D . M. JO H N SO N
CAN BE LI EF BE CO MMA N DED '!
1
Wh en 1 hear my children still talking and laughing after I have put them to
bed, I call upstairs, 'Go to sleep !' But on reflecti o n it occurs to me that saying
this is no more sensible than if I had told [hem to flap their arms and fly [ 0
the ceiling, since gulng to sleep is not something OM is able to do at will. At
most. it would be sensible to command those things - e.g. being quiet ,
closing the eyes, keeping moti onless etc. - from which sleep normally
follows. The question 1 ask in this paper is whether in this respect believing is
like going to sleep.
Most philosophers who have thought ab OUI the question take it as obvious
that it is not sensible to command belief .' For example, one author'
remarks, without seeing need to give arguments to support the assertion, that
" ... I cannot command someone to believe something (though I can
command him to undertake everything that might lead to his acquisit ion of a
certain heliet) . .. ."
I shall argue to the contrary th at , at least within limits - i.e. in some
respeds and in some situations - what a person believes is sufficiently under
his cont rol that a command to believe would make sense to him , since he
could obey it. The word 'Can' in my title shows I am asking about possibility.
That X is. possible follows from its being actual in at least one case. Thus,
while situations where someone commands belief may be rare, finding even
one would be suffi cient for my purpose.
Let us take a concrete example. I dimly remember witnessing a television
commercial once, which had something like the following form: 'So you
don't (or can't) believe that our detergent gets clothes cleaner than any other
brand" . . . Believe it!'
I can think of three possible ways of interpreting the words, ' Belie...e it !' in
this context.
i) Be liefs can be produced, created or caused, e ven if not commanded. If
you say to me, 'Go down the stairs" , after which I obediently go down the
stairs, your command is not a cause of my doing this. as if you had tripped or
kicked me down the stairs. A command is something I consider, and to which
Sy nt hese 39 (1978) 325 -334.1111 Riglllt Reserved.
'.opyrfglrt Cl 1978 by D. Reidel Publishilrg Com pany. Dordrecht , Holland.
326
D. M . JO H N SO'"
(i f I choose to obey) [ then try to con form my act ions. But causes of
behavior are no t like this. They require no considera tion, since they produce
their effects willy-nilly.
Torture, clc prh'Ation, hypn otism , incantation , drugs, etc. can bring peop le
to believe or suspend belief about almost anything.3 And one Can administer
techniq ues of this SOI'l to himself. For example, William James held that a
man can det ermin e some of his beliefs at Will, but only 'gradually." The
correctness of what James says IS shown by the following. A person may
convince himself of somet hing by asserting it time and lime again; or by
continually pre tending, and acting as if it were true ; or by dwelling on
evidence in favo r o f what he wants to belleve, and igno ring contr ary evidence.
By similar meth ods, he may bring about a suspension of belief concerning
things he never doub ted before.
Some means of producing beliefs - e.g. incantat ion and hypn oti sm ­
make use of words. This may sho w the point of 'Believe it! ' in the television
commer cial. Perhaps it was a bit of brain-washing, which happened to have
the form of an imperative. In that case, rather than a command to believe,
which a person migh t choose to carry out or no t carry out, it would be only a
cause o fh elieving. wh ere choice is not in questi on."
If this is right, then the example falls outside th e scope of this paper. My
conce rn is rational beJief;r. but the belief these pro ced ures bring about is
irrationa!. in the following sense. They prod uce belief or suspension of belief
irrespective of evidence.
(ii) After the announce r said 'Believe it! ' he may have gone on to give
corroborating evidence - testimonials, reports of scientific st udies et c. In
this seco nd case, ' Believe it I' again would have been supe rfluous and a sham,
rathe r than genuine command , but now for a diffe rent reason. The reason is
that the evidence, not thi s statement , would lead a person to believe. For
example, the huckster might have meant 'Believe it! ' as equivalent tu 'Believe
me ~ ,' inte rpreted as follows : 'Since I am a reliab le sort of person, and I
believe it, yo u should also.' In that case, rather than commanding something,
he is providing one more bit of evidence which m igh t lead someone to
believe.
By contrast, if a person chooses to follow a genuine command like 'Shut
the door I,' he does what he does. not as a result of assessl[lg ~vi d el l ce , but as
part of what is involved in o beying.
CA N HELl E F BE COM M A :S DE D1
327
(iii) Anoth er possibility is that the announcer may have inten ded 'Believe
it!' as a bona fide command . In this case, a person could choose to carry it
ou t or not, with out being det ermined to do so by evidence for or against the
p roposition to be believed.
Philosophers commonly reject (iii) as impossible. They mostly agree with
me in recognising, but then also passing over (i) - a form of irrati onal
belief - on the grounds that the proper concern of a philosophi cal theory is
rational belief only." But the y disagree by supposing that (ii) is the only
alternative left. The reason the y recognise (i) and (ii) but not (iii) is that they
take it as obvious that whenever we believe rationally , the re must be a
determining conn ection bet ween belief and preponderance of evidence.
J . L. Evans provides an examples of this positi on I am atta cking. He asserts
that
The Historian wh o is study ing a pro blem where t!le evide nce is insuffi cient to warra n t
ce rt ain ty d ocs n ot cho ose wh at he will b elieve; he believes that prop o sition to be tru e
which see ms [ 0 him mor e likely in relation to th e evide nce. "
According to Evans, the idea that belief is cnough un der a person's co ntrol
that it is possible t o command him to believe somet hing is based on a
confusion of believing with asserting a belief. One can choose whe ther to
express a belief in language, et c.; but canno t cho ose wheth er he will have th is
belief.9
Evans' position is that 3 person faced with a preponderance of evidence
acquires a belief as a result. My objection is this: a preponde rance is still a
p reponderance, even whe n a very small one, Th us, it follows that no matter
how small the greater weight of evidence is, or how weak an d indirect the
evidence involved in it may be, a belief still must arise from it. But this is
implausible.
I elabo rate this answer by means of the following two points.
(a) Philosophers like Evans ca nnot distinguish belief from an inclinati on
to believe, According to them , the slightest tenden cy to believe P over not·f
constitutes a belief that (or in) P, though perhaps a wea k one. But in ordinary
life, usually.: we lake these as separate. For example. we do not say that
someone believes his friend Jones is walking towards him SOD yards down the
m ad, if he has only some small, inco nclusive piece of evidence - e.g. the red
hair which he can just make out - for claiming he sees Jones. Rat he r, we say
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~L
CAN BELI EF DE CO;"I M AND ED ?
J O H NS O N
he does not believe anyt hing about •...,ho this person is, though he may have a
tendency to believe such and such .
There arc situatio n, where one believes something, but fear , mod es ty,
shame or confusion make him unwilling or unable to express his belief. Evans
does not distinguish such st rung b ut overridden dispositions to exp ress belief,
and similar dispositions which are simply weak. Weakness is not a type of
rest raint. In the lat tel' cases where overriding is unnecessary, we have reason
t o say that belief is not present.
Thus, even if we grant that something involuntary occurs whenever a
person is faced with a preponderance of evidence, it does not follow that it is
appropriate to call such involuntary reactio ns ' believing.' 1 maintain that
'belief is at least partially 11 norm ative no tion. In this respect it differs from
the noti on o f 'sleep.'
If there is a difference between belief and an inclination to believe, what
does this differene amount to ? Is it merely a behavioral di fference - e.g. a
diffe rence in the snength o f 3 disposition? This does not seem cor rect. One
has stro ng tendencies to believe something, which neve rtheless are not beliefs,
and weak beliefs which nevertheless are not mere tendencies. This would be
impossible if noth ing more were involved here but a continuum from
weakness to strength.
I suggest, rather, that there is a threshold of strength of corrobo rating
evidence which must be reached before we coun t what we have as a belief.' <1
1 shall say more about this later.
(b) Judges claim 1101 to make up their minds about th e guilt or innonence
o f defendant s un til all the evidence has been presented . They also Instruct
jur ies to deliberate according 10 the same principle. Thus, prima facie there
are commands at least to suspend belief; therefore the burden oi proof is On
vans and those like him 10 show that the idea of such commands is senseless.
They seem not 10 realise they bear this burden. since they simply assurn
that these comm ands are impossible. They dismiss the claims of judges and
jury members to suspend belief at will, as either a conspiracy to hide
p rejudice, or blindness by which they all make the same mistake about the ir
own state of mind. This s trikes me as implausible.
Let us now consider some ob jections to what r am proposing,
(1) It might be objected tha t 'making up one's mind' is ambiguous; it can
mean either coming to believe, Or deciding what verdict to give . One may
329
believe things for reasons of all so rts; but a legal jud gmen t must be defensible
in term s ofall and only the evidence presented at a t rial.
My rep ly is tha t if we have in mind rational beliefs _. i.e . beliefs
determined by evidence, not emotion - then verdicts arc beliefs. In other
words, the distinction which the objection presuppo ses cannot be maintained.
Let me explain this reply. How does the objection suppose that verdicts
differ from beliefs?
There are several trivial ways in which they are different. Fo r example,
( La) a judgment may be given dishonestly, in which case it doe s no r express a
belief. Th us, suppose X gives the verdict 'innocent' because he has been
threatened or bribed, but nevertheless believes tha t the defendant is guilty.
Here his t.. erdict is simply a lie ; and it is no mo re reasonable to expect it to
reflect what he believes than any other lie he tells. Also, (l .b) a judgmen t
migh t be dictated hy a legal techn icality . Suppose, for example, th at there is
overwhelming evidence for Y's guilt, and Y has confessed. But since the
confession was obtained in an improper way , the judge gives the verdict
'innocent .' This a Iso does not point to any important difference bet ween
beliefs and legal judgment. We describe such a case as 'gett ing o ff on a
technicaii ty' precisely to disclaim any connectio n be tween the verdict and
beliefs about the defendant's actions. Next , (J .c) the judge Or ju ry member
ay know mo re abo ut a case than appears in evidence. He then forms his
erd ict - someone might say - on the basis o f the trial's evidence alone ; but
dete rmines his real beliefs frum every thing he knows, I reply that such
situations are not really a separate case, but ale a form 0 1 ( l .a), dishonest
[udgrnent, because a person is bou nd in ho nesty and by law no t to withhold
an)' evidence known to him, which bears on a trial.
\\'hat is left? Are there any nun-t rivial v.'a y~ that verdicts differ from
beliefs?
The only candidate I can think of is the foUowing. (I .d) Suppose that the
evidence p resented at a trial points to guilt : but it is merely circumstantial
and the refore not decisive. In this situation, a phi losophe r like Evans might
argue, although the judge believes the man is guilty , he gives the verdict
'inn ocent' because of the principle that a man is presumed innocent until
p ro ved guilty b-eyond reasonable doubt.
Yet there is anot her, equally plausible way to interpret this situation.
Suppose the phrase 'reasonable doubt' means what it says - i.e., that this is
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D . M, W il , i SON
doubt which excludes reasonable (as opposed to emotional) belief. Then ,
altho ugh the judge's verdict is 'innocent ,' we must conclude that he still does
not believe anythi ng about the guilt or innocence of the de fendant . He may
f eel that the defendant is guilty; but this is not in question. I maint ain for this
reason that ( l .d) is a form of the previous case ( l. b), 'gett ing off on a
technicality' ; and does not illustrate a non-trivial conflict bet ween verdicts
and beliefs,
The above reply can be summed up by saying that the object of
justice - however indirect - is nut legali sms but truth .
Why else do examiners exclude anyone from ju ry dut y who says, 'I am
familiar with the case already, and believe the man is guilty (o r innocent )'? If
the above objection were correct , the exarruner should say, 'It makes no
difference what you believe >since we are interested only in your verdict after
witnessing the trial.'
(2) Ano ther objection is tha t while Evans speaks only of a historian's
judgment , I challenge his claims by pointing to behavior of judges and juries.
But can one generalise from the formalised procedures of law courts to other
context s'! Do scientists, historians, mechanics anJ dancers suspend belief
while considering a question, the way a judge claims to dory
My answer is this: we see on reflection that not only in a court of law, but
also generally, one de termines belief not simply by preponderance, but by
sufficiency of evidence. I I The st rength of evidence required for belief varies
with different disciplines and contexts. For example, we set it high in a
courtroom, or in a diplomatic co ntext where one must decide whether
actions of a foreign power justify declaring war, because much hangs on what
:'l jud ge, president , general o r diplomat believes. But for lovers swearing
devotion, or t ravellers passing time chatti ng, usually, the threshold for belief
is low. A low threshold is not the same as no threshold.
What determines whe re one's threshold is set '! No t only the cont ext but
also one's personality and style of Hie have an influence. Some people are by
nature scrupulous and fair; others tend to be biased, devil-may-can: and
whimsical.
But context and personality are not the only determining factors.
Sometimes there is also room for decision. Of course, there arc limits beyond
which one is nol free to move his threshold - or at least, cannot while
continuing t o believe rationally. For example, I canno t suddenly decide to
AN BE LiEF BE C O MM AN DE D?
331
believe that I am J 00 feet tall, nor disbelieve or even suspend by belief that
cows have four legs. Nevertheless, there is some free play within these limits.
For example, if a judge chooses to b e~i n considering cases that come before
him in a lazy, arbit rary or prejudiced way - the reby lowering usual st andards
for determining belief in a judicial setting - he is free to do so. On .he other
hand, a lover may wake up to the fact that he has accep ted outrageous claims
in the past, and resolve to do so no longer - though sticking to this
resolut ion carries a certain danger of offending the loved one. Similarly. a
traveller may decide not to credit any more tales that are not substant iated
by good evidence - though he then must be careful not to seem boorish or
commit a breach of enqueue .' 2
(3) W~ are Iarmliar with negative commands like, 'Don' t make up you r
mind before . .. " 'Don't believe it unless . . . " which require us to suspend
belief or resist a temp tation to form one. But can there also be positive
commands like, 'Believe X l,' 'Disbelieve Y !' which require us to form new
beliefs'! Someone may claim th at these are asymmetrical; and even if the first
is possible, the second is not.
I reply that the only asymmetry here is in human nature - not in the
meaningfulness or feasibility of commands of the two sorts. Most people are
more gullible than sceptical. Because of this, they need commands and.
encouragement to refrain from believing. more often than to believe. But this
fact of psychology does not show th at commands of the latt er sort are
impossible. For example, suppose I have a studen t who is capable, but
excessively (i.e. irrationally) conscientious. I say to him, ' You have done well
in my course,' and point out things in his performance which I think establish
this conclusion. The student agrees with all the points 1 mention, and seems to
understand them more or less as I do, but still refuses to accept my original
statement . It gradually becomes clear that the reason he docs not believe this
is that his standards for his own work - and therefore also for beleving he has
done well _ are unrealistically high. I then say, 'Rclax l,' 'Don' t be so hard on
yourself" ,' 'Don' t be so pedanti c!' In this context, such commands might
amount to the same thing as, 'Believe it!'
Here is :t second example, where no evaluative terms occur. Can I sensibly
command you t o believe that the ice on the lake is thick enough to suppo rt a
rnan?!:' Suppose I present evidence tha t would be more than sufficient to
convince most informed people, but you remain unconvinced. At this point,
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C A N BE LlEF
D . M . JO I-lN SO N
rather than looki ng for addit ional proof , I might try to get you to assess
evidence already available in a less deman ding way. One means of do ing this
would be to give reasons which show that it is silly to adopt the stan dard o f
belief you do. Another would be nut to concern myself with reasons at all,
b ut simply command your assent. One may have various reasons for obeying
a command - e.g, he might trust the competence o r accept the au thor ity 0
hi m who comma nds, BUI the command it self ne ither mentions nor
p resupposes any o f these reasons. Thus I migh t say 'Don't be such a stickler} ,'
but not say why I believe you should not be a st ickler. Again, in this context
such a command migh t be virtually tile same as saying, 'Believe it! '
(4) Someone m igh t object that the preceding ex am ples arc commands to
ssess evidence for P differen tly, or to believe that lowering or raising
standards of evidence for P is m one's inte res t or :1 good thing to do. But
these are quite different from the command which 1 claim is present , viz.
'Believe P!'
I reply that this objection is as unreasonable as a drill sergeant who says, 'I
to ld you us fix bayonets, not t ake them ou t of the scabbards!' It is im possible
to fix a bayonet t hat one still wears on his belt. Thu s. laking it out o f the
scabbard has to be the first step ill obeying this order. He who commands the
end comman ds also th e means, where the re 3IC n (l alternative means. 1
main tain tha t lowering the threshold of evidence in the above examples is not
a separate preliminary for believing that P. Since it is the only available means
of obeying the commands, it must be parr of what is involved in obe yi ng
them.
Ano ther point in my reply has been touched on already . Th at it is
advantageous o r ra tio nal to believe P is one reason for believi ng P. (O f course,
re a-so n for believing P is not the same as a reason for P.) But a command
docs not presuppose, and need not rncnuon any reasons in favor of obeying
that command. In fact, doing something in obedience to a command entails
that, although one may have reasons for doing ir. his considering these
reasons is not what . at that moment, brings him to do it.
Thus, ' Believe it !' (when a genuine command) can be construe d to mean :
'Granted that you have some inclination to believe X , and 3 sta ndard of
accepta nce which available co rrob orating evidence fails 10 meet , lower your
standard un til this Same evidence becomes sufficient.' This is no t indirect
manipulation or a mere cause of belief , if I am right in claiming that meeting
ut
COM M A N DE D?
333
such 11 stan dard is not a preliminary to believing but part of believing. It also
is no t liomething which results in irrati onal belief. since it does not cont radict
the available evidence, nor take away from this evidence its role of
determining belief. In following the command, one assesses differen tly,
(",(;lctly the same c\iden ce he had before. But this dues not mean that the
command ra ther than the fvid cnce \now produ ces the resulting belief.
Such a command is appropriate in some cont exts. nut in ot hers. For
example, even if somehow I fo und a way o f lowering my thr eshold oi
adequate evidence enough to believe that [ am Alt Ha the Hun , or raising it
enough to suspend my be lief that water will drown me, this resulting belief 0 1
suspension of belief would not be rational.
Let me conclude by restating the main point of the paper.
[ main tain that belief has a normative dimension. It depends on a human
institut ion or practi ce _ and this dependence amou nt::; to more than its just
p resupposing that practice. The practice ls that of a person's deciding on , and
putt ing into ef fect in his behavior, criteria aCCfl rding to which some th ings
count as adequate evidence for a belief and others do not. I .j
In many cases, these decisions which intluence a man' s beliefs are genuine
choices which might have been difTe rent , depending on his goals, desires or
whims. In such cases , 'Believe it!' may count as a sensib le command rather
than eith er (a) a cause o f belief or (b) a misleading prelimin ary to the
introduction of mo re evidence.' S
York University
NO TE S
I
Thi s may confli c t with what the y profess on Sundays. One of the few ex plicit
commands o f Q uist was a com mand to (le l i~ve [Cf . tl.!!. 1 John , Chapt er 3, verse 23 .)
lso , Pope Plus X commanded cllUrch memb ers to y,r.c 'e x terna l and in ter nal asse nt' to
decrees of the Puntific:ll Uibllcal c om mission such as th at wo man had bee n for med o ut
of the bud)' of the flUl man . tef. Time Magl1; inc. Dec, 30, 19 7>l , p . 41.)
1 Petru von Morstein. " '1magine" ' , Mind 13 Ap ril (191 4 ), p . 24 2.
J 'D isbe li.c f is one kind o f belief. T o dis belie\'e P Is t o bdieve that not P.
• 'n r ~ l'rilJcfp l~ of P.,.dw(o/O' . Vol. It . Dover , New York , 195 0 , p. 321. AIsQ cf. H. H.
Price. ' Belief and Will' in ?Jrilomp hy of Mind, ~d itcJ b)' Stuart liampsh i~. HllIper &
Ro..... . New York. 1966 , pp. 106 -1 10.
, It touows th at for :1 raw r ecru it, 'A ltel1 t ion ~' is a real comm and; but later , though still
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D. M. J OHNSON
havin g the 'e xternal form' of an im per a t ive, it beco mes mere ly a stimulus whi ch elicits
behavio r au to rna ticnlly.
• Th u s. 'Bel ief in the titl e , 'Ca n Belie f be Co m ma nded?,' refers only to rati onal, no t
irra tion al belief.
Some philoso pher s never d i sti n ll1J i ~h ration al and irrati on al beli ef. In the ir case, Ill y
claim is tha t it this di stin cti on were po inte d ou t, they pro bably wo uld ad mit th a t t he
foc u s of a phil o soph ical th eo ry shou ld be the rust, not the sec o nd ,
, J. L. Evans , ' Er ror and Will,' Ph ilosophy 31l (196 3 ), p. 14 6.
) Cf. ibid.
?
10 Thi s d oe s not co m mi t m e to saying tha t all be lief is co nsci ous, since we can di sco ver
in d irectly , throu gh beh a vior , wha t so meone ac ce pt s as a be lief and wh at not _ his
t hr e sh old - wi thou t his being ah le to tell us. Cons ider th e mother' s advi ce to her
da ugh ter th at , 'Wha t boys say and wh at the y beli eve are diffe rent! ' The mot h er
re co gni ses th a t what o ne be lie ves is o ft en n ot the same as wh a t he belie ves he believ es.
I I
Su ffi cie nt , tha t is, for beli ef _ not fo r kn ow ledge .
: , See my pap er, 'A No te o n Belie f,' J f iro d 95 ( 97 6), pp, 601-2 .
" Cf. Ryl e, Th e Concep t of Mind , Ba rnes & Nob le. New Yo rk , 1960, pp . 134- 5.
1 4 If o ne im ists th a t beli eving must invo lve int rospec t tble fee lings _ for example,
feelin gs o f bei ng coer ced -- he m er ely begs th e q ue st ion. I say that th e central th ing in
beli eving is se tting poli cies for on ese lf of accep ting prop o sit ion s wh ich arc based on a
given a mou nt and sort of evid e nce. Even if feeli ngs ar c beyo nd voluntary co n tro l, the
same need not be true o f ad hering to suc h a poli cy.
" An earlier versio n of th is p aper was presen ted at mee tings o f th e Am erica n
Phil oso phical Associa tion , Pacifi c Divisio n, San Diego, Marc h, 19 75 .
Ric hard Keshen first introdu ced me to th e pr obl em in th is essay. Also . th an ks ar e du e
to Deanna McMah o n, David Palm er, G. Fr aser Co wley , V. Reuter and E. M. Cu rley rOr
h elp in clarifying my ideas.
j