Transatlantic Trends
Key Findings 2011
Transatlantic Trends 2011 Partners
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword.............................................................................................................................................................................. iii
Executive Summary 2011.....................................................................................................................................................1
Section One: Transatlantic Relations...................................................................................................................................5
Section Two: Global Views..................................................................................................................................................11
Section Three: The Economy..............................................................................................................................................17
Section Four: Transatlantic Security..................................................................................................................................22
Section Five: Libya and the Transatlantic Role in the Middle East and North Africa.....................................................29
Section Six: Continuity and Change in Turkey..................................................................................................................37
T R A N S AT L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1 | i
Foreword
T
his year marks the 10th anniversary of Transatlantic Trends surveys, which started in 2002 as World Views. During this
decade, Transatlantic Trends has become the pre-eminent source of U.S. and European public opinion on a host of
transatlantic issues, including common foreign policy challenges, support for NATO, the economy, and the rise of other world
powers. The data provided by the surveys have become an invaluable tool for policymakers, members of the media, think tank
officials, and academics who have an impact on foreign policy decisions within their respective countries. In addition to original research, the survey’s goal is also to foster debate on the strategic policy goals, objectives, and values of the United States
and Europe as members of the transatlantic community.
The decade reflected by our polls has been a very tumultuous one for both Europe and the United States, one that has been
marred by a very marked divide between the two sides of the Atlantic about the U.S. intervention in Iraq, the alliance’s role in
Afghanistan, and the global economic crisis. Nothing has been more emblematic of the transatlantic relationship than how
Europeans related to the two U.S. presidents of this time. The low approval of George W. Bush’s management of foreign policy
quickly turned into euphoric optimism when Barack Obama was elected in 2008. This almost overnight change of public opinion toward the U.S. president demonstrated that the basics of transatlantic cooperation remained strong and had not eroded
during Bush’s presidency, despite his unpopularity among the European public.
Sweden has been added to the Transatlantic Trends survey this year, and as you will see in the data, it is a welcome addition. It
is the first Nordic country and first non-NATO member to be included in Transatlantic Trends — adding new perspectives and
geographical diversity to the survey during a time of heightened interest in transatlantic relations in a globalized world.
Craig Kennedy
President, German Marshall Fund of the United States
T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1 | iii
Executive Summary 2011
I
n a year of tumult and upheaval, with political revolu-
those in the EU felt that EU membership had helped their
tions in the Middle East and North Africa, natural
country’s economy. Nevertheless, a plurality or majority in
catastrophes in Japan, economic turmoil in Europe and
every EU country surveyed, with the exception of Germany,
the United States, the killing of Osama bin Laden, and
were reluctant to give the EU more power over national
heated debates over NATO, Transatlantic Trends paints a
budgets and finances. While the EU is seen fairly positively,
picture of a complex relationship between the United States
the majority of EU respondents agreed that using the euro
and Europe and how they respond to global challenges.
either had been or would be a bad thing for their country’s
Transatlantic Trends shows that people respond to complex-
economy. The euro was particularly unpopular in those
ity with nuance rather than simplification.
countries surveyed outside the eurozone, while opinions
In the context of mounting global challenges, the survey
within the eurozone varied.
uncovered some remarkable findings. Among others, four
Security Policy: While a transatlantic opinion gap still
stand out: Americans’ growing focus on Asia; EU respon-
exists on some security topics, the survey also revealed
dents’ steadfast support for the European Union in the
important shifts in public opinion on some key security
midst of crisis; the growing transatlantic convergence on
policies. These shifts resulted in a convergence of EU-U.S.
security policy; and that the views of Swedish respondents,
opinion on the best way forward. Marking a sharp increase
included in Transatlantic Trends for the first time, differ
over last year in the United States, this year’s survey showed
from other Europeans’ perspectives in some important
an equally solid majority in the United States and the EU
ways.
wanting to reduce troop levels or withdraw all troops from
1
Asia: For the first time in its ten-year history, Transatlantic
Trends data now suggest that a shift of alignment away
from Europe may be under way as Americans turn toward
Asia. A majority of Americans reported that their national
interests lie more with the countries of Asia, such as China,
Japan, and South Korea, than with the countries of the EU.
In contrast, a majority of those in the EU countries polled
Afghanistan. Despite outgoing U.S. Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates’ harsh words about the future of NATO,
a solid majority in both the EU and the United States
reported that they see NATO as essential for their security,
and pluralities in the EU and the United States would like
to see their governments maintain current levels of defense
spending.
reported that the United States is more important to their
Sweden: Sweden’s first year in the survey revealed that
national interests than the countries of Asia.
the country’s public opinion stood apart from other EU
European Union: The euro crisis did not seem to undermine faith in the EU as an economic unit. The majority of
This year’s survey includes the United States, Turkey, and 12 EU
countries: Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom. When the report refers to EU opinions, it is only meant
to refer to the opinions of those in the 12 EU countries surveyed.
1
countries on a number of issues. The Swedes were the most
likely to approve of their government’s handling of foreign
policies and the least likely to be affected by the economic
crisis. Compared to other Europeans, the Swedes were more
willing to maintain troops in Afghanistan, more supportive
of the intervention in Libya, and more likely to promote
T R A N S AT L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1 | 1
democracy in the Middle East and North Africa. At the
international policies, and there was an even larger gap
same time, the Swedes were evenly divided on whether
when it came to his handling of the U.S. economy.
cooperating with NATO was essential for their own
security.
Turkey: Although Turkish feelings for the EU and United
Transatlantic Trends has asked a number of new questions
Turks still view the EU and the United States unfavorably.
this year. For the first time, respondents rated their own
However, the plurality of Turks thought that working with
government’s handling of international affairs. A series
the countries of the Middle East was more important to
of questions was dedicated to the volatile situation in the
their economic and security interests than working with
Middle East and North Africa.
countries of the EU. At the same time, fewer than half of the
Middle East and North Africa: With regard to the international military intervention in Libya, there was often a
greater divide among EU countries than between each side
of the Atlantic. On average, just under half those in the
EU approved of the intervention by international forces in
Libya. Optimism about stabilizing the situation in Libya
was much lower across the board than approval for the
intervention. While Americans remained wary of democracy promotion abroad, Europeans were largely in favor of
the idea. It should be noted that polling was conducted in
May and June 2011, before more recent Libyan rebel victories. There was also a transatlantic difference on the best
approach to help resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. A majority of Americans preferred to put more pressure on the
Palestinians, while a plurality of those in the EU preferred
putting more pressure on the Israelis.
Government Approval: This year, for the first time,
Transatlantic Trends asked how people viewed their own
governments’ handling of international policies. When it
came to general handling of international affairs, governments across the board evoked the approval of around half
of their citizens.
The set of questions that Transatlantic Trends asks every
year continues to produce remarkable findings, especially
when it comes to the views that American and Turkish
respondents hold on international relations.
United States: The survey showed a very strong partisan
divide in the United States over Barack Obama’s handling
of international policies. Republicans were four times less
likely than Democrats to approve of Obama’s handling of
2 | T R A N S AT L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1
States warmed somewhat over the past year, a majority of
EU respondents felt that Turkey’s accession would benefit
the EU economically or promote peace and stability in
the Middle East. Only about one-third of the EU public
believed that Turkey does not belong in the EU either
because it is a predominantly Muslim country or because it
is either too poor or too populous to join the EU.
KEY FINDINGS OF THE SURVEY INCLUDE:
Transatlantic Relations and U.S. Leadership
nn Marking a slight decline from 2010, 75% of people
in the 12 EU countries polled approved of Obama’s
handling of international policies but his approval has
dropped 17 percentage points in Spain (68%), 13 points
in Slovakia (58%), and 12 points in France (76%) and
Italy (79%) since 2009.
nn A little over half of the EU residents polled (54%) said
it was desirable that the United States exert strong
leadership in world affairs.
more of an economic opportunity than a threat (41%),
but a majority in the United States (63%) viewed China
as more of an economic threat.
nn Pakistan was the least popular country asked about in
the survey with around one-in-four (26%) in the EU
and one-in-five (18%) in the United States holding
favorable views of the country.
The Economy
nn People are still hurt by the economy: 82% of the
Americans and 61% of those in the EU reported
being personally affected by the economic crisis. The
nn U.S. public opinion is strongly polarized: 85% of
the Democrats approved of Obama’s handling of
EU numbers ranged from 31% in Sweden to 89% in
Bulgaria.
international policies, but Republicans were four times
less likely to approve (21%).
nn The majority of EU respondents (67%) considered
membership in the EU to be a good thing for their
nn Seventy-three percent of the EU respondents approved
countries’ economies, but the majority (53%) thought
of Obama’s efforts to fight international terrorism.
that using the euro had been or would be a bad thing
nn When it came to general handling of international
for their economies.
affairs, governments across the board won the approval
nn A plurality or majority in every EU country, with the
of around half of their citizens, showing a 54% approval
exception of Germany, were reluctant to give the EU
rate in the EU, 50% in the United States, and 45% in
more power over national budgets and finances. Sixty
Turkey. In the EU, approval rates ranged from Spain
percent of EU respondents thought it acceptable that
(39%) on the low end to Sweden (74%) on the high end.
their countries contribute to a fund that would help bail
out member states with budgetary difficulties.
Global Views
nn A majority of Americans said the countries of Asia
(51%) were more important to their national interests
than the countries of the European Union (38%).
nn Young people in the United States viewed China more
Transatlantic Security
nn For the first time, a majority of Americans (56%)
were pessimistic about the prospects of stabilizing
Afghanistan; EU pessimism remained high (66%).
positively than older Americans and were much more
nn For the first time, the majority of U.S. (66%) and EU
likely to say the countries of Asia are more important
(66%) respondents agreed that troop levels should be
for U.S. interests.
reduced or troops should be withdrawn altogether from
nn A majority of EU respondents (52%) thought that the
United States was more important to their national
interests than the countries of Asia (37%). Responses
Afghanistan.
nn NATO is still seen as essential by 62% of both EU and
U.S. respondents.
varied greatly among the EU countries surveyed.
nn The Swedes were evenly split about the North Atlantic
nn A slight plurality in the EU (46%) thought China was
military alliance, with 47% saying it was important for
T R A N S AT L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1 | 3
their security to cooperate closely with NATO and 48%
saying it was not important.
nn When asked about defense spending, a plurality in 10 of
the 14 countries surveyed wanted to maintain current
spending levels.
nn The vast majority of those in the EU (75%) and the
United States (76%) remained concerned about Iran
acquiring nuclear weapons, and pluralities on both sides
of the Atlantic preferred using economic sanctions or
incentives to stop Iran’s nuclear program.
nn Half of those in the EU did not agree that Turkey’s EU
membership would be good for the EU in economic
terms.
nn A plurality of Turks (27%) said that the country
should act alone in foreign affairs, while one-in-five
said Turkey should act in closest cooperation with the
countries of the Middle East (20%) or the countries of
the EU (19%).
nn A plurality of the Turks considered Turkey’s neighbors
in the Middle East as more important to the country’s
economic interests (43%) and security interests (42%)
Libya and the Transatlantic Role in the Middle East
than countries of the EU.
and North Africa
nn Regarding the intervention in Libya, EU respondents
were, on average, evenly divided, with 48% approving
and 47% disapproving.
nn A majority of U.S. respondents (59%) approved of
the international intervention in Libya, but only 31%
supported sending U.S. ground troops to assist the
rebels who oppose Colonel Gaddafi.
nn The majority in the EU (54%) and a plurality in the
United States (48%) were pessimistic about stabilizing
the situation in Libya.
nn U.S. support for democracy promotion (37%) remained
low in 2011, down from a majority (52%) in 2005. EU
support for democracy promotion remained high at
69%.
nn To solve the Arab-Israeli conflict, a majority of
Americans (53%) preferred putting more pressure on
the Palestinians, while the plurality in the EU (38%)
preferred putting more pressure on the Israelis.
Continuity and Change in Turkey
nn There was a ten-point increase in the percentage
of Turks who thought Turkish membership in the
EU would be a good thing (48%), but such support
remained much lower than it was in 2004 (73%).
4 | T R A N S AT L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1
Transatlantic Trends is a comprehensive annual survey
of American and European public opinion. Polling was
conducted by TNS Opinion between May 25 and June
17, 2011, in the United States, Turkey, and 12 European
Union member states: Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The survey is a project
of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF)
and the Compagnia di San Paolo, with additional support
from the Fundação Luso-Americana, Fundación BBVA,
the Communitas Foundation, and the Swedish Ministry for
Foreign Affairs.
The academic advisory committee for the survey included
Pierangelo Isernia, professor of political science, University
of Siena (Italy); Philip Everts, emeritus director of the
Institute of International Studies, University of Leiden
(Netherlands); and Richard Eichenberg, associate professor
of political science, Tufts University (United States).
The authors of the key findings report were Zsolt Nyiri,
director of Transatlantic Trends, and Ben Veater-Fuchs, program associate for Transatlantic Trends. The authors wish to
acknowledge the invaluable help of Matthew M. Borda, who
played a major role in creating the accompanying charts
and providing other essential help during the preparation of
this report.
Section One: Transatlantic Relations
B
arack Obama’s six-day European tour in May was
world’s most wanted terrorist. Nevertheless, the enormous
widely covered by the transatlantic media. During his
popularity that Obama had enjoyed in Western Europe after
busy visit, Obama attended the G8 summit, met a num-
his election continued its slow decline.
ber of European leaders, and even had the time to enjoy
a Guinness in his ancestral home of Ireland. In response
Obama STILL POPULAR, BUT approval Continues
to the Arab Spring, Obama suggested Poland as a model
to Decrease among some European allies
for Arab nations undergoing political change, saying its
According to the findings of this year’s Transatlantic Trends
peaceful overthrow of communism held lessons outside of
survey, the U.S. president was still very popular in Europe.
Europe. Prior to his visit to Europe, leaders of the European
On average, a very impressive 75% of the population of the
Council and European Commission praised the U.S.
12 EU member countries polled approved of his handling
president for the tracking down of Osama bin Laden, the
Chart 1:
Approval of Obama’s Handling of International Policies
100
92
90
88
82
81
79
81
84
82
79
76
83
78
75
85
82
75
72
74
76
74
68
64
60
72
69
68
58
65
55
71
63
58
58 57
54
52
50
40
30
23
20
Tu
rk
ey
S.
U.
a
ov
ak
i
ar
ia
Sl
d
Bu
lg
an
Po
l
ai
n
Sp
ia
an
K.
U.
Ro
m
EU
Sw
ed
en
e
nc
Fr
a
Ita
ly
s
la
nd
er
an
y
Ne
th
rm
Ge
tu
ga
l
0
Po
r
Percent
80
88
2011
2010
2009
91
90
87
*For trend questions, the EU average is calculated by using EU-7 average from 2002-2003, the EU-9 average from 2004-2006, the EU-11 average from 2007-2010 and the EU-12 average for 2011.
Q3
T R A N S AT L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1 | 5
35
30
Chart 2:
Approve Very Much of Obama’s Handling of International Policies
30
29
2011
29
26
25
20
Percent
2010
2009
21
17
15
16
10
11
7
5
0
U.S.
EU
Turkey
Q3
of international policies.2 This figure remains much higher
seven times as high in France and Germany, and four times
than the EU approval levels for George Bush in 2008 (20%)
as high in the United Kingdom and Turkey.
and even higher than EU citizens’ approval ratings of their
own national governments when it comes to handling inter-
On average, majorities in the EU countries surveyed
national policies (54%).
approved of his leadership in foreign policy. In addition
Nevertheless, in some countries, Obama’s approval rating
showed somewhat lower support compared with the EU
was not nearly as high as it was just after his election (see
average, including Slovakia (58%), Bulgaria (63%), Poland
chart 1). Compared with the results in 2009, for example,
(65%), and Romania (68%). However, Obama’s approval
Obama’s approval dropped 17 percentage points in Spain
increased by seven points over last year in Poland, but
(68%), 13 points in Slovakia (58%), and 12 points in France
decreased by 18 points in neighboring Slovakia during the
(76%) and Italy (79%). Obama’s foreign policies were met
same time.
with the highest levels of approval in Portugal (82%),
Germany (81%), the Netherlands (81%), Italy (79%), France
(76%), Sweden (75%), and the U.K. (74%). His policies were
the least popular in Turkey (30%), the only country where
the majority (58%) actually disapproved of his handling
international policies. Still, these approval ratings are much
higher than those accorded George W. Bush in 2008: about
2
Unless otherwise noted, approval rates are calculated by combining
the percentage of respondents who approve “very much” and the
percentage of those who approve “somewhat.”
6 | T R A N S AT L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1
to Spain (68%), Central and Eastern European countries
Another notable trend this year was the decrease in the
intensity of support for Obama (see chart 2). Two years ago,
close to three-in-ten (29%) in the 11 EU countries surveyed
approved of Obama very much. This year, less than one-infive (17%) expressed intense support for Obama’s handling
of international policies.
OBAMA’S FIGHTING international terrorism
and one-in-five (20%) approved of his handling of the situ-
received highest approval
ation in Libya. Less than one-in-four Turks approved of the
Beyond the general approval of Barack Obama’s handling
U.S. president’s management of relations with Russia (23%)
of international relations, the data revealed that Europeans
and his fight against international terrorism (23%). With
are less likely to approve of the president’s specific foreign
regard to the latter, this was a dramatic 50-point difference
policies, continuing a trend found last year. Among the
between his approval in Turkey and the EU average.
foreign policies tested, handling of Libya and efforts to
stabilize Afghanistan were the least popular in the EU (see
DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS CONTINENTS APART:
chart 4). On average, about half (51%) of the people in
STRONG POLARIZATION AT HOME
the 12 EU countries polled this year approved of Obama’s
While the difference between EU (75%) and U.S. (54%)
policies with regard to Libya and Afghanistan. Fifty-eight
approval of Obama’s handling of foreign policies was strik-
percent approved of Obama’s managing of relations with
ing, even more remarkable was the tremendous polarization
Russia. The only foreign policy area where his approval
of the U.S. public on the same matter. An overwhelming
was almost as high as his general approval likely involved
85% of the Democrats surveyed approved of Obama’s han-
his administration’s success in eliminating al Qaida leader
dling of international policies, but only 21% of Republicans
Osama bin Laden. On average in the EU, 73% approved of
agreed. Independents’ support, at 43%, was closer to that of
the American president’s fighting of international terrorism.
the Republicans than to the Democrats.
The Turks were a lot more critical than those in the EU
The political polarization of the U.S. public was also appar-
about Obama’s specific foreign policies. One-in-six Turks
ent in the intensity of Obama’s approval. The majority of
(17%) approved of Obama’s efforts to stabilize Afghanistan
Chart 3:
Approval of U.S. President Obama by Policy
100
90
80
Democrat
86
Percent
Independent
Republican
85
78
70
60
Republicans (56%) disapproved very much of Obama’s
75
71
67
50
54
49
40
69
50
43
46
40
38
30
31
20
26
21
10
10
0
Fighting
International
Terrorism
Handling
International
Policies
Handling U.S.
Economy
Managing
Relations
with Russia
Stabilizing
Afghanistan
Handling
Situation in Libya
Q3, 4.1-4.5
T R A N S AT L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1 | 7
handling of international policies, while the plurality of
MAJORITY APPROVAL OF OWN GOVERNMENT
Democrats (49%) approved very much. Like Europeans,
HANDLING INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Democrats showed lower levels of approval when it came
This year, for the first time, Transatlantic Trends asked
to specific foreign policies, except for the case of fighting
how people viewed their own governments’ handling of
international terrorism, where Democrats had a high level
international policies (see chart 4). When it came to general
of approval at 86%. Democrats were least likely to approve
handling of international affairs, governments across the
of Obama’s policies in Afghanistan (71%) and Libya (69%)
board had the support of about half of their citizens, show-
than of other policies. Nearly half the Republicans sup-
ing a 54% approval rate in the EU, 50% in the United States,
ported Obama’s fighting international terrorism (49%)
and 45% in Turkey. One government in particular, Sweden,
and 46% approved of his policies in Afghanistan, but only
received very high marks, with three-in-four (74%) Swedes
about one-in-four (26%) approved of his policies in Libya.
approving of the way their government handled foreign
Obama’s management of relations with Russia met the
policy issues. Somewhat behind the Swedish government,
approval of 31% of Republicans and 75% of Democrats.
but still above the EU average, the German (65%) and the
Dutch (65%) governments had above-average approval rates
Nowhere else was the polarization of the American
for their handling of foreign affairs. At the other extreme,
public more striking than in Obama’s handling of the U.S.
the Spanish showed the lowest level (39%) of support for
economy, the only nonforeign policy topic Transatlantic
their government’s foreign policy.
Trends asked about: one-in-ten (10%) Republicans and
nearly eight-in-ten (78%) Democrats approved of Obama’s
While a majority of EU respondents gave general support to
handling of the U.S. economy.
their countries’ foreign policies, there was less support for
Chart 4:
EU12 Approval Own Government’s vs. Obama’s International Policies
80
75
70
60
Percent
50
Approve Obama’s
international policies
73
61
54
Approve own country’s
international policies
58
54
51
51
45
47
40
30
20
10
0
Handling
International Policies
Fighting
International
Terrorism
Managing Relations
with Russia
Handling
Situation in Libya
Stabilizing
Afghanistan
Q4.1-.5, 5, 6.1-.5
8 | T R A N S AT L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1
some particular international activities. Most notably, only
(45% each) approved of their governments’ efforts in this
45% of the people in the EU approved of their governments’
respect.
handling of the situation in Libya, but opinions varied
greatly within the EU countries surveyed. The Swedes, at
65%, were the most approving of their government’s policy
toward Libya followed by the Dutch (61%). But just about
half of the French (52%) and the British (50%) and 42%
of the Germans and Italians supported their governments’
policies in Libya. Italy was the only country where a slight
majority (53%), rather than just a plurality, disapproved of
how their government dealt with Libya. The Turks were
evenly divided with 45% approving and 44% disapproving
of the Turkish government’s handling of Libya.
Governments received the lowest approval with regard to
dealing with their countries’ economies. Only two-in-five
(40%) of those in the EU approved of how their elected
leaders were managing the economy. Especially disappointed were the Spanish and the Romanians, with only
18% support. Sweden (68%), Germany (63%), and the
Netherlands (62%) were the only countries surveyed where
majorities approved of how their governments had been
dealing with the economy. In Turkey, a slight plurality
(47%) approved of how their government had been handling the economy.
The greatest support for governments’ involved their handling of international terrorism. On average, 61% of the EU
respondents and 45% of Turks approved of their governments’ efforts against international terrorists. The British
were the most approving (72%), followed by the Germans
(70%), Portuguese (69%), and Swedes (68%). On the other
side of the scale, fewer than half of the Turks and the Poles
STATE of Transatlantic Relations: GOOD OR
MIXED, BUT NOT BAD
Across the board, perceptions of the state of the transatlantic relationship are very similar in the EU and the United
Sates. In the United States, a slight plurality (49%) felt
that relations are mixed and 42% said that relations were
Chart 5:
The State of EU--U.S. Relations
50
49
40
45
46
Good
42
Mixed
Percent
Bad
30
20
10
5
4
0
EU12
U.S.
Q2.1
T R A N S AT L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1 | 9
good, down from last year’s 54% who said relations were
STABLE EU SUPPORT FOR STRONG U.S. LEADERSHIP
good. Those in the EU were evenly divided about whether
IN WORLD AFFAIRS
relations were mixed (46%) or good (45%) (see chart 5).
Over half of the EU residents polled (54%) said it was
In the 11 EU countries that were polled in 2010 and 2011,
desirable that the United States exert strong leadership in
those who described relations as “good” decreased by 12
world affairs. While this seems low compared to Obama’s
percentage points. Only Spain (54%) and Germany (55%)
popularity, support for strong U.S. leadership in world
had clear majorities saying EU-U.S. relations were good.
affairs continues to be much higher than it was under much
Nevertheless, very few people described the current state of
of the Bush administration (see chart 6). Unsurprisingly,
relations between the two continents as bad — only 4% in
an overwhelming 85% of Americans found U.S. leadership
the EU and 5% in the United States.
desirable. The majority of Americans (69%) also thought it
was desirable that the EU exert strong leadership in world
As in previous years, on both sides of the Atlantic, strong
affairs, which was likewise the majority opinion among the
majorities (71% in the United States and 68% in the EU) felt
EU countries (76%). Only about one-in-five (17%) Turks
that the United States and the European Union had enough
said U.S. leadership was desirable, while somewhat more
common values to be able to cooperate on international
(28%) said EU leadership was desirable.3
problems.
3
EU averages reflect EU7 from 2002-2003, EU9 from
2004-2006, EU11 from 2007-2010, and EU12 for 2011. See more on
trended data in the Methodology section.
Chart 6:
EU Approval of U.S. President
vs. EU Desire for Strong U.S. Leadership in World Affairs
90
83
80
U.S. leadership
in world affairs
desirable
Presidential approval
70
64
78
75
Percent
60
50
45
40
30
36
38
39
37
36
36
18
19
20
2006
2007
2008
55
55
54
2009
2010
2011
30
20
21
24
10
0
2002
2003
2004
2005
* Uses EU7 from 2002-2003, EU9 from 2004-2006, EU11 from 2007-2010, and EU12 for 2011.
10 | T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1
Q1a, 3
Section Two: Global Views
A
mid the Arab Spring, the earthquake and nuclear
other and of other countries in the world. Turks, however,
disaster in Japan, the international intervention in
held distinctly different views on the world. They were less
Libya, and the killing of Osama bin Laden, global issues
positive about the United States, EU, and China and more
dominated the transatlantic agenda over the past year. This
approving of Pakistan than others in the survey.
year’s Transatlantic Trends captured public opinion about a
More than four-in-five (83%) Americans had a favorable
broad set of countries that are relevant in world affairs and
opinion of their own country (see chart 7).4 A high percent-
are intertwined with various facets of transatlantic relations.
age of the Americans (75%) also held a favorable opinion of
Japan. Nearly two-thirds of Americans (65%) had favorable
EU AND U.S. OPINIONS OF OTHER COUNTRIES
SIMILAR, TURKISH VIEWS DIFFER GREATLY
4 Unless otherwise noted, favorability rates are based on combining
the percentage of respondents who have a “very favorable” opinion
and the percentage of those who have a “somewhat favorable”
opinion.
Americans and those in the EU polled by Transatlantic
Trends in 2011 tended to have similar opinions of each
Chart 7:
Favorable Opinions of the Rest of the World
U.S.
Japan
65
EU
39
India
Brazil
56
56
37
48
Russia
37
42
Turkey
42
34
18
0
10
20
U.S.
50
EU12
45
Turkey
47
26
Pakistan
71
59
53
45
75
68
54
China
83
72
30
52
30
40
50
Percent
60
70
80
90
Q7.1-7.9
T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1 | 11
opinion of the European Union. China and Turkey were
the United States increased by eight percentage points and
looked at favorably by 42% of the Americans. Pakistan,
those who held a very unfavorable opinion dropped by 11
where al Qaida leader Osama bin Laden was hiding in
points.
almost plain sight before he was killed, was only seen favorably by 18% of Americans.
The EU was seen in the most favorable light in the two
Pakistan was also the least popular country within the EU.
(87%). On the other hand, Turks were the least supportive
Just one-in-four in the EU (26%) held a favorable opinion
of the EU, with a majority (53%) holding unfavorable views.
of the country. Support was especially low in Sweden (12%),
Still, the percentage of Turks who held favorable views of
Germany (14%), and Slovakia (16%).
the EU increased by five points over last year’s results.
Those polled in the EU had equally favorable opinions of
Overall, favorable opinion of Turkey increased in the
the United States (72%) and the EU (71%). The United
European Union and some countries showed markedly
States was seen especially favorably in Italy, Romania, and
positive changes. This year, favorable opinions of Turkey
Portugal (81% each) and the U.K. (78%). Relatively fewer
increased by 12 percentage points in France (53%), 10
people held a favorable opinion of the United States in the
points in the Netherlands (60%), 11 points in Portugal
Netherlands (62% — a marked decline from last year’s 81%)
(52%), 10 points in Poland (49%), and 8 points in Germany
and Slovakia (63%). The Turks were the least supportive of
(42%) and Italy (33%). During the same period, Americans
the United States, with only 30% holding a favorable view
(42%) were eight percentage points less likely to have favor-
and 62% holding an unfavorable view. However, when
able opinion of Turkey than they were last year.
newest EU member states of Bulgaria (90%) and Romania
compared with last year, the percentage of Turks favoring
Chart 8:
Favorable Opinion of China
70
69
67
60
59
53
53
52
49
47
43
40
42
40
35
34
Tu
rk
ey
36
Sw
ed
en
Ge
rm
an
y
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Percent
50
35
30
20
12 | T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1
Ita
ly
S.
U.
an
d
Po
l
EU
12
n
Sp
ai
K.
U.
ga
l
tu
e
Po
r
Fr
an
c
nd
s
la
Ne
th
er
Bu
lg
ar
Ro
m
an
i
a
0
ia
10
Q7.3
Percent
TRANSATLANTIC DIVIDE ON WHERE TO LOOK FOR NATIONAL INTEREST
When asked whether the countries of the European Union or the
countries of Asia were more important to their countries’ national
interests, a slight majority of Americans (51%) and a plurality of
Turks (44%) indicated that the Asian countries such as China,
60
Japan, or South Korea were more important. On the other hand,
52% of those living in the EU countries polled thought that the
50
United States was more important to their national interests than
40
the countries of Asia (see chart 9).
This year’s results mark a notable reversal in U.S. attitudes from
2004, when a majority of U.S. respondents (54%) viewed the countries of Europe as more important to their vital interests than the
countries of Asia (29%).1
Chart 9:
More Important Region
to National Interests
EU12 Attitudes
U.S. Attitudes
52
51
38
37
30
20
10
However, there were important differences among the EU countries when it came to this question (see chart 10). Majorities in
Sweden (55%) and Spain (53%) and half the French (50%) felt
that Asia was more important to their national interests than the
United States. The British and Poles (60% each) as well as the
Germans (59%) and Romanians (58%) were the most likely to
identify the United States as more important.
0
Asia is
EU is
More
More
Important Important
Asia is
U.S. is
More
More
Important Important
Q20a,b
Chart 10:
More Important Region for National Interests
70
60
The United States is
more important
60
60
59
The countries of Asia
are more important
58
52
Percent
50
50
48
44
44
44
41
39
37
41
36
32
30
50
48
42
40
30
55
53
52
33
31
24
24
20
19
1 Tu
rk
ey
n
en
Sw
ed
ai
Sp
ia
e
Sl
ov
ak
nc
Fr
a
la
n
ds
ia
er
ar
Ne
th
lg
ga
l
Bu
tu
ly
Po
r
Ita
12
EU
an
ia
.
an
y
Ro
m
rm
U.
K
Ge
Po
la
n
0
d
10
Q20a
In 2004, the question was worded to ask about “vital” interests rather than “national” interests asked about in 2011.
T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1 | 13
Americans and Europeans were somewhat divided over
Marking a reverse from last year, the plurality of EU
China. A slight plurality in the EU (47%) held favorable
respondents thought of China as more of an economic
views of China and 44% held unfavorable views. In the
opportunity (46%) than an economic threat (41%) (see
United States, 42% held favorable views of China while half
chart 11). Last year, only 39% viewed China as an economic
the Americans (50%) held unfavorable views. Romanians
opportunity. This year, majorities in the Netherlands (67%),
(69%) and Bulgarians (67%) held the most positive views of
Sweden (65%), the U.K. (58%), and Germany (57%) as well
China while majorities in Germany (58%), Sweden (57%),
as around half of the population in Bulgaria (49%) and
Slovakia, and Turkey (54% each) held the most unfavorable
Romania (51%) considered China an economic oppor-
views (see chart 8).
tunity. At the same time, majorities in the United States
(63%), France (56%), and Portugal (54%) viewed China as
more of an economic threat than an opportunity.
AMERICANS MORE LIKELY THAN EUROPEANS TO SEE
CHINA AS ECONOMIC AND MILITARY THREAT
Europeans were also less likely to see China as a military
China has paid a lot of attention to Europe over the past
threat than Americans (see chart 12). While only 30% of
years. In late June, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao completed
those polled in the EU and 21% of the Turks viewed China
official visits to Hungary, Britain, and Germany to enhance
as a security concern, almost half the Americans (47%) saw
China’s economic relations with those three countries.
China in that light, although nearly an equal number (49%)
Chinese delegations also made visits to crisis-stricken
did not consider China a military threat.
Greece, Portugal, and Spain as China looked for stronger
economic ties with eurozone countries.
Chart 11:
Does China Represent Economic Threat or Opportunity?
80
China is more of an
economic threat
70
60
48
47
46
40
38
46
37
32
51
49
47
41
31
58
57
54
50
30
67
65
63
56
Percent
China is more of an
economic opportunity
39
37
36
34
31
26
20
27
24
23
23
22
en
Ro
m
an
ia
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s
ria
Sw
ed
ga
U.
K.
Bu
l
Tu
rk
ey
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Ge
rm
an
y
12
EU
ly
Ita
n
ai
Sp
d
an
al
Po
l
tu
g
ce
Po
r
Fr
an
U.
S
0
.
10
Q22
14 | T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1
80
U.S.
70
BY YOUNGER AMERICANS
A generation gap has emerged among Americans with
regard to China. Young people in the United States viewed
EU12
60
China more positively than older Americans. Close to
three-in-five (59%) Americans between the ages of 18-24
62
50
Percent
CHINA IS SEEN MORE POSITIVELY
Chart 12:
China is a Military Threat or Not
was only shared by 33% of the 45 to 54 age group, 37% of
49
47
40
had a favorable opinion of China, but that favorable opinion
those between 55 and 64, and 36% of those aged 65 or older.
30
30
When asked about the United States’ national interests,
76% of the younger Americans (aged 18-24) identified the
20
countries of Asia, such as China, Japan, and South Korea,
to be more important than the countries of the European
10
Union (17%). In each progressively older age group, the
0
China is a
Military Threat
China is Not
a Military Threat
percentage of those who thought of the EU as more important increased, while those who thought Asia was the most
Q23
important decreased. Half of Americans aged 55 and older
considered countries of the EU more important than those
of Asia. While there were some age-related differences
Chart 13:
Asia as Most Important Region for National Interest, by Age
80
76
U.S.
70
EU12
70
62
60
Percent
50
40
41
46
44
40
36
36
37
30
33
29
20
10
0
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
Age
55-64
65+
Q20a. 20b
T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1 | 15
among EU respondents on this question, the pattern was
with more than seven-in-ten (72%) judging China as an
much less dramatic (see chart 13).
economic threat. Even after controlling for a variety of other
Perceptions about the Chinese economy also varied greatly
based on age as younger Americans (18-34) were more
likely to see China as an economic opportunity (52%) but
only 22% of those 65 and older saw China in that positive
light. The 55 to 64 age group was the most fearful of China,
16 | T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1
demographics, age remained an important predictor of
sentiments toward China, with younger Americans holding
more positive opinions of China and seeing China as more
important than the EU for U.S. national interests.
Section Three: The Economy
O
ver the past 18 months, the European economy
austerity measures while larger economies, especially Spain
faced unprecedented challenges in its effort to limit
and Italy, remained vulnerable to default due to high public
contagion from the sovereign-debt crisis. Beginning with
debt and weak economic growth prospects. Meanwhile,
Greece’s troubles in early 2010, fears quickly spread that
the U.S. economy continued to show signs of a very weak
the debt crisis would bring down other EU countries with
recovery since the 2008 recession, unemployment remained
high public debt-to-GDP ratios. These concerns were
uncomfortably high, and many economists worried about a
exacerbated when, in November 2010 and April 2011,
double-dip recession.
Ireland and Portugal, respectively, applied for rescue funds
from the EU. In February 2011, eurozone finance ministers
established the European Stabilization Mechanism, a €500
billion bail-out fund. Countries across Europe enacted
Chart 14:
Personally Affected by Recent Economic Crisis
90
89
89
86
84
80
78
2010
82
80
76
75
71 71
70
68
67 67
70
64
60 61
60
55
54
50
53
56
52
49
45
40
40
40
31
30
20
10
Fr
an
ce
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s
Po
la
nd
Sw
ed
en
an
y
EU
Ge
rm
K.
U.
Ita
ly
a
ov
ak
i
n
Sl
ai
Sp
S.
U.
l
Tu
rk
ey
ga
tu
ia
Po
r
ar
lg
Bu
an
ia
0
Ro
m
Percent
2011
78
Q33
T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1 | 17
MOST PEOPLE STILL PERSONALLY
(down 9 percentage points to 45%) showed large decreases
AFFECTED BY CRISIS
in respondents feeling personally affected by the crisis. The
While some economies had started to recover for the third
Swedes (31%) were by far the least likely to be personally
year in a row, the number of respondents who claimed that
affected by the economic crisis.
their family’s financial situation had been greatly or somewhat affected by the economic downturn remained high in
EU OPINION VARIES GREATLY
the EU and the United States5 (see chart 14).
ON GOVERNMENT SPENDING
Many countries in the EU have reacted to the economic
In the United States, 82% of respondents (up 7 percent-
crisis by implementing austerity measures. Citizens, on
age points from 2010) had been personally affected by the
average, appeared to support such efforts. Asked whether
economic crisis, while the average in the EU remained
they would prefer to decrease, maintain current levels, or
stable (61%). However, the EU average masks the fact that
increase government spending, half of those in the EU
respondents in Bulgaria (up 5 points to 89%), Slovakia
(50%) preferred to decrease spending, although there were
(up 10 points to 78%), the U.K. (up 6 points to 70%), the
notable differences across countries (see chart 15). At the
Netherlands (up 9 points to 49%), and Poland (up 12 points
same time, Americans (61%) were also much more likely to
to 52%) showed increases over the past year. Notably,
want to decrease spending than either of the other options.
Turkey (down 21 percentage points to 55%) and Germany
The Swedes (55%) and the Dutch (42%) were the most
likely to want to maintain spending at current levels. The
Those affected are based on adding the percentage of respondents
who were “greatly affected” and the percentage of those who were
“somewhat affected.”
British were the most divided, with approximately one-in-
5
Chart 15:
What to Do About Government Spending
100
6
13
12
90
80
80
11
17
10
26
19
28
19
9
11
22
33
29
17
64
60
39
54
54
50
49
38
Decrease
spending
20
Keep current
levels of
spending
34
35
32
32
55
46
40
30
42
61
50
13
14
33
19
62
29
15
35
70
Percent
22
16
36
33
Increase
spending
25
18 | T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1
en
Sw
ed
Tu
rk
ey
K.
U.
s
la
nd
er
an
d
Po
l
Ne
th
ia
Bu
lg
ar
ia
ov
ak
Sl
Ita
ly
12
EU
rm
an
y
a
Ge
an
i
S.
U.
Ro
m
Fr
an
ce
ai
n
Sp
Po
r
tu
0
ga
l
10
Q11
three choosing to the decrease spending (32%), maintain
current levels (34%), and increase spending (29%).
EU MEMBERSHIP VIEWED AS GOOD FOR ECONOMY,
80
THE EURO AS BAD
Despite another rough year for most economies inside the
Chart 16:
Positive Effect on the Economy:
EU Membership vs.
Using the Euro (EU12)
Good
70
EU, the majority of EU respondents (67%) still considered
67
60
that membership in the European Union had been a good
thing for their country’s economy (see chart 16).
Bad
53
Percent
50
With the strongest economy in the EU, Germans (76%)
were the most likely of all to say that membership in the
40
40
30
EU had a positive effect on their economic well-being. This
is particularly noteworthy because of Germany’s role in
24
20
helping to bailout other EU economies with debt problems.
10
Germans’ belief that the EU had been good for their economy was followed closely by the Poles (74%) and the Dutch
0
(73%). The Bulgarians (46%) and the British (46%) were the
EU Membership's
Effect on
National Economy
least likely to say that EU membership had benefited them
The Euro's
Effect on
National Economy
Q29, 30
Chart 17:
The Euro's Effect on the National Economy
80
Good
77
Bad
70
67
60
58
55
54
49
46
48
49
47 47
52
46
40
31
30
53
46
41
40
39
39
33
30
30
26
20
18
(€) Eurozone countries
K.
U.
en
Sw
ed
lg
a
ria
d
Bu
an
Po
l
l(
€)
)
tu
ga
(€
Po
r
ce
12
Fr
an
EU
ai
n
(€
)
ia
Sp
an
(€
)
Ro
m
s
nd
er
la
an
y(
€)
Ne
th
(€
rm
ly
Ge
)
(€
ia
Ita
0
)
10
Sl
ov
ak
Percent
50
54
Q29, 30
T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1 | 19
economically. In Turkey, a plurality (48%) said that EU
thing, respondents outside the eurozone were the least likely
membership would be a good thing for their economy.
to think so: U.K. (18%), Sweden (26%), Bulgaria (30%), and
Poland (33%).
Despite these relatively high ratings of the economic benefits of EU membership, the euro did not enjoy the same
EU CONTROL OVER NATIONAL BUDGETS UNPOPULAR
support. Only 40% of EU respondents thought that using
When it came to the EU having more authority over
the euro had been (as asked inside the eurozone) or would
member states’ economic and budgetary policies — a likely
be (as asked outside the eurozone) a good thing for their
prerequisite for future bailouts from Brussels — a major-
country’s economy and a majority (53%) thought it had
ity in every country surveyed, except Germany and Italy,
been a bad thing (see chart 17).
preferred that each member state retain authority for itself
(see chart 18). People in the U.K. (84%) and Sweden (75%)
Slovakia (55%) was the only country using the euro where
were by far the most likely to say that member states should
a majority of respondents said it had been a good thing
maintain authority over their own economic and budget
for the country’s economy, and respondents were evenly
policies. In Italy, respondents were almost evenly divided,
divided about the benefits of using the euro in Italy (49%),
with 47% agreeing that each member state should keep
Germany (48%), and the Netherlands (47%). More than half
more control. Germany was the only country in which a
of the French (54%) and Portuguese (58%) said the euro
clear majority of respondents preferred that the EU have
had been a bad thing for their economies (see chart 17).
more control over member states’ budgets and policies.
With the exception of Romania, where a plurality of respondents (46%) thought that using the euro would be a good
Chart 18:
Sentiments about More EU Economic Oversight of National Finances
100
EU should have more authority
over member states' economic
and budgetary policies
90
80
Each member state should
retain this authority for itself
60
54
44
40
56
53
46 47
75
55
58
56
55
58
58
47
43
42
42
41
40
39
35
35
30
32
20
20
(€) Eurozone countries
20 | T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1
en
Sw
ed
)
an
d
Po
l
(€
ov
ak
ia
ar
ia
Sl
Bu
lg
EU
12
)
(€
e
Fr
a
nc
an
ia
)
(€
Ro
m
nd
s
Ne
th
er
la
ga
l(
€)
)
tu
(€
Po
r
ai
n
Sp
ly
(€
)
Ita
€)
Ge
rm
an
y(
0
K.
12
10
U.
Percent
70
50
84
Q31
Chart 19:
Support for Contributing to a Special Assistance Fund
for Countries with Budgetary Difficulties
80
76
70
70
67
66
65
63
60
63
60
60
53
Percent
50
50
43
40
38
30
20
)
ov
ak
ia
(€
K.
U.
Sl
an
y(
€)
ia
Ge
rm
lg
ar
d
Bu
an
Po
l
12
EU
en
Sw
ed
€)
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s(
an
)
(€
n
ai
Ro
m
€)
(€) Eurozone countries
Sp
l(
ga
tu
e
(€
Po
r
nc
Fr
a
Ita
ly
(€
)
)
0
ia
10
Q32
CONTRIBUTING TO STABILITY FUND SEEN POSITIVELY
dents approved of this in all countries except for the U.K.
When asked whether they approve of their country making
(43%) and Slovakia (38%). In Germany, likely to be the larg-
contributions to a fund to assist member states that find
est contributor to any such fund, respondents were more
themselves in budgetary difficulty, 60% of EU respondents
divided, with 50% approving of such a contribution and
thought it acceptable that their countries contribute to this
47% disapproving (see chart 19).
fund while only 36% disapproved. The majority of respon-
T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1 | 21
Section Four: Transatlantic Security
A
side from the killing of Osama Bin Laden on May 2,
While a transatlantic opinion gap still exists on certain
events dominating the transatlantic security agenda
security topics, the survey also revealed notable shifts in
in 2011 had been fairly gloomy. Amid growing charges of
public opinion on some key security policies. These shifts
corruption and decreasing confidence in Afghan President
resulted in a convergence of EU-U.S. opinion on the best
Hamid Karzai, the lack of progress in Afghanistan and the
way forward on several issues — in particular concerning
rising cost of the war dominated the headlines in the United
Afghanistan. However, despite some shifting attitudes, sup-
States. Meanwhile, the last speech U.S. Defense Secretary
port for other security activities and institutions remained
Robert Gates gave in Brussels bluntly criticized NATO and
relatively stable over the past year.
its members for shortages in military spending and political
will, warning of “a dim if not dismal future” for an alliance
at risk of becoming irrelevant.
WANING U.S. OPTIMISM IN AFGHANISTAN
For the first time, a majority of Americans (56%) were
pessimistic about the prospects of stabilizing the situation
Chart 20:
Optimistic about Stabilizing Afghanistan
60
2009
2010
50
2011
56
51
Percent
40
30
41
32
28
20
23
10
0
EU
U.S.
Q13.1
22 | T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1
in Afghanistan. Only 41% were optimistic — marking an
reduce the number of troops in Afghanistan grew nine per-
important reversal from 2009 when 56% were optimistic
centage points to 31% and those who wanted to withdraw
and only 39% were pessimistic (see chart 20).
all troops grew 16 points to 35%.
A majority of the EU public has been unenthusiastic about
European attitudes about troop presence in Afghanistan
the situation in Afghanistan since the survey first asked
did not change much over the past year. The plurality of
this question in 2009. This year, the EU public was slightly
respondents (44%) thought that their government should
more optimistic (28%) than in 2010 (23%), but was still less
withdraw all troops, 22% thought troop levels should be
optimistic than in 2009 (32%).
reduced, 29% thought troop levels should remain the same,
and very few (3%) thought their government should commit more troops.
CONVERGING U.S. AND EU VIEWS ON TROOPS
IN AFGHANISTAN
Individual countries in Europe mostly reflected these EU
As optimism and willingness to commit more troops
averages, with a solid majority in each country preferring to
to Afghanistan continued to wane in the United States
and Europe, the transatlantic divide on how to deal with
Afghanistan appears to be shrinking. For the first time, the
majority of U.S. and EU respondents (66% each) agree that
troop levels should be reduced or troops should be withdrawn altogether (see chart 21).
levels in Afghanistan shrank from 25% in 2010 to only
6% this year and those who wanted to keep troop levels
the same decreased from 33% in 2010 to 25% this year.
Meanwhile, the number of Americans who wanted to
EU
60
a plurality, preferred to withdraw all troops. The fact that
would prefer to withdraw all troops means that this opinion
is shared by a plurality or majority in six of the seven countries contributing the most troops to Afghanistan.
On the other end of the spectrum was Sweden, where
VIEWS ON NATO REMARKABLY STABLE
Despite growing pessimism about NATO troop presence
in Afghanistan and Secretary Gates’ gloomy picture of the
future of NATO in his speech in Brussels, the institution
66
was still seen as essential by solid majorities in all countries
surveyed except for Turkey. The fact that the survey also
50
Percent
the only two countries where a majority, rather than just
increase them.
U.S.
66
64
the seventh largest number of troops in Afghanistan, were
48% preferred to maintain troop levels and 6% wanted to
Chart 21:
Reduce or Withdraw Troops
from Afghanistan
70
largest contingent in Afghanistan, and Poland (56%), with
pluralities in France (44%), the U.K. (43%), and Italy (39%)
The number of Americans who backed increasing troop
80
reduce or withdraw troops. Germany (51%), with the third
came on the heels of a highly publicized and controversial
40
intervention in Libya only makes it more noteworthy that
41
the transatlantic institution is still seen as essential by 62%
30
of EU and 62% U.S. respondents (see chart 22).
20
Among the EU NATO members, those who said NATO was
essential for their country’s security ranged from a high of
10
0
73% in the Netherlands to a low of 51% in Poland. As in
2010
past years, Turkey was the NATO member with the lowest
2011
Q14a
T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1 | 23
Chart 22:
NATO is Essential for Country’s Security
80
70
69
62
60
Percent
50
62
60
57
56
53
52
61
60
60
59
55
62
60
61
59
62
62
55
44
40
35
30
38
37
35
30
20
EU
U.S.
Turkey
10
0
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Q10a
support for NATO, with only 37% saying that NATO is
of respondents wanted to reduce government spending.
essential.
However, when asked about defense spending in particular,
in 10 of the 14 countries, a plurality wanted to maintain
SWEDES DIVIDED ON WHETHER NATO
IS IMPORTANT FOR SECURITY
Sweden has long been known for the country’s policy of
military nonalignment. As the only non-NATO member
in the survey, people in Sweden were asked if cooperating
closely with NATO is important for their country’s security.
Despite the nation’s history of being a “virtual” ally, there
was no broad consensus on the issue. The Swedes were
evenly split, with 47% saying it was important and 48% saying it was not important to cooperate closely with NATO.
current levels of military outlays (see chart 23).
On average, 50% of those in the EU countries surveyed
wanted to decrease government spending, 29% wanted to
keep current levels, and 16% wanted to increase spending.
But when asked about defense spending, 34% wanted to
decrease spending, 46% wanted to keep current levels, and
17% wanted to increase (see chart 24).
A fairly similar pattern was true in the United States. Sixtyone percent of Americans wanted to decrease government
spending, 19% wanted to maintain current levels, and 17%
PUBLIC LESS LIKELY TO CUT DEFENSE SPENDING
wanted to increase spending. But when it came to defense
THAN SPENDING IN GENERAL
spending, only 34% wanted to decrease, 45% wanted
When asked whether their government should increase
spending, maintain current levels, or reduce spending, most
respondents chose either to maintain or reduce spending in
general. In fact, in 9 of the 14 countries surveyed, a plurality
24 | T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1
to maintain levels, and 19% wanted to increase defense
spending.
Chart 23:
Decrease Government Spending vs. Decrease Defense Spending
90
Decrease government spending
80
Decrease defense spending
80
70
64
62
60
61
Percent
54
50
54
50
50
49
49
45
40
30
43
38
36
34
33
46
32
38
36
34
33
32
32
25 24
24
24
20
19
18
en
K.
Sw
ed
U.
s
Tu
rk
ey
la
nd
d
er
ia
an
Ne
th
Po
l
ar
Bu
lg
ia
ly
ov
ak
Sl
Ita
12
EU
ia
an
an
y
Ro
m
Increase
Decrease
defense
defense spending
spending
Keep defense
spending at the current level
40
Percent
Q11, 12a
Chart 24:
What to Do About Defense Spending
60
50
rm
Ge
U.
S.
e
nc
Fr
a
ai
l
ga
tu
Po
r
Sp
0
n
10
46
45
38
34
30
20
34
24
23
19
17
10
0
Turkey
U.S.
EU12
Q12a
T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1 | 25
IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM SLIGHTLY
EU AND United States PREFER ECONOMIC
LESS URGENT CONCERN
TACTICS TO PRESSURE IRAN
The public’s concern about Iran has remained relatively
Despite the same level of concern in the United States and
stable in the EU over the past year (see chart 25). In the
the EU, there were differing opinions about how best to
United States, those concerned about Iran acquiring nuclear
prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons (see chart
weapons dropped to 76%, down ten percentage points from
26). A plurality of those in the EU (32%) preferred offering
last year, and Americans who were very concerned about
economic incentives, while a plurality of Americans (33%)
Iran fell even more, from 69% in 2010 to 56% in 2011.
preferred imposing economic sanctions, although the
majority of EU and U.S. respondents chose one of these two
On average, European concern about Iran largely remained
options and were often fairly divided over which one was
the same, dropping from 79% in 2010 to 75% in 2011. The
preferable. The percentage of Americans who preferred sup-
EU countries that showed the most notable decreases in
porting the Iranian opposition dropped from 25% in 2010
concern were Bulgaria, (down 13 points to 64%), Slovakia
to 13% in 2011 — matching EU levels of support (15%) for
(down 12 points to 54%), and Romania (down 11 points to
the same option.
64%).
There was also little support in the EU countries polled
As in past years, Turkey was the least worried about Iran
(6%) or the United States (8%) for simply accepting that
acquiring a nuclear weapon. Only 38% of Turks were
Iran could acquire nuclear weapons while other options
troubled by their neighbor becoming a nuclear power, while
were on the table. A quarter of Turks, a plurality, said that
51% were only a little concerned or not concerned at all.
accepting a nuclear Iran (25%) was the best option. Very
Chart 25:
Concerned About Iran Acquiring Nuclear Weapons
100
90
2010
88
86
86 87
86
80
83
76
81
75
79
79
75
78
77
76 76
72
70
75
Percent
64
73
71
67
64
2011
67
65
66
60
54
50
40
40
38
30
20
26 | T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1
Tu
rk
ey
ia
ov
ak
Sl
nd
s
Ne
th
er
la
en
d
Sw
ed
an
Po
l
an
ia
e
nc
Ro
m
Fr
a
ria
.
lg
a
Bu
U.
K
EU
n
ai
Sp
an
y
.
U.
S
Ge
rm
l
tu
ga
Po
r
Ita
0
ly
10
Q15
Chart 26:
Support for Measures Against Iran’s Nuclear Program
45
40
Offer economic incentives
Provide support to opponents
of current government
Impose economic sanctions
Take military action
Accept Iran could acquire
nuclear weapons
35
Percent
30
25
33
32
28
25
20
15
20
15
13
10
6
5
20
13
12
8
6
9
4
0
EU12
U.S.
Turkey
Q16
few people in the EU (6%), the United States (13%), and
that this difference in values is deeply held and unlikely to
Turkey (4%) preferred military action over other options.
change despite day-to-day events and changing security
However, while very few American and EU respondents
favored military action as their choice among many policy
options, changing the context of the situation led to much
different results. The respondents who chose a nonmilitary
option for dealing with Iran were then asked to imagine that
all nonmilitary options had been exhausted. They were then
given the choice between accepting a nuclear Iran and tak-
environments. In 2011, there was a 42 percentage point
difference between those in the EU (33%) who felt war
is sometimes necessary to obtain justice and those in the
United States (75%) who felt so (see chart 27). The U.K.,
with 64% agreeing that war is sometimes necessary, was the
only European country that looked more like the United
States than like the rest of the EU.
ing military action. In this scenario, a plurality of Europeans
However, despite these differences when it comes to justify-
(47%) and a majority of Americans (54%) favored the use of
ing war, there are a number of security policies on which
force. Turkey (50%), Germany (50%), the U.K. (46%), and
U.S. and European opinions seem to be converging. As seen
Poland (41%) were the only countries where a majority or
above, this is the first year where the same number of EU
plurality of respondents would accept a nuclear Iran over
(66%) and U.S. (66%) respondents want to reduce or with-
military action under these circumstances.
draw troops from Afghanistan. When presented with the
option of allowing Iran to acquire nuclear weapons or tak-
THE USE OF FORCE: TRANSATLANTIC DIVIDE IN
THEORY, CONVERGENCE IN POLICY
For a long time, the United States and Europe have not seen
eye to eye on the use of force. Repeated surveys have shown
ing military action, those in the EU (47%) and the United
States (54%) who preferred military action were only seven
percentage points apart. Even on approval for the international intervention in Libya, which will be discussed in the
T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1 | 27
Chart 27:
War is Sometimes Necessary to Obtain Justice
100
90
84
80
78
70
78
Turkey
EU
U.S.
82
74
77
74
75
71
Percent
60
50
40
47
49
42
48
36
41
30
35
35
33
34
29
20
32
27
23
27
10
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Q34.2
following chapter, U.S. and European publics held remark-
obtain justice in the abstract, when presented with actual
ably similar views in many cases. These findings seem to
security issues they might share a common perspective.
suggest that although Americans and Europeans report
vastly different opinions about whether war can be used to
28 | T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1
Section Five: Libya and the Transatlantic Role in the Middle East and North Africa
U
nforeseen by most of the world, a chain of events
Libya, these violent attacks on civilian populations resulted
starting in the winter of 2010 led to a series of pro-
in an UN Security Council resolution that endorsed the use
tests and uprisings that considerably altered the political
of force to protect civilians. An international coalition sub-
landscape across the Middle East and North Africa. By the
sequently intervened, and since the survey data was taken,
time this survey was in the field in May, the Arab Spring
the government of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi has been
had already resulted in drastic governmental changes. The
effectively overthrown.
autocratic leaders in Tunisia and Egypt were disposed in
As the United States and the EU respond to rapidly chang-
relatively peaceful coups. In Algeria, Jordan, and Morocco,
ing conditions in the region, the survey found differing
protests led to the promise of meaningful democratic
public views about the prospects for success of this inter-
reforms. Protests in Bahrain, Syria, Libya, and Yemen were
met with violent attempts to suppress the uprisings. In
Chart 28:
Approval for Libyan Intervention by International Forces
80
70
69
65
60
59
58
57
54
53
48
47
46
40
39
37
30
35
30
23
20
*Aside from their membership in NATO, these countries are not involved in military operations in Libya.
Tu
rk
ey
*
ia
d*
ov
ak
Sl
Po
la
n
an
y*
ia
an
Ge
rm
ria
Ro
m
lg
a
ly
Bu
Ita
12
EU
K.
U.
n
ai
Sp
al
*
e
tu
g
S.
nc
Po
r
Fr
a
U.
er
la
nd
en
Sw
ed
0
s
10
Ne
th
Percent
50
Q39
T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1 | 29
vention, the appropriate level of U.S. and EU involvement,
(69%) and the Netherlands (65%), countries that began to
and the best policy options for the transatlantic partners.
contribute militarily after NATO took control of the operation, were the most likely to approve of international forces
intervening in Libya. Turkey, despite participating militarily
EU APPROVAL DIVIDED ON LIBYA
in Libya, had the lowest level of approval for the interna-
On March 19, NATO began airstrikes in Libya with the
tional intervention, with only 23% approving and 64%
intention of preventing Gaddafi’s military from killing large
disapproving. Of all the nations surveyed, only Germany,
numbers of civilians in an attempt to suppress the rebel-
Poland, Slovakia, and Portugal did not directly contrib-
lion. The survey, conducted two months after the incursion,
ute militarily to the Libyan intervention apart from their
showed a solid majority (59%) of Americans approved
general membership in NATO. And, with the exception of
of the military action in Libya by international forces —
Portugal (57%), support in these nations was low: Germany
and this support was equally shared among Republicans,
Democrats, and Independents.
(37%), Poland (35%), and Slovakia (30%).
While EU respondents were, on average, evenly divided
LOW LEVELS OF OPTIMISM ABOUT LIBYA
about the intervention, with 48% approving and 47%
Despite relatively high U.S. approval of the international
disapproving, there were great differences in public opinion
intervention in Libya, U.S. respondents were divided, with
among countries (see chart 28). The United States (59%),
46% reporting they were optimistic about stabilizing the
France (58%), and the U.K. (53%), all of which spearheaded
situation in Libya and 48% saying they were pessimistic. EU
the military intervention from the beginning, showed
respondents (39%) were even less optimistic (see chart 29).
majority levels of public support for the effort. Sweden
In fact, Sweden (59%) was the only country surveyed where
Chart 29:
Optimistic about Stabilizing the Situation in Libya
60
59
50
47
46
46
44
Percent
40
40
39
39
39
36
35
34
30
30
30
24
20
30 | T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1
rm
an
y
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Ge
Tu
rk
ey
ai
n
Sp
ga
l
tu
d
Po
r
an
s
nd
la
Po
l
ia
er
ar
Ne
th
lg
12
Bu
EU
e
a
nc
Fr
a
an
i
K.
U.
Ro
m
.
U.
S
Ita
Sw
ed
en
0
ly
10
Q13.2
Chart 30:
Support for Libya Intervention Options
100
Intervening to protect civilians
Sending military advisors
to assist the rebels who
oppose Gaddafi
Removing Colonel Gaddafi
Sending arms and military
supplies to the rebels who oppose Gaddafi
90
80
Percent
70
77
60
Sending ground troops to
assist the rebels who
oppose Gaddafi
74
68
66
59
50
54
54
54
49
40
37
30
31
32
34
31
25
20
10
0
U.S.
EU12
Turkey
Q40.1-40.5
a clear majority of the public was optimistic about stabiliz-
However, when respondents were asked about sending their
ing Libya.
own country’s ground troops to assist the rebels, support
dropped to 31% in the United States and 32% in the EU.
EU AND United States AGREE ON BEST POLICY
OPTIONS IN LIBYA
While EU and U.S. respondents showed different levels of
support for the international military intervention in Libya,
respondents on both sides of the Atlantic held relatively
similar views about how best to support the Libyan revolution (see chart 30). Roughly three-in-four respondents in
the United States (77%) and the EU (74%) backed intervening to protect civilians. While there was some variance
among countries on this question, solid majorities in every
nation supported intervening to protect civilians. Majorities
in the United States (66%), EU (68%), and Turkey (54%)
also supported the removal of Colonel Gaddafi. Finally,
majorities of Americans (59%) and of those living in the EU
(54%) also supported sending military advisors to assist the
The only countries where a majority supported this option
were the Netherlands (57%) and France (56%). Slovakia
(14%), Bulgaria (15%), Romania (16%), Germany (18%),
and Poland (21%) were the least supportive of this option.
Both EU and U.S. respondents were much more likely to
approve the intervention in Libya by international forces
than they were to support sending their own countries’
troops to assist the rebels. While 59% of U.S. respondents
approved of the intervention by international forces, only
31% supported sending U.S. ground troops to Libya. At the
same time, 48% of EU respondents approved of the international intervention, but only 32% supported sending troops
from their own countries to assist the rebels who oppose
Gaddafi.
rebels who oppose Gaddafi.
T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1 | 31
TRANSATLANTIC DIVIDE ON DEMOCRACY PROMOTION
AMERICANS AND TURKS ARE LEAST LIKELY TO SEE
As the Arab Spring raises the prospect of greater democ-
PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND
racy in the Middle East and North Africa, the 2011 survey
NORTH AFRICA TO BE THEIR ROLE
attempted to gauge U.S. and European enthusiasm for sup-
After providing their opinions about democracy promo-
porting that transition. In 2005, when Transatlantic Trends
tion in general, respondents were later asked whether it
first asked a question about democracy promotion, in an
should be the role of the EU or the United States to promote
attempt to capture whether respondents’ views were being
democracy in situations like those in the Middle East
affected by the war in Iraq, three-in-four (74%) of those in
and North Africa. Notably, mentioning the events of the
the nine EU countries surveyed felt it should be the role of
Arab Spring did not elicit much of a change in opinion.
the EU to help establish democracy in other countries. At
Respondents in most countries were only a little more likely
the same time, a slight majority (52%) of U.S. respondents
or about equally likely to favor democracy promotion in
supported such a role for the United States. EU opinion
general over efforts to do so specifically in the Middle East
on this question has changed very little over the years. In
and North Africa (see chart 32).
2011, 69% of EU respondents reported that the EU should
promote democracy abroad. However, U.S. support for
democracy promotion began to drop in 2006 (45%), slid
even further in 2007 (37%), and remained low in 2011
(37%) (see chart 31).
A solid majority of EU respondents (64%) said it should be
the role of the European Union to support democracy in
cases such as the Middle East and North Africa. Fewer than
one-in-three (29%) said the EU should stay out completely.
In the United States, 43% supported democracy promo-
Chart 31:
It Should be the Role of the U.S./EU to Help
Establish Democracy in Other Countries
80
74
70
71
71
70
69
60
Percent
50
52
45
40
37
38
37
30
20
EU
10
U.S.
0
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Q19
32 | T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1
Chart 32:
U.S./EU Role to Help Establish Democracy:
Generally vs. in the Middle East and North Africa
100
Role of U.S./EU to establish
democracy (in general)
90
85
80
83
76
75 76
70
Percent
Role of U.S./EU to establish democracy
in Middle East and North Africa
75
70
75
73
70
68
70
68
64
62
60
70
69
62
58
58
53
50
43
40
50 49
45
43
38
37
30
20
S.
U.
K.
U.
ia
an
Ro
m
ov
ak
ia
ia
Sl
lg
ar
s
Bu
er
la
nd
12
an
Po
l
EU
Ne
th
d
e
nc
Fr
a
Ge
rm
an
y
ly
Ita
en
Sw
ed
ai
Sp
Po
r
tu
ga
l
0
n
10
Q19, Q36
tion in the region and half (50%) said that the United States
MECHANISMS FOR SUPPORTING DEMOCRACY ARE
should stay out completely.
POPULAR — EXCEPT MILITARY INTERVENTION
Respondents who said the EU/United States/Turkey should
A plurality (44%) of Turks said it should be Turkey’s role to
help support democracy in the Middle East and North
promote democracy in the Middle East and North Africa,
Africa were then asked what they would like to see done.
while 35% said Turkey should not engage in such activities.
As shown in chart 34, those who wanted to help establish
democracy were very supportive of providing assistance to
SOME COUNTRIES VIEWED AS NOT YET READY TO
political parties, support for civil society groups, election
BECOME DEMOCRACIES
monitoring, and economic aid for development. However,
Respondents who said the EU/United States/Turkey should
when asked about sending military forces to help remove
not help support democracy in the Middle East and North
Africa were then asked follow-up questions regarding why
nondemocratic governments, support dropped sharply in
both the EU and the United States.
they thought that their countries should not get involved.
As can be seen in chart 33, those who wanted to stay out
FEAR OF INSTABILITY DOES NOT CHANGE SUPPORT
completely were most likely to agree that certain countries
FOR DEMOCRACY
are not yet ready to become democracies.
When respondents were reminded of a potential trade-off
between democratization and instability, a solid majority
T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1 | 33
Chart 33:
Stay Out Completely Because...*
90
Some countries are not
yet ready to become
democracies
80
79
70
It is not possible to
export democracy
to other countries
72
65
60
Percent
Governments that would act
against our interests might
come to power
61
58
64
58
57
50
58
40
43
30
20
10
0
U.S.
EU 11
Turkey
Q37.1-37.3
*This question was only asked to those who said that the EU/U.S./Turkey should help support democracy.
Chart 34:
Support for Own Country Following Various Policies in Situations
Like the Middle East and North Africa*
Helping to monitor elections
in new deomocracies
100
80
Providing aid for economic
development
85
82
Percent
77
60
Providing assistance to nonpolitical
groups such as trade unions and
human rights associations
Providing assistance to political
parties and leaders
82
Sending military forces
to help remove
nondemocratic governments
79
72
70
69
64
54
60
52
48
40
39
38
20
0
U.S.
EU12
*This question was only asked to those who said that the EU/U.S./Turkey should help support democracy.
34 | T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1
Turkey
Q38.1-38.5
Chart 35:
Promote Democracy Even if it Leads to Periods of Instability
90
80
83
76
70
75
69
Percent
60
61
60
60
58
50
53
50
45
40
41
37
35
32
30
20
ia
ar
lg
ia
Bu
an
Ro
m
ia
d
ov
ak
Sl
an
Po
l
S.
U.
Tu
rk
ey
K.
U.
s
la
er
Ne
th
rm
Ge
nd
an
y
l
ga
tu
12
Po
r
EU
n
Sp
ai
ly
Ita
e
nc
Fr
a
Sw
ed
0
en
10
Q35
of EU respondents (61%) said they would still promote
On this question, the countries of Central and Eastern
democracy even if it leads to a period of instability (see
Europe, such as Bulgaria (32%), Romania (35%), Slovakia
chart 35). However, only 27% preferred to promote stability
(37%), and Poland (41%), were the most likely to promote
if that meant accepting nondemocratic governments. In
stability even if it meant accepting nondemocratic govern-
the United States, respondents were evenly split, with 45%
ments. On the other hand, the overwhelming majority of
saying they would promote democracy and 42% saying they
Swedes (83%), followed by the French (76%), the Italians
favored stability. The Turks looked much more like those in
(75%), and the Spanish (69%) favored promoting democ-
the EU, agreeing that promoting democracy (50%) is more
racy even if it leads to a period of instability.
important that promoting stability (23%) and putting up
with nondemocratic governments.
T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1 | 35
TRANSATLANTIC DIFFERENCES ON THE ISRAELI-ARAB CONFLICT
Although it is still unclear exactly how the sweeping changes in the Middle East and North Africa will affect the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, the survey revealed that there was a clear transatlantic divide when it came to addressing the issue.
As in past Transatlantic Trends surveys, when respondents were asked about attempts to solve the Israeli-Arab conflict,
EU and U.S. views differed.
A slight majority of Americans (53%) recommended putting more pressure on the Palestinians to resolve their decadesold conflict with the Israelis, while one-in-five (21%) suggested putting more pressure on the Israelis. Republicans (71%)
were more likely to prefer putting pressure on the Palestinians than Democrats (49%) and Independents (50%).
In the EU, a plurality of respondents (38%) favored putting more pressure on Israel, while only 15% favored putting
more pressure on the Palestinians. In Turkey, a majority (55%) preferred to put pressure on Israel, while only 7% favored
putting pressure on the Palestinians.
These numbers show a strong transatlantic difference on the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. But it is important to note that
15% of U.S. respondents, 28% of EU respondents, and 24% of Turkish respondents reported that pressure should be put
on neither or both the Israelis and the Palestinians — even though respondents were not presented with this option in
the question. Also important to note is that a relatively large portion of respondents did not know how to respond to the
question in the United States (12%), EU (19%), and Turkey (14%). So while a strong transatlantic divide does exist on
this issue, it appears that attitudes on both sides of the Atlantic are somewhat nuanced or have yet to be formed.
Chart 36:
Whom to Pressure to Resolve Arab-Israeli Conflict
60
50
53
Put pressure on
the Palestinians
Put pressure on both
or neither (spontaneous)
Put pressure
on Israel
Don’t know or
refusal to answer
55
Percent
40
38
30
28
20
10
24
21
19
15
12
15
14
7
0
U.S.
EU12
Turkey
Q18
36 | T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1
Section Six: Continuity and Change in Turkey
T
urkish public opinion has shown some of the most
This year, Turks responded a little more positively about
dramatic changes since Transatlantic Trends started
their relations with the EU and NATO. While Turkish
polling there in 2004. Last year’s survey reported that
attitudes on these issues have shown a consistent downward
Turkish public opinion had dramatically decreased when
trajectory over the past seven years, it appears that last
it came to approval of President Obama or the benefits of
year’s results may have been a low point, reflecting a series
joining the EU. The percentage of those who believed that
of international crises that strained Turkey’s relations with
NATO was essential for the country’s security also dipped
both the United States and the EU. These included an Israeli
last year, while the percentage of those who said Turkey
raid against a Turkish aid flotilla headed for Gaza, Turkey’s
should act in closest cooperation with the countries of the
controversial “no” vote on a UN Security Council decision
Middle East doubled. Taken all together, it looked as if
to impose sanctions on Iran, and a Turkey-Brazil deal to
Turks were turning away from the West and instead looking
help Iran with a nuclear fuel swap. This year, the lack of
toward their Middle East neighbors.
similar international crises seems to have mollified Turkish
attitudes toward the West. It is too soon to tell, however,
80
Chart 37:
Turkish Attitudes Toward Membership on the EU: Good vs. Likely
73
Membership a
good thing
70
Likely to join
63
60
54
Percent
50
48
40
40
42
48
38
33
30
20
26
26
2007
2008
28
26
10
0
2004
2005
2006
2009
2010
2011
Q24a, 24b
T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1 | 37
whether this marks the first year of an upward trend or
over last year’s result, but there was virtually no change in
merely a return to normal.
the EU, where 53% still thought Turkey’s EU membership
was likely. Romanians and Swedes (66% each) as well as the
TURKEY SEES EU MEMBERSHIP MORE POSITIVELY
The 2011 data revealed a more Europe-friendly Turkish
British (65%) and the Dutch (60%) were the most likely to
think that Turkey would join the EU.
public in some respects, but also one that had a strong
desire to work with Turkey’s Middle East neighbors. This
TURKEY’S EU MEMBERSHIP:
year, there was a ten-point increase in the percentage of
FEW BENEFITS SEEN IN THE EU
Turks who thought Turkish membership in the EU would
Public opinion in the EU was not totally against Turkey’s
be a good thing (48%). Throughout the years, Turkish
EU accession, but most people were divided or pessimistic
public opinion has trended downward on this topic, but this
about the benefits of Turkish membership. On average, a
was some of the highest support for Turkish membership in
plurality in the EU (48%) and the majority of the Americans
the EU since 2006 (see chart 37).
(54%) agreed that Turkey’s membership in the EU would
A plurality of those polled in the EU thought that Turkey’s
EU accession would be neither good nor bad (39%) — the
same as in 2010. Other respondents were almost equally
divided between those who thought it would be a bad thing
(29%) and a good thing (26%). Romanians were the most
likely to say that Turkey’s EU membership would be a good
thing (48%) while the French (45%) and the Germans
(40%) were the most likely to consider it a bad thing.
The percentage of Turks (33%) who thought it was likely
that Turkey would join the EU increased by seven points
60
50
Chart 38:
Turkey’s Membership in the EU:
Good vs. Likely
Likely to
join the EU
53
Membership
a good thing
48
Percent
However, this was not shared in all countries; majorities in
France (59%) and the Netherlands (51%) as well as a plurality in Slovakia (46%) disagreed.
TURKS SEE MORE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF
EU ACCESSION THAN EU CITIZENS
Half of those polled in the 12 EU countries disagreed that
Turkey’s EU membership would be good in economic terms
for the EU, while 39% agreed that it would be economically beneficial. The French (63%), Swedes (62%), Germans
(58%), Spanish (55%), and Dutch (54%) were the most
likely to see Turkey’s EU membership as negatively affecting
the EU economy. The majority of Turks (55%), on the other
hand, thought that EU membership would be good for the
Turkish economy.
ISLAM, POVERTY, OR SIZE NOT SEEN AS OBSTACLES
TO TURKEY’S EU INTEGRATION
The majority of those living in the EU countries surveyed
40
(56%) — including relatively strong majorities in Sweden
(66%), the U.K. (65%), Spain (64%), and Germany (62%)
33
30
— did not believe that Turkey’s predominantly Muslim
26
population was a reason to keep Turkey out of the EU (see
20
chart 39). A majority of Bulgarians (58%) and pluralities of
Poles (46%) and Slovaks (48%) believed that EU member-
10
0
help promote peace and stability in the Middle East.
ship for a predominantly Muslim population might be a
problem. A little more than one-third of the Turks (36%)
EU12
themselves thought that Turkey did not belong in the EU
Turkey
Q24a, 24b
38 | T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1
because it was a predominantly Muslim country. However,
Chart 39:
Attitudes About Turkey’s Membership in the EU
60
50
Turkey
55
51
EU12
48
Percent
40
39
36
30
35
32
32
27
20
22
10
0
Turkey’s
Turkey’s
As a predominantly
membership
membership
Muslim country,
would help
would be good in Turkey does not
promote peace economic terms belong in the EU
and stability
for the EU/Turkey
in the Middle East
Turkey is too
poor to be
integrated
into the EU
Turkey is too
populous to
be integrated
into the EU
Q25.1-.5
this number was higher in 2005, when 43% of the Turks
Less than three-in-ten (27%) of EU respondents thought
thought that, as a predominantly Muslim country, Turkey
that Turkey was too populous to be integrated into the EU,
did not belong in the EU.
while 61% did not think that was a problem. Around one-
Just about one-in-three of those polled in the EU (32%)
agreed that Turkey was too poor to be integrated into the
third (32%) of the Turks agreed that the country was too
populous for EU membership.
EU, while 58% said that Turkey’s poverty was no barrier to
Relatively few Americans (26%), Turks (22%), or those in
accession. Bulgarians (19%) and Romanians (13%) were
the 12 EU countries (19%) were concerned that if Turkey’s
the least likely to see poverty as an obstacle to EU member-
membership in the EU was delayed, the country would drift
ship for Turkey; these two countries also have very similar
away from the EU.
levels of GDP per capita as Turkey. Only about one-in-five
Turks themselves (22%) agreed that Turkey was too poor to
be integrated into the EU, perhaps reflecting the country’s
stellar economic growth in recent years. When Transatlantic
Trends last asked this question in 2005, 36% of the Turks
thought that their country was too poor to join the EU.
TURKEY, THE NOT-SO-LONE WOLF
Recent Turkish foreign policy that has promoted positive
relationships with the country’s neighbors appeared to be in
line with Turkish public opinion. One-in-five Turks (20%)
thought that on international matters Turkey should act in
closest cooperation with the countries of the Middle East,
echoing similar support in 2010.
T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1 | 39
However, the percentage of Turks who thought their
interests, 42% of the Turks felt that the country’s Middle
country should ally with the nations of the European
East neighbors were more important than the countries of
Union increased by six percentage points over last year to
the EU.
19%. While the plurality of the Turks (27%) said that their
country should act alone, this number is down from 34%
TURKEY–United States RELATIONS COOLING DOWN
last year. Relatively few Turks thought their nation should
While Turks seemed to have a more positive view of the
cooperate most closely with Russia (9%) or the United
EU and NATO this year and EU respondents also had
States (8%).
more positive attitudes toward Turkey, favorability toward
Turkey among Americans decreased by eight percentage
TURKEY’S MIDDLE EAST NEIGHBORS SEEN MORE
points, with 42% having a positive opinion of Turkey. There
VITAL TO ECONOMY AND SECURITY THAN THE EU
was a similar seven point drop in the percentage of those
While in this year’s survey, more Turks saw the benefits of
Americans who considered Turkey’s membership of the
joining the EU and there was an increase in the percentage
EU as a good thing (34%). The plurality of Turks (34%)
of those who thought the country should cooperate with
described current relations between the United States and
the countries of the EU the closest on international matters,
Turkey as bad, with 28% saying ties were mixed and 27%
the plurality of Turks (43%) considered their neighbors
saying they were good. Among Turks, 62% had an unfa-
in the Middle East as more important to the country’s
vorable opinion of the United Sates. But the intensity of
economic interests than countries of the European Union.
that anti-Americanism has subsided somewhat. This year,
Still, a considerable number, one-in-three (33%), named the
38% of Turks had a very unfavorable opinion of the United
EU as being more important. In terms of Turkey’s security
States, an 11 percentage point drop since 2010.
Chart 40:
With Whom Should Turkey Cooperate Closest
50
Percent Agreeing
40
30
43
2009
34
2011
2010
27
22
20
20 20
19
13
10
11
10
9
3
0
Turkey should
act alone
Countries
Countries
of the
of the
Middle East European Union
40 | T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 1 1
5
Russia
7
9
4
[All]
6
8
The United
States
Q27
Methodology
T
NS Opinion was commissioned to conduct the survey
maintain consistency with previous years’ reports. For new
using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews in all
questions starting in 2010, the results were also weighted so
countries except Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and
that the sample matches certain population characteristics,
Turkey, where lower telephone penetration necessitated the
including age, gender, and education.1
use of face-to-face interviews.
When processing is complete, data from the survey are
In all countries, a random sample of approximately 1,000
deposited with the Roper Center for Public Opinion
men and women, 18 years of age and older, was inter-
Research at the University of Connecticut, the Inter-
viewed. Interviews were conducted between May 25 and
University Consortium for Political and Social Research at
June 17, 2011.
the University of Michigan (ICPSR), and the GESIS-Leibniz
Institute for the Social Sciences, and are available to scholars
For results based on the national samples in each of the 14
and other interested parties.
countries surveyed, one can say with 95% confidence that
the maximum margin of error attributable to sampling
and other random effects is plus or minus three percentage
points. For results based on the total EU sample, the margin
of error is plus or minus one percentage point. In addition
to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can also introduce error or bias
into the findings of public opinion polls.
For trended questions, averages were weighted on the
basis of the size of the adult population in each country to
Year
Total
Coverage
France, Germany, Italy, The
Netherlands, Poland, The
United Kingdom
2003
U.S. + E7
France, Germany, Italy, The
Netherlands, Poland, The
United Kingdom, Portugal
U.S. + E10
France, Germany, Italy, The
Netherlands, Poland, The
United Kingdom, Portugal,
Turkey, Slovakia, Spain
U.S. + E12
France, Germany, Italy, The
Netherlands, Poland, The
United Kingdom, Portugal,
Turkey, Slovakia, Spain,
Bulgaria, Romania
U.S. + E13
France, Germany, Italy, The
Netherlands, Poland, The
United Kingdom, Portugal,
Turkey, Slovakia, Spain,
Bulgaria, Romania, Sweden
2011
to the survey. While the addition of new countries has
affected the Europe-wide average, the impact has usually
not been statistically significant. Therefore, for ease of
presentation, we have treated several different averages as
if they were part of one average. When the EU average is
reported for previous years, they are calculated using the
the EU7 average from 2002-2003, EU9 from 2004-2006,
EU11 from 2007-2010, and EU12 for 2011.
Table of European Averages Reported
U.S. + E6
2006–2010
Over time, additional European countries have been added
European Coverage
2002
2004–2005
Note on European averages
EU7
2002–2003
U.K., France, Germany, the
Netherlands, Italy, Poland, and
(2003) Portugal
EU9
2004-2006
EU7 countries plus Slovakia
and Spain
EU11
2007–2010
EU9 countries plus Bulgaria
and Romania
EU12
2011
EU11 countries plus Sweden
For more detailed methodology and topline data, please
visit www.transatlantictrends.org
1
Trend questions (those asked before 2010): Q1a, 1b, 3, 7.1, 7.2, 8, 9,
10a, 13.1, 14a, 17, 19, 22, 23, 24a, 24b, 27, 33, 34
New questions (those asked since 2010): Q2, 4, 5, 6, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, 7.6,
7.7, 7.8, 7.9, 10b, 11, 12a, 12b, 13.2, 14b, 15, 16, 18, 20a, 20b, 25, 26a,
26b, 28a, 28b, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41
www.transatlantictrends.org
A project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, with
additional support from Fundação Luso-Americana, Fundación BBVA, the Communitas Foundation, and
the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.