Civil War:
Problems and Solutions
John Lee
Florida State University
Department of Political Science
Spring 2011
Map found in Buhang and Gates 2002, based on
data by Gleditsch.
• What is a Civil War?
Types of Conflict
• Interstate Conflict – Between two states (e.g.
Germany v. United States).
• Intrastate Conflict – Between a state and a
non-state actor within the state’s designated
territory (e.g. Sri Lanka v. LTTE).
• Extrastate Conflict – Between a state and a
non-state actor outside the state’s designated
territory (e.g. Present United States v. Taliban).
What is a State?
1.
2.
3.
4.
Defined Territory
Permanent Population
A Government
Capacity to Enter into Relations with Other
States
Treaty of Montevideo (1933)
Civil War
• Small and Singer (1982) define civil war as
“any armed conflict that involves*…+
– Military action internal to the metropole
– The active participation of national government
– Effective resistance by both sides (210)”
• What is effective resistance? How many
deaths are required? Do civilian deaths
count?
Stats Notes
Sambanis 2004
• What causes Civil Wars?
Primary Commodities
• Primary commodities are raw/unprocessed
materials (e.g. oil, fresh fruit).
• Dependence on primary commodities causes
civil war.
– “primary commodity exports substantially increase
conflict risk. We have interpreted this as being due
to the opportunities such commodities provide for
extortion, making rebellion feasible and perhaps
even attractive (Collier & Hoeffler 2004, n/a).”
Collier & Hoeffler 2004
Rare Events Logit
1960-1999
(1) Primary Commodities
• Collier & Hoeffler 2004’s findings receive
media attention, but are they conclusive?
(1a) Oil
• Oil signifies weaker governments with large
revenue sources. Thus, rebels should be more
likely to fight since the prize is greater and the
costs are lower.
• Do primary commodities matter? Or, is it just
the presence of oil that matters?
Fearon 2005
Oil/Primary Commodities
• Neither has robust impact on the occurrence
of civil wars.
Natural Disasters
• “nature induced cataclysmic events that
overwhelm local capacity (Nel & Richards
2008, 162).”
• Types of natural disasters include: hydrometeorological, geological, and other (e.g.
famine, epidemics).
(2) Natural Disasters
• How do natural disasters increase the
probability of civil war (Nel and Righarts
2008)?
1. Natural disasters lead to resource scarcity which
creates an incentive for war as groups compete
over resources.
2. Natural disasters diminish a state’s capacity to
rule, creating an opportunity for rebellion.
Nel and Righarts (2008)
(3) Economic Capacity or lack thereof
• The stronger a country’s economy the more
capable it is to fight off rebellions (Hegre and
Sambanis 2006). As a result, rebels don’t
attack strong states.
(4) Population
• As a country increases in population the
probability of civil war increases because
there are more potential victims (Hegre and
Sambanis 2006).
Hegre and Sambanis (2006)
(5) Gender Inequality
• Structural violence is required to keep women
and men in their separate spheres. Societies that
allow for such inequality tolerate violate more
frequently than other societies (Caprioli 2005).
• Female/male inequality implies a greater
probability of intrastate conflict.
– Studies argue that this extends to interstate conflict.
Caprioli 2005
What factors affect the intensity of civil wars?
1.) Location represents distance from capital.
2.) Absolute Scope represents absolute area of conflict zone. Relative Scope
represents the area of conflict zone as proportion of total land.
3.) Identity equals one if rebels come from different ethnic group.
4.) Incompatibility equals one if rebellion is over territory.
For other variable descriptions, etc see Buhaug and Gates (2002).
• How are Civil Wars Ended?
Puzzle
• Why do interstate wars reach
settlements more frequently than
intrastate wars?
• “Between 1940 and 1990 55 percent of
interstate wars were resolved at the
bargaining table, whereas 20 percent of civil
wars reached similar solutions (Walter 1997,
335).”
Flawed Rationalist Explanations
1. Expected Utility of winning Civil War is too
high to pass up.
2. Issue indivisibility.
3. Poor communication.
Flawed Ideational Explanations
1. Issues are “close to the heart.” No
compromise.
Commitment Problems
• Civil war negotiations fail because the one side
can not credibly commit to any agreement.
• Walter (1997) argues that “*n+egotiations fail
because civil war opponents are asked to do what
they consider unthinkable. At a time when no
legitimate government and no legal institutions
exist to enforce a contract, they are asked to
demobilize, disarm, and disengage their military
forces and prepare for peace (335-336).”
Walter 1997
Solutions
1. Third Party Guarantor – Some other
state (not involved in conflict) must
enforce agreement on both parties.
To be successful Walter (1997) suggests that
outside state must…
1. Have significant interest in conflict’s resolution.
2. Be ready to use force.
3. Signal Resolve.
Walter 1997
Regan 2002
Solutions
2. Partition – “Stable resolutions of
ethnic civil wars are possible, but
only when the opposing groups are
demographically separated into
defensible enclaves (Kaufmann
1996, 137).”
Why Partition?
1. “in ethnic wars both hypernationalist
mobilization rhetoric and real atrocities harden
ethnic identities to the point that cross-ethnic
political appeals are unlikely to be made and
even less likely to be heard. (Kaufmann 1996,
137).”
2. “Intermingled population settlement patterns
create real security dilemmas that intensify
violence motive ethnic “cleansing,” and prevent
deescalation unless the groups are separated
(Kaufmann 1996, 137).”
Sambanis
2000
Solutions
3. In Group Policing – Each ethnic
group punishes its own members
for transgressions against other
ethnic groups (Fearon and Laitin
1996).
Works Cited
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Buhang, Halvard, and Scott Gates. 2002. “The Geography of Civil War.” Journal of Peace Research. 4: 417-433.
Caprioli, M. 2005. “Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict.”
International Studies Quarterly. 49: 161-178.
Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke. 2004. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” Oxford Economic Papers. 56(4): 563595.
Fearon, James. 2005. “Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. 49: 483-507.
Fearon, James D., and Latitin, David D. 1996. “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation.” American Political Science
Review. 90: 715-735.
Hegre, Havard, and Sambanis, Nicholas. 2006. “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset.”
Journal of Conflict Resolution. 50: 508-535.
Kauffmann, Chaim. 1996. “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars.” International Security. 20:
136-175.
Nel, Phllip, and Righarts, Marjolein. 2008. “Natural Disasters and the Risk of Violent Civil Conflict.” International
Studies Quarterly. 52: 159-182.
Regan, Patrick M. 2002. “Third Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts.” Journal of Conflict
Resolution. 46: 55-73.
Sambanis, Nicholas. 2000. “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical
Literature.” World Politics. 52: 437-483.
Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004. “What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational
Definition.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. 48: 814-585.
Small, Melvin, and J David Singer. 1982. Resort to Arms: International and Civil War, 1816-1980. Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage.
Walter, Barbara F. 1997. “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement.” International Organization. 51: 335-364.