A Brief History of Taiwan - a Sparrow Transforming into a Phoenix
FU-SAN HUANG1
Introduction
Although Taiwan is a small island with only a short -recorded history, it
has miraculously evolved into one of the world’s most advanced nations.
In political terms, the island has spent periods under the oppressive rule
of five alien regimes over the last four hundred years, during which its
inhabitants suffered numerous hardships and tragedies. Nevertheless, the
island recently gave birth peacefully to the world’s first Chinese
democracy, which is an epochal achievement. In economic terms, Taiwan,
based on a primitive and self-sufficient economy, began to grow rapidly
following Dutch occupation of parts of the island in 1624, and has today
transformed into one of the most prosperous, industrialized, hi-tech
countries in East Asia. With these many twists and turns, Taiwan’s history
is like the story of Cinderella, or “a sparrow transforming into a phoenix”
as the Taiwanese say.
As for the causes behind this dramatic transformation, Taiwan’s unique
geographic location and the resulting turbulent historical experience
undoubtedly played a decisive role. The former set the stage for
developments, while the latter provided a specific script.
Taiwan’s most significant geographical feature is its location at the
1
Professor FU-SAN HUANG, Founder of the Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica; Currently
Adjunct Research Fellow of the Institute.
1
middle of a chain of islands in the western Pacific. To the north are the
Ryukyu Islands, Japan and Korea; across the Bashi Channel to the south
it connects with the Philippines, Borneo, Indonesia, and other Southeast
Asia’s territories. It therefore occupied a pivotal position on East Asian
sea routes. Oceans are both boundaries that isolate an island’s inhabitants
from the outside world, and highways that connect them. This makes
islands both isolated and open, and the extent of developments is largely
a matter of the inhabitants’ choice. Before 1624, Taiwan was essentially
isolated and under-developed. The Dutch introduced a mercantile policy,
and marine trade became the pillar of Taiwan’s economy. This led to
rapid developments, which gave rise to Taiwan’s tradition of trade and
commerce in future generations, with the result that today Taiwan is one
of the world’s most advanced nations.
A second geographic feature is Taiwan’s separation from the southeastern
coast of the Chinese mainland by the Taiwan Strait. With a width of
between 130 and 200 kilometers, the island is neither too close to nor too
far from China, and consequently her historical development has been
heavily influenced by China, the main focus in East Asia until the
nineteenth century. Further,
Taiwan is neither large nor small, with an area of 36,000 square
kilometers, and therefore suffered from the historical ambiguity of being
too small for independence but too large to be subsumed within China.
No wonder its historical position oscillated between the two. Even today,
the issues of national identity and unification/independence continue to
perplex Taiwan’s population.
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A third feature is that Taiwan’s unique topography and climate make it an
agricultural paradise. The island is a steep uplift formed by collision of
the Eurasian and Philippine Sea tectonic plates, with the island’s Central
Mountain Range forming its backbone, and thus possesses a variety of
topographic features such as towering mountains, deep valleys, hills, and
plains. With the Tropic of Cancer dividing the island into roughly equal
parts, the plains in the south of Taiwan are tropical and those in the north
sub-tropical. Mountain climates are similarly diverse, with both freezing
conditions at high altitudes and temperate zones below. These unusual
topographic and climatic conditions have had a profound influence on the
island’s economic development. In general, high temperatures and
abundant rainfall make the plains very suited to agriculture, producing a
wide variety and volume of grains, vegetables, and fruits. Following
arrival of the Dutch, agricultural produce, led by rice and sugar, became a
major and long-term pillar of the local economy. Mountain areas, on the
other hand, produced tea, camphor, fruit, and vegetables that grow in
temperate and frigid zones. Therefore, despite its small size, Taiwan has a
richness and diversity of agricultural produce rarely seen in the world.
One more feature is that Taiwan is surrounded by sea, with the Taiwan
Strait to the west and the Pacific Ocean to the east. As the cold Oyashio
Current and the warm Koroshio Current of the Pacific meet in nearby
waters, Taiwan possesses rich and productive fishing grounds, including
offshore and deep-sea, which provide islanders with another source of
income.
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To sum up, as a productive island that occupies a key position in East
Asia’s sea traffic, Taiwan has thrived in agriculture and commerce, and
has created a trade-oriented society. No wonder the Chinese called it a
“treasure island.” Following dramatic increases in population after World
War II, however, the island’s economic focus gradually shifted to industry.
Today, Taiwan has become an industrialized high-tech country.
Political development of Taiwan has been bumpy, however. Prior to the
17th century, Taiwan’s aboriginal people did not make full use of the
island’s advantages, nor did they found a nation-state with which to
defend themselves. As a result, alien powers coveted and eventually
plundered Taiwan as a piece of jade in the rough. These external threats
followed one after another as political power passed from hand to hand.
Alien regimes included those of the Netherlands and Spain (1624-1662),
Jheng Kingdom (1661-1683), Ching Dynasty (1683-1895), Japan
(1895-1945), and the Republic of China (1945-).
Alien rule seemed to have become the islanders’ tragic destiny. With such
frequent changes of political regime, Taiwan’s political, economic, and
cultural histories also became discontinuous, and the attainment of
accumulated higher-level development was difficult as each regime
imposed its culture and systems on the island. One result of this was
confusion regarding national identity and stagnation of local culture.
From another angle, however, it can be argued that it was this historical
background that enabled Taiwan to absorb diverse and advanced cultures,
and thus allowed it to progress rapidly. When each alien regime withdrew
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from the island, its culture remained and became a source of Taiwan’s
heritage, enriching the local culture. Taiwan today is a combination of
aboriginal, Chinese, Japanese, and Western cultures, and can be regarded
as a small but exquisite piece of art.
It was in such a turbulent, tragic, and yet dynamic environment that
Taiwan’s history advanced, as introduced in the following sections.
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CHAPTER 1
The Period of Early Inhabitants - The Orphan of East Asia and a
Self-sufficient Society
Despite its geographical advantages, Taiwan has long been an orphan of
East Asia, isolated from other civilizations and having little contact with
the outside world. However, Taiwan has traces of human habitation
dating back to the Paleolithic Age and was far from uninhabited, though it
was long seen as primitive and deserted. Archeological sites of Neolithic
cultures are even more widely found.
From the Paleolithic, to the Neolithic and Chalcolithic Ages
Archeologists in Taiwan have discovered more than 1,600 archeological
sites around the island, including those from the Paleolithic, Neolithic,
and Chalcolithic ages. The oldest site to date is the Changbin Culture 長
濱文化, a legacy from the Late Paleolithic Age situated in Basian Cave
八仙洞 in Taitung County’s Changbin Rural Township. At this site,
many chipped-stone artifacts were found and dated to between 13,000
and 3,000 B.C.
Evidence of Neolithic cultures, such as the Dabenkeng Culture 大坌坑文
化, Yuanshan Culture 圓山文化, and Shihsanhang Culture 十三行文化,
have been discovered throughout the island. Archeologists have found
that in addition to stone tools, some communities used iron implements
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and were even able to smelt iron. Overall, Taiwan’s prehistoric
inhabitants lived primarily by hunting and fishing, but also developed
primitive farming, pottery, and textiles.
The relationship between Taiwan’s aborigines of today and the prehistoric
peoples who inhabited these sites is not clear. Some scholars suggest that
these aborigines are descendents of Taiwan’s prehistoric inhabitants, but
this theory has yet to be confirmed. It is interesting to note that all of
Taiwan’s aboriginal groups have legends about short, dark-skinned
people, who have physical and cultural similarities with the primitive
peoples living throughout Southeast Asia. Perhaps these were Taiwan’s
earliest residents, but more research is needed to answer this question.
Aboriginal Society—Simple and Self-subsistent
There is a general agreement in the academic community that Taiwan’s
existing aborigines belong to the same Austronesian family as the
Southeast Asians, based on physical characteristics and cultural traits.
There is still controversy, however, over the origin of the Austronesians.
Most researchers think that the Austronesians originally lived in
Southeast Asia and subsequently expanded outward, with some migrating
to Taiwan. In recent years, however, some scholars have argued that the
Austronesians originated in Taiwan, from where they moved southward
and dispersed. If this is true, then Taiwan may be the original homeland
of the Austronesian people, and the very existence of Taiwan’s aborigines
makes the island a living museum of Austronesia.
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Taiwan’s early aboriginal society was fairly isolated and primitive.
Politically, aboriginal tribal society lacked any unified island-wide
organization, namely, no state existed. At the end of the 16th century,
Chen Di 陳第 of the Ming dynasty (明; 1368-1644) wrote in the Record
of the Eastern Aborigines (東番記) that “each tribal community [社]
consists of a thousand, or five or six hundred people, with no chief.” This
observation indicates that before the Dutch occupied parts of Taiwan in
1624, aboriginal people lived as independent tribes. In both Dutch and
Han literature, there are records of aboriginal Quata (番仔王) or Dadu
King (大肚王), however, who ruled over more than ten tribes in central
Taiwan. Perhaps the existence of this leader can be interpreted as the
preliminary formation of a nation.
Economically, aborigines lived primarily in self-subsistent, Neolithic
societies, where hunting, fishing, and primitive farming were the primary
means of livelihood. Agriculture was slash-and-burn, without making use
of fertilizers or irrigation, and consisted of low-yield harvests that were
inadequate to feed large populations. They had not yet developed
sophisticated handicrafts, practicing only simple techniques such as
pottery-making, spinning and weaving. Nor was there complex commerce.
In all, aborigines lived in self-subsistence. At the close of the 17th century,
scholar Yu Yong-he 郁永河 recorded that in northern Taiwan, aborigines
were self-subsistent in terms of food, clothing, shelter, and other daily
necessities. He wrote:
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“aborigines …… seek clothing only when they feel cold and food
when hungry, making no preparations for the future….There are no
market or trade activities. Money is of little use, and the concepts of
‘storing’ and ‘saving’ are unknown to them. … They build their own
houses, knit their own clothes, grow their own food, and drink from
the stream. They gather linen to make nets and bend bamboos to make
bows for hunting and fishing. … Everything needed in life is
home-made.”
Some aborigines did engage in limited trade, however. At sites in western
Taiwan, archeologists have found jade from eastern Taiwan, as well as
copper coins of the Tang, Song, and other dynasties. According to the
literature of the early 17th century, aborigines in northern Taiwan had
fairly frequent trade exchanges with the outside world. Most of this trade
was irregular, however, consisting of small-scale bartering with overseas
visitors. The islanders traded goods like sulfur, deer hides, and gold for
salt, fabrics, and iron.
Today, there are twelve officially recognized aboriginal ethnic groups in
Taiwan: Atayal 泰雅族, Saisiyat 賽夏族, Bunun 布農族, Tsou 鄒族,
Paiwan 排灣族, Rukai 魯凱族, Puyuma 卑南族, Amis 阿美族, Tao 達
悟族 (or Yami 雅美族), Thao 邵族, Truku 太魯閣, and Kavalan 噶瑪
蘭族, with a total population of about 400,000 living primarily in the
mountain areas. In addition, there are eight additional groups categorized
as Pingpu (Plains) peoples 平埔族, namely, Ketagalan 凱特格蘭族,
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Taokas 道卡斯族, Pazeh 巴宰族, Papora 拍瀑拉族, Babuza 巴布沙族,
Hoanya 洪雅族, Siraya 西拉雅族, and the above-mentioned Kavalan
噶瑪蘭族. These people live mostly in lowland areas and have been
largely assimilated by Han majority culture.
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CHAPTER 2
15th Century Onwards - An East Asian Commercial Hub and Base for
Fishermen, Businessmen, and Pirates
Before the Age of Exploration in the 16th century, Taiwan was quite
isolated. Very little was known about Taiwan, even in neighboring China.
Some scholars believe that references to Yijhou 夷洲 during the Three
Kingdoms Period 三國時代 (222-265 A.D.) was perhaps Taiwan.
Supporting evidence is lacking, however. Others assert that the Liuciou
流求 (琉球) mentioned in the historical records of the Sui 隋 (581-618)
and Yuan 元 (1279-1367) dynasties refer to either Taiwan or a group of
islands to the east that includes Taiwan. Other researchers argue that this
reference is to Okinawa.
From the Tang dynasty 唐 (618-907) onwards, China’s external trade
began to prosper, especially along the southeastern coast. During the
Sung 宋 (960-1279) and Yuan dynasties, Quanzhou Port 泉州港 grew
into the largest port in China and perhaps even the world. Merchants from
Fujian 福建 were active throughout East Asia. Taiwan produced few
goods of value, however, and was thus largely ignored by traders. It was
not until the Yuan dynasty that a patrol outpost 巡檢司 was established
on the Penghu 澎湖 Islands（the Pescadores）in the Taiwan Strait and the
archipelago was incorporated into China’s territory as part of Jinjiang
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County 晉江縣 of Fujian. Even at this point China made no effort to
establish political sovereignty over Taiwan proper, however.
Trade in East Asia continued to prosper during the Ming 明 (1368-1644)
dynasty, especially from the 15th century onwards. Regular trade routes
began to take shape, and Taiwan happened to sit astride the new shipping
lanes. The outside world slowly began to take note of the island. In the
latter half of the 16th century, the Ming court lifted its ban on commercial
travel overseas. Fujianese merchants once again became very active in
the ports of East Asia. Towards the end of the 16th century, the Japanese
government also began to encourage overseas trade in the East, and
merchants responded enthusiastically. Further, with increasing emphasis
on expanding international trade by European traders, the flow of goods
among China, Japan, and Southeast Asia grew accordingly.
It was under these circumstances that people became increasingly aware
of Taiwan’s existence. The Chinese called this mysterious island Siao
Liuciou 小琉球, Siao Dongdao 小東島, Beigang 北港, or Dongfan 東
番, as well as a number of names with pronunciations similar to “Taiwan”,
such as Dayuan 大員, Taiyuan 臺員, and Dawan 大灣. As for the
Japanese, Taiwan was referred to as Takayama Koku or Takasago 高山
國, meaning “the country of high mountains”, while Europeans named it
Formosa, the Portuguese word for “beautiful.”
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Although China prohibited direct trade with foreign countries, the island’s
proximity to the mainland made it very important geographically. As
none of the countries claimed jurisdiction over the island, Taiwan
gradually emerged as a site of international trade for all nations of the
world, in addition to be a place for both pirates and fishermen made a
living.
Fishing Grounds
Taiwan is surrounded by sea, and the mingling of cold and warm currents
nearby makes for rich fishing grounds. The Penghu Islands have earned
renown for just this reason, as have the fishing grounds along the western
coast of Taiwan. Mullet is the most important product and is called “black
gold 烏金”, for its skin is black and its roe is a Chinese delicacy that
commands a high price. The mullet migrate south every winter to the area
off the shore of southern Taiwan to lay their eggs. Chinese fishermen
have long come to Taiwan to harvest this mullet roe.
According to Ming dynasty historical records, early settlers to Taiwan in
the 16th century consisted mainly of fishermen. From Keelung 雞籠 and
Danshuei 淡水 in the north, right down to southern Taiwan, these early
Chinese visitors left their mark. It was said that an experienced fisherman
could reach Keelung or Danshuei from the mouth of the Min River 閩江
in northern Fujian province in only one long day or night of sailing. For
example, it is recorded that fishermen from Fuzhou 福州 sailed to
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Danshuei on the night of the fourth day of the fifth lunar month, arrived
at dawn, fished, and then returned to the mainland to make preparations
for the Dragon Boat Festival, which falls on the fifth day of the fifth lunar
month. Taiwan quickly became a fishing ground frequented by Chinese
from the mainland. This has led some scholars to believe that most early
Chinese settlers to Taiwan were fishermen. The fishing village at
Cianjhen 前鎮 in Kaohsiung City is possibly the site of their earliest
settlement. Further research is needed if this theory is to be confirmed,
however.
A Free Port for Traders from Okinawa, China, and Japan
Since Taiwan had no sovereign government and no country assumed
jurisdiction over it, the island was free from levies and administrative
interference, making it a free port where merchants from different
countries could trade. Among these, Chinese and Japanese traders were
the most active.
Following establishment of the Ming dynasty, the new rulers enforced a
ban on shipping in an attempt to discourage Japanese piracy. Chinese
were not allowed to set sail, although the Ming court allowed
non-Chinese some limited trading privileges under a vassal-tribute policy.
After 1398, Okinawan merchants began to pursue trade with Southeast
Asian countries such as Siam. In 1422, they started paying tribute to the
Ming court and conducting trade with the blessing of the Chinese empire.
The Ming even conferred upon the Okinawan leader the title of King of
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Okinawa. Okinawan merchants therefore enjoyed a privileged position
and, in turn, were respectful of the Ming court, to which emissaries paid
frequent tribute. The activities of these Okinawan traders helped to
establish a small trading circuit in East Asia.
After 1570 the influence of Okinawa began to wane, however. At the
same time, the outside world was beginning to take note of Taiwan, due
to its location en route to Japan. Four small islands to the north of
Taiwan—Keelung Island 基隆島, Mianhua Island 棉花嶼, Huaping Island
花瓶嶼, and Pengjia Island 彭佳嶼—were important landmarks for
Chinese vessels sailing between China and Japan via Okinawa, as were
supply stops at Keelung and Danshuei. At the beginning of the Ming
dynasty, the main island of Okinawa was known as Da Liuciou 大琉球
[Big Okinawa]. Probably sometime after 1373, the name Siao Liuciou 小
琉球 [Small Okinawa] was given to the area of northern Taiwan that
includes Keelung and Danshuei.
With the decline of the Okinawan traders, Chinese merchants started to
take their place and grew more familiar with Taiwan. During the 16th
century, the Chinese named Taiwan as Siao Dongdao 小東島, Dongfan
東番, and Beigang 北港. In the latter half of the 16th century, the Ming
ban on sea trade was lifted in Fujian Province allowing trade and fishing
to flourish in southern Taiwan. Merchants and fishermen from China and
Japan gathered at Dayuan, now Anping 安平 in modern day Tainan
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County 臺南. Several different pronunciations of Dayuan in the Southern
Fujianese dialect—such as Taiyuan, and Taiwan 臺灣—were in common
use at that time, but eventually the name Taiwan came to be used to refer
to the entire island.
At the end of the 1560s, officials from Fujian and Guangdong provinces
cooperated to put down the pirate Zeng Yi-ben 曾一本, bringing relative
stability to the Fujian coast. In response to a proposal by Fujian Governor
Tu Ze-min 塗澤民 in 1567, the Ming government replaced its absolute
ban on trade with a looser vessel-licensing system of restrictions 船引制
度 in which local vessels were permitted to sail from Yuegang 月港 in
Zhangzhou Prefecture’s 漳州 Haicheng County 海澄縣. Under this
licensing system, Chinese merchants were allowed to sail either east or
west for trading. Taiwan had few natural resources and trade was limited,
however, so Fujianese merchants traveled primarily to Japan and only
used Taiwan for stopovers. Han Chinese came to northern Taiwan mostly
to barter with the aborigines, purchasing sulfur, deer hides, and gold
while selling cloths, iron etc. Southern Taiwan remained the realm of
fishermen.
Japanese merchants were also very active at the end of the 16th century.
In April 1565, the Spanish fleet occupied the Philippines, and discovered
that both Japanese and Chinese merchants made annual trips to Luzon for
business. In 1592, Japan was unified under Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豐臣秀
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吉. Hideyoshi sanctioned official permits 御朱印狀 to Japanese vessels
to expand overseas trade, and Japanese trade with Southeast Asian ports
including Siam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Taiwan increased as a
result. The success of this can be seen in such gestures as the offering of a
collection of local products as tribute to Hideyoshi in 1593 by Nayasuke
Zaemon 納屋助左衛門, a Japanese merchant who accumulated wealth
from trade with Taiwan and Manila.
During much of the rapid expansion in East Asian trade at the end of the
16th century, the Ming rulers enforced restrictions on sea faring as part of
stringent efforts to eliminate Japanese piracy. As a result, both Penghu
Islands and Taiwan proper, located off the coast of the mainland Chinese
province of Fujian, became stepping stones and bases for the Japanese to
acquire Chinese goods. Dayuan (modern day Anping, Tainan) sat at the
crossroads of the trade routes connecting China, Japan, and the
Philippines, and developed into a free trade zone for merchants from
China and other nations. The Japanese merchants, rich in capital and well
organized, established a settlement in Baxenboy 北線尾 (opposite to
Anping harbor, Tainan) to conduct long-term trade with Chinese for
merchandise such as silk and satin. They also came to northern Taiwan to
purchase gold, with some settling there. Taiwan became something of a
free port in East Asia and, therefore, trade continued to grow.
A Pirate Base
Expansion of trade in East Asia inevitably gave rise to pirates who hoped
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to grab a share of the wealth. In fact, many adventurers on the seas at this
time engaged in both piracy and commerce, banding together in powerful
groups. As the aboriginal people of Taiwan had no island-wide
organization to defend themselves, Japanese marauders and other pirates
found Taiwan an easy target, using the island as a base for piracy.
From the 13th to 16th century, coastal waters from the Korean Peninsula
to southern China were plagued by groups of wo kou 倭寇 (“Japanese
pirates”). However, by the second half of the 15th century and through
the 16th century, most wo kou 倭寇 were in fact mainly Chinese and
Korean fugitives, who proved to be an even greater bane than the
Japanese. Although China enjoyed prosperity and increased productivity
during the Ming dynasty, the government’s ban on sea trade meant that
those seeking Chinese commodities frequently resorted to looting and
smuggling. Even leading families in Fujian and Zhejiang provinces chose
to collaborate with the pirates in view of the huge profits.
In 1564, pirates who had been raiding Fujian Province were defeated by
Chinese general Ci Ji-guang 戚繼光. They fled to Taiwan to loot the port
of Keelung and settled there, forcing aborigines to take refuge in East
Taiwan. The Ming general Shen You-rong 沈有容 was sent to
“Dongfan” (Taiwan) in 1602 to suppress pirates who had occupied the
island as a base for raids on maritime traders. By 1617, however, pirates
had returned to Taiwan and taken Jhuchan 竹塹, an old harbor of today’s
Hsinchu, as a base for operations island-wide. Not until 1636, when the
Japanese government sealed their country to outsiders and prohibited
overseas travel, did the problem of Japanese pirates finally come to an
end.
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The mountainous provinces of Fujian and Guangdong had limited
farmland, and so many people relied on fishing and commerce for their
livelihoods. The Ming prohibition against maritime trade led some coastal
residents to risk their lives as pirates, who subsequently presented a
hazard to maritime trade. Penghu served as their first base until Ming
troops drove them to Taiwan proper. Lin Dao-cian 林道乾 led the first
pirate group to make Taiwan a base. Lin’s pirates harassed the coastal
region of China but, in 1564, were defeated by military governor Yu
Da-you 俞大猷. The pirates made a strategic retreat to “Beigang” 北港
(Taiwan), extending their influence throughout central and southern
Taiwan. Lin did not consider Taiwan a long-term base, however, and
ruthlessly slaughtered aborigines before fleeing via either Anping or
Dagushan 打鼓山 (in modern day Kaohsiung) to Jhancheng 占城 on
the Malay Peninsula. After Lin Dao-cian’s death, another pirate, Lin Fong
林鳳, rose to take his place. He invaded Taiwan via Penghu in 1574 but
was driven to the Philippines by the joint efforts of the troops of regional
commander Hu Shou-ren 胡守仁 and aboriginal warriors.
The story of pirate and pirate-trader groups in Taiwan would not be
complete without mentioning Yan Sih-ci 顏思齊 and Jheng Jhih-long 鄭
芝龍. Yan Sih-ci was a native of Haicheng County in Fujian’s Zhangzhou
Prefecture, but lived in the Japanese city of Nagasaki. In 1624, Yan and
Jheng organized a gang of 28 conspirators and attempted to revolt against
the Japanese shogunate. The group fled to Taiwan when their plot was
exposed. Yan died the next year and Jheng Jhih-long assumed command,
leading the group to great fame and fortune.
Jheng Jhih-long 鄭芝龍, or Jheng Yi-guan 鄭一官, was born in Quanzhou
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Prefecture’s 泉州府 Nan’an 南安 County in Fujian Province. He was a
valiant warrior and keen strategist. After establishing his Taiwan base in
1624, he used it to lead his band of pirates back and forth across the
Taiwan Strait to raid the mainland Chinese coast. He enforced strict
discipline among his men and performed small works of charity, which
made him popular with common people. Jheng was able to defeat
government troops on several occasions, and Ming officials recognized
him as a “villain [with a talent] rarely seen in the past or present.” In 1627,
government troops were unable to prevent Jheng occupying Xiamen 廈
門 on the mainland. Finally, in 1628 the Ming court offered an amnesty
and official position in exchange for his allegiance, and Jheng accepted.
He then patrolled coastal waters, put down other pirates, and defeated his
enemies, all the while rising in rank. By 1639, he had risen to the post of
regional commander.
Jheng then monopolized coastal trade, requiring every trading vessel to
fly his flag. The annual fee for each vessel was 3,000 taels of silver, and
Jheng collected more than ten million taels a year from this levy. He put
these funds to use, organizing a huge trading fleet. The ships were known
as “Yi-guan ships” 一官船, and they could be seen in ports all over East
Asia. He also contracted with Dutch merchants on Taiwan. His great
success as an international trader enabled him to amass a fortune to rival
that of the Ming treasury.
Jheng Jhih-long is a rarity in Chinese history, as he was able to play
simultaneously the roles of pirate, official, and merchant. His power and
influence commanded respect throughout East Asia. During the famine of
1630 in Fujian Province, Jheng assisted many starving victims to cross
the strait to Taiwan and then opened land for these new settlers. Even
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after his surrender to the Ming government in 1628, many of his
subordinates remained in Taiwan and maintained contact with the former
pirate commander. These followers later led the Han people in Taiwan to
rise against Dutch rule (the Guo Huai-yi 郭懷一 incident, discussed in
Chapter 3, is one such example) and assisted Jheng’s son Jheng
Cheng-gong 鄭成功 (Koxinga) in his expedition to Taiwan.
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CHAPTER 3
The Dawn of Modern Transformation Under the Colonial Rule by
Holland and Spain：Complementary Roles Played by the Dutch and
Han Chinese Gave Rise to a New Taiwan (1624-1662; 1664-68)
It was the Dutch and the Spanish that first established formal political
powers on Taiwan, marking the beginning of Taiwan’s transformation
from an era of prehistoric obscurity into the modern world forged after
the Age of Exploration. Through expanding trade with the outside world
during the period of the world Commercial Revolution following the
Great Exploration of the 15th and 16th centuries, Taiwan progressed
rapidly to become one of the most thriving economies in East Asia. Both
the Dutch and the Han Chinese immigrants played important roles in
achieving this goal by working together, each group complementing the
other. Generally speaking, the Dutch formulated policies based on
mercantilism while the Chinese implemented them, and thus created a
new Formosa. Their relationship was also competitive, however, and
sometimes even confrontational, as evidenced by some Chinese uprisings
and ultimately Jheng Cheng-gong’s invasion of Taiwan.
European Occupation of Taiwan and Confrontation between Holland
in the South and Spain in the North
In the middle of the 16th century, Portuguese ships frequently passed
Taiwan to trade with Japan. Impressed by its beauty, Portuguese sailors
referred to Taiwan as “Ilha Formosa”, meaning beautiful island, and
Formosa thus became the name commonly used in the West. The
Portuguese showed no great interest in occupying Taiwan, however,
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stopping only when compelled by weather or shipwreck. In 1582, a
Portuguese ship was wrecked near a river mouth in Formosa, the sailors
were forced to stay for some months but left after mending their ship
without establishing any formal administration.
Japan was the first country to show colonial ambitions in Taiwan. After
unifying Japan, Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豐臣秀吉 undertook a policy of
overseas expansion, invading Korea in the west and extending Japan’s
influence southward. In 1592, Japan sought sovereignty over Taiwan
(Takayama Koku in Japanese) without result. In 1609, the Tokugawa
Shogunate 德川幕府 sent feudal lord Arima Haruno 有馬晴信 on an
exploratory mission to Taiwan. In 1616, the powerful Nagasaki official
Murayama Toan 村山等安 led troops on what would ultimately be an
unsuccessful invasion of Taiwan. However, there were some Japanese
trading in gold in Northern Taiwan.
In the end, it was the Europeans who succeeded in establishing formal
administrations on Taiwan. The Dutch established their first Far East
trading factory in Bantam 萬丹, Indonesia in 1598, and sent vessels to
Japan to request the opening of trade in 1600. In order to expand overseas
trade more efficiently, the Dutch went further to set up the Dutch United
East India Company (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, VOC) to
monopolize Asian trade in 1602, establishing their headquarters in
Bantam first and then removed to Batavia (present-day Jakarta). Dutch
envoy Wijbrand van Waerwijck and his army were ordered to occupy
Penghu for opening China trade in 1604, but failed after being requested
by Ming general Shen You-rong 沈有容 to withdraw.
In 1609, the Dutch won permission to trade with Japan at Hirado Port in
23
Nagasaki, setting up a trading factory there, and thus were more eager to
have trade with China, an even more attractive trading partner with her
great size and rich resources. As the Portuguese controlled Macau in
China coast and the Spanish established themselves in the Philippines
where they attracted numerous Chinese merchants to trade in Manila, the
Dutch needed a base of operations closer to China if they were to break
the trading blockade. In 1622, Dutch envoy Cornelis Reijerszoon attacked
Macau but was defeated by the Portuguese. He then chose to occupy
Penghu in a bid to persuade the Chinese to open trade. The Ming court
rejected the proposal and sent regional commander Yu Zih-gao 俞咨皋
to attack the Dutch in 1624. The two parties eventually reached an
agreement under which the Dutch moved to Taiwan while the Ming court
allowed the Chinese merchants to trade there. The Dutch new official
Maarten Sonk took up his new post at Dayuan (present-day Anping in
Tainan County), and thus began the Dutch rule of Taiwan.
The Spanish had occupied northern Luzon 呂宋 since 1571 and had
built a fortress in Manila, where numerous Chinese and Japanese came to
trade and the Chinese even established a community called Parian 澗內.
As the Dutch control of Dayuan in Formosa severed the trading route
between China and the Philippines, the Spanish resolved to defend their
interests. In 1626, a Spanish expedition was sent to northern Taiwan to
occupy Keelung which the Spanish called Santísima Trinidad, and built
Fort San Salvador. Between 1628 and 1629, they moved westward to
occupy Tamsui（Danshuei）, where they set up the settlement of Fort
Santo Domingo in a bid to attract Chinese merchants.
With the Spanish in the north of Taiwan and Dutch in the south,
confrontation between these two European adversaries was inevitable.
24
The Dutch tried to expel the Spanish forces on several occasions, and
finally sent an expedition north to attack the Spanish fortresses in 1642.
The Spanish were forced to withdraw from Taiwan to end their 16-year
rule after being defeated. This left the Dutch as the sole ruling power on
Taiwan until Jheng Cheng-gong’s conquest of the island in 1661/62.
Both the Spanish and Dutch focused on trade and missionary work in
Taiwan but, in the end, it was the Dutch who achieved more.
Beginning of Mercantilism and Complementary Roles Played by the
Dutch and Han Chinese
The Dutch administration of Taiwan followed the principles of
mercantilism prevalent in early modern Europe and thus gave rise to
Taiwan’s trade-oriented economy. In the beginning, they established a
base an entrepôt in Tainan from which they could engage in international
trade. The Dutch also developed agriculture and some industries to
further increase their profits, leading Taiwan down the road towards
greater economic development. These achievements were possible thanks
to the cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship between the Dutch
and the Han Chinese.
The most valuable goods in East Asian trade were Chinese silk, Japanese
silver, and spices from Southeast Asia. Taiwan’s central location between
these three points made it an ideal base for entrepôt trade. When the
Dutch arrived in Taiwan in 1624, they established a trading factory in
Anping, the fortified city of Orange, which was renamed Zeelandia in
1627. Dutch merchants took advantage of seasonal winds to transport
25
goods between the north and south by sea. In the summer, the vessels and
traders left Batavia to sail first to Thailand and Kampuchea, and then on
to Taiwan, where they unloaded goods to be distributed to China and
Japan. When prevailing winds blew from the north in the winter, the
Dutch sailed south, transporting Chinese and Japanese goods to Batavia,
then further to Persia, Holland, and the rest of Europe. Silk and porcelains
from China, silver from Japan, spices from the Southeast Asia, and deer
hides from Taiwan made up most of this cargo.
Limited channels and the importance of Chinese goods meant that
Chinese traders were both Holland’s primary trading partners and main
competitors. Li Dan 李旦, Syu Sin-su 許心素 and especially Jheng
Jhih-long were all important Chinese partners/competitiors. Around 1635,
the Dutch were earning 100 percent profits due to increased trade on
Taiwan, thanks to relaxation of the Ming dynasty’s ban on maritime
activity, safer sea passage and fruitful cooperation with trading partners.
Trade reached a peak in 1640, but subsequently dropped off. War in
China interrupted the steady supply of Chinese silk, and Jheng Jhih-long
began to compete with the Dutch for the Japanese market. The Dutch
reacted by exporting sugar and tea to Persia, as well as Japan, and
increasing their taxation of Han Chinese activities in Taiwan. In all, the
Dutch achieved great commercial success in Taiwan. Between 1640 and
1653, net profits increased dramatically from 13,000 to 338,000 gulden,
making Taiwan the second most profitable trading house in Asia behind
Japan.
26
As sugar was a valuable commodity in the international market, the
Dutch also developed agriculture in the 1630s when they discovered that
Taiwan’s soil and climate were well suited to sugarcane plantations. Since
Taiwan’s aborigines had never cultivated sugarcane and produced sugar,
the Dutch turned to Han Chinese to establish this new industry. Dutch
administrators provided Chinese immigrants with a suitable environment
for development, arranging ships to carry immigrants to Taiwan,
providing land and capital, constructing irrigation systems, and
maintaining a garrison of soldiers for security. The Han Chinese
undertook the actual work of cultivation and sugar production, providing
labor, technology and even capital. In order to open new land for
cultivation, the Dutch adopted a feudal system of farming under which
they employed Han Chinese to farm the land of the Dutch East India
Company. The Dutch also allowed the Han to develop and hold private
plots to accelerate the development of agriculture. Under this mutually
beneficial division of labor, agricultural development proceeded smoothly,
firstly with the cultivation of sugarcane and then with rice.
In the begining, the Dutch transported sugar from southern China to
Taiwan for export to Japan, the Middle East, and Europe. Production
subsequently shifted to Taiwan. After 1630’s, a large number of Chinese
immigrants arrived, and the sugar production grew quickly. The
production in the Tainan area rose from 1,244 piculs (136,900 pounds) in
1636 to 17,300 piculs (1,906,996 pounds) in 1658. Output exceeded even
that of Java and replaced deer hides as the island’s main export. Profits at
the Dutch trading house on Taiwan came to depend on the export of sugar.
27
As for rice, Taiwan initially relied on imports from Japan and Thailand to
sustain itself, but gradually achieved self-sufficiency as more immigrants
arrived and cultivated rice fields. In 1642, Taiwan produced about 4,000
piculs (440,924 pounds) of rice. By 1656, the island was producing a
surplus for export. Rice and sugar became two main agricultural crops for
the next three centuries until the 1960s.
Fishing and hunting also developed, and Dutch reliance on Han Chinese
to do business carried over into these two activities. The most common
method of formalizing this relationship was the farming system (bak,
adopted from the European pacht system under which the Dutch
auctioned rights). This system enabled the Dutch to minimize
administrative costs while ensuring stable revenues. In the case of trade
with aboriginal tribal units, Han Chinese merchants also bid under the
system called bak she for the rights to handle all trades with aboriginal
communities (fan she 番社).
In general, therefore, the complementary roles played by the Dutch and
the Han Chinese brought a combination of Dutch political power and
Chinese economic strength to bear on the development of Taiwan’s
economy. Taiwan began a tradition of trade-oriented development with
rice and sugar emerging as the enduring backbone of the island’s
economy.
Dutch Administration and Missionary Works
The Dutch mainly came to Taiwan for commercial reasons and, therefore,
28
their administration and military forces in Taiwan were streamlined to
reduce costs. The number of the Dutch administrative personnel stationed
in Taiwan was extremely limited, supported by a small force of about
1,000 soldiers.
The Dutch established a trading house under the Dutch East India
Company in Zeelandia (later Anping), appointed a governor, and set up a
management board. The trading house was the highest administrative
organization in Taiwan, directing subordinate officials and serving as the
government for the people. Four local assemblies (landdagh) were
established in the south, north, Danshuei (in northern Taiwan), and
Beinan in (eastern Taiwan) to handle the aboriginal affairs. Elderly chiefs
were selected from aboriginal tribes to take orders from the governor and
carry out his policies. This was a modified form of the European manor
system and provided a system of local self-governance that allowed the
Dutch to maintain its administrative manpower at a minimum.
How such a small number of administrative staff and soldiers could rule
Taiwan effectively needs further explanation, however. In addition to the
above-mentioned system, the secret lay in the multiple roles of
missionaries. The Dutch administration in Taiwan hired missionaries to
undertake administrative work, as they were enthusiastic in their
missionary work and fulfilled their duties loyally. Furthermore,
missionaries spoke local languages and could help the administration
communicate with the local people. The other advantage of hiring
missionaries lay in the great savings in administrative expenses.
29
The Dutch administration attached great importance to the combined
effect of religious and educational work carried out by missionaries with
the aborigines and provided them with financial support. By 1630,
Christian churches and schools could be seen along the coastal plains of
western Taiwan. Missionaries even hired aboriginal assistants to carry out
Christian education.
Well-known missionaries include Rev. Georgius Candidius and Rev.
Robertus Junius who came to Taiwan sometime after 1627 and worked
mainly with the plains aborigines in southern Taiwan, especially those of
the Singang community 新港社. Missionaries used the Latin alphabet to
develop a system for writing the Singang language spoken by the Siraya
tribes, and then used this system to translate prayers, catechisms, the Ten
Commandments, and the New Testament. In 1641, Junius accompanied
the Dutch trading house governor on an inspection tour of the island. The
governor was stunned to see that aboriginal people had been converted to
Christianity in large numbers and paid their respect to the Dutch. At that
time, an estimated 4,000 to 5,000 people had been baptized islandwide.
Clearly, missionary work was a success in Taiwan. The written form of
the Singang Siraya language developed by the missionaries continued to
be used even after the Dutch left Taiwan. As late as 1812, during the reign
of the Ching Emperor Jiacing 嘉慶, aborigines were still using the
language to sign contracts with Han Chinese, which are known as
“Singang Language Agreements” 新港文書, or “fanya contracts” 番仔
契.
30
Spanish Development of Northern Taiwan (1626-1642)
The Spanish occupied northern Taiwan in 1626 and immediately started
to promote trade and missionary work. Trade ties with Japan had broken
down in 1625, however, and although Danshuei Port was opened, only a
limited number of merchant ships sailed from China to Taiwan. The
Spanish were, therefore, unable to achieve their goal of defeating the
Dutch in southern Taiwan.
Regarding religion, records show that only about 300 local people had
been converted to Christianity by the Spanish missionaries by 1630, and
this number rose to a mere 320 by 1634. As with the Dutch, Father
Jacinto Esquivel also created a writing system for local language based
on the Latin alphabet and compiled books such as Glossary of the
Danshuei Language Used on Taiwan Island 臺灣島淡水語辭彙 and
Christian Doctrines in the Danshuei Language of Taiwan Island 臺灣島
淡水語基督教理書 as aids for his preaching. He did not achieve the
success that he had hoped for, however. Moreover, the priest’s dream of
preaching in Japan was also shattered when Japan began prohibiting
Christianity in 1633.
Most worrying for the Spanish in Taiwan was the great imbalance
between revenues and expenditures. The Spanish trading house was not
profitable and thus required subsidies from the Spanish authority in
Manila to support its operations. From 1635, therefore, the Spanish
adopted a much less aggressive policy toward Taiwan. Another problem
31
was resistance by aboriginal people. In 1636, aborigines attacked Fort
Santo Domingo in Danshuei, resulting in the death of more than 30
Spaniards. In order to cut down on manpower and expenses, the Spanish
authority in Manila withdrew the army from Danshuei in 1638 and only
maintained a small garrison in Keelung.
The Dutch stationed in southern Taiwan had been very uncomfortable
with the Spanish occupation of northern Taiwan and had been waiting for
an opportunity to drive them off from the island. In 1642, Dutch troops
went north, captured Danshuei and Keelung, defeating the Spanish and
expelling them from Taiwan. The Dutch built a new Fort Santo Domingo
in the vicinity of the old Spanish fort in Danshuei, which still stands
today and is known as the Red-haired Fort 紅毛城. Another trading
house was set up in Danshuei for the purpose of trading with Japan and
Fuzhou. Business did not flourish, however, and southern Taiwan
remained the center of trade.
Conflict Between the Dutch and Han Chinese, and Jheng
Cheng-gong’s Victory over the Dutch
The Han Chinese and Dutch shared a love-hate relationship. The Dutch
relied on Han Chinese to develop agricultural and fishing industries for
them, and the Han could not have immigrated to Taiwan in such large
numbers and made a living without assistance from the Dutch. They
shared a mutually beneficial but sometimes tense relationship. Han
Chinese had a highly developed cultural identity and a strong sense of
32
national dignity, and were not content being ruled by the Dutch. Various
heavy taxes and levies imposed by the Dutch made the situation all the
more untenable. By 1650, the Han Chinese population in Taiwan
exceeded 30,000, far surpassing the Dutch who numbered less than 2,000.
Under these circumstances, conflict between the two peoples was
inevitable. In 1652, the Guo Huai-yi 郭懷一 Incident finally ignited
hostilities between the two sides.
Guo Huai-yi was a local Chinese leader in the area that is today’s
Yongkang 永康 Township, Tainan County. On September 7, 1652, Guo
and a group of comrades devised a plot to invite the Dutch authorities to a
banquet for the Moon Festival on the September 17, and then rise in
rebellion. The plot was exposed, however, forcing Guo to assemble a
force of some 16,000 people to take immediate action. The Dutch,
meanwhile, marshaled their troops and recruited aborigines to suppress
them. Guo Huai-yi was killed in battle, and the rest of his forces retreated
south of Ercenghang 二層行 Creek. Within half a month, the Han
Chinese were defeated with loss of more than 4,000 lives. After the war,
the power of the Han Chinese greatly dwindled, but the problem of ethnic
antagonism worsened, setting the stage for Jheng Cheng-gong’s attack on
Taiwan in the 1660s.
It was Jheng Cheng-gong (known to the Dutch then, and to many
Westerners still, as Koxinga) who eventually ended Dutch rule in Taiwan.
Jheng undertook his eastern expedition to Taiwan for two reasons. Firstly,
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the Jhengs were seafarers who could not allow an island so near China to
remain under Dutch rule for long. Secondly, the Jheng family had a long
history connected with Taiwan. Jheng Cheng-gong’s father, Jheng
Jhih-long, was active in Taiwan between 1624 and 1628. After the Ming
dynasty on the Chinese mainland was overthrown, some of Jheng
Jhih-long’s subordinates remained in Taiwan. These loyalists were
originally from Fujian and resented the rule of the Dutch. Although Guo
Huai-yi’s rebellion in 1652 was suppressed, suspicion between the Han
Chinese and Dutch deepened, culminating in Jheng’s expedition to
Taiwan.
The recent reason that brought Jheng Cheng-gong to Taiwan was the
setback he suffered during his resistance to Ching dynasty rule on the
Chinese mainland. In 1659, Jheng went on a northern expedition to
Jinling 金陵 (present-day Nanjing) but was defeated and confined to the
Chinese coastal region of Xiamen and Kinmen 金門. Having suffered
heavy losses and running low on supplies, Jheng needed a new and safer
base for survival and counter-attack. Around this time, He Bin 何斌, an
interpreter for the Dutch in Taiwan who had served as a tax agent for
Jheng in the past, embezzled more than 200,000 taels (liang 兩) of silver
from Dutch public funds. Worried that his theft might be found out, in
1659 He Bin secretly made a map of the Luermen 鹿耳門 waterways,
presenting it to Jheng Cheng-gong and persuading him to attack Taiwan.
In April 1661, Jheng Cheng-gong led an army of 25,000 soldiers from
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Kinmen to occupy Penghu. On the dawn of April 30, his army invaded
Taiwan through Luermen to occupy Fort Provintia (present-day
Chihkanlou 赤崁樓), where the majority of residents was Han Chinese,
and then surrounded the Dutch at Fort Zeelandia. After nine months of
pitched battles and sieges, the Dutch agreed to surrender on February 1,
1662, and soon left Taiwan after four decades of governance.
Although the Dutch and Spanish did not rule Taiwan for long periods,
they had great significance in Taiwan’s history. Politically, they ended
Taiwan’s status as a territory without national identity and initiated a
series of colonial rules of Taiwan by foreign powers hereafter.
Economically, the Dutch and Spanish brought the island out of isolation
and into the global market, leaving behind a legacy of trade-oriented
economy. The Dutch rule also brought great numbers of Han Chinese
immigrants to Taiwan, and paved the way for the eventual replacement of
the aborigines by them. These changes transformed the island from a
closed society to an open one, from an isolated island in East Asia to an
island known to the world, and from an inland culture to a maritime
culture.
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CHAPTER 4
First Han Government—Jheng Island Kingdom (1661-1683)
The rule of the Jheng 鄭 family had great influence on Taiwan’s history
for two important reasons. Firstly, Jheng Cheng-gong’s 鄭成功 conquest
of Taiwan was a victory for the Han Chinese over a Western colonial
superpower. Although Han immigrants arrived in Taiwan very early and
in great numbers, it was not until 1661/62 that Jheng Cheng-gong
established the first Han political administration in Taiwan. Han people
therefore viewed (and still view) Jheng as a national hero for securing
Taiwan. Secondly, the Jheng regime can be regarded as a pioneer of
Taiwan independence. After taking over Taiwan, Jheng not only resisted
the newly established Ching dynasty on the mainland, but also planned a
southern expedition to the Philippines, which showed his ambition to
expand his territory and establish an independent state. Although some
argue that his ultimate goal was to restore the previous Ming dynasty, this
can hardly be verified due to his early death. However, his son, Jheng
Jing 鄭經, and then grandson, Jheng Ke-shuang 鄭克塽, succeeded him
to rule Taiwan as an independent state until 1683 when the last Jheng
surrendered to the Ching. The Jheng administration exercised full
authority over Taiwan and dealt with foreign countries as a sovereign
nation, and therefore can be said to be the first independent government
based on Taiwan.
The Jheng rulers appropriated parts of the Dutch system while
36
formulating systems and policies of their own. They established a
Chinese-style political system, introduced Han culture to Taiwan, and
built an economy with equal emphasis on agriculture and trade. In
southern Taiwan, the Han Chinese gradually overwhelmed the aborigines
to become the dominant ethnic group, paving the way for the complete
“Sinicization”（or Hannization）of Taiwan during the Ching dynasty.
The Jheng Kingdom Establishes the First Chinese System of
Government on Taiwan
In 1648, Jheng Cheng-gong swore fealty to Emperor Yongli 永曆 of the
Ming dynasty. After the Emperor was defeated and then killed in 1662,
Jheng Cheng-gong continued to use Yongli’s reign period as a political
symbol in his fight against the Manchus, and so did his son and grandson.
Immediately after Jheng Cheng-gong had captured Provintia and trapped
the Dutch in Fort Zeelandia in 1661, he began the work of founding a
state. He renamed Provintia as Dongdu Mingjing 東都明京 (Eastern
capital of the Ming dynasty) and Zeelandia as Anping Fort in memory of
his birthplace. He set up a central government with six branches in charge
of official personnel, finances, rites, military affairs, judicial affairs, and
construction. The central government consisted of the Chengtian
Prefecture 承天府 in Provintia, which ruled over two counties, Tiansing
County 天興縣 in the north and Wannian County 萬年縣 in the south,
and a pacification command 安撫司 in Penghu. For all practical
37
purposes, therefore, this system functioned as a national government with
central and local administrations. Jheng was even criticized by some
people as having usurped the royal system of government. In any case,
his son and grandson succeeded him to be rulers of the new kingdom as
an independent state, conducting diplomatic affairs with Japan, Holland,
Spain and England. It should come as no surprise that some foreign
history books referred to the island under Jheng rule as the “Kingdom of
Taiwan.”
After Jheng Cheng-gong’s death, Jheng Jing succeeded his father but
relied heavily on a capable advisor, Chen Yong-hua 陳永華, to govern
the state. Chen was a gifted counselor and was praised as a reincarnation
of Jhuge Liang 諸葛亮 (a statesman renowned for his political savvy
depicted in the classic Chinese historical novel Romance of the Three
Kingdoms). Chen planned and carried out a number of major political,
economic, and cultural development projects on Taiwan. In addition to
expanding administrative organizations, Chen constructed Tainan’s
Confucian Temple (now an important historical site) and attached great
importance to education and the cultivation of young talents. He also built
temples to purify people’s minds and prohibited gambling to improve
social behavior. After a few years, Taiwan had become an overseas
paradise for Chinese from the mainland, as the people could now enjoy
safe and comfortable lives.
Trade Expansion through Establishment of a Merchant Fleet
38
The Jheng family had always been seafarers, and had established a
flourishing trade empire in the Far East. Jheng Cheng-gong inherited this
tradition and built upon it, accumulating considerable political and
military power. Jheng Cheng-gong’s influence was confined to the narrow,
impoverished eastern seaboard of China, however, and he required a
stronger economic base if he was to defy the power of the Manchus, who
had established the Ching dynasty on the mainland. His successful
conquest of Taiwan only afforded him a temporary foothold and limited
resources, as Taiwan was not yet wel-developed to offer immediate
benefit. Commerce was therefore vital to Taiwan’s existence, if the Ching
court’s economic blockade was to be overcome.
At first, Jheng set up a merchant guild system consisting of double
five-hong 行 to carry out foreign trade on the mainland. These five hong
山五商 conducted trade via mountain routes and were categorized into
gold (jin 金), wood (mu 木), water (shuei 水), fire (huo 火), and earth
(tu 土). They were established in Hangzhou 杭州 and its vicinity for
purchasing, and then transporting, silk and other products to Xiamen.
Another five hong 海五商, specializing in sea trade, were based in
Xiamen for exporting Chinese goods overseas. These were categorized as
benevolence (ren 仁), righteousness (yi 義), courtesy (li 禮), wisdom
(jhih 智), and Honesty (sin 信). In addition, Jheng also partook in
smuggling with mainland merchants. Thanks to the Ching court’s ban on
maritime trade, Jheng monopolized coastal trade and was able to
39
accumulate sufficient finances to maintain an army. After the destruction
of the five-hong system by the Ching, his son, Jheng Jing, built a large
merchant fleet to carry out international trade, as well as open Taiwan to
trade with foreign merchants, such as the British East India Company.
Therefore, Taiwan became prosperous and was thus able to survive and
even counter-attack China.
Development of Taiwan through Agriculture and Commerce
In addition to establishing Han Chinese political rule on Taiwan, Jheng’s
rule also contributed to the island’s economic development. Equal
emphasis was placed on both commerce and agriculture, making them the
foundation of Taiwan’s economy ever since. Jheng, apart from continuing
the mercantilist policies of the Dutch, opened more land to farming and
developed Taiwan’s agriculture.
Jheng Cheng-gong placed special emphasis on the cultivation of staple
crops. Having sufficient food was needed to resist the Ching court’s
economic blockade. He needed to feed his thousands of troops and the
swelling ranks of immigrants from China. Fortunately, Taiwan had an
abundance of uncultivated land ideal for agricultural development.
Nevertheless, the shortage of skilled labor was a problem. Jheng made the
most of the manpower available to him. Firstly, he assigned soldiers to
cultivate undeveloped wilderness via an army-farming system begun in
1661 whilst besieging the Dutch. Secondly, he encouraged all of his
subjects, civilian officials, military personnel, and common people, to
re-claim wasteland on conditions that they “reported the area of land
40
before it is cultivated”. Thirdly, he encouraged Chinese agricultural
laborers to migrate to Taiwan. Finally, he introduced more advanced
farming techniques and technology from China, such as draft oxen and
the scythe, to replace the primitive tools and low-yield methods used by
the natives, thereby raising productivity.
The development undertaken by the Jheng rulers centered on southern
Taiwan in present Tainan City and Tainan County 臺南縣、市 and
extended as far south as Kaohsiung 高雄 and north into Chiayi 嘉義.
Only scattered settlements could be found farther north, with central and
northern Taiwan remaining largely unexplored. Criminals and captured
soldiers were banished to the north, and only in emergencies would Jheng
station larger forces there.
Westward Expedition, Internal Strife, and Collapse of the Jheng
State
Under the rule of the Jheng family, the population of Han Chinese on
Taiwan reached about 120,000. With political power and a more
advanced culture, the Han Chinese brought the aborigines under control,
and even established partial dominance on the plains. It was the mistaken
policy of invading the Chinese mainland that drained national resources
and set the Jheng state on the path to defeat.
In 1674, the civil war of the Three Feudatories 三藩之亂 broke out in
China. Considering this a golden opportunity to overthrow the Ching
41
dynasty, Jheng Jing led his forces west to join the three feudal lords who
had initiated the anti-Cing rebellion, Geng Jing-jhong 耿精忠, Wu
San-guei 吳三桂, and Shang Jhih-sin 尚之信. Initially, the war favored
the rebels, with both southern Fujian and eastern Guangdong falling into
their hands. Later, however, the alliance dissolved into an internecine
conflict between Jheng and two of the other leaders, Geng and Shang, and
in 1680, with his army weakened, Jheng was forced to retreat from the
mainland.
This disastrous campaign claimed the lives of many soldiers and drained
the national coffers. It also set in motion the eventual collapse of the
Jheng state. The Ching court had never intended to send forces overseas
but, in the aftermath of the rebellion, the Manchu rulers began devising a
plan to eliminate Jheng. China’s coastal population was forcibly moved
inland to isolate Taiwan from mainland supplies. The Ching court also
began mustering a navy in preparation for an invasion of Taiwan.
Jheng Jing died in 1681. In the scramble for power following his death,
Jheng Ke-shuang emerged victorious over his brother, but real authority
fell into the hands of the powerful courtier Feng Si-fan 馮錫範, and the
affairs of the state slid into disarray. Two years later, Ching general Shih
Lang 施琅 captured and occupied Penghu after a bloody war. Seeing
that his advantage had been lost, Jheng and his officials opted to
surrender without resistance.
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CHAPTER 5
The Manchu Occupation of Formosa and the Ching Court’s Plans
for Integrating it into the Empire - The Sinicization of Taiwan
(1683-1895)
The Manchus conquered Taiwan in 1683 and ruled it until the island was
ceded to Japan after the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. This was the first and
almost the only period of time in which Taiwan was practically a part of
China, and which affected Taiwan society tremendously. Politically, a
Chinese-style regime and the traditional concept of loyalty to an emperor
were established. Economically, Taiwan was developing a thriving
economy that was complementary to China’s. Socially, the Han
inhabitants’ encroachment on Taiwan plains drove aborigines to become a
weak minority, thereby consolidating the foundation for a Han society in
Taiwan.
Policies of Guarding Taiwan and Stopping Illegal Han Immigration:
the Sinicization of Taiwan
Following the surrender of the Jheng forces in 1683, the Ching court was
divided over whether to incorporate Taiwan into its territory. A decision
was finally reached in 1684 to make Taiwan a part of Fujian Province,
with Taiwan Prefecture 臺灣府 responsible for overseeing three
counties called Taiwan 臺灣縣, Fongshan 鳳山縣, and Jhuluo 諸羅縣.
Although occupying the island, the imperial court adopted a passive
43
policy to administer it with the intention of simply “keeping a watchful
eye on Taiwan.” From the start, the Ching court was simply trying to
prevent possible anti-Manchu insurrections on Taiwan, as did the Jhengs.
Accordingly, it was against the Manchu government’s interests to see a
well-developed Taiwan that might bring about a resurgence of
anti-imperial elements, especially since dealing with such unrest across
the Taiwan Strait was costly in terms of time, money, and effort.
To summarize, the Manchu policy of isolation focused on two points:
Firstly, it sought to curb the further migration of Han Chinese to Taiwan
with a permit system that imposed strict qualifications on those wishing
to move there. Secondly, it tried to prevent separatism and ethnic conflict
by placing a ban on Han people, forbidding them from encroaching into
the mountains and intruding into aboriginal homelands. To carry out this
policy, a great amount of power was given to the circuit commissioner
and the regional commander, the top administrative and military
commanders in Taiwan, to handle emergencies. Secondary measures were
also taken, such as disallowing the construction of walled cities to prevent
rebels from putting up greater resistance, weapon controls to keep
potential insurgents unarmed, and the rotation of troops stationed in
Taiwan to prevent collaboration with local powers.
Unfortunately, the Manchu isolation policy fell short of its goals.
Population pressures had increased and, by the 1700s, many residents in
the hilly provinces of Fujian and Guangdong could hardly earn a living
on their limited farmland. In contrast, the growing reports of Taiwan’s
44
vast uncultivated plains and sparse population made the trip across the
Taiwan Strait a very attractive option. Before long, residents of the two
provinces were ignoring the government ban and moving to Taiwan in
large numbers, changing the character of the island. It was not long
before Han immigrants severely outnumbered the economically weaker
and less-advanced indigenous peoples, whose original population of
around 200,000 quickly dwindled between 1683 and 1895. In contrast,
the population of Han inhabitants jumped dramatically from 100,000 to
2.5 million.
After possessing most of the plain areas, the Chinese immigrants started
to partake in intensive farming and to promote business, which laid a firm
foundation for the establishment of Han Chinese society on the island.
Under the rule of Ching in 1683-1895, Taiwan was rapidly Sinicized,
with Chinese culture becoming dominant. Taiwan experienced economic,
social, and cultural transformations, which are detailed in the sections that
follow.
Immigration to Taiwan and Its Development
Emigration to Taiwan took place on a massive scale in the beginning of
the 18th century. This was followed by large-scale land developments,
including the opening of new land for cultivation and the growth of
sugarcane and paddy rice.
Although Taiwan’s high temperatures, plentiful rainfall, and fertile soil
provided suitable conditions for agriculture, vast areas of Taiwan’s plains
45
had so far remained as primitive breeding grounds for wild deer. All of
these factors were a great attraction to the Han Chinese who were good at
intensive cultivation. Before long, incoming Han were using every means
possible—both legal and illegal, proper and improper—to obtain arable
land. Soon, most of the plains had been converted into rice or sugarcane
fields. Several well-known irrigation systems were constructed around
this time. These include the Babao 八堡 irrigation ditch on the
Changhua Plain 彰化平原 and the Hulutun 葫蘆墩 irrigation ditch
built in the Taichung Basin 臺中盆地. Rice and sugar production
increased rapidly, with large quantities exported to China. Taiwan was
gradually becoming a granary for southeastern China.
As most immigrants were not wealthy, how could the costly and laborious
task of re-claiming opening the land be accomplished in such a short
period of time? The reason is found in the cooperative system of
cultivation. During the Ching dynasty, rich and influential families
applied to the government for cultivation licenses to become land
developers. Since the lands were vast and cultivation permits only lasted
three to five years, applicants would recruit leasers to perform the actual
work, by using their own labor and capital. As a result, each was
responsible for part of the effort and took part of the risk, allowing the
task of cultivation to be accomplished swiftly. In fact, most of the
applications filed were not by individuals, but by partnerships or familial
organizations, allowing their concerted efforts to be transformed into a
ground-breaking power. A double land ownership system was thus
46
created after the land had been cultivated, wherein applicants became
legal landowners, or major landowners, while leasers held permanent
tenancy rights and thus became joint landlords, or minor landowners. The
minor landowners could recruit petty tenant farmers to cultivate their
lands or even sell their permanent tenancy rights. This double land
ownership system allowed major landowners to become very wealthy
during the early stages. By the middle period, however, this scenario was
already on the decline. In its place, many minor landowners began to
sprout up, such as the Lin families in Banciao 板橋 and Wufong 霧峰.
Soon, the majority of Taiwan’s lands consisted of small tenant farms.
Cross-Strait Economic Complementariness: Commercial
Development
Taiwan was rich in agricultural products but not in producing daily goods.
China, on the other hand, lacked rice in Fujian Province and sugar in its
central and northern regions, but had a well-developed crafts industry and
an abundance of daily commodities at low prices. Frequent trade between
the two sides contributed to the development of complementary
economies. Primary exports from Taiwan were rice, sugar, peanut oil, and
indigo, while the main imports were textiles, porcelain, construction
materials, and daily commodities. Due to the large volume of trade taking
place, jiao 郊 ( guild, special business associations responsible for
formulating trade regulations) began to appear. Before long, jiao
businessmen were conducting most of the cross-strait trade.
47
Merchant associations were named after the place traded with, or the
commodity being traded. For example, Xia jiao 廈郊 referred to the
business organization trading with Xiamen Port, while the bu [cloth] jiao
布郊 dealt with the textile trade. Tainan had three major jiao: a bei
[northern] jiao 北郊, nan [southern] jiao 南郊, and tang [sugar] jiao 糖
郊. Lugang 鹿港, the major port in central Taiwan, had eight jiao,
including a Quan[zhou] jiao 泉郊, a bu [cloth] jiao, and you [oil] jiao 油
郊. Due to the thriving trade, many prosperous ports arose along Taiwan’s
coastline, including Tainan, Lugang, and Bangka 艋舺 (renamed
Wanhua 萬華 in Mandarin), which were the three largest ports. Wealthy
merchants from the jiao trade began to become as influential as Taiwan’s
wealthy
landlords. For instance, the aforementioned three jiao of Tainan
pooled their resources to establish the sanyitang 三益堂, a rich
organization that often donated money to the government for public
services and once even organized its own militia to help suppress a
rebellion.
Opening Ports and Entering the Global System: The Introduction of
Western Commerce and Culture (1860-1895)
Taiwan was an important intersection on East Asian shipping routes, a
primary source of the rare substance, camphor, and had rich reserves of
coal, an important energy resource. It was only natural, therefore, that
48
Western countries were interested in conducting trade with Taiwan. In the
aftermath of the Anglo-French Expedition against Beijing, the Treaty of
Tianjin 天津條約 was signed in 1858 and the Treaty of Beijing 北京條
約 in 1860, both of which forced Taiwan to open its ports to foreign trade.
In 1862, Danshuei Port became the first to be opened, and the British
Consulate was established to promote trade. The United Kingdom also
claimed that Danshuei Port included Dadaocheng 大稻埕 and Bangka,
forcing their opening too. The following years, Anping, Keelung, and
Dagou 打狗 (today’s Kaohsiung) ports were also opened. As a result,
foreign businessmen could legally live and trade along the shores by
these ports, and many set up firms for trade, including Jardine, Matheson
& Co., Dent & Co., Dodd & Co., Elles & Co., and Boyd & Co. In
addition to opium, these firms imported textiles, metals, coal, kerosene,
matches, and other Western goods to Taiwan while exporting sugar,
camphor, and tea to the rest of the world. Tea was Taiwan’s most
significant and largest export item, and the primary source of its trade
surplus with the rest of the world. Formosan Oolong tea was especially
popular and enjoyed global fame. Due to Taiwan’s trade surplus, people’s
standard of living gradually improved. Moreover, closer trade relations
with other countries and participation in the world economic system led
to a decline in its complementary economic relationship with China.
More importantly, the economic structure began to undergo tremendous
changes, transforming from an economy based on rice and sugar
production to one based on tea, sugar, and camphor. Since the new
49
products were produced primarily in the north, northern Taiwan soon
surpassed southern Taiwan to become the new economic, political, and
cultural center of the island.
The opening of Taiwan’s ports not only allowed foreign businessmen to
enter, it also brought in Western religions, such as Catholicism and
Presbyterian church. Before long, these two became the most prominent
Western religions on the island, especially after establishment of the
English Presbyterian Church in southern Taiwan by Dr. James L.
Maxwell and the building of the Canadian Presbyterian Church in
northern Taiwan by George L. MacKay. Western missionaries were
enthusiastic in preaching the gospel to the local populace and quickly
established churches everywhere. To enhance the ability to read Bible,
missionaries developed a Romanized writing system of Taiwanese dialect
(Peh-oe-ji 白話字), which also helped to raise literacy. The Presbyterian
Church even published the first Presbyterian Gazette in Taiwan. In
addition, the church built hospitals and schools, and introduced Western
culture. All these were very beneficial to raising the cultural standards of
the Taiwanese people.
Slow Development of Culture and Education
Compared with its rapidly developing economy, Taiwan’s cultural and
educational systems lagged behind. Traditionally, the Chinese way of
administering the state involved bringing in new talent through an
imperial examination and official appointment system, as well as
50
establishment of political and legal systems. The people’s support was
gained by directly involving them in the empire’s development. Special
incentives were usually given to encourage people living in remote areas
to attend school. Taiwan was no exception, with special quotas given to
Taiwanese students. In the beginning, Taiwanese people were not very
interested in attaining scholarly honor or official rank, for four main
reasons. Firstly, since many Taiwanese were immigrants, their first
priority was to make a living, and they did not have time to pursue such
goals as scholarly honor or official rank. Secondly, the quality of
Taiwan’s educational facilities and teachers was not very high, and
students were unable to compete with those from China. Thirdly, because
Taiwan’s economy thrived, the people had opportunities to get rich
without having to seek promotion via the imperial examination system.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, constant internal disturbances and
foreign aggression forced the government to ask local gentries to donate
money for recruiting soldiers to serve in the Ching court. As a result,
many rich families were able to obtain scholarly honor or official rank
through direct donations or other military contributions without having to
go through the imperial examinations normally required for such honors.
Indeed, during the Ching dynasty, many Taiwanese gentry became
gongsheng 貢生 or jiansheng 監生—students of the imperial
academy—through such donations.
Since the early Taiwanese were not very interested in education, a large
number of students from China, pretending to be Taiwanese, came to the
island to enroll as candidates for the civil service examinations and
51
thereby avoid the more competitive examination environments that they
would have to face in their hometowns. After the reigns of Emperor
Jiacing 嘉慶 (1796-1821) and Emperor Daoguang 道光 (1821-1851) ,
however, this phenomenon decreased gradually, in part because more
Taiwanese people began to participate in imperial examinations. At first,
most Taiwanese candidates took part in the military course exams wuke
武科, but by the time of Emperor Daoguang’s reign, the number of
candidates for the wenke 文科 exams for civil servants was already
beginning to surpass those for wuke. By the time of Emperor Sianfong 咸
豐 (1851-1862) and Emperor Guangsyu 光緒 (1875-1908), the ratio of
wenke candidates to wuke candidates among the juren 舉人, successful
candidates of provincial examinations, was already 2.18 to 1. Taiwan was
slowly moving towards a better-cultureded period.
Turbulent Immigration Society (1683-1895): Clashes Between the
Han Chinese and Taiwan’s Indigenous Peoples - Rebellions and
Conflicts
During the Ching dynasty, Taiwan was still largely a turbulent immigrant
society characterized by a lack of law and order, frequent uprisings, and
few guarantees for personal life and property. It was not until the 19th
century that Taiwanese society began to gradually enjoy a degree of civil
rule. In addition to clashes between the Han Chinese and Taiwan’s
indigenous peoples, there was also a great deal of unrest caused by
52
constant rebellions against the state and numerous armed inter-ethnic
conflicts.
After the Jhu Yi-guei 朱一貴 Rebellion in 1721, Lan Ding-yuan 藍鼎
元, an imperial official during the Ching dynasty, reported: “The people
of Taiwan have an inclination for rebellions the same way that moths are
drawn to a flame, and even though many die, there are still many more
followers… Whenever a rebellion has been suppressed, it soon emerges
again.” During the reign of Emperor Daoguang, Taiwan Governor Syu
Zong-gan 徐宗幹 repeated: “A minor putsch takes place every three
years, and a major uprising takes place every five years.” During the
reigns of Emperors Tongjhih 同治 and Guangsyu, a juren from
Guangdong Province named Wu Zih-guang 吳子光 quoted an adage
saying “no rebellion in Taiwan has ever really succeeded, and no
suppression has ever really succeeded either.” These comments reflect the
frequent turbulence and unrest occurring in Taiwan at the time. There
were several reasons for this instability. Firstly, poor bureaucratic
discipline combined with rampant corruption and oppression led to
popular discontent. Secondly, since Taiwan was relatively far away from
China, it was only natural for some Taiwanese to harbor intentions of
breaking away from the Ching court’s control. Thirdly, since many
immigrants were single men, it was quite common for them to form
tightly knit groups for support. Whenever there was a disturbance, they
53
would rally together and respond to trouble as a group, consequently
escalating small incidents into larger ones. The three most serious
rebellions in Taiwanese history were the Jhu Yi-guei 朱一貴 Rebellion
(1721) , the Lin Shuang-wen 林爽文 Rebellion (1786), and the Dai
Chao-chun 戴潮春 Rebellion (1862). The resulting chaos created by
these major rebellions affected most of the island, and forced the Ching
court to send troops to Taiwan to suppress the rebellions. Smaller
uprisings happened frequently.
Rampant Armed Conflicts Between Population Groups
During the Ching dynasty, frequent armed conflicts were a huge social
problem. The Annals of Prefectures and Counties records 42 major fights
in Taiwan in the period. The first was the armed conflict between
Fujianese and Cantonese in Fongshan County 鳳山縣 in 1722; the last
was between the Sie 謝 and Huang 黃 families in Tainan’s Syuejiabao
學甲堡 in 1894. Wei Yuan 魏源 (1794-1857) suggests in his book
Notes on the Royal Military Actions (Sheng Wu Ji Lue 聖武紀略) that
“Minor fights occurred every seven or eight years, while a major one
occurred on average after a decade or so.”
Many of Taiwan’s armed conflicts stemmed from economic factors, such
as between groups contending for area of land, water, or other business
resources. Moreover, since most immigrants usually lived in compact
communities with people coming from the same village or hometown,
54
such as the Quan Village 泉莊, Zhang Village 漳莊, and Yue Village 粵
莊, individual disagreements or grievances often escalated into larger,
more serious disputes, resulting in armed conflict. To maintain their own
bases of power, many local authorities attempted to suppress disturbances
by using their pre-existing sub-ethnic or clannish tensions. For example,
when immigrants from Zhangzhou 漳州 began an armed rebellion, the
local authorities recruited Hakkas or immigrants from Zhangzhou or
Quanzhou to deal with them. The four major categories of armed
conflicts were the Min-Yue 閩粵 (strife between Fujianese and
Cantonese), the Zhang-Quan 漳泉 (strife between Fujian immigrants
from Zhangzhou and Quanzhou), labor conflicts, and conflicts between
specific families or clans (i.e., between different surnames 姓). The
Min-Yue conflicts began with the Jhu Yi-guei Rebellion in 1721, while
the Zhang-Quan conflicts originated in 1782 from gambling disputes in
the Cihtong Village 莿桐莊 of Changhua 彰化.
Armed conflicts were not just limited to clans, but sometimes involved
entire counties, or even the whole island. The most common weapons
used were knives and clubs, but sometimes included firearms. Feuds
could last anywhere from several days to several months or even years,
and the animosity often lasted for several generations. Larger fights
usually entailed heavy casualties, and numerous small temples—such as
da jhong ye 大眾爺 and wanshan tongguei 萬善同歸—were placed
55
around the island for worshipping the ghosts of those who died from the
fighting. Survivors from the losing side in these conflicts frequently
moved to other areas od same origins. For example, many Hakkas left the
Taipei area and moved to Hsinchu 新竹 or Taoyuan 桃園; those of
Zhangzhou origin moved to Shihlin New Street 士林新街; and following
the fights between the merchant guilds of ding jiao 頂郊 and sia jiao 下
郊 in Bangka during the third year of Emperor Sianfong (1853),
immigrants originating from [Xiamen’s] Tongan 同安 moved to
Dadaocheng 大稻埕.
Feuds between different groups were a huge, destructive factor in the
history of Taiwan. Even local authorities were often powerless. Of graver
consequence was the fact that such strife led to splits among the
Quanzhou, Zhangzhou, and Hakka immigrants, causing ethnic
confrontations and hindering the formation of a “Taiwanese”
consciousness.
The Mudan Tribe Incident 牡丹社事件 and the Beginning of the
Positve Policy of Actively Administering Taiwan (1874-1895)
During the 19th century, the power of the West’s industrial revolution and
its imperialist foreign policies and military might began to affect the Far
East. The weak Ching Empire was unable to withstand the Western
onslaught and, consequently, Taiwan suffered from frequent foreign
56
aggression, especially since the Ching court considered the island to be
relatively unimportant. With the arrival of new sea powers in the 19th
century, however, Taiwan suddenly gained in importance due to its
strategic location on the heavily trafficked East Asian shipping lanes. In
addition, Taiwan’s rich coal, camphor, and other resources began to be
coveted by foreign powers. Lastly, the perilous waters around Taiwan
were made even more dangerous by the island’s lack of navigational
facilities, such as lighthouses, and frequent accidents forced shipwreck
survivors onto the island, where they were often killed or robbed by
Taiwan’s indigenous peoples. All these were used as excuses for even
greater external interference and aggression.
During the Opium War, two British naval vessels, the Nerbuda in 1841
and the Ann in 1842, were defeated by Taiwanese and Hakka troops while
harassing Keelung and Daan 大安 harbors. Many British sailors and
soldiers were captured from both ships and subsequently killed by Da
Hong-a 達洪阿, commander of Taiwan and Yao Ying 姚瑩, circuit
commissioner after receiving permission from the emperor to execute
them. After the Opium War, the British government lodged an official
protest with the Ching court, which found both Da Hong-a and Yao Ying
responsible for their actions and relieved them of their posts.
In 1854, US Commodore Matthew Perry ordered an American ship to
Keelung to investigate the coal mines there. Later, using the importance
of Taiwan’s coal production to American interests and the island’s
strategic position in Asia as excuses, Perry recommended to the American
57
government that the United States occupy Taiwan. In 1867, the American
ship Rover ran aground at Cisingyan 七星岩 off the shores of Langciao
琅嶠 (modern day Pingtung 屏東), and most of the surviving crewmen
were subsequently killed by local aborigines. This prompted the signing
of an agreement between American consul at Amoy, General Charles
William Le Gendre, and Chief Toketok 卓其督 of the 18 tribal
communities (she) 十八社 in Langciao, in which the aborigines
promised not to harm survivors from shipwrecks. Following the signing
of this treaty between the US government and an indigenous group, it
began to be said that “uncivilized lands do not belong to China,” and this
saying would later be used to justify the Japanese invasion of Taiwan. In
1868, using the excuse that “Eastern Taiwan (Houshan 後山) does not
belong to China,” two entrepreneurs—a German merchant named James
Milisch and a Englishman surnamed Horn—together illegally reclaimed
wastelands in Da-nan-ao 大南澳 for cultivation. That same year, the
local government in Taiwan confiscated a shipment of camphor products
being smuggled by British merchants. This prompted the British Empire
to dispatch ships and troops to attack and occupy Anping. Subsequently,
the Taiwan circuit commissioner was forced to sign an agreement with
Britain on the free trade of all camphor products.
The event that most seriously threatened the Ching court’s ruling power
over Taiwan was the Mudan Tribe Incident. In 1871, several Japanese
fishermen from the Ryukyu Islands were forced into Bayaowan 八瑤灣
58
(modern day Taitung 臺東) because of a typhoon, and were killed by the
aborigines of Mudan Village. Under the pretense of protecting its people
and seeking justice for the fishermen’s deaths, Japan lodged an official
protest with the Ching court. The Ching court responded that the area
where the event occurred was “uncivilized land,” and therefore the Ching
Empire could not hold the Taiwan government responsible or punish it for
the actions of the local aborigines. In 1874, citing these words and using
the excuse that “uncivilized land does not belong to China,” Japan sent
troops to invade Taiwan. Japanese troops penetrated as far as the
mountainous areas of Pingtung and were preparing to set up a permanent
base there when the Ching court sent Imperial Commissioner 欽差大臣
Shen Bao-jhen 沈葆楨 to handle the matter. After repeated negotiation,
an agreement was signed in which the Ching court agreed to compensate
Japan 500,000 taels of silver in return for Japan’s withdrawal from
Taiwan.
In light of these events, the Ching court re-examined the changing world
situation and the major problem of foreign aggression, and then modified
its former policy of “guarding against Taiwan” to one of “guarding
against foreign powers.” Thus, after 200 years of turbulent rule, the Ching
court’s control over Taiwan suddenly became extremely tight. Although a
few small unrests were still inevitable, serious rebellion was all but
impossible. Following the Mudan Tribe Incident, under the suggestion of
Imperial Commissioner Shen Bao-jhen, the Ching court began to
implement a policy of actively governing Taiwan. Firstly, to strengthen
59
administrative organization, the Ching court doubled Taiwan’s
government structure from one prefecture 府, four counties 縣, and three
semi-counties 廳, to two prefectures, eight counties, and four
semi-counties. The second prefecture, Taipei Prefecture, was established
in northern Taiwan, and the provincial governor of Fuchien was stationed
in Taiwan for half of each year. Secondly, the Ching court expedited work
for opening up mountain roads, suppressing the un-Sinicized aborigines
生番, and soliciting people to reclaim wastelands for cultivation so as to
eliminate foreign influence. Thirdly, the Ching court began to modernize
infrastructure for the primary purpose of defense. This included building
telegraph lines and establishing new-style forts. In this manner, Taiwan
gradually joined the ranks of China’s 30-year “self-strengthening”
movement.
The Sino-French War, Taiwan’s Acquisition of Provincial Status, and
Liou Ming-jhuan’s Modernization Drive
As the Sino-French War (1884-1885) began to spread, French forces
invaded northern Taiwan. Liou Ming-jhuan 劉銘傳, an official of the
Ching court, was sent to defend Taiwa. Although French troops occupied
Yuemei Mountain 月眉山, Shenaukeng 深澳坑, and Nuannuan 暖暖
via Keelung, they were defeated by a combined force of Ching troops and
local militia at Danshuei using Liou’s strategy of “evacuating Keelung to
protect Danshuei.” After these defeats, the French turned their attacks
60
toward the Mawei Shipyard 馬尾造船廠 in Fuchou , occupied the Penghu
Islands, and imposed a blockade on Taiwan. As a result, Taiwan’s
trade-based economy was severely disrupted, leading to tremendous
inflation and difficulties in the people’s livelihood. Despite the embargo’s
success, however, France was unable to accomplish anything further
militarily. Eventually, a truce was signed between the two countries and
France lifted its embargo against Taiwan.
In 1885, after the Sino-French War, the Ching court had learnt its lesson
and issued an imperial order making Taiwan a province of China,
appointing Liou Ming-jhuan as its first provincial governor. Following his
appointment, Liou began to implement sweeping reforms in Taiwan.
Firstly, Liou expanded Taiwan’s administrative organizations into three
prefectures 府, one autonomous prefecture 州, 11 counties 縣, and three
semi-counties 廳.
Secondly, he implemented tax reforms intended to simplify the land
ownership system by eliminating double land ownership. He also
increased tax revenues for infrastructure development. Although Liou’s
land reforms were only partially successful, the goal of increasing taxes
and revenues was achieved, with annual agricultural land taxes rising
from 180,000 taels to 670,000 taels.
Thirdly, Liou cooperated with officials and local gentry to open up the
mountains and placate the aborigines, thereby resolving the problems of
61
internal governance. This task was primarily carried out with assistance
from two prestigious families, both surnamed Lin (one family in Banciao
板橋 and the other in Wufong 霧峰). Lin Wei-yuan 林維源 from
Banciao was appointed to the post of assistant land developer and
appeasement officer 幫辦撫墾大臣, but in reality was in charge of
aboriginal affairs. Lin Jhao-dong 林朝棟 from Wufong was given the
title of assistant central-range appeasement developer 中路撫墾幫辦
and command of the armed forces, making him responsible for quelling
aboriginal rebellions. Due to the efforts of Liou’s administration and the
two Lin families, these policies were carried out fairly well, and soon the
Ching Empire’s governance of Taiwan gradually permeated throughout
Taiwan’s mountain areas.
Liou’s primary administrative goal and greatest achievement was
modernizing Taiwan’s infrastructure. Thus, aside from his military
contributions of establishing the Bureau of Weaponry and Machinery 機
器局 and setting up new artillery emplacements, his most praiseworthy
achievement was modernizing the island’s transportation system,
especially Taiwan’s railways. Under Liou’s administration, the planning
and laying down of railway tracks connecting Keelung and Tainan was
begun in 1887 to overcome difficulties of transporting goods and people
between northern and southern Taiwan. In 1891, after four years of effort,
the Keelung-Taipei section was finished; and in 1893, two years after
Liou had abdicated his position as governor, the Taipei-Hsinchu section
62
was completed. This railway was not only the first one in Taiwan
constructed by the Chinese, but also the first form of convenient, modern
transportation that the Taiwanese people were able to enjoy ahead of their
compatriots on the mainland. In 1888, Liou had also established the first
post office in Chinese history. Other important administrative
achievements made under his governance included the establishment of a
telegraph school 電報學堂, a Western-style school 西學堂, the Bureau of
Commerce 商務局, and the development of new industries such as coal,
gold, crude oil, sulfur, cotton, and silk. Liou also initiated urban
development in Taipei via the construction of western-style buildings,
roadways, and the use of electric street lamps for illumination. All of
these achievements reveal Liou’s high ambitions, and Taiwan was
commended at the time for being the most advanced province in the
Ching Empire. Nonetheless, after Liou’s abdication in 1891, his successor
to the post of provincial governor abandoned most of the construction
plans that Liou had set in motion. Soon thereafter, in 1895, Taiwan was
ceded to Japan.
63
CHAPTER 6
Colonization and Modernization under Japanese Rule (1895-1945)
In 1895, Taiwan was ceded to Japan following the Ching dynasty’s defeat
in the Sino-Japanese War. Despite attempts to found a Republic of Taiwan
臺灣民主國 and mobilize militia to repel the Japanese, the Taiwanese
were subdued within five months. For the next 50 years until Japan’s
defeat by Allied forces in 1945 at the conclusion of the Second World
War, Taiwan remained a Japanese colony.
Japan governed Taiwan in the same way that Western nations ruled their
colonies, but with oriental features such as authoritarian despotism and
enlightened Confucianism, which had a far-reaching impact on Taiwanese
society. The colonial government was committed to developing Taiwan to
meet Japan’s needs and achieved noticeable progress both materially and
culturally, in spite of its authoritarian rule and subsequent anti-colonial
movements among Taiwan’s people due to discriminations. In other
words, colonization and modernization went hand in hand, laying the
foundation for post-war development while creating difficulties for the
Chinese to rule smoothly as they were not so advanced.
The following section summarizes Taiwan’s resistance before cession to
Japan, the establishment of an authoritarian system, evolution of Japan’s
colonial policy, economic policy shift from an early emphasis on
agriculture to the later focus on industry, inequality in modern education,
discrimination, and non-military forms of resistance.
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The Republic of Taiwan and Uprisings against Taiwan’s Cession to
Japan
In 1894, war broke out between Japan and China over disputes in the
Korean Peninsula. Within one year, China had been defeated. On April 17,
1895, the Ching court signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki 馬關條約,
under which Taiwan was ceded to Japan. Taiwan’s people, after
struggling for more than 200 years to transform the island into a place
they could call home, naturally rejected this turn of events and were
highly perturbed when news arrived of Taiwan’s cession to Japan. When
their protests to the Ching court fell on deaf ears, Taiwan gentry resolved
to establish a Republic of Taiwan to resist Japanese rule. On May 23, the
Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Taiwan was proclaimed.
Two days later, a ceremony celebrating the founding of the new republic
was held in Taipei, and the Ching-appointed governor to Taiwan, Tang
Jing-song 唐景崧, was named president. However, the East Asia’s first
republic, which was founded expediently to resist Japanese occupation,
existed for only a very short period of time, collapsing as soon as
Japanese troops equipped with modern weapons launched a large-scale
invasion of Taiwan.
Taiwanese refusal to peacefully cede Taiwan under the Treaty of
Shimonoseki 馬關條約 forced Japan to dispatch a division of imperial
guards under the leadership of Prince Kitashirakawanomiya Yoshihisa 北
白川宮能久 to quell Taiwan. The Japanese expedition troops stayed
65
away from the better-guarded Danshuei 淡水 and Keelung Port 基隆港
areas and, instead, on May 29, 1895, landed at the small fishing village of
Yanliao 鹽寮 in northeastern Taiwan (now in Yilan County) before
marching northwest. On June 2, Governor-General Sukenori Kabayama
樺山資紀 completed the cession procedures with Ching delegate Li
Jing-fang 李經方 off the Keelung coast, and then joined the invading
troops. Japanese forces overcame all resistance, taking control of Keelung
on June 3 and Shueifanjiao 水返腳 (modern day Sijhih 汐止) on June 6.
As they pressed forward to Taipei City and the situation grew more
perilous, soldiers from the Ching army offered little resistance. On June 6,
Republic of Taiwan president Tang Jing-song and his family fled to China.
Left behind without a leader, soldiers from the Ching army began to
randomly kill, plunder, and burn, spreading terror throughout Taipei City.
The gentry and foreign merchants agreed to send representatives to greet
the Japanese troops at Shueifanjiao. Thus, on June 7, Japanese troops
entered Taipei without any bloodshed and, on June 17, Governor-General
Kabayama held an inauguration ceremony there to mark the beginning of
Japanese colonial rule over Taiwan. This day came to be known as
Commemoration Day of Opening Rule.
Despite the collapse of the Ching army, however, many Taiwanese local
leaders continued to organize militia to resist Japanese invaders in an
effort to protect their homeland. Besides, General Liou Yong-fu 劉永福,
who had fought against French imperialists in Viet-nam, moved to Tainan,
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making it a new center for anti-Japanese efforts. To raise funds for
military needs, he issued official monetary notes and stocks. On June 19,
Japanese troops heading southward encountered a series of resistance
staged by these local militiamen at Sansia 三峽 and Hsinchu in north
Taiwan, Changhua in central Taiwan, and areas around the Zengwen
River 曾文溪 and Pingtung 屏東 in southern Taiwan. These Taiwanese
militia were poorly organized, lacking training and funding, and
ill-equipped, and so posed little threat to Japan’s modern army and were
quickly forced to retreat as Japanese forces swept from north to south.
After the fall of Changhua, Japanese reinforcements arrived via three
different routes from northern, southern, and central Taiwan to besiege
Tainan. On October 21, 1895, through mediation by the gentry and
missionaries, Japanese forces entered Tainan without resistance and thus
ended the war against colonial rule by the Republic of Taiwan.
In addition to revolts against foreign rule in defense of the homeland
during the early period of Japanese rule, small isolated uprisings
continued to occur, triggered by conflicts of interest between traditional
local power bases and the modern colonial government. Among the
best-known uprisings, were those led by Jian Da-shih 簡大獅 and Chen
Ciou-jyu 陳秋菊 in northern Taiwan, Ke Tie 柯鐵 in central Taiwan,
and Lin Shao-mao 林少貓 in southern Taiwan. By 1902, however,
Taiwanese people had gradually become appeased by the carrot-and-stick
policies of the new Office of the Governor-General. While massive
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civilian revolts subsided, there were occasional armed uprisings, often
caused by the forced acquisition of land required for construction projects,
conflicts of interest in the camphor trade, or the 1911 Revolution in China.
The more notable uprisings were the 1907 Beipu 北埔 Incident (led by
Cai Ching-lin 蔡清琳), the 1912-1913 Luo Fu-sing 羅福星 Incident,
and the 1915 Silai Temple Incident (led by Yu Ching-fang 余清芳).
Nevertheless, the Japanese colonial government had largely gained
control of Taiwan ever since.
Establishment of Authoritarian Rule and Evolution of Colonial
Policy
In the early days of the Japanese colonial rule, Taiwan’s residents were
allowed a two- year leniency to choose between Japanese and Chinese
nationalities, but by the deadline on May 8, 1897, only about 4,500
persons (0.16 percent of Taiwan’s 2.8 million people) had registered
officially to leave Taiwan for China. Clearly, after two centuries of
migration and development, most descendents of Chinese immigrants
were now indigenized and regarded Taiwan as their homeland. Moreover,
when it became clear that the resistance to the Ching court’s cession of
Taiwan to Japan was futile, most people in Taiwan accepted Japanese rule
as reality.
How Japan could govern Taiwan was not such a simple matter, however.
Unlike western nations of that time, who were both militarily strong and
economically mature enough to export capital and technology to their
colonies, Japan was still an immature imperialist nation, lacking the
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advanced technologies and sufficient capital to be a true colonial power.
Moreover, Japan was also short of experience since Taiwan was its first
colony.
Large-scale surveys and research were immediately undertaken to act as a
basis for Japan’s governance of its colony. While taking into account
Japan’s unique national environment and the colony’s circumstances,
Japan also referred extensively to the colonial experiences of Western
nations. Eventually, however, it adopted a more direct form of rule than
those generally adopted by Western colonialists, establishing
bureaucracies that were dominated vertically by Japanese nationals and
aimed at implementation of national policies by the colonial government.
Japan’s governor-general was given wide administrative, judicial, and
military powers to rule Taiwan as a special administrative region. In other
words, the governor-general, granted wide ranges of powers under Law
No. 63, became a dictator de facto in Taiwan.
The Office of the Governor-General (OGG) was the highest authority in
Taiwan, followed by the Director of the Home Affairs Bureau (later
called the Chief of Home Affairs). During the initial period of Japanese
rule, generals were appointed to the post of Taiwan governor-general in
order to suppress local uprisings more effectively. By 1919, however,
social transformations, the influence of a worldwide trend towards
self-determination, and the change of Japan’s central government from a
cabinet government composed of feudal lords and officials into a political
party-based cabinet, led Japan to replace these military officers with
civilians. Kenjiro Den 田健治郎 was the first civilian governor-general
without the military power, which was given to the newly established
post of Taiwan Commander. In 1921, Law No. 63 was replaced by Law
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No. 3, which further restricted the Taiwan governor-general’s power.
However, in the 1930s, as Japan undertook a more aggressive foreign
policy and prepared for wars, this trend was reversed and the military
governor-generalship was re-installed in 1936 until Japanese surrender in
1945. Whatever it was, the true nature of the governor-generalship of
Taiwan was one of dictatorship, designed to meet Japan’s needs without
any regard for its colonial subjects.
In addition to this dictatorship, in order to rule Taiwan effectively, the
OGG set up a well-organized local administrative . Following numerous
revisions, by the 1920s this had divided Taiwan into five prefectures and
three sub-prefectures 五州三廳制, under which were shih 市 (“town”),
jie 街 (“street”), jhang（village）as local administrations. The strictly
defined levels of the administrative system were run by a body of
Japanese bureaucrats, with Taiwanese clerks at the lowest levels merely
being responsible for carrying out orders. This allowed the OGG to
implement political orders effectively. More importantly, police stations
were established throughout the island, supplemented by traditional
Chinese baojia （保甲 social security units）, which served as the eyes,
ears, and complementary units of the local government, and ensured that
laws and decrees were properly enforced. In 1928, the Special High
Police was established to control people’s thoughts and actions and, in
1937, the Economic Police was established to supervizel wartime
economic affairs. This widespread police network, operating under the
OGG, continued to expand its power throughout Taiwan, eventually
giving the island a reputation of being a “police state” governed by
“police politics.” The strictness and effectiveness of Japan’s colonial rule
made it unique among all colonialists worldwide.
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One constant policy of this colonial governance was the naturalization of
Taiwanese. Its evolution can be subdivided into three stages: i)
appeasement and special governance, ii) assimilation of Taiwan as an
extension of homeland Japan, and iii) Japanization.
During the first stage of appeasement and special governance
(1895-1918), the colonial government recognized differences in language,
history, culture, and customs between Taiwan and Japan, and did not
apply the Meiji Constitution to Taiwan instantly. Instead, Japan made
Taiwan special governance with a different legal system from that of
Japan, of which Law No. 63 was an important example. High-handed
military rule was initially adopted to counter instability in the early period
of colonization and then later revised by trial and error. In addition to
military suppression, softer measures were also implemented to pacify the
Taiwanese people. The most famous of these pioneering policies was the
“principle of biology” adopted by Home Affairs Director Shimpei Goto
後藤新平 under Governor-General Gentaro Kodama 兒玉源太郎. Goto,
a medical scholar trained in Germany, likened governing a country to
treating an illness and believed that a proper diagnosis was needed before
any medication could be prescribed. He promoted a series of large-scale
investigations of traditional Taiwanese systems and customs to see what
could be retained and what should be discarded. Customs that were still
useful were absorbed into the new system before progressive
modernization reforms were implemented. These included the
establishment of a system of “one farm with one owner” 一田一主,
which was carried out by purchasing the landownership of major
landholders, a gradual ban on opium, and the incorporation of old
customs into the modern legal system. During this stage, Taiwan’s legal
system differed from that of the Japanese homeland.
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The second stage of colonial rule was assimilation, which sought to make
Taiwan an extension of the Japanese homeland (1919-1936). The end of
World War I in 1918 ushered in a new respect for the concepts of
democracy, freedom, and ethnic self-determination. At that time,
education in Taiwan was also improving and becoming increasingly
widespread. Consequently, there was a growing awareness of
self-determination and equality among the Taiwanese people. At the same
time, as the first party-based cabinet government emerged in Japan, the
military governor-general of Taiwan was replaced by a civilian, and Law
No. 63 was abolished. To cope with this new situation, the Japanese
turned to a policy of assimilation, claiming that Taiwan was an extension
of the Japanese homeland（內地延長主義）, and professing to grant equal
treatment to Taiwanese and Japanese, which would give Taiwanese rights
under Japanese codes. Slogans such as “same schools for Japanese and
Taiwanese” 內（日本）臺共學, “legitimization of Inter- marriages
between Japanese and Taiwanese” 內臺婚姻合法化, and “Japan and
Taiwan are one entity” 日臺一體. These efforts to win the hearts of the
Taiwanese people enjoyed only limited success, however, due to the two
sides’ differing expectations and demands.
The third and final stage of colonial rule was that of Japanization 皇民化
(1937-1945). When Admiral Seizo Kobayashi 小林躋造 was appointed
to govern Taiwan in 1936, he proposed new administrative directions for
Taiwan to be based on “Japanization, industrialization, and
southward-base construction” 南進基地化. With the outbreak of the
Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Japan entered a state of war in which it was
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suddenly in dire need of large quantities of supplies. In particular,
following the eruption of the Pacific War in 1941, the powerful Allied
forces proved too much for Japan’s national strength and it was forced to
mobilize human and material resources from its colonies. At that time,
Taiwan was not only the southern boundary of imperial Japan but also its
base for southward expansion from which to feed Japanese needs in
South Asia. To this end, Japan not only vigorously promoted the
industrialization of Taiwan to increase the productivity of its war machine,
but also initiated a Japanization movement to assimilate Taiwanese
people into Japanese culture and make them loyal to Japan. Important
measures included giving everybody Japanese names, making Japanese
the only language used, and trying to convert everyone to Shinto. In 1941,
to intensify the policy of Japanization, “Devotion Association of Imperial
Subjects’” 皇民奉公會 were established at different levels of the central
and local administrative units. These organizations were targeted at
fostering people’s dedication to the war effort, reinforcing a work ethic,
and strengthening civil security. The colonial government also used
volunteer servicemen from 1942 to solve the growing problem of soldier
shortages in the Japanese army. Although young Taiwanese were
recruited to work in the Pacific war zone largely as laborers rather than
regular soldiers in the beginning, the Imperial Diet of Japan passed a bill
for the drafting of soldiers from its Taiwan colony at the end of 1944.
In general, however, since most of these Japanization measures went
against the deeply rooted Chinese cultural traditions, they were met with
passive resistance and, by Japan’s surrender at the end of World War II,
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little had been accomplished except an increased use of the Japanese
language.
Modernizing Taiwan’s Agriculture: A Government-guided
Capitalism (1895-1930)
As its capitalist and imperialist development was still in premature stages,
Japan needed to focus on its domestic industries and had scarce resources
for the management of its colonies. To help achieve the political and
economic goals of the empire, however, the Taiwan OGG devoted itself
to improving the island’s infrastructure so as to generate a better
investment environment. It also offered incentives to solicit investments
of Japanese conglomerates. These included drafting industrial
development policies, providing rewards and grants, and ensuring
markets for their products. These low investment costs, low risks, and
high profits attracted many Japanese companies, and Taiwan more or less
attained its goals of modernization.
These economic policies were in consideration of Japanese national
interests rather than those of Taiwan, however, and were subsequently
changed to accord with changes in Japan’s national policy and its
domestic industrial development. Before 1930, the government practice a
policy of “Industrial Japan and Agricultural Taiwan” 工業日本，農業臺
灣. Taiwan focused on producing tropical cash crops and grains, while
served as a market for Japanese industrial products. From around 1930
onwards, the policy shifted to one of “industrial Taiwan and agricultural
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Southeast Asia” 工業臺灣，農業南洋. Taiwan, as a base for Japan’s
southward expansion, industrialization was promoted to make it a new
center for Southeast Asia.
When Japan first acquired Taiwan, its domestic industries were still
developing and so lacked the capacity for large-scale external investment.
To attract their investment, the foremost task for the Taiwan OGG was to
create a favorable environment.
The first step was to improve Taiwan’s infrastructure, especially
transportation, which was done through deficit financing and the issuance
of public bonds. Construction of the Keelung-Kaohsiung railway was
started in 1898. Completion of this north-south artery ten years later, after
overcoming geographic obstacles of mountains and rivers, made Taiwan a
community for the first time in history. Highways, postal services, and
telecommunications were also developed rapidly, connecting the entire
island into a unified economic entity, and allowing resources to flow
freely from Taiwan’s various regions. In order to improve communication
with Japan, ports at Keelung and Kaohsiung were expanded repeatedly
from 1899 onwards, which also increased economic integration between
Taiwan and Japan.
The Taiwan OGG also promoted institutional reforms, including
unification of the currency and of weights and measures, establishment of
modern banks, and census of the population. Land surveys and reform, in
particular, contributed to the establishment of modern land ownership
75
procedures. In addition, forested and inhospitable areas, which were
surveyed and regulated, were sold off to encourage entrepreneurial
development of mountainous areas. The OGG also increased revenues by
updating land surveys, establishing government-owned monopolies,
collecting local taxes, and issuing public bonds.
Completion of various infrastructure projects in the 1910s paved the way
for Taiwan’s truly capitalist development. Further, the target of financial
independence was achieved in 1905, and subsidies from Japan were no
longer required.
A second important step was the effort to attract Japanese investment. To
meet Japan’s urgent need for tropical agricultural products, especially
cane sugar, great attention was paid to developing Taiwan’s agricultural
sector. Using Inazo Nitobe’s 新渡戶稻造 improvement suggestions for
the sugar industry as a blueprint, measures were taken to improve
sugarcane varieties and promote fertilization and mechanization in the
sugar industry. Modern factories gradually replaced the Old-styled sugar
mills dated from the Ching dynasty. Established in 1900, the Taiwan
Sugar Production Corporation 台灣製糖株式會社 was the first of these,
and it was quickly followed by other sugar corporations established under
Japanese private investment but with full support of the Taiwan OGG.
The latter’s pragmatic assistance included capital subsidization,
designation of raw material harvesting areas, and market protection.
Sugar production soared as a result, large quantities were exported to
Japan, and Taiwan became one of the world’s largest sugar producers.
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With Japan’s increasing prosperity and its concomitant increase in rice
consumption, from the 1920s onwards the Taiwan OGG promoted the
island’s rice industry to help meet this demand. Penglai 蓬萊 rice, which
was a domesticated type of Japanese rice, became the main crop. With
water a major limiting factor in agricultural productivity, the OGG also
dedicated itself to building irrigation canals. The completion of the Jianan
Canal 嘉南大圳 at great expense and over 10 years in 1930, the greatest
water conservancy project in East Asia at that time, opened up the Jianan
Plain 嘉南平原 for development of paddy fields no longer dependent on
the natural elements. With this government assistance, Penglai rice was
cultivated throughout Taiwan, production increased, and exports to Japan
soared.
Now that there were two cash crops, sugar and rice, fierce competition for
farmland ensued. Underlying this was the more contentious issue
regarding the balance of economic benefit to the peoples of Japan and
Taiwan. The sugar industry was controlled by Japanese capitalists; rice
production by Taiwanese. Development of rice paddies and increases in
rice prices were beneficial to Taiwanese landowners and farmers,
therefore, but led to diminished profits for the Japanese.
The overall effects of economic developments in this period included a
rise in Taiwan people’s standards of living. These were also greatly
improved by advances in hygiene and medical services, progressive
development of better facilities for water, power, and public
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transportation, installment of telephonic communications, and better city
planning. The colonial government also introduced a seven-day week and
stipulated Sunday as a day of rest, which allowed the general public some
leisure from work. Western movies, music, art, sightseeing tours, and
buses were also introduced.
Industrializing Taiwan: a New Base for Japan’s Southward
Expansion (1930-1945)
From the 1930s onwards, fear of a global economic recession fueled
regionalism. Japan’s increasingly militarist outlook also encouraged it to
become expansionist, invading China to the west and advancing
southward through Southeast Asia in an ambitious attempt to establish a
hegemonic position in East Asia. Due to its location near to Southeast
Asia, Taiwan was chosen as the production base for military necessities
and logistics center for Japan’s southward advance, and increased
industrialization of the island became necessary. In fact, as Japan had
gradually become self-sufficient in foodstuffs and could now acquire
low-priced sugar from Indonesia, Taiwan’s agriculture was no longer so
important. Moreover, following upgrading of Japan’s industries, its less
important industries needed to move to a region of cheaper labor. With its
abundant and cheap hydro-electric power supplies, as well as excellent
basic infrastructure, Taiwan was an ideal site for this investment.
The Sun Moon Lake hydroelectric power plant, completed at massive
cost between 1931 and 1934, proved to be another important milestone in
Japan’s industrialization plans for Taiwan. Ample, low-cost power
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provided by the plant led to the development of Taiwan’s fertilizer,
aluminum, cement, shipbuilding, and other industries. Special emphasis
was given to the chemical, metal, and machinery industries related to
Japan’s military requirements. By the end of Japanese rule, Taiwan’s
industrial infrastructure had been transformed, with agricultural product
processing, heavy and light industries making up 65 percent, 20 percent,
and 15 percent of the industrial sector respectively. The standards of
Taiwan’s industries, although still not very high, were well positioned to
take off. In terms of production value, by 1940, Taiwan’s industrial
production was already 1.4 times that of its agricultural production,
making Taiwan a fledgling industrialized society.
It is noteworthy that Japanese capital was responsible for more than
three-fourths of this industrial capitalization, with only a small fraction
provided by Taiwanese capital. In particular, major Japanese
conglomerates like Mitsui and Mitsubishi dominated the sector. Most of
Taiwan’s industry was either affiliates of Japanese corporations or
extensions of Japanese industries, which were controlled from Japan and
had the underlying objective of supplying the needs of the Japanese
empire.
With implementation of Japan’s southward expansion policies,
Kaohsiung Port in southern Taiwan rose markedly in importance, as it not
only became the island’s largest military port but also developed the
island’s first industrial park nearby. Most of Taiwan’s newly developing
heavy industries were established in this park, which laid the foundation
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of Kaohsiung’s development as an industrial port. During the war period,
Kaohsiung was rapidly transformed into an industrial city, thus
establishing Kaohsiung as the island’s major southern economic center
balancing that of Taipei in the north.
In coordination with the southward expansion policy, the OGG also
promoted off-shore expansion including, at the end of 1936,
establishment of a semi-official Taiwan Development Corporation (TDC)
responsible for development of colonial business both on the island, and
in southern China and Southeast Asia. The TDC provided development
funding to implement economic colonization in conjunction with military
occupation. Under the TDC, the colonial government’s agricultural
experience was transplanted to southern China and Southeast Asia, which
might be considered the first export of Taiwan experience. Financial
institutions also fanned out overseas with the Bank of Taiwan setting up
branches all over East Asia. It also established the Hua-Nan Bank to cater
to the needs of southward expansion and to grasp economic opportunities
in Southeast Asia.
Despite these developments to become a fledgling industrial society in
the 1930s and afterwards, US air raids on Taiwan, which started in 1944,
destroyed a large number of industrial production facilities, setting back
post-war industrial development.
Colonial Unequal and Modern Education
80
Although the Taiwanese were discriminated against in educational
opportunities under Japanese rule, some progress was made, and this had
profound influence on Taiwan’s subsequent social development, and was
an important aspect of the island’s modernization. The education system
consisted of primary secondary, vocational and normal schools, as well as
limited higher education. For local Taiwanese, education was generally
limited to primary, vocational, and normal education, with secondary and
higher education mainly catering for Japanese students.
As part of its efforts to rule Taiwan, the OGG began to promote
Japanese-language education immediately after the Japanese occupied
Taiwan in 1895. Primary education developed rapidly, with the number of
primary schools increasing tenfold from 103 in 1899 to 1,099 in 1944,
and enrollment rising 90-fold from 10,295 to 932,525 students. By March
1944, primary school enrollment rates had reached 71.3 percent for
school children overall, including 83.4 percent for aborigine, 71.2 percent
for Taiwanese, and as high as 99.6 percent for Japanese in Taiwan,
making Taiwan’s enrollment rate second only to Japan out of all Asian
nations.
To promote this expansion of education, a large number of teachers was
required, and so teachers’ education was developed rapidly, including
establishment of the Taipei Normal School 台北師範學校 and Tainan
Normal School 台南師範學校. Teachers, who were given grants during
school years, enjoyed high social status and stable employment. As a
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consequence, many Taiwanese opted to study in Normal Schools and
competition was keen. Many graduates from these schools became key
figures in Taiwan’s social movements.
To increase the people’s productivity, emphasis was also placed on
vocational education, with the establishment of schools of agriculture,
industry, commerce, and maritime studies, as well as continuing
education schools of vocational and technical training. These included the
Taipei School of Industry 台北州立台北工業學校 and Tainan School
of Industry 台南州立台南工業學校; Taipei Commercial School 台北商
業學校, Taichung Business School 台中商業學校, and Kaohsiung
Commercial School 高雄商業學校; Keelung Fishery School 基隆水產
學校; and Chiayi Agriculture and Forestry School 嘉義農林, Pingtung
Agricultural School 屏東農業, and Taichung Agricultural School 台中
農業學校. Continuing education schools were established as affiliates of
primary or vocational schools in order to teach vocational and technical
skills.
The policy of the OGG encouraged Taiwanese students to attend
vocational schools to improve production skills, rather than at secondary
schools or higher education establishments, thereby maintaining Japanese
people’s educational advantages. Local people’s professional skills and
standards were upgraded, however, which not only was conducive to
economic growth at that time but also provided high-quality human
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resources for economic development in the early post-war period.
Taiwan’s secondary and tertiary educational systems developed rather
slowly but made some progress. Major secondary education institutions
included the prefecture-run Taipei Middle School 州立台北中學校 and
Tainan Middle School 州立台南中學校, where a majority of students
were Japanese. After petitioning, a Taichung Middle School 台中中學校
was established specifically for Taiwanese. Schools for women included
the Taipei Girls’ High School 台北高等女學校 and Tainan Girls’ High
School 台南高等女學校. Establishment of private high schools was also
approved. Generally speaking, however, enrollment by Taiwanese
students in secondary education was low, and most educational resources
were devoted to Japanese. Similarly, the only higher educational institute,
Taihoku Imperial University 台北帝國大學 established in 1928, was
almost exclusively for Japanese students and accepted very few
Taiwanese.
By 1944, therefore, there were one university, five colleges, four normal
schools, 46 secondary schools, 117 vocational schools, and two schools
for the aurally and orally impaired. This allocation of educational
resources clearly indicates a disproportionate emphasis by the Japanese
on providing widespread access to primary and vocational education
while paying relatively little attention to secondary or higher education.
Furthermore, many of these schools were for Japanese students living in
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Taiwan, and were not easily accessible to local Taiwanese. Fundamentally,
Japan sought to educate its colonial subjects for the purpose of improving
productivity instead of cultivating a highly educated populace. In the
1920s, therefore, those Taiwanese wishing to pursue a higher education
did so overseas, mainly in Japan, China, and even the United States and
Europe. As a result, almost all of Taiwan’s intellectuals at that time were
educated abroad, and many became pioneers of political and cultural
movements.
Although Taiwan’s colonial education system did not offer equality to
Taiwanese, it had its merits. School enrollment was far higher than it had
ever been under Ching rule, and schools followed a modern curriculum.
Taiwanese people began to learn western cultures and technology, and
were introduced to numerous new ideas, which contributed positively to
the modernization of Taiwan’s society. Widespread primary and
vocational education improved production skills and modern knowledge,
and acted as a catalyst for Taiwan’s post-war economic miracle. As the
rule of law was introduced through school and social education, and with
a judicial system offering a reasonable degree of fairness and justice,
Taiwan avoided the disorder that characterized the later years of the
Ching dynasty in China. People were generally law-abiding, and there
was a high level of social order.
In short, education under the Japanese rule, in spite of its discrimination,
upgraded the cultural level of average Taiwanese and had a profound
influence on post-war development.
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Discriminatory Policies and Uprisings Against Colonial Rule
As has been noted above, Japanese colonial rule helped modernizing
Taiwan and contributed greatly to the island’s development. Nevertheless,
colonial rule betrays human nature. As a consequence, anti-Japanese
activities were incessant and varied as time went on.
Although direct armed revolt against Japanese rule was not witnessed
after the Yu Cing-fang (余清芳) incident at Silai Temple (西來庵) in
1915, this does not mean that anti-colonial sentiment had diminished. In
addition to the ethnic identification of Taiwan’s Han people, intense
dissatisfaction was stirred by the high-handed, discriminatory policies of
the colonial government. The triggering of a series of organized,
large-scale, unarmed, modern-style anti-Japanese movements was
directly related to the international environment in the aftermath of the
First World War. By that time, ideas of democracy and freedom had
become mainstream ideas, and United States President Woodrow
Wilson’s advocacy of self-determination was widely welcomed by
colonial subjects. Success of the 1917 communist revolution in Russia
further stimulated the tides of anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism. In
response to the world trends, Japan entered the “Taisho Democracy”
period of constitutional government in the 1920s, which included
adoption of more lenient and enlightened policies towards its colonies.
The young Taiwanese intellectuals who studied in Japan kindled the
flames of anti-colonialism, which led gradually to a modern anti-Japanese
movement, spreading throughout Taiwan and reaching a peak between
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1920 and 1930. With the exception of the Wushe 霧社 Incident of 1930
in which aborigines revolted, most anti-Japanese activities were
non-violent. Instead, they focused on political, cultural, and social
movements. These shared the common goals of shedding colonial rule
and attaining Taiwanese autonomy.
The Taiwanese students in Japan were the earliest and most deeply
influenced by these new trends, and so became the vanguard and
enlighteners in the anti-Japanese movements. Cai Huei-ru 蔡惠如 and
others studying in Japan in the 1920s and afterwards, joined with Lin
Sian-tang 林獻堂 to establish the New People Association 新民會,
initiating the political reform movement. Their two publications,
Taiwanese Youth 臺灣青年 and the Taiwan People’s Newspaper 台灣民
報, inspired new thinking. In December 1920, Lin, Cai, and Lin Cheng-lu
林呈祿 sought Taiwan self-governance and autonomy by attempting to
request the Japanese Imperial Assembly, through the right of petition
provided for by the constitution, for the establishment of a Taiwan
Assembly. They launched a petition movement of 15times to achieve this
end without success between 1921 and 1934. Nevertheless, these
activities awakened the political and national consciousness of the
Taiwanese.
In addition to such political movements, intellectuals also initiated social
and cultural movements to raise the level of knowledge among average
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people. The Taiwanese Cultural Association 臺灣文化協會, founded in
1921, was the most important organization for the purpose of cultural
enlightenment. It later developed into a multifaceted nationalistic
movement and gave birth to numerous other social activist organizations.
By setting up branch organizations in important cities throughout Taiwan,
it held various kinds of activities, including island-wide cultural lectures,
newspaper reading centers, academic and popular seminars, and summer
schools. The Association provided a new arena for Taiwan’s upper classes
and intellectuals to play their roles in leading Taiwan’s people to fight for
their future.
Unfortunately, from 1927 onwards, the colonial policies of carrots and
whips, combined with disruptions caused by disputes between moderate
and radical intellectuals, consumed much of the Taiwanese Cultural
Association’s energy and even ended with a split. The first political party
in Taiwan’s history, the Taiwanese People’s Party 臺灣民眾黨, was
formed in 1927 under the leadership of Jiang Wei-shuei 蔣渭水. Its main
functions were organizing political resistance activities, correcting poor
social
practices,
and
coordinating
labor
activities
with
fringe
organizations such as the Taiwan Laborers’ General Union. Achievements
were limited, however, due to obstruction by the Japanese, and the party
was disbanded in 1931. There were some more other anti-colonial
movements but all ended without success. The Erlin Incident 二林事件
of 1925, which pitted sugarcane farmers against sugar refineries, led to
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the establishment of a farmers’ organization. This moved a step further
the following year to organize an island-wide Taiwanese Peasant
Association, which, with its Marxist approach, combined with laborers to
carry out resistance. More radical Taiwanese even formed the Taiwan
Communist Party in Shanghai in 1928, loudly proclaiming their slogans
of Taiwanese nationalism, Taiwanese independence, and the creation of a
Republic of Taiwan. They later joined in the activities of the Taiwanese
Cultural Association and the farmers’ organizations, and played leading
roles in the anti-imperialist struggle.
From 1930 onwards, with its rising militarism, Japan moved one step
further towards expansionism, occupying northeastern China in 1931,
launching the war on China in 1937, and initiating the Pacific War in
1941. To coordinate with national policy, the colonial government went
all out to clamp down on the people’s rights, restricting political and
social activities which, with the above-mentioned splits and mutual
distrust within the Taiwanese groups, led to a gradual weakening of the
anti-Japanese movement. The only significant achievement was the
limited election local assemblies, with half the members of prefecture,
city, town, and village assemblies being elected by populace and half
appointed by the government. In this way, Taiwan’s people got their first
taste of democracy, deepening the idea of self-governance in the post-war
period.
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CHAPTER 7
The Transformation of Taiwan under the Republic of China
(1945~1970s):
White Terror
Following Japan’s surrender to the Allies in 1945, Taiwan came under the
rule of the Republic of China (ROC). Upon throwing off of colonial rule,
the Taiwanese welcomed their return to their fatherland. In 1947, less
than two years after the handover, however, a series of factors led to the
February 28 Incident 二二八事件, a violent disturbance that sowed the
seeds of mutual hostility between the Nationalist government2 and the
people of Taiwan. After being defeated by the Chinese Communists and
the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949,3 the
Kuomintang-led government of the ROC retreated to Taiwan, marking
the beginning of an era known as the “ROC on Taiwan.” To safeguard its
regime, the Nationalist government 國府 promulgated the martial law 戒
嚴令 and resorted to high-handed governance to control the population,
which created further antagonism between Taiwan’s society and the
government. Lasting until the Emergency Decree was lifted in 1987, this
became known as the period of “white terror.” However, the nationalist
government also promoted development, and Taiwan’s economy enjoyed
a long period of high growth rate, winning global praise as an “economic
miracle,” and transforming Taiwan into a modern country. Further,
2
Nationalist government 國府: refers to the long-term Kuomintang-led government of the ROC
before the change of the governing party in 2000
3
Chinese communists 中共: refers to both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s
Republic of China, established by the CCP on October 1, 1949
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a ”political miracle ”was added from the 1980s onwards. Responding to
various internal and external challenges, the government gradually and
peacefully establishing democracy, which was unique among Chinese
societies around the world. Taiwan’s history from 1945 to the present is a
story interwoven with expectation and disappointment, frustration and
success, tear and laughter, bitterness and sweetness. It is not only a story
of Taiwan’s transformation from a sparrow into a phoenix, but also an
exemplary record of success in human beings’ striving for freedom and
democratization.
Tragedy after Taiwan’s Retrocession to the ROC—the February 28
Incident (1945-1949)
With the handing over of Taiwan to the ROC in 1945, rather than giving
Taiwan the formal status of a province, the Nationalist government set up
a unique administration called the Taiwan Provincial Governor’s Office
臺灣省行政長官公署 (TPGO). Chen Yi 陳儀 was appointed provincial
governor and made responsible for the island’s military as well as civil
affairs. On October 25, 1945, Chen Yi held a Japanese surrender
ceremony in Sun Yet-san Hall, which marked the beginning of the ROC’s
governance of Taiwan. After his inauguration, Chen announced his goal
of establishing Taiwan as a model province based on Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s
“Three Principles of the People” 三民主義 (nationalism, democracy,
and socialism). Unfortunately, Chen’s controversial policies, stubborn
character and erratic ruling style soon roused wide-spread discontent
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among the Taiwanese people.
With regard to politics, Chen worked under the assumption that the
Taiwanese people had been enslaved by the Japanese and actively
promoted a campaign to re-Sinicize 再中國化 them, ignoring their
strong desires to participate in the island’s politics after the ending of
colonial rule. Thus, with the exception of one “half-mainlander” deputy
director appointed to the Education Department, almost all of Taiwan’s
middle and upper offices were held by the mainlanders.4 Furthermore,
although the speaker of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly only had the
right of consultation, Chen Yi still chose his favorite confidant, another
“half-mainlander” named Huang Chao-cin 黃朝琴, to hold this post,
instead of Lin Sian-tang 林獻堂, a Taiwanese leader who had long
enjoyed public support and confidence ever since the Japanese period. As
mainlanders took most of the mid-level up positions in the government
hierarchy while Taiwanese could only serve at low-level ones, the
provincial governor was viewed as a new version of the Japanese
governor 日本總督, and Taiwan’s return to the ROC was viewed as
merely a “change of bosses” 換老闆.
In 1946, one year after the Japanese surrender, the TPGO abolished
Japanese editions of newspapers, forbid the use of the Japanese language
in both writing and speech, and used proficiency in Chinese as an
4
Taiwanese people called mainlanders, who has arrived after Taiwan’s retrocession in 1945, “A-shan”
阿山 after the word Tangshan 唐山, literally Tang Mountain, which refers to China in general. Those
Taiwanese who had gone to China during the period of Japanese rule and then returned after 1945 were,
therefore, known as “half-mainlanders” 半山, literally “half-mountain.”
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important consideration when recruiting people for government jobs.
Taiwanese intellectuals suddenly became semi-literate, therefore, and
most were excluded from the civil service, which added to people’s
feelings of resentment. In addition, the fact that many mainland officials
were incompetent, corrupt, and soldiers were law-breaking aroused
antipathy and disdain from Taiwan’s people, heightening antagonism
between the public and government officials.
Chen Yi, who was infatuated with socialism and mistakenly attributed
Japan’s economic success in Taiwan to state-controlled policy, radically
enforced it under a slogan of “establishing Taiwan as a model province
based on Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s ‘Three Principles of the People”. His core
policy was for an economic system constructed on the framework of
government-run enterprises. He established a Takeover Committee 接收
委員會 to confiscate important Japanese industries and a Japanese
Property Management Committee 日產處理委員會 to take over private
Japanese assets. Records show that some 860 Japanese enterprises were
taken over, of which the small ones comprising predominantly of
Taiwanese capital were sold off, while the other 399 large-scaled ones
became government owned. These government-owned enterprises
belonged to four categories: state-run enterprises, enterprises jointly run
by the state and province, province-run enterprises, and county/city-run
enterprises. Almost all of the enterprises sold to the private sector were
small; large corporations and fundamental sectors of the up- and
mid-stream industries, such as the sugar, petroleum, electricity, aluminum,
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fertilizer, machinery, shipbuilding, and cement enterprises, were all
absorbed into state-run companies.
Monopolization Bureau of Tobacco and Wine, initiated by the Japanese
governor-general, was continued by Chen’s administration. Further, the
TPGO founded the Taiwan Provincial Trade Company 台灣省貿易公司
to control Taiwan trade, and the Taiwan Railway Administration 台灣省
鐵路局 and Taiwan Highway Bureau 台灣省公路局 to control
transportation. In this way, Chen’s administration effectively controlled
all of Taiwan’s economic activities much more tightly than the Japanese
did. Although Chen expected to solve Taiwan’s social and economic
issues at one go, the results belied his hopes, primarily due to inadequate
supplies, as well as bureaucratic inefficiency and widespread corruption
in Taiwan’s postwar government-run enterprises.
In addition, the civil war between the Nationalists and Communists in
China was reaching a critical phase. Instead of helping Taiwan to recover
in the aftermath of World War II, the Nationalist government was busy
transporting vital materials and supplies out of Taiwan and into China.
This created imbalances between supply and demand in Taiwan, and led
to a dramatic rise in both commodity prices and unemployment. Taiwan
used to be a food exporter, but now began experiencing unprecedented
rice shortages. Major differences in societal development between the
two sides of the Taiwan Strait also led to dissimilar living habits and
customs, which created further confrontation between Taiwanese and
mainlanders.
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All these factors led to a slow buildup of tension between government
and populace that finally exploded on the night of February 27, 1947,
during a police raid on smuggled tobacco. This sparked the February 28
Incident, in which, without proper investigation, the Nationalist
government sent troops to suppress dissent and launched a campaign of
“cleaning up hometowns” 清鄉, which resulted in the deaths of
thousands of innocent people. Targeting mainly at Taiwanese local
leaders and elites, Nationalist government also removed obstacles to its
future rule over Taiwan and paved the way for establishment of an
authoritarian regime. Taiwanese illusions about China were broken,
however, which only further fueled antagonism between the government
and populace not yet freed of even nowadys.
Relocation of the Nationalist Government to Taiwan; Promulgation
of Martial Law (1949-1987)
On August 15, 1945, Japan surrendered to Allied forces, bringing the
Second World War to its conclusion. Soon thereafter, civil war broke out
in China between the Nationalists and the Communists, with the two
sides alternating between talks and armed conflicts. By 1949, the
situation had become extremely precarious for the Nationalist
government; on January 21, President Chiang Kai-shek 蔣中正 was
forced to step down, while Vice President Li Tsung-jen 李宗仁 took
over as acting president. As the Generalissimo of the Kuomintang 國民
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黨總裁, however, Chiang continued to run the government from behind
the scenes and began deploying troops to Taiwan to serve as a last
stronghold for the Nationalists’ fight against the Communists. To ensure
stability on the island, Chiang proclaimed Emergency Decree (a form of
martial law) in Taiwan on May 20, 1949. Four days later, the Statute for
the Punishment of Rebellion 懲治叛亂條例 was approved by the
Legislative Yuan. On May 27, the Taiwan Garrison General Headquarters
警備總司令部 (TGGH) began to use the Emergency Decree to regulate
and censor publications; prohibit the assembly and formation of
organizations without prior permission; and enforce bans on such
activities as organizing demonstrations, making petitions, and engaging in
boycotts or strikes of any kind, by students, laborers, shopkeepers or
enterprises etc.
As the situation in China worsened, on August 1, 1949, the Kuomintang
(KMT) set up the Office of the Generalissimo 中國國民黨總裁蔣中正
辦公廳 on Taipei’s Grass Mountain 臺北草山 (renamed as Yangming
Mountain) to run the state behind scene. Four days later, the US released
its White Paper on China in which it stated that it would no longer
support the Nationalist government. Confronted with this imminent crisis,
Chiang re-organized its military machines by nominating General Chen
Cheng 陳誠,Peng Meng-ji 彭孟緝,Sun Li-ren 孫立人 as new heads.5
5
The new arrangements were replacing the TGGH with the Southeastern Military Administrator’s
Office 東南軍政長官公署 headed by Chiang’s favorite subordinate, Chen Cheng 陳誠 on August 15,
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On October 1, the Chinese Communists founded the People’s Republic of
China 中華人民共和國 (PRC), thereby ending the Nationalist rule of
the mainland. On October 25, five Communist army corps attacked
Kinmen’s Guningtou 古寧頭, but were annihilated on the beach by
Nationalist forces, thus halting any further communist advances and
temporarily giving the Nationalist government some breathing space.
On December 7, 1949, the ROC government relocated to Taipei and, on
March 1, 1950, Chiang Kai-shek resumed the presidency, thereby
becoming the supreme leader in name as well as in reality. At this point,
the Nationalist government was being subjected to synchronized threats
both from within and without, facing external invasion from the
Communists as well as internal discontent from the Taiwanese people in
the aftermath of the February 28 Incident. To defy these challenges,
Chiang Kai-shek and his son, Chiang Ching-kuo 蔣經國, created a
rigorous party-state authoritarian regime 黨國威權體制 by copying
soviet system which Chiang Ching-kuo learned in his youth days in
Russia. The strict Emergency Decree proclaimed in 1949 was strictly
enforced and applied for the next 38 years, until finally being lifted on
July 15, 1987. The period is commonly called “white terror”, under which
tens of thousands lost their freedom and lives.
the establishment ofTaiwan Peace Preservation Headquarters 臺灣省保安司令部 headed by General
Peng Meng-ji 彭孟緝 on September 1, and the Taiwan Defense Headquarters 臺灣省防衛總司令部
headed by Lieutenant-General Sun Li-ren 孫立人 on September 21.
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This type of the authoritarian rule is too unique to be classified. In general,
it has been called a Quasi-Leninist regime, as it was close but not
equivalent to the communist model, since it had slightly weaker control
over politics and the economy. Others have dubbed it the Taiwanese
Authoritarian Regime or a Martial Law Regime. Regardless of title, the
regime possessed an ethnic structure that heavily influenced its operation,
that is, a minority group with not small number of powerful mainlanders
ruled a large number of weaker Taiwanese. In this sense, the regime
resembled the Spartan System of ancient Greece, under which the few but
strong Dorians conquered and enslaved a vast number of Messenian
inhabitants, at a ratio of around 1 to 20, by monopolizing political,
military and economic power. They also resorted to high-handed
governance and terrorism, such as the killing of one person as a warning
to the rest. Between 1945 and 1949, 1.02 million people (including some
600,000 soldiers, as well as numerous political personnel, public servants,
and teachers) swarmed to Taiwan from China. In the eight million of
population, the ratio was around one mainlander for every seven
Taiwanese, and so the number of mainlanders was large enough to control
political and military affairs through the use of terror policies. To this
added a modern political-juridical system and communist ruling
technique, Chiang’s regime was well-safeguarded. The following
characteristics can be listed.
Firstly, the long-term imposition of martial law gave a thick military
tincture. The 38 years of Taiwan’s martial law set a world record, with
TGGH handling national security issues and courts-martial trying
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important criminal cases. The use of force became the primary pillar
bolstering the stability of the Nationalist regime. Basic human rights,
such as the freedoms of speech, assembly, and formation of organizations
and processions, were all frozen.
Secondly, after its relocation to Taiwan in 1949, the Nationalist
government monopolized political power by claiming it was the
legitimate government of China 法統. For instance, Chiang’s
administration suspended all central government elections under the
excuse that they could not conduct national elections for the whole of
China following the fall of the mainland. Representatives of the central
government (equivalent to Congressmen) who had been elected in 1947
did not have to run campaigns for their positions, and could be replaced
by other runners when they died. Chiang Kai-shek could be re-elected as
president without limitation, therefore, and was able to pass on the reins
of power to his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, as if a hereditary system existed.
Since mainlanders occupied most of the offices within the central
government, the KMT was able to perpetually arrogate power for itself.
Under Chiang’s regime, the existing opposition parties such as the
Chinese Youth Party 青年黨 and the China Democratic Socialist Party
民社黨 were nothing more than fragile political vases, while a ban was
in effect forbidding the formation of new political parties. Since there was
no distinction between the ruling political party and the state, and since
most Taiwanese could not participate in the decision-making mechanisms
of the central government, many viewed the KMT as an alien power.
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Some even went so far as to dub it the “Chiang dynasty” 蔣家王朝.
Thirdly, the Nationalist government held complete control over the
economy. Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Principle of Social Well-being was very
similar to socialism in nature and, in accordance with this principle, the
government owned large and important enterprises. The KMT
accumulated immense assets through its monopolistic economic activities,
which were operated by both the government and the party itself. Private
enterprises were mostly small companies, most of which survived by
adhering to rules set by the state-run enterprises and trying to maintain
good relations with KMT and government officials. Scholars have
therefore described Taiwan’s economy as being “Party-State Capitalism”
黨國資本主義.
Fourthly, Chiang’s regime maintained complete control over thought and
behavior of people. The Nationalist government attributed the fall of the
mainland to indoctrination of young students and intellectuals to
communism. Consequently, the government enforced education that
instilled in the people the perception that the KMT was the only
legitimate party allowed to control political power. The “Three Principles
of the People” became a compulsory subject in every senior high school
and university curriculum and the topic was tested in every public
examination. Most media outlets, institutions, and organizations were
manipulated either directly or indirectly by the KMT. Moreover, agents
and informants from the government’s intelligence and national security
99
authorities were in every corner of Taiwan’s society. Through these spies
and the use of wiretapping, tailing people, and threats, the government
was able to comprehensively control the people’s thoughts and behavior,
and envelop the island in a miasma of “white terror.” Soon, everyone had
visions of “a miniature TGGH” inside their heads 人人心中有個小警總
to keep them insecure and constantly monitoring their own thoughts.
The two greatest dangers to the Nationalist government’s existence were
the invasion of Chinese communists and aspirations for Taiwan
independence at home. Of these two, however, the communists were
initially the more immediate threat, so the KMT enacted stricter laws for
punishing and preventing the spread of communism. On June 13, 1950,
the Nationalist government declared the Rules for Prosecuting
Communist Spies During the Period of National Mobilization for
Suppression of the Communist Rebellion 戡亂時期檢肅匪諜條例 and,
on September 29, the Executive Yuan enacted the Regulations on Joint
Assurance, Prosecution, and Punishment of Communist Spies during the
Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist
Rebellion 戡亂時期檢肅匪諜舉辦連保連坐辦法. On September 17, the
Regulations Governing the Surrender of Communists and Communist
Adherents 共匪及其追隨附匪份子者之自首辦法 and the Regulations
for Rewarding those Who Turn in Communist Spies 檢舉匪諜獎勵辦法
were promulgated. With all of these rules and regulations in place, the
intelligence and national security authorities began to actively arrest
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“communist spies” 匪諜. For example, on May 13, 1950, the Taiwan
Provincial Committee of communist China 臺灣省工作委員會, led by
Cai Siao-cian 蔡孝乾, was successfully uncovered; on June 18, former
Provincial Governor Chen Yi was executed for plotting a revolt; and on
November 22, a underground organization founded by the Sociology
Department of the Political Bureau under the Chinese Communist Party’s
Central Committee 中共中央政治局社會部 was broken.
The second threat to KMT power was the Taiwan independence
movement. Most of Taiwan’s elite was silenced in the aftermath of the
February 28 Incident, but some went into exile, mostly in Japan, from
where they advocated their cause. In 1948, on the first anniversary of the
February 28 Incident, Liao Wun-yi 廖文毅 and Sie Syue-hong 謝雪紅
established the Taiwan Re-liberation Alliance 臺灣再解放聯盟 in Hong
Kong. Liao then went to Japan to promote the Taiwan independence
movement and, in 1956, founded the Provisional Government of the
Republic of Taiwan 台灣共和國臨時政府. Whenever the independence
movement gained support and followers in Taiwan, however, the KMT
would make arrests, including the following high-profile cases: the 1961
Su Dong-ci Incident 蘇東啟事件, in which more than 200 persons were
arrested; the 1962 Liao Wun-yi Taiwan Independence Incident 廖文毅臺
灣獨立事件, in which more than 200 persons including Guo Guo-ji 郭國
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基 and Yang Jin-hu 楊金虎 were arrested; and the 1964 “Declaration of
Taiwan Self-Salvation Incident” 台灣人民自救宣言事件, in which
National Taiwan University professor Peng Ming-min 彭明敏 and his
students, Sie Cong-min 謝聰敏 and Wei Ting-chao 魏廷朝, were
imprisoned.
It is estimated that more than 15,000 political dissidents and rebels were
arrested under martial law, with at least 5,000 executed and the rest
imprisoned, and many were in fact wrongfully accused or intentionally
persecuted. Agents of intelligence authorities often abused their powers
and terrorized innocent citizens. Taiwan was enveloped in a terrible
atmosphere of fear in which everyone felt watched and threatened, from
which the period has become known by the nickname of “white terror”.
Therefore, antagonism between society and the state that had been
initially aroused by the February 28 Incident was further aggravated.
Although Taiwan’s society appeared peaceful and calm for a long time,
beneath the surface there was an undercurrent of opposition waiting for
emergence. The situation eventually turned into a vicious cycle: the
severer the government’s measures were, the stronger the people’s
antagonism became, which, in turn, caused government restrictions to
become even stricter.
To relieve the tension, the ruling KMT, in addition to resorting to political
terror, also adopted a compromised model, namely,“ politics for
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mainlanders and economy for Taiwanese” 外省政治，本省經濟. In other
words, while the mainlanders were tightly grasping the reins of military
and political power, they were also encouraging the Taiwanese to
dedicate themselves to economic development and allowing them to
become wealthy. Naturally, those Taiwanese who survived the February
28 Incident saw politics as a difficult path fraught with danger, and were
more than happy to concentrate their efforts on the economic well-beings.
Their efforts unexpectedly created an economic miracle in the
international environment of antagonism between free world and
communist bloc.
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Educational and Cultural Development and Social Changes: Policies
Encouraging Study Abroad
Although the Nationalist government enforced an autocratic
administration, it also put forth a lot of effort to improve education. The
purpose of this was not only to elevate the people’s production skills and
cultural level, but also to re-Sinicize the Taiwanese people and instill the
spirit of Chinese nationalism. Subjects such as Chinese history,
geography, and the “Three Principles of the People” were emphasized
tremendously in secondary and higher education. In any case, under the
KMT’s efforts, education flourished. During the Japanese colonization,
compulsory elementary education was common. In 1968, the Nationalist
government expanded upon this, making nine years of education
compulsory and increasing the number of secondary and higher education
options. As a result, both the quality and quantity of education in Taiwan
were greatly elevated. Between 1950 and 2000, the number of schools in
Taiwan rose more than five-fold, jumping from 1,504 to 8,158. A closer
examination of these figures shows that the number of elementary schools
increased from 1,234 to 2,586; secondary schools rose from 128 to 863;
colleges climbed from 3 to 78; and universities multiplied from 1 to 57.
During this same period, the number of graduates also increased almost
ten-fold, jumping from 120,345 to 1,218,495. Among these, elementary
school graduates rose from 86,995 to 317,581; college graduates
increased from 523 to 126,916; students earning bachelor’s degrees
jumped from 1,013 to 107,430; and master’s degree recipients went from
1 to 20,752. In 1950, Taiwan did not have any doctorate programs; in
104
2000, there were 1,413 PhD holders.
These statistics reveal that the two categories in Taiwan’s educational
system that underwent the greatest expansion were the secondary and
higher levels. Further, many Taiwanese students studied abroad in
advanced countries, with the US a favorite destination. Students who
received university or higher level degrees often went on to excel in a
wide range of industries, especially in careers involving higher education.
Owing to universal, higher education standards, Taiwan rapidly
transformed itself from a relatively conservative and traditional society
into a modern, free and open one. Consequently, Taiwanese people’s
philosophies towards life, ways of life, familial attachments, and social
concepts also underwent drastic changes.
Transformation from a State-controlled Economy to a Free-Market
Economy: Taiwan’s “Economic Miracle”
In 1949, the Nationalist government fled to Taiwan after being defeated
by the Chinese communists. Faced with the external threat of Chinese
communist invasion and the internal problems of how to provide for the
livelihood of the million civilian and military personnel that had just
arrived, Taiwan was at a critical juncture between life and death.
Fortunately, with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the United
States began to provide Taiwan with military and economic aid, as well as
assistance in the defense of the Taiwan Strait, enabling the Nationalists to
105
survive eventually. In exchange for military and economic aid, however,
the US applied political pressure on the Nationalist government to
promote free-market economic policies, and so gradually the
state-controlled economy was relaxed. As a result, private enterprises
thrived, setting the stage for their eventual emergence as the backbone of
Taiwan’s economic development.
From 1950 to 1964, the main theme of the Nationalist government’s
economic development policy was the gradual transition from import
substitution to export incentives. In 1950, the sudden influx of more than
a million military and civilian personnel to the small island of Taiwan
resulted in shortages of many basic necessities, causing severe inflation
and trade deficits. From 1950 to 1953, the government implemented
several highly successful farmland reform measures, including the
reduction of rents to a maximum of 37.5 percent of the main crop, and the
land-to-the-tiller program. The government also implemented measures
such as paying land taxes with grain and grain- for- fertilizer exchange
program by underestimating produce values. In this manner, the
government was able to control large quantities of agricultural resources
at extremely low cost, which it could then transfer to the public and
industrial sectors to support military, civil, and education personnel, as
well as fuel industrial development.
The US aid after 1950 helped greatly to bring Taiwan’s devastated
economy under control and allowed stable development to begin. In the
15 years between 1951 and July 1965, Taiwan received US$100 million
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per year from the US, i.e. about US$10 per person annually. It is
estimated that capital aid from the US not only accounted for 34 percent
of Taiwan’s gross capital formation but, in terms of foreign trade, also
compensated for about 91 percent of the imbalance per year. In addition,
aid provided by the US was used to affect the economic policies of the
Nationalist government in three major ways, all of which were conducive
to the gradual formation of a liberalized economy and the development of
private enterprises. Firstly, most of the US aid was used to improve
infrastructure on the island, thereby increasing the productivity of private
enterprises and promoting growth. Secondly, the Nationalist government
was forced to relax its controls over the economy. Finally, military
expenditure was kept in check. Taiwan’s economy soon stabilized and, by
1952, industrial and agricultural production standards had already
recovered to the pre-war highs set in 1938. In 1953, the government
began to promote a series of four-year economic plans that would
eventually help the country achieve astounding economic growth.
During the initial stages of Taiwan’s economic recovery, the
government’s policies focused on limiting imports and encouraging
exports, especially the export of rice and sugar. Measures for promoting
import-substitution industrialization were adopted. In 1950, the
government began taking measures to increase domestic production and
reduce imports, such as implementing a multiple exchange rate system
that set low rates for imported raw materials and capital goods and high
rates for other imported goods. These measures reduced production costs
for local manufacturers while discouraging consumption, thereby
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protecting domestic manufacturing industries from having to compete
with a flood of imports. Restrictions placed on the establishment of
factories also protected the interests of specific investors and expedited
capital formation. The import-substitution industrialization policies were
quite successful at enhancing the productivity of domestic industries
while limiting imports.
However, the complicated procedures involved for completing foreign
exchange transactions and the severely overvalued foreign exchange rate
discouraged exports and hampered economic development. Coupled with
Taiwan’s small domestic market, such obstructions soon spiked
opportunities for growth and drew demands for change in the late 1950s.
Consequently, Taiwan began to formulate export-oriented policies.
In April 1958, the government promulgated the Foreign Exchange and
Trade Control Plan 外匯及貿易管制計劃 and, in August of that same
year, an exchange rate of NT$40 to US$1 was set up. By 1963, this
unified exchange rate had achieved the goal of opening up a whole new
era for Taiwan’s export-oriented policies. Through depreciation of the
New Taiwan dollar (NT$), the government eliminated a major obstacle
and encouraged exports. In 1960, the government introduced the
Nineteen Financial and Economic Reform Measures 十九點財經改革方
案 and other statutes for encouraging investments. This helped to reduce
export tariffs, allowed for the provision of low-interest loans for exports,
provided income tax breaks for new investments, increased capitalization,
and allocated public land or requisitioned private land for industrial use.
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The most important measure, however, was the establishment of an
export-processing zone in Kaohsiung in 1965, which created a favorable
investment environment in Taiwan. All of these encouraging measures led
to a boom for local industries and a tremendous increase in exports.
Moreover, as export-oriented industries expanded, private enterprises
began to develop more rapidly and soon became the primary force
driving Taiwan’s economy.
During this period, the international division of labor flourished due to
the activities of multi-national enterprises, which benefited Taiwan
benefiting immensely from this trend. Caused by inflation and rising
labor costs in developed countries, multi-national enterprises sought to
invest in developing countries to take advantage of lower labor costs and
thereby maintain high profits. The practice first appeared in the 1950s
between Hong Kong and the US, and later between Japan and the US in
the early period following the Second World War. Taiwan joined in the
1960s and, although lacking in capital and technology, the island’s
talented, industrious, and cheap labor force attracted foreign investors to
set up factories to manufacture products for export.
There were four special characteristics of economic development at this
stage: Firstly, the gross national product (GNP) registered annual growth
in double-digits. Secondly, industrial production gained a dominant
position and surpassed agricultural production. Thirdly, exports increased
rapidly, with primary export items shifting from agricultural products to
industrial products. Fourthly, foreign investment in Taiwan increased
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dramatically.
It is worthwhile to pay attention to the triangular trade relationship among
Taiwan, the US, and Japan, which scholars dubbed the “triangular-linkage
structure” 三環構造. In the 1950s, Taiwan exported agricultural products
to Japan while importing manufacturing materials from Japan, and
receiving various forms of aid from the US. In the 1960s, however,
exports of industrial products to the US rose sharply and, in the 1970s,
Taiwan imported manufacturing materials again from Japan and exported
industrial products to the US. In other words, Taiwan would import
manufacturing materials and other intermediate products from Japan,
process them, and then export the finished products to the US.
Consequently, Taiwan had a trade deficit with Japan and trade surplus
with the US, tying Taiwan’s economy to the economies of both nations.
Thriving exports of industrial products sharply raised the industrial
sector’s contribution to Taiwan’s GNP. Meanwhile, the agricultural
sector’s share continued to decline and represented less than six percent
of total GNP in the 1980s. In other words, Taiwan had already become an
industrial and commercial society. With the unabated expansion of private
enterprises and Taiwan’s trade surplus with the US, the Nationalist
government, under pressure from the US, began expediting economic
liberalization. Import controls were gradually relaxed from 1983 onwards
and, in 1987, many approval rights of domestic operators over imports
were cancelled, removing more than half the controls that had been in
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place for 30 years or longer. Tariffs were repeatedly reduced to around
five percent from the early 1980s onwards, thus abolishing most of the
import intervention measures. Most foreign exchange controls were
removed in July 1987. Other liberalization measures included the
privatization of state-owned enterprises and financial institutions. The
state’s tight controls over the economy gradually gave way to a more
liberalized, undistorted, and efficient system.
In summary, the basic direction of the Nationalist government’s economic
policies in the postwar period moved from strict control to liberalization.
During this process, private enterprises played an important role in
promoting economic development by creating a great deal of wealth and
reconstituting the structural context of Taiwan’s industries. In this manner,
Taiwan was transformed from an agricultural economy into a modern
economy of industry and commerce.
Beginning of the Movement Opposing Authoritarian Rule
The KMT’s authoritarian rule led to confrontations between the
government and Taiwan’s broader society. Moreover, the KMT continued
to assert that it represented all of China and was its sole legitimate
government. Many of those who accompanied the Nationalist
government to Taiwan occupied high-ranking posts in the central
government, and legislators and members of the National Assembly who
had been elected to office before the government’s relocation continued
to hold their posts without new elections. There were, therefore, few
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channels for the expression of popular will. Even those local government
posts for which elections were held, such as for the provincial councilors,
county magistrates, city mayors, and members of local councils, were
heavily dominated by the KMT. This situation served to deepen the
Taiwanese people’s animosity towards the Nationalist government. The
KMT’s long-term suppression of Taiwan society made the emergence of
anti-establishment sentiments inevitable and, following changes in both
domestic and international environments in the early 1970s,
anti-authoritarian ideas gradually began to surface and intensify. There
are several reasons for the change.
US assistance in the aftermath of World War II helped Taiwan’s economy
to develop rapidly, and thus a Taiwanese middle class began to take shape
when small and medium-sized enterprises emerged. As a result, people
became financially capable of engaging in political activities or assisting
political candidates monetarily. In addition, the educational development
led to the rise of a new class of intellectuals, many of whom had studied
abroad. With increased knowledge and skills, they became Taiwan’s new
middle-class intellectual elite 中智階層. In the 1970s, many of these
individuals were between 30 and 40 years of age and in the prime of their
lives. They were now numerically and qualitatively capable of taking the
place of those of Taiwan’s elite who had been sacrificed in the February
28 Incident, and thus of taking up the task of challenging the authoritarian
establishment.
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The international crisis also challenged the rule of the KMT.After
withdrawing to Taiwan, the Nationalist government adhered to a policy of
“gentlemen won’t stand with thieves” 漢賊不兩立, which led to a
national identity crisis. Global confrontation between the two blocs
advocating “freedom” and “communism” allowed the ROC to gain US
support with regard to its representation of China at the United Nations
and its seat as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Thus, at
that time, the ROC had international status to support its orthodoxy and
legitimacy for internal rule. After the founding of the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) in 1949, however, the Chinese Communists had effective
rule of China. Consequently, many members of the international
community chose to break diplomatic relations with the ROC in order to
recognize the PRC. On October 25, 1971, the UN Assembly passed a
resolution to replace the seat of the Republic of China with that of the
People’s Republic of China, challenging the legitimacy of the Nationalist
government in Taiwan. On January 21, 1972 while visiting China, US
President Richard Nixon met with Chinese Communist Chairman Mao
Zedong 毛澤東 and Premier Zhou Enlai 周恩來. On February 27, 1972,
the US and the PRC signed the Shanghai Communiqué, one key point of
which was that “The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on
either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that
Taiwan is a part of China.” In 1978, the US government decided to sever
diplomatic relations with the ROC and, on January 1, 1979, established
formal ties with the PRC. These developments weakened the Nationalist
government’s claim to represent all of “China” and led the Taiwanese
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people to doubt and challenge the legality and legitimacy of the KMT’s
monopolization of political power in the name of the central government.
In 1971, Da-syue Magazine 大學雜誌 was first published by rising
middle-class intellectual elites and people began to participate in political
activities, which created powerful forces to challenge the KMT’s
authority. Movements advocating democracy and autonomy began to
arise in response to the changing tides.
Faced with these new situations both at home and abroad, the Nationalist
government had no choice but react. As a result, the Chiang Ching-kuo
regime attempted to strengthen the internal legitimacy of the Nationalist
government by including supplementary and regular elections for some of
the seats in the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly, as well as by
implementing a gradual localization, or Taiwanization, of the
government.
On January 10, 1972, Lei Jhen 雷震 published Advice on Saving the
Nation for Its Survival 救亡圖存獻議. In this publication, he offered ten
suggestions for saving the nation: (1) announcement of the establishment
of the “Chinese Democratic Republic of Taiwan” 中華臺灣民主國; (2)
resignation of Chiang Kai-shek from the presidency; (3) implementation
of democratic politics; (4) reduction of military expenditure; (5)
implementation of the rule of law and safeguarding of human rights; (6)
reform of organizations in charge of social security; (7) abolition of the
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ban on new mass media; (8) streamlining of administrative organizations;
(9) abolition of the provincial-level governmental system; and (10)
amnesty for all political prisoners. Although none of his suggestions were
formally adopted at the time, the government did at least begin to actively
implement localization policies.
On May 20, 1972, Chiang Kai-shek began his fifth term as president of
the Republic of China and, six days later, his son Chiang Ching-kuo took
up the post of premier. After taking office, Chiang Ching-kuo announced
the appointment of seven Taiwanese to his Cabinet: Syu Cing-jhong 徐
慶鐘 as vice premier, Lin Jin-sheng 林金生 as minister of the interior,
Gao Yu-shu 高玉樹 as minister of transportation, and four ministers
without portfolio. These appointments greatly raised the status of
Taiwan-born government officials, especially since Gao was not even a
member of the KMT. On June 1, 1972, Chiang Ching-kuo appointed Sie
Dong-min 謝東閔 as the first Taiwan-born governor of Taiwan Province.
To further elevate the status of Taiwanese people within the KMT, Chiang
Ching-kuo increased the number of Taiwanese members of the party’s
Central Standing Committee. He also entrusted Lee Huan 李煥 to
implement a policy in which talented young Taiwanese were promoted or
appointed to the level of leading cadre in the KMT headquarters or the
directors of local party organizations, posts that in the past had been
completely monopolized by mainlanders. Lee Huan supported Da-syue
Magazine’s call for political reforms, recruiting important figures
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associated with the magazine, despite the magazine’s vigorous criticism
of old establishment and policies, such as the KMT’s policy of
“recovering the mainland”反攻大陸. People recruited by the KMT
included Chang Chun-hung 張俊宏, Chen Shao-ting 陳少廷, and Hsu
Hsin-liang 許信良, all of whom later became well known in Taiwan’s
political and media circles. On June 29, 1972, the KMT abolished the
Measures on Supplementary Elections 增補選辦法 implemented in
1969 and, instead, announced the Measures on the Supplementary
Parliamentary Elections in the Free Area During the Period of National
Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion 動員戡亂時期
自由地區增加中央民意代表名額選舉辦法. By doing so, the KMT
hoped to resolve the crisis regarding its legitimacy, and to increase the
number of representative seats held by Taiwanese. On April 5, 1975,
Chiang Kai-shek passed away and was succeeded by Yen Chia-kan 嚴家
淦. Under the guidance of Chiang Ching-kuo, the KMT’s localization
policies were further developed as the government tried to reform the
massive and corrupt bureaucracy. The government also began to relax,
albeit to a limited extent, its control on freedom of speech.
The long-term establishment and deep roots of the KMT-party
government made the task of reform slow and difficult, however. As a
result, many of the Taiwanese elite became disappointed or at odds with
the party; some even broke away from the party and confronted it. These
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would later become the leaders of the dangwai6 黨外 (literally, “party
outsiders,” i.e. non-KMT), and eventually of the Democratic Progressive
Party 民主進步黨 (DPP), which was established on September 28, 1986.
What began as simply voicing views and criticisms against the
government later evolved into a real movement that culminated in
political confrontation and, eventually, shook off authoritarian rule by the
Nationalist government.
In 1975, a magazine run by Taiwanese entitled the Taiwan Political
Review 臺灣政論 was first published. Huang Sin-jie 黃信介, Kang
Ning-hsiang 康寧祥, and Chang Chun-hung 張俊宏, the magazine’s
publisher, president, and editor-in-chief, all belonged to a group of
Taiwanese elite who were dissatisfied with KMT rule. The publication of
this magazine therefore signified one of the first joint efforts by local
middle-class intellectuals to challenge the KMT establishment. The
Taiwan Political Review called upon the government to make extensive
constitutional reforms, which was a bold breakthrough at that time, and
immediately made the magazine popular amongst intellectuals and the
general public. Before long, circulation had reached 36,000 and had
attracted the authorities’ attention. In its fifth issue, published on
December 27, 1976, the magazine carried an article by Chiou
Chwei-liang 邱垂亮 entitled “Two States of Mind—An Evening
6
Dangwai 黨外: refers to a loose grouping of opposition figures who could not establish an official
party due to the Nationalist government’s ban on the formation of political parties
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Discussion with Fou Cong and Professor Liou” 兩種心向—和傅聰, 柳
教授一夕談 that violated laws on rebellion and sedition. The
government moved swiftly, revoking the publisher’s license and
abolishing the magazine. Nevertheless, the sparks of dissatisfaction had
been ignited, its fire quickly spread beyond the government’s control, and
soon other political magazines were carrying on the cause.
With its strongly independent consciousness, the Presbyterian Church has
long been native to Taiwan, having the oldest history and most followers
of all protestant churches on the island. The church’s heavy native
coloring was reflected in its use of the Taiwanese language for
performing religious services and its use of the Taiwanese Romanization
Peh-oe-ji 白話字. As early as December 29, 1971, the church reacted to
the changing international situation of the ROC’s withdrawal from the
UN and Nixon’s visit to China by issuing the Taiwan Presbyterian
Church’s Statement and Suggestions on National Affairs 臺灣長老教會
對國事的聲明與建議. In it, the church advocated self-determination for
Taiwan and comprehensive elections for all parliamentarians. On
September 28, 1975, in response to US President Gerald Ford’s visit to
China, the church issued Our Appeals 我們的呼籲, which not only
advocated self-determination for the Taiwanese people and
implementation of a constitutional government, but also boldly
challenged the KMT’s “one-China” policy. On August 16, 1977, after
taking into account the normalization of US-China relations, the
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Presbyterian Church’s central committee passed a Declaration of Human
Rights 人權宣言, in which it advocated “self-determination for the
Taiwanese people” and “the establishment of a new and independent
country.” It was at this point that advocacy for Taiwan independence
began to emerge. On October 10, 1976, Wang Sing-nan 王幸男, a
Taiwanese who advocated Taiwan independence, sent a mail bomb to Sie
Dong-min, governor of Taiwan Province, injuring him. The fact that some
individuals resorted to terrorism reveals just how impatient people had
become. On October 18, 1976, a Taiwan independence advocate named
Huang Hua 黃華 was tried and sentenced to ten years in prison.
Anti-establishment movements were emerging from underground and
starting to become a problem for the KMT.
Although the partial elections being implemented at that time were
incapable of shaking the KMT’s grip on power, they were still a very
important platform from which opposition forces could legally enter the
world of politics. In 1977, local elections for county magistrates and city
mayors were held, with many from the new generation of Taiwanese elite
participating and Hsu Hsin-liang quitting the KMT to stand as candidate
for Taoyuan County magistrate. On November 19, however, the day that
ballots were supposed to be counted in Jhongli City 中壢市, suspicious
irregularities were discovered of the chief supervisor from the 213th
polling station. Outraged at this event, a small riot broke out, with people
setting fire to police cars, surrounding the police station, and confronting
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both the police and government troops. Dubbed the Jhongli Incident 中
壢事件, this confrontation marked the first time since the February 28
Incident that Taiwanese people had rallied on the streets and gone
head-to-head with the establishment. Success in the Jhongli Incident
encouraged dangwai figures to challenge the Nationalist government.
During the election itself, the dangwai had managed to make substantial
gains, with dangwai candidates winning 4 of the 20 open posts for county
magistrates and city mayors (2 of each), 21 of the 77 seats available for
the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, and 8 of the 51 open seats on the Taipei
City Council. The unprecedented success of the dangwai in this election
and the talents of the dangwai members elected noticeably increased the
dangwai’s influence in Taiwan. The KMT considered the results of this
election to be a major defeat and held the more enlightened clique
represented by Lee Huan responsible for the party’s setback. The KMT
consequently demoted this group and replaced it with a more
conservative one led by Wang Sheng 王昇. The only effect this had,
however, was to further exacerbate confrontations between society and
the state.
On March 21, 1978, Chiang Ching-kuo became the sixth-term president
of the ROC and continued to promote gradual democratic reform. On July
20, 1978, the Executive Yuan passed the Bylaw Measures on the
Supplementary Parliamentary Elections During the Period of National
Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion 動員戡亂時期
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自由地區增加中央民意代表名額選舉辦法細則. While the incumbent
parliamentarians did not have to go through an election to keep their posts,
this law raised the quota for the Taiwan area so as to give Taiwanese
people more opportunities for political participation.
To better unite societal strength in confronting the KMT and to coordinate
islandwide campaigns, on October 6, 1978, Legislator Huang Sin-jie
announced the formation of the Taiwanese Dangwai Group for Election
Campaigns 臺灣黨外人士助選團. On October 31, Huang proposed “12
Political Constructions” 十二大政治建設, making an appeal for the
complete implementation of a constitutional government so that elections
for parliament and popular elections for provincial governor, mayors, and
other posts, could be held. This also called for the abolition of the
Emergency Decree***. Suddenly, the entire island was seething with
excitement from campaign activities. The ruling KMT, worried that the
situation was getting out of hand, tried various measures to counteract it.
For instance, on December 12, 1978, there was a confrontation on the
campus of the National Taiwan University between supporters of the
Democracy Wall 民主牆 and those of the Patriotism Wall 愛國牆, with
the former representing the power of the public and the latter representing
the countering force of the government.
It can clearly be seen, therefore, that the challenges being issued by
society against the ruling party’s authority were slowly gaining
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momentum, and the post-228 fear that the KMT had used to maintain
stability was becoming less effective. Had this gradual democratization
movement been allowed to continue smoothly and comprehensively,
Taiwan would no doubt have transformed peacefully from an
authoritarian state to a democratic one. Unfortunately, just as the
supplementary parliamentarian elections were underway in December
1978, US President Jimmy Carter suddenly announced that the United
States would establish formal diplomatic ties with the PRC on January 1,
1979. The impact of Carter’s announcement on both the Nationalist
government and Taiwan society led to panic and, on December 16, 1978,
President Chiang Ching-kuo announced the suspension of all
supplementary election campaign activities in the hope of temporarily
easing confrontation between Taiwanese society and the government.
This left the fundamental problems of democratization unresolved,
however, sowing seeds of tension and instability that would give rise to
the Kaohsiung Incident 美麗島事件.
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CHAPTER 8
The First Democracy in the Chinese World: The Kaohsiung Incident
and Taiwan’s “Political Miracle”
As mentioned above, struggles between the government and Taiwanese
society began to surface from the early 1970s onwards. Distrusts and
tensions between the two sides further exacerbated after the US President
Carter’s announced that the US would recognize the People’s Republic of
China as the Chinese government on January 1, 1979 and thus severed
the formal ties with Taiwan in December 1978. Generally speaking, the
KMT’s strategy in handling the situation was to use punishment as a
warning so as to “kill flowers before they bud.” The dangwei
（dissidents）counter-acted with intensifying confrontations, including
demonstrations against martial law, and thus led to the Kaohsiung
Incident of 1979 in the end. This incident could have become another
February 28 Incident for the KMT to withstand the democratic movement
after suppression. Contrary to anticipations by some KMT officials, it led
to the peaceful and progressive birth of the first democracy in the Chinese
world as changes at home and abroad forced the government and dangwei
to compromise. This evolutionary process is summarized in the following
sections covering the Kaohsiung Incident, abolition of martial law, and
democratization.
The Kaohsiung Incident
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After the United States announced its severance of diplomatic ties with
Taiwan, the KMT continued its long-established implementation of
carrot-and-stick policies. Thus, on the one hand, it promoted the
step-by-step piecemeal democracy to ease Taiwanese antagonism via
supplementary elections and partial re-elections for members of the
National Assembly and Legislative Yuan, as well as limited appointments
of high officials for the Taiwanese, while on the other, it tightened
controls on dissidents. The Yu Deng-fa case 余登發 was a good example.
On January 1, 1979, the US terminated its formal relations with Taiwan.
On January 21, former Kaohsiung County Magistrate Yu Deng-fa 余登
發 and his son, Yu Ruei-yan 余瑞言, were detained by the Taiwan
Garrison General Headquarters (TGGH) pending an investigation of their
suspected involvement with Wu Chun-fa 吳春發, or Wu Tai-an 吳泰安.
This incident occurred with great suddenness and suspicion. It was
widely believed that Wu Chun-fa was an informant for an intelligence
body and was being used to trap the father and son. Yu Deng-fa was
sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment on April 26, while Wu was
executed before he could say anything.
Yu Deng-fa was persecuted because of his tough stance toward the
government while serving as magistrate, which threatened the KMT’s
vested interests. For instance, Yu had cut the county budget for the
KMT’s grassroots organizations and prohibited KMT members of the
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county government from scheduling party meetings during office hours.
Although in essence Yu Deng-fa’s political ideals were quite dissimilar to
those of the dangwai (he was a staunch Sinocentrist and against Taiwan
independence, for example), the dangwai felt threatened by the
government’s persecution of Yu and took it as a warning of further
repression. Thus, to curb abuses by the security and intelligence agencies,
various members of the dangwai including Huang Sin-jie 黃信介, Hsu
Hsin-liang 許信良, Yao Chia-wen 姚嘉文, and Shih Ming-teh 施明德
held a demonstration to protest Yu’s arrest. Gathering against the will of
Yu’s family on January 22 near Kaohsiung Bridge, demonstrators
distributed pamphlets entitled Tell me: Why did you arrest Yu Deng-fa and
his son? This protest, which violated the government’s Emergency
Decree of prohibiting demonstrations, marked a major step forward in
Taiwan’s democractic movement. In response, the KMT did not intend to
loosen its grip on these dissidents. Confrontation between the two sides
was aggravated when the Control Yuan passed a resolution on April 20,
1979, calling for the impeachment of Taoyuan County Magistrate Hsu
Hsin-liang for his participation in the Kaohsiung Bridge rally and, on
June 29, Hsu was suspended from his post.
The dangwai became more organized in defiance of the KMT, however,
and on June 2, 1979, more than 20 non-KMT members, including Yao
Chia-wen, Huang Huang-hsiung 黃煌雄, and Lu Hsiu-lien 呂秀蓮,
gathered in Taipei to establish the Association for the Dangwai
Candidates Participating in Supplementary Elections for Parliamentarians
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增額中央民意代表選舉黨外候選人聯誼會 in an effort to consolidate
anti-KMT power. On July 28, Jhang Chun-nan 張春男, Lu Hsiu-lien,
and other dangwai candidates traveled to Taichung to deliver speeches
and hold demonstrations. Police subsequently used water cannons to
disperse these demonstrations, and dangwai members were even labeled
“communists” by some people. Despite these setbacks, members of the
dangwai continued their efforts, eventually becoming the forerunners of
Taiwan’s new party, the Democratic Progressive Party.
What the KMT feared most was organized opposition forces of the
Taiwanese. Therefore the KMT Right-wingers became extremely nervous
and took a variety of countermeasures, but only made things worse. The
final direct confrontation between Taiwanese society and the state was the
launching of the Formosa magazine, which developed into a political
organization and culminated in the so-called Kaohsiung Incident, or the
Formosa Incident.
In March 1979, the Nationalist government relaxed restrictions on free
speech to cope with changes taking place both at home and abroad. Thus,
despite the ban on political magazines, their publication never completely
stopped. For instance, when The Taiwan Political Review was banned,
The Eighties took its place and became successful. As for why the
dangwai felt it necessary to publish The Formosa Magazine, there are
two possible reasons. Firstly, the quality and quantity of Taiwan’s
middle-class intellectual elite was rapidly increasing. The greater
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diversity within this group made it impossible for their demands to be met
through only a single publication. Secondly, the new generation hoped to
speed up political reform, with some people dissatisfied with Kang
Ning-hsiang’s 康寧祥 moderate, reconciliatory attitude.
The process of establishing Formosa magazine ran as follows. On
December 25 following cancellation of the election (due to the US
severance of ties with Taiwan), the dangwai held a press conference on
Taipei’s Minzu West Road. At this press conference, Huang Sin-jie
publicly recommended the formation of a group consisting of Hsu
Hsin-liang, Chang Chun-hung, Yao Chia-wen, Lin I-hsiung 林義雄, and
Shih Ming-teh for promoting democratic activities, with the first four of
these persons responsible for mapping out strategies, and Shih Ming-teh
in charge of implementation. In March 1979, Huang, Chang, and Yao
held a meeting at Shih’s home in which Huang proposed that Yao apply
for a publishing license to set up a magazine that could serve as the
dangwai gazette. On August 16, 1979, the debut issue of Formosa was
released under the headline, “Joint promotion of the new generation’s
political movements,” and this subsequently became the magazine’s goal.
Staff members of the magazine included all kinds of anti-KMT figures,
including both unification and independence advocates, but shared a
common ground : the pursuit of freedom and democracy on the island.
The sale of Formosa increased quickly, taking Taiwan by storm. The
25,000 copies of the initial issue sold out immediately after hitting the
newsstands, and more had to be printed. The second and third issues grew
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to a circulation of nearly 100,000 copies, and the fourth issue surpassed
110,000. Formosa was breaking all previous records set by a political
review magazine published in Taiwan.
More importantly, all of Taiwan’s anti-KMT elements began to rally
under the banner of Formosa magazine, which served as a force to
counterbalance the Nationalist government. To increase sales and expand
its network even further, Formosa magazine began consolidating local
anti-KMT powers around the island into a political group by aiming to
establish 20 service centers in major counties and cities. Formosa
magazine established the Kaohsiung service center on September 28,
1979, Taichung center on October 25, and Nantou center on November 12.
By December 1979, 15 service centers had been established, all within a
few months. The rapid development of these centers was akin to the
establishment of a political party, which was Formosa magazine’s real
goal. Shih Ming-teh once said that Formosa magazine was “a political
party without name” 沒有黨名的黨 that was prepared to use “legal
methods to overthrow the government” 合法推翻政府. Apparently,
Formosa magazine was the embryonic form of a political group whose
goal was to organize a political party.
The Nationalist government knew that in order for a minority to control
the majority, it was necessary to adopt a policy of “prevention in place of
suppression” 防範重於鎮壓, and consider as taboo the establishment of
[political] organizations. Security agencies became extremely nervous
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and, on October 17, 1979, a meeting of 22 KMT security agencies
adopted a proposal to ban Formosa magazine under the pretext that the
magazine’s second issue, with a story entitled “Unveil the Myth of the
Korean Economic Miracle” 揭發韓國經濟奇蹟的神話, had resulted in a
protest from the Korean Embassy. Formosa magazine did not comply
with the ban, and, in the end, it was not enforced. In fact, the Nationalist
government tried to tone down the situation and establish a dialogue with
the opposition, inviting dangwai members to KMT-sponsored luncheons
in October and November to discuss the matter. Their opposing
standpoints made it hard to reach any consensus, however. Moreover, the
timing was ripe and the opposition was prepared to begin its journey
forward. In contrast, the KMT authorities knew that if they did not put a
stop to these trends, they would gradually be forced to give ground and
relinquish their grip on power. Thus, while the opposition continued to
fan the flames ever higher, the authorities were making an all-out effort to
extinguish those same fires, even going so far as to hire radical
right-wingers and local gangsters for this purpose. Consequently, the
curtains on an increasingly volatile drama continued to rise.
On September 8, 1979, members of Formosa magazine held a reception
at the Taipei Mandarin Hotel to celebrate the premier issue of Formosa,
and invited party and government officials to attend. Members of the
magazine Gust including the “defectors for freedom” 反共義士 Lao
Jheng-wu 勞政武 and Shen Guang-siou 沈光秀 also gathered people
at the same location, however, in order to “condemn the national traitor
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Chen Wan-jhen 陳婉真,” throwing stones and fruit skins and cursing
loudly in an attempt to instigate a confrontation. These members were
actually undercover agents, sent to China earlier by Ye Siang-jhih 葉翔
之 while he was serving as chief of the ROC Military Intelligence
Bureau, who later withdrew to Hong Kong in order to establish
themselves as “defectors for freedom.”
On November 29, 1979, assailants wielding swords and axes ransacked
the residence of Formosa magazine’s publisher, Legislator Huang Sin-jie,
and the magazine’s Kaohsiung service center. At 1:40 p.m. on December
7, six unidentified assailants also attacked the Pingtung service center,
which was originally scheduled to hold an inaugural party entitled “The
Night of Formosa” 美麗島之夜 at 6:30 p.m. the following evening.
Demolishing phones, tables, and chairs, the attackers, two of whom were
armed with guns, held the center’s staff hostage and injured one person
with an axe. The fact that these raids in Taipei, Kaohsiung, and Pingtung
occurred at almost exactly the same time proved that they were not
isolated incidents. Despite these attacks, however, there was no way to
curb public sentiment. Thus, when the inaugural party in Pingtung was
held as planned at 6:30 p.m. on December 8 but at a new location, the
auditorium of Ren-ai Elementary School 仁愛國小, many people
attended even though they had not received invitations, packing the floor.
It was later alleged that members of the magazine Gust carried out the
attacks on Huang Sin-jie’s residence and the Kaohsiung and Pingtung
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service centers. The rapid intensification in organized and violent
confrontation between society and the state finally led to the Kaohsiung
Incident.
To celebrate International Human Rights Day, Formosa magazine’s
Kaohsiung service center applied for a permit to hold a human rights
seminar on December 10 at an indoor stadium. Their application was
rejected, however, so the magazine submitted a new application to
hold the event in Fu Lun Park 扶輪公園 opposite the President
Department Store 大統百貨公司 which, again, was rejected. In the
meantime, agencies in charge of social order began to send additional
agents to monitor the magazine’s personnel. Formosa magazine’s
Kaohsiung office therefore decided to proceed with its original plan
in the belief that a December 10 Human Rights Day demonstration
would help to highlight the improper restrictions on freedom under
Taiwan’s martial law.
On the afternoon of the 9th, the Kaohsiung service center sent two
vehicles to roam major thoroughfares and smaller alleyways making
announcements about the event. Both ran into conflicts with the
police, however, and were stopped in Kaohsiung’s Gushan District
鼓山區 by law-enforcement agents, who promptly seized the
vehicles’ audiotapes and arrested Yao Guo-jian 姚國建 and Ciou
Sheng-syong 邱勝雄. While being taken into custody at the
Southern Garrison Command, Yao hit his head against the stairs and
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broke two of his teeth. That evening, over 40 dangwai activists held
a silent protest at the building’s entrance and, after midnight, even
more supporters joined in. Yao and Ciou were eventually released.
This series of incidents shows that Formosa magazine was becoming
increasingly involved with political activities and building up social
momentum on a scale that had not been seen since the February 28
Incident of 1947. A number of leaders were even preparing to fight
for their cause with the do-or-die spirit of a martyr. For the
government, these incidents led to the largest crisis to face the KMT
since the February 28 Incident, where the slightest slipup might spell
doom for the government. The government, ruling party, and just
about everyone with mainland origins, felt deeply threatened by the
situation and demanded that drastic measures be taken. By this time,
both the state and society had drawn their weapons, the fuse for
confrontation was already primed, and it only required the smallest
of sparks to set it off. Not surprisingly, it was the Human Rights Day
activities of December 10, which would become known as the
Kaohsiung or Fomosa Incident, that set things in motion. Details of
this event are as follows.
On the afternoon of December 10, the Kaohsiung service center
continued to make announcements that speeches would be delivered on
time as scheduled. By 4 p.m., anti-riot vehicles had blocked off the venue
at the roundabout and, by 7 p.m., close to 200 people had gathered at the
intersection beside Formosa magazine’s Kaohsiung headquarters. Shih
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Ming-teh was in command, and everyone was given a lit torch. The group
began to march and, since there were anti-riot vehicles on the right, took
a left turn and continued towards the train station, stopping at a small
roundabout for speeches before a crowd of two to three hundred
people. A few minutes later, several anti-riot vehicles arrived and
began circling the venue. By this time, policemen had encircled the
intersection and were clasping hands to prevent traffic from entering
and protestors from leaving. As tension and unrest began to mount,
scuffles erupted between the crowds and the police.
There were many different versions of how these conflicts began.
The official government version was that the crowds attacked the
police first; whereas dangwai activists maintained that it was the
police who instigated the rioting by driving riot-control vehicles into
the crowds. There was also speculation that the attackers were
government infiltrators planted by intelligence agencies to initiate
violent confrontations in order to frame Formosa magazine. Some
have conjectured the incident was a plot by the 1205 [December 5]
Special Task Team 一二○五專案小組 under Wang Sheng, while the
Gust Group 疾風集團 claimed it was the result of an attempt to
flush instigators out into the open. Others believed that the
government had hired thugs to stir up conflicts, while others felt that
the people who had fought with law-enforcement officers were
actually soldiers (as they had crew cut hair) disguised as civilians.
With so many contradictory versions, the truth remains a mystery to
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this day.
What a Spartan regime fears most is that its subjects will become
organized. It was to be expected, therefore, that the Nationalist
government would not just sit back without taking action. During the
KMT’s fourth plenary session on December 11, some people insisted
that “stronger, more hard-line countermeasures” be taken. On
December 12, demands for disciplinary action grew, and the
authorities decided to take punitive measures. On December 13, the
Government Information Office 行政院新聞局 suspended Formosa
magazine’s publication license for one year and, at the same time, the
TGGH announced that the illegal assembly of people in Kaohsiung
was obviously an organized, planned, and premeditated action.
Fourteen persons were arrested for suspicion of sedition: Chang
Chun-hung, Yao Chia-wen, Wang Tuoh 王拓, Chen Chu 陳菊, Jhou
Ping-de 周平德, Su Ciou-jhen 蘇秋鎮, Lu Hsiu-lien, Ji Wan-sheng
紀萬生, Lin I-hsiung, Chen Jhong-sin 陳忠信, Yang Cing-chu 楊清
矗, Ciou Yi-bin 邱奕彬, Wei Ting-chao, and Jhang Fu-jhong 張富
忠. The TGGH also issued an arrest warrant for Shih Ming-teh,
offering NT$500,000 for information leading to his capture. On
January 8, 1980, after 25 days in hiding, Shih was finally arrested in
Taipei, meaning that everyone connected to the Kaohsiung Incident
was then in police custody.
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Although hearings for earlier sedition cases had been held behind
closed doors, because of the attention it had attracted from
international media and human rights groups, the TGGH made the
Kaohsiung Incident trial open to the public. The court of inquiry
began its hearings on March 18, 1980, and completed all of its
interrogations and cross-examinations by March 28. A military
prosecutor then indicted the defendants for attempting to commit
sedition through establishment of a “five-person group”; using
Formosa magazine as a center to promote its plans to usurp power;
establishing as many as 11 offices in a matter of months to promote
mass movements; and initiating moves to overthrow the government.
For these reasons, the prosecutor sought punishment for all of the
defendants. On April 18, following a month-long hearing, a TGGH
court martial announced its verdicts: a 14-year prison term and
10-year deprivation of civil rights for Huang Sin-jie; life-long
imprisonment and deprivation of civil rights for Shih Ming-teh; and
12-year prison terms and 10-year deprivation of civil rights each for
Yao Chia-wen, Chang Chun-hung, Lin I-hsiung, Lin Hong-syuan 林弘
宣, Lu Hsiu-lien, and Chen Chu.
Strangely, according to Article 2, Paragraph 1 of the Statute for the
Punishment of Sedition 懲治叛亂條例, the only sentence available for
those found guilty of committing such acts was the death penalty. Why
were those convicted in the Kaohsiung Incident not sentenced to death in
accordance with the law? As the court verdict explained, “the defendants
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committed serious offenses, either at the instigation of overseas traitors or
without a clear understanding of the situation. When indicted, however,
all felt deep remorse for the violence that ensued from the Kaohsiung
Incident. Therefore… their sentences were reduced at the court’s
discretion as a show of sympathy.” In reality, the sentences were lighter
because of changes in the internal and external environment, which
prevented the Nationalist government from reproducing the “February 28
effect” 二二八效應 via suppression. Although the judgments were strict,
a degree of leniency was shown in order to leave room for compromise.
Conversely, anti-KMT social forces became more united after the
incident, forcing the government to repeatedly seek reconciliation
through increasingly moderate means and accelerating Taiwan’s moves
towards localization and democratization. Taiwan’s transition away from
authoritarian rule was achieved by a more progressive and peaceful
approach than that of either the Philippines or South Korea, whose
transitions were characterized by violence, bloodshed, and even
assassinations (such as the murder of South Korean political leader Park
Chung Hee).
The Lifting of Martial Law and Democratization
In terms of the strategies pursued in the wake of the Kaohsiung Incident,
the Nationalist government became more defensive and gradually
retreated. In terms of tactics, however, it sometimes continued to act
aggressively in order to prevent opposition forces from growing too
quickly and maintain political stability. The primary action taken by the
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government was to ban dissident publications. For instance, on August 15,
1980, the Taipei City Information Department imposed a one-year
suspension on the publication of two magazines, Warm Current 暖流
and Gust 疾風. On September 24, 1980, the TGGH banned books
written by Lin I-hsiung, Yao Chia-wen, and Chang Chun-hung, including
A Tiger Out of Its Element 虎落平陽, Campaigning and Changing the
Law 護法與變法, From Lanyang to Wufong 從蘭陽到霧峰, My
Thoughts and Struggles 我的沉思與奮鬥, and A Collection of Jing
Han’s Selected Works 景涵選集. Moreover, government intelligence
agencies also took harsh and inappropriate measures against dissidents to
serve as warnings for others, such as the infamous murder cases of Chen
Wen-cheng 陳文成 at the National Taiwan University in July 1981 and
Henry Liu 劉宜良 (better known by his pen name of Jiang Nan 江南) at
his San Francisco home on October 15, 1984. The fact that Chen and
Liou were both US citizens and that their murders were associated with
government intelligence agencies caused widespread indignation in the
US ruling and opposition parties, greatly tarnishing the Nationalist
government’s image. Consequently, this not only contributed nothing to
the perpetuation of KMT’s authoritarian system, but on the contrary,
hastened its decline.
Although the individuals associated with Formosa magazine were all
sentenced to prison terms, they won sympathy from a majority of the
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people. Their thinking and views did not disappear but, rather, grew
stronger. Soon, waves of protests began to emerge. On August 29, 1980,
Hsu Hsin-liang began publishing Formosa Weekly 美麗島週刊 in the US;
on July 23, 1981, The Asians 亞洲人 was suspended and banned after
the publication of the second issue of its first volume (March 1980), but
resumed operations later that same month; on October 30, 1983, the
Association of Supporters for Taiwan’s Political Prisoners and Their
Families 臺灣良心犯受刑人暨家屬後援會 was established; and on
April 26, 1984, Huang Sin-jie began a hunger strike in prison, and was
later joined by Lin Hong-syuan, Chang Chun-hung, and Yao Chia-wen.
Their families, and dangwai members who had been elected to public
office formed the Association of Supporters for the Hunger Strike Being
Held by Political Prisoners of the Kaohsiung Incident 美麗島政治犯絕
食聲援會 and launched a three-day hunger strike movement on May 4.
On December 9, 1984, the Taiwan Association for Human Rights 臺灣人
權促進會 was formally established, with Chiang Peng-chien 江鵬堅
serving as chairman; on April 12, 1985, the dangwai political journals
New Tide Review 新潮流評論 and Taiwan Era 臺灣年代 began
publication; on July 18, 1985, the responsible persons and editors of a
dozen different dangwai political magazines filed a petition with the
Executive Yuan concerning the confiscation of related magazines; on
March 28, 1986, Shih Ming-teh began a hunger strike to demand release
of all political prisoners being held by the Nationalist government; and on
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May 19, 1986, the dangwai held a special event at the Longshan Temple
in Taipei’s Wanhua District entitled 519 Green Action 五一九綠色行動,
which not only demanded the lifting of martial law but also laid the
groundwork for holding a demonstration that would end with the delivery
of a petition to the Office of the President. All of these actions reveal how
protest activities were gradually developing into an unstoppable force.
The crowning achievement of the dangwai’s efforts was the successful
founding of an opposition party, thereby putting an end to the KMT’s
one-party authoritarian rule. Their pioneering work dates back to
September 28, 1982, when dangwai members held their first meeting in
Taipei’s Zhongshan Hall 中山堂 to present six points, including the
enactment of a national fundamental law 國家基本法, under the general
principles of democracy, unity, and national salvation.
On January 8, 1984, a draft motion was passed to form the Dangwai
Campaign Assistance Group (DCAG) 黨外後援會; on February 25, the
organizational ordinance of the Dangwai Association of Public
Functionaries for Public Policy Research 黨外公職人員公共政策研究會
was adopted by independent public functionaries; on June 7, the Alliance
of Dangwai Writers and Editors (ADWE) 黨外編輯作家聯誼會 held a
forum to discuss the organization of an opposition group; on August 28, a
dangwai parliamentarian joint service center was instituted in Jhongli;
and on September 2, the Dangwai Public Policy Research Association
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(DPPRA) 黨外公共政策會 was created.
The DPPRA convened its first plenary session on August 23, 1985, and
its first board of directors meeting on March 10, 1986. At the latter, the
DPPRA admitted two chapters from Kaohsiung and decided to accept
applications from other branches as well. On April 12, 1986, approval
was given to Provincial Assemblyman Yu Shyi-kun’s 游鍚堃
application to set up an Yilan chapter, the formation of which was guided
by You Ching 尤清. Six days later on April 18, the KMT decided that, as
the DPPRA was to set up local branches, it should be dissolved within a
set period of time. If this were not done, both the DPPRA headquarters
and all of its chapters would face a crackdown. Despite this serious threat,
the DPPRA pressed on, establishing chapters in Taipei, Taichung, and
Pingtung on May 17, June 3, and June 22, respectively. On August 5,
1986, the Taipei chapter held an opening ceremony for its new clubhouse.
On August 9, the DPPRA hosted a presentation assembly for the
formation of a political party at Chin-hwa Junior High School 金華國中,
and on August 15, with the ADWE, jointly hosted the presentation
assembly for forming a new political party according to constitutional
provisions at Chung-shan Elementary School 中山國小. On September 7,
1986, Time magazine carried a story about the research and plans for
establishing a future party platform drafted by the ADWE Taskforce for
the Formation of a Political Party 組黨工作小組.
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On September 28, 1986, dangwai leaders announced the founding of the
Democratic Progressive Party 民主進步黨, released a draft of its party
platform, and appointed seven members to continue work on the party’s
organization. The KMT government made no effort to suppress these
moves but, instead, made a simple announcement on September 30, 1986
through a three-member task force which was responsible for contact and
communication with the party, demanding further communication with
the DPP or be subject to legal prosecution. It was in this manner that the
KMT’s authoritarian rule was finally broken, and Taiwan’s first native
political party since the end of World War II was precariously born.
Since the KMT was unable to root out dangwai power with a single blow
and to avoid head-on conflict, it embarked on a “step-by-step democracy”
分期付款式民主. In the supplementary election for central
parliamentarians held on December 6, 1980, independent candidates did
surprisingly well. Relatives of several jailed leaders of the Kaohsiung
Incident, such as Chou Ching-yu 周清玉, Hsu Jung-shu 許榮淑, and
Huang Tien-fu 黃天福, were also elected. In the elections for county
magistrates, city mayors, and provincial and special municipal council
members held on November 14, 1981, defense attorneys in the Kaohsiung
Incident trials, including Frank Hsieh 謝長廷 and Chen Shui-bian 陳水
扁, were elected by huge margins. In the supplementary election of the
Legislative Yuan held on December 3, 1983, however, the success rate for
independent candidates decreased slightly from the previous election,
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with the KMT winning 62 seats and independent candidates only taking 9,
primarily because of the KMT’s across-the-board counterattack.
Nevertheless, the fact that Fang Su-min 方素敏, wife of imprisoned
dissident Lin I-hsiung, was elected as legislator, was widely interpreted as
a signal of support for victims of the Kaohsiung Incident. Clearly, with
the Kaohsiung Incident, the KMT failed to achieve the same level of
intimidation as it had with the 228 Incident, and the foundation of its
authoritarian rule was facing wide-ranging collapse.
With successful formation of the DPP on September 28, 1986, the
supplementary election of central public representatives held that year
marked the true beginnings of party politics and a competing two-party
democracy in Taiwan.
In addition, the Nationalist government was accelerating the process of
localization, with the number of Taiwanese taking important government
posts slowly increasing to better reflect the general demographic structure
of the island. One of the most concrete examples of the government’s
resolve to promote localization was the selection of Lee Teng-hui 李登輝
to run on the ballot for ROC vice president. Under the guidance of
Chiang Ching-kuo, who was then serving concurrently as ROC president
and KMT chairman, the second plenum of the KMT’s 12th National
Congress, held on February 15, 1984, chose Lee to serve as Chiang’s
running mate in the upcoming presidential election. On May 20 of that
same year, Chiang and Lee were sworn in as the ROC seventh-term
president and vice president. In an interview with Time magazine held on
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August 16, 1985, Chiang further stated that he had ruled out any sort of
dynastic solution of passing on power to a family member, and that the
next president would be determined in accordance with the ROC
Constitution. On January 25, 1986, during a celebration marking the
anniversary of the implementation of the Constitution, Chiang clarified
his stance even further by stating unambiguously that members of the
Chiang family “could not and would not” run for the office of president,
nor would military rule take place either. To prove his sincerity, on
February 18, 1986, Chiang dispatched his son, Chiang Hsiao-wu 蔣孝武,
overseas to serve as a deputy representative of Taiwan’s trade delegation
to Singapore.
In June 1987, Chiang Ching-kuo told several Taiwanese nestors: “Taiwan
will soon be yours.” On July 15, 1987, after 38 years, the government
officially ended martial law in Taiwan. Twelve days later, Chiang
elaborated further by saying: “Although I am a Chinese, after eating
Taiwanese rice for 40 years, I am also a Taiwanese.”
On January 13, 1988, Chiang Ching-kuo passed away. In accordance with
the Constitution, Vice President Lee Teng-hui succeeded him to become
the first native Taiwanese president. On March 21, 1990, the National
Assembly elected Lee as the eighth-term president, ushering in the Lee
Teng-hui era in Taiwan. Under Lee’s administration, many political
reforms were carried out, such as further implementation of popular
elections at central and local levels, lifting of martial law and the ban on
new media and political parties, and amendments to the Constitution.
Among these changes, lifting the martial law and the ban on new political
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parties, holding a comprehensive election of parliamentarians, and direct
election of the president were accounted the most significance.
The democratization process peaked in March 1996, when Lee Teng-hui
won the first direct presidential election in Taiwan’s history, and again in
March 2000, when DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian won the second direct
presidential election. This marked the unprecedented change of governing
party that ended the KMT’s five-decade hold on the office and thus made
Taiwan a member of the world’s democracies. The peaceful
democratization of Taiwan, which has been widely acclaimed as a “quiet
revolution” 寧靜革命, was achieved via constant compromise and
reconciliation between the state machine and societal forces, thereby
making the ROC the first Chinese democracy.
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CHAPTER 9
Where to Go?----International Crisis of Taiwan and Taiwan-China
Relations
After conclusion of World War II in 1945, the ROC’s status in the
international community was at its peak, in particular due to its being one
of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.
With the Nationalists’ defeat by the Communists in the Chinese Civil War
and their subsequent retreat to Taiwan in 1949, as well as the
establishment of the People’s Republic of China, which also claimed to
represent all of China, in Beijing on October 1 of that year, the entire
situation began to change gradually. The period of changes can be divided
into three stages: favorable, adverse, and co-existent. In the favorable
stage (1949 to 1971), the ROC continued to represent all of China in the
UN and adhered to a strict policy of “gentlemen won’t stand with
thieves”, repulsing the dual recognition of the ROC and the PRC, and was
recognized by a majority of the world nations. The adverse stage (1972 to
1987) began late in 1971 when the UN passed a resolution stating that the
PRC was the sole representative of China. In light of the PRC’s effective
control of the mainland and increasing power, the international
community also increasingly identified the PRC as the only
representative of China. The ROC’s international status declined even
further and the country began to sink into isolation. The co-existent stage
(1988 to present) began with Lee Teng-hui’s ascension to the presidency
in 1988, and his promotion of a policy of co-existence between Taiwan
and China in order to break Taiwan’s isolation. This struggle is far from
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over, however.
The Favorable Stage (1949-1971): “Gentlemen Won’t Stand with
Thieves” and Represented China
Taipei became the government’s wartime capital following the ROC’s
retreat to Taiwan in 1949, while all national policies were directed at
retaking the mainland. At that time, the ROC adopted a policy of
“gentlemen won’t stand with thieves” and labeled the PRC as an illegal
regime.
During this early period, owing to the eruption of the Korean War in 1950,
the UN viewed the PRC as having invaded Korea, and the United States
and the PRC were in a state of war. With the announcement of a Korean
War ceasefire, the international situation switched to confrontation
between the free world and the communist bloc. This was favorable to the
KMT government and helped ensure the ROC’s right to represent all of
China.
The Nationalist government’s goal of recovering the mainland and
reunifying China was not achieved during this time, however, while the
PRC, on the contrary, was consolidating its rule over the mainland.
Considering itself to be the sole legitimate representative of China, the
PRC began to attack and isolate the ROC on the diplomatic front,
gradually weakening the legal base and legitimacy of ROC’s right to
represent China.
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The PRC was formally established on October 1, 1949. On November 15
of that same year, China’s premier, Zhou Enlai 周恩來, delivered a
statement to UN Secretary-General Trygve Halvdan Lie and President of
the General Assembly Carlos P. Romulo. This expressed the view that the
PRC was the sole legitimate representative of China and requested the
cancellation of all ROC’s rights at the UN. On November 25, when the
ROC was presenting its case regarding the Soviet Union’s invasion of
China before the UN Ad Hoc Committee of the General Assembly, Soviet
Ambassador Andrei Y. Vyshinsky countered by calling for the
replacement of the ROC with the PRC as the sole representative of China,
thus starting the long controversy over who was the rightful
representative. On January 8, 1950, the PRC asked the UN
secretary-general and members of the Security Council for the right to
represent China in the UN and all of its organizations. Two days later,
Soviet Ambassador Lacob Malik submitted a formal proposal at the 459th
meeting of the Security Council calling for the immediate expulsion of
the ROC delegation, marking the opening salvo in the issue of China
representation at the UN. On January 20, the PRC Foreign Ministry
informed the UN secretary-general, the UN Security Council, and all
members of the UN that the PRC delegation had already been sent to the
UN, and inquired when the ROC delegation would be expelled.
With the eruption of the Korean War in May 1950, the US faced down the
PRC, the ROC’s crisis was reduced temporarily, and the UN Security
Council vetoed a Soviet proposal to accept the PRC and expel the ROC.
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On September 19, 1950, the 5th session of the UN General Assembly
passed a resolution asking a seven-country committee that included
Canada, India, and the Philippines to study the issue of China’s UN
representation. On October 16, 1950, the case was shelved at the
recommendation of the Philippine delegation.
On November 6, 1951, at the 6th session of the UN General Assembly
held in Paris, the Soviet delegation suggested the issue of China
representation be listed on the agenda. Four days later on November 10,
however, while the General Committee was still reviewing the Soviet
proposal, the Thai delegation requested a deferral, adding that any plan to
accept the PRC into the UN at the expense of the ROC was simply
unacceptable. Thus began the period of postponement, which lasted until
1960 and eliminated the ROC’s crisis by constantly deferring the issue of
China’s representation in the UN for a variety of different reasons.
With the end of the Korean War, however, confrontation between East
and West abated, which was disadvantageous to the ROC’s claim of
representing all of China. Originally, admission of nations to UN
membership was selective. When the principle of universality of
membership was adopted in the UN’s handling of its membership
application from 1955 onwards, however, the PRC became entitled to
request UN membership. The issue had become too difficult to be
relegated to whether the PRC or ROC should be the sole legal
government of China. In 1961, both Mongolia and Mauritania planned to
join the UN. Although the ROC wanted to use its veto power to prevent
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Mongolia from joining, the US persuaded the ROC not to and, in
exchange, the US had the issue of China’s representation changed from
“deferred” status to “an important issue” for future discussion, thus
ensuring the ROC’s membership in the UN. In other words, the only way
for the General Assembly to vote the ROC out of the UN would be to
obtain a two-thirds vote in accordance with the provision of Chapter 18 of
the Charter of the United Nations.
In the 1960s, the US position on the issue of China representation
changed so that it would allow the PRC to become a member of the UN
only if the ROC could maintain its seat. Although the US continuously
worked to persuade the ROC to accept this system of dual representation,
which was supported by most UN members, President Chiang Kai-shek
would not budge from his principle that “gentlemen won’t stand with
thieves” and adamantly refused to co-exist with the PRC. For its part, the
PRC pressed further on this issue, continuing to express that it was the
sole, legitimate representative of China. On September 29, 1965, PRC
Foreign Minister Chen Yi 陳毅 stated that even if the UN General
Assembly expelled the ROC and instated the PRC as the legitimate
representative of China at the UN, the PRC would refuse to be a part of
the world body unless the UN underwent a complete reformation first.
Since both the ROC and the PRC insisted on representing China solely,
the international community was forced to choose between the two.
Given the PRC’s continuous and effective rule of the mainland, most
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countries began to recognize the PRC as representing all of China. On
November 20, 1970, the right to represent China was voted on “as an
important question” at the 25th session of the UN General Assembly. The
voting was extremely close, with the US proposal of allowing the ROC to
keep its UN membership receiving just two votes less than the Albanian
proposal of accepting the PRC and expelling the ROC, thus failing to
meet the two-thirds requirement. Although the closeness of the vote
symbolized how precarious the ROC’s position had become, President
Chiang Kai-shek obstinately refused to compromise and continued to
order Foreign Minister Wei Dao-ming 魏道明 to announce that the
ROC’s policy of “gentlemen won’t stand with thieves” remained
unchanged. Aside from being completely out of sync with international
reality, this policy was also not in the national interests of the United
States. Consequently, the US’s policy on China began to change rapidly
under the orchestration of Henry Kissinger, the US national security
advisor to President Nixon.
On October 20, 1971, on the eve of the UN General Assembly’s next
session, Kissinger flew to Beijing to meet with PRC Premier Zhou Enlai.
Several countries that had originally supported dual representation then
began to change their attitude. Five days later, as expected, the UN
General Assembly passed the Albanian proposal by a vote of 76 to 35,
with 17 abstentions. The PRC thus replaced the ROC’s UN seat for
representation of China. During the voting process, the ROC delegation
announced the ROC’s withdrawal from the UN and left.
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This setback, the largest ever faced by the Nationalist governments since
its move to Taiwan, not only signified a formal end to President Chiang
Kai-shek’s aspirations to retake the mainland and reunify China, but also
marked the start of the issue of survival in Taiwan for the KMT regime.
On October 26, 1971, President Chiang delivered an address on ROC’s
withdrawal from the UN, urging citizens to support the government, and
to “maintain composure during these times of adverse change and remain
firmly dignified and vigorously self-reliant.”
As for Taiwan-China relations during this period, mutual hostilities
continued and occasionally escalated into more intense crises, including
vigorous attacks and battles in the Taiwan Strait. The first such crisis
occurred in 1954/55. On August 1, 1954, Commander-in-Chief of the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Zhu De 朱德 announced that he was
“liberating Taiwan” 解放臺灣 and, on September 3, began artillery
bombardment of Kinmen. The US, which supported the defense of
Taiwan and Penghu but was opposed to stationing military personnel on
Kinmen, Matsu, or any of the other smaller offshore islets, was worried
about the situation and debated how deeply it wanted to get involved in
this battle. To resolve its standpoint on dealing with Taiwan-China
conflicts, the US signed the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty 中美
共同防禦條約 with Taiwan on December 2, 1954, explicitly stating that
the US would only defend Taiwan and Penghu. Thus, when the PLA
attacked the Dachen Islands 大陳島 and occupied Ichiangshan 一江山
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on January 10, 1955, the US avoided directly engaging with PRC forces
in battle and, instead, adhered to a policy of assisting ROC’s forces to
evacuate the island.
The second military crisis in the Taiwan Strait was the 823 Cannon War,
which began without precedence on the afternoon of August 23, 1958,
following a sudden announcement by the PRC that it was “determined to
liberate Taiwan and other offshore islands, as well as land forces on
Kinmen in the near future.” Although the US was not involved in this
battle, it did send vessels to the region to safeguard supplies and provide
new weapons to ROC’s forces. The PRC was eventually forced to
abandon its attack. On October 23, the US signed a joint communiqué
with the ROC government in which it recognized Kinmen and Matsu as
areas it would help to defend alongside Taiwan and Penghu, while the
ROC promised that it would seek the unification of China in accordance
with the Three Principles of the People as opposed to using military
means, and give up on its ambitions of retaking the mainland by force.
In 1961, just after US President Kennedy had taken office, the US basic
stance was of advocating peaceful co-existence, with China on one side
and Taiwan on the other. Consequently, the US began making plans for
Taiwan to become the Democratic State of China-Taiwan. In the face of
strong objections from both the ROC and PRC governments, however,
this project was cancelled, leaving the hostile situation in the Taiwan
Strait unresolved.
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The Rise of the P R C in International Arena and the Dilemma of
“One China”Policy (1972-1987)
The ROC’s withdrawal from the UN was the greatest crisis ever faced by
the government since its move to Taiwan. In 1979, it was dealt another
harsh blow when the US cut ties in order to establish formal diplomatic
relations with the PRC. Despite being buffeted by a sea of difficulties,
however, the Chiang regime continued to weather the storm all the way
through 1988, when political power was peacefully transferred into
Taiwan-born hands, which, undeniably, was an exceptional feat amongst
authoritarian systems. During this period, there were three major
competing forces in operation: the Nationalist government and its clique
of unification advocates; the nativists; and the Communists.
After the ROC’s withdrawal from the UN at the end of 1971, the ROC’s
international situation began to deteriorate rapidly as one country after
another began to recognize the PRC as being the sole representative of
China. Amongst these, most crucial was the United States, ROC’s
long-term ally and supporter. On November 30, 1971, the PRC and US
simultaneously announced that US President Richard Nixon would make
a state visit to China. On February 21, 1972, President Nixon went to
China to meet with Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong and hold
discussions with PRC Premier Zhou Enlai. Six days later, the two sides
signed the Shanghai Communiqué, in which the most important point was
that “The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either part of
the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and Taiwan is part
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of China.” The US and PRC then headed towards the eventual
establishment of formal relations.
On December 15, 1978, just when supplementary elections for members
of the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly were about to be held in
Taiwan, US President Jimmy Carter suddenly announced that the United
States would establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of
China on January 1, 1979, and abrogate the Sino-American Mutual
Defense Treaty on December 31, 1979. These proclamations struck the
ROC like lightning bolts, as the loss of the US as its long-term ally and
supporter left the Nationalist government almost completely isolated in
international politics.
Despite this change, however, the US was still very sympathetic to the
Taiwanese people’s situation and strongly opposed to both communism
and dictatorships. From start to finish, therefore, the US never made any
definite proclamation on the future of Taiwan, and insisted that the
cross-strait issue be resolved in a peaceful manner that fully respected the
wishes of the people on Taiwan. Immediately after severing formal
relations with the ROC government, the US drafted legislation to ensure
the safety of Taiwan and continue supplying the island with defensive
weapons to counter the PRC’s military threat. This legislation, known as
the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) 臺灣關係法, was signed into law by US
President Carter on April 10, 1979, and governed future unofficial
relations with Taiwan in the absence of formal ties. The US promised to
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abide by and put into practice every article in the TRA. On February 28,
1983, the US Senate passed a resolution on Taiwan that declared: “The
future of Taiwan should be resolved peacefully, in a form acceptable to
the people of Taiwan that is free from coercive means and consistent with
the spirit of the bill passed by Congress and the US-PRC Communiqué.”
In other words, the US was using “strategic ambiguity” 戰略性的模糊
in dealing with the problematic question of “one China” and leaving more
time and maneuvering room for future changes.
The ROC’s various foreign affairs setbacks greatly impacted the nativists
and unification advocates, both of whom were eagerly seeking a way out
for Taiwan. Independence advocates living overseas began to accelerate
their activities, moving back to the island to collaborate with nativists in
promoting democratization and the independence movement. The
Nationalist government, under the directions of Chiang Ching-kuo, also
strategically manipulated the situation to protect its power. On February
22, 1972, following the ROC’s withdrawal from the UN, Koo
Kuang-ming 辜寬敏, an executive member of the Japan-based World
United Formosans for Independence (WUFI) 臺灣獨立聯盟,
immediately left the organization’s headquarters in Japan and returned to
Taiwan to help save the country from national crisis. On April 2, Kyu
Yeong-hann 邱永漢, a member of the central committee of the Taiwan
Youth Independence Union (TIU) 臺灣青年獨立聯盟, also returned
from its Japanese headquarters to Taiwan to celebrate Chiang Kai-shek’s
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success in being reelected to a fifth term as president and to implement
plans for investing in and setting up a factory in Taiwan. In addition,
many other individuals blacklisted from entering Taiwan were finding
different ways of returning to the island, each hoping to fulfill the dream
of establishing an independent Taiwan. This heightened the sense of crisis
felt by those in favor of unification, some of whom reacted by striking out
at independence advocates, while increasing numbers of others laid their
hopes for unification on the Chinese communists. Consequently, conflicts
between unification and independence advocates became increasingly
intense and visible, adding chaos to the future domestic political scene.
In foreign affairs, the Nationalist government’s long-term policy of
“gentlemen won’t stand with thieves” had to be modified gradually for
the ROC to survive. The most important change of international policy
was the tacit consent of dual recognition; domestically, it was the
acceptance of Unifying China Under the Three Principles of the People,
and replacing the hostile mentality of Retaking the Mainland by Force
with one of Peaceful Future Unification. Antagonism towards the Chinese
communists began to soften.
On May 20, 1984, Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui were sworn into
office as the seventh-term president and vice president. On October 15,
1986, the KMT’s central standing committee passed a proposal to end
Emergency Decree, which was lifted on July 15, 1987, followed by lifting
of the ban on visiting relatives on the mainland. These moves symbolized
a softening in Taiwan’s hostile attitude towards China.
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At the same time, China ceased all substantial military actions against
Taiwan and, instead, opted to use its “one-China” principle to establish
diplomatic ties with other countries so as to isolate the ROC in the
international arena. The PRC was largely successful with this policy.
Adoption and Predicament of the “Co-existence” Policy on
Taiwan-China Relations (1988-present)
Chiang Ching-kuo passed away suddenly on January 13, 1988, leaving
Vice President Lee Teng-hui to succeed him as president. Lee was
subsequently elected to the post of KMT chairman on July 8 of the same
year; re-elected as the eighth-term president of the ROC in 1990; and
became the first ROC president to be elected by direct popular vote in
1996. Lee’s term in office as president spanned 12 years, from 1988 to
2000. Lee Teng-hui was Taiwan’s first head of state of local origin, and
thus his presidency carried special historical significance, symbolizing
the localization of an alien regime. Lee’s long term in power carried
substantive meaning for two additional reasons. Firstly, because Lee was
in office for 12 years, he had sufficient time to establish authority and
implement his ideals. Secondly, Lee’s unique background, having lived
through two alien regimes (Japanese rule and the ROC government) and
his membership of the intellectual elite whose education included
Japanese, Chinese, and American cultures, gave him a unique perspective
of Taiwan-China relations. Accordingly, foreign policy and cross-strait
relations underwent many fundamental changes under his reign.
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Lee’s new policies can be largely summarized as follows: Domestically,
he espoused the “New Taiwanese” 新臺灣人 identity to resolve
problems of ethnic confrontation and consolidate the island into a
“organismic community” 生命共同體, in the hope that Taiwan could
eventually establish itself as an independent state. Internationally, he
abandoned the old “gentlemen won’t stand with thieves” credo of the
KMT and promoted “pragmatic diplomacy” 務實外交; gradually
adopted a more open policy towards China; and shifted from the vague
theory of “future unification” 未來統一論 to the clearer “state-to-state”
theory 兩國論.
In his inaugural address on May 20, 1990, President Lee Teng-hui vowed
to terminate the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the
Communist Rebellion, amend the Constitution within two years, and
communicate with China over the issue of unification on an equal footing.
On May 1, 1991, he officially announced the termination of the Period of
National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion,
claiming “the mainland is now under the jurisdiction of the Chinese
Communists, and this is a fact that we must face.” In addition to
signifying that Taiwan was no longer in a state of confrontation with the
Chinese Communist Party, this announcement acknowledged the
concurrent “existence of two political entities” 政治實體的存在 across
the Taiwan Strait. In 1991, elections were held to replace the entire
National Assembly. In 1994, the Constitution was amended again, with
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the Additional Articles stipulating that, henceforth, the ROC president
would be directly elected via popular vote, beginning with the 1996
election. By this stage, it was apparent that, at a constitutional level,
Taiwan was a sovereign state.
On the other hand, Lee’s efforts to promote negotiations with China were
yielding little progress due to the fact that the “one-China” issue
remained unresolved. To end this stalemate, Lee guided the establishment
of several agencies for commencing negotiations with China, such as the
National Unification Council 國家統一委員會, Straits Exchange
Foundation (SEF) 海峽兩岸基金會, and Mainland Affairs Council
(MAC) 大陸工作委員會. The event that drew the most attention was
undoubtedly the discussions held on April 27-29, 1993, in Singapore
between the SEF and its mainland China counterpart, the Association for
Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) 海峽兩岸關係協會. At
these talks, dubbed the “Icebreaking Tour” 破冰之旅, then SEF
Chairman Koo Chen-fu 辜振甫 and ARATS Chairman Wang Daohan
汪道涵 reached consensus on four points. The critical issue of “one
China” remained unresolved, however, and what progress was made was
later offset by other setbacks. Consequently, Taiwan-China relations
remained in a quagmire.
President Lee Teng-hui was well aware that to achieve breakthroughs in
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foreign relations, Taiwan needed to reach out and make the world aware
of its existence. He therefore took every opportunity to travel abroad on
state visits including Singapore between March 5 and 9, 1989, when
Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew 李光耀 introduced him as the “President
from Taiwan.” Throughout the 1990s, Lee continued to carry out his
“vacation diplomacy” 渡假外交, leaving footprints in the Middle East,
Europe, and the Americas. The most influential of these trips was
undeniably the 1995 visit to his alma mater in the US, Cornell University.
This visit not only triggered a series of verbal attacks and military threats
from Beijing, bringing cross-strait relations to a new low, but also
prompted China to carry out large-scale military exercises and fire
missiles into Taiwan’s waters during the ROC presidential election of
March 1996. The situation became extremely intense. Fortunately, the US
placed two aircraft carriers on alert in the waters near Taiwan, and the
crisis ended without any real danger.
Furthermore, from 1993 onward, Taiwan began to seek re-admission to
the United Nations. No progress has been achieved to date, however, due
to constant interference from China. In 1999, just before ARATS
Chairman Wang Daohan’s first visit to Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui openly
defined Taiwan-China relations as a “special state-to-state relationship”
特殊兩國論. This evoked strong protests and condemnation from China,
resulted in the cancellation of Wang’s trip, and caused cross-strait
relations to deteriorate.
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DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian was victorious in the 2000 ROC
presidential election. In his inaugural address, Chen took into account the
threat from China and the stance of opposition forces on the island by
proposing a “Five Noes” 四不一沒有 policy that included a vow not to
actively seek independence for Taiwan. China did not trust Chen,
however, and adopted a “listen and watch” 聽其言,觀其行 policy,
maintaining a high profile in the international community, and
suppressing the ROC president whenever possible so as to prevent him
from deviating from his declared position. Meanwhile, opposition parties
in Taiwan repeatedly criticized Chen’s policies, putting him under attack
from both internal and external forces. Despite these pressures, Chen
managed to maintain a low profile while constantly expressing goodwill
gestures to China. China did not respond with any positive signs of its
own, however. In August 2002, Chen suddenly announced his theory that
there was “one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait” 一邊一國論.
This evoked strong criticism from both Beijing and domestic
pro-unification forces. Given that Taiwan is autonomic and democratic
while communist China emphasizes nationalism, and the two sides are
therefore mutually exclusive, it is clear that it will be difficult to reduce
tensions in cross-strait confrontations.
Although there is still no solution to the political problems facing Taiwan
and China, economic and people-to-people exchanges between the two
sides have continued to increase. Taiwan businesses have also invested
heavily in China, contributing much to the rapid growth of China’s
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economy and allowing it to supplant the US as Taiwan’s largest export
destination. The annual number of Taiwanese tourists visiting China has
also grown dramatically, greatly contributing to China’s development.
In sum, Taiwan has already adopted a pragmatic policy that supports the
co-existence of the two sides. Owing to internal conflicts amongst
different social groups and external threats from the PRC, however,
Taiwan is still unable to participate in the international community with
the status of a sovereign state. Whether or not Taiwan can free itself from
this straitjacket remains to be seen.
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CHAPTER 10
Conclusion
History has shown that Taiwan is an island with multiple characteristics
and complicated destinies. First and foremost, Taiwan is by nature an
island of misfortune. As Taiwan’s early inhabitants failed to organize
themselves into a nation state, the island suffered the tragic fate of being
constantly invaded and ruled by foreign countries. Consequently, early
inhabitants were never able to establish themselves as the masters of their
own homeland. Moreover, as the alien ruling regimes differed in race,
culture, and language, and changed hands with great frequency, Taiwan’s
inhabitants, especially the first generation in a new regime, always
suffered discrimination and spiritual torture during the period of
adjustment to their new masters. This continuous change of alien rulers
also meant that Taiwan had difficulty in developing a sophisticated
culture, which requires the accumulated efforts of several generations.
Looked at from a different perspective, however, Taiwan was also an
island of blessings. Since most of the foreign powers occupying the island
were from more developed regions, such as the Dutch, Chinese, and
Japanese, advanced production techniques and cultures were quickly
introduced, allowing the island to progress rapidly. Furthermore, once
these foreign powers left, the effects of their respective cultures became
important assets for enriching and diversifying Taiwan’s own culture.
Looking to the future, one could also say that Taiwan is an island of hope.
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Firstly, the island’s achievements in democracy, economic liberalization,
and cultural diversity make it an ideal model to follow for other Chinese
societies, such as China, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Secondly, Taiwan’s
highly educated populace living on an island possessing all modern
facilities, particularly convenient transportation and communication, has
produced a cluster effect, expediting economic and cultural innovation
and giving Taiwan unlimited potential for development. Thirdly, Taiwan
is at the confluence of the world’s two most commonly used languages,
English and Mandarin Chinese, with many Taiwanese speaking both. This
places Taiwan in the perfect position of serving as a bridge or melting pot
between the two communities. In due course, Taiwan is bound to play an
important and unlimited role in the world arena.
There is still a hidden social illness that needs to be eliminated, however,
which is Taiwan’s national identity. After the establishment of the
People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949, the Republic of China
continued to claim that it represented all of China and adhered to a strict
policy of “one China,” when, in reality, it only exercised jurisdiction over
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. Consequently, Taiwan became
increasingly isolated diplomatically. In 1971, the ROC was forced to
withdraw from the United Nations and, on January 1, 1979, the US
severed formal ties with the island, making Taiwan an orphan in the
international community. This difficult situation in international relations
subsequently caused a crisis in governance and, since then, the legitimacy
of the government and the people’s sense of national identity have
become controversial issues. If the government accepts a Chinese identity,
it faces the problem of being ruled by the Chinese Communists whereas,
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if it acknowledges a Taiwanese identity, then independence becomes
inevitable. Where to go? Here one crucial and critical problem derives
from the fact that citizens of different origins in Taiwan hold widely
differing views on this issue. The mainlanders have long controlled
Taiwan’s political, economic, and social resources, but are a minority on
the island, and thus risk becoming a disadvantaged group should the
government choose to accept a Taiwanese national identity. Thus, it is
only natural that they support the “one-China” principle through every
means possible. Conversely, native Taiwanese favor independence for
fear that, if Taiwan is unified by China, they will fall back to the
hereditary tragedy of being ruled by outsiders and the hard-earned fruits
of the past half century, which cost many people their lives, will be
destroyed overnight. As these two groups hold opposite stances and have
many conflicts of interest, a consensus is difficult to reach, and this has
resulted in political instability and social disharmony. A community can
be likened to a boat cruising in the ocean, which can be navigated toward
its destination only with the concerted efforts of the crew. Unfortunately,
Taiwan’s different ethnic groups hold controversial national identities so
strongly that it poses a great threat to Taiwan’s survival. How this
deep-rooted social illness can be eliminated and a harmonious society be
created will test the wisdom and abilities of Taiwan’s people in the years
to come.
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