CHAPTER 6
UNDERSTANDIN G
AMERI CA
Political Culture
Jack Citrin
THE ANATOAfY OF AN
EXCEPTIONAL NATION
Lr
PETER H. SCHUCK AND
JAMES Q. WILSON, EDITORS
Political culture is a patterned way of thinking about political life that is
widely shared, spans the generations, and excludes other values and customs.
Political scientist Jack Citrin explains difining aspects ofAmerica's political
culture: identity, suspicion of authority, individualism, conceptions of equal­
ity, the political role of religion and morality, political participation, and insti­
tutional fragmentation. This culture, he argues, imposes constraints on what
government can do and the way it can do it.
WHO ARE WE AMERICANS? WHERE HAVE WE COME FROM? WHERE
should we be going? How can we get there? These fundamental
questions about collective identity, collective purposes, and collective
authority lie at the core of descriptions of a community's political
culture, a concept that refers to a distinctive set of assumptions,
beliefs, and practices. A political culture is a patterned way of think­
ing about political life that is shared by a number of people, spans the
generations, and excludes other values and customs. It identifies
the "correct" ways of behaving politically, indicating what actions
are legitimate and what projects are feasible. Those who act on these
assumptions widely shared in their collectivity "belong," while those
who follow a different set of values and beliefs about proper modes
of conduct will be viewed as outsiders or deviant.
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PUBLICAFFAIRS
Fifty years ago, Louis Hartz's The Liberal Tradition in America,
building on de Tocqueville's century-old Democracy in America, pro­
vided the dominant interpretation of modern American political
New York
147
148
Political Culture 149
Jack Citrin
culture. Hartz portrayed America as an ideological nation, defining
means the advance of an ethos of dissent, self-expression, and moral
itself not ethnically but through the values of democracy, individ­
relativism at the expense of bourgeois values and manners. The re­
sult is one nation with two competing moral visions. One political
ualism, liberty, equality, and property rights. He argued that the
overriding cultural belief in these values throughout American his­
consequence of this quasi-religious conflict of values is a party sys­
tory defined rigid boundaries for state action. Accordingly, an im­
tem in which, rather than seeking the political center, warring Red
portant factor in the "exceptionalism" of its politics-the absence of
and Blue armies fight to the death over tradition and modernity,
a strong socialist party, the weakness of the labor movement, the ac­
faith and science, nationalism and cosmopolitanism, equality of
ceptance of economic inequality, and the limited development of
opportunity and equality of results. Of course, not everyone accepts
government programs in the area of welfare and health care-is the
this reasoning or agrees that America is breaking apart. In recent
firm grip of its liberal tradition.
books, Alan Wolfe and Morris Fiorina emphasize the persistence
Today, the idea of cultural unity in American politics is under
sustained attack. Looking backward, Rogers Smith holds that
of consensus and moderation. 3 Still, both sides in the debate about
the contours of cultural division agree that something important
incomplete and that a rival inegalitarian tradition had widespread
has happened.
Thinking ofAmerican political culture as an "ideational code"­
support, sustaining a racial hierarchy through Jim Crow laws and
a set of plans or rules governing behavior-underscores that the
ethnocentric immigration and naturalization policies. 1 Looking for­
focus is on collective norms rather than individual beliefs. Five con­
ward, recent work from left, right, and center projects an image of
ceptual issues can be distinguished. First, what are the boundaries of
America as a splintering society whose vaunted exceptionalism is a
a political culture; that is, what types of assumptions and beliefs are
thing of the past. The country, in these views, is globalizing and
included? Should it include general beliefs about the nature of
fragmenting at the same time, making e pluribus unum-national
causality, the trustworthiness of other people, and assumptions about
Hartz's characterization of a uniform American political culture is
solidarity based on a common culture-unsustainable. 2 Globaliza­
economic activity, or should it be confined to beliefs about political
tion, it is argued, has diminished the sovereignty of even the Ameri­
identities and goals? Second, what degree of consensus must prevail
can superpower. Economic interdependence frays the connections
for an abstracted composite of values and beliefs to be designated as
between citizenship and personal welfare, and diffusion of global
a "culture"? Not every American shares or even knows all the dom­
patterns of speech and communications erodes a nation's distinct
inant assumptions about politics that guide and constrain political
culture, substituting a cosmopolitan commitment to universal
action. Indeed, modern societies rarely display complete cultural
human rights and international legal norms. At the same time,
homogeneity, and different ways of life make peaceful setdement of
immigration-driven demographic diversity combines with identity
conflicts more difficult. Lockean liberalism, conventionally regarded
politics to gnaw at the cultural consensus from within. Multicultur­
as the core ofAmerican political culture, stresses both limits on po­
alism as an ideology celebrates the maintenance of cultural differ­
ences and regards the melting pot ideal as an oppressive symbol of
litical authority and broad religious toleration.Yet while few Ameri­
cans publicly repudiate the liberal principle of tolerance, this
cultural imperialism. This perspective suggests the creation of a deep
seeming consensus on abstract values often breaks down over spe­
new fault line in American political culture. Finally, modernization
cific policies such as abortion or school prayer.
I 50
Jack Citrin
Political Culture
151
Third, since political culture is a property of a collectivity, which
institutionalized discrimination. Rogers Smith regards the inconsis­
unit of analysis is being used? Most writing about American politi­
tency between liberalism's inclusionary conception ofAmerican cit­
cal culture focuses on the nation as a whole and contrasts the
izenship and ethnocentric immigration and naturalization laws as
United States with other countries. However, one can analyze re­
evidence for the enduring potency of an inegalitarian ideology
gion, class, or ethnic group and compare these subnational entities
opposed to the liberal political tradition. Myrdal, though, believed
to determine whether their way of thinking about politics is com­
that commitment to the liberal national creed was genuine and that
patible with the dominant national culture. For example, can liberal­
America ultimately would resolve its "dilemma" through reforms
ism's insistence on equality and individual autonomy accommodate
providing full citizenship to African-Americans. Similarly, Samuel
a subculture that rejects a woman's right to choose her own spouse
or career?
its reality falls so far short of its ideals. America is not a lie, it is a dis­
Huntington comments that "critics say that America is a lie because
Fourth, one must distinguish between the beliefs of political
appointment. And it can be a disappointment only because it is also
elites and those of ordinary' citizens. Almost fifty years ago, Herbert
a hope."s In the context of these dissenting views, it makes sense to
McClosky showed that Democratic and Republican activists were
define political culture in terms of values and beliefs and to leave its
ideologically far apart while their rank-and-file followers clustered
relationship to behavior as a matter for historical investigation.
in the middle of the liberal-conservative continuum. Soon after,
Philip Converse demonstrated that while political leaders did orga­
American Identity
nize their beliefs on the basis of abstract general principles, the vast
What does it mean to be an American? As a nation of immigrants,
majority of the American mass public was ideologically "innocent."
the United States has always faced the exacting task of balancing
Disputants about the existence of a culture war in America agree
universality and diversity. At Independence, about 80 percent of the
that competing moral and ideological visions pit activists and intel­
newly minted Americans were British in origin, so the problem of
lectuals against one another, but that the general population is less
forging an identity separate from that of the mother country pushed
divided and more moderate. 4 The question that remains is how much
toward a civic rather than ethnic definition of nationhood. America
less divided, and for how long. In a society rich with opportunities
could be a universal nation founded on democratic political princi­
for political participation along with populist antagonism toward es­
ples in part because, as John Jay wrote in The Federalist (no. 2), the
tablished authority, a large gap between elite and mass preferences is
country was "blessed" with a common language, values, and customs.
unlikely to endure, if only because such a gap emboldens opposition
Early America was inclusive in principle, but not in practice.
actors to mobilize the less vocal, if not necessarily silent majority.
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Blacks and Native Americans were excluded from citizenship. And
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A final conceptual issue is whether stated attitudes, beliefs, laws,
each wave of immigration, whether from Germany, Ireland, Asia,
and institutional practices truly reveal cultural preferences. A dis­
Italy, or eastern Europe, raised fears about newcomers' capacity
crepancy between abstract ideals and prevailing practices, between
and willingness to adapt and live up to the democratic national
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rhetoric and reality, is commonplace. Gunnar Myrdal famously de­
creed. Nativism represented one ideological solution to the prob­
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scribed race relations in the United States as "an American dilemma,"
lem of a common national identity in a diverse nation. Immigra­
because the commitment to equality of opportunity conflicted with
tion laws should favor people who already are familiar with the
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Jack Citrin
Political Culture 153
dominant national culture, and all newcomers should undergo a
cial recognition and support to minority cultures that would other­
program of Americanization to speed cultural and linguistic assimi­
wise disappear. Multiculturalism thus advocates group representation
lation. Theodore Roosevelt accepted immigration, but insisted that
the new arrivals should feel, think, and talk "American." Confor­
to govern the allocation of many political and economic benefIts.
In its strong form, multiculturalism conceives of the nation-state
mity to an Anglo-Protestant culture was the goal.
as a confederation of equal cultural groups, an outlook that differs
The liberal conception of national identity associated with the
both from liberalism's insistence on equal individual rights and
Declaration of Independence is optimistic about American society's
nativism's promotion of a cultural hierarchy. From this perspective,
ability to absorb immigrants, whatever their origin. Zangwill's melt­
the answer to the question "Who are we?" is "Anyone who is here."
ing pot metaphor for the blending of cultures symbolizes this idea
The basis of American identity is simply subjective opinion, a will­
of nationhood. Yes, immigrants should adopt the national creed and
ingness to identify oneself as an American and a commitment to the
learn to speak English, but this will happen without the need for a
program of indoctrination that denigrates their original cultures.
country's well-being. 6
One sign that multiculturalist ideas have spread within elite
The political contest between the liberal and nativist conceptions of
intellectual opinion is the different reactions to David Fischer's Al­
American identity was settled in the 1960s. The twinned passage
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Immigration and Na­
bion's Seed (1989) and, more recently, Samuel Huntington's VVho
Are JIVe? Challenges to American National Identity (2004).7 Both books
tionality Act instituted a color-blind version of access to citizenship
state that Americans of all national origins share a political culture
that steadily increased the Hispanic and Asian segments of the na­
founded on British values and traditions. Fischer's book was received
tional community. And despite periodic outbursts of anti-immigrant
with general acclaim, whereas many reviewers accused Huntington
sentiment, the legal foundations of this ethnic transformation of
of xenophobia and racism for proclaiming that English-speaking
American society remain intact.
and Anglo-Protestant political values are the core of an increasingly
turalism as a new challenge to the dominant political culture. In the
fragile American identity.
Rather than embracing multiculturalism, most Americans still
aftermath of the civil rights movement, disappointment about the fail­
give priority to an overarching national identity. A 1994 national
ure to eliminate entrenched racial inequalities spawned cultural na­
survey showed that 96 percent thought of themselves mainly as "just
tionalism among blacks. The assertion of claims for equal rights and
Americans" rather than as members of an ethnic, racial, or religious
recognition on the basis of group membership spread to other eth­
group. When given a chance to choose both labels, few white
nic minorities, women, homosexuals, and the disabled. Multicultur­
Americans do, suggesting that the various groups of European "eth­
alism became the label for an ideological defense of redistribution
nics" have indeed melted. Pluralities of black, Hispanic, and Asian
on ethnic and gender lines. The fundamental tenet of this doctrine
was that ethnicity imparts a distinct set of beliefs, values, habits, and
respondents opt for the hyphenated ethnic-American option, al­
though this tendency diminishes among naturalized citizens and
observances, and that the freedom to live this way of life is essential
those born in the United States. A 2006 national survey of Hispan­
to personal dignity and self-realization. Because no culture in a
ics living in the United States confirms that a large majority feel
multi-ethnic society is privileged, the government should give offi-
strongly American, while retaining a sense of being Mexican, Puerto
Ironically, though, liberalism's triumph quickly spawned multicul­
154 Jack Citrin
Political Culture 155
Rican, and so on. 8 Both Hispanic and Asian immigrants over­
for beneficiary groups to retain a strong sense of ethnic identity.
whelmingly agree that it is crucial to learn English, and by the third
Making dual citizenship legal may diminish the intensity of nation­
generation most members of these ethnic groups are monolingual
alist sentiment.
English speakers-just like the experience of earlier European im­
migrant generations.
Today, however, there is broad agreement about what it means
to be an American. Most Americans continue to support the ideal of
Probing mass beliefs about what makes someone an American
an overarching common identity without denying the legitimacy
also suggests continuing support for an inclusive egalitarian concep­
of ethnic pride and diverse traditions. They believe that cultural as­
tion of national identity. Several national and California surveys
similation and cultural pluralism are compatible, but also that the
asked what respondents felt made someone a "true" American.
Americans are much more likely to express love of their country
and its institutions than other people. The vast majority of Ameri­
unum should have emotional precedence over the plures. For exam­
ple, the pervasive desire that English remain the country's common
language means that bilingual education programs win support only
if framed as a transition to linguistic assimilation.
The liberal tradition's staying power even constrains the tactics
of its nativist and multiculturalist challengers. Historically, support­
ers of restricting immigration argued that this was necessary to
American democracy. Today, advocates of multiculturalism, with
some success, appropriate egalitarian rhetoric to promote represen­
tation for minorities and women, arguing that equality entails di­
versity. Academic, business, and political elites mostly have signed
on, and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor ultimately accepted this ra­
cans also say that they would rather live in the United States than
tionale as a valid justification for affirmative action in higher educa­
anywhere else. Ethnic differences on survey questions measuring
tion. In the public realm, any hint of a racial slur or ethnic joke by a
pride in America are relatively small, and immigrants acquire this
attitude relatively quickly.
political candidate or entertainer generates fIrSt criticism and then
Whether this positive outlook will persist is more difficult to
Patrick's and Columbus Days to give us various ethnic history
say. Among non-Hispanic whites, the young and the college-educated
are relatively less patriotic and more sympathetic to multicultur­
months, Cinco de Mayo parades, karaoke, Kwanzaa holiday cards,
alism and the emotional claims of ethnicity. And government
political culture recognizes multiple identities and accepts ethnic
policies can affect the future balance of national and ethnic identifi­
differences more than it did fifty years ago.Yet this changed orienta­
cation. What schools teach often shapes attitudes toward the value of
cultural assimilation, the meaning of American history, and the
tion leaves unchallenged the belief of most Americans that when
Overwhelming majorities of all ethnic groups mentioned the
creedal values of treating people equally, getting ahead on one's
own, and participating in civic life as very important. Virtually
everyone agrees on the importance of being able to speak English,
something that one can learn whatever one's ancestry or place of
birth. The more exclusionary or "ethnic" attributes ofAmericanism,
religiosity and nativity, are least likely to be deemed important. 9
People who continue to believe that "America equals white and
Christian" surely are a minority. Patriotism also remains the norm.
virtue of patriotism. Affirmative action programs create incentives
an apology. And "festival" multiculturalism has gone beyond St.
Celebrate Diversity bumper stickers, and fusion cuisine. American
push comes to shove, their national rather than their ethnic identity
should be paramount.
156 Jack Citrin
Trust in Authority
Political Culture 157
Figure 6.1
Trust in Government 1964-2004
Suspicion of political power is a distinctive feature ofAmerican po­
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litical culture, making people reluctant to grant the state broad re­
..§
sponsibilities. This entrenched antigovernment ethos coexists with
...-5"o
patriotism, reverence for the Constitution, and pride in American
democracy. But while strong public allegiance to the fundamental
90%
80%
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70%
values and symbols of the American political system remains intact,
~
60%
trust in the motives and competence of government and other lead­
t
50%
...~
40%
ing social institutions has sharply declined over the past fifty years.
Beginning in the 1960s, pollsters have asked the American pub­
lic how often they trust the government in Washington "to do what
is right" and how much confidence they have in "the people run­
ning" the main branches of government and other social institu­
tions. Figure 6.1 tracks the trend in the proportion of respondents
who say they trust the government "just about always" or "most" of
the time" in the University of Michigan's biennial National Election
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30%
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20%
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10%
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Studies (NES). It shows a sharp drop between 1964, when 77 per­
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cent expressed trust in government, and 1980, when only 26 percent
~Democrats
did. There was a rebound during the economic recovery under
Reagan, another slide in trust to the nadir of 24 percent in 1994,
Republicans
_Total
SOURCE:
National Elections Studies (CPS, University of Michigan).
and then another upward bounce during the economic good times
in Clinton's second term. Although 9/11 was a national tragedy, a
CBS poll conducted about a month later showed another large
jump in political trust, with fully 55 percent saying they trusted the
government "always" or "most of the time." This apparent resur­
gence of trust actually represented a temporary fusion of "govern­
ment" and the "nation" in people's minds. An external attack on the
country's economic and political institutions produced a bipartisan
A major cause of these fluctuations is a change in how the pub­
lic evaluates the performance of the incumbent presidential admin­
istration.Vietnam, urban riots, Watergate, stagflation, and the Iranian
hostage crisis reduced trust in government, while the improved state
of the economy under Reagan and Clinton helped reverse the trend.
Nevertheless, declining confidence represents more than a short-term
judgment about the competence of current leadership. Table 6.1
surge of patriotism, a rallying around the flag. However, the intense
partisanship in domestic politics and renewed division over the war
compares the proportion of respondents who indicate they had a
in Iraq engendered a new decline in political trust, particularly
among Democrats, recorded in the 2004 NES data.
and social institutions in 1973 and again in 2004, according to Na­
"great deal" of confidence in the "people running" twelve political
tional Opinion Research Center surveys. Except for the army and
158 Jack Citrin
Table 6.1
Political Culture 159
Declining Confidence in Institutions
A lack of trust draws attention to the question of "who guards
the guardians." Pervasive political cynicism in the United States pre­
1973
2004
pared the ground for ethics committees in Congress, special prose­
Business
31.4%
17.0%
cutors, conflict of interest laws, campaign finance reform, open
Clergy
36.1
24.1
Education System
37.5
27.5
Executive Branch
29.9
20.8
Labor Movement
16.2
12.4
Press
23.4
9.2
Medicine
54.6
36.5
Television
18.8
10.3
meetings rules, and term limits. But whatever their merit, these re­
forms have failed to boost public confidence in authority. Like a lost
religious faith, trust in government is hard to regain completely.
Individualism
Liberty conceived as freedom from government implies individual
responsibility. American individualism refers to belief in the value of
human independence and self-reliance. Individualists oppose exter­
nal interference with "the pursuit of happiness" and downplay col­
lective obligation for economic welfare. A majority of all ethnic
Supreme Court
32.6
31.0
groups believe that getting ahead on one's own is important for
Scientific Community
40.1
42.5
making one "a true American," say they believe in "the American
Legislative Branch
24.1
13.3
Army
32.6
56.8
country. Blacks and Hispanic Americans, who, despite "faring
Column figures indicate percent of survey respondents expressing a
"great deal" of confidence for the people running a given institution.
NOTE:
SOURCE:
Dream," and agree that people who work hard can get ahead in this
National Opinion Research Center.
poorly in the individualist social order, still support its basic premises
are more like white Americans than Europeans in their optimism
about the possibility of economic achievement and the need for
personal responsibility."I o
Americans are less likely than people elsewhere to expect the
the scientific community, every institution experienced a drop in
government to provide economic security. In 1994, less than a quar­
public confidence. In part, poor performance, scandal, and the rise
ter of Americans completely agreed that "It is the responsibility of
of an adversarial mass media have fueled this broad loss of confidence.
the government to take care of very poor people who can't take
Beyond this, skepticism toward authority is a feature of modernity,
care of themselves," far less than the proportion of Germans, French,
as reason and science are elevated above habit and tradition. Finally,
British, or Italians who completely agreed with this opinion. Only a
some expressions of political cynicism are merely ritualistic, an echo
minority of Americans agree that government should guarantee
of the familiar cliche that "politics is a dirty business." In this regard,
everyone a basic income, provide a "decent" standard ofliving, and
declining trust in government is not a uniquely American phenom­
enon. Critical citizens have increased in most European countries as
reduce differences in income between the rich and poor. In contrast,
the majority of Europeans supported this role for government. 11
well, suggesting a more general cultural shift in modern democracies.
The World Values Survey, conducted in 2001, compared American
160
Jack Citrin
Political Culture
I
6I
attitudes to those in fourteen other wealthy democracies and found
"small" government. In practice, organized groups are quick to de­
among Americans more support for private ownership of business,
mand public protection and largesse.
more belief that poverty was due to laziness and a lack of individual
Moreover, a "something for nothing" mentality governs public
motivation than unfair treatment by society, and less support for in­
opinion. Majorities say they want more spending on a wide range of
creased government assistance for the poor than elsewhere. These
specific programs while they oppose higher taxes and "big" govern­
individualist values were widely shared in the United States: the
ment. Similarly, the public decries bureaucracy while favoring more
modal viewpoints of men and women, black and white, rich and
poor, and young and old were the same.
environmental regulation and consumer protection. Harold Wilen­
sky argues that Americans embrace contradictory values when it
Consistent with these attitudes, Americans pay lower taxes than
comes to the role of government. 12 They are simultaneously indi­
most Europeans. America also spends less on transfer payments
vidualistic and collectivistic, wanting to be rewarded to the maxi­
such as pensions, unemployment insurance benefits, family al­
mum for economic success as well as protected from hardship by
lowances, and child care than other countries and is virtually the
pensions and health insurance. Wilensky concludes that American
only wealthy democracy without a government-supported univer­
individualism mainly explains the country's slowness in initiating
sal health care system. Moreover, the financing of Social Security
welfare state programs, an emphasis on limiting access to welfare
and health care programs reflects the commitment to personal re­
and income maintenance programs to those below a certain income
sponsibility: individuals and their employers contribute to insur­
level, and the private sector's relatively large role in providing pen­
ance funds. And unlike many European countries, America restricts
sions and health insurance. However, American public opinion is
the access of even legal immigrants to social services such as
not an immovable barrier to the welfare state's growth. Indeed, de­
Medicare, with widespread public support. This, too, fits the idea
spite differences in national political cultures, the common eco­
that people should contribute before they receive public benefits.
nomic regimen imposed by global competition and the graying of
It is striking that the American belief in individual achievement
populations are forces for convergence in social policies in rich de­
remains so strong despite evidence that upward mobility is slowing
mocracies, with America expanding health care and job training
and income inequality has grown. For many years after the Great
programs while European countries reduce some benefits and im­
Depression, there was mass upward economic mobility in the sense
pose more rules on access.
that incomes were rising rapidly throughout the population. A
America's distinctive individualist outlook has endured despite
blue-collar worker in the 1960s earned more than a manager had
waves of immigration creating new patterns of ethnic diversity.
made in the late 1940s, even though his relative position within the
Recent immigrants currently are no different from native-born
income distribution had not changed. Starting in the 1970s, real
Americans in their beliefs about personal responsibility and individ­
wages have grown much more slowly and that kind of mobility has
ual economic opportunity. In fact, one can argue that those who
stalled. Yet optimism about getting ahead in America through hard
choose to immigrate are carriers ofAmerican individualism. Immi­
work remains pervasive, possibly because in all circles there are vivid
grants are a self-selected group who leave family and home to start
examples of"rags to riches" Success stories. In the abstract, suspicion
a new life as strangers in an alien culture, often enduring great
of political authority and individualist values yield a preference for
hardships to get to America. Once arrived, they demand little from
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Jack Citrin
Political Culture 163
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government, focusing mainly on the opportunity for economic
study of elite attitudes confirmed this cultural difference in the idea
success through hard work. And this is as true for black immigrants
of equality. 13 For example, Swedish political party and union leaders
from the Caribbean and Africa as for Mexican and Asian newcomers.
are more likely than their American counterparts to favor limits on
income and equality of results. And this matters; there is more in­
Equality
equality in the United States than in Sweden and most other West­ If liberty is the most basic American political value, equality is a
ern democracies.
close second. However, equality is a more elusive concept than lib­
A distinction between equality of opportunity and equality of
erty in American thinking. People answer the questions "Equality
results resolves this apparent collision between the values of individ­
for whom?" and "Equality in what respects?" in different ways. Most
ualism and opportunity. Equality of opportunity means that every­
Americans distinguish between political and legal equality on the
one should have a fair chance to get ahead and go as far as possible.
one hand and economic equality on the other. Originally, America
Liberty means the freedom to do well, not a guarantee that one will
restricted voting to propertied white men, but today there is virtu­
succeed. There is no right to an equal share of material goods. The
ally universal agreement that the ideal of political equality should be
value of personal responsibility implies that economic differences
extended to all, with conflict confined to more restricted issues such
are the result of individual choices, effort, and abilities. As a result,
as the fairness of registration laws and voting machines, felon disen­
inequalities in income are largely accepted as fair, despite numerous
franchisement, racial gerrymandering, and the like. Discrimination
warnings about a shrinking middle class and excessive compensa­
on the basis of race or religion is Widely considered un-American,
tion for top executives. American reactions to inequality tend to be
and in the domain of criminal justice policy this has affected the
populist, not socialist.Voters periodically support attacks on concen­
rules for jury selection and sentencing. Finally, equality of respect is
trated corporate power but continue
widely endorsed. Jim Rome, the iconic host of a nationally syndi­
italism and free enterprise. The fact that Americans are more likely
cated sports radio show, has laid down the law to his listeners: "In
than Europeans to attribute poverty to a lack of motivation and
this day and age we are beyond mocking someone's ethnicity or sex­
hard work than to luck is reflected in how America and Europe
ual preference. So don't go there."There is a lot of grumbling about
fight poverty. 14
how political correctness amounts to a form oflinguistic martial law,
to
espouse the benefits of cap­
The strength of the individualist commitment to equality of
but the spread of this code for public discourse indicates pervasive
agreement on an inclusive conception of the political community.
opportunity is clear in the data about public attitudes toward affir­
mative action, a policy designed to increase the representation of
Though political equality and equality of respect are now inte­
gral features ofAmerican political culture, economic equality is not.
women and minorities in employment and education. Like "equal­
More than people in other countries, Americans continue to toler­
ate great inequalities of income and do not call for changing the
only mean assuring fairness in recruitment and selection, or does
it mean something more, for example, the use of explicit preferences
foundations of an economic system based on limiting government
in the allocation of scarce, desirable positions? "Soft" affirmative ac­
interference with the market. If one's earnings are based on ability,
tion aims at increasing equality of opportunity, "hard" affIrmative
most Americans believe, there should be no limit. A comparative
action at moving toward equality of condition. Affirmative action
ity," the term "affirmative action" is notoriously ambiguous. Does it
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164 Jack Citrin
Political Culture 165
policies force a collision between individualistic and egalitarian
one-third of blacks and two-thirds of Hispanics oppose preferences
values, and most Americans believe strongly in both. Virtually
in hiring and college admissions. In part, the difference in white and
everyone opposes discrimination on the basis of race or gender and
black attitudes represents a response to their distinct historical expe­
agrees that society should do "whatever is necessary" to make sure
riences. For whites, the individualistic and egalitarian elements in
there is equality of opportunity. And the great majority of the pub­
American political culture tended to be complementary; for blacks,
lic believes that, due to past discrimination, a special effort should be
individualism, even after the success of the civil rights movement,
made to improve opportunities for minorities and women. At the
failed to meet expectations for economic and social progress. And
same time, Americans draw the line at any program that gives an
while most blacks endorse the principle of merit-based achievement
absolute preference to blacks or women. Channeling resources in
in the abstract, they understandably are less likely than whites to at­
the form of special training programs or extra effort in recruiting is
tribute lack of economic success to individual failings rather than sys­
acceptable, but quotas, reserved places, and different admissions
temic flaws. By a significant margin, blacks are more likely than
standards are not. This opinion is, generally speaking, the position
whites to favor government actions to improve the economic and
reached after twenty-five years of wrestling with the constitutional­
social circumstances of minorities.
Some liberal scholars regard opposition to affirmative action
ity of affirmative action programs in employment and education.
Despite years of proselytizing by academic and, more recently,
and other policies to benefit blacks as evidence of racial prejudice.
business elites, surveys reveal a remarkable continuity in the public's
Others point to the role of self-interest. White males are the main
outlook. The more clearly a question is framed as preferential treat­
losers under affirmative action, so it makes sense for them to be
ment, the more it is opposed. A 2001 national poll found that 92
most antagonistic. Similarly, self-interest should spur blacks to favor
percent of respondents agreed that hiring and college admissions
affirmative action. Clearly, values and interests interact, but the fact
should be based on merit and other qualifications besides race or
that some whites may be disadvantaged by affirmative action does
ethnicity. Need-targeted programs---so-called economic affirmative
not mean that most opposition is selfish and unprincipled. The fact
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action-are more widely accepted than those based on ascriptive
that opinions about affirmative action are usually race-neutral, with
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criteria. is The overwhelming opposition to preferences in hiring
the level of opposition roughly the same whether blacks, women, or
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and college admissions is unaffected when survey questions refer to
European immigrants are named as the beneficiaries, testifies to the
the need to compensate for past discrimination or inequalities. Peter
important causal role of fundamental cultural norms.
Schuck notes that differences in phraseology, question order, and
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In the court of public opinion, individualism trumps the desire
other contextual factors influence the distribution of opinion to­
for social equality. Quotas and numerical goals for diversity violate
ward affirmative action but concludes, "No researcher doubts that
traditional conceptions of the meaning of equality of opportunity
the public's opinion remains decidedly and intensely negative."16
and thus are rejected. Even strong supporters of affirmative action
There is a racial and ethnic gap in attitudes with blacks and, to
accept that the equal treatment of individuals is the ultimate goal for
a far lesser extent, Hispanics more favorable than whites to harder
a just society. They argue that preferential treatment is required for a
forms of affirmative action. Even so, polls show that more than
limited period because the effects of institutional racism make the
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166 Jack Citrin
Political Culture 167
end oflegal discrimination insufficient for achieving genuine equal­
Although race and income influence political values and policy
ity of opportunity. A hobbled competitor cannot be expected to
positions, no one seriously talks about a race or class war in Amer­
win a race, however fair the rules and judges.
ica. From the nineteenth century on, scholars have agreed that
Blacks aside, the strongest support for affirmative action comes
working-class consciousness was stronger in Europe than in the
from the intelligentsia, particularly in universities, big business, and
more industrially advanced United States. In their recent book, It
liberal political elites. In the wake of recent Supreme Court deci­
Didn't Happen Here, Seymour Martin Lipset and Gary Marks ex­
sions, the academy, in particular, has settled on the supposed educa­
plain why the trade union movement and socialist political parties
tional benefits of ethnic diversity as its main justification for
have been so weak in AmericaY Political culture is one important
affirmative action. Institutionalizing diversity thus makes race and
factor. Lipset and Marks, like Hartz, stress the pervasiveness and
ethnicity legitimate, even preferred qualities, rather than suspect cat­
durability of bourgeois values in a nation without a feudal past, aris­
egories in policymaking. It is a way around individualism, but one
tocratic tradition, church establishment, or great economic inequali­
that diverts affirmative action from its original purpose of improv­
ties. The power of the liberal tradition is such that even American
ing the conditions of blacks and has little to do with reducing eco­
radicals have tended to espouse individualism, decentralization, and
nomic inequalities in the foreseeable future.
antistatism rather than the socialist solutions of public ownership
If there is a culture war about the meaning of equality, it is a war
and state power.
between elites allied with most blacks versus most other Americans.
Electoral institutions are another reason for the failure to de­
The affirmative action case illustrates that the causal influences of
velop a successful socialist party. The plurality electoral system
political culture and public opinion are limited. Race-based prefer­
weakens the chances of all third parties to win legislative seats. The
ences have survived despite four decades of opposition. Invisible bu­
presidential system combines the plurality system with the need for
reaucratic decisions initiated group-conscious employment and
a national majority in the Electoral College, a further disadvantage
education programs and expanded them incrementally. Once in
for the small working-class and socialist parties. In addition, Ameri­
place, they provided benefits to a concentrated, well-organized
can trade unions did not support an independent working-class
constituency, and this clientele prevailed over the dispersed and un­
political party, partly because of the dominance of more conserva­
organized majority for whom the issue was less salient. In this re­
tive craft unions in the decentralized union movement and partly
gard, affirmative action resembles farm subsidies. The American
because of the quintessentially American suspicion of the state among
political system favors the status quo, and affirmative action received
important union leaders such as Samuel Gompers, the longtime
powerful support from a wide range of elites and opinion leaders.
head of the American Federation of Labor.
But when direct democracy moved affirmative action to the elec­
The cultural, religious, and ethnic diversity of American work­
toral battleground in California, Washington, and Michigan, voters
ers also made it difficult for class identities to attain paramount im­
in these Blue states rejected the preferential programs defended by
portance. The strength and durability of religious and ethnic
the elites as indispensable for justice and progress. For the public,
affiliations made cross-class electoral appeals more effective than
equality continues to mean equality of opportunity.
calls for working-class solidarity. Waves of immigration from different
168 Jack Citrin
Political Culture 169
countries periodically created new ethnic divisions among the work­
ity. The major battles are over abortion, drug use, gay marriage, the
ing class, allowing employers to combat unions by exploiting con­
death penalty, assisted suicide, school prayer, and pornography. Be­
flicts between immigrant and native workers. Among immigrants,
cause these issues engage deep-seated beliefs about what is right and
ethnicity was a stronger basis for political attachment than class. Fi­
wrong, good and evil, they arouse strong emotions and make com­
nally, unrelenting racial prejudice excluded black workers from many
promise more difficult. Underlying these policy debates is a conflict
trades, isolating them from the socialist political projects of whites.
between moral traditionalism and moral individualism, between be­
During the Great Depression, the politics of the United States
lief in unchanging standards of conduct derived from a transcendent
did shift in the European direction with the emergence of a more
authority on the one side and devotion to self-expression and per­
activist role for the state and pro-labor policies that boosted mem­
sonal freedom on the other. To the defenders of orthodox morality,
bership in trade unions. Because of Franklin Roosevelt's popularity
"anything goes" means that nothing matters, while to those in the
among workers, immigrants, and blacks, however, the union move­
more permissive camp, it means live and let live; pornography, sexual
ment generally allied itself with the Democrats rather than the So­
activity, abortion, and family structure are private matters and the
cialists, choosing political effectiveness over ideological purity. FDR,
law should recognize this.
Individualism, however, is context-bound. Proponents oflaissez­
reviled as a traitor to his class, helped save capitalism.
After World War II, the depression era's tilt toward social de­
faire in economic life often want the government to enforce strict
mocracy in America ended. The gap in social spending between
rules for drug use and sexual behavior, whereas advocates of gov­
America and Europe emerged in the decades immediately after the
ernment spending and business regulation demand that politics stay
war. In Europe, Labor and Socialist parties held offIce and con­
out of the bedroom. In other words, people align themselves differ­
structed a generous welfare state. In the United States, class tensions
ently on various issues, making for some fluidity in political coali­
diminished as a result of sustained prosperity, the left wing of the
tions. Fanatics exist on both sides of the moral divide; the extreme
Democrats lost ground, and individualist and antistatist values re­
antiabortion activists bomb clinics; the animal rights zealots bomb
asserted themselves.
Economic and political trends after the 1970s have pushed Eu­
research laboratories.
To some extent, religiosity underlies one's choice of moral vi­
ropean politics in the American direction. Neoliberal economic
sion. Religion has always been important in American politics. As
policies presently hold sway worldwide, and even where there are
Robert Wuthnow notes in his essay in this volume (see chapter 10),
socialist parties, there seems to be less and less socialism. The in­
the original European settlers in America were "pilgrims" seeking the
triguing question for American political culture today is how the
freedom to practice their own religion; observers such as de Toc­
economic consequences of globalization will influence traditional
queville remarked that Americans were more religious than citizens
conceptions of equality and the role of the state.
of European countries. Americans are still more likely to belong to a
church or religious organization and more likely to say they believe
Religion and Morality
If there is a culture war in America today, it is not about segregation
in God and that prayer is important in their daily life. Most Americans
also agree that there are clear guidelines for good and evil, and this
or free enterprise but about questions of personal and public moral-
helps explain the unusually moralistic quality ofAmerican politics.
18
170
Jack Citrin
American political culture celebrates freedom of religion, not
freedom from religion. Religious leaders were important in the
antislavery, temperance, and civil rights movements. In addition to
Political Culture
171
podium for public ceremonies, and voters increasingly say they
could be willing to vote for a Catholic or Jew for president.
The continuing importance of religion and traditional morality
taking stands on more clearly religious questions like abortion,
in American political culture is something of a puzzle. The "Protes­
school prayer, and stem cell research, many churches call for an end
tant ethic," with its emphasis on faith and hard work, does fit with the
to American military involvement in Iraq, divestment from Israel
American values of economic achievement and personal responsibil­
and the Sudan, and sanctuary for illegal immigrants fleeing political
ity. But belief in a transcendent authority, deference to the church's
persecution or domestic violence.
leaders, and taking on communal responsibilities seem to conflict
America has no religious oath for taking office, but all candidates
with the culture's emphasis on personal autonomy and mistrust of
for important elected positions proclaim their faith in God and praise
pronouncements from on high. Furthermore, many who write about
the virtues of religion. Invocations and benedictions are a staple of
economic modernization believe that it is associated with seculariza­
political and organizational life. Congress has chaplains; college
tion, scientific rationality, and self-expression at the expense of reli­
football teams at public universities routinely "take a knee" in prayer
gious authority, strict moral codes, and corporate identities. From this
before taking the field. The Supreme Court has struggled to define
perspective, which some might challenge, the persistence of tradi­
how high and wide the wall separating church and state should be.
tional values and religious orthodoxy in the United States, an afflu­
Many legal scholars (and some of the justices themselves) criticize
the Supreme Court for its muddled Establishment Clause decisions­
ent, technologically advanced democracy, is striking.
Conclusions about the distribution of"traditionalists" and "per­
for example, on the constitutionality of school prayer, the display of
missivists" in America vary with the measures of values and policy
nativity scenes and other religious symbols on public property, the
preferences used. James Davison Hunter places roughly 15 percent
use of vouchers for tuition at religious schools, and the inclusion of
of the population in each camp, leaving about 70 percent of the
the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance-but public
public occupying a middle range of diverse and more nuanced
opinion clearly opposes the principle of complete separation.
moral perspectives. 19 On the abortion issue, only about one-third of
No religious institution receives direct government support, but
the public takes the most extreme positions. As the results of many
a diverse array of religious groups are active in civic life, providing
state ballot measures show, a large majority of the public insists on
food, clothing, health care services, job training, help in navigating
defming marriage in traditional terms. Yet there is substantial and
government bureaucracies, and training in political participation.
growing support for the concept of civil unions and benefits for do­
Most Americans favor allowing religious organizations to receive
mestic partners of the same sex, a development that reflects the pop­
government funding to do this civic work, just as they favor school
ular commitment to the idea of equality of opportunity. Moreover,
prayer, official recognition of Christmas (and Hanukkah), and the
the moral "traditionalists" and "permissivists" are not divided by re­
traditional Pledge ofAllegiance. Religiosity remains a potent politi­
cal force, in part because it has become more ecumenical in re­
ligious denomination. There are Protestants, Catholics, and Jews in
sponse to the proliferation of new religious choices and greater
religion generally reject the orthodox moral vision. Among Protes­ tolerance. Imams are joining ministers, priests, and rabbis on the
tants, the fundamentalist and evangelical sects are most prominent
both camps, although the growing number who say they have no
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72 Jack Citrin
Political Culture 173
among the traditionalists, while liberal (and more upper-class) de­
among the politically engaged. This activist minority chooses the
nominations such as Presbyterians, Episcopalians, and Unitarians
battlegrounds and mobilizes grassroots troops to help do the fight­
tend to favor the permissive position on most of the current moral
ing. Passionate rhetoric in Congress and campaign speeches, angry
issues. Orthodox Jews are more likely to adopt the traditionalist
confrontations between rival protest groups, and the determination
viewpoint while reform Jews, who tend to be better off, support the
permissive one.
to carryon the battle in new political venues make warfare an ap­
Wayne Baker's exhaustive analysis of the cross-national World
propriate metaphor for conflicts over partial birth abortion, the fate
of Terry Schiavo, and stem cell research.
Value Survey concludes that America is unique among modern
A number of developments combined to produce a rebirth
nations for the continuing hold that traditional values have upon
of moral conflict in American politics. The onward march of
it.
20
At the same time, permissiveness with respect to self-expression
modernization-bringing with it affluence, higher levels of educa­
and self-realization has grown. America has a mixed value system, and
tion, scientific progress, and skepticism of authority-increased the
many individuals hold seemingly contradictory traditional and mod­
ranks of the morally permissive and diminished belief in religious
ern values. What makes America exceptional among economically
orthodoxy if not religious participation. The explosions of the 1960s
advanced democracies is the failure of secular rationality to become
decisively changed what was acceptable in speech, art, and personal
dominant, a failure that testifies to the central place of religion in
conduct. The egalitarian impulse embodied by the civil rights
the nation's cultural heritage. Baker rejects the portrayal ofAmerica
movement also mobilized disabled, feminist, and gay and lesbian ac­
as divided into two cohesive moral camps, arguing that the "tradi­
tivists to challenge the prevailing norms about "reasonable accom­
tionalists" and "permissivists" have similar attitudes toward national
modation," sexuality, the role of women, and child-rearing
identity, the performance of political institutions, and the trustwor­
arrangements. Important decisions of the Warren Court expanded
thiness of other people. He does agree, however, that a broad range
the domain of "inalienable rights" beyond established boundaries,
of moral perspectives leads to significant differences on issues relat­
ing to family, work, and the separation of church and state.
spawning a political backlash.
Important changes in the structures of interest groups, party
Given these and other data about ambivalence, moderation, and
organizations, and media institutions help keep moral issues on the
inconsistency in public attitudes, why is the claim that there is a cul­
political agenda. New recruitment technologies such as direct
tural war in America plausible? The moral issues now debated in­
mail, the availability of political entrepreneurs and organizers, and
volve vital personal choices, spanning the life cycle literally from
the sponsorship of government agencies and philanthropic founda­
cradle to grave. Fifty years ago, abortion, school prayer, and gay
tions have produced a proliferation of interest groups across the
rights were non-issues. Today they are salient enough to dominate
political spectrum. These organizations carefully monitor political
debate over Supreme Court nominations and generate initiatives
and referenda at the state and local level. With cherished values at
decisions that affect school curricula, the availability of antipreg­
stake, political conflict resembles a holy war with total victory the
button issues. Changes in the rules for nominating presidential
goal of both sides. Partisan polarization and ideological consistency
candidates and financing election campaigns have enhanced the
across economic, moral, and foreign policy issues have increased
influence of advocacy groups and hugely wealthy individuals
nancy measures, the separation of church and state, and other hot­
174 Jack Citrin
Political Culture 175
committed to diverse moral causes. Office seekers need more
The rise of new media outlets makes it easier to wage a large-scale
money and campaign workers than party organizations can supply.
campaign on moral issues. Cable television and satellite radio, Inter­
No Democrat can get ahead in national politics without support­
net Web sites, political bloggers, targeted mail, and political advertis­
ing abortion rights and affirmative action. Republicans are increas­
ing are important conduits of communication. There are electronic
ingly beholden to fundamentalist churches and other morally
churches whose preachers reach a vast audience. Radio talk show
conservative groups to mobilize their voters.
hosts mobilize listeners to bombard Congress with emails or join
The political realignment that began in the late 1960s is now
demonstrations. The relatively detached tone of network news is
virtually complete. There is a two-party South with the Republi­
passe. People can and do choose news channels by their politics:
cans now dominant. In a highly polarized Congress, ideologically
conservatives gravitate to Fox, liberals to CNN. More and more, the
homogeneous blocs of Democrats and Republicans diverge sharply
talking heads who review politics and the news are deliberately stri­
when voting on cultural issues. Furthermore, the lack of competi­
dent and partisan. Listening to the passionate like-minded further
tion in so many congressional races means that incumbents are as
reinforces existing opinions and devalues the ideas of the other side.
worried about being outflanked by ideologues in the party primary
The new media environment contributed to the polarizing ef­
as much as they are winning the general election. The virtual ex­
fects of the last two presidencies. The president is critical in defining
tinction of conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans reduces
the nation's agenda and focusing the attention of other political
incentives for bipartisanship and compromise, and the visible lack of
actors, the media, and ordinary citizens. The moral lapses of Bill
comity among political leaders fortifies the public's negative image
of party politics as selfish and aggressive.
Clinton, ultimately forgiven by the electorate, galvanized the
The intense partisan polarization among elites has trickled
larly enraged secular liberals. More generally, elite messages fIlter
morally orthodox. The faith-based politics of George W Bush simi­
down to the rank-and-file. The University of Michigan National
down to the public, creating opinions and solidifYing preferences.
Election Studies show a rise in the number of people calling them­
The size and influence of the political center gradually shrinks
selves Independents with no partisan leaning between 1952 and
when elites are deeply divided and competing messages reach mil­
1980. On the eve of Reagan's election, 14 percent of voters sur­
lions of people who can choose whom to tune in or out.
veyed classified themselves as "pure" Independents; in 2004 the pro­
portion was just 8 percent. Furthermore, the relationship between
Political Participation
party affiliation and presidential voting has become stronger in re­
Americans have more opportunities to vote than citizens of any
cent elections. Increased loyalty among "weak" identifiers and Inde­
other democracy. Staggered elections at set times; primary elections
pendent "leaners" in both parties, together with the decline in the
for nominating candidates; elections for judges, local administrators,
number of Independents, gave rise to Karl Rove's 2004 strategy of
and boards; and direct democracy at the state and local levels make
mobilizing the base rather than appealing to the median voter. The
for frequent trips to the polls to fill out truly long ballots. Despite
connection between party identification and issue beliefs also is
growing at the mass level, partly because voters choose the party
their commitment to the importance of popular control,Americans
vote at lower rates than the citizens of virtually every other democ­
that represents their values and partly because partisans learn the
positions that fit their inherited party affiliation. 21
racy. Data from the International Institute for Democracy and Elec­
tronic Assistance show that between 1945 and 2005, the average
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176 Jack Citrin
Political Culture 177
turnout in elections to the House of Representatives (in presidential
tion costs; the fact that there always is another election just around
years) averaged 55 percent. In the same period, the average turnout
the corner makes it easier to rationalize not doing one's civic duty.
to the lower house of the legislature was 90 percent in Italy, 85 per­
By making the votes of third-party supporters more meaning­
cent in Sweden, 75 percent in Britain and France, and 74 percent
ful, proportional representation, a feature of many European elec­
in Canada and Spain. The main reasons for this large difference in
toral systems, also boosts turnout. In addition, political parties, the
electoral participation between the United States and other de­
main instrument for mobilizing voters in modern democracies, are
mocracies are institutional, not cultural. Technical differences in
weaker in the United States. To summarize, Americans turn out to
how official turnout rates are calculated lower American turnout
vote less not because they are more alienated from politics or less
figures relative to those in other countries. The denominator for
committed to democratic institutions than citizens of other coun­
calculating the turnout rate in the United States is the voting age
tries, but because rules and regulations make it more costly for them
population, and this includes people ineligible to vote such as
to vote.
felons, people confined to mental institutions, and the growing
number of non-citizens.
Despite rising levels of education, the single strongest predictor
of turnout, and the steady easing of registration requirement, voting
In contrast, other countries use the number of registered voters
in American elections actually declined during the past generation.
as their denominator. This practice is sensible, since voting is auto­
In the 1964 presidential election, 61.9 percent of the voting age
matic in most of the world. In the United States, however, registra­
population cast ballots; turnout sank to 48.9 percent in 1996, before
tion is the responsibility of the individual. The ease of registration
climbing to 56 percent in 2004. Among the reasons for the down­
varies from state to state and the rules matter. States with no regis­
ward trend in participation are changes in the composition of the
tration and those allowing registration on Election Day have
electorate, the growth of immigration, and a decline in social and
turnout levels well above the national norm; American turnout ex­
communal ties that motivate voting and other forms of civic engage­
pressed as the proportion of those registered who vote hovers above
ment. Decreases in marriage rates, length of residence in a commu­
70 percent, a fIgure comparable to turnout in a number of Euro­
nity,job stability, and church attendance contribute to the decline in
pean democracies. Recent reforms have made it easier to register
American turnout.
and cast absentee ballots, but there are other factors that make the
The younger generation of fifty years ago learned to vote and
personal cost of voting higher in the United States than elsewhere.
became accustomed to doing so. A large segment of those under
For example, in America most elections are held on a Tuesday, an
thirty today seem to feel that politics and voting simply is not for
ordinary workday, rather than on Sunday or a specially designated
them. A recent study by Martin Wattenberg reported that people
otli.cial holiday.
under thirty today are less likely than they were fifty years ago to
The British political scientist Anthony King suggests that
read books or newspapers, watch the news on television, or have in­
turnout in America may be low because people are called on to vote
so often and on so many things. The frequency of elections lowers
terest in and factual knowledge about politics. 22 They also are less
likely to think that politics and voting have an impact on their lives.
the incentive to vote in any particular one. The number and com­
Moreover, the correlation between age and the most common forms
plexity of items on the typical American ballot adds to the informa-
of political involvement is much stronger today than fifty years ago,
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178 Jack Citrin
Political Culture 179
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meaning that the gap between the young and older citizens has
country's politics from its origins. The continued durability of these
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grown. The disengagement of the young is more pronounced in the
United States than elsewhere but it also exists in most established de­
values is important for preserving a conception ofAmerica in which
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mocracies. To the extent that the ideology of the young and old di­
broad legitimacy. Because the consensual values of patriotism, lib­
verges, the participatory gap between them may diminish the
erty, and equality are so abstract, however, they can be used to justifY
representative quality of government policies.
competing political positions. The Patriot Act, so named to symbol­
e plurihus unum is an attainable ideal and existing institutions enjoy
Voting aside, however, Americans are more likely than Europeans
ize action to thwart America's foreign enemies, has been called un­
to be politically active. Surveys conducted by the European Social
patriotic for undermining the constitutional rights to privacy and
Survey in 2002 and Georgetown University in 2004 asked respon­
freedom of speech. The idea of equality is used equally to attack
dents whether they had done any of ten different political activities
and defend affirmative action. Political conflict tends to be most in­
in the past year. The activities included contacting public officials,
tense and threatening to peaceful resolution when the issues involve
working in a political party organization, signing a petition, boy­
collective ideals or a group's way oflife. The debate between the ad­
cotting products, and participating in protest activities. The average
vocates of competing moral visions for American society has this
level of participation was significantly higher in the United States
than in Europe, both among those under thirty-five years old and
all-or-nothing quality.
Political culture is simultaneously a cause, constraining and guid­
those older. In the United States, the younger generation still was
ing policy, and an effect, reshaped by institutional choices and
less politically active than those thirty-five and older. When asked
patterns of political socialization produced by education, civic par­
whether they were active in a voluntary organization rather than
merely belonging in the sense of formal membership, Americans
ticipation, and media consumption. In the United States, the liberal
were, again, more likely to be involved than Europeans, but this time
individual rights, and prevent the tyranny of the majority. The
young people were as likely as the older generation to be active. 23
Constitution created a fragmented and decentralized government
In 1835, de Tocqueville remarked on the American propensity
tradition created a political system design to limit power, protect
with the intention of making rapid positive action difficult. In this
to form associations of all types. In Bowling Alone (2000), Robert
the Framers largely succeeded. The separation of powers, federal­
Putnam worried that civic engagement had declined since the
ism, the Bill of Rights, and an independent judiciary are buttressed
1950s with unfortunate implications for the vitality of democratic
by legislative procedures that benefIt intense organized minorities, by
institutions. The empirical status of Putnam's claims about the
plebiscitary opportunities in many states, by weak party organizations,
United States remains unsettled, but in comparative perspective, at
least, Americans remain a "nation ofjoiners" using a variety of tac­
and by a proliferation of interest groups with close ties to elected
tics other than voting to advance political interests.
tional policies together or making major reforms except during a na­
Culture, Institutions, and Policy
tional crisis. Political fragmentation limits the power to achieve
universal health care or gun control regardless of popular opinion.
Peace and war are both features of American political culture. A
strong consensus remains on the fundamental values that shaped the
",
officials and bureaucrats. The result is great difficulty in linking na­
Institutional arrangements as well as political culture have created
what scholars call path dependency, a circumstance in which initial
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180
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Jack Citrin
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choices establish a trajectory that is very difficult to reverse. The
American distrust of authority produced institutions that effectively
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limited government. These institutions reinforced dominant cultural
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values through policies accorrunodating local control, creating ac­
cess to political decision makers, and giving private organizations an
important role in social programs.
The institutional order that has governed America for more
than two hundred years is unlikely to change even if cultural values
move slowly in the European direction. Path dependency applies to
policy in the moral as well as the economic or social domains. No
matter how much people might welcome an entente cordiaIe in the
culture war, the American emphasis on individual rights, combined
with mistrust of authority and an adversarial media, make pro­
longed conflict without radical change likely. Because of regional
variation in the distribution of moral perspectives, the culture war
in America often begins with local skirmishes. Media attention then
mobilizes ambitious politicians along with the usual suspects in the
interest group world, moving the argument to a larger stage. In this
context, federalism creates intriguing possibilities. The Rehnquist
Court's resurrection of the framework of dual sovereignty grounded
.~:
in the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution opens the door for
I,·
states to chart their own moral path on assisted suicide and gay mar­
riage,just as they can in promoting stem cell research or banning af­
fIrmative action. Overturning Roe v. Wade would mean a return to
state discretion over abortion policy. Not surprisingly, conservatives
~\:"
call for the nationalization oflaw in domains such as tort reform or
drug use when permissive forces win at the state level, whereas lib­
erals insist that rights guaranteed under the federal Constitution
trump local preferences regarding school prayer, adoption rights,
and abortion. The dual sovereignty scenario would allow more peo­
ple to opt out of the culture war by relocating to a more congenial
cultural environment, thus posing a serious challenge to the tradi­
tional conception of One America with a common identity.