Volume 6 | Issue 1 | Number 0 | Jan 01, 2008
The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus
Reconciling Japan and China
Mel Gurtov
issues in dispute are well known and are
Reconciling Japan and China *
therefore not the primary subject of this paper.
Instead, the aim here is to explore areas of
Mel Gurtov
potential cooperation that may ease tension and
eventually lead to reconciliation.
Abstract: The conflict-resolution literature offers
new insights to reconciling parties in conflict.
This aim, almost needless to say, is more easily
This article applies that literature, along with
written about than accomplished in fact.
political-science approaches, to the seemingly
Intractable conflicts by their nature acquire a life
intractable China-Japan rivalry. Proceeding from
of their own; the longer they go on, the more
the standpoint that China and Japan need one
vested in conflict do the parties become. In the
another, and should manage their conflict for
case of China and Japan, moreover, history
mutual benefit, the article suggests several steps
envenoms the relationship to an extraordinary
they may take—bilaterally, in multilateral
degree, infecting both high-level dialogue and
settings, and in civil society—to reduce tensions
public opinion. Official rhetoric about the
and promote better understanding.
importance of Sino-Japanese peace and
cooperation notwithstanding, in the public arena
A Framework for Transforming Sino-Japanese
it is rare to find groups or individuals speaking
Conflict
out on behalf of reconciliation, even when (as in
the case of business leaders, for instance) they
China-Japan relations constitute a long-running,
benefit from it. In fact, influential people in both
dangerous, and seemingly intractable conflict.
countries have been attacked for advocating
The relations are not immune to positive change,
reconciliation. Governments always devote more
but they are constantly vulnerable to
resources to conflict than to conflict resolution.
backtracking and intensification of rivalry. Both
kinds of changes have occurred since
Because China-Japan conflict operates at so many
normalization of relations in the early 1970s. The
levels—it is at once structural, societal,
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psychological, and of course political—any effort
This paper contends that to travel that road, the
to move it toward reconciliation needs to look at
appropriate starting point is not continuing
both policiesand processes
. Moreover, we should
debate over grievances but practical steps that
be audacious in thinking of reconciliation as
serve common interests. There is a school of
involving something more than “simple
thought that argues that until Japan fully
coexistence.” As David Crocker has written with
acknowledges its past transgressions against
respect to warring parties, reconciliation is a
China and, like post-war Germany, makes
healing process:
apologies and amends, no progress is possible.
But such an approach may add to the problem of
conflict resolution. Dealing with the proximate
In the most minimal account . . .
causes of conflict is often more productive than
reconciliation is nothing more than
attempting to resolve past grievances. As we
“simple coexistence” in the sense
have seen many times in the China-Japan case,
that former enemies comply with
whenever Japanese politicians reopen the
the law instead of killing each other.
wounds of war, they invite a Chinese response,
Although this modus vivendiis
thus feeding competitive nationalisms and
certainly better than violent conflict,
pushing the history issue to center
transitional societies . . . should aim
stage—precisely where it should not be.[3]
for more . . . Among other things,
History is better off being shelved until such time
this implies a willingness to hear
as a sense of true partnership emerges—that is,
each other out, to enter into give-
when concerted cooperation occurs over a
and-take about matters of public
lengthy period. Only then, when mutual trust is
policy, to build on areas of common
implicit because of habitual dialogue and policies
concern, and to forge principled
that serve common interests, is reconciliation
compromises with which all can
possible and apologizing politically feasible.
live. The process, so conceived, may
help to prevent a society from
lapsing back into violence as a way
to resolve conflict.[1]
Yet, if transformationof the parties is the ultimate
goal of reconciliation,[2] there is a long road to
travel when it comes to China and Japan.
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politics of identity (nationalism in
particular).
Analyses grounded in political science, however,
are insufficient when it comes to reconciling
states and societies in conflict. For one thing, they
have a strong tendency to fish for trouble: They
mainly seek to identify the causes and
consequences of conflict rather than focus on
preventing, managing, and resolving conflict.[4]
For another, they are in sharp disagreement with
one another on basic premises. Realist analysis
typically sees China-Japan rivalry as an enduring
Premier Fukuda Yasuo (right) meets Prime
feature of the East Asian strategic landscape, and
Minister Wen Jiabao in Beijing
discounts economic engagement as likely
contributing to China’s military as well as
For reconciliation to happen, the tools of both
economic superiority. Constructivists often point
political science and conflict resolution need to be
to nationalism and history as being able to
used. Most analysts favor one or more of the
overwhelm any common ground Chinese and
three now-standard approaches in political
Japanese diplomats may find. The Liberals’
science:
response—that strong business ties, coupled with
China’s deepening involvement in Asian
• Liberalism: the role of multilateral
multilateral groups, will diminish rivalry and
regimes and commercial ties in
promote further cooperation with Japan—is
promoting
appealing but not easily testable. On one hand,
irreversible
interdependence;
business ties have grown in spite of disputes over
• Realism: the impact of power
history and territory; but on the other, those
differentials and power transitions
disputes have persisted. Moreover, strong
on policy making;
economic relations sometimes create new
• Constructivism: addressing issues
disagreements of their own, such as over
pertaining
technology transfers, trade imbalances, and
to
cultural
and
development assistance.[5]
psychological differences, and the
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If scholars are to contribute to China-Japan
civil society, must weigh in any usable approach
reconciliation, as I believe they should, they will
to conflict management.[7] Of cardinal
need to dig deeper into the tool box and exploit
importance, as stressed below, is the widespread
the conflict-resolution literature. Three areas
understanding that each leadership and society
seem particularly pertinent:
must come to about the virtues of their mutual
dependence, as a source of common prosperity
and as a restraint on nationalistic outbursts.
• Dialogue: focus on the legitimacy
of the parties, the diversity of
Problems
formats for discussions, and the
• Engagement: techniques, such as
Conflict
In this paper I elaborate on the contribution and
use of positive incentives, for
piece together a menu that might be seized upon
bringing parties to the table or
by Chinese and Japanese at various levels to
otherwise making contact;
design a new relationship with each other. These
• Confidence building
: the use of
diplomacy
Sino-Japanese
Management
process of “getting to yes”;
preventive
of
ideas are essentially building blocks, in which
and
synergy and consistency rather than a carefully
transparency to build trust.
calibrated strategy is the key. The essential
argument is that peaceful, cooperative relations
The vantage point of conflict resolution is its
are in China’s and Japan’s (not to mention the
focus on establishing greater trust, widening
United States’ and everyone else’s) best interest,
common ground, and managing differences
and that there is a high and increasing price to be
between disputants. Rivalry is not treated as
paid for indifference to the consequences of
unalterable, nor is one side to a dispute assumed
ongoing rivalry—among which is a new cold war
(for purposes of a settlement) to bear greater
in Asia.
responsibility than the other. Approaches to
resolving conflicts and reconciliation must take
Managing Sino-Japanese differences presents a
place at several different levels, from the
number of special problems, however. One is
personal to the regional and global.[6] Of central
that neither Beijing nor Tokyo seeks an honest
importance, and often neglected, is the domestic
broker who might mediate the conflict. Another
political element. In the case of China and Japan,
is the lack of self-criticism in each society, hence
the roles of powerful bureaucracies, parties, and
also the seeming inability of each to establish a
political leaders, as well as of public opinion and
new domestic consensus regarding the other
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party. Third is that neither of the multilateral
break, and would give a breakdown of its
forums to which Japan and China belong—Asia-
military budget.[9] But these two steps were
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the
undermined when Japan’s navy joined U.S.,
various offshoots of the Association of Southeast
Indian, and Australian ships in war games, part
Asian Nations (ASEAN)—has the capacity or the
of a major security initiative under Abe to
authority to act preventively or as conciliator in
become a strategic partner with Australia and
the dispute. Nor does Northeast Asia, unlike
other states with “democratic values.”[10]
Southeast Asia, have a security dialogue
mechanism that the two countries might use to
One other formidable obstacle in the path of
discuss their disputes.
China-Japan reconciliation is the United States.
Positive U.S.-China relations are central to the
Fourth is the asymmetry of Japanese and Chinese
resolution of most of East Asia’s security issues.
power. While much is made these days of the fact
But while the United States and China have
that the two countries, for the first time in their
found common ground lately in a number of
modern history, are simultaneously strong, their
policy arenas, such as terrorism and nuclear
strengths lie in different areas. Fifth, is the
nonproliferation, Japan and China have not. In
consistent inconsistency of China-Japan dialogue.
the eyes of many Chinese specialists, U.S.
It seems that every positive step is quickly
partiality to Japan is a major reason why.[11]
undermined by a negative one—sometimes
Their argument is that Japan’s deployments in
deliberately, one suspects. One recent example is
the Middle East, its enhanced military firepower,
when Koizumi expressed “deep remorse” to Hu
its interest in constitutional revision, its strategic
Jintao in April 2005 for Japan’s aggression in
partnership with Australia, and its revival of
China. Hu accepted; but once Koizumi
national spirit have all come at the behest of the
announced in Japan that he would visit the
United States and thus have the appearance of
Yasukuni Shrine, all the goodwill dissipated.[8]
balance-of-power politics directed at China. Yet,
A second such instance occurred following
as one Chinese specialist on Japan has admitted,
Chinese defense minister Cao Gangchuan’s visit
Beijing must choose between the lesser of two
to Japan in August 2007. It was the first such
evils:
military exchange in nearly ten years, and it may
lead to the setting up of a hotline. Thereafter,
China’s foreign ministry informed the UN
The Chinese academic community is
secretary general that it would resume reporting
somewhat conflicted about the
of arms exports and imports after a decade-long
fu¬ture of the U.S.-Japanese alliance.
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On one hand, although it does not
revealed the secretiveness of the military even
expect the alliance to become
within
stronger, an invigorated U.S.-
ranks[13]—Japanese leaders will justify
Japanese alliance may join hands
countermeasures, such as increases in military
against China. On the other hand, a
spending and force acquisitions, and revision of
looser U.S.-Japanese alliance may
Article 9 of the constitution.
China’s
own
bureaucratic
lead to its ultimate collapse, leaving
Accenting the Positive
a Tokyo unbound by Washington. It
remains uncertain whether an
Up until now, the official bilateral level has been
independent Japan would employ a
the locus of most discussions of problem areas in
friendly China policy. The direction
China-Japan relations. There is a positive side to
and future of the alliance, however,
this reality, however. First, Japanese and Chinese
is ultimately up to Washington and
leaders have embraced East Asian regionalism, at
Tokyo.[12]
least in terms of deepening economic integration
and
The Costs of Avoidance
joint
consultations
(mainly
in
ASEAN+3);[14] and they along with all the other
key actors in Northeast Asia have also accepted
A serious potential consequence of the
the idea of creating a regional dialogue
continuing rift is that a new cold war will break
mechanism for dispute resolution.[15] Second, as
out in East Asia. The longer the rift simmers, the
discussed further below, Prime Minister Abe
more likely it is that the so-called security
Shinzo’s trip to China and South Korea soon after
dilemma will come to pass. While Japan has
succeeding Koizumi Junichiro in October 2006,
extended its security ties, Beijing is busy
and the reassurances to China of his successor,
cultivating its own alignments: the Shanghai
Fukuda Yasuo, may open the door to further and
Cooperation Organization, ASEAN+3, and
more concrete dialogue. Third, the high and
Russia. As China’s military modernization
growing degree of economic interdependence
proceeds and issues of transparency go
between Japan and China—in trade, direct
unresolved—the 17.8 percent boost in military
investment, and official development assistance
spending announced in 2007 represented the
(ODA)—remains the crucial asset for preventing
seventeenth year in the last eighteen in which a
open conflict.
spending increase reached double digits; and
China’s ASAT test in January 2007 may have
Viewed from the perspective of conflict
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management, moreover, another source of
optimism is that the same issues that divide the
two countries and peoples may be turned into
arenas of cooperation.
Why do Chinese and Japanese leaders eye each
other so warily? The reasons are easy enough to
list: geographic propinquity, historical animosity,
unequal power, concern about alliance
relationships. All these concerns can be turned
Fortunately, in recent times the China-Japan
around, however, so that the key issue becomes
relationship has not been all about competition
not sources of endless rivalry but ways in which
and heated words. In October 2006, on the
China and Japan need one another. For indeed
occasion of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s official
they do—such as to control environmental
visit to the PRC, the two sides proclaimed that
destruction, to promote China’s “peaceful rise” in
they would “strive to build a mutually beneficial
ways conducive to both domestic and
relationship based on common strategic interests
international stability, to restrain military
. . . ” “Contact and dialogue,” including
growth, and to sustain regional political and
“frequent” talks between the top leaders, would
economic stability. Such mutual dependence
take place. Explicit references were made to four
helps neutralize potentially aggressive forms of
areas of cooperation: the East China Sea
nationalism. Thus, rather than interpret China-
negotiations, “Japan-China security dialogue,”
Japan relations exclusively in terms of
ASEAN+3, and the Six-Party Talks. Last, Japan
competition for influence, we might think about
and China promised to “strengthen mutually
the significant opportunity costs that occur as the
beneficial cooperation particularly in the areas of
result of China-Japan friction.[16]
energy, environmental protection, finance,
information and communication technology, and
protection of intellectual property.”[17] Then, in
April 2007 Prime Minister Wen Jiabao returned
Abe’s visit and won great applause with a
speech, “For Friendship and Cooperation,”
before the Japanese Diet. As he had in the past,
Wen stressed looking ahead rather than
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backward, common development, and “seeking
Japan-China relations have had their best
agreement while minimizing differences”
moments when dialogue has focused on
(qiutong cunyi). Mention was again made of
functional areas such as those mentioned in the
energy and environmental cooperation.[18]
joint statement on military, economic,
environmental, and other concrete subjects. Still,
Some specific follow-ups to those promises have
one wonders how much wider and deeper
since emerged. First, Prime Minister Fukuda
cooperation might be if dialogue were more
immediately proclaimed interest in improving
culturally informed. How does dialogue actually
China-Japan as well as Japan-Korea relations,
take place between Japanese and Chinese
starting with the assurance that he would not
officials,
visit the Yasukuni Shrine for war dead. On
environmental and energy experts? Are there
visiting China in December 2007, following a
missing ingredients that reduce the opportunities
visit to the United States, Fukuda (like Abe)
for creating greater trust, such as mutual respect
again stressed mutual interest.[19] Second, the
and acceptance of the other’s legitimacy?
two governments reportedly reached a basic
Intercultural research has shown that
understanding on global warming, with Japan
insensitivity in international relationships can be
agreeing to provide China with technological
a major contributor to tensions, or can limit
assistance to help cut greenhouse gas
progress in dialogue.[23] Likewise, the choice of
emissions.[20] Third, on the military side, the
format, procedures, and participants in
Chinese missile destroyer Shenzhenvisited Tokyo
international dialogue may also have much to do
Bay in November 2007, with a Japanese return
with outcomes.[24]
journalists,
historians,
and
visit scheduled for sometime later.[21] Fourth,
the first China-Japan High-Level Economic
Reconciling:
Dialogue was held in December 2007. China’s
Resources [25]
Potential
Avenues
and
delegation leader spoke of how trade with Japan
was of mutual benefit: “China’s development is
Tracks I, II, III Options at Three Levels
not a threat to Japan but an opportunity, and
Japan’s development is advantageous for China’s
Below I consider just a few possible steps on
uninterrupted economic progress.”[22]
three
tracks—governmental,
mixed
governmental and nongovernmental, and
The restoration of high-level diplomacy was in
popular (civil society)—and at three levels:
itself an important act, and the promises made as
unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral. Track I
the result of Abe’s visit were all to the good.
consists of official declarations, confidence8
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building measures (CBMs), and negotiations.
coincide—the well-known win-win approach.[26]
Track II includes activities such as workshops,
conferences, and other gatherings that bring
• Regularization of High-Level
together NGOs, business, parliamentary, and
Diplomacy (Track I, Bilateral)
other officials speaking in their private capacity.
Now that direct dialogue has
Track III activities are entirely in the public (civil-
resumed, Chinese and Japanese
society) domain—e.g., professional and popular
leaders should pledge to make it a
associations, media and labor groups, and
regular occurrence. In addition, they
businesses.
should issue a new joint statement
of friendship and cooperation to
Unilateral Stepsare those that either of the parties,
upgrade both the sentiment and the
or an important outside party such as the United
functionality of the 1998 joint
States, might take to reduce tensions. These
declaration. A counterpart of such
include policy initiatives such as statements of
diplomacy might be creation of a
noninterference, arms reductions, and apologies
prevention-focused bilateral group
for past conduct. Bilateral Stepsare those the
to provide advance notification (for
parties take together, such as joint research,
instance) of troop or ship
environmental cooperation, and energy
movements, somewhat like the
development, as well as pledges and statements
Organization for Security and
of principle. Multilateral Stepsbring the parties
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
together in larger cooperative networks, such as
regional and global organizations devoted to
security dialogue, energy, arms transparency,
• Mutual Appreciation (Track
labor, health epidemics, and other transnational
I/Unilateral and Track II)
Chinese government, media and
issues.
other institutions (including schools)
The steps I have chosen may not stand much
can contribute to a positive
chance of being implemented any time soon, but
atmosphere
each one may generate the kind of goodwill and
appreciation
trust that will lead to other positive steps. Thus, I
contributions to China’s economic
have stepped around issues of historical
rise. Some Chinese commentators
grievance, which are the most difficult to
agree that China has been lax in this
address, in favor of those where mutual interests
regard.[27] Japan has been very
9
by
expressing
for
Japan’s
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generous with yen loans, for
Jiang Zemin, because the Japanese
example—over $14 billion from 1990
side failed to provide an apology for
to 2005 alone—and has directly
the past, unlike in the Japan-ROK
invested over $51 billion in the same
joint declaration that had been
period.[28] Although expressions of
concluded the previous month; and
appreciation have been made from
Obuchi Keizo, because of Jiang’s
time to time, they have often been
immoderate criticisms of Japan. The
diluted by bitter reminders of the
China-ROK agreement, and the
past and suggestions that Japanese
Sino-Indian joint declaration of
business has also benefited from the
November 2006, are models of
aid and investments.[29] The
forward-looking statements: They
Japanese side therefore has an
specify areas of actual and potential
obligation too: to acknowledge the
cooperation, as well as the agencies
benefits it has received, and to
that will undertake it; they assign
consider new ways to contribute to
roles for specialists; and they stress
China’s development, such as an
mutual involvement in regional and
extension
environmental
global activities. These functional
protection programs when ODA
areas are framed with rhetoric
ends in 2008.[30]
suggesting positive intentions
of
toward the other party: India and
• Affirmations of Good Intentions
China
“are
not
(Track I, Bilateral)
competitors” but rather have a
Although words can never replace
“strategic
deeds, professions of friendly
partnership,” says the joint
intentions and mutual respect,
declaration.[31] It therefore might be
apologies for past conduct, and a
time for China and Japan to
positive common vision of future
renegotiate or update the 1998
relations do serve good purposes. A
agreement, with a new spirit of
negative example to demonstrate
cooperation and attentiveness to
the point is the November 1998
specific areas of cooperation.
and
rivals
or
cooperative
China-Japan joint declaration of
friendship and cooperation, which
• Creating a Northeast Asia Security
left both leaderships very upset:
Dialogue Mechanism (Track I,
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Multilateral)
bilateral “security consultations”
All the recent agreements reached
since 1994, provide positive
during Six Party Talks on North
reference points and building blocks
Korea—the September 2005 joint
for
statement of principles and the
mechanism.[34]
a
regional
dialogue
agreements of February and October
2007—held out the prospect of a
• Putting Balance into U.S. Policy
[35]
multiparty security forum that
As two knowledgeable experts have
might evolve from the Talks and the
argued, the United States has a large
establishment of a “permanent
stake in a moderation of China-
peace regime” on the Korean
Japan relations. If U.S. policy
peninsula.
Although
continues to promote “normal
implementation of each party’s
nation” status for Japan in ways that
commitments remains to be seen,
seem to China to amount to
preliminary discussion of the scope
containment, a new cold war in Asia
and organizing principles for a
might result, with the two countries
dialogue mechanism could begin
engaged in arms racing, forcing
now. A dialogue mechanism would
other countries (notably in ASEAN)
provide China and Japan with an
to take sides. Rather than promote
opportunity to work together on
an
any number of common security
international security role and
issues, such as their long-running
sound alarm bells about China’s
dispute in the East China Sea,[32]
military modernization, the United
security guarantees for the Korean
States
peninsula, and a Northeast Asia
unambiguous
nuclear-weapon-free zone.[33] The
worsening Sino-Japanese relations
common forum would also provide
and exert its considerable influence
an institutional basis for greater
with both Tokyo and Beijing to
transparency in military affairs, such
establish a cooling-off period.”[36]
as
and
One major Japanese newspaper,
deployments. The Japan-China
worried about a new cold war in
Fisheries Agreement that went into
Asia, offered several concrete
force in June 2002, and ongoing
suggestions, all of which require
arms
acquisitions
11
expansion
“should
of
Japan’s
declare
its
opposition
to
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U.S. support in multilateral settings:
have feared in the past but that
creating a Northeast Asia security
Chinese analysts themselves do not
“entity” (such as the security
demand.[38] What they want, and
dialogue mechanism discussed
what is surely in Japan’s interest as
above), convening regular U.S.-
well, is cooperativeness in U.S.-China
Japan-PRC summits, and obtaining
relations, which is vital to East Asia’s
U.S. and Chinese signatures on a
future. For history shows that when
protocol to the Treaty on the
their relations are cooperative,
Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-
difficult regional issues can be dealt
with effectively, as the Six Party
Free Zone (the Treaty of Bangkok)
Talks on North Korea have
that bans the use of nuclear
abundantly demonstrated.[39] Japan
weapons.[37] Other ways the United
may well need to hedge against a
States can help improve Japan-
rising China, but it should not be
China relations are by moderating
perceived as seeking to contain it.
Japanese expressions of a security
U.S. and Japanese policies would do
interest in Taiwan (contained in the
better to focus on seeing that
“2+2” joint U.S.-Japan statement of
China’s modernization proceeds
February 2005), not supporting
along environmentally sustainable
constitutional revision of Article 9,
lines.[40]
and not calling upon Japan’s
military in support of U.S.
• Track II Gatherings
collective-security missions far from
Apart from high-level diplomacy,
Japan, and inviting China to take
Chinese and Japanese media,
part in the trilateral security talks
business, academic, and scientific
that take place between Japan, the
circles have much that they could
United States, and South Korea.
explore with each other. A gathering
All these policy changes can be
of such specialists, drawn from
taken with assurances to Japan that
private and public institutions,
the security alliance remains strong
might promote mutual
and that the United States is not
understanding, reduce stereotyping,
moving to a “pro-China”
and change popular opinion in both
policy—shifts that Japanese leaders
countries. For example, a scientific
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meeting might be arranged to come
sometimes said to have been a target
up with initiatives on global
of the April 2005 demonstrations
warming and energy cooperation, or
against a permanent Japanese seat
a joint plan for dealing with
on the UN Security Council for not
transboundary pollution.[41] A joint
being as tough with Japan as Jiang
East Asia television history project is
Zemin had been; and the China
a second example, following on
hands in Japan’s foreign ministry
publication in 2006 of a joint
have often been criticized in the
Chinese-Japanese-Korean history
Japanese press for being too “pro-
text. Track II gatherings might also
China.” At the popular level, the
encourage particular groups to
problem is more complex. In
lobby their governments for
China’s case, anti-Japanese
improvements in China-Japan
nationalism clearly has grassroots
relations—as Japanese business
dimensions; the fact that the 2005
groups have already done on the
protests were driven by the Internet
Yasukuni issue. The two
showed that new reality very
governments might convene an
plainly. But official approval of anti-
eminent persons group to advise on
Japanese feelings (so long as they do
solutions to specific issues in
not get out of control) is just as
dispute.[42]
clearly involved, not only in popular
demonstrations but also in the
• Track III – Civil Society and People-
“patriotic education campaigns”
to-People Exchanges
carried on numerous television
Improving mutual perceptions and
stations. Japan has its counterparts
counteracting distorted imagery
when it comes to playing to or
require remedies at the grassroots
promoting anti-Chinese feelings.
level as well as among political
Japanese courts consistently reject
leaders. For policy makers,
suits that challenge officially
nationalism is a two-edged sword; if
sanctioned history textbooks and
they appear to be going against it,
ask for compensation for Chinese
they face domestic opposition to
(and all other) war victims;
“softness” when dealing with the
revisionist historiography still has
enemy. Thus, Hu Jintao is
an audience (and is rarely criticized
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by public officials); the arch-
scholarly panels to reevaluate
conservative Sankei Newsand
historical sources of grievance has
popular comic books often depict
already occurred twice, in the first
China in the most evil terms.[43]
instance (in 2005) ending with the
production of a joint textbook in
Civil society, though nascent in
Chinese, Japanese, and Korean. Such
China and still rather weak in Japan,
scholarly gatherings should be
needs to be encouraged to explore,
regularized.
systematically and practically, how
Chinese and Japanese can learn at
If some of the above ideas are implemented, they
least to be more accepting of one
may lead to other positive developments.[48] For
another. At least one study of
example, China might support a Japanese seat on
Japanese NGOs in China—which
the UN Security Council. The two countries
are far more numerous there than in
might find agreement on the purposes and
any other country—suggests that
membership of the East Asian Community.
they can be very effective people-to-
Suspicions about the force modernizations of
people diplomats, particularly in the
their militaries might abate as new CBMs are
environmental field.[44] Yomiuri’s
devised. They might establish a standing crisis-
reevaluation of Japan’s war
management body. Private groups might be
responsibility exemplifies what the
mass media can do to dispose of
prevented by their governments from interfering
historical myths.[45] Yomiuriand its
in territorial disputes. In the end, China and
liberal newspaper counterpart, Asahi
Japan must reach the point of recognizing that
Shimbun, might co-sponsor a media
security for one is really security for the
summit with their Chinese
other—just as happened between the United
counterparts on ways to avoid
States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War,
stereotyping and report objectively
and as the previous two South Korean
on events in the other country.[46]
governments decided in seeking to engage the
The editors of these two newspapers
North.
have already joined in calling for
building a secular war memorial to
replace the Yasukuni Shrine.[47] In
Mel Gurtov is Professor of Political Science and
academia, the appointment of
International Studies in the Hatfield School of
14
6|1|0
APJ | JF
Government, Portland State University, and Editor-comfort women. Instead of simply indicating that
in-Chief of Asian Perspective. His most recent books
he had no intention to change the Japanese
are Superpower on Crusade: The Bush Doctrine in USstatement of 1993, issued in the name of the chief
Foreign
P o l i c y cabinet secretary, that blamed the army for the
(http://www.amazon.com/Superpower-Crusade-Doctr
forcible seizure of women in occupied lands to
ine-Foreign-
serve as sex slaves, Abe, while expressing
Policy/dp/1588264076/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&s
sympathy for the women, said that in his opinion
=books&qid=1199582615&sr=8-1)
and Global Politics the army’s role was unproven. He thus found
in
the
Human
I n t e r e s t himself in the same bed with the former
(http://www.amazon.com/Global-Politics-Human-Inte
education minister, Nakayama Nariaki, who
rest-5th/dp/158826484X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=boboasted about how he and other LDP members
oks&qid=1199582665&sr=1-1), both available from had kept mention of the comfort women and the
Lynne Rienner Publishers (www.rienner.com). He
army’s role in their recruitment out of school
may be reached at [email protected].
texts. These unfortunate words lend legitimacy to
the Chinese view, expressed by one prominent
Written for Japan Focus and posted on January 5,Chinese scholar, that historical issues (in this
2008.
case, the Yasukuni Shrine) have “become a main
or perhaps even the only obstacle to Sino-
Notes
Japanese engagement and cooperation at the
moment, like a fish bone stuck in the throat. Only
* Prepared for presentation at the International
if this problem is appropriately resolved will
Studies Association Annual Convention, San
China further discuss po¬tential cooperation
Francisco, California, March 28, 2008.
programs with Japan and specify its policy on
[1] David Crocker, “Reckoning with Past
Japan’s role in international and regional
Wrongs: A Normative Framework,” Ethics and
security.” Yang Bojiang, “Redefining Sino-
International Affairs, vol. 13 (1999), pp. 43-64.
Japanese Relations After Koizumi,” Washington
[2] On transforming the relationship between
Quarterly, vol. 29, No. 4 (Autumn, 2006), p. 131.
disputing parties, see Louis Kriesberg,
[4] Of course there are exceptions. See, e.g., Kent
Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to
E. Calder, “China and Japan’s Simmering
Resolution, 2d ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman &
Rivalry,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, No. 2 (March-
Littlefield, 2003).
April, 2006), pp. 129-39.
[3] A recent example occurred in 2007 when
[5] On the political uses of Japan’s ODA, see
Prime Minister Abe reopened the issue of the
Tsukasa Takamine, “A New Dynamism in Sino15
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APJ | JF
Japanese Security Relations: Japan’s Strategic Use
declaration should be seen in the context of
of Foreign Aid,” The Pacific Review, vol. 18, no. 4
Japan’s “values diplomacy,” the brainchild of
(December, 2005), pp. 439-61.
Foreign Minister Aso Taro in a speech in late
[6] Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts, p. 329.
2006 on a democratic alliance of Japan with other
[7] See Reinhard Drifte, “Engagement Japanese
states—though not South Korea, interestingly.
Style,” Chinese-Japanese Relations in the
When Abe visited India the following August, he
Twenty-first Century: Complementarity and
referred to an “expanded Asia”—Japan, the
conflict. (Routledge: New York, 2002), p. 53. See
United States, Australia, and India—marked by
also Murata Koji, “Domestic Sources of Japanese
shared democratic values and strategic interests.
Policy towards China,” in Lam Peng Er, ed.,
“Abe: Japan, India United by Values,” Asahi
Japan’s Relations with China: Facing a Rising
Shimbun (http://www.asahi.com), August 23,
Power (Routledge: London, 2006), p. 39.
2007.
[8] See Tok Sow Keat, “Neither Friends Nor Foes:
[11] See also Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for
China’s Dilemmas in Managing Its Japan Policy,”
Stability with America,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 84,
China: An International Journal, vol. 3, No. 2
No. 5 (September-October, 2005), p. 44.
(September, 2005), pp. 297-98.
[12] Yang Bojiang, “Redefining Sino-Japanese
[9] Reuters, "China Defense Minister Visits Japan,
Relations,” p. 133.
Ties on Mend," August 29, 2007; NAPSNet, same
[13] See Bates Gill and Martin Kleiber, “China’s
date.
Space Odyssey,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 86, No. 3
[10] The U.S. commander in the maneuvers
(May-June, 2007), pp. 2-6. The authors contend
denied they were directed at China (Reuters,
that the test, in which a ballistic missile shot
"Bay of Bengal War Games Not Aimed at China:
down a weather satellite, was undertaken by the
U.S.," August 23, 2007, at NAPSNet, same date);
Chinese military without consulting the ministry
but it is highly unlikely that Chinese leaders saw
of foreign affairs.
it that way. The new Japan-Australia declaration
[14] Sueo Sudo, “It Takes Two to Tango: The
on defense, signed in March 2007, “will
Conflict as Japan Sees It,” in James C. Hsiung,
mean”—in the words of then-Prime Minister
ed., China and Japan At Odds: Deciphering the
John Howard—“that our security relationship
Perpetual Conflict for the Future (New York:
with Japan will be closer than with any other
Palgrave, 2007), pp. 43-57. ASEAN+3 refers to the
country with the exception of the United States,”
ten ASEAN states plus Japan, China, and South
even though the agreement reportedly only
Korea, with “the three” now meeting regularly.
concerns cooperation on terrorism and disaster
[15] This was one element of the Joint Statement
relief. (Japan Times, March 11, 2007.) This
of Principles of the Six Party Talks in September
16
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APJ | JF
2005, and it has been repeated in subsequent
Institute of Peace, 1997).
meetings of the six parties. Text in Northeast
[24] See Harold Saunders, A Public Peace
Asia Peace and Security Network (NAPSNet)
Process: Sustained Dialogue to Transform Racial
Special Report, September 20, 2005, online from
and Ethnic Conflicts (London: Palgrave
nautilus.org.
Macmillan, 2001), and Herbert C. Kelman, “The
[16] I am indebted for this point to Prof. Peter
Problem-Solving Workshop in Conflict
Van Ness of the Australian National University.
Resolution,” in Richard L. Merritt, ed.,
[17] “Japan-China Joint Press Statement
Communication in International Politics (Urbana,
(http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/chin
Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1972).
a/joint0610.html),” October 8, 2006.
[25] A version of this section was originally
[18]
Chinese
text
in
Renmin
gang
presented in a paper, “Reconciling China and
(http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1024/560834
Japan: A Menu of Alternatives,” for the
6.html) (People.com), April 13, 2007.
Conference on the Need for Conflict Prevention
[19] Fukuda cited three areas: promoting mutual
and Conflict Management in Sino-Japanese
benefit (such as energy), mutual understanding
Relations,” Tokyo, March 8-9, 2007, sponsored by
(such as security), and international society (such
Uppsala University and Keio University. The
as terrorism and North Korea). See Kazuyo Kato,
paper owes much to a workshop on China-Japan
“China-Japan Rapprochement in Perspective
reconciliation that was held at the Australian
(http://www.jamestown.org/china_brief/article
National University in August 2006, the results of
.php?articleid=2373877),” China Brief, vol. 8, No.
which I summarized in “Options for Reconciling
1 (January 4, 2008).
China and Japan,” Asian Perspective, vol. 31, No.
[20] Yomiuri Shimbun, "Japan, China Reach Deal
1 (2007), pp. 169-75.
on Anti-Global Warming Project," November 30,
[26] This focus on interests draws inspiration
2007, in NAPSNet, same date.
from Roger Fisher, Elizabeth Kopelman, and
[21] New York Times, November 28, 2007, p.
Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Beyond Machiavelli:
A16.
Tools for Coping with Conflict (Cambridge,
[22] Statement of Vice-premier Zeng Peiyan
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).
(http://world.people.com.cn/GB/1029/42354/6
[27] See Shi Yinhong, “Sino-Japanese
600621.html), as reported in Renmin gang
Rapprochement as a ‘Diplomatic Revolution
(People.com), December 1, 2007.
(http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2003hearings/
[23] See Raymond Cohen, Negotiating Across
written_testimonies/031030bios/sing-
Cultures: International Communication in an
japprochement.htm).'” Shi urges (p. 4) that “the
Interdependent World (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Chinese government, represented by our top
17
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APJ | JF
leader, should frequently use appropriately
the
strong language to express gratitude to Japan for
(http://pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=2216
its large scale economic assistance to China since
8),” November 21, 2006.
the beginning of our ‘Reform and Opening’ in the
[32] For specific proposals to resolve the East
late 1970s.”
China Sea dispute, see Mark J. Valencia, “The
[28] See Chu-yuan Cheng, “Sino-Japanese
East China Sea Dispute: Context, Claims, Issues,
Economic Relations: Interdependence and
and Possible Solutions,” Asian Perspective, vol.
Conflict,” in James C. Hsiung, ed., China and
31, No. 1 (2007), pp. 127-67. Each side has
Japan At Odds: Deciphering the Perpetual
presented proposals for joint development of
Conflict (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007),
undersea resources (Japan in September 2005,
table 5.2, p. 84.
China in June 2004 and March 2006), but basic
[29] Ralph Jennings, “Japanese Aid Message Lost
issues of territorial control and jurisdiction stand
on
in the way.
Deaf
Chinese
Ears
People’s
Republic
of
China
(http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?par
[33] See Peter Van Ness, “Why the Six Party
entid=19388),” Japan Times, January 11, 2005;
Talks Should Succeed,” Asian Perspective, vol.
China Daily (Beijing), December 14, 2004;
29, No. 2 (2005), pp. 231-46 and Van Ness, “The
“Japan's Aid to China is Not Unilateral
North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four-Plus-
Benefaction: FM Spokeswoman,” People’s Daily
Two—An Idea Whose Time Has Come,” in Mel
Online (Beijing), December 2, 2004. Moreover,
Gurtov and Peter Van Ness, eds., Confronting the
PRC repayments of Japanese loans have
Bush Doctrine: Critical Views From the Asia-
regularly surpassed loan amounts since 2003.
Pacific (London: Routledge-Curzon, 2005), pp.
[30] Ever since 2001, when Japan began to cut
242-59.
back ODA to China, most aid has gone into
[34] The fisheries agreement established a joint
environmental programs. One reason may have
commission to manage overlapping fishing areas.
been political: to answer critics in Japan who
The security dialogues, of which there have been
variously argued that China no longer needed
seven (through 2006), also include exchanges of
foreign aid and was diverting ODA to military
visits by military personnel. On the latter, see
programs. See Glen Hook et al., Japan’s
Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Security
International Relations: Politics, Economics and
Agenda: Military, Economic, and Environmental
Security, 2d ed. (London: Routledge, 2005), p.
Dimensions (Boulder, Colo.: Rienner, 2004), box
201.
5.3, p. 196.
[31] Press release of the prime minister’s office,
[35] For an extensive treatment of this issue, see
“Joint Declaration by the Republic of India and
my “U.S. Policy and Sino-Japanese Rivalry,” in
18
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APJ | JF
Hsiung, ed., China and Japan At Odds, pp.
forward, the only way to resolve the regional
113-31.
security dilemma in East Asia completely is to
[36] Minxin Pei and Michael Swaine, “Simmering
promote multilateral security structures.”
Fire in Asia: Averting Sino-Japanese Strategic
[39] As Wu Xinbo writes: “If China has normal
Conflict,” Policy Brief (Carnegie Endowment for
relations with the United States as well as Japan
International Peace), No. 44 (November, 2005), p.
and trilateral relations are largely stable, Beijing
7.
will be less suspicious of a Washington-Tokyo
[37]
“Japan’s
New
Strategies
axis . . . ” Wu, “The End of the Silver Lining,” pp.
(http://www.asahi.com),” Asahi Shimbun, May
128-29.
23, 2007. The commentary said: “The important
[40] See Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising: The
thing is that none of these moves should be
Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose
confrontational—that is to say, they must not aim
(New York: PublicAffairs, 2007), pp. 337-38, 348.
to isolate, antagonize or keep anyone in check.
[41] Kent Calder (“China and Japan’s Simmering
Otherwise, they will kill the dynamism of
Rivalry,” p. 136) suggests that energy
regional development. And this is where holding
cooperation provides an especially fruitful
regular Japan-U.S.-China summits will be of
avenue for promoting Track II cooperation
great help.”
between China and Japan.
[38] Japanese concerns about Washington’s
[42] Valencia, “The East China Sea Dispute.”
China policy were rife in the Nixon years, at the
[43]Cohen and Pei, “A Vicious Sino-Japanese
time of the visit to China, and when the Clinton
Cycle of Rhetoric.” On Sankei Shimbun’s ability
administration
to silence critics of Japan’s policies toward China,
established
a
“strategic
partnership” with China. See Gerald L. Curtis,
see
“U.S. Policy toward Japan from Nixon to Clinton:
(http://www.japanfocus.org/products/topdf/2
An Assessment,” in Curtis, ed., New Perspectives
466),” Japan Focus, July 18, 2007.
on U.S.-Japan Relations (Tokyo: Japan Center for
[44] Akio Takahara, “Japanese NGOs in China,”
International Exchange, 2000), pp. 9-19. On
in Lam, ed., Japan’s Relations with China, pp.
China’s perspective, Yang Bojiang (“Redefining
166-79.
Sino-Japanese Relations,” p. 135) writes that “the
[45] James Auer, ed., From Marco Polo Bridge to
best choice for the United States would be to
Pearl Harbor: Who was Responsible? Tokyo: The
continue its alliance with Japan and South Korea
Yomiuri Shimbun, 2006.
and keep be¬nign relations with China but also
[46] China’s official newspaper, the Beijing
to transition to active promotion of multi¬lateral
People’s Daily, has certainly published its share
cooperation throughout the region. Looking
of anti-Japanese articles; but it has also published
19
David
McNeill,
“Softly,
Softly
6|1|0
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positive commentaries, such as one endorsing
[48] Two other groups that have made proposals
“rational” and “moderate” nationalism in the
concerning China-Japan reconciliation are:
two countries. See “Role of Nationalism in Sino-
International Crisis Group, “North East Asia’s
Japanese Relations,” People’s Daily Online,
Undercurrents
February 16, 2007.
(http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l
[47] Wakamiya Yoshibumi and Watanabe
+1&id=3834)),” Report No. 108 (December 15,
Tsuneo, “Yomiuri and Asahi Editors Call for a
2005); and Japan Forum on International
National Memorial to Replace Yasukuni
Relations, Policy Council, “Japan and China in
(http://www.japanfocus.org/article.asp?id=524)
the Changing Asia” (Tokyo, October 2006).
,” Japan Focus, February 28, 2006.
20
of
Conflict