared
(6)
Notes : Column (1)-(2) report results from a regression, where the dependent variable is support for increased government spending in a decade.
Column (1) only contains a time dummy and whether the canton adopted women suffrage before or in 1971 ("Early Adopters"). Column (2)
includes an interaction term between the linear trend and early adoption. Columns (3)-(6) report results from a regression, where the dependent
variable is voter support for women suffrage in the federal referendums in 1959 and 1971. All specifications include whether the canton is on the
border, number of foreign tourists per capita, population density, fraction with university education and controls for the age structure. Changes over
time in the propensity to support suffrage are captured by a dummy for the 1971 ballot ("Indicator 1971"). Column (3) includes average support for
higher government spending in federal propositions ("Voter Preferences"), while column (4) adds the dominant language in a canton. Column (5)
tests for reverse causality by including the average growth rate in canton expenditures, while column (6) again adds the language variable. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 11: Robustness to Inclusion of Additional Controls
Income
(1)
Expenditures
Left Party
(2)
Direct
(3)
Suffrage Adoption
-0,024
(0,019)
-0,061
(0.026)**
-0,07
(0.020)***
-0,0558
(0.0328)*
-0,0255
(0,027)
-0,102
(0.0275)***
Other Controls
Year Dummies
Canton Dummies
Observations
R Squared
Yes
Yes
Yes
875
0,94
Yes
Yes
Yes
1173
0,97
Yes
Yes
Yes
1200
0,97
Yes
Yes
Yes
875
0,96
Yes
Yes
Yes
1173
0,97
Yes
Yes
Yes
1243
0,97
Years Since Adoption
Years Squared
Other Controls
Year Dummies
Canton Dummies
Observations
R Squared
-0,018
-0,005
-0,01
(0.003)***
(0,004)
(0.003)***
0,0002
0,0005
0,0004
(0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)***
Yes
Yes
Yes
875
0,94
Yes
Yes
Yes
1173
0,97
Yes
Yes
Yes
1200
0,97
Welfare Expenditures
Income
Left Party
Direct
(4)
(5)
(6)
0,0084
(0,006)
0,0001
(0,000)
Yes
Yes
Yes
875
0,96
0,0232
-0,0046
(0.0048)*** (0,004)
0,0003
0,0004
(0.0001)*** (0.0001)***
Yes
Yes
Yes
1173
0,98
Yes
Yes
Yes
1200
0,97
Notes : The table reports results of a regression where the dependent variable is canton expenditures (Columns (1)-(3)) and welfare
expenditures (columns (4)-(6)) respectively. The top part shows the coefficients on suffrage adoption (as in Table 8), while the bottom
part shows the coefficient of years since adoption (as in Table 9). Columns (1) and (5) adds mean cantonal income, which is
available since 1965. Columns (2) and (6) add the percent of left-party seats in the cantonal parliament. Columns (3) and (7) include
three measures of direct democratic instruments: whether the canton has a mandatory budget or law referendum and the signature
requirements in percent of eligible voters of the voter initiative. All specifications include canton and year fixed effects as well as the
same controls as in Table 8. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 12: Political Turnout Behavior Cannot Account for Dynamic Suffrage Effect
Years 1 to 5
Years 6 to 10
Years 11 to 15
Years 16 to 20
More than 21 Years
Other Controls
Observations
R Squared
Overall
Turnout
(1)
Female
Turnout
(2)
Relative
Turnout
(3)
-10,507
(1.53)***
-8,061
(2.01)***
-6,275
(2,659)
-4,037
(3,099)
-3,878
(3,949)
0,517
0,868
0,542
0,914
0,559
0,944
0,582
0,977
0,583
0,995
Yes
920
0,99
Overall
Welfare
Health
Education
Expenditures Expenditures Expenditures Expenditures
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
-0,027
(0,023)
-0,092
(0.026)***
-0,108
(0.032)***
-0,114
(0.038)***
-0,061
(0,047)
-0,021
(0,036)
0,017
(0,045)
0,027
(0,057)
0,05
(0,062)
0,184
(0.076)***
-0,053
(0,053)
-0,034
(0,076)
0,041
(0,092)
0,141
(0,102)
0,322
(0.128)**
-0,044
(0,028)
-0,071
(0.036)**
-0,082
(0.046)*
-0,043
(0,050)
0,047
(0,060)
Yes
1200
0,97
Yes
1200
0,97
Yes
1200
0,93
Yes
1200
0,97
Notes : The table analyzes turnout behavior in cantonal elections and its effect for the evolution of expenditures. Column (1) regresses aggregate turnout in canton
elections on 5-year dummies for years since suffrage adoption and the same controls as in Table 8. The next two columns show the evolution of estimated female
participation (column (2)) and relative turnout rates (column (3)) based on the estimates from column (1). See Section 6.3. on the details of calculation. Relative
turnout rates vary from zero prior to adoption to slightly above one (as the percentage of women in the eligible population is 51.4 percent). The right-hand side of the
table reports the effect of estimated relative turnout on overall expenditures (column (4)) as well as welfare, health and education expenditures (columns (5)-(8)).
The control variables are the same as in Table 8 and include canton and time fixed effects. Standard errors in (4) to (8) are bootstrapped to account for first-stage
estimation of relative female turnout.
Figure 1: Political Gender Gap in Federal Elections, 1971 - 2003
35
Percentage Left Parties
32,5
30
27,5
25
22,5
20
1971
1979
1987
1995
2003
Year of Federal Election
Women
Men
Notes : The party reports the percentage of men and women voting for a left party in federal elections. Since the
party system in Switzerland is fragmented with many small and regional parties, voting for a left party includes any of
the following parties: Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (SPS), Labor Party (PdA), Socialist Party (PSA),
Progressive Organisations of Switzerland (POCH), Feminist and Green-Alternative Associations (FGA), Green Party
of Switzerland (GPS), Green Alliance of Switzerland (GBS) and the Solidarities.
Source : Kueffer (2004)
Figure 2: Turnout Gap in Federal Propositions
Male Turnout Rate - Female Turnout Rate
0,2
0,18
0,16
0,14
0,12
0,1
0,08
0,06
0,04
0,02
0
1977
1981
1985
1989
Year
Source : VOX Surveys, 1977-2003
1993
1997
2001
Table A1: Federal Propositions with the Largest Gender Gap
Title of Proposition
Initiative for Reducing Tobacco Consumption
Equal Representation of Women in Federal Government
Change in Marital Law
Against Racial Discrimination in the Military
Against Subsidizing Corn Production
Initiative for Reducing Alcohol Consumption
For Saving the Waters
For a Car-Free Sunday per Quarter
For Abandoning Nuclear Energy
For Equal Rights of the Disabled
Initiative for Equal Rights of Men and Women
Vote
Number
Year of Vote
Gender Gap
(percentage)
404
461
336
414
413
403
381
498
365
500
306
1993
2000
1985
1994
1994
1993
1992
2003
1990
2003
1981
0,177
0,175
0,170
0,168
0,156
0,155
0,153
0,149
0,147
0,146
0,145
Notes : The first column reports the official number of the vote, the second column the year the vote was held. The final column shows the gender gap, the percentage of
women approving the proposition minus the percentage of men. Positive numbers imply that women were more supportive of the proposition than men.
Source: VOX Surveys, 1981-2003, Sample of Voters.
Table A2: Titles of Federal Propositions by Policy Area
Policy Areas and Title of Proposition
No.
Year Result
Policy Areas and Title of Proposition
Environmental and Nuclear Policy
Social Security
For Environmental Protection
Longer Maternity Leave
No.
Year Result
For Protection of the Moor
349
1987
Yes
For Protecting Motherhood
323
1984
No
For Protecting the Waters
377
1992
Yes
Law on Maternity Insurance
458
1999
No
For Saving the Waters
381
1992
No
Reducing Unemployment Benefits
For Protecting the Alpine Area
408
1994
Yes
Measures for Unemployment Insurance
398
1993
Yes
For Reducing Traffic
463
2000
No
Financing Unemployment Insurance
437
1997
Yes
More Money for Solar Energy
465
2000
No
For Decreasing Retirement Age
Energy-Environment Initiative
466
2000
Yes
For Reform of Public Pension System
444
1998
No
For Taxing Energy instead of Labor
481
2001
No
For a more Flexible Public Pension System
469
2000
No
For a Car-Free Sunday per quarter
498
2003
No
Flexible Retirement Age of 62 for Women and Men
470
2000
No
500
2003
No
Against Nuclear Energy
Supporting the Disabled
For a Future without Nuclear Power Plants
321
1984
No
For Abandoning Nuclear Energy
365
1990
No
Equal Rights for the Disabled
Stop New Nuclear Power Plants
366
1990
Yes
Health
For Electricity without Nuclear Energy
501
2003
No
For an Affordable Health Insurance
373
1992
No
Stop New Nuclear Power Plants
502
2003
No
Initiative for Financially Sustainable Health Insurance
416
1994
No
Health Initiative
499
2003
No
Transport Policy
Defense Spending
Against further Road Construction
Stop Road Construction
359
1990
No
Less Military
Against A Freeway from Murten to Yverdon
360
1990
No
For a Switzerland without Army
357
1989
No
Against Freeway in the "Knonauer Amt"
361
1990
No
Against Purchasing Fighter Planes
393
1993
No
Pretcting the Landscape near River "Aare"
362
1990
No
No
For Public Transport
Promoting Public Transport
370
1991
No
For a Railway though the Alps
382
1992
Yes
For Improving Public Transport
445
1998
Yes
Against subsidizing Parking Space
Against Subsidizing Parking at Train Stations
471
2000
482
2001
No
Change Military Law
495
2003
Yes
Abolish Subsidizing Wheat Price
333
1985
Yes
Abolish Reduction of Wheat Price
413
1994
Yes
Agricultural Policy
Against Subsidizing Acriculture
429
1996
Yes
Relax Speed Limit
Relax Speed Limit to 130/100
Reduce Military Spending
For Switzerland without Army
358
1989
No
For Liberalizing Agriculture
For an Ecological and Competitive Agriculture
418
1995
No
Education
Resolution on Dairy Farming
419
1995
No
For free Education
Resolution on Agriculture
420
1995
No
For a new Corn Article
446
1998
Yes
Guaranteed Education and Retraining
340
1986
No
Notes: The table reports all federal votes between 1981 and 2003, which fall into one of the following seven broad categories: Environmental Politics and Nuclear Policy,
Transportation Politics, Agricultural Policy, Social Security, Education, Health and Military Policy. Results of the federal votes can be found at
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/va/index.html.
Table A3: Propositions with Predictable Financial Consequences
No.
Increase Expenditures
Result
No.
Increase Subsidies/Grants
Result
No.
Decrease Federal Debt
313
Energy Article
No
333
Self-Supply with Corn (A)
Yes
400
For healthy Federal Finances
Result
Yes
323
Protection Motherhood (W)
No
335
Risk Guarantee for Small/Medium Enterprises
No
421
For Controlling Expenditures
Yes
339
Culture Initiative
No
341
For Domestic Sugar Production (A)
No
439
For Budget Balancing
Yes
340
Guarantee Vocational Retraining (Edu)
No
425
Revision Language Article
Yes
480
For Controlling Debt
Yes
348
Railway 2000 (T)
Yes
349
Protection Moor (Env)
Yes
350
Change Health Insurance (H)
No
308
Improving Federal Budget
Yes
326
Against Contributions for Primary School (Edu)
Yes
363
Vine Cultivation (A)
No
312
New Regulation Fuel Taxes
Yes
327
Against Federal Contributions for Health (H)
Yes
367
Energy Article
Yes
316
For Taxing Heavy Traffic
Yes
328
Resolutions on Contributions on Education (Edu)
No
370
Promoting Public Transport (T)
No
317
Fees for Road Use
Yes
413
Against Corn Subsidies (A)
Yes
373
For Stable Finances of Health Insurance (H)
No
324
Law on Radio and TV
Yes
428
Against Duty on Schnaps Purchases
Yes
377
Protection of Waters (Env)
Yes
331
Against Cantonal Share in Federal Stamp Duty
Yes
429
Against Federal Contributions for Parking Space
Yes
381
Saving the Waters (Env)
No
332
Distribution of Revenues from Alcohol
Yes
436
Against "Pulverregal"
Yes
382
Construction of Railway through the Alps (T)
Yes
371
For Reorganizing Federal Finances
No
437
Financing Unemployment Insurance (W)
No
386
Salary Parliamentary Members
No
389
For Increasing Fuel Charges
Yes
446
New Corn Article (A)
Yes
387
Improve Infrastructure Members of Parliament
No
399
Resolution on Federal Finances
Yes
410
Promoting Cultural Activities
No
400
For healthy Federal Finances
Yes
416
For a new Health Insurance (H)
No
401
Pro healthy Social Insurance
Yes
384
Change Law on Stamp Duty
423
Securing Invalidity/Age Insurance (W)
No
405
For Fee on Road Use
Yes
430
Counter-Initiative: For Ecological Agriculture
Yes
406
For Fees on Heavy Traffic
Yes
431
Re-Organisation Administration
No
407
Introducing Fees for Heavy Traffic
Yes
346
Vote on Military Expenditures (Def)
444
Revision Age Insurance (W)
No
442
Law on Fees for Heavy Traffic
Yes
393
Against Fighter Planes (Def)
No
445
Infrastructure for Public Transportation (T)
Yes
465
For a Solar Energy Tax
No
421
Resolution on Slowing Expenditures
Yes
458
Law on Motherhood Insurance (W)
No
484
For a Capital Gains Tax
No
422
Change on Pension and Disability Laws (W)
Yes
469
For a flexible Age Insurance (W)
No
427
Cantonal Responsibility for Military Equipment (Def)
No
470
For flexible Retirement Age (W)
No
357
For Switzerland without Army (Def)
No
500
Equal Rights for the Disabled (W)
No
471
Saving at the Military (Def)
No
482
For Switzerland without Army (Def)
No
Increase Taxes
Decrease Subsidies/Grants
Decrease Taxes
Yes
Decrease Expenditures
No
Notes: The table lists all federal propositions between 1981 and 2003, which either led to an increase in federal expenditures, taxes, subsidies and grants, or a decrease in expenditures, taxes or public debt. The
information is taken from publications of the federal government, which publishes the fiscal consequences for each new law and executive order. These are available online at http://www.ads.bar.admin.ch/ADS.
Expenditures in individual policy areas are constructed from the respective votes. These are marked after the title using the following abbreviations: (A) for agriculture, (T) for public transport, (Env) for environment,
(Def) for Defense, (W) for welfare, (H) for health and (Edu) for education.
Table A4: Propositions where Men and Women had accepted Different Outcomes
Title of Proposition
Year of Vote
Yes Women Yes Men
Decision
Ecological and Modern Agriculture
Easier Access to Swiss Real Estate for Non-Residents
Abolish Subsidies for Parking Spaces at Train Stations
For a Sustainable Unemployment Insurance
1995
1995
1996
1997
0,44
0,43
0,52
0,39
0,50
0,55
0,41
0,52
No
No
Yes
No
New Regulation Fuel Tariffs
Introduction of Civil Service
Reduce Property Sales, especially to Non-Residents
Stop Construction of Nuclear Power Plants
Stop Use of Nuclear Energy
Reducing Animal Testing
For an Ecological Military
Against Fighter Planes
Flexible Retirement Age 62 for Men and Women
For Equal Rights of the Disabled
Stop Construction of Nuclear Power Plants
1983
1984
1984
1984
1990
1992
1993
1993
2000
2003
2003
0,48
0,52
0,51
0,54
0,58
0,55
0,51
0,52
0,50
0,55
0,50
0,57
0,45
0,48
0,48
0,43
0,42
0,43
0,43
0,44
0,40
0,44
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Notes : The second (third) column shows the percentage of women (men) voting in favor of the proposition. The last column shows the
official outcome of the federal proposition. The first four rows show the votes where women changed the result. The other rows report the
votes, in which men were decisive.
Source : VOX Surveys, 1981-2003.