“Given the growing number of actors and spacecraft in orbit, the major challenge
facing the international community is one of collective action. . . .”
Twenty-First-Century Space Security:
Conflict or Collaboration?
JAMES CLAY MOLTZ
H
uman space activity is on the verge of
a major expansion—but only if uncontrolled traffic and national rivalries do
not ruin it first. Once the preserve of the two
superpowers during the Cold War, space is now
becoming widely accessible to hundreds of new
actors: developing countries, start-up companies,
universities, and even private individuals. But this
expansion of new players and spacecraft coincides
with a range of emerging problems: a growing
field of dangerous orbital debris, limits in the
available radio frequency spectrum, and crowding
in the critical geostationary orbital belt 22,300
miles above Earth’s surface.
The commercial sector is gearing up to offer a
range of new space-based communications services (including mobile broadband), and various
companies, from SpaceX to Virgin Galactic, are
likely to begin carrying private passengers on
orbital and suborbital flights within the next five
years. Earth-observation technologies are also
improving rapidly, with companies like Planet
Labs, Google’s Skybox, and Digital Globe offering
more timely and more precise images than were
ever available before. Lower launch prices in an
increasingly competitive marketplace will further
stimulate the expansion of space activity, especially given the option of ultra-cheap—but highly
capable—miniature satellites, known as cubesats.
As a result, the US National Security Space
Strategy now describes space as “congested, contested, and competitive.” Behind Washington’s
concerns is the range of new space powers moving
into military activities in orbit. Officials describe a
future in which the United States may face asymmetric vulnerabilities relative to its military competitors due to its heavy reliance on space assets.
The rise in counterspace efforts by China, in
particular, suggests that emerging conditions may
make the Cold War in space look like a cakewalk.
Earth orbital space, which used to seem infinite, now appears quite finite and at risk. While
the 2013 movie Gravity was not perfectly accurate
in its depiction of a deadly debris cascade in lowEarth orbit started by a Russian weapons test, it
was not all that far off. To understand the current
situation and its dynamics, it is useful to review
the nature of emerging space threats, the trends
among major space powers, and some possible
remedies for preserving space for the use of future
generations.
TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
The current state of affairs in Earth orbital space
shares certain characteristics with the status of
railroads in the mid-nineteenth century and with
automobiles at the turn of the twentieth century,
particularly a rapid growth of users without effective traffic rules. The results in these cases were
frequent collisions and fatalities, until rights of
way, signaling, and speed limits were established
and enforced by competent national authorities.
The problem in space is that objects are moving
much faster (nearly 18,000 mph in orbits closest
to Earth) and the environment is an unmarked,
three-dimensional region without national jurisdictions to facilitate the enforcement of rules.
Airspace in the years between the world wars
faced some of these same problems, especially
after transoceanic commercial aviation service
began in 1938. In the 1940s, the International
Civil Aviation Organization began crafting best
JAMES CLAY MOLTZ is a professor of national security affairs
at the Naval Postgraduate School and the author, most
recently, of Crowded Orbits: Conflict and Cooperation
in Space (Columbia University Press, 2014). The opinions
expressed here are his personal views, not those of the US
Navy or the Department of Defense.
16
Twenty-First-Century Space Security: Conflict or Collaboration? • 17
practices to guide the growing traffic and enhance
The latter protection endures and provides at least
its safety. No similar organization exists yet for
a limited floor of cooperation in space for signaspace, despite regular human visits to space since
tories of relevant arms control treaties, including
1961. While the current scale of the human presthe United States, Russia, and other countries
ence in orbit is tiny—consisting of the six persons
party to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.
on the International Space Station (ISS) at any
The same clause appears in all these treaties.
In 1972, the UN also passed a liability convengiven time—this number may reach 1,000 people
tion that requires countries whose space objects
a year once orbital hotels and suborbital tourist
harm others to provide compensation. A 1975 UN
services begin operation by 2020, if things go
agreement furthermore requires countries to regaccording to plan. Improving safety in space will
ister their satellites and provide the UN with basic
then become a priority.
information on their orbit and purpose. But the
In 2009, an active Iridium Communications
sanctions for violating these agreements are weak,
satellite collided with a dead Russian spacecraft
and compliance has been imperfect. The registrain orbit, generating substantial space debris and
tion convention is a critical transparency tool for
adding to the 22,000 trackable objects already
space traffic management, yet countries do not
in space. Scientists began to worry that orbital
have to notify the UN if they move their sateldebris may have passed the threshold for the
lites—limiting the convention’s value for modern
“Kessler effect” predicted by a NASA scientist in
the 1970s: a condition in which the density of
traffic control.
debris reaches a point at which collisions involvTESTING TIMES
ing dead satellites and orbital fragments begin to
While some observers have a mental image of
cascade, regardless of human restraint in releasing
space as having always been
additional debris.
a peaceful sanctuary from
Some rules do exist.
conflict, where satellites and
Beginning in 1963, United
We may need to protect safe
manned spacecraft operate safe
Nations resolutions called
access to space to ensure
from harm, the actual history
on countries to respect the
our species’ survival.
of the space age tells another
rule of law in space, to refrain
story. In fact, less than a year
from claiming territory on any
after the 1957 Soviet launch
celestial body, and to agree
of Sputnik, the first artificial satellite, the United
not to place weapons of mass destruction in
States tested a series of nuclear weapons in orbit,
orbit. In the commercial realm, the International
believing that the arms race would eventually
Telecommunications Union since the 1960s has
extend into space. The Soviet Union quickly folhad responsibility for distributing rights to the
lowed suit, leading to a four-year period of tit-forradio frequency spectrum and claims to the limtat nuclear testing, mirroring practices on Earth.
ited slots above the equator in geostationary orbit,
The explosion of nuclear weapons in space
where satellites travel at the same speed that Earth
posed a unique problem. The electromagnetic
turns, allowing them to “stare” at hemispherepulse (EMP) created by the blasts quickly spread
sized areas of the world for communications, misaround the low-Earth orbital band and dissile warning, or weather monitoring.
The provisions of the 1963 UN resolutions
abled the electronics on satellites. In July 1962,
and an additional ban on military activities on
the United States exploded a huge 1.4-megaton nuclear bomb in the Starfish Prime test,
the Moon—to prevent possible superpower conflict there—became international law in the 1967
launched from Johnston Island in the Pacific,
Outer Space Treaty. This agreement has now been
to assess its possible missile defense capabilities. The EMP it generated gradually disabled
ratified by all major space powers and is an important (if dated) centerpiece of existing space secunearly all of the world’s first-generation satellites,
rity guidelines. During the US-Soviet détente era,
including the first transoceanic communications
Washington and Moscow also agreed in the nowsatellite, the US TelStar-1. Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev wrote anxiously to President John
defunct Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty not to test or
F. Kennedy imploring him not to test a weapon
place ballistic missile defenses in space and not
during the planned flight of the next Soviet
to interfere with one another’s so-called national
cosmonaut. Kennedy himself worried that the
technical means of verification—military satellites.
18 • CURRENT HISTORY • January 2015
in California. After the Iridium-Cosmos crash in
ongoing nuclear test programs would make his
2009, the center has largely shed its Cold War
vision of sending astronauts to the Moon by
secrecy and has begun to share “conjunction”
1970 impossible.
Human space activity had reached a critical
warnings with satellite owners whose spacecraft
turning point. If the two superpowers continued
it expects to cross paths with orbital debris. But
testing nuclear weapons in space, they would be
the owners still have the final say as to whether
signing the death certificate for commercial satelor not to spend their precious fuel reserves to
lite communications, human spaceflight, and, not
move a satellite out of the way—that is, if it is still
incidentally, military reconnaissance, which was
operational.
just then beginning to yield valuable images of the
CHINA’S ASCENT
other side’s nuclear-capable bombers, submarines,
Unfortunately, the UN debris convention came a
and missiles. Facing this trade-off, the two sides
bit too late. In January 2007, Chinese military offistepped back from the precipice and began to
cials exploited the absence of a formal antisatellite
cooperate to preserve their safe use of space.
treaty to conduct the first kinetic test in 22 years.
In 1963, the superpowers joined the United
The destruction of a Chinese weather satellite
Kingdom in banning nuclear weapons testing in
525 miles up created more than 3,000 pieces of
space as part of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The
harmful debris, eliciting global condemnation,
agreement allowed the US and Soviet militaries
to develop valuable force support programs in
especially from the commercial satellite commeteorology, communications, and various types
munity. China initially denied responsibility, but
of reconnaissance (visible imagery, signals, and
later admitted to the test, arguing unconvincingly
infrared sensing).
that it was not a threat to anyone. Experts now
But neither side gave
predict that the Chinese
up entirely on prospecdebris will remain in orbit
tive space weapons. The
for at least 40 years, given
A first-come-first-served approach is
Soviets conducted about
its initial altitude.
likely to lead to international conflict
two dozen tests of a conWhile the Chinese miliover ownership of space resources.
ventionally armed antisattary leads, operates, and
ellite system from 1968 to
controls the country’s
1982, developing a limited
space activities, Beijing
capability for destroying US satellites and generatalso conducts a wide range of civil, scientific, and
ing some of the first major sources of man-made
commercial activities in space. Indeed, China’s
orbital debris. The United States followed suit in
broad-based investment in space capabilities,
1985 by exploding an aging weather satellite with
infrastructure, and personnel may pose as great a
a homing missile launched from an F-15 jet, creatlong-term challenge to the existing space powers
ing another large field of debris that remained in
as its military capabilities.
Some of China’s highest-profile achievements
orbit for over 20 years.
have been in human spaceflight. It shocked the
In response to that incident, the US military
for the first time recognized the threat that NASA
world in 2003 by becoming only the third country to carry out a human orbital spaceflight, a
scientists had long been warning about. Wisely,
feat it has repeated five times since with up to
Washington began to craft rules to limit releases
three “taikonauts” on a flight. It now periodiof orbital debris in US space activities. Over time,
cally occupies the small Tiangong-1 space station
meetings with allies and eventually with Moscow
and has plans for a larger one within a decade.
resulted in international guidelines, which passed
In space science, China has carried out a lunar
the UN on a voluntary basis in December 2007.
They now encourage countries to refrain from
mapping mission and successfully landed a
destroying space objects and releasing any longshort-lived autonomous rover on the Moon.
lasting debris, defined as objects that will remain
In the commercial realm, it has recently begun
in space for longer than 25 years.
operating a position, timing, and navigation
This convention and the status of space trafsystem called Beidou, similar to the US Global
Positioning System, though it does not yet offer
fic is monitored mainly by military radars and
global coverage. China will soon open a major
telescopes connected with the US Joint Space
Operations Center at Vandenberg Air Force Base
new launch facility on Hainan Island, which—
Twenty-First-Century Space Security: Conflict or Collaboration? • 19
once its new booster is fully tested—will allow
it to conduct more sophisticated missions with
heavier payloads.
China is also using space to achieve broader
political, economic, and strategic goals, targeting especially energy-rich countries like Nigeria
and Venezuela, which it provides with communications and observation satellites, training,
and ground stations. China’s Great Wall Industry
Corporation has also offered favorable loans and
even grants to provide space capabilities to poorer
countries such as Bangladesh, Bolivia, Laos, and
Thailand.
Unsurprisingly, China’s Asian neighbors have
not viewed its rise in space with equanimity.
Since 2007, Japan and India have abandoned
decades-old policies of civilian-only space activity to make major investments in military space
assets. Elsewhere in Asia, Australia, Singapore,
and Vietnam have made strategic decisions to
upgrade their remote-sensing and communications programs as well.
On the Korean Peninsula, the North and South
are competing against each other and have invested heavily in different aspects of space technology.
North Korea seems mainly interested in developing an intercontinental ballistic missile for its
nuclear arsenal, but tried to cover this effort by
launching its first satellite into orbit in December
2012 (although it failed to achieve a stable orbit).
South Korea quickly followed in January 2013,
launching a more sophisticated satellite into a
stable orbit aboard a two-stage rocket built in
cooperation with Russia. Seoul has also sent an
astronaut on a Russian booster to the ISS and has
built a modern satellite production capability,
showing that it is prepared to compete in space
over the long haul.
OTHER PLAYERS
In contrast to Asia’s increasing competition,
the European Space Agency (ESA) has established
itself over the past four decades as the world’s
leading cooperative space hub. ESA now boasts a
membership of 20 countries and a budget of over
$5 billion a year. Although economic pressure on
its member states has recently strained its budget,
ESA remains a top-tier space power. Its Frenchbuilt Ariane launchers are a mainstay of the global
commercial sector, and its Automated Transfer
Vehicles have successfully brought four payloads
to the ISS, helping to compensate for the retirement of the US space shuttle.
In Russia, following the near-collapse of its
space program in the 1990s due to budgetary
problems, space activity has again become a priority under President Vladimir Putin. Moscow
recently committed itself to reestablishing Russian
military might in orbit, as well as to expanding
its civil space activities. But while Russia’s space
program has achieved a great deal in the past
decade and remains the only one now ferrying
humans to the ISS, it continues to suffer from
serious problems including an aging workforce,
lack of innovation, and poor quality controls.
Its high-profile Phobos-Grunt scientific mission
intended to investigate a Mars moon, launched
in November 2011, ended in disaster when the
spacecraft lost communications with mission control and crashed back into Earth’s atmosphere in
early 2012. Russia’s previously reliable Proton
satellite launcher has suffered a number of costly
failures in the past few years, hurting its position
in an increasingly competitive commercial marketplace. But the United States and other foreign
militaries have certainly taken notice of renewed
Russian assertiveness in space.
As in Asia, a mini–space race may be taking
place in the Middle East, given the possible linkages between space launch capabilities and missile
delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.
Although rarely discussed, Israel has had a spacelaunch capability since the late 1980s. It is well
known for its sophisticated military-support satellites, which it has bartered in deals with India and
Taiwan. More recently, its rival Iran has entered
the club of launch-capable countries, surprising
the world by putting its first satellite into orbit
in 2009. Observers worry that this capability may
sometime be turned into a weapons delivery system. This risk has stimulated Saudi Arabia and
Turkey to invest more heavily in space technology.
In this challenging environment, many
American analysts have warned of the harmful
consequences of recent US budget cuts for both
military space activities and NASA. The Obama
administration’s 2010 decision to cancel the costly
Constellation program—a multiyear effort intended to support an international lunar mission—has
led to questions about future US leadership in
space.
CODE OF CONDUCT
Given the growing number of players and
spacecraft in orbit, the major challenge facing
the international community is one of collective
20 • CURRENT HISTORY • January 2015
action: Can a multiplicity of new actors with a
range of objectives develop effective cooperative
mechanisms to manage an increasingly complex
environment? To address a problem, a number
of proposals have been raised at the international
level aimed at bringing order and greater military
restraint to twenty-first-century space activity.
In 2008, Russia and China proposed a pact to
ban space-based weapons, the so-called Treaty
on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons
in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force
against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). While
many countries initially supported this effort,
further analysis of the proposal showed that the
treaty would preserve China’s ground-based antisatellite program and allow continued kinetic
testing in space. Moreover, the proposed agreement lacked any debris-mitigation requirements
or verification mechanisms, suggesting that its
aims are mainly political (a new draft presented
in June 2014 also lacked specific verification
mechanisms).
Fearing a lack of progress in international space
security, a variety of European countries came
together in 2009 and issued a draft code of conduct for space activity designed to create at least
some “rules of the road.” The idea—based loosely
on the International Civil Aviation Organization
concept as well as a prior European-sponsored
code of conduct for missile activities—was to
develop norms for space activity and a basic
structure for international discussions on space
security. Such a forum has been lacking due to
conflict within the Geneva-based Conference on
Disarmament, the body tasked by the UN with
negotiating arms control treaties. Due to an antiquated consensus rule, this group has failed to
agree on an agenda since 1996, stymieing efforts
to negotiate a new space treaty.
One area of recent progress was a consensus report issued in 2013 by the UN Group of
Governmental Experts, which had been asked to
identify space security problems and offer possible
remedies in the areas of international transparency and confidence building. The report called
specifically for new efforts in debris mitigation,
space weather monitoring, natural disaster warning, and long-term sustainability for commercial
activities. These findings should help four ongoing working groups under the UN Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in Vienna to
come up with some practical recommendations
for release in 2015.
Given the lack of progress on a new treaty
for space, the code of conduct—now called the
International Code of Conduct for Outer Space
Activities—may represent the most promising
alternative effort. If enacted, it will create new
norms against interference with foreign spacecraft,
strengthen calls for debris mitigation, and establish
a database of satellites and debris that will be accessible to all signatories. Perhaps most importantly,
the code would bring member states together on
a yearly basis to discuss compliance and develop
collective responses to emerging problems. The
interested scientific community could perhaps create a small technical organization to help monitor
the code and publicize violations.
But prospects even for a voluntary code remain
questionable. A number of countries view the
proposed code as too weak; conservative members
of the US Congress oppose it for allegedly limiting
American military options in space. As a result, an
international dialogue of the deaf may prevent the
code’s implementation.
Meanwhile, there have been no serious treaty
initiatives beyond the PPWT vetted at the international level to date, partly out of fear of a negative US response. Yet the recent US preference for
voluntary approaches in space has risks. The
George W. Bush administration pushed to keep
the debris mitigation convention approved by
the UN in 2007 on a voluntary basis. But such
mechanisms lack enforcement. A recent study on
the effectiveness of these UN Debris Mitigation
Guidelines revealed that 40 percent of countries
operating space assets have not been complying
with them. For this reason, formal treaties may
be the only effective option going forward, given
the large number of players and the need for more
explicit coordination and compliance in order to
keep space safe.
CELESTIAL MINING
Another rising concern at the international
level is the lack of guidelines for developing
lunar and asteroid resources. Several countries
and private companies have announced plans
to begin mining operations for precious metals
and rare isotopes (such as Helium-3) within the
next 20 years. To date, the 1979 Moon Treaty—
negotiated by the UN—is the only document that
outlines a process toward the formation of an
international system for licensing and conflict
resolution (it would apply to resource extraction
and settlement on all celestial bodies).
Twenty-First-Century Space Security: Conflict or Collaboration? • 21
recently signed a cooperative agreement with the
However, no major space power has joined the
SDA. The military has decided that it is in the
treaty, since the agreement also calls for a framenational interest to work with the private secwork for international profit sharing to benefit
tor to avoid geostationary collisions, no matter
non-space-capable countries. The result is interwhose satellites are involved.
national reliance on a vague set of guidelines for
In the low-Earth orbital region, even greater
future activities on celestial bodies laid out in the
future problems are expected to arise as the
1967 Outer Space Treaty, which ban ownership of
population of tiny, non-maneuverable cubesats
land but allow commercial use. There is no frame(10 centimeters on a side, or about the size of a
work for coordinating competing claims or deterlarge softball) grows from a few dozen to perhaps
mining how much mining can take place before
as many as several thousand. The low cost and
the treaty’s restraint against “harmful interference”
increasing capability of cubesats make them ideal
with the interests of other countries is activated.
for universities, companies, and cash-poor govEntrepreneurs and certain countries (including
ernments. But some users are failing to register
China) have stated their interest in celestial minthese satellites or the frequencies they are broading. They have tended to oppose any regulation
casting on, in violation of international law.
of their activities. But a first-come-first-served
Moreover, given the fact that most designs do
approach to these issues is likely to lead to internot include any propulsion capability, they will
national conflict over rights to and ownership of
soon become space debris, normally within a few
space resources. The only body currently workyears of their launch, without any ability to leave
ing on practical cooperation is the International
orbit except under the very gradual influence of
Lunar Network, a consortium of scientists seeking
atmospheric drag. Requiring cubesats to be regto develop common standards and data-sharing
istered and carry drag sails or
for future lunar research. But
other deployable equipment
more will need to be done to
to speed the post-life decay of
bridge the gap.
China is using space to
In the face of these probtheir orbits could help prevent
achieve broader political,
lems, some experts have
the further crowding of the
economic, and strategic goals.
begun to discuss the possible
low-Earth orbital region. Such
contribution of the interested
hazards will become of even
space community in different
greater concern once various
forms of “societal verification” of space activorbital and suborbital human spaceflight services
ity. Notably, amateur scientists and astronomers
begin operation in the next few years in the same
were the first to notice and publicize the “missband of near-Earth space.
ing” satellite in China’s constellation after the
COUNTERSPACE CONSTRAINTS
Fengyun 1-C was destroyed in January 2007,
Of course, the existence of all these civil and
helping to put the blame on China. While the
commercial space risks assumes that military conUnited States knew about this action, it had
flict will not occur in space. Given the rapid expanrefrained from publicizing it—possibly to keep
sion of counterspace programs among a small but
its own sensor technologies and their capabilities
growing number of space actors, this assumption
secret. But considerable information and radar
cannot be taken for granted. Militaries tasked with
data on the incident was later released publicly
protecting their countries’ space assets are likely
by NASA’s debris office.
The commercial sector may also offer useful
to oppose restrictions on these activities, arguing
models. In 2009, a group of companies operatthat they are for “defensive” purposes only. China,
ing satellites in geostationary orbit decided to
for example, has taken this line as it continues its
take matters into their own hands after failing to
test programs. Similar views, not surprisingly, can
obtain locational data, necessary for safe stationbe found in the US and Russian militaries.
Without greater international attention to the
keeping maneuvers, from national governments.
need for restraint in these programs and the risks
Led by the satellite operators Intelsat, Inmarsat,
of other actors joining the competition, the proand SES, they created the Space Data Association
(SDA), the first commercially led data service
liferation of such technologies may make their
for space situational awareness. After initially
use—whether intentional or inadvertent—more
opposing it, the US Department of Defense
likely. In contrast to other environments where
22 • CURRENT HISTORY • January 2015
non-nuclear military tests pose limited risk of
lasting damage, Earth orbital space could quickly
exceed its carrying capacity for debris. Some basic
international agreements, prohibiting at least
kinetic tests and laser or other electronic interference that may result in the explosion of fuel tanks
or other equipment, would be prudent next steps,
if not necessities, to ensure a continued human
presence in low-Earth orbit.
The most frequent refrain of critics of new
space security agreements is that they are “too
hard” to negotiate and will be “unverifiable.” But
very little of a destructive nature can be hidden
in space, given the ability of ground- and potential space-based radars and telescopes to detect
satellite breakups or debris generation. Such
verification mechanisms are currently in the possession of the US military and some other foreign
governments, but there is no centralized system
with publicly sharable data. Many of the sensors
are antiquated. The US government is hoping to
build a more accurate next-generation system of
sensors, but has been slowed by congressional
budget cuts.
Unlike the nuclear field, where the
Comprehensive Test Ban Organization operates
hundreds of sensors around the world to detect
nuclear detonations, space has no such system to
monitor harmful activities and prevent collisions.
A system to fill this gap, possibly building on
the code of conduct process and the commercial
model of the SDA, could be paid for by all users
of space. The space science community, if given
financial support by governments and perhaps
the private sector, certainly has the technical
resources to create an effective monitoring system
for detecting destructive events, if the political
will emerges to do so.
SURVIVAL STRATEGY
Whether the next few decades witness the
creation of new cooperative institutions for space
surveillance, traffic management, and military
restraint will be an important test case for humanity. If we get this wrong, accessing the valuable
region of near-Earth space may become increasingly dangerous and costly. That would harm
global economic, social, and scientific development, as well as postpone humanity’s efforts to
build its capability for living in space. We may
need to protect safe access to space to ensure our
species’ survival, if nuclear catastrophe, climate
change, or some future plant blight, like the one
depicted in the movie Interstellar, were to make
Earth uninhabitable.
Fortunately, shared risks such as debris may
cause today’s competing nations—against all
odds and experience—to recognize and value
our common humanity in a dark and dangerous
cosmos. Past practices of “zero-sum” thinking
about space—where one side’s gain is the other’s
loss—are beginning to change in the approaches
of corporations, scientific groups, and even some
militaries. They realize that all parties in space
must begin to identify more productive “positivesum” approaches for protecting space, from which
all sides can benefit.
Success in overcoming twenty-first-century
space challenges will not be easy, given the competitive politics associated with space activity in
many regions. Luckily—and unlike in the movies—conditions on Earth do not yet require us
to leave our lovely and hospitable planet in order
to save humankind. But the political obstacles to
managing space competition suggest that we need
to learn to cooperate faster if we are to preserve
our options for the future.
■