The Politics of Decentralization in a Centralized Party System: The Case of Democratic Spain
Author(s): Alfred P. Montero
Source: Comparative Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Oct., 2005), pp. 63-82
Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20072913
Accessed: 09/03/2009 16:18
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=phd.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the
scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that
promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to Comparative Politics.
http://www.jstor.org
The Politics of Decentralization
in a Centralized
Party
System
The Case of Democratic
Spain
Alfred P. Montero
H. Riker argued that the most distinctive aspect of federalism is "the consti
tutionally assured potential for local governments to disrupt."1 Taken too far, inter
and inefficient.
conflicts could make policymaking
unresponsive
governmental
Riker argued that such disharmony, when not effectively eliminated by the (^cen
tralization of the administrative structure of the state, can be mediated by the central
ization of the political party system. His argument focused on two dimensions of the
William
party system: the distribution of partisan loyalties between central and subnational
government and the tendency of locally elected politicians to articulate local inter
to Riker, the first dimension of disharmony ismore likely to be con
ests. According
trolled where the same party or alliance controls national government and most or all
of the subnational units. This argument assumes that national parties are disciplined
around partisan brokers who reside at the national level. These conditions are also
crucial in reducing the tendency of subnational politicians to articulate local interests
to the detriment of their affiliations. Therefore, centralized, disciplined parties with
in partisan loyalties across the national-subnational
high degrees of concordance
divide are able to limit intergovernmental conflict.
Riker's theory directly influenced more recent comparative studies of decentral
ization that follow his notion that party system structures are the key independent
variables in explaining the nature of intergovernmental relations. Most recently, the
seminal work by Eliza Willis, Christopher Garman, and Stephan Haggard focuses on
the location of party brokers, party leaders who shape the careers of politicians on
the national and subnational levels through control over nominations and placement
on electoral lists.2 In party systems inwhich these leaders are located in subnational
in its policy responsibilities,
government, the state ismore likely to be decentralized
revenue-raising powers, and expenditures since these resources will flow to the cen
ters of power that shape the political interests of national policymakers.3 There is an
ongoing tension between national and subnational politicians in which national par
tisans, especially those in government, prefer to limit the autonomy of subnational
their own capacity to distribute resources across a
governments in order tomaximize
country based on the criteria of need and expected political payoffs.4 Closed elec
toral lists empower party leaders who control not only nomination of candidates but
63
Comparative
Politics
October
2005
In short, the process of
the probability
of election through list placement.5
is shaped by bargaining among politicians,
and "the structure of
decentralization
6
political parties provides the medium through which such bargaining takes place."
a
to
Democratic
arguments about party organization
Spain presents
challenge
also
a centralized political party system with highly disciplined national
state. Spain's transi
organizations and a decentralized and continually decentralizing
tion to democracy during the 1970s was a dual transition in the sense that itwas a
since
itmixes
regime transition and a state transition, the latter involving the replacement of a cen
tralized bureaucracy with a federal structure. Yet unlike the democratic transition
that was based on consensual pacts among political elites and transparent institu
tions, Spain's regional autonomy system (the state of the autonomies) was born in
the context of intense intergovernmental conflicts and ambiguous institutions requir
ing continued interpretation by legislatures, parties, the judiciary, and even the elec
torate.7 These intergovernmental conflicts continued even during periods when the
same party ruled the majority of regions and maintained an absolute majority in the
or congreso).
lower house of parliament
(the chamber of deputies
governing
as
even
the
conflicts
continued
the
brokers
who
party
managed
Intergovernmental
legislative process retained their capacity to shape the political careers of
their copartisans. Why does Spain's experience diverge so apparently from the pre
dictions of the Rikerian framework? To answer this question, arguments about the
power of party organization have to be questioned fundamentally.
national
Challenging
Party Organization
Arguments
applied to a broader set of experiences, party organization arguments fail to
explain some aspects of change in the degree, pace, and structure of decentraliza
tion, especially in cases of increased decentralization with centralized party systems.
First, change in party system structures has been too slow or too shallow to explain
significant shifts in intergovernmental policy responsibilities and resources over time
When
cases.8 Second, these explanations rely on a one-dimensional
as partisan and not territorial.9 Governors
and mayors
interests
of
understanding
have interests emanating from the offices they hold and not just the parties they rep
resent. These interests are most obvious when regional presidents, such as those in
Catalonia and the Basque Country, claim to represent "nations." Yet territorial inter
ests are also apparent in nonnationalist
leadership
regions such as Asturias, whose
and across different
has sought to reverse the area's industrial decline under different party governments
regionally and nationally.10 Party system structures are not irrelevant, but they are
insufficient to explain decentralization.
of shaping
arguments focus too much on the mechanisms
Party organization
foci
of
other
in
the
and
decentralization
political con
they ignore
legislative arena,
64
Alfred P Montero
flict that determine decentralization. These limitations are apparent in countries that
initiated their decentralization processes at the same time as their democratic transi
tions. Simultaneous, dual transitions produced two fundamental tensions that explain
outcomes: the simul
the divergence in party system structure and decentralization
and decentralization
produced countervailing
taneity of democratization
logics in
favor of both party system concentration
and decentralization
of the state, and
democratization
provided new political spaces for subnational interests to demand
reforms in the state structure after transitions (and their founding constitutions) were
initiated and established. These conditions are common in third wave democracies
decentralization
of the state has continued even as party systems struggle
toward greater centralization under the exigencies of implementing reform.11
state and central
Spain demonstrates that a political order with a decentralizing
ized and disciplined national parties will still allow subnational interests to influence
where
public policy either through the articulation of policy differences within the national
parties or through intergovernmental conflicts inwhich subnational executives repre
sent territorial interests vis-?-vis the national government. Where
the discipline of
national parties is particularly robust, and the capacity of subnational partisans to
represent their region's interests in parliament is weak, the weight of representing
to intergovernmental conflicts and
subnational interests will shift disproportionately
from
conflicts.
away
intraparty
Riker's central claim that the political structure of government ismore influential
than administrative structure in shaping the degree of decentralization
needs to be
reevaluated. The continued decentralization
of the administrative structure can have
a dynamic at least partially independent from the political structure. This dynamic is
based on intergovernmental
conflicts between subnational executives and national
an
arena
in
that
of political conflict and cooperation not wholly
is,
governments,
within the purview of parties and legislatures but legitimated and necessitated by the
political logic of a simultaneously decentralizing democracy.
Spain illustrates the most prominent ways in which the Rikerian framework fails
to explain the degree, pace, and type of decentralization.
The logic governing the
consolidation of national democratic institutions diverged from the logic governing
of the Spanish state as a federal administration.
the recomposition
In the hope of
the sectarian and ideological conflicts that doomed the Spanish Republic
(1931-36) and led to the Civil War (1936-39), most of the institutional choices dur
ing the regime transition underscored the need for government stability.12 The elec
toral laws devised in December
1976 favored the formation of a small number of
avoiding
disciplined national parties in full control of closed electoral lists for each of the
fifty electoral districts.13 This system quickly became institutionalized around stable
patterns of party competition including three to four statewide parties (the Union of
the Democratic Center, UCD; the Socialists, PSOE; the Popular Party, PP; and the
United Left, IU) and prominent regionalist/nationalist
parties, the most important of
65
Comparative
Politics
October
2005
which were
the Basque Nationalist
Party (PNV) and the alliance of the two main
i
Uni?). Party identities remained the strongest pre
parties (Convergencia
dictors of the electorate's choices during most of the democratic period and, with the
exception of the Basque Country and Catalonia, the two centrist parties following
the implosion of the UCD in 1983, PSOE on the left and PP on the right, controlled
Catalanist
the regions and governed the national congreso. The parties themselves remained
highly disciplined and mostly centralized organizations.14
In contrast to the centralization of political society, the regime transition set the
stage for the decentralization of the state as an essential component of the consolida
the transition and the new
tion of Spanish democracy. The elites that negotiated
democratic constitution created seventeen "autonomous"
regions
resources and policy responsibilities.
Spain is therefore a useful
of the administrative structure of
hypothesis that decentralization
a
at
to
least
according
partly divorced from the institutions
logic
mentary
with
designated
test case for the
the state proceeds
governing
parlia
behavior and the party system.
Party Brokers
and the Dual Party
System
in Spain is paradoxical for party organization arguments
Increasing decentralization
precisely because party brokers preside on the national level, the electoral system is
closed-list, and the national legislative process is dominated by the interests of par
in Europe, the
compared to party systems elsewhere
liamentary parties. When
score
at
of
of
the
end
indicators
internal
discipline.15 The
high
Spanish parties
national leaders of the UCD, PSOE, and PP all rely on formal powers reinforced by
party statutes and the regulations governing the legislative process in the congreso
that give these individuals singular control over their organizations.16 The UCD is
the exception that proves the rule. The UCD was poorly institutionalized as a party,
and its fractiousness led to its demise soon after the 1982 elections.17
system provides party leaders with extraordinary control over the
election of candidates to parliament. Proponents of party organization arguments hold
that this institution alone, ceteris paribus, is a factor favoring centralization if national
party leaders control the lists.18 In Spain this assumption holds de jure, but the subna
tional party organizations exert some influence defacto over the composition of elec
The closed-list
toral lists. Formally, both national and regional party leaders design the electoral lists,
but the criteria they use inmost cases are not subject to a specific outline set down in
party regulations. From extensive interviews of the general and organization secretaries
of themajor statewide and nationalist parties in seven regions and interviews of national
party bureaucrats, I surmise that the criteria used to advance politicians' careers differ
primarily on whether
66
the list is for the congreso or the regional assembly. Each regional
Alfred P Montero
party office in all of the statewide parties and provincial organizations of the major
nationalist ones inGalicia, the Basque Country, and Catalonia nominate candidates for
the regional lists, and they have significant input in the composition of lists in the elec
toral districts in their region for the congreso. Regional party officers may select local
following the national notables on lists for the congreso. As Table
1 shows, diverse criteria, including attention to regional concerns, invariably emerge as
notables for positions
part of the process, which indicates that the subnational offices are not mere franchises
of the national party office. But regional concerns shape candidate selection more sys
temically in the composition of regional lists than in the composition of lists for the
congreso, reflected in the more consistent tendency to value experience in subnational
office and service to the party in the composition of regional lists. Because national
party brokers must approve all recruitment choices, subnational party offices select can
didates for the congreso's list that will pass the national electoral committee's scrutiny.
The judgment of the national committee, in turn, is governed by the loyalty and service
that the candidate has demonstrated to the party and not necessarily to the region. The
nationalist parties are only partial exceptions, but they too favor national party service
as the key determinant of placement on the national list.While the national electoral
committee has final say over the regional lists, these organizations eschew micro
management of the subnational lists, so most are accepted with few changes.
Table
1 Candidate Recruitment
Criteria for Seven Regions
National List
Region
Regional List
Andalusia
Service to national party
Service to local party; experience in
local office
Asturias
Experience in regional/local office;
service to national party
Experience serving mining areas,
local office
The Basque
Country
Service to national party
(PSOE/PP) or nationalist party
(PNV)
Experience in local office;
willingness to serve local party
Catalonia
Professional non-politician of social
standing; service to national party
(PSOE/PP) or nationalist party and
local experience (CiU)
Experience in local office; service to
local party
Galicia
Service to local party; experience in
Service to thenational party
(PSOE/PP); sectoral representatives local office
(labor, business, etc.); experience in
local office (PP); party notables
Madrid
Service to national party
Service to local party; experience in
local office
Valencia
Service to national party
Service to local party; experience in
local office
(BNG)
Source: Based on themost prominent answers in author interviews with general and organization
secretaries of PSOE (including PSE and PCE), PP, CiU, BNG, and PNV, September 2002
January2003 and June 2003. If not specified, entries refer to all partisan respondents.
67
Comparative
Politics
October
2005
The
rules governing
the legislative process, codified
into the Reglamento
del
of
de
los
the
and
1982,
autonomy
Diputados
February
Congreso
strongly support
power of national partisan brokers. Individual deputies have little autonomy from
their grupos parlamentarios
(parties) or their leaders.19 The law prohibits individual
own organizations. Deputies who fail to join one of
from
their
politicians
forming
the congreso's parties are lumped into a single heterogeneous
grouping called the
one
as
must
act
grupo mixto (mixed group), which
entity. Legislation must be pro
a
posed by parliamentary group, and amendments to an entire bill must be presented
by a parliamentary group.20 The parliamentary groups shape the composition of the
official governing body of the parliament, the mesa, that is formed prior to the for
mal instauration of a new government and is responsible for procedure. The parties
also elect the president of the chamber, who heads the mesa. Thematic committees
is based on the distribution
(some permanent and others ad hoc), whose composition
of seats by party in the congreso, reshape initial legislation and release reports that
are the focus of discussion in plenary sessions before votes are taken. The formation
of committees and even the implementation of parliamentary rules on a daily basis
are determined by the whips of the congreso's parliamentary groups, who negotiate
individual
(junta de portavoces).
Consequently,
frequently as a rules committee
deputies in interviews and surveys report consistently that they have little influence
whenever a single party enjoys an absolute majority, since the party's leaders tend to
determine the agenda.21
In short, the Spanish party system has elements of centralization and decentral
ization that together allow for the paradox of a system of nationally disciplined and
their
generally centralized partisan organizations that are capable of accommodating
subnational legislatures and subnational party
interests with those of unicameral
offices. This dual system, as some scholars have argued, creates a channel for subna
tional interests to pressure national parties to decentralize authorities and resources
to favor their subnational partisans. Boix and Grau i Creus found evidence in pre
vailing spending patterns and policy choice that seem to indicate the influence of
intraparty pressures associated with subnational actors.22 The evidence suggests that
subnational partisans regularly shape the policy choices of national party leaders,
who are disposed to be responsive because the electoral interests of the national
organization rely on the need to cultivate subnational constituencies.
If the dual hypothesis
is correct, both the national and regionalist parties in con
influence on policymaking.
gress should process subnational
should recruit members with substantial subnational political
For example, they
experience and con
tacts.23 Subnational governments and party offices, for their part, have strong incen
tives to promote the political careers of partisans with strong local ties, as they will
provide their local bailiwicks with a say in parliament and the national partisan
apparatus.24 National
68
and subnational party leaders should be interested
in perpetu
Alfred P Montero
in congress. The length of a
ating the careers of these subnational representatives
a
determinant
of a deputy's informal
in
the
is
congreso
Spanish deputy's experience
ties and understanding of the parliamentary process.25 Deputies who sit for a single
mandate have less access to the backroom deal-making where the details of legisla
are
tion
composed.
tend to favor regional interests in their
the regional electoral committees
of
lists
for
the
regional parliament, national deputies with experience as
composition
have
the best combination of service to the party and a pro
should
regional deputies
file of representing the region's interests. Have subnational party offices effectively
promoted these candidates on national lists? Do these national deputies have longer
runs in the congreso than deputies with other subnational elected or appointed expe
Since
riences? Using data for all seven legislatures and the constituent assembly (LC),
Table 2 demonstrates that, while the percentage of deputies with subnational experi
ence expanded during the democratic period, municipal
experience has been more
representative of the subnational cohort in the congreso than regional parliamentary
experience serve less time on aver
experience. Moreover, deputies with municipal
no
subnational experience. Deputies with subnational parlia
age than deputies with
mentary experience tend very slightly to serve more time, but this tendency is not
appreciable in either the descriptive or the correlative data.
Through bivariate and multivariate ordinary least squares statistical analyses, the
role of regional experience and type of experience were tested as determinants of the
number of terms served in the congreso. None of these variables was significant.
Even if the regional party offices have some (albeit not determinate) say in the selec
tion of candidates for the national lists, they do not put up politicians with extensive
subnational experience, and even when these candidates gain seats in the congreso,
Table 2 Subnational Experience
Term
LC
and Longevity
Regional
Deputies
Municipal
Office*
24.0
9.5
8.9
I27.9
i 0.9
11.4
Regional
Experience
1.99
% _Average
No
Mayors
1.76
Terms
by Type, LC-VII
Served**_
Councilors
1.88
Experience
1.97
17.6
II
36.2
11.2
III
41.1
14.0
IV
49.2
20.1
30.4
51.2
24.3
33.9
VI
58.1
23.5
37.0
VII
59.6
24.5
41.1
V
Reg.
Deputies
in the Congreso
22.9
N-1597
aIncludes only mayors
^For all legislatures
and members
of municipal
councils.
combined.
69
Comparative
Politics
October
2005
they do not stay long enough to gain much influence. By contrast, the regional gov
ernments are composed by politicians favored by the subnational party office, so
these politicians have both the incentives and the capacity to respond to the particu
lar needs of the region. Although a more systemic analysis of the careers of the sub
cohort in the congreso is necessary to come to firmer conclusions,
the evi
dence thus far suggests that the system is dual in the sense that party brokers exist at
two levels. National party brokers articulate the interests of their national affiliations
national
in the congreso, while regional party offices address the interests of the regions and
shape political careers in their regional assemblies. Yet the latter do not exert their
interests or their representatives in the intraparty dimension in the congreso.
Divided
Government
and the Nationalist
Parties
Some scholars of Spain have argued that decentralization has occurred when nation
al parties are in particular need of subnational support. Cases of divided government,
in the executive and legislative branches or
the absence of same-party majorities
in systems with coll?gial executives, will therefore be associated
absolute majorities
In another variant of divided government, the
with greater levels of decentralization.
or
the
coalition
that
controls
national
party
government is not the same as the one
that controls a majority of the subnational governments. Colomer usefully defines
the two variants of divided government as "horizontal" (national executive-legisla
executive), respectively.26 Riker
tive) and "vertical" (national executive-subnational
refers to the latter as "disharmony" and sees it as both a cause of intergovernmental
conflict and a consequence of the inability of national parties to control subnational
opponents.27
In Spain periods of horizontal divided government have coincided with the for
of alliances between one of the major parties of the center, the PSOE or the
PP, and the nationalist parties. More than the United Left (Izquierda Unida, IU), the
mation
third statewide party, the nationalist parties of Catalonia (CiU), the Basque Country
(PNV), and the Canary Islands (CC) have been successful in negotiating governing
in the congreso. Nationalist parties based in particular regions have fewer
central government
than statewide parties to acquire discretionary
opportunities
resources. Hence they have strong incentives to bargain their votes and support with
alliances
governing parties to get a piece of the fiscal pie for the regions they represent.28
These pressures have been most salient when national parties can not form majority
governments or enact extraordinary legislation through supermajorities without the
The
support of regionalist parties (PSOE in 1993-96 and PP in 1996-2000).29
nationalist parties are also ideologically
centrist, which favors them as strategic
alliance partners when compared with IU.30
70
Alfred P Montero
If correct, the horizontal divided government theory implies that the pattern of
in Spain is overall one of slow or little decentralization punctuated
decentralization
more
intense decentralization during periods of divided government.
of
by episodes
But the actual pattern of decentralization does not bear out this prediction. As Table
3 demonstrates, the Spanish state became more decentralized, at a faster rate, during
in the congreso (1982-93)
than
periods when the PSOE held its absolute majorities
in the more recent period of minority governments. To be sure, this decentralization
had much to do with the dynamics of the democratic transition and the creation of
in the 1990s also decentral
the state of the autonomies, yet minority governments
ized significantly, even if not at the same high rate.
The argument that the nationalists acted as powerbrokers or veto players during
these minority governments must be subjected to a counterfactual test.Would decen
that looks at the
tralization have been less without their influence? A perspective
of the 1980s produced a pow
entire process would suggest that the decentralization
erful trend that could not have slowed down even if the PP, supposedly the most cen
in 1996.
tralizing party (a point contested below), gained an absolute majority
1979 and 1999 the central government's share of total public spending in
fell
from 90 to 61.3 percent, while that of the autonomous communities rose
Spain
or decentralizing
state in Europe
from 12 to 26 percent.31 No other decentralized
a
this
similar
level
of
fiscal
decentralization
experienced
during
period.32 To be sure,
as illustrated
the nationalist parties have been catalysts for some decentralization,
Between
below, but their influence does not explain the overall pattern.
Has the influence of the nationalist parties appeared primarily in the congreso?
The horizontal divided government argument requires that the national composition
of these parties reflect local interests and experiences. Yet the legislative branches of
the nationalist
represent their
parties do not always directly or unquestionably
more
to
On
the
nationalist
members
of
tend
have
subnation
average,
parties
regions.
al experience prior to taking their seats in the congreso (57 percent for all eight leg
islatures) than the PP (52 percent) and the PSOE (44 percent). Yet, if they represent
their regions' interests in the congreso, they do not do so very long. Seventy-nine
percent served one or two terms, compared to 73 percent of the PP and 71 percent of
Table
3 Rate
of Change
in the Territorial
Distribution
of Public Expenditures,
1981-1999
1981-84
-13%
Central
+300%
Regional
Source:
(London:
Based
on author's
Frank Cass,
2001),
1987-90
1984-87
-9%
-4%
+40%
+20%
calculations
from
figures
1992-97
1990-92
1997-99
-6% -9%
-5%
+13%
in Luis Moreno,
+16%
+23%
The Federalization
of Spain
p. 66.
71
Comparative
Politics
October
2005
the PSOE, and only nine percent served four or more mandates, compared to 13 per
cent of the PP and 19 percent of the PSOE. Members
of the nationalist parties are
also a third more likely to ask for a baja, or permission from their party to renounce
their seat prior to the end of
as representatives
motivations
Catalanist deputies show that
PSOE to define themselves as
the term, than members
of the PP and PSOE. Their
of their regions' interests are also suspect. Surveys of
they are less likely than deputies from the PP or the
representatives of their region and they are more like
ly to identify themselves as representatives of their party.33 They are also less likely
to meet with members of the Generalit?t parliament, which presumably they repre
sent, than are the PP and PSOE with regional parliaments in general.34 Not surpris
conflicts have emerged regularly within the CiU. For
ingly, national-subnational
Roca's
led him to clash
example, Miquel
stewardship of the CiU in the congreso
with Jordi Pujol, the longtime president of the Generalit?t, on numerous occasions.35
Differences
among the congressional
strategies of the nationalist parties also raise
doubts that the nationalist parties fulfill the same function in the congreso. CiU has
more of a parliamentary strategy in that it has maintained a steady leadership at the
national level, while turnover is higher in the PNV and its legislative production is a
third of the CiU's.36
The vertical divided government argument relies on Riker's point that party bro
kers at the national level must control the political careers of the rank and file.
favor centralization.
Otherwise,
intergovernmental harmony would not necessarily
Yet in Spain the weakness of the representation of subnational interests in the con
greso and the inability of subnational governments to influence their copartisans in
the lower house through regular party channels give the regions incentives to pursue
lobbying. Therefore, a high level of harmony would not necessarily
extralegislative
favor centralization in Spain, nor would a high level of disharmony guarantee decen
tralization.
Gordin found that there is no strong correlation between fiscal
Accordingly,
and the degree of partisan disharmony between national and subna
decentralization
tional levels in Spain.37 One reason for the weak correlation is that governments with
absolute majorities,
contrary to the logic of party organization arguments, have not
resources. Both the PSOE and PP governments have decen
to
centralize
preferred
and
tralized fiscal resources to partisan and nonpartisan subnational governments,
the data do not show consistently that they have favored their copartisans dispropor
tionately. For example, in 1996-99, when the PP was in power, two Socialist regions
tended to be among the top three regions (along with
(Andalusia and Castille-Le?n)
the PP's partner, Catalonia, led by the CiU) to receive transfers and to sign coopera
tive agreements with the center. Also, subnational governments,
regardless of the
party in power, are not restrained in lobbying for more resources. Subnational inter
ests matter, and they will be represented in intergovernmental relations where subna
tional advocates can find political space to do so.38
72
Alfred P Montero
Party Structure Arguments
in party structure may explain the paradox of an apparently disciplined
party system with continued decentralization. While the PP has a highly hierarchical
structure, the PSOE's federal structure may explain the decentralization
during the
Socialists' absolute majorities from 1982 to 1993.39 Some of the key figures on the
governing federal council of the party, who are commonly referred to as the barons
Differences
are the current or former presidents
of regions such as
of the organization,
and
Andalusia.
The
Catalan
and Basque
Castille-La
Mancha,
Extremadura,
that
and
Socialists maintain their own party organizations
PSE, respectively)
(PSC
are affiliated with the national PSOE and follow it in the congreso, but they explicit
ly represent the interests of their regions. Since 2000 candidate selection in the
PSOE has been determined by internal primaries, thus increasing the influence of
in the regional parlia
subnational interests. The PP, by contrast, had few majorities
ments prior to 1995, so it has less need to have a decentralized
internal organization.
Also,
its internal cleavages
are more
ideological
and less regionalist
than the older
PSOE's.40
Yet as an explanation for decentralization party differences seem to matter little.
As reported in Table 3, fiscal decentralization
accelerated once the PP came to
one
power in 1996 and belies the notion that
party is more sensitive to subnational
concerns than the other. The data show that more PP deputies have held subnational
office prior to gaining seats in the congreso, 52 percent compared to 44 percent of
PSOE deputies. In a poll of 212 deputies conducted in 1997, Uriarte showed that
"service to the region" was slightly more important to PP deputies than to Socialist
ones.41 National
surveys done by the Centro de Investigaciones
(CIS)
Sociol?gicas
show that deputies from both the PP and PSOE declare that representing their region
is important in roughly equal proportions.42
Several factors account for the similarities of the two major parties in terms of
how they mediate the effects of decentralization. First, the parties operate under sim
ilar guidelines in the parliamentary process. Because of the need tomaintain parlia
mentary discipline, their leadership is uniformly opposed to factionalism, of which
regional loyalties are one variant. Second, as reported above, candidate selection
methods are similar in both parties. Regional and provincial party offices have the
right to propose candidate lists, but national electoral committees can amend these
lists and hold ultimate authority over their approval. Third, both the PP and the
PSOE have tended to address conflicts involving intergovernmental relations outside
the parliamentary arena. This tendency in itself is indicative of similar internal struc
tures. The PP and the PSOE are centralized and disciplined parliamentary parties
that close off the autonomy of regional interests in the congreso. But the federal
structure of the Spanish state creates other arenas inwhich regional concerns can be
heard.
73
Comparative
Politics
The Weakness
Some
October
2005
of Intergovernmental
Institutions
of the Spanish intergovernmental
system have argued that it has
in the last few years into a phase of "cooperative federalism." 43 Since the
intergovernmental system maintains numerous forums for center-periphery coopera
observers
evolved
tion?sectoral
the senate, and bilateral agreements?the
conferences,
party system
need not aggregate the entire range of subnational interests. Various multilateral
organizations emerged during the evolution of the state of the autonomies to iron out
differences
in policymaking
between
the central government
and the seventeen
the
The
from
the
relevant
and the gov
ministries,
representatives
regions.
regions,
on
or
coalition
sit
sectoral
conferences
party
erning
twenty-four
(conferencias secto
are
and
assorted
interministerial
committees
that
riales)
organized thematically by
policy area. In most cases negotiations on these committees flesh out the technical
but in cases where there is significant
decentralization,
to a joint commit
the
intergovernmental disagreement,
principals move negotiations
tee for the transfer of administration (comisi?n conjunta a para la transferencia de
competencias), which is staffed by representatives from the responsible ministry, the
details
of administrative
regional government(s), and the ministry of public administration.
The activities of these intergovernmental
committees and sectoral conferences,
however, demonstrate that they are limited in a number of ways. First, following a
tribunal in 1983 (ruling 76/1983),
the sectoral confer
ruling by the constitutional
ences can not override or change in any meaningful
way the authorities already
devolved to the regions. This protects the regions' extant policy rights, but it also
limits the extent to which extensions of regional autonomy can be negotiated through
the sectoral conferences. Consequently,
the relevance of the sectoral conferences has
of public administration data analyzed by Grau i Creus demon
waned. Ministry
strates that the frequency of meetings
decreased after 1981-86, when the regions
most
of
their
authorities.44
The
national government has shown little inter
garnered
est in reviving the sectoral conferences. Presently, it does not maintain consistent
representation for permanent agencies on most of them. Second, the sectoral confer
ences and the interministerial committees are also limited in their capacity to allow
the regions a say in intergovernmental
relations, illustrated by the example of the
council of fiscal and financial policy of the autonomous communities
(consejo de
the primary body
de las comunidades
aut?nomas),
fiscal y financiera
to
structure
for
the
fiscal
and
administrative
of the state
responsible
drafting changes
of the autonomies. Council rules give the national government qualified votes, in
practice as many votes as the regions, so the council is nothing more than a vehicle
pol?tica
through which the government gives itself recommendations.45
forms of shared rule between
The weakness of multilateral
governments
74
has underscored
the importance
of bilateral
central and regional
in resolving
agreements
Alfred P Montero
are joint planning agreements
disputes. The chief form of bilateral agreements
as
convenios. Most of the convenios involve the provision of central-level fis
known
cal resources to finance policy areas previously devolved to the regions; in most
is necessary, as either most are signed by one
cases, no multilateral
negotiation
or
subsequently other regions bilaterally join the original signatory.46
region
Corporatist rules promoted a centralization of patterns of labor and business rep
resentation of their interests during the first years of democratization.47 The same
can not be said for the regional governments. Given the weakness
of intergovern
mental institutions and the vacuousness of subnational representation in parliament,
no corporatist system of interest intermediation for the regions emerged during or
after the democratic transition. And even though corporatist institutions contributed
to the centralization of economic and fiscal policymaking
during the early years of
the new democracy they did so less after years of intergovernmental bargaining over
the fiscal structure of the state.
The Persistence
of Bilateral
Intergovernmentalism
The autonomy process created a set of institutions that gave the regions incentives
and opportunities to renegotiate their fiscal powers over time. Given the weakness of
subnational representation in the congreso, within the major parties, and in the for
mal institutions of intergovernmental
relations, renegotiation was continuous but
uninstitutionalized.
The
largely
resulting pattern of fiscal federalism was one of per
bilateral
that produced an uneven distribution
of
sisting
intergovernmentalism
resources and powers and a never-ending
of
and
spiral
cross-regional
intergovern
mental
conflict.
the state of the autonomies became part of the constitution, negotiations
in
the congreso over the shape and content of the fiscal federal system.
began
Between July 1979 and September 1980 draft legislation went back and forth between
the two chambers of the Cortes. With UCD, PSOE, and PCE for and the AP/PP, the
Once
Catalan nationalists, and the Andalusian Socialist Party against, the Cortes approved
Ley Org?nica 8/1980 on September 22, 1980. The Organic Law of Financing the
Autonomous
Communities
de las Comunidades
(Ley Org?nica de Financiaci?n
a
established
of
five
in which the
years (1980-86)
Aut?nomas)
provisional period
details
of each region's fiscal responsibilities
in two succeeding five-year periods
(1987-91 and 1992-96) would be negotiated with the national government. Article 13
of the law defined the role of the regions in collecting taxes for the central govern
ment. These tax revenues are defined for each region as the percentage of participa
en los ingressos del esta
tion in the revenues of the state (porcentaje de participaci?n
do). This figure determines the size of fiscal transfers to each region. Thus, it is usu
ally the focus of intergovernmental negotiation of the fiscal system.48
75
Comparative
Politics
October
2005
From its inception, the fiscal structure created nodes of cross-regional and inter
governmental conflict by producing an asymmetric model of fiscal federalism. The
seventeen regions were divided into four distinct groups: the special regime regions,
143 regions with multiple provinces, and the
the Article
151 regions, the Article
Article 143 regions with single provinces. As Table 4 demonstrates, these differences
determine significantly the resources that each region retains for autonomous policy
and uniprovincial regions spend just over half and one
making. The multiprovincial
151 regions do. Yet even
third, respectively, per inhabitant, than what the Article
these regions spend only just over two-thirds of what the special regime regions of
the Basque Country and Navarre spend. These two regions keep most of what they
collect in taxes as own resources (approximately 87 percent of their revenues). Other
revenues come from fiscal transfers for health care spending (Insalud) and social
security (Inserso). In turn, the Basque Country and Navarre transfer to the national
treasury an amount (the cupo or quota) from their tax revenues that is negotiated
every five years.
The Article
151 and 143 regions were subject to a general model of financing.
These regions have five types of income. First, and primarily, they collect taxes that
they keep as their own resources, and they receive a percentage of national tax collec
tions through fiscal transfers. Second, they receive subsidies for health care through
Insalud and Inserso. Third, they receive fiscal transfers meant to address issues of
and inequality through a national compensatory
fund (fondo de
underdevelopment
interterritorial) and European structural funding. Fourth, they receive
compensaci?n
conditional fiscal transfers after signing bilateral convenios to fund national expendi
tures in their territory. Fifth, they can accumulate debt. Fiscal transfers dominate the
Table 4 Fiscal Structure of the Autonomous
per Inhabitant, Based on the 1994 budget)
Article
Andalusia
232.22
Canary Is.
186.7
Article
Aragon
60.4
122.2
Article
Asturias
70.0
Cantabria
151 Regions
(in Thousands
Valencia
198.9
218.3
(Multtprovincial)
CastiHeLeon
136.8
143 Regional
Castille-La
Mancha
166.7
Extremadura
129.2
123.06
(Uniprovincial)
Madrid
73.9
78.5
Murcia
103.6
LaRioja
79.9
81.17
Special Regime Regions
Basque Countrv/Navarre
314.8"
Source: Figures taken fromMoldes Teo, "La participaci?n," p. 110,
76
of Pesetas,
Average
Galicia
240.6
Catalonia
233.2
143 Regions
Is.
Balearic
Communities
314.8
Alfred P.Montero
financing of the fifteen nonspecial regime regions (approximately 85 percent of all
revenues). The regions spend money that they do not necessarily collect.
instability in
Spain's asymmetric fiscal federal structure produced considerable
relations. First, the system created incentives for the regions to
intergovernmental
hoard resources and to overstate the costs of the services that they provide; the fiscal
structure is not set and is perpetually subject to renegotiation. Regional governments
mobilize politically to engineer terms that are favorable to them individually, even if
costs to their neighbors.
Individual regions also
the new agreement externalizes
next
in
the
round
of
their
bets
losses
hedge
against potential
bargaining by preserv
ing scarce resources or, conversely, spending on visible (though not necessarily use
ful) projects that might justify future funding from the center. Second, the reliance
on fiscal transfers, most of which are unconditional,
creates a gap between the costs
of taxation and the benefits of spending. The tax-benefit gap broadens incentives for
to spend in the present and plan future spending without fully under
standing changes in the tax base. Current spending risks overshooting resources over
the medium term. Since fiscal transfers and own resources are often not sufficient to
cover the shortfall, regions must accumulate debt, which contradicts the efforts of
the regions
to stabilize public accounts.49 Finally, the inherently unequal
governments
distribution of authorities and resources cause the have-not regions to up the ante in
their calls for new authorities. At the same time, the have regions attempt to protect
their special rights versus the demands of the common regime regions. Interregional
national
relations, therefore, take on a zero-sum competitive dynamic since all actors know
the national fiscal pie is limited.50 The result is a spiraling of demands for an expan
sion of subnational authorities and resources that undermines any kind of rational or
coherent fiscal logic implemented from the center.
The evolution of the Spanish fiscal system reflects this logic of distributive conflict
more than the presence of disciplined national parties with absolute majorities
in the
congreso. The end of the provisional period in 1986 led to negotiations concerning the
fiscal federal system for the next five years. Each region (except the special regime
regions) negotiated the cost of administering policies within their range of competence.
While these costs were based on explicit variables in each area, no central agency was
charged with calculating the real amounts. Each regional government tried tomaximize
the cost per policy area in the hope of raising the ceiling of funding. After the first five
year period (1987-91) was negotiated, the second five year period (1992-96) was con
sidered. Both the central government and the regions agreed that total funding per poli
cy area could not decline; therefore, the regional governments had an even stronger
incentive to inflate the presentation
of administrative costs to raise the funding ceiling
still higher. These perverse incentives softened budget constraints considerably and put
a premium on the ability of each region to exert leverage on the central government and
the council of fiscal and financial policy.
77
Comparative
Politics
October
2005
At the same time, the regions were
resources. The imposition of the VAT
reduced the domain of taxes already
increasingly pressed to find their own fiscal
in 1985 as a prelude to accession to the EU
in the hands of the regional governments,
taxes
the
and
main
nonincome
taxes, the impuesto sobre transmi
including luxury
siones patrimoniales
and actos jur?dicos documentados.
Efforts to decrease the tax
in these taxes after the 1985
of Catalonia responded by issuing a white paper calling for
the devolution of large percentages of the income tax (impuesto de la renta sobre las
and an expansion of own resources for the region.51 Such pressure
personas fisicas)
expanded to include virtually all of the other regions, leading directly to a set of rec
burden
and encourage
reform. The Generalit?t
investment
led to declines
distributed by the council of fiscal and financial policy in June 1992
15 percent of the income tax to the nonspecial regime regions.52 The
reform of the Ley Org?nica de Financiaci?n
de las Comunidados Aut?nomas pro
and
the
council
of
fiscal
financial
policy conditioned fiscal transfers to the
posed by
on
tax
Once it was implemented in
of
their
income
collections.
15
percent
regions
ommendations
to decentralize
1994, the nonspecial regime regions gained substantial control over taxation.
The Catalans, once again, proved to be the spearhead of reform, but in a way that
led to the generalized decentralization
of the income tax. Having secured extraordi
nary influence in the national government following the governing pacts of 1993,
Jordi Pujol demanded a doubling of the region's collection of income tax to 30 per
cent. The Socialists acceded to 15 percent, but they had to buy the support of the less
regions of Andalusia, Galicia, and Extremadura by guaranteeing these areas
fund.53 Once the PP came to power
additional monies from a national compensatory
well-off
in 1996 and signed agreements with three nationalist parties?PNV,
CiU, and CC?
a governing majority,
to maintain
it implemented a series of fiscal reforms that
greatly expanded subnational resources. From 1997 to 2001 the national government
agreed to cede the property tax, inheritance and donation taxes, gaming taxes, and
another 15 percent of the income tax.
The strategic-interactive dynamics of Spain's asymmetric fiscal federal system set
the controls sought by governing
that superseded
up a decentralizing
dynamic
national parties. Fiscal decentralization proceeded in this open-ended fashion during
Conflicts
and side payments on the
and minoritarian
governments.
majoritarian
dimension
determined
of national-regional
outcomes.
government,
not intralegislative
or intraparty politics,
Conclusions
is the design of national representa
The central paradox of Spanish decentralization
tive institutions of democracy to enhance centralized administration but the continu
78
Alfred P Montero
of the larger apparatus of the Spanish state. The party system
ing decentralization
failed to reconcile these tensions. The national and regional parties do not aggregate
subnational interests either within the congreso or systematically within the parties
role of intergovernmental committees,
themselves. Given the mostly nonfunctional
most of the major issues facing Spain's federal system have been addressed in the
poorly institutionalized arena of intergovernmental distributive conflict. Iterated bar
gaining, asymmetry of authority and resources among the regions, and a weak center
that was incapable of imposing solutions without resorting to periodic mediation
with regional presidents shaped intergovernmental distribution. Future research must
explore these variables in distinct policy areas to assess intergovernmental dynamics
in Spain.
Rikerian party organization arguments provide insufficient explanations of the
degree or pattern of decentralization. The major parties of Spain are disciplined and
centralized organizations for the most part, and they have tremendous control over
the legislative process. But they have not been immune from intergovernmental pres
sures to decentralize policy authorities and resources emanating from regional gov
ernments headed by subnational copartisans and opposition groups. This finding is
consistent with work on party structures and state reform in other countries. In the
experience of statewide parties in territorially decentralized
(and decentralizing)
countries inwestern Europe, organizations that previously favored centralization can
become
advocates of decentralization
later (for example, the British Labour Party
and the Flemish Liberal and Socialist parties), even when they are in government
and even if, as with the statewide parties in Spain, they are relatively centralized.
The preferences of central party brokers and their capacity to impose them on their
subnational copartisans vary according to electoral concerns and policy choices.54
The nature of intergovernmental distributive conflict plays a key role in this strategic
can be fully understood with refer
game. Clearly, the argument that decentralization
ence to the degree of centralization in governing parties is not sustainable in compar
ative
perspective.
Most important in the failure of party organization arguments, the game of car
rots and sticks that supposedly
links national and subnational copartisans
is not
exclusive to the legislative arena. The behavior of copartisans in the legislature and
in the larger multiarena of intergovernmental relations can differ substantially. The
most disciplined parties operating in the most structured legislatures can assure that
their deputies will vote according to the interests of the party brokers, but these insti
tutional sources of discipline are of little use when attempting to convince subnation
al incumbent copartisans to follow the party line. Such requests can threaten the
interests of regional incumbents and require side payments or
rethinking of reform and policy options. Scholars of representation argue
that agents have imperative mandates to do what the principal would do. In the case
of politicians motivated to represent their regions, decentralization of the state and a
electoral
and policy
wholesale
79
October
Politics
Comparative
2005
centralized party system produce a dual imperative to represent both the party and
the region. Politicians
in parliament in these cases are poorly placed to fulfill the
dual imperative. Subnational executives, however, can do both, and they have the
to reconcile the two imperatives of representation
political space and the means
when they enter into conflict. This factor more than any other explains how a cen
tralized and disciplined party system may have to deal with
tralizing state that it does not sufficiently control.
the dynamic
of a decen
NOTES
like to thank Lourdes
The author would
ers for Comparative
Politics
1. William
H. Riker,
Publishers,
1987), p. 74.
review
L?pez Nieto, Pedro Puy Fraga, and the three anonymous
for their helpful comments and suggestions.
The Development
Federalism
Kluwer
Academic
(Boston:
of American
in Latin
2.
Eliza Willis, Christopher Garman, and Stephan Haggard, "The Politics of Decentralization
America," Latin American Research Review, 34 (1999), 7-56; Christopher Garman, Stephan Haggard, and
A Political Theory with Latin American
Eliza Willis,
53
"Fiscal Decentralization:
Cases," World Politics,
between politicians
and party bureaucrats.
(January 2001), 205-36. These authors do not distinguish
our purposes,
of interests
lies between
national
and subnational
the relevant division
politicians
and bureaucrats. Party brokers may be likened to what Kitschelt
bureaucrats, not between politicians
the dominant
coalition
within
European Social Democracy
3.
See Stephan Haggard
the party organization.
See Herbert Kitschelt,
Press, 1994).
(New York: Cambridge University
and Steven B. Webb,
Incentives
and
"Political
in Alfred P. Montero
Brazil and Mexico
Argentina,
Compared,"
in Latin America
Decentralization
and Democracy
(Notre Dame: University
4.
"Fiscal Decentralization,"
p. 209.
Garman, Haggard, and Willis,
5.
Haggard and Webb, pp. 241^13.
Relations:
For
and
calls
The Transformation
of
Fiscal
Intergovernmental
and David
J. Samuels,
eds.,
of Notre Dame, 2004).
p. 48.
Willis, Garman, and Haggard, "The Politics of Decentralization,"
and Mariano
"Autonom?as
See Jos? Ram?n Montero
Torcal,
y Comunidades
dimensiones
de Estudios
Preferencias,
y orientaciones
Espa?a:
pol?ticas," Revista
6.
7.
?poca),
8.
70 (October-December
See Alfred
P. Montero,
Aut?nomas
Pol?ticos
en
(Nueva
1990), 34.
"After Decentralization:
of Intergovernmental
Conflict
in
Patterns
31 (Fall 2001), 43-64.
Brazil, Spain, and Mexico," Publius: The Journal of Federalism,
Argentina,
in Latin
and Mayors: The Politics of Decentralization
9.
See Tulia Falleti, "Of Presidents, Governors,
at the meeting
of the Latin American
Studies Association,
Dallas, March
America,"
paper presented
27-29, 2003.
in
in Global Markets:
Subnational
Industrial
P. Montero,
States
10.
See Alfred
Policy
Shifting
Brazil and Spain (University Park: Penn State University
Press, 2002), ch. 4.
Contemporary
in Latin America
and
the State: The Politics
11.
See Hector
Schamis, Re-Forming
of Privatization
of Michigan
Press, 2002).
(Ann Arbor: University
"The Spanish
See Josep M. Colomer,
'State of the Autonomies':
West European Politics, 21 (1998), 40-52.
Europe
12.
13.
Political
See Richard
Science
14.
Ibid.
15.
See Kitschelt,
80
"Electoral
G?nther,
83 (September
Review,
pp. 223-24.
Laws,
Party Systems,
1989), 835-58.
and Elites:
Non-Institutional
The Case
Federalism,"
of Spain," American
Alfred P.Montero
in Robert A. Goldwin, Art
and the Estado de las Autonom?as,"
16.
Juan J. Linz, "Spanish Democracy
The Approaches
A. Schambra,
and William
eds., Forging
Kaufman,
of Eight
Unity Out of Diversity:
Institute for Public Policy Research,
Nations
1989), pp. 297-98.
Enterprise
(Washington, D.C.: American
The Collapse
"A Crisis of Institutionalization:
of the UCD
17. Richard G?nther and Jonathan Hopkin,
Parties:
Old
Jos? Ram?n Montero,
and Juan J. Linz, eds., Political
in Spain,"
in Richard G?nther,
Press, 2002).
(New York: Oxford University
Concepts and New Challenges
18. Garman, Haggard, and Willis,
"Fiscal Decentralization,"
p. 212.
inManuel Alc?ntara
19. Lourdes L?pez Nieto,
"Las Cortes Generales,"
and Antonia Mart?nez,
eds.,
2nd ed. (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2001), p. 228.
to particular articles may be made by individual deputies, but the party's spokesper
son (portavoz) must sign off before the change is presented formally. See Pablo O?ate, "La organizaci?n
en Espa?a:
de los Diputados
in Antonia Mart?nez,
del Congreso
de los Diputados,"
ed., El Congreso
Funciones
y rendimiento
(Madrid: Tecnos, 2000).
Pol?tica y gobierno
20.
Amendments
en Espa?a,
21.
Irene Delgado,
"Elites pol?ticas
inMart?nez,
ed.
espa?oles,"
22.
Caries Boix, Political
Parties,
and
Strategies
Grau i Creus,
Integration
Actividades
y motivaciones
de los diputados
Conservative
and Social Democratic
Growth
and Equality:
in the World Economy
Press, 1998), pp. 142^45;
(New York: Cambridge University
"The Effects of Institutions and Political Parties upon Federalism: The Channelling
within
in Spain
the Comunidades
Aut?nomas
the Center-level
Policy Processes
Economic
Mireia
y vida parlamentaria:
of
Institute, Florence, 2000).
(1983-1996)"
(Ph.D. diss., European University
"Notas sobre los pol?ticos: Opiniones
de alcaldes
23.
See L?pez Nieto,
quehacer," Working
24.
See Michael
Political
25.
Paper No.
Keating,
sobre su
y diputados espa?oles
Institut de Ci?ncies Politiques
i Socials, 2000), p. 9.
179 (Barcelona:
in Western Europe:
The New Regionalism
Territorial
and
Restructuring
Edward Elgar, 1998).
Change (Cheltenham:
See Lourdes L?pez Nieto,
Teresa
and Antonia
Lorenzo,
auton?micos"
(mimeo, 2003),
Mercedes
Monteagudo,
p. 19.
Alda, Esther del Campo, Jos? Ram?n Laorden, El?seo L?pez,
"Un primer balance
sobre la actividad de los parlamentos
"Las instituciones
Revista
del federalismo,"
26.
Josep M. Colomer,
(2000), 41.
27.
Riker, pp. 93-94.
multinacionalismo
28.
Juan J. Linz, "Democracia,
y federlismo,"
1 (2000), 25.
Pol?tica,
29.
Espa?ola
Revista
de Ciencia
Espa?ola
1
Pol?tica,
de Ciencia
B. Heller,
in Europe:
Parties and National
Politics
de las
"Regional
Spain's Estado
1993 to 2000," Comparative
Political Studies, 35 (August 2002), 657-85.
30.
Jordi Capo Giol, "Sistema
electoral y gobernabilidad
de Ciencia
espa?ola," Revista Espa?ola
\ (2000), 61.
Pol?tica,
31.
See Pedro Puy Fraga, "Financiaci?n
auton?mica
in Enrique Moldes
Teo
y reforma del Senado,"
William
Autonom?as,
and Pedro Puy Fraga,
1996), p. 60.
eds., La financiaci?n
de las Comunidades
Aut?nomas
(Madrid: Minerva
Ediciones,
32.
See Francesc Morata,
"El Estado de las Autonom?as:
Veinte a?os de rodaje," in Alc?ntara
and
Mart?nez,
eds., p. 131.
"La representaci?n
33.
Antonia Mart?nez
and M?nica M?ndez,
in
pol?tica en el Congreso
espa?ol,"
Mart?nez,
ed., pp. 236-37.
34.
35.
36.
Ibid, p. 261.
Linz, "Democracia,"
p. 25.
See L?pez Nieto, "Las Cortes,"
p. 238.
the Politics of Intergovernmental
Transfers: Comparative
Evidence
Jorge P. Gordin,
"Unraveling
from Argentina
and Spain," paper presented at the meeting
of the Midwest
Political Science Association,
Chicago, April 3-6, 2003.
37.
81
Comparative
Politics
October
2005
38. William
Coalition
Subnational
in Europe's
Politics
Government,
Downs,
Style: Multiparty
Press, 1998), p. 218.
(Columbus: Ohio State University
Regional Parliaments
See Mireia Grau i Creus, "Spain: Incomplete
39.
in Ute Wachendorfer-Schmidt,
Federalism,"
ed.,
and Political Performance
Federalism
(New York: Routledge,
2000), pp. 72-73.
Luz Moran,
"Renewal
and Permanency
of the Spanish Members
of Parliament
(1977-1993):
on the Institutionalization
of the Spanish Parliament," Working
Paper No. 81 (Madrid: Center
for Advanced
1996).
Study in the Social Science, Juan March Foundation,
41.
Edurne Uriarte, "La pol?tica como vocaci?n y como profesi?n: An?lisis
de las motivaciones
y de la
40.
Reflections
carrera pol?tica de los diputados espa?oles,"
Mart?nez and M?ndez,
42.
p. 236.
Revista
Espa?ola
de Ciencia
3 (October
Pol?tica,
2000),
108.
see Tanja A. B?rzel,
For example,
in the European
Union:
States and Regions
Institutional
in
Press, 2002); and Robert Agranoff,
Germany and Spain (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Adaptation
"Las relaciones
Pol?tica y Sociedad,
13 (1993),
y el Estado de las Autonom?as,"
intergubernamentales
87-105.
43.
44.
iCreus, "The Effects of Institutions," p. 117.
See Puy Fraga, p. 67.
in Spain," Regional
"Decentralization
46.
Luis Moreno,
regime inNavarre and the Basque Country usually obviates
47.
For more on this argument, see Omar Encarnaci?n,
Grau
45.
Studies, 36 (2002), note 12. The special fiscal
the need for these regions to sign convenios.
and the Paradox of Corporatism,"
"Federalism
in Joanne Bay Brzinski, Thomas D. Lancaster, and Christian Tushhoff,
eds., Compounded
Representation
inWest European Federations
(Portland: Frank Cass, 1999), pp. 102-3.
en los ingresos del Estado,"
Teo and Puy
in Moldes
48.
See Enrique Moldes
Teo, "La participaci?n
Fraga, eds.
49.
See Mar?a Casais Mira, "Los recursos tributarios de las Comunidades
Aut?nomas:
refer
Especial
encia al caso gallego," inMoldes Teo and Puy Fraga, eds., p. 103.
50.
See Puy Fraga, pp. 64-65.
51.
de Catalunya
sobre elf?nan?a
Generalit?t
de Catalunya, Llibre blanc del govern de la Generalit?t
ment autonomie
i Finances,
d'Economia
(Barcelona: Departement
1985).
52.
See Emilio
Alvarado
P?rez, "Veinte a?os de proceso auton?mico:
dual," in Juan Luis Paniagua Soto and Juan Carlos Monedero,
en Espa?a: Temas abiertos del sistema pol?tico espa?ol (Madrid: Editorial
53. Morata,p.
138.
federalismo
54.
327?48;
82
see Seth Goldstein,
For example,
Downs, Coalition Government.
"Party Leaders,
Power
Del
federalismo
eds., En
Tecnos,
and Change,"
al
cooperativo
torno a la democracia
1999), p. 370.
Party
Politics,
8 (2002),