CommunalRiotsofMuzaffarnagarShamli,2013:InstitutionalisedRiots
System,MajoritarianPoliticsand
HumanInsecurityofthe‘Minority’
Communityintheregion.
Submittedby:SurbhiKhyati
ISAAsiaPacificConference2016,CityUniversity,HongKong
TableofContents
INTRODUCTION
2
THEPOLITICSOFCATEGORISATIONANDHUMAN(IN)SECURITYOFTHE
‘MINOTITY’COMMUNITY
3
REDUCINGCITIZENSTOCATEGORIES–ACHALLENGEFORHUMANSECURITY ERROR!BOOKMARK
NOTDEFINED.
MUZAFFARNAGARANDSHAMLI–ANEWCASEOFIRS?
4
POLITICALSKETCH–
SOCIALMAKEUP–
(1)JATS
(2)KHAPPANCHAYAT
(3)FARMERS’POLITICSOFTHEREGION-
THE2013RIOTS
5
5
6
6
7
10
MANUFACTUREDVIOLENCE–FRACTUREDCOMMUNITY
14
EFFECTSOFTHERIOTSONHINDUSANDMUSLIMS
RELATIONSHIPBETWEENHINDUSANDMUSLIMSBEFORERIOTS
CHANGEINRELATIONSHIPAFTERTHERIOTS
POLITICALOUTCOMES
15
15
16
17
CONCLUSION
18
2
Introduction
Communalidentitiesandtheirviolentmanifestationsareanon-goingsocio-political
probleminSouthAsiaforoversevendecadesnow.InSouthAsianlexicon,theword
‘communal’delineatesaverydifferentanalogythanthegeneralmeaningofthetermas
usedinotherpartsoftheworld.Communalism,inthiscontext,pertainstoaconditionof
suspicion,fearandhostilitybetweenmembersofdifferentreligiouscommunities
(Pandey,1990,p.6).Communalviolenceorcommunalriot,similarly,meansviolent
conflictsbetweenthesereligiousgroups,“analogoustoviolentracialorethnicconflicts,
[which]involvecollectiveand/orindividualactsofviolence–murder,looting,arson
andthedestructionofproperty.”(Patel,1995,p.370).Communalidentityisreligionbasedidentity,likeHinduorMuslimidentity,invokedparticularlyagainstother
religiousidentities.Communalismisthusinvokedinbinary,oneagainsttheother,in
mostofthecircumstances,almostalwaysasgroupidentitybasedonhomogenized
religiousmarkers.AsPandeysuggests,“Inacademicinvestigations,moreoftenthannot,
thetermisappliedtoorganizedpoliticalmovementsbasedontheproclaimedinterest
ofthereligiouscommunity,usuallyinresponsetoarealorimaginedthreatfrom
anotherreligiouscommunity(orcommunities)”(Pandey,1990,p.6).Communalpolitics
isthemanipulationoruseofthesegroupidentitiesindirectpoliticalinstigationsand
workings.
Thepoliticsofcommunalismanditsresultantviolencehasbeenpresentintheannalsof
Indianhistoryevenbeforeindependence.Communalpoliticsremainedpivotalinthe
partitionofBritishIndiaintoIndiaandPakistanandisblamedfortheviolenceand
bloodshedfollowingthepartitionandmigrationofHindus,SikhsandMuslimsacross
theborderonbothsidesin1947.Communalviolencehasgraduatedfrombeing
sporadicincidencesofviolenceintobeinganunceasingrecurringfeatureofIndian
politics.OneofthewatershedmomentsinIndiancommunalhistoryafterpartition,
whichchangedthepoliticalandsocialconversationaboutandaroundreligious
communities,wasthedemolitionofBabriMosqueinAyodhya(UttarPradesh)in1992.
Themostrecentlarge-scalecommunalviolenceinIndiaweretheriotsofMuzaffarnagar
andShamliinthenorthernstateofUttarPradesh,whichleftaround50,000people
internallydisplaced,thelargestsuchdisplacementafterpartition.
InstitutionalisedRiotSystem
Inthispaper,Iwillpresentthefindingsofresearchandinterviewsconductedinthe
violence-hitregionofMuzaffarnagarandShamliin2015,tobringforththeinterestsof
certainpoliticalgroupsandtheroleof‘InstitutionalisedRiotsSystem’(IRS)(Brass,
2004)incommunalviolencewitnessedbythisregionin2013.Inhispaper
‘DevelopmentofanInstitutionalisedRiotSysteminMeerutCity,1961to1982’(2004),
Brasschallengedtheideathatriotsaresponteneousoccurrences,wheretheangerofa
communityagainstanotherleadstoviolence.Brasssaid-
Farfrombeingspontaneousoccurrences,theproductionofsuchriotsinvolves
calculatedanddeliberateactionsbykeyindividuals,theconveyingofmessages,
recruitmentofparticipants,andotherspecifictypesofactivities,especiallyprovocative
ones,thatarepartofaper-formativerepertoire.Moreover,alltheseactionsmay
requirefrequentrehearsalsuntilthetimeisripe,thecontextisfelicitous,andthereare
noseriousobstructionsincarryingouttheperformance.(2004,p.4839).
3
Healsostressedevenwherethereisexistenceofinterreligiousassociationor
interpersonalrelationamongstmembersofdifferentcommunities,“elementsofcivic
engagementcannotwithstandthepowerofpoliticalmovementsandforcesthatseekto
createintercommunalviolence”(ibid.).InmyresearchofMuzaffarnagarandShamli
riotsof2013,Ifoundelementsofcalculatedanddeliberateactionsbeforetheriots,
variousprovocativeactivitiesandrehearsalsofriotsbeforetheactualriotofSeptember
2013.
ThePoliticsofCategorisationandHuman(In)Securityofthe
‘Minotity’Community
Historically,securitydebateshavelargelyrevolvedaroundtheunderstandingofState
beingthereferentobjectofsecuritizationfromthreat,wherethreatwasperceivedtobe
external.(CommissionofHumanSecurity[CHS],2003,p.2).However,withtheendof
ColdWarandtheriseofapresumably‘unipolar’world,mostofthe‘threats’noware
withinstate’sownterritorialboundary.Sourceofconflictandaggressionaremostly
internalratherthanexternal.Hence,aneedwasfelttobroadenthehorizonofsecurity
paradigmandredefinetheunderstandingofsecurity.Inthiscontext,theHuman
DevelopmentReportof1994publishedbyUNDPbroughttheideaofHumanSecurityon
theglobalstageasanalternativeapproachestoSecurity,claimingthatitistimefor
humanitytorestoreitsperspectiveandredesignitsagenda(UNDP,1994,p.1).
WhiletheadvocatesofHumanSecurityareunanimousontheideaofHumanBeing,and
notthestate,being“theonlyirreduciblefocusfordiscourseonsecurity”(Macfarlane
andKhong,ascitedinShani,2007,p.4),thereisalackofconsensusaboutwhatthe
individualsshouldbesecuritizedagainst.Proponentsofwhatistermedthe‘narrow
view’conceivehumansecuritynegatively,intermsofabsenceofthreatstophysical
securityofindividuals,whilethoseof‘broadview’advocateforfreedomfromfearand
freedomfromwant(CHS,2003,p.4).TheNarrowApproachtoHumanSecurity
conceivesthethreatas‘physicalharm’toindividuals.Proponentsofthe‘narrow’
conceptofhumansecurityfocusonviolentthreatstoindividualsor,asUNSecretaryGeneralKofiAnnanputsit,‘theprotectionofcommunitiesandindividualsfrominternal
violence’(HumanSecurityCentre,2005).Thebroaddefinitionofhumansecurity,onthe
otherhand,isnotnecessarilyexclusiveofthenarrowdefinitionof‘negativesecurity’,
butaddsmuchmoretoit.TheFinalReportoftheCommissiononHumanSecurity(CHS),
headedbyAmartyaSenandSadakoOgata,publishedin2003,takesthebroadapproach,
definingHumanSecurityintermsofprotectionofthe'VitalCore'ofallhumanlivesto
enhancehumanfreedomandfulfilment.Asperthisreport,humansecuritymeans
“protectingpeoplefromcritical(severe)andpervasive(widespread)threats
andsituations.Itmeansusingprocessesthatbuildonpeople’sstrengthsand
aspirations.Itmeanscreatingpolitical,social,environmental,economic,military
andculturalsystemsthattogethergivepeoplethebuildingblocksofsurvival,
livelihoodanddignity”(CHS,2003,p.4).
Post-SecularHumanSecurity
AthirdperspectivethathasemergedintheHumanSecurityparadigmisthatofpostsecularapproach,whicharguesagainstthewestern-liberalstandofviewinghuman
beingsasanindividualunencumberedbycommunityandculture.Theproblemwith
4
thisdominantwestern-liberalunderstanding,asGiorgioShaniargues,isthatitfailsto
grantdifferentfaith-basedgroupstherighttoliveinaccordancewiththeirbeliefs–
enjoyingalifeendowedwithmeaninganddignityfromtheirworldviewand
understanding–andforcesthemtoassimilatetothehegemonicvaluesofwestern
secularmodernityasenshrinedinthemodernnation-statesystem(2007,2014a,
2014b).Unlessthisculturaldifferenceofvariousfaith-basedgroupsisrecognisedand
includedinthediscourseofhumansecurity,theidealsofhumansecurity,freedomfrom
fear,freedomfromwantandespeciallyfreedomtoliveindignity,willremainadistant
dream.
Thisessaywillarguethatthecontinuumofreligious-basedviolenceinIndiaincites
humaninsecuritiesatallthreelevelsofhumansecurityparadigm,thatis,narrow
approach,broadapproachaswellaspostsecularapproach.
MuzaffarnagarandShamli–AnewcaseofIRS?
TherearethreeimportantcharacteristicsofMuzaffarnagar,whichmakesitinteresting
asacasestudy.ThefirstisthepresenceofJatswhoareHindusaswellasJatswhoare
Muslims–commonlyknownasMula-Jatsintheregion.MulaJatsoccupyasignificant
positioninsocialrelationshipshere,mainlybecauseoflandownership.
ThesecondinterestingfeatureofMuzaffarnagaristhestrongpresenceoffarmers’
politicshere,tillrightbeforetheriots.Muzaffarnagarisoneofthehighestproducersof
sugarcaneinthecountry,becauseofwhichithashighestGDPinthestate.Thefarmers
ofMuzaffarnagar,bothHindusandMuslims,werepartofaverystrongfarmers’
movementin1990sand2000sandevenafterthemovementbecamelesseffective,the
farmersoftheregionhadastrongsayinthepoliciesofagriculturesetbythestateand
theagro-industrysector.
ThethirdpointthatmakesMuzaffarnagarunique,eveninthewesternUttarPradesh
region,isthefactthatthisdistricthadneverwitnessedariot,inspiteoflargeMuslim
presence.Whilethefirsttwocharacteristicsmentionedabovecanbefoundinsome
otherdistrictsofwesternUttarPradesh,mostofthedistrictslikeMeerutand
Bulandshahrhavefacedviolentcommunaltensionsinthepast,significantlyduringthe
1992Babrimosquedemolitionandtheriotsthatfollowedit.Hence,IRSisarguably
establishedinthesedistricts.However,suchasystemwasnon-existent,aswas
communalviolence,inMuzaffarnagar-Shamli.
Allthesethreepointswillbediscussedingreaterdetailsbelow,withanattempttoshed
somemorelightonthesocio-politicalaswellaseconomicatmosphereof
Muzaffarnagar.
DemographyofMuzaffarnagar-Shamli
MuzaffarnagarisanorthwesterndistrictofUttarPradesh,whichsharesborderswith
theneighbouringstatesofHaryanaandNationalCapitalRegionofDelhi.Shamliwas
carvedoutofMuzaffarnagarin2011.SinceShamliisstillanewlyformeddistrict,and
thelastCensusconductedinIndiawasintheyear2011,mostofthedataoftheregionis
stillavailableunderMuzaffarnagardistrict.
SaddledbetweentworiversGangaandYamuna,Muzaffarnagar-Shamliareprimarily
agriculturebasedregion,withover71percentofthepopulationlivinginruralagrarian
5
area.Thesearealsotwoofthelargestsugarcane-producingdistrictsofthecountry,with
highestGDPinthestateofUttarPradesh.
Thedistricthasanareaof4008squarekilometersandhas27townsand1019villages.
AccordingtoCensusofIndia,2011,thetwindistrictsofMuzaffarnagar-Shamlihavea
populationofabout4millionpeople.Outofthis,only1.2millionliveinurbanareas,
whereasaround3millionliveinruralareas.Religionwise,1.7millionpeoplefollow
Islaminthedistrict,while2.8millionareHindus.The57.51%Hindupopulationofthe
districtisdominatedbylowercasteHindus(JatavsandChamars)andJats(anagrarian
community).Muslimsconstitutemorethan40%ofthepopulation,whichismuch
higherthantheirpopulationpercentageatanall-Indialevel(13%).
StatisticsofMuzaffarnagar-ShamliasperCensus2011.
InNumbers
InPercentage
TotalPopulation
4,143,512
PopulationinUrbanAreas
1,191,312
28.75%
PopulationinRuralAreas
2,952,200
71.25%
Hindus
2,832,914
57.51%
Muslims
1,711,453
41.30%
PoliticalSketch–
TherearefourmajorpoliticalpartiesinUttarPradesh-theIndianNationalCongress
(calledCongressorINChereafter);theBharatiyaJanataParty(BJP),whichistheHindu
nationalistpartyofIndia;theSamajwadiParty(SP)whichemergedasthechampionof
backwardclasseslikeYadavs(acastegroupwithsignificantpopulationinUttar
Pradesh)andMuslims;andBahujanSamajParty(BSP),whichemergedasthedefender
oftheScheduledCastegroups.Whilethefirsttwoarenationalparties,SPandBSPare
regionalpartieswithpoliticalsignificanceinUttarPradesh(thoughBSPgotthestatusof
anationalpartytechnicallyasithascandidatesinotherstatesaswell).SamajwadiParty
rulesthestatenowandtheChiefMinisterisAkhileshYadav.TheSPgovernmentcame
inpowerin2012andwasinpowerduringtheMuzaffarnagarriots.Thenextstate
legislativeelectionsareduein2017.
Politically,theentireregionofWesternUttarPradeshhasalargepresenceofMuslims
andJats,twoimportantcommunitieswithsufficientstrengthtochangethepolitical
fortunesofparties.Muslimshavesignificancepresenceinaround13parliamentary
constituencieswhereasJats,with6percentpopulationinWesternUP,canswing
politicalfortunesinatleast10constituencies(Pai,2013a,2013b,2014).Theregionis
dominatedbyOBC-Muslimpopulation,ononehand,wooedbySamajwadiPartyandthe
Dalitcastes,ontheother,targetedbyBahujanSamajParty.TheBJPwonthe
constituencybetween1991and1999,theperiod,whichsawtheriseofHindutvaacross
thecountry.Since1999,however,BJPwasunabletowinthisseatuntilthelastelections
of2014.Inthepast,however,westernUttarPradeshwasthestrongholdofanother
regionalpartycalledLokDal,whoseleaderChaudharyCharanSinghwasaverypopular
farmers’leaderamongstbothJatsandMuslims.Thepartydividedlateronandnow,
RashtriyaLokDal(RLD),runbyCharanSingh’ssonAjitSinghandgrandsonJayant
Chaudhary,stillhassomebaseinthearea.RLDstillpresentsitselfasafarmers’party
andtriestowoobothMuslimsandJats,whohavetraditionallybeenitsvoters.
SocialMakeup–
6
Asisclearfromthepointmentionedabove,inordertounderstandthesocialmakeupof
theregion,itisveryimportanttounderstandthreefactors–(1)Jats;(2)KhapPanchayat
and(3)Farmers’politicsoftheregion.
(1)Jats
JatsarepresentinlargenumbersinwesternUttarPradeshandinMuzaffarnagar.They
comprisenearly40%ofthepopulationinMeerut,Muzaffarnagar,Saharanpurand
BijnordistrictsofwesternUP.Becauseoftheirnumericalpreponderanceaswellas
theircontroloversizeableproportionofland,Jatsdominateboththepoliticsand
economyoftheregion.Theviolencethatensuedin2013wasaresultofdirectclash
betweenJatsandMuslimsinsomevillagesofMuzaffarnagar-Shamli.
JatsareaHinducommunitymainlysettledinthenorthernandnorth-westernregionsof
India.TheJatspopulateHaryana,somepartsofPunjabandRajasthanaswellas
WesternUttarPradeshTheyaremostlyagrariancommunity,withlargelandholdingsin
bothUttarPradeshandHaryana.Jatsofsomeregion(mainlyRajasthan)areincludedin
thelistofOtherBackwardClasses(OBCs)inIndia,whichmeansthattheyaregiven
reservationingovernmentemployment.JatsofUttarPradesharenotgiventhebenefit
ofreservation,whichhasprovedtobethecauseofmajoragitationsandprotestsfrom
thiscommunity.AccordingtoSurajBhanBharadwaj(2012),thesocialpositionofJats
strengthenedafter16thcentury.TheJatsofWesternUttarPradesharedividedinto92
Gotrasorclans(2012,p.62).
(2)KhapPanchayat
InordertounderstandthesocialrelationshipsbetweenJatsandothercommunitiesin
Muzaffarnagar,itisimportanttounderstandasocialsetupuniquetoJat-dominated
areasinIndiacalledKhapPanchayat.KhapPanchayatcanbebestunderstoodalocal,
informalsystemofdisputeresolutionandsocialcontrol,primarilydominantinregions
ofIndiawithhigherpopulationofJats.ThemainregionswhereKhapisprevalenttoday
inthecountryincludesthestatesofHaryana,someregionofPunjabandRajasthanand
WesterndistrictsofUttarPradesh.WhileKhapPanchayatismostlyassociatedwithJats,
othercommunitiesinUttarPradesh,likeGujjarsandRajputsarealsoapartofthissocial
institution.Whiletheinstitutionitselfisconsideredveryold,itisstillpopularandhasa
lotoflegitimacyamongstthecommunitiesparticipatinginitinmodernIndia.Scholars
tracetheoriginsofKhaptothetribaltimes,evenasinformationavailableaboutKhaps
isfewandfarbetween(Kumar,2012).Khapsareknowntohaveplayedasignificant
roleduringtheMughalperiod(16thcentury)inIndia(Bharadwaj,2012;Sangwan,
2008;Kumar,2012).AsperSangwan(2008),Khapswereanimportantsourceof
disputeresolutioninNorthernIndiaduringthisperiod.AstheBritishEastIndia
CompanytookovertherightstocollectlandrevenuefromtheMughalemperorin1803
inHaryana,PunjabandUttarPradesh,thecolonialrulealsomaintainedtherecognition
oftheKhapsystem(Kumar,2012).EvenaftertheindependenceofIndiain1947,the
holdofbiglandlordsdidnotchangemuchdespiteattemptsoflandreformsinnorthern
statesofHaryana,Punjab,andUttarPradesh.SincetheinstitutionofKhapis
intrinsicallylinkedtolandholdingsinruralareas,eventhoughKhapsbecameinformal
asformalStatetookovertheadministration,thelegitimacyandpopularityofKhap
remainedunalteredintheregion(Kumar,2012),totheextentthatlocaladministration
normallydoesnotinterferewiththefunctioningsoftheKhapPanchayatandavoid
confrontationwiththem(Sagwan,2008).
Initsbasicstructure,Khapcomprisesofacertainnumberofvillagesorganisedintoa
council.However,overtheperiodoftime,anddependingonthesocio-economic
makeupoftheregion,Khapstodayareofdifferenttypes.Whilesomearedominatedand
unitedtogetherbyaparticularclan(Gotra),thereareothersorganisedonthebasisof
dominantcastesandsomeothersonthebasisofbothgotraandcaste.Therearealso
7
someKhaps,whicharemulti-gotraandmulti-caste.Thebasicparameterforthe
organisation,however,remainsgotra,casteandlandholdingsinthevillage.EachKhap
hasothergotrasandcastegroupslivinginthevillage,butsincetheyarefewerin
numberorholdfarlessland,theydonotdominatetheKhap.
KhapsystembelievesintheconceptofBhaicharaorbrotherhoodamongstthevillage
members.Theideaofbhaicharameansthatmembersofthesamegenerationare
classificatorysiblings(brother–sister)andcannotintermarry.Thisideaofbhaichara
startsfromvillagelevelandcontinuesuptotheKhaplevel(Sangwan,2008,p.341).
AsBharadwajrightlypointsout,whiletheJatsareHindus,theirsocio-culturalpractices
didnotconformtothetraditionalrigidculturesoftheHinducastesystem.Jatsdidnot
haverestrictionsandtaboosaboutcustomsandtraditionsregardingmarriagesduring
theirearlyphases.
ThatiswhythereispopularsayingthatJatkakyaHinduaurMeokakyaMusalman
[What’sHinduabouttheJatsorMuslimabouttheMeos].Thisconveysthatitisdifficult
toclearlyequatethereligionofJatsasHinduorthereligionoftheMeoasMuslims.Jats
didnotrigidlyobserveHindutraditions,nordidMeoscoselyobserveMuslimtraditions.
ThissayingthuscapturesthefluidiltyofthesemoderndaycategorieslikeJatsbeing
HindusandMeosbeingMuslims.OnecansafelysaythattheJatcommunitystoodapart
fromtherigidboundariesofBrahmanicalHinduorder...fromtheMughalperiodtothe
present,Jatcommunitieshavedevelopedinstrikinglydifferentwaysfromothergroups.
(2012,p.64)
SimilartotheMeosofRajasthanarethecommunityofMuslimJatsorMulaJatsin
MuzaffarnagarandShamli.Mula-JatsarelandowningMuslimswhobelongtothe
communityofJatsandhencearecalledMula-Jats.Theyareconsideredtobeconverts
fromtheJatcommunityintoIslamatsomepointinhistory.Thereissignificantcultural
similaritybetweenJatsandMula-Jats.Becauseofthecastecorrespondenceand
landownership,MulaJatsandJatssharedaverycloserelationshipwithoneanotherin
theregion.Mula-JatshavebeenknowntobeapartoftheKhapPanchayatforavery
longtime.AsMangeKhanofKharadvillageinMuzaffarnagar(PersonalInterview,
September10,2015)pointsout:“BothHindusandMuslimsareapartoftheKhap
system…WhenKhapPanchayatwerecalledinthepast,Muslimswerealsocalledto
participateinit.”FarmerleaderRakeshSinghTikaitofBharatiyaKisanUnion(BKU)
alsoexplainedthisfeatureofKhap.“KhapisnotofJatsalone;it'sofeveryjatiinthe
region…Peoplefromallcommunitycome(inKhappanchayats).Khapwasasocial
systembeforethegovernment.PanchayatisystemwastakenfromKhapPanchayat.Its
1200-1400yearsold”(PersonalInterview,October11,2015).
TheexampleofKhapPanchayatandparticipationofMula-Jatsinthispanchayatuntil
recentlyshowsthatcategoriesofHinduandMuslim,pittedagainsteachotherin
communalpolitics,aretoooversimplifiedandhomogeneous,anddoesnotrecognise
pluralitiesofidentitieslikethoseofJatsandMula-Jats.
(3)Farmers’PoliticsoftheRegion-
MuzaffarnagarandShamli,andbyextension,theentirewesternUttarPradeshhasa
verystrongagrariancommunity.ApartfromJatsandMula-Jats,Gujjars,Tyagisand
Rajputshavesignificantlandholdinginthearea.Thus,theregionhasbeenahotbedfor
farmers’politicsforoverfourdecadesnow.Jatsbeingsthelargestlandholding
community,dominatefarmers’politics.AsZoyaHasan(1994)pointsout,thedecadeof
the1980switnessedtheemergenceoftwointerrelatedchangesinUttarPradesh,the
firstbeingagriculturaltransformationsthatincreasedproductivitybymanyfolds,and
thesecongbeingthetransformationoffarmersthemselves,asaresultofthefirst
transformation,intoamajorpoliticalforce.Boththesedevelopmentcrystallizedintoa
powerfulfarmersmovementinthestateduringthe1980s,whenthefarmerssucceeded
8
indemandingandnegotiatingforbetterpricesforagriculturalproduceandinfluence
otherissuesoftradebetweenagriculturalandindustrialsector,thusimpactingthe
economicpoliciesconcerningagricultureinUttarPradeshandatanationallevel(1994,
p.165).
Amongstthefirstfarmers’politicalleaderfromtheregionwasChaudharyCharanSingh,
whohadbeeninstrumentalinlendingapoliticalvoicetofarmersofUttarPradesh,
specificallyofthewesternUttarPradeshfromwherehebelonged.Singhwasan
influencialleaderoftheJanataDalgovernmentthatchallengedthehegemonyof
CongressPartyunderformerPrimeMinisterIndiraGandhi.Heusedhispolitical
influencetobringaboutashiftintheeconomicpowerfromcitiestoruralareasand
challengedthesupremacyofCongressbyconstructinganallianceofmiddleand
backwardcastes,andsucceededinmarginalisingtheCongressinwesternUttarPradesh
duringthe1970s(Hasan,1994,p.168).AstheChiefMinisterofUttarPradesh,the
MinisterofFinanceundertheJanataDalgovernmentfrom1977to1979andasthe
PrimeMinisterofIndiafrom1979to1980,Singhbecametheleadingprotagonistsof
farmersinUttarPradeshandinIndia.However,afterhisdeathin1987,andinLokDal’s
failuretoextanctanymajorconcessionforfarmersfromtheconsecutiveCongress
governments,therewasapoliticalvacuumcreatedregardingfarmers’voiceinpolitics.
BharatiyaKisanUnion(BKU),whichwasformedin1978,rosetoprominencein1987to
fillthisgapandbecomethechampionoffarmersinstateaswellasnationalpoliticsfor
thenextdecade.Itsleader,ChaudharyMahendraSinghTikait,wasacharismaticfarmer
leaderfromMuzaffarnagar’sSisaulivillage,chosetoremainoutoftheelectoralpolitics
andworkasapressuregroupforfarmersbycreatingfarmers’movementinthestate
thatsuccessfullyinfluencedtheeconomicandtradepoliciesforfarmersofUttar
Pradeshonanumberofoccasionsinthenexttenyears.BKUcapturednationalattention
inthewinterof1988,whenitssupporterslaidsiegetoMeerut,demandinghigher
sugarcaneprices,loanwaiversandhigherruralinvestmentwithloweringofelectricity
andwaterratesinruralareas.InOctober1988,massivefarmers’rallycapturedDelhi.
Theagitationwasmilitantinnatureandgainedwidespreadsupport,withfarmers
blockingroads,closingvillagesforadministrationandcontinuingprotestforseveral
days(Hasan,1994,p.166).Farmers’movementunderBKUhadstructachordinrural
UttarPradeshandsoonbecameamovementwithwhichallpoliticalpartieswantedto
associatethemselveswith.Whilethesuccessofthecampaignwasintermsof
concessionforthefarmers,itslong-termimpactwastheemergenceofTikaitasa
powerfulleader“withformidableabilitytomobilisethepeasantryofwesternUttar
Pradesh”(Hasan,1994,p.168).Eventhoughthemovementdidnotachieveitsmajor
demandofhigherpricesofsugarcane,Tikaitsucceededinmaintainingthemomentum
ofthefarmers’movementandintransformingBKUasapressuregroupforfamrers’
interest.
Thesuccessoffarmers’politicsintheregionisverysignificantinthehistoryof
communalrelationshipsofMuzaffarnagar,tounderstandthishomogenisationof
categoriesthatdidnotexistinpast.
BKUwasdefinitelydominatedbyJats,andfollowedthestructuresofKhapPanchayat
foritsownmeetings.ButBKUalsohadaverystrongsupportbaseamongstMuslimsof
theregion.AsHasanpointsout,“Thepoliticalsignificanceanddurabilityofthefarmers’
movementwasdependentonitsabilitytoforgeanetworkofsupportbytranscending
theshort-terminterests…sothataspectrumofruralproducersbelievedtheyshared
economicinterestsandpoliticaloutlooks”(1994,p.181).Thiscross-communalnetwork
wassuccessfullyforgedbyBKUbyuseofpluralreligioussymbols,andtakingcareofthe
interestsofMuslimfarmers.BKUinvestedspecialeffortsinpromotingcommunal
9
harmonyinWesternUttarPradesh,andasaresult,gainedplentyofsupportfrom
Muslims.
TheMuslimfarmersthatIinterviewed,includingMangeKhanofvillageKharadand
ShaifAliSiddiquifromvillageBawadi(PersonalInterview,September9,2015),claimed
thattheyalwaysparticipatedintheBKUrallies.“Duringfarmers’protests,BKUcalled
Khapsandgavecallsforprotests,weusedtoparticipateinsuchKhaps.In2011-12,we
participatedinBKUKhapthatledtorailblockandahugefarmers’protest,”saidMange
Khan(PersonalInterview,September10,2015).
AsignificantexampleofthisnetworkwastheBKU’scampaignagainsttheabductionand
murderofaMuslimgirl,Naiyma,inMuzaffarnagardistrictin1989.RakeshTikait,inhis
interview,pointedtotheincidentasanexampleofHindu-Muslimunityintheregion.
AbouttheNaiymacase,Hasanwrites:
ThisincidentsnowballedintoamajoragitationasTikaitmarchedwiththousandsof
farmerstothebanksoftheGangaCanal,anddemandedthatthegovernmentrecover
Naiyma.FollowingtherecoveryofNaiyma’sbody,hundredsofthousandsoffarmers
gatherednearthecanaltoprotestagainsthermurder.AstheTimesofIndiaobserved:
ThemereactofthousandsofHindussquattingonthebanksofacanalatBhopatoseek
redressalofaMuslimgrievanceisremarkableinitself.Whilethisdoesnotnecessarily
meanthatcommunalprejudicesarebeingconsciouslycombated,itdoespowerfully
demonstratethatthereisacommoncodeofsocialmoralitythatguidesruralsociety–a
realitythaturbanpoliticiansareunabletograsp(TimesofIndia,9August1988).
(Hasan,1994,p.182).
TimesofIndiamadeaveryimportantpointaboutthecommoncodeofsocialmoralityin
ruralsociety,wherethecommunityawarenessofbeingJatandMuslimwas
overshadowedbytheawarenessofbelongingtoafarmers’community.Thisawareness
ofbelongingtoafarmers’communitywithcommoneconomicandsocialinterests,
however,hasdiminishedovertheyearsandnow,theidentityisnolongerofthefarmer,
butofthecategoriesengrainedintheConstitution,thoseof‘Hindu’and‘Muslim’.
Forinstance,whenthefarmersofMuzaffarnagarweretogetherunderBKUpolitics,
negotiatingforbettersugarcaneprices,theidentity‘we’constitutedofallthefarmers,
HindusandMuslims,andthesugarmillownersconstitutedthe‘they’.Thisaffectedthe
policy-makingforagricultureforseveralyearstocome,asfarmersbecamemembersof
thecommitteeinUttarPradeshthatdecidedthesugarcaneprice.Now,however,this
identityoffarmerislostastheidentityofhomogenised‘Muslim’and‘Hindu’community
hastakenover.MangeKhan,thefarmerwhoparticipatedinrailblocksin2011-12
underBKU,saidaboutthesituationduringtheriots–
AllMulaJatshavelandinthesevillages.SomeHinduJatshavemorefarmlandthanus
butmostdon’t.Butournumericalstrengthislessinthevillage.Thetotalvoteinour
villageis7400,outofwhichMuslimshaveavoteof250andthey(Hindus)aretherest.
Sowhatcouldwehavedoneduringtheviolence?Ifwehadstayed,oursituationwould
havebeenlikeLisad.Thatiswhyweleftthevillage.(PersonalInterview,September10,
2015).
LisadisavillageinShamli,wheremaximumnumberofdeathsamongstMuslim
communitywasreportedduringtheriots.Aswillbeelaboratedlater,nonebutone
Muslimfamilyhasreturnedtothatvillagetwoyearsaftertheriots.
Thiscategoryof‘we’and‘they’issignificantlydifferentfromthe‘we’and‘they’of
farmers’movementorofprotestagainstNaiyma’sabduction.Thisisnottosaythatthe
communityofHinduandMuslimdidnotexistearly,butapoliticalcategoryof‘Hindu’
10
and‘Muslim’mightnothaveexisted,whichnowexists.Thesehomogenisedcategories
includeanyandall‘Muslims’-fromlandownerMula-Jatstolowercasteslike
washermenandlandlabourers.Andadirectresultofthesecategorisationand
realisationofcommunityidentityisthat,whereasinademocracy,theeconomic
interestsoffarmersshouldhavebeenthecohesiveforceforcommondeliberation–and
itwasforasignificantlylongperiod–thecommunityidentitiesmakesuchcohesion,
whichisstillinfavourofboththeHinduandtheMuslimfarmers–moredifficult(and
evenimpossibleinariot-tornarealikeMuzaffarnagar).
The2013Riots
Inspiteofsuchsocio-culturalandpoliticalbondsbetweenthetwocommunitiesof
HindusandMuslims,theregionofMuzaffarnagarandShamli,forthefirsttimeinits
history,witnessedlarge-scalecommunalviolencein2013,whichdisplacedaround
50,000peoplejustaftertheriots.
WhilemanyoftheintervieweesconfirmedthattensionbetweenHindusandMuslims
andincidentsofharassmentofMuslimshadbeengoingonforayearbeforetheriots,
theactualincidentthatledtotheriotswasthatofallegedeve-teasingofaJatgirlbya
MuslimmannamedShahnawaz.ShahnawazwasallegedlykilledonAugust27,2013,in
hisvillageKawaal–aMuslimmajorityvillageinMuzaffarnagar–bytwoJatmen,Sachin
MallikandGauravMallik(ofthenearbyMallikpurvillage),whowerethebrotherand
cousinofthegirlallegedlyteased.Thetwomen,inturn,wereattackedbythemobin
KawaalvillageasareactiontoShahnawaz’sdeath,andwerekilledinKawaalaswell.
AsperthereportoftheNationalCommissionforMinorities(NCMreport,September
19th,2013),Shahnawaz’sfatherdeniedtheallegationsofteasingandreportedthatthere
wasascufflebetweentheMallikbrothersandShahnawazregardingaminormotorcycle
accidentthatescalatedintoafightleadingtothethreemurders.Thenextday,saysthe
report,peoplereturningafterthecremationoftheJatmen,setfiretoahutmentanda
hutinabrickkiln,anddamaged27housesinvillageKawaal.Astensiongrew,aMuslim
gatheringtookplaceinMuzaffarnagartownarea,which,asperthereport,wastoappeal
forcalmonAugust28.Butthetensiondidnothalt.Afterthecondolencemeetingofthe
MallikbrothersinanearbyvillagecalledNanglaMandauronAugust31,acarwith
Muslimswasattackedandthepeopleincarwerebeatenasthecarwasburnt.Some
moreincidentsofattackonMuslimswerereportedfromMuzaffarnagaraswell.Asthe
tensioncontinued,apanchayatwascalledinthevillageLisadonSeptember5,where
theMahapanchayatofSeptember5wasannounced(NCMreport,September19,2013).
RakeshTikait,thefarmers’leaderofBKU,saidintheinterview(PersonalInterview,
October11,2015)–
Whenthepanchayatwascalled,tensionwashigh.Igaveacallforassemblyandsaidon
August28ththatonAugust31st,wewillallassembleandwillpayhomagetoSachinand
Gaurav(shradhanjalisabha).Ididnotexpectthattherewouldbesomuchanger
amongstthepublic.Whenweassessedthatahugecrowdmayturnupforthe
condolencemeeting,andtherewasalotofangerandreactionamongstthepeople,I
cancelledit..PeoplesaidIwaswrongincancellingthemeeting.Inspiteofcancelingthe
meeting,somepeoplestillassembledandsaidthattherewillbeameetingon
September7.TherewasneitheranyleadernoranyplanforthemeetingonSeptember
7.
OnSeptember7,amahapanchayat(grandassembly)wascalledinNanglaMandaur,
wheremorethan40,000men(mostlyJats)gathered.AspertheNCMreport,
participantsenroutetothemahapanchayatwereassaultedintheMuslimmajority
11
villageofBassiKalan,andtensionrosefurther.Atthemahapanchayat,inflammatory
speechesweregivenandaMuslimbusdriverwasbeatentodeath(NCMreportSept.9,
2013).JatsreturningfromthemahapanchayatwerewaylaidbyaMuslimcrowdata
localcanalbridgeandfourotherplaces.Sixdeathswerereportedintheseincidents,
thatincluded2Muslims.ThetensionledtoacurfewbeingimposedinMuzaffarnagar.
It’simportanttonoteherethattheversionofwhathappenedduringthe
mahapanchayatdiffersamongstMuslimsandJatsIinterviewed,witheachclaimingthe
otherstartedtheviolenceandwashostilefortheother.Onthesameday,ajournalist
waskilledinMuzaffarnagarduringtheviolenceandthestategovernmentcalledinthe
IndianArmyforcontrollingthesituation.However,violencespreadinvillageswith
severalcasesofarsonandmurderreportedfromvillagesofKutba,Kutbi,Lank,Lisad,
Baawadi,Phugana,MohammadpurRaiSingh,Kakra,Kharad,MohammadpurModern
andAtali.
Meanwhile,thedistrictmagistrate(DM)andsuperintendentofpolice(SP)were
changedbythestategovernmentthriceinthewakeoftheriots.Soonaftertheincidents
ofAugust27,theDistrictMagistrateandSuperintendentofPoliceofMuzaffarnagar
weretransferred.Thenextteamwasalsotransferredwithindays,saystheNCMreport.
Tikaitaccusesthegovernmentanddistrictadministrationforthedisruptionand
violencethatstartedfromthemahapanchayatandcontinuedforthenextthreedays,
spreadinginvillagesofMuzaffarnagarandShamli.Heclaims-
Itwasamahapanchayat.Itwasareactionfromthepublic.Itwentwhereveranyone
called.Itwasacrowd.Therewasnoleaderornoaimofthiscrowd.Peoplewereready
tofollowanyonewhowouldlead.Thereweresome500-600,000peoplewhereasthere
wereonly7-8menfromtheadministrationtocontrolthecrowd.Administrationand
governmenthadaroleinorchestratingtheriots.(PersonalInterview,October11,
2015).
AspertheNCMreports(19September2013,3October2013,26December2013,28
January2014,28June,2014),65peopleweremurderedduringtheriotsandaround
51,000peoplefledtheirhomesduringtheriots.Aftertheriots,thestategovernmentset
upreliefcampsforriotvictims.Lateron,astheriotvictimsrefusedtoreturntotheir
respectivevillages,thestategovernmentgrantedarelocationpackageofRs500,000per
family.Somefactsoftheviolenceisasfollows:
Totalreliefcamps–58(41inMuzaffarnagarand17inShamli)
Totalnumberofpeoplelivinginthesecamps–51,000
Sixmonthslater,numberofpeopleleftincamps–2500
TotalnumberofpeoplekilledinMuzaffarnagar–29(9Hindusand20Muslims)
Totalmurdersduringtheriots–65
Totalcasesregistered–566
LisadinShamliwastheworstaffectedvillage.Ithasapopulationof19000,including
15,500JatHindus,2200Muslimsand1500ScheduledCaste.AsperthereportofNCM
datedOctober3,112oftotal250buildingsbelongingtoMuslimsinLisadwereburnt
downduringtheriots.
Kutuba-KutubivillageofMuzaffarnagarwerethesecondworstriot-hitvillage.There
werenoJatdeathsreportedfromthistwinvillage,but8MuslimswerekilledinKutba
and48housesofMuslimswereburntdowninKutuba-Kutubi(NCMreport,September
19).
ThefirstpointIwillmakehereisthattillthepeopleofMuzaffarnagaridentifiedas
farmers,boththecommunitiesvotedinsimilarpatternstomakesurethatleaderswho
careaboutfarmersweresentasrepresentativetolegislativeassemblyandparliament.
However,intheeventsprecedingtheriots,theidentitiesofthepeopleunderwent
12
certainchanges.Whiletherecanbeseveralreasonscontributingtotheseidentity
changes,onereasonthatwashighlightedbyseveralintervieweeswastheso-called
benefitthatMuslimcommunityisgettingfromthegovernmentbecausetheyare
‘minority,'whichbecameaboneofcontentionbetweenJats/HindusandMuslimsinthe
region.
Again,itispertinentheretonotethatsuchargumentsthatthegovernmentisonly
workingfor‘minorities’areverymisplacedbecauseoftworeasons–one,thereisample
evidencetosuggestthat‘minorities,'especiallyMuslims,aresocio-economically
backwardanddeservesocialwelfarebythegovernment.However,suchschemesbeing
termedasbeingfor‘minorities’createsdivisivesentiments.Andtwo,tobefairtoany
governmentscheme,whenpeoplefocusonschemesonlybroughtforminorities,they
stoptakingintoaccountalltheotherbenefitsandschemesgrantedtoalltheother
sectionsofthesociety.Butamoreimportantpointtobemadehereisthatsuch
sentimentsareopentoorevencreatedbypoliticiansforelectoralbenefitsbyinstigating
communalragethroughwhatPaulBrass(2004)callsInstitutionalisedRiotSystem
(discussedlater).
TheSamajwadiPartygovernmentinUttarPradeshcameupwithaseriesofsocial
welfareschemesforminoritiesinthestatebetween2012-13.Onesuchschemewas
providingfundingfordaughtersoftheminoritycommunityfor‘educationormarriage’;
anothergovernmentpolicywasforconstructingboundarywallsingraveyardsfor
Muslims.Atthesametime,thegovernmentalsocameupwithseveralotherflagship
schemeslikedistributingfreelaptopstomeritoriousclassXandclassXIIstudents,
whichwasforallcommunity,including20%forminoritiesand21%forScheduledCaste
andTribe.Similarly,thegovernmentalsocameupwithunemploymentallowanceforall
unemployedyouthbetweentheageof25and40,whichwasalsoforeveryone
irrespectiveofcommunitymembership.Thereactionoftheseschemes,however,was
thatSamajwadiPartygovernmentwasseenfavouringonlyMuslimsinthestate.
Forexample,OmPrakashMallik,aformerforestofficerandfarmerfromvillage
PhuganainShamlisaidintheinterviewthatMuslimsintheregionhadbecome
“arrogant”sincetheSamajwadiPartygovernmentcametopower.“Theyweremore
arrogantandstubborninthelastsix-sevenmonths,especiallysinceSamajwadiParty
government,”saidMallik.“Likenow,everythingisfortheirbenefit.Policiesaremadein
thenameofminorities.Evenschemesforthepoorhavearound20-30%benefitallotted
forminorities.MinoritymeansMuslimsoverhere.ReportsbyMuslimsarelodgedvery
easilyinthepolicestationwhilewehavetofacealotofdelay”(PersonalInterview,
October12,2015).
MallikpointedoutthatJatsintheregionwerealreadyarrogantandstubborn.Butsince
theSPgovernmentcameintopower,Muslims“startedfeelingthattheyaresuperiorto
theHindusasthisistheirgovernment”andthisbecameareasonfortensionbetween
thetwocommunities,thatledtoclashesbetweentheminhisvillageaswell.Malliksaid
–
OnereasonforthetensionbetweenthecommunityistherolethatBJPplayed.BJPhas
alwayssidedwithHindus.BJPsaidthisveryopenlythatinthisperiod(ofSP
government),onlyonecommunityisbenefittingfromthegovernment.Thiswasalso
supportedbynonBJPpeople,thatthisgovernmentisbenefittingonlyforMuslims,and
doingnothingforHindus.(IfHindusarethevictims,thentheywilltakesomeone’s
supportright.ItcamefromBJP).Forinstanceinschools,100%ofthescholarshipfor
minoritieswasdistributed,somescholarshipforYadavswasalsodistributed,butthe
restofthescholarshipnevercame.Inallrecruitmentproceduresforgovernment,
MulayamSingh(PresidentofSamajwadiparty)filledhismen(YadavsandMuslims)and
nooneelsegotrecruited.(ibid.)
13
SimilarsentimentswereechoedbyseveralotherJatmembersIinterviewed.KapilDeo
Agarwal,whowasamemberofBJPandlaterwentontobevotedasmemberofthestate
legislativeassemblyfromMuzaffarnagar,said-
[A]ftercomingtopower,MulayamSinghYadavhasplayedtheroleofdividingthe
societyonreligiouslines.Theyspent1000crorerupeesforboundrywallof(Muslim)
cemetry.First,thereisnonecessityforaboundarywallinacemetry.Secondly,ifthey
wantit,theyshoulddoitthroughvillagehead,blockheadsbecausethereismoneyat
blockandvillaheheadlevel.Butthegovernment,justtoprovideprotectionandto
appeaseIslamicpeople,doesthiskindofthinginasystematicmanner,andinreligious
places,onlyboundarieswillbeerectedformuslimcementryandnotforHindu
crematorium,thentherewillbeoutrageinpublic.Thematterisnottheboundary,but
favouringonecommunity.Third,whenmoneycamefordaughters,itwasonlyfor
minoritydaughters.IrrespectiveofhoweverpooraHindugirlmaybe,themoneyonly
cameforminoritygirls,whetheritbefordaughtersorscholarshipforstudents.Even
thelaptopsthatweredistributedweredistributedtoMuslimgirlsandwhentherewas
outrageaboutit,someweredistributedamongstothersaswell.Sojusttoappeasesome
sections,Akhileshgovernmenthasdonethejobofdividingthesociety.(Personal
Interview,October11,2015).
Itisimportanttopointoutherethatthesesentimentsabouttheprejudicedbehaviourof
thegovernmentwerewitnessedverystronglyamongsttheJatsalone.Infact,the
narrativesprovidedintheinterviewswereverysimilartooneanotherandraiseddoubt
aboutwhethertheywereindependentthoughtsoftheintervieweesorwerepartof
propagandabyaparticularpoliticalparty.Hasan(1994)calleditdemonisationofthe
state,amethodusedbyBJPandotherHindunationalistgroupsin1992communalriots
aswell.
Thisdivisivenessdrasticallychangedthevotingtrendsintheregion.MangeKhan
explainsthatearlier,HindusandMuslimsvotedtogetherintheregion.“Thisareahas
votedforBJP,SP,BSP,etc.andevenRashtriyaLokDal…[weevenvotedforBJP,inspite
ofbeingaMuslim]WeknewthatBJPwasananti-Muslimparty.Butwehadthe
confidencethatourfriendiswinningsohewillhelpus.Nowthatconfidenceisnot
there,”hesaid(PersonalInterview,September10,2015),claimingthatnow,allMulaJatswillvoteforaMuslimcandidate.
GhulamMohammadJaula,fromvillageJaula,whowasaseniormemberofBKUbut
separatedfromtheorganisationaftertheriots,saidthattheyallvotedforSPin2014
elections.
Atleastonetrendhaschangedinthearea.Inthisarea,jatsvotefortheircastemember
(candidate)whicheverpartytheymightbefrom.ThisishowMuslimsarealsothinking
now.Muslims,afterthisriot,willnotvoteforJats,nomatterwhichpoliticalpartythey
arefrom,evenifitisSP.Rightnow,therearetalksofmysongettingaticketfornext
electionsfromRLD,buttheMuslimsarenotreadyforthis.Theyaresuggestingitis
bettermysontakesaticketfromBSPratherthanLokDal.Thepainandbetrayalisquite
freshrightnow,MuslimswillnotvoteforanyJatthistime.(PersonalInterview,
September10,2015).
Hence,theseinterviewsprovethatvotebankpoliticshasincreasedandisdividedon
religiouslinesintheregion.MuslimsarenotreadytotrustanyrepresentativefromJat
communityandwanttosendtheirownrepresentativestotheparliament.Notgranted
anysafeguardintheConstitutiontocounterHindumajoritarianism,Muslimswillthus
havetovoteenbloctoclaimashareofpoliticalpower.
14
ManufacturedViolence–FracturedCommunity
Atseveralinstances,theintervieweesreferredtothe“recruitmentofparticipants”,
“provocativeactivities”andofotheractivitiesinvillagesbycertainHindunationalist
elementsdirectlyorindirectlyrelatedtotheBJP,inthedaysprecedingtheriots.
Forinstance,SajeevKumar,villageheadofvillageDulehrainMuzaffarnagar,nexttothe
twin-villageofKutba-Kutbithatwitnessedextensiveviolence,saysthatthegeneral
trendinvillagesisthattheofficeofapoliticalpartyisopenedafewmonthsbeforethe
electionsfortheelectoralcampaignintheregion.However,whilethenationalelections
wereduein2014,theBJPpartyofficeinMuzaffarnagarruralareaswasalreadyopen
andrunninginearly2013(PersonalInterview,October12,2015).Asimilarnarrative
wasprovidedbyGhulamMohammadJaula(PersonalInterview,September10,2015).
Further,MohammadIslamofLisadvillage,whowastheonlyMuslimtoreturntothe
villageaftertheriots,saysthatforthefirsttimeinhismemory,theShivSena,an
ultranationalistHindugroupwithitsbaseinthestateofMaharashtra,wasseen
campaigninganddistributingswordsinhisvillageafewmonthsbeforetheriots.Islam
said-
Some6-7monthsbeforetheriots,ShivSenahadaceremonyhere.Theywereusing
inflammatoryspeechagainstMuslimsontheloudspeaker.Thiswasthefirsttimethat
weheardsuchagatheringorsuchhatredonloudspeakeragainstus.Wecomplainedto
ourVillagePradhan[villagehead],andheagreedthatwhathappenedwasnotcorrect.
Theydistributedswordsaswell.(PersonalInterview,October13,2015).
MohammadKhalid,whowasafruitvendorinLisadbuthadtomovetothenearbytown
ofKandhlaafterhishouseandshopwereburntdownduringtheriots,alsoconfirmed
theaccountofShivSenadistributingswordsinthevillage(PersonalInterview,
September8,2015).
MangeKhanofKharadaccusedtheHindunationalistgroupsofdistributingalcoholand
moneyintheareatowinoverandrecruittheJatyouthsfortheriots.“Alcoholwas
distributedjustbeforetheriots.Alcoholsweredistributedinourvillageaswell.BJPalso
distributedmoney,”saidKhan(PersonalInterview,September10,2015).He
maintainedthatonlytherogueelementsofthevillage,thusrecruited,wereinvolvedin
theviolenceandmostoftheelderlyJatmenwerenot.Narratingsimilarincidencesof
activitiesbyShivSena,GhulamMohammadJaulasaid–“TheyouthsofJathavegonein
favourofBJP.AmitShah(aBJPleader)hasdistributedmoneyamongstthem.Jatelders
areveryworriedbytheirownsonsandtheviolencebecauseitcausedalotofwastage”
(PersonalInterview,September10,2015).
Althoughthesearehearsaynarrativesandcannotbefullyconfirmedordenied,the
presenceofsuchnarrativesmakesitclearthateveniftherewasnoinstitutionalisedriot
systeminMuzaffarnagarbefore,becausetherewerenoriotsbefore2013,thereisa
strongprobabilitythatHindunationalistforcesattemptedtoestablishsuchasystemin
theregionjustbeforetheriots.
Brasssaysthatprovocativeactivitiesareplannedbeforetheriots,andsuchactivities
requirefrequentrehearsalsuntilthetimeisripeforthemainevent(2004,p.4839).
Severalsuchprovocativeincidentswerereportedintheregion,whichconsequently
increasedthetensionbetweenthetwocommunities,foroversixmonthsbeforethe
actualriot.OnesuchmajorincidentwastheprotestledbyBJPMemberofParliament
HukumSinghinShamli.TheincidenthappenedinJune2013whenSinghwasamember
ofUttarPradeshlegislativeassembly.Themedia,byandlarge,reportedtheincidentas
thatofaprotestbyBJPleadersagainstthegangrapeofa.AsperthereportbyTheIndian
15
ExpressdatedJune18,2013,agirlwasgangrapedwhiletravellingfromUttarakhandto
Haryana.TheBJPleaderswereprotestingagainsttheincidentwhenSPAbdulHameed
orderedlathi-charge(useofbaton)onthem.Theprotesttookplacewhencurfew,
“prohibitingtheassemblyofpeople,hadbeenimposedinShamlicitysinceafternoon
after"minorclashes"witha"communaltinge"werereported.”Differentinterviewees
gavedifferentaccountsofthisprotest.Forinstance,VikrantBurman,alocalBSPactivist
inShamlidistrictsaidthattheBJPtriedtoblowtheissueofDalitcommunityintoa
Hindu-Muslimincident(PersonalInterview,September9,2015).MangeKhan,onthe
otherhand,calleditanincidentwhereBJPtriedtostokecommunaltension.“BJP
leadersSangeetSomandHukumSinghtriedtostokeviolenceinShamlijustbefore2013
riots.SPAbdulHameedstoppedit.Therewaslathi-charge,andBJPleadersgothurt.
Afterthat,on5thSeptember,therewasthemahapanchayat...BJPcandidatesand
peoplewerevisibleinMuzaffarnagarforayearorso,”saidKhan(PersonalInterview,
September10,2015).
AcompletelydifferentaccountispresentedbyRajeshMallik,sonofBabaHarkishanof
Lisadvillage.BabaHarkishanistheheadofGathwalaKhapintheregionandwas
accusedofviolenceinLisadandotherareasduringtheriot.Averyoldman,heis
respectedamongsttheJatsofGathwalaKhapandwasanactivevoiceduringtheriots,
alongwithhisson.TheyarealsoaccusedincasesofviolenceregisteredinLisadvillage.
Mallik,andanothermemberofJatcommunityfromLisad,Surpalwerepresentduring
theinterview.Surpalsaid–
SPAbdulHameedwaspostedinourdistrict.OuryoungerbrothersareValmikis(it’sa
lowercaste)asdefinedbyHinduhierarchy.Hameedmadeapublicstatementabouthis
religionandsaidthatfirst,heisaMuslimandthenheisaSuperintendentofPolice.He
madecommentsabouthiscommunity.Whencalamityhitouryoungerbrothers
(Valmikis),theywereputinjail,andtheirFIRswerealsonotlodged,allHindus,
includingRajputsandothercastes,neitherthroughBJPnorShivSena,butbytheirfree
will,cametogethertofightfortheirbrothers,theValmikis.Muslimshadattacked
Valmikisandhadbeatenthemupandsettheirhomesonfire.(PersonalInterview,
October13,2015).
RajendraMalliksupportedthisaccountbyclaimingthattheMuslimssetthehouseson
fireinfrontofHameed.
Asisclearfromtheaboveelaboration,whiletheaccountsoftheincidentsdiffer,itis
clearhowincidentsofcommunaltensionweretakingplacemuchbeforetheactualriot
ofSeptember2013,confirmingwithBrass’stheoryofIRS.
EffectsoftheRiotsonHindusandMuslims
RelationshipBetweenHindusandMuslimsbeforeRiots
Severaloftheinterviewees,whenaskedaboutrelationshipsbetweenHindusand
Muslimsbeforetheriots,claimedthattherelationswereverygood.MangeKhan,for
instance,saidthattheyusedtodojointfarmingofsugarcane,whereonepartofthefield
wascultivatedbyaMuslimfarmerandanotherbyaHindufarmer(PersonalInterview,
September10,2015).ZahidHussain,wholivesinShamli,alsoconfirmedthatthetwo
communitiessharedverycloserelationship.“Werememberthataschildren,weusedto
goseeRamLeela(aplayofRamayanacommonlystagedduringthefestivalof
Dashehra).Festivalswerecelebratedtogether,”saidHussain.Hefurthersaid-
Ihavemovedtotownbutmyparentsstillliveinthevillage.Jatsinmyvillagekeptmy
parentsintheirhouseforprotection(duringviolence),tookgoodcareofthem,gave
themfood,washedtheirclothes.Thesituationwassuchthatwewantedtobringour
16
parentstothetowntolivewithus,buttheJatwomenofourvillagewouldn’tletmy
parentsleavethevillage,becausetheycalledthemthecharmofthevillage.Theywould
saythatwewilltakecareofyourparents,cookandwashforthem,butwontletsthem
leave.(PersonalInterview,September9,2015).
ShaifAliSiddiquiofBawadi,Shamli,saysthathesharedcloserelationshipwithseveral
Hindusofhisvillage.“TherewereHindufriendsinvillage,whocouldnoteatmeatat
homeasmeatwasnotcookedintheirhomes.So,theywouldcometomyhousetoeat
meat,”saidSiddiqui.HerememberedthatduringtheBabrimosquedemolitionin1992,
therewasfearofattackonMuslimsandhewantedtoguardthemosqueinhisvillage,
lestsomeoneattacksanddemolishesit.“TwoelderJatmenofmyvillagecameandsent
ushome,sayingthattheywillguardthemosqueforusallnight.Andtheydid.Suchwas
ourrelationship,”saidSiddiqui.(PersonalInterview,September9,2015).
HindusandMuslimsusedtoparticipateincommonpanchayatsaswell.AbdulSattar,
whoisnowaresidentofMLACampinKairana,Shamli,acolonyestablishedforpeople
whowerelivinginreliefcampsafterfleeingfromtheirvillage,said-
Weusedtoparticipateinpanchayats.Whoeverneededtocallapanchayat,theycould
call,beitMuslimorHindu.Ineversawsuchalevelofviolenceandtensionbetweenthe
twocommunities.EvenforfightsbetweenJats,Muslimswereinvited.If,say,amatter
wasnotresolvedbythepanchayat,thenalargerpanchayatof36biradari(community)
wascalledtoresolvethematter,forMuslimsandforothercommunities.(Personal
Interview,September9,2015).
HidnusandMuslimssharedafinancialrelationshipinvillagesaswell.Invillageswhere
HinduJatswerelandowners,theyusedtogiveloantoMuslimsforallsocialpurposes.
Surpal,fromLisadvillage,said-
Therearetwotypesofemploymentintheseareas.Thefirstissugarcaneagriculture.
Thesecondisofbrickkiln.Labourersworkinbothkilnsandourfarms.Ouragriculture
dependsonlabourers(whoaremostlyMuslims).Whenthey(Muslims)neededmoney,
wegavethemloan.Thenweusedtokeepdeductingsomeamountfromtheirpayment
forfarmlabour.Thisishowthesystemworked....Wearedependentoneachother.
Theydependedonusformoney.Wewerethepeopleresponsibleforrunningthesocial
systeminthevillages,sowewereresponsiblefortheirwelfareaswell.Thatiswhywe
lendedthemmoneywheneverneeded.(PersonalInterview,October13,2015).
Hussainsaid–
Ihaveseeninmychildhoodthatiftherewasdroughtinaparticularyear,theHindus
usedtodosomeBhandarasandYagyas(worshippingforrain),andmyfatherandother
MuslimswoulddonatemoneyandcontributeintheYagyaforrain.EvenJatswouldsend
moneyforMuslimsinMosque.(PersonalInterview,September9,2015).
ChangeinRelationshipaftertheRiots
Evenafteralmosttwoyearsoftheriots,severalMuslimfamilieswholeftthevillagesare
notreadytoreturntotheirvillage.Withtherelocationgrantsfromthegovernment(Rs
500,000perfamily),theyhavebuilthousesinnearesttownarea,orneartheircamps.As
aresult,severalvillageslikeLisadandBaawadiinShamliandKutba-Kutbiin
Muzaffarnagar,havebecomeall-Hinduvillages,withnoMuslimfamilieslivinginthem
anymore.EventheMuslimswhoreturnedtotheirvillage,arereadytoselloftheirland
andpropertyinthesevillagesandsettlesomewhereelse.
Forinstance,MohammadIslamfromLisad,whoistheonlyMuslimtoreturntohis
villageaftertheriots,said–
Ireturnedbecausemyfatherwaskeenonreturning.Hedidnotlikeliveanywhereelse.
Hetalkstopeoplehere.Hewouldnotgoanywhereevenbeforetheriots,evenforfamily
visits.Hejustlikesbeinghere.[But]Ifriotshappenagain,wehavemadearrangements,
likeIhaveconstructedahouseinKairana.Icannotlivehereallaloneforever.There
17
werearound300housesofMuslimshereandnowIamtheonlyonelefthere.Wewill
livehereaslongaspossible,andthenImightsellmypropertyandleave.Ihave12-13
bighasoflandhere,andsomeotherproperties,whichIcouldnotsellimmediatelyafter
theriots.MyelderbrothersettlednearDelhinow.
MulaJatsinKharad,whohavesignificantpropertyintheirvillage,arealsonotfeeling
safetoliveintheirvillagesforlong.Dr.SharifofKharadsaidthatMuslimsintheir
regionareafraidaftertheviolenceof2013andwanttolivetogether,inghetoes,
separatedfromtheHindus.Hesaid-
WethinkthattherewillbeanautomaticpartitionbetweenHindusandMuslimsbecause
ofthefearandtheseevents.Bawadi,Lisad,Lankh,PhuganahavenoMuslimsleftinthe
villages.AndBJPwillgainfromthispartition.Becauseoftheseriots,Muslimshavegone
backatleast20yearsindevelopmentinthisregion.Noonewillbenefitfromthe
partitionapartfromBJPbutwhatcanwedo?Shouldwedie?Somesayweshouldhave
leftforPakistanwhentherewaspartition.(PersonalInterview,September10,2015).
TensionamongstHindusandMuslimsisperceivableintheseareas.Ghetoisationof
MuslimhomesisfurtheraggravatingtheprocessofalienationamongstMuslims.For
instance,thepeopleinterviewedinKharadclaimthattheynolongertalktoHindusin
theirvillage,orparticipateinthevillagepanchayats.
GhulamMohammadJaulagaveseveralaccountsofhostilityamongstthetwo
communitiesevenaftertheriotsended-
WearehearingalotofcaseslikeeveteasingofMuslimwomen,teasingofaMullahby
pullinghisbeardonabus.Sowhilethesituationiscalm,relationshavenotimproved
(betweenHindusandMuslims).Recently,inaRLDrallyaddressedbyChaudharyAjit
Singh,therewasverylowturnoutofMuslimsintherally....Theelderswerenever
interestedinthiskindoftensionandviolence.It’stheyouthwhoaremoreinvolvedin
theriots.Thecasesthatwerefiledwereduetothepressureofthecourt,inwhich
innocentpeopleweresenttojailfromboththeir(Hindu)sideaswellasourside.Many
whowereatfaultescapedfrombothsides....Bothcommunitieshavetoliveinthe
samecountry,itsbettertheyliveinpeace.Becausethisviolenceisharmingeveryone.
Farmershavefacedworseloss....Muslimshaveafeartodaythatthey(therioters)are
notevenconsideringMuslimsasIndians.Muslimsneedsupportrightnow…”(Personal
Interview,September10,2015).
HindusalsodonottrusttheMuslimsanymore.SurpalandRajendraSinghofLisadnow
fearthattheMuslimsarenotgoingtoreturntheirloans.“Inourvillage,thetotalloanon
Muslimswhichisnotpaidyetisaround3.5crorerupees.Similarsituationistherein
everyothervillagewhereMuslimshaveleft.Thatmoneywillnotreturnnow.Ifthey
livedinvillage,theycouldhavereturned.Butnowitdoesnotseemso,”saidSingh,
addingthatatotalof102FIRandsome400peoplearenamedinLisadaloneandthat
mostoftheseFIRswerefalseandtheMuslimswereusingtheseFIRstoblackmailthe
HindusandarereadytosettlethesecasesiftheHindusgivemoneyassettlement
(PersonalInterview,October13,2015).
PoliticalOutcomes
AsisclearlyevidentfromthecasestudyofMuzaffarnagarandShamli,relationships
betweenHindusandMuslimschangedovertheperiodoftime.Identitieschangedfrom
activefarmerstoreligiouscommunitymemberlikeHindusandMuslimsandthe
politicalexploitationofsuchdivisionledtotheriots,withoneparticularpoliticalparty,
theBJP,benefittingextensivelyfromsuchpolarisation.AsGhulamMohammadJaula
pointedourquitecorrectlyinhisinterview,
TobreakthewesternUttarPradesh,BJPreallyneededtotakeJatsunderitswing
becauseJatsinfluencethevotesofJhimars,Chamars,Rajputsetcofthevillage.They
18
createdtheatmosphereoftensionforthelastoneyear,whereMuslimsweretargeted.
ThiswasallinreactiontoMulayamSinghYadav’sgovernmentpoliciesforMuslims.The
BJPstartedsayingthatthisgovernmentisonlyforMuslimstoinstigatedivision.
(PersonalInterview,September10,2015).
Aftertheriots,intheparliamentaryelectionsof2014,BJPwonaclearmajorityof281
seatsintheparliament.InUttarPradesh,thepartywon71ofthe80parliamentary
seats,givingitsbestperformanceinthestateever.
Hence,toanswerthefinalsubsidiaryresearchquestion-‘Doestheinteractionbetween
the‘secular’and‘post-secular’featureoftheConstitutionresultinpoliticisedidentity
formationleadingtocommunalclash?’–thecasestudyofMuzaffarnagarandShamli
presentaclearexampleofhowpoliciesforminoritycommunitiesbythegovernment
becomesafactorintransforming‘secular’identitylikethatoffarmersintoreligious
politicalidentityofHinduandMuslim.Itneedstobeclarifiedherethattherearevarious
factorsthatleadtocommunalisminIndia,andsuchpost-secularfeaturesoftheIndian
Constitutionbecomeoneofthosemanyfactorsthatleadtocommunalclash.
Conclusion
Thepoliticsofreducingpeopletopre-assignedcategoriesormarkers,liketheir
religiousaffiliationortheirgender,aggrevatesthethreatstohumansecurity.Such
categoriesareeasilytranscendedintobecomingmodernidentities.Fromthecasestudy
presentedhere,itcanbededucedthat,inspiteofsharingahealthysocialandcultural
spaceandbeinginterdependentoneachotherforeconomicwellbeing,theresidentsof
Muzaffarnagar-ShamlidistrictwerereducedtothepoliticalcategoryofHindusand
Muslimsin2013riots.ThevictimsoftheseriotswerepredominantyMuslims,targeted
fortheirreligiousaffiliationinspiteofthefactthattheyhadnothingtodowiththeclash
betweentheyouthsinKawalvillageofMuzaffarnagar.Muslimsisthecategorythatis
considered‘minority’inpoliticallanguageofIndia,owingtotheirnumericalstrength
beinglessascomparedtothe‘Hindus’inIndia.Thecategoryof‘Muslim’thusceasesto
denoteonlyreligiousaffiliationsandendsupbecomingamarkerforidentitybasedon
lowestcommondenominationofareligion.Italsoendsupbecomingapoliticalmarker
andasourceofhumaninsecurityforthepeoplefollowingaparticularreligion.Theright
wingBJP–whichbasesitspoliticsonHindumajoritarianism–wonthe2014
parliamentaryelectionswithflyingcoloursimmediatelyaftertheriotsof2013,which
provesthatpolarisationofsuchpoliticisedidentitieshasleverageintheracefor
politicalpower.Inanidealmodelofmajoritariandemocracy,‘majority’,inprinciple,is
expectedtoberandomandprotem,readytochangeatthenextvote.However,the
majorityassociatedwiththeenumerationoftheethnoreligiouscategories,havea
permanencyandinthemodernpoliticaldemocracy,such‘majority’formationscan
provehazardousnotonlyforthesocietybutalsofortheverysurvivalofidealpolitical
democracy.Suchcategorisationof‘majority’and‘minority’becomesaseverethreatto
humansecurityofthegrouporcategorythatismarginalised,asincaseofMuslimsin
India,wholosetheirlives,sourceoflivelihoodaswellasfaceconstantchallengetotheir
righttodignity.
ThecaseofMuslimsinMuzaffarnagarandShamliisnotverydifferentfromthe
conditionofMuslimsacrossIndia,whohavebeensubjectedtoviolenceacrossthe
countryonvariouscountsofcommunalviolence.Plethoraofevidenceisavailableon
socio-economicbackwardnessofMuslimsinIndia,andtheirexposuretoperiodic
19
violencenotonlythreatenstheirrighttolivein“freedomfromfear”butalsoaggravates
thechallengestotheir“freedomfromwant”.Harassmentinsocialspacesbecauseof
prevalentprejudicesensuingfromincidentswherethecrimeofoneMuslimisextended
tobecometheonusofallwhobelongtothereligionalsochallengestheirrighttolive
withdignity.
Thus,thepoliticsofcategories,theidentityformationitensuesandthepoliticisationof
suchidentitiescanbeacauseofgravehumaninsecurities,challengingtheparadigmof
HumanSecurityatallthreelevels–thefreedomfromfear,freedomfromwant,and
freedomtoliveindignity.
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