Historically Speaking
Earle G. Wheeler at 100
J
DoD
Tonkin Resolution in the aftermath of
anuary 13, 2008, marks the oneBy Brig. Gen. John S. Brown
the Gulf of Tonkin incident.
hundredth birthday of Gen. Earle
U.S. Army retired
Benefiting from the breadth of his
Gilmore Wheeler, Army Chief of Staff
from 1962 to 1964, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff professional experience, Gen. Wheeler fulfilled his responfrom 1964 to 1970. Distinguished service brought him to sibilities towards the Vietnam War in a pragmatic, busithese positions of preeminent responsibility and posi- nesslike manner. When the fall of South Vietnam seemed
tioned him to be a key strategic player—and the Washing- imminent and President Johnson determined to Americanton, D.C., face of the U.S. military—throughout most of the ize the war, rather than accept that result, Wheeler shepVietnam War. It seems a good time to reflect upon his ca- herded a timely infusion of American forces that precluded
the collapse. The American buildup continued with more
reer and his legacy.
than 180,000 in 1965, 385,000
Gen. Wheeler graduated
in 1966, 485,000 in 1967 and
from the U.S. Military Acad536,000 in 1968. American
emy in 1932 and was commisforces performed well, and
sioned as an Infantry officer.
their logistical support proved
After four years at Fort Bento be exceptional. Facing an
ning, Ga., he served with
unconventional adversary, they
the 15th Infantry Regiment in
developed doctrine to match
Tientsin, China, and then with
their circumstances and redethe same regiment in Fort
signed advisory training sysLewis, Wash. He taught at the
tems to accommodate advisory
U.S. Military Academy during
demands on an order of magni1940–41. During the early
tude greater than previous preyears of World War II, demoncedent. Gen. Wheeler transstrated staff excellence tied
formed the force while at war,
him into training assignments
fully integrating the helicopter
in the United States. He deand other modern technology
ployed as chief of staff of the
in the face of the enemy. When
63rd Infantry Division in NoPresident Richard M. Nixon revember 1944. The 63rd Inplaced President Johnson and
fantry Division landed in Maremphasized Vietnamization to
seilles, moved to Willerwald,
reverse Americanization, Gen.
crossed the Saar River, mopped
Wheeler methodically reversed
up the Muhlen Woods and
the flow of American forces
fought bitter battles to seize
while accelerating programs to
Gudingen, breach the Siegfried
Gen. Earle G. Wheeler
develop the South Vietnamese
Line, force the Rhine and capmilitary. Ultimately, the South
ture Heidelberg. It pushed on
through the Hardthauser Woods and Schwabisch Hall to Vietnamese Army performed capably at the battalion level
and below, although it never became independent of
force the Danube River before the war ended.
Following World War II, Gen. Wheeler served in the Field American logistical and air support, and its politico-miliArtillery School, in occupied Germany’s U.S. Constabulary tary leadership left much to be desired.
Gen. Wheeler’s most perplexing task was sustaining
and in various staff positions within NATO and on the
Army Staff. He took command of the 2nd Armored Divi- force quality in the absence of National Guard and Orgasion in Fort Hood, Texas, in 1958, and of the III Corps in nized Reserve participation, assets President Johnson
1959. He was named director of the Joint Staff in 1960, firmly denied the Joint Chiefs despite urgent objections.
deputy commander of U.S. forces in Europe in March 1962 The mobilization base had to be redesigned, and draftees
and Chief of Staff of the Army in October of the same year. pushed through it in numbers sufficient to fight the war
He became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in July and meet worldwide demands while compensating for
1964, a month before Congress surrendered its war-making those voluntarily serving but unavailable in the reserve
powers to President Lyndon B. Johnson with the Gulf of components. Deferments complicated the issue with re70
ARMY ■ January 2008
National Archives
Gen. Wheeler, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff from
1964–1970, confers with President
Lyndon B. Johnson at the White
House in January 1968.
spect to fairness, numbers and available talent. In the
midst of war and sustained containment, the military also
contended with massive domestic violence in the late
1960s. Hasty initiatives such as Operation Garden Plot
generally got forces where they were needed. Fortuitously,
reserve forces were made available for domestic contingencies. Again doctrine had to be rede-signed, and performances such as that of the 101st Airborne Division in Detroit became models for handling violence when the
perpetrators are among one’s own countrymen. Under
Gen. Wheeler’s steady hand, American units almost invariably sustained high standards of performance despite
the obstacles that had emerged in fielding them.
G
en. Wheeler proved capable in managing flaps inside
and outside of the services. Like Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, he presided over headstrong subordinates with
prickly senses of prerogative—and without the benefit of the
subsequent Goldwater-Nichols Act. His interventions with
the services concerning the composition of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Headquarters enabled that
agency to work, and he repeatedly smoothed the waters between Gen. William C. Westmoreland in Vietnam and ostensible superiors of naval provenance in Hawaii. Gen. Wheeler
managed to downplay much that could have been damaging
in the media. Cases in point include recriminations between
the Army and the Marines after the Tet Offensive, and Gen.
Westmoreland’s planning for the use of nuclear weapons
around Khe Sanh. One piece of information he could not
BRIG. GEN. JOHN S. BROWN, USA Ret., was chief of military history at the U.S. Army Center of Military History from
December 1998 to October 2005. He commanded the 2nd Battalion, 66th Armor, in Iraq and Kuwait during the Gulf War
and returned to Kuwait as commander of the 2nd Brigade, 1st
Cavalry Division, in 1995. He has a doctorate in history from
Indiana University.
much suppress was the post-Tet
calculation that 206,000 more
troops would be needed to finish
the job. At some point, costs in
blood and treasure would not be
considered worth the stakes.
It has become fashionable to
accuse Gen. Wheeler and his colleagues of dereliction of duty for
not revolting against their civilian masters. A response would
depend in part on when one believes the war was lost, who
knew for sure and the extent to which the loss was a military phenomenon. In A Better War: The Unexamined Victories
and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam, Lewis
Sorley argues that the Vietnam War had been won by
1970—the year of Gen. Wheeler’s retirement—and America
subsequently jettisoned the victory and abandoned the effort. If true, Gen. Wheeler would have little to apologize for
with respect to his watch. One might also ask whether it
would have been better to abandon Vietnam in 1965 or
1975. By 1975 the Sino-Soviet alliance had visibly disintegrated, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and other constraints had softened the Soviet threat and the long-term
validity of containment was reflecting itself in an increasingly prosperous West and restive East Bloc. In this new
strategic context, Vietnam seemed less consequential as a
domino. Finally, there is one’s take on the oath officers
swear to support and defend the Constitution of the United
States. A downside of hari-kari is that one only gets to commit it once. Until and unless the right moment comes, officers obey the lawful orders of those appointed over them.
In Earle G. Wheeler we find a soldier who had been dealt a
bad hand, but nevertheless believed results would be better
if he stayed at his post than if he left it. His example remains relevant today.
✭
Recommended Reading:
Cosmas, Graham A., MACV: The Joint Command in the
Years of Escalation 1962-1967 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2006)
Hammond, William M., Reporting Vietnam: Media &
Military at War (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press
of Kansas, 1998)
Sorley, Lewis, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories
and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam
(New York: Harcourt, 1999)
January 2008 ■ ARMY 71