The presidentialization of politics concept: between parties and leaders
Gianluca Passarelli
ABSTRACT
The presidentialization of politics. A concept clearly defined but that can affect at the least three dimensions
of politics. As Poguntke and Webb (2005) acutely indicated the presidentialization interested the executive
face, the electoral face, and the party face. Presidentialization has had a strong impact on politics, and it
seems been active in almost all advanced democracies. Even though with differentiate outcomes, mostly
depending on the balance of powers of each political system, the presidentialization «appeared» in all the
three institutional systems: presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary. Moreover, the
presidentialization has quickly been (mis)understood as a flow that only (or primarily) interested - and that
has been led by - political leaders (presidents and prime ministers). Nevertheless, leaders are not the only
political actors of that «new» game. Political parties are at the core of at least two of the three faces of
presidentialization. The «electoral campaign», and the «personalization of party leadership» are in fact
strongly related to the changes which affected most the political parties in (at least) the last fifteen years. In
addition, the control of their «own party» is the main political tool the heads of government have in all the
three forms of government. So, we can look to presidentialization of parties as the main feature of
presidentialization of politics. Three main elements contribute in defining the kind of presidentialization of
parties. The institutional framework, and in particular the electoral system, the balance of power between the
three faces of the party, and so the equilibrium in the dominant coalition, and, finally, the genetic model of
party. We theoretically and empirically investigate how changes on the mix of these elements affected the
process of presidentialization of parties in different systems.
Introduction
The presidentialization of politics. A concept clearly defined but that can affect at the least three
dimensions of politics. As Poguntke and Webb (2005) acutely indicated the presidentialization
interested the executive face, the electoral face, and the party face. Presidentialization has had a
strong impact on politics, and it seems been active in almost all advanced democracies. Even
though with differentiate outcomes, mostly depending on the balance of powers of each political
system, the presidentialization «appeared» in all the three institutional systems: presidential, semipresidential, and parliamentary. Moreover, the presidentialization has quickly been (mis)understood
as a flow that only (or primarily) interested - and that has been led by - political leaders (presidents
and prime ministers). Nevertheless, leaders are not the only political actors that directly play this
«new» game. Political parties are at the core of at least two of the three faces of presidentialization.
The «electoral campaign» and the «personalization of party leadership» are in fact strongly related
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to the changes which affected most the political parties in (at least) the last fifteen years. In
addition, the control of their «own party» is the main political tool the heads of government have in
all the three forms of government. However, it seems that in all three different regime types the
process of presidentialization affected more «one face», that is party. Political parties, and in
particular the «presidential» one, seem having allowed the presidentialization process to strongly
affect the formal politics.
In addition, in the logic of the presidentialization of politics (and parties) process, it should be taken
in account the role and the relevance of leaders. First of all, the importance of leaders in politics is
growing both in general political arena, and in the parties. In the latter case, the function of the
leader arises as crucial on a double meaning: the leader is (or should be) deep linked to a party in
order to achieve his political goals. Vice versa, each party need a (strong) leader in order to better
face the political and electoral races. Moreover, the control of the party organization strictly affects
the leader’s influence on the balance of power between the party’s faces as well as on the
equilibrium internal at the dominant coalition.
Thus, the goal of this essay is to propose an analytical tool useful to depict paths in the
processes of presidentialization of parties in various contexts/countries. Differences would arise, we
suppose will mostly depend on parties’ «organizational» and «internal» characteristics rather than
(or at the best not only) on exogenous factors, such as the institutional frameworks, which play a
role but not a primary one. So we could expect to find out differences and similarities mostly among
«types» of parties instead among countries and/or regime types.
The concept of presidentialization of politics… and personalization too
The process of presidentialization has interested three faces of politics: the party, the executive, and
the electoral campaign (Poguntke and Webb, 2005). Thus, each element contributed to generate the
presidentialization phenomenon. A general definition of presidentialization is offered by Poguntke
and Webb: «presidentialization denominates a process by which regimes are becoming more
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presidential in their actual practice without, in most cases, changing their formal structure that is
their regime type» (Ibidem, 1). So, there have been an «increasing leadership power resources and
autonomy within the party and the political executive respectively and increasingly leadership
centred electoral processes» (Ibidem, 5). So, the presidentialization goes across countries and
regime type, as a general and generalized (ideal-typical) phenomenon of politics. After all, as had
put in evidence Antony Mughan (2000) presidentialization has interested also parliamentary
countries such as Great Britain in primis. And in fact, according to Mughan presidentialization (and
the related role of the mass media) «implies a movement over time away from collective to
personalized government [...] electoral politics dominated [...] by the party leader» (Ibidem, 7). In
this respect it seems that Mughan overlaps the two analytical dimensions: on one side he stressed
the institutional side of that process (which will «verge» parliamentarism to presidentialism), rather
on the other side he (implicitly) confirms the presidentialization process’ independency by arguing
that it implies a progressive concentration of power on the party’ leaders hands. So, it arises that –
as we argue – presidentialization can be possible in various institutional regimes.
Problems on definition of presidentialization have been stressed by Karvonen (2012) which put in
evidence some incongruence in the work of Poguntke and Webb in particular in relation to the
choice of cases analysed, and the lack – even in a common analytical framework – of the empirical
research developed and (secondary) data collected by each contributor (Ibidem, 6 and 10).
Moreover, if institutional context matters as claim Samuels (2002, 462), especially on the
relationship between presidentialized parties and presidential regimes, Poguntke and Webb
correctly note that presidentialization define an ideal-typical phenomena don’t be confounded by
the analyses on presidential systems (Poguntke and Webb 2005, 2). Beyond the goal to reach a
shared definition, the most relevant innovation introduced by the presidentialization concept has to
do with the ability to focus on the general process affected politics. The most important
consequence, according to us, is that presidentialization – as a defined and autonomous event – can
be analyzed in its origins and effects on different political actors. In any case, in particular, we
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would advice that all three faces of politics related to «presidentialization» can be seen as – directly
or not – strongly related to the political parties. Both the presidentialization of the executive and the
electoral campaign are in fact possible only if the party is «presidentialized» in itself. In many
contemporary democracies there has been a growing increase of the resources of the «head of the
government» both in terms of financial funds and of organizational and human resources.
Moreover, the electoral process, the candidature selection processes, and the increasingly tight
relationship between voters and candidates as «head of government» have had a crucial role in
centralizing politics. At the same time, the electoral campaign, due to many coherent factors, has
more and more been focused on the candidate. So, all these factors contributed – whereas with
different level of intensity – to the presidentialization of politics.
Before to go through the analysis of the ways in which the presidentialization interested the
structures and the balance of powers within political parties, a preliminary specification is needed.
In fact, even though the personalization of politics (McAllister 2007; Karvonen 2010), and the
centralization of some related political processes – such as the rise of candidate-cantered politics
(Wattenberg 1991) –, have been part of the general trend interested politics in almost all
democracies, a conceptual distinction should be done with respect to presidentialization.
Thus, a preliminary clarification and definition of what commonly personalization means it is
required and opportune. Even though both personalization and personalization imply an increasing
role of individual relevance in politics rather than of a collective dimension, some differences arise
as well. A crucial distinction – we think – should be done referring to both the conceptual and the
empirical dimensions. We assume that presidentialization is in fact a wider concept that in some
way includes that of personalization. The latter can in effect be considered as an effect of the
previous one. Presidentialization refers to a well defined political actor – and not only to a person,
so, we can have an individual subject affected by presidentialization as well as a «collective» actor
such as the «party in public office» or the external party (the party in central office), and the single
leader of course. Moreover, presidentialization can be measured through some indicators such as:
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elections (success or failure), political actors’ resources, concentration of power, etc. Vice versa, it
seems that personalization would predominantly refer to the way in which the previous phenomena
are implemented. After all, is quite evident on Karvonen’ definition of personalization, which refers
to general changes affecting institutions, citizens’ perceptions of politics, people’s electoral choices,
etc. (Karvonen 2010, 5). So, thus personalization seems to be complementary to presidentialization.
Thus, we will focus on presidentialization which represents a wider political phenomenon and that
include also personalization, with the latter being just one aspect of the previous. In particular, as
said, we would concentrate on the presidentialization of parties, and their related differences. First
of all, we should consider that the reasons at the base of this trend are different and often
interrelated. Nevertheless, the main factor should be researched on the evolution that affected the
parties in the last twenty years at least.
From «our» party to «my» party
In the last twenty years the political parties, especially (but not only) in Europe have quickly and
constantly evolved. The changes have been particularly evident in all their three organizational
faces and they refer to a process started in the late Fifties of the last century. The evolution of the
political parties and in particular of the mass «model» was primarily due to the deep innovation
intervened in modern societies. The declining of social class divisions, the weakening of the blue
collars workers, were basically the causes of the emergence of the so-called catch-all party. The
new characteristics of those parties were well illustrated by Kirchheimer (1966): the decline of
ideology, the weakening of a classe gardée, the growing importance of the leadership, the influence
of lobbies, and the reduction of the weight of members and activists. The end of mass party, the
related progressive weakening of bureaucrats gave more force and relevance to the typical traits of
catch all parties. Moreover, the reduction of the intensity and force of the linkages between the
political parties and the society has produced a growing relevance of the proximity between the
parties and the state. The latter would particularly due to the possibility for the party to acquire
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financial resources form the state, the so-called cartelization (Katz and Mair 1995), after the decline
of economic aid coming from supporters. So, it was possible to detect general trend of reduction of
the collective dimension of politics in parties, and the related «personalization». In sum, all these
factors were indicating a «centralization» of the party organization and to some extent a
personalization of the leadership, or better dynamics which facilitated the emergence of a
centralized, presidentialized party. Paradoxically, all the changes that political parties have adopted
in order to reduce their low legitimacy and appeal, have at the end reinforced the party «in central
office», and the leadership at the expense of the party «on the ground» (Penning and Hazan 2001;
Rahat and Hazan, 2001; Van Biezen 2003; Ignazi 2004). In particular, looking at the process of
centralization of powers in the party central leadership hands, Samuels (2002) refers to a cases of
«presidentialized party»: however we must consider that the last one is different from the situations
of «presidential party» or rather the «party of the president». The first case – the presidentialized
party – con be considered as depending on presidentialism (as regime type), while the second – the
presidential party – catch the internal process that involved the balance of powers of parties.
Presidentialization of political parties: is the «presidential party» the key factor?
Presidentialization of political parties is not (just) one face of the general process of
presidentialization that affected politics, is rather the core of that dynamics. And in any case it
represents its most relevant aspect. The personalization, the fact that the electoral campaign is
mostly based on candidate(s), and the concentration of «powers» on the head of government are in
fact basically been possible thanks to the presidentialization of political parties. Being the chief of a
party can be considered as the key element (Passarelli 2010a,b) in allowing a political leader to lead
not only the parliamentary group, but also - eventually - the national government. The so-called
«presidential(ization of the) party» (Cole 1993) is the tool the politicians have to control (almost) all
zones of uncertainty in their political organizations. Moreover, leading the party would allow
leaders to affect both policies and political strategies. The control of the «own» party permits to the
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leader to (easily) overcome internal opposition challenges, and to legitimize himself/herself as the
main actor facing other parliamentary groups. Leading the party – in a presidentialized way – means
to be the most probable candidate to the national government, and so to directly and «personally»
organize the electoral campaign. In some way, the party is at the personal political «disposal» of the
candidate/leader, and it often is the link between the apex and the party on the ground, that is
activists, and voters. In such a way the leader can easily overcome the middle level party elite,
especially those elected in public office (national Mps but also politicians locally elected). No
matter what the regime system is, the presence of a «presidential» party represents the most
noticeable factor in presidentializing politics, government or parliamentary groups. Without a
«personal» party (Calise 2000) leaders cannot (easily) face internal and external challenges nor can
they control the party in public office. The last point means the head of the government is not able
in «passing» his bills in parliament without an extenuating negotiation with factions, minorities, and
groups. Vice versa, in the case of a legitimated and strictly controlled «presidentialized party, the
leader strengthen its majority both inside the party and in parliament. After all, this trend can be
observed in almost all so-called advanced democracies without any significative differentiations
between presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary systems. So, «presidential» parties
represent the common factor in all systems/cases where the presidentialization process has been
more evident. Even though some scholars (Samuels 2002) only refer to the influence of
presidentialism in pushing trough more and more presidentialized parties, it is in fact evident that a
similar trend is ongoing in countries with different regime type. In particular Samuels argues that
presidentialism rely on «presidentialized» party, that is «emerged around the presidential race» (ivi).
The main idea is in fact that presidentialism stresses the intensity of parties’ «vote seeking»
incentives (Strøm 1990). (Not only in presidential systems) Party leaders have almost always tried –
explicitly or not, and successfully or not – to create their own party. The idea is to consolidate the
control over the party organization in order to have a powerful weapon to challenge rivals both in
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the party and outside1. So, as said, it is relevant – especially to detect the entity of centralization, to
distinguish cases between presidentialized party (Samuels 2002) and party of the leader (Cole
1993). In sum, in the case of a «presidentialized» party it is neither clear nor automatically
detectable which face of parties is concerned. That is, is not evident if that process concerns «only»
or mostly a person, or better the leader. A comparison between presidentialism, parliamentarism
and semi-presidentialism could be interesting at the electoral stage that is in terms of political
parties. We can in fact assume that exist differences (and similarities) between parties, and the
related presidentialization paths, not only between systems, but also in the same system.
Moreover, in some (not frequent and widespread) cases the party leaders (formally or
informally) have also contemporarily been executive chief. Nevertheless, the trend is a positive one
even in contexts where the party organization historically had a big influence, but, again, the most
relevant factor is the «nature» of party, the genetic model and its internal balance of power. These
are constitutive elements which are often resilient to quick changes.
In Italy in (only) four times the head of the government have contemporary been the
secretary of his own party: it has been the case of Bettino Craxi (1983-87), Ciriaco De Mita (198889), Giovanni Spadolini (1981-82), Silvio Berlusconi (1994; 2001-06; 2008-11). In France, during
the Fifth Republic, we should separately consider the cases of the prime ministers, and those of the
Presidents of the Republic. In the first category, even though not formally secretary or their parties
but certainly their political chiefs2, we found Charles De Gaulle (1958-69), Valery Giscard
d’Estaing (1974-81), François Mitterrand (1981-95), Jacques Chirac (1995-2007), and Nicolas
Sarkozy (2007-2012); vice versa, the group of prime minister sharing both charges and «functions»
is – as a consequence – less numerous than the first. The prime minister that led a party while
exercising the governmental functions have been: Jacques Chirac (1974-76), Lionel Jospin (19971
The cases that can potentially be included in the research we would further develop are all «relevant» parties of
democratic regimes. From an institutional point of view, as said, we consider all three regime types such as presidential,
parliamentary, and semi-presidential. The latter choice allow us in stressing similarities and differences among parties,
and to eventually detect patterns of parties presidentialization even following paths across regime types.
2
Of course there have been periods of political difficulties for each president in controlling over the parties, but here we
would indicate a general trend.
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2002), and Jean-Pierre Raffarin (2002). In Spain, the prime minister was the charge of the general
secretary of their own party for the terms of Felipe González (1982-96), José Aznar (1996-2004),
and José Luis Zapatero (2004-12). In Germany, Konrad Adenauer (149-63), Willy Brandt (196974), Helmut Schmidt (1974-82), Helmut Kohl (1982-98), (Gerhard Schröder (1998-2005). In Great
Britain are noticeable the cases of Clement Attle (1945-51), Harold Wilson (1964-66; 1966-70;
1974-76), James Callaghan (1976-79), Margareth Theatcher (1979-90), Toni Blair (1997-2007),
Gordon Brown (2007-10). Finally, in Portugal four cases are remarkable: Cavaco Silva (1985-95),
Antόnio Guterres (1995-2002), and José Socrates (2005-11); Pedro Passos Coelho (2011- ).
Outside Europe, we mostly face (semi) presidential cases. As is well known in the USA the
president – as chief of the government – is not the leader of his own party, also due to the typical
characteristics of American political parties. So, if we consider three Latin American cases, such as
Chile, Argentina, and Brazil, we can observe the overlapping of the two functions in a few
circumstances: in Chile (Michelle Bachelet, 2006-10), in Argentina (Carlos Menem, 1989-95), in
Brazil (Luiz Lula, 2003-11). Then we can found a situation of (almost) systematic overlapping of
the two functions in the case of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party.
Only party leaders matter? Some (other) evidences
Therefore presidentialization of politics has found a great ally in leaders. In fact, party
leaders with their «own/personal» parties have accelerated a process that interested many countries.
Theory and literature tell us – as seen – that the presidentialization of politics interested three faces
of politics: executives, electoral campaign, and parties. The leader has been the main actor in
beneficing of this trend and at the same time in increasing and pushing in that direction. However,
as said, is the control of the party which allows leaders to have a leader-centred electoral campaign,
to benefit of greater autonomy and power in executive branch, and to promote rules and procedures
which strengthen and confirm the central control of parties. The presence of «party/parties of the
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president» could in fact be an epiphenomenon, and also a contextual consequence. Vice versa, the
«presidentialization» of political parties is strongly related to a general process of change in politics.
Nevertheless, in order to go further in investigation I propose to deeper analyse only the
party face of the presidentialization. Given the both theoretical and empirical problems that this
procedure can implies, we suggest adopting a few specific indicators for each country. In such a
way, it will be possible to empirically confirm the acute interpretation and definition of Poguntke
and Webb (2005). After all, the same two authors clearly and frankly admit that their report and
analysis «does not in itself constitute a truly systematic and independent quantitative test of [their]
hypothesis» (Ibidem, 19 and 351).
Presidentialization effects on political parties, and the presidentialization of political parties
Which party face has been presidentialized (more)? And in which way and why parties
reacted differently to the presidentialization process? What are the factors that inhibit or rather
emphasize the presidentialization of political parties? The answer to these questions is not easy to
give. In any case the best way to advance is deeply analyzing the variables which affect the
presidentialization process in political parties. We need to choose some good indicators to detail
processes interested parties and their presidentialization. Parties as organizations are complex
structures, and so far way from a neither monolithic view nor interpretation. As Panebianco
reminds, «the leader, even if he leads because he controls crucial zones of uncertainty, must (more
often than not) negotiate with other organizational actors: he is at center of a coalition of internal
party forces with which he must at least to a certain degree negotiate» (1988, 37).
Moreover, literature has shown differentiated paths in organizational parties’ developments.
It has been put in evidence the progressive process of de-organization of parties. The latter
development, started with the «end» of mass parties have followed a (no always linear) trend of
deep organizational and ideological changes which characterized different dimensions. The most
remarkable innovations were detectable on the ideological identity, in members’ role and in the
10
centralization of control over the organization, as well as in the increasing professionalization of
party’ personnel and the growing invasive influence of public financial resources coming from the
state. So, this process (would be) culminated in many contexts with the emergence of a
«cartelization» of political parties. Moreover, – on one side – on terms of balance power it has been
clearly put in evidence a growing influence of the party in central office (Pco) coherently with the
previous predominance of the extra parliamentary face in presence of strong organizational
structures of mass parties. On the other side, consistently, the presidentialization of politics process
– for what concern the party face – it has been described as a trend mainly concerning the party
leader. It is fact the leader that control the party organization, led the electoral campaign, and it is
the «real» chief of government once his get power. Nevertheless, the increasing influence of Pco it
is not so extensively widespread as have been detailed demonstrated. In fact, in many countries of
«recent» democratization – in both Western and Eastern Europe at least (van Biezen 2003) – the
Ppo is, for many reasons, the party face which get powerful. This argument rely on the party
adaptation process, but of course also the contexts of party. So, this latter discrepancy – between the
presidentialization process that stress the role of the leadership (and the related centralization), and
the organizational development which emphasizes the grown importance of Ppo – sounds a bit
«strange».
Nevertheless, a conceptual misleading could arise, and so a deeper clarification should be
tried. How we can keep together the increasing power of party in public office together with the
dynamics of centralization of power in the hands of the party in central office, and especially of its
leader? Does this contradiction derive from an intrinsic problem in one or both analyses of party
evolution? Or vice versa, as we think, it depends mostly on a lack of in-depth examination on
presidentialization of parties that will consider different cases in various countries?
The presidentialization of parties in fact is not – as after all is not either in the case of
«politics» – a monolithic phenomenon. Rather it adopts differentiates characteristics depending on
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various factors, such as: the genetic model of party, the institutional context (electoral systems
among others), the ability of party leader, the dominant coalition features.
It is in fact evident that parties faced the presidentialization in different ways, following
paths mostly indicated by their own genetic characteristic. It is mean that presidentialization do not
concerned parties in the same way and in all time. Vice versa, presidentialization mostly depends on
the internal balance of power among the three faces of the parties. So, the equilibrium among the
different components of each party will determine the «presidentialized» outcomes.
We propose a focus on the balance of power of political parties. This analysis would help in
depicting the different patterns the presidentialization of parties followed in different cases.
Before introducing the study of the dominant coalition it is relevant to concentrate on the genetic
model. In fact, the genetic model matters. «A party's organizational characteristics depend more
upon its history, i.e. on how the organization originated and how it consolidated, than upon any
other factor» (Panebianco 1988, 50). Parties can be distinguished in two categories referring to as
many as kinds of origins: External origin; Internal origin. The first refers the presence of a
«sponsoring organization [which] generally results in a weak institution. In fact, the external
organization has no interest in strengthening the party […] for this would inevitably reduce the
party’s dependence upon it» (63). On the other hand, «it is easier for an internally legitimated party
(i.e. a party not sponsored by another organization) to become a strong institution» (ivi).
In «new [European] democracies» they have mostly been internally created, that is after
reaching the right to representation in democratic assemblies. They have so institutional rather
societal origins, and as a consequence they tried to focus on electoral mobilization rather than on
partisan mobilization. Despite the fact that the official rules of Southern European parties put the
party in the parliament under the strict control of the extra-parliamentary party […], the party in
public office would be the predominant face of political parties in newly democratizing systems
(Van Biezen 2003, 164 and 175).
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Moreover, it should be take into account the differentiation between parties which had an
organizational development through penetration and those which developed via diffusion. The first
«tends to produce a strong institution, [and a] a cohesive elite, able to set in motion a strong
developmental process in the nascent organization, is present by definition from the start». Vice
versa, a party which developed through diffusion «tends to produce a weak institution because of
the presence of many competing elites controlling conspicuous organizational resources; the
organization is thus forced to develop through federation, compromise, and negotiation among a
plurality of groups» (Panebianco, 1988, 63)3. That said, it arise as evident enough that the future
«presidentialization» of a party mostly will depend to some organizational characteristics, due to its
genetic model, such as the degree of its unity and homogeneity, and the balance of power in the
dominant coalition. In particular the equilibrium established between two of the three faces of the
party: the extra parliamentary party, and the party in public office, both generally definable as the
«party leadership». Nevertheless, the expression «dominant coalition» does not at all imply that
only national party leaders take part in such a coalition: a dominant coalition includes the national
leaders (or some of them) as well as a certain number of local or intermediate leaders (p. 37). This
analysis implies to consider both the degree of internal cohesion and the degree of degree of
stability in the dominant coalition. The degree of cohesion refers to the fact that the control over
zones of uncertainty is either dispersed or concentrated. So, we must consider the presence of
parties divided into factions (strongly organized groups) and parties divided into factions (loosely
organized groups) (Ibidem, 38) vice versa, the degree of stability depends on horizontal exchanges
(elite-elite exchanges), and, in particular, to the character of compromises (whether stable or
precarious) at the organization’ upper echelon (Ibidem, 39). From these previous factors it is arise
the possibility to define an «organizational power map» which concerns […] both relations the
party’s various organizational units (e.g. the predominance of the parliamentary group, the internal
3
It is possible to also have a mix kind of organizational development in which are present both elements of diffusion
and penetration (Panebianco 1988).
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national leadership, or the peripheral leadership, etc.) and relations (of predominance,
subordination, and/or cooperation) between the party and other organizations. (p. 39).
As said, we can assume to have different types of presidentialization of parties, that is a
balanced presidentialization between the central and the public office faces of the party, or, vice
versa, an overwhelming dominance of one of them. In particular, we can indicate different path by
looking at the way in which leaders get and/or lost their power and control of parties. Following this
line of thinking it is so clearer why for example – due to organizational balance of power in the
dominant coalition - some leaders kept control over parties after electoral defeats, and vice versa
some others lost that control (Table 1).
So we argue that the presidentialization of politics, in terms of political parties, affected each
organization in various ways. Put differently, we can have a high centralized party, with a
presidentialized electoral campaign «in the leader’s hands» but with the same leader that can that
can easily loose the control over the party. This dismissal on the organizational control can derive
from peculiar characteristic of such a party. So, the presidentialization of party in that case would
mean a mere presidentialization of the electoral momentum. Moreover, the presidentialization of
party would be easily detectable looking at other level of party organization, such as the
parliamentary group and other organizations and/or factions (more or less organized). Vice versa,
we can have parties in which even after a big electoral defeat the leader continue in keeping (strong)
control over the party organization. In the case in point, the presidentialization of party would
effectively mean also «a personalization» around the most eminent and important party’
representative.
At this point I would try to depict better the way to go deeper in defining the schema that
each party (or some of them) has followed in «presidentializing» their leadership. So, it will be
possible also to indicate the most influent factors in affecting the process of presidentialization of
parties. The question that quickly arises is thus on how to measure presidentialization in political
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parties? In each context we suggest to take in account systematically the following criteria, trying
where possible to standardise those variables.
In the case of the leader we will consider the role inside the party, in the executive, and in
parliament.
• Do the party leader is at the same time the party chief (formally or informally)?
• Do the party leader is at the same time also the executive chief?
• Do the party leader is also the chief of the parliamentary majority? (Or of the opposition?)
From the organizational point of view, the following criteria related to the balance of powers
between different faces of the party:
• Do exist formal rules in the party chart which empower (mostly) the party in central office?
• Which party's face gets more financial and organizational/human resources?
• Internal party division (dominant coalition) and the presence of «separated» groups, such as
factions or tendencies (Sartori 1976; Panebianco 1988)
• Party personnel overlap between the two main organizational faces (Pco, and Ppo)
Leadership force «is not based on organizational control of the party [...] it is contingent upon
electoral success» (Poguntke and Webb 2005, 5). So, as a consequence we shall have a
presidentialization of both politics and party around the leader. However, in terms of political party
we can analyse different patterns, or better consider that trend has not fill all kind of parties. Basing
the power on electoral success would in fact make the leader’s position much more precarious if not
related and supported by a conspicuous control and power inside the party (from which they have
tried to move away and became «independent»). The fact is that the electoral (in) success would
increase or, vice versa, reduce the leader power on the basis of the kind of party to which he
belongs to.
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Figure 1 illustrates the possible outcomes in the «nature» of presidentialization of parties’
leadership in political parties. The vertical axis considers the style of party leadership (that is the
kind of dominant coalition); rather on the horizontal axis we found the «balance of power» between
the three faces of parties.
The main indicators I have adopted are the following: the electoral process; the party
control; the executive (government) control; the structure of tendencies. The presence on 2 or 3
elements it depends on whether the party won the elections to consider also the variable
«executive») = MAX score on vertical axis; none or 1 of such indicators.
+
Personalized
+ Leader (es: “Outsider”)
+ Group (es: PPO)
Personalized
–
Fig. 1. The nature of presidentialization of leadership in political parties
Hypothesis
H1: to be «presidentialized» the leader should control (at least) the parliamentary group (for
example in 2012 the Italian Lega Nord, Maroni, a close allied of the leader/secretary Bossi, tried –
successfully – at least to oppose an own candidature for the parliamentary group leadership to that
in charge)
Figure 2 illustrates the typology we propose in order to «measure» the kind of presidentialization
process each party has followed. The first dimension refers to the electoral result: the electoral
16
outcome can be affect the leadership’s role in the party; the second dimension stresses the role of
the control of the party organization: keeping or losing the leadership of the party organization can
be both dependent and independent from the electoral result (so, it means that the consequences are
mostly related to the «genetic» features of the party examined.
Some empirical evidences are illustrated in table 1. For example Ségolène Royal: become
the presidential candidate for the French socialists in 2007, but then – after her electoral defeat – she
failed in keeping or consolidating the control over the party organization. As it was happened before
(in a quite different context) to Lionel Jospin in 2002.
Table 1. Leaders, electoral results, and the control of party organization outcome
Kept control of the party
Lost the control of the party
Sarkozy (Ump – France) W
Royal (Ps – France) D
Berlusconi (Fi and Pdl – Italy) W
Veltroni (Pd– Italy) D-Party
Bayrou (Udf – France) D
Blair (New Labour – GB) Party
Di Pietro (Idv – Italy) D
Brown (New Labour – GB) D
Merkel (Ccd-Cdu – Germany) W
Zapatero (Psoe - Spain) Party
…
Socrates (Ps – Portugal) D
…
Sarkozy (Ump – France) D
…
Berlusconi (Fi and Pdl – Italy) D
Other countries/cases…(to be continued)
Other countries/cases…(to be continued)
Legend:
D: electoral defeat
Party: parliamentary group defeat
W: winning elections
+
Keeping control of the party
+ Positive electoral result
– negative electoral result
Losing control of the party
–
17
Fig. 2. Outcomes in political parties control
Finally, figure 3 shows the main factors that affect the path of presidentialization a leader/party
follow due to some characteristics of both the institutional system, and of the «nature» of the party
itself. It is evident that each case/party can follow a peculiar process, and that we can found
probably many «mix» of elements of both the left pillar (less presidentialized) as well as many other
of the right pillar (more presidentialized). For example, the regime type can theoretically affect the
kind and level of presidentialization as follow: in a parliamentary system we can expect less
presidentialization in a situation of strong coalitions, whilst we could hypothesize a more
presidentialized track in one party governments contexts. Similarly, the electoral system would
affect the presidentialization towards a strengthening or weakening effect according to the nature of
the system itself: proportional (closed or open list), majoritarian, that is emphasizing or not factions
and tendencies in parties. The combination of such factors will determine, or at the least strongly
affect, the nature of the presidentialization a party (and its leadership) will follow.
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PARTIES
Less presidentialized
More presidentialized
Diffusion
Genetic model
Penetration
Factions
Dominant coalition
Tendencies
Party in public office
PR (open list)
Balance of power
PR (closed list)
Electoral system
Parliamentary
Semi-presidential (PM)
"Autonomous
parliamentary group"
Primary (closed)
Party appointment
Other(s)
Party in central office
Majoritarian (plurality,
double ballot, etc.)
Presidential
Regime type
Semi-presidential
"Personal" party
Candidature selection
Official rules (endorsment)
(PR)
"Presidential" party
Primary (open)
Party appointment
Party leader
Electoral failure
Electoral performance
Electoral success
"Normal" profile
Context
"Strong" profile
Fig. 3. Factors affecting the presidentialization of party process
19
On Going Conclusions
As seen the presidentialization of politics can be referred to (at least) three major dimensions of
politics. The first concerns the executive, the second refers to the electoral campaign, and the third
implies a presidentialization of political parties. We argued that presidentialization as general
phenomenon can be better not only understood, but also explained by referring to the process which
(in some cases) invested political parties. It is in fact the political party’s presidentialization that at
the end allows in presidentializing the executive/government through the control of the
parliamentary group, of the party. The latter party can be both the majoritarian one, or at least of
one of the parties composing the majoritarian coalition. Moreover, the parties can be affected (or
not) by a process of presidentialization which interest the candidature selection process, the role of
the party on central office, as well as through a centralized electoral campaign (primaries, catch-all
attitudes, de-ideologization of voters, role of mass media, etc.). Generally speaking,
presidentialization can be seen as a general concept affecting politics which may assume a
«collective» dimension or rather a «personal» one. Presidentialization can thus be «implemented»
through a personal process, or vice versa thanks to a collective tool, for example a group. In
addition, and it is the main point we would stress, the presidentialization of politics can be measured
looking at the three faces of political parties. In some cases will be the «party in public office» the
most presidentialized, in some other circumstances is the «the party in central office», and the
single leader of course that led that process.
The main «finding» we would share, and discuss is the analytical framework we suggested in order
to go deeper in analyzing the presidentialization of politics. Starting from the concept of
presidentialization of politics (Poguntke and Webb, 2005), we would introduced some specification
as useful tool to measure that phenomenon especially in political parties. The latter are, according to
us, the true vessels which carry the main effects of presidentialization. In order to do so, we softly
propose the use of some indicators such as: elections (success or failure), political actors’ resources,
concentration of power, etc. Each case/party followed a different (or new) pattern of
20
presidentialization depending on the institutional framework, the electoral law, the genetic model of
the party, the kind of leadership the party has, the presence of factions, etc. So we hypotheses that
the arising differences among parties in terms of presidentialization will mostly depend on the
nature and evolution of each party. It is possible have big similarities between «similar» parties in
different contexts (Passarelli, 2010) face to as many as differences between parties in the same
national case. Further comparative analysis adopting the framework we have proposed can be a toll
in depicting these different paths of presidentialization of political parties, which are the main actors
of this political phenomenon.
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