Free Trade Optimism: Lessons from the Battle in Seattle
A World without Walls: Freedom, Development, Free Trade and Global Governance by Mike
Moore
Review by: Dani Rodrik
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2003), pp. 135-140
Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20033584 .
Accessed: 17/07/2013 15:44
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
.
Council on Foreign Relations is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Foreign
Affairs.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 128.112.203.62 on Wed, 17 Jul 2013 15:44:28 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Review Essay
Free
Trade
Optimism
Lessons From theBattle inSeattle
Dani Rodrik
A World Without Walls: Freedom,
Development, Free Trade and Global
BY MIKE MOORE.
Governance.
New
York:CambridgeUniversityPress,
2003,
Within
302
pp.
$28.00.
twomonths of taking office as
thenew director-general
of theWorld
TradeOrganization(WTO),
Mike Moore
Even to its supporters, it appeared that
theWTO had suffered a near-fatal blow,
fromwhich itwould recover only very
gradually, if at all.
Yet two years later,when trademinis
tersmet again in themore secluded envi
ronment of Doha, Qatar, theywere able
towalk out with an agreed framework in
hand. The Doha meeting launched a "De
velopmentRound"of tradenegotiations
famous"tear-gas
ministerial"conference (which is still stumbling along) and inau
was handed amajor setback at the now
of November 1999 in Seattle. With pro
testerswreaking havoc outside, Moore, a
formerprimeministerofNew Zealand,
was unable to prevail on the assembled
gurated China as amember of theWTO.
The death knells forMike Moore's WTO, it
turns out, had sounded prematurely.
Moore's determinationtobridge the
governmentofficials to conclude an
gaps that separated theUnited States
agreement thatwould launch a new round from the European Union (EU)and the
of trade negotiations. To the WTO'S
rich countries from the poor ones was
opponents,thecollapseof themeeting
not the only reason forDoha's success.
represented the high point of their crusade Doha took place scarcely twomonths
against"corporate-led
globalization."
after the September 1i terrorist attacks,
DANI RODRIK isProfessor of International Political Economy atHarvard's
John F. Kennedy School of Government and the author ofMaking Openness
Work:TheNew Global Economy and theDeveloping Countries.
[135]
This content downloaded from 128.112.203.62 on Wed, 17 Jul 2013 15:44:28 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Dani Rodrik
and the pressure was high, particularly
on the advancedcountries,toprevent
another failure thatwould have sapped
confidencein theglobaleconomy'sability
toweather the shock. Of critical impor
tancewas thewillingness of theUnited
and grudg
States to accede-eventually
leadership teamwas barely in place and
he had had little time to put his own
stamp on the process and on the negoti
ating draft. Doha, he writes, was the
"mirror
opposite."
He describeshisgrueling
schedule ("traveled over 62S,ooo km,
visiting 182citiesandmeetingwith more
ingly-to developing-countrydemands than300ministers"),his difficulttime
in the area of intellectual property rights with his opponents innongovernmental
by signing on to a statement that existing organizations,thepettypoliticsof the
WTo agreements do not and should not
WTO, and his uneasy relationship with
preventmembers fromtakingmeasuresto his staff. And yet although Moore can
protectpublichealth.Nonetheless,Moore be quite frank and revealing about such
will be remembered by friends and foes of
theWTo alike as theman who put the in
ternational trade regime back on track.
FROM DISASTER
TO DOHA
The middle (andmost interesting)part
ofA World Without Walls is devoted to
Moore's account of how he engineered
this remarkable turnaround.He is remark
ably candid about many aspects of his
tenure,especiallyabout the inauspicious
start he had, which followed a bitterly
fought contest between him and Supachai
Panitchpakdi of Thailand for the position
member
of director-general.
The WTO's
ship, unable to reach consensus on a
single name, eventually awarded the first
three years of the term toMoore and the
second three years to Supachai, who took
over fromMoore as director-general in
September2002.Moore thinkshe had
majority support among themember
ship, and it is clear that he feels cheated.
He describes the arrangement to split his
term as "a slightly sordid deal" and relates
matter-of-factly, and with no regrets, his
refusal to be photographed with Supachai
onMoore's first day in office.
Moore attributes the debacle at Seattle
to the lack of adequate preparation: his
[136]
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
issues, he does not offer a systematic
behind-the-scenesaccountof how the
Seattle disaster was transformed into
the Doha consensus. One wishes he
had written more about the cajoling,
arm-twisting, and horse-trading thatwas
required to get key governments to fall
into line. Except for an occasional nod in
their direction, Moore says little about
the roles played by Robert Zoellick and
Pascal Lamy, the point persons on trade
for theUnited States and the EU, respec
tively, or about his relationship with them.
Strategically, Moore's key accomplish
ment was to recast the failed Seattle
agenda around the theme of development
and to promote a new development round
with agricultural liberalization as its cen
terpiece.Moore was neither the first nor
the only voice arguing that the new round
should focus on the needs of developing
countries. The World Bank's president,
and the British
JamesWolfensohn,
minister for development, Clare Short,
among others, had called for a develop
ment round before Seattle. But itwas
Moore who tookwhat most observers had
come to call the "Millennium Round" and
transformed it in the global consciousness
into a development round.
Volume82No.3
This content downloaded from 128.112.203.62 on Wed, 17 Jul 2013 15:44:28 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
REUTERS
Thedealmaker:
MikeMoore,CostaRica,August28,2001
countrieshad failedto liveup to their
commitments(withrespectto,forexmple,
liberalization
of textilestradeand in
creasedfinancialassistance).
The devel
with thedemonstrationsoutside thecon oping countrieswere opposed to thepush
ferencecenterthanwith the intransigenceby advancedcountriesto expandthene
of thegovernmentsinside.Their clashes gotiatingagendato indudenew issuessuch
revolvedaroundtwomain axesof conflict. as investment,governmentprocurement,
First, theUnited States-backed by the competitionpolicy,environment,and
CairnsGroup of 17agricultural
which thedeveloping
exporters, laborstandards,
which it leads-locked hornswith theEU countriesfeltwould imposecostsand
andJapanoveragriculturalliberalization. obligationspredominantlyon them.
The United Statesdemandedsignificant
Agriculturethusbecame, inMoore's
improvementsinmarket accessand a
or deal-breaker,"
words, the "deal-maker
phasingout of exportsubsidiesfor farm sincewithout enthusiastic
U.S. support
products,which the EUrejected.Second, thenew roundwould havegone nowhere.
developingcountriesfelt thattheprevious Much ofMoore's hardwork between
UruguayRound of tradenegotiationshad SeattleandDoha was directedatputting
left themsaddledwith costlyobligations, agriculture
at thecenterof a "development"
thattheTRIPS(trade-related
aspectsof
agenda thatwould not only capture
intellectualpropertyrights)agreement
themoral high ground but alsomake the
worked against them, and that the rich
momentum foragriculturalliberalization
To seewhy thiswas important and
what problems it solved, we need to go
back to Seattle. Moore knew that the
collapse of the talks there had less to do
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS-
May/June2003
This content downloaded from 128.112.203.62 on Wed, 17 Jul 2013 15:44:28 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
[137]
unstoppableby enlistingdeveloping
country support on the issue. "Bymaking
Moore
agriculturea developmentissue,"
writes in a revealing passage, "we brought
Africa, most of Asia and Latin America
together on a common agenda." This
brilliant tactic bridged both of the divides
that had led to the collapse of the Seattle
ministerialmeeting.The EUcouldnot
have blocked an agreement atDoha
without appearing to undermine devel
opment,anddevelopingcountriescould
walk awaywith a document that claimed
to put their interests at the center.
Unfortunately, Moore does not tell us
how he managed to convince developing
countries that an agenda little changed
from Seattle could now serve as the blue
print for a development round. As the
locution of the quote above suggests, it
was hardly evident that an agenda centered
on agriculture would amount to a devel
opmentround.The developingcountries'
interest in agricultural liberalization had
always been ambiguous. Aside from a
few middle-income members of the
Cairns Group such asArgentina, Brazil,
Chile, and Thailand, which are important
agricultural
exporters,fewdeveloping
countries looked at this area as amajor
source of gain. Research done at theWorld
Bank during theUruguay Round had
highlightedthepossibilitythatmost sub
Saharan African nations could actually
end up worse off as a result of a rise in
world food prices produced by a reduction
in European export subsidies. As Arvind
Panagariya, an economist at theUniversity
ofMaryland and a strong supporter of
trade liberalization, has noted, the vast
majority of theworld's poorest nations are
net importers of agricultural products and
will end up paying higher prices for their
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
POSMONANNOUNCEMENT
ANDSPONSORSHIPS
MANAGER,
ADVERISING
To 40K
BASESALARY
PLUS
GENEROUS
COMMISSION
a paid,
With
circulation
of
ABC-audited,
125,000, Foreign Affairs is the international
forum of choice for the most important new
ideas, analysis, and debate.
Its website, www.foreignaffairs.org,
attracts
over 200,000 visitors each month, and three
language versions
(Spanish, Japanese, and
Russian) serve an expanding international read
ership.
As the leader of the Foreign Affairs advertising
sales team, the Manager will focus on building
profitable
business
relationships
between
Foreign Affairs and corporate sponsors and
advertisers
and other strategic partners. The
Manager will report directly to the Publisher
and oversee a staff of two.
Preferred Qualifications:
o Two-plus years related business develop
ment, direct sales, management experience
o Degree in related field with strong academic
credentials, including coursework and
proven interest in International Relations
and a proven track record in business-to
business sales development
o Results-oriented, entrepreneurial
professional with the ability to engage and
connect with a wide network of contacts
o Excellent verbal and writing skills
Qualified candidates should send a resume and
cover letter to:
HUMANRESOURCES
OFFICE
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
58 EAST68TH ST.,NY, NY 10021
FAX 212-434-9893
[email protected]
EMAIL:
The Council on Foreign Relations is an equal
opportunity employer and actively seeks
candidates from a diverse background.
[138]
This content downloaded from 128.112.203.62 on Wed, 17 Jul 2013 15:44:28 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Free TradeOptimism
importsif agricultural
exportsubsidiesin very convincing, and ultimately one gets
the rich countries are phased out. For the
the feeling that his heart is not quite in it.
most part,developingcountries'interests
lie not in deep liberalization in agriculture, IDEALS VS. BUREAUCRACIES
but in restricting the agenda to a narrow Moore's strategy did pay off, and the
world's tradeofficialdomwas spared
set of issues and in fixing the perceived
shortcomingsof theUruguayRound.
another embarrassment inDoha. But the
There were ways inwhich the negoti
eventual outcome remains very much in
ating agenda could have been broadened
doubt. Negotiations are practically dead
in a trulydevelopment-oriented
way.To locked over agriculture, as they are over
TRIPS.Few knowledgeableobservers
take themost glaring omission, develop
ing nations would have benefited most
believe that much progress will be made
from reform in an area inwhich theDoha
before tradeministers next meet inCan
framework makes no commitments at all: cun,Mexico, in September of this year.
And even if there is progress, itwill be
the liberalization of temporary interna
tional labor flows. It is hard to identify
difficult to hail it as a great success for
development,nomatterwhat theofficial
any other issue in the global economy
with comparable potential for raising
appellation of the round.
income levelsinpoor countrieswhile
Moore's fascinating account of the
enhancing the efficiency of global resource road from Seattle toDoha is sandwiched
allocation. Even a relatively small program between two long sections devoted to ru
of temporary work visas in rich countries minations about the state of theworld
could generate greater income gains for
and global governance. He takes on awide
workers from poor countries than all of
rangeof issues, from themoral basis for
theDoha proposals put together.
freetradeto thedemographic
challenge
Instead,developingnationswere
awaiting advanced countries. These parts
saddledwith negotiationson ill-fitting
read lesswell than themiddle section of the
issues such as the environment, investment, book, as they contain few new ideas and
governmentprocurement,competition
seem to have been put together in a rush.
His arguments are typically presented by
policy, and trade facilitation. This was
the price of leaning so heavily on agricul
weaving a string of declaratory statements
ture.These new areaswere of particular
around supporting quotations from various
interest to the EU (and, in some cases, to
authors.What shines through all this is
Japan), and their inclusion on the agenda Moore's unshakable faith in globalization
was the quid pro quo for the EU'sacquies
and his contagious confidence in the com
cence on agriculture. The irony is that
bined ability of markets and democracies
the costs of this particular tradeoff will
tomake theworld a better place for the
be bornealmostexclusivelyby developing vast majority of its inhabitants.
countries, in effect adding injury to insult.
The world of ideas and action, as
Moore devotes a chapter to these new is Moore presentsit, isdividedbetween
sues, making the case that the developing
those who favor free trade, freedom,
nations will eventually benefit by under
transparency,
goodgovernance,tolerance,
taking reforms in these areas.But he is not and competition, and those who stand
FOREIGNAFFAIRSMay/June2003
This content downloaded from 128.112.203.62 on Wed, 17 Jul 2013 15:44:28 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
[139]
Dani Rodrik
corruption, versus isolation-they lose the ability to
forprotectionism,repression,
This stark,
monopoly,and isolationism.
handlethechallengesposedby thesecritics.
good-versus-evil
dichotomykeepsrecurring One of the paradoxes of this book is that
Moore's
throughoutthebook and lends
Mike Moore isno fan of international bu
reaucracies.
Indeed,someof his criticisms
arguments a strongmoral undertone. But
is it a good guide to the realworld? The
troublewith equating free tradewith all
that other good stuff and protection with
its opposite is that it evades the hard ques
tions. The choices the realworld presents
are rarely as clear-cut as that between out
ward orientation a laHong Kong and iso
lation "alaMyanmar. They typically have
to do with selecting an appropriate mix
of regulations,incentives,andmarketdis
ciplinethatstimulateseconomicactivity
while safeguarding
publicwelfare.
What shouldwe make, for example, of
South Korea's and Taiwan's trade and in
dustrial policies in the 196os and 1970s
policies thatwould have run afoul ofWTO
rulesmany times over if those ruleshad
been in effect at the time?How could
China (orVietnam) have grown so rapidly
in recent decades even though they lacked
the benefit of WTOmembership? How do
we interpret theUnited States' own protec
tionist history during the critical period of
the late nineteenth centurywhen the for
mer colony caught upwith and surpassed
theUnited Kingdom's economic prowess?
All thesecountries
were outwardoriented
of theWTO read like they could have come
outof leafletsdistributed
by theprotesters
in Seattle. "Therewas a great difference
between the promise of theWTO and the
practice,"hewrites midway through
the book as he reminisces about his first
few days inGeneva. "Inmy experience," he
writes toward the end, "it'sall too seldom
about the customers or countries, it'sabout
the expansion and power of the various in
stitutions,
whether inGeneva,Wellington
orWashingtonDC." (TheInternational
Monetary Fund and theWorld Bank come
in forconsiderable
criticismtoo.)Moore's
answer to the "recalcitranceand self-interest
of many of our bureaucrats"and "the ex
cesses and ignorance of themore extreme
protestors" is a "voluntaryglobal democratic
caucus-a grouping of senior parliamen
tarians,drawn from national legislatures, to
provideoversightof international
organiza
tions.Yet although he thinks the solutions
liewith greater democracy, transparency,
and openness, he isoften quite cynical
about theway the political processworks.
Nevertheless, Moore remains an ardent
optimist. The world's national and interna
tional institutionsmay not be ideal, but
they arebetter than any of the alternatives
that have been tried.When all is said and
done, he believes democratically elected
governments andmarkets wili respond ap
propriately to the challenges they face.The
in their own fashion. But anyonewho tries
to understand their success in terms of sim
ple categories such as free trade versus
protection runs out of useful things to say
pretty quickly.Many of the critics of the
WTO take issue not with trade itself but
with the perceived defects and asymmetries forcesof openness,freedom,competition,
of the rules that govern trade.When de
and, of course, free tradewill prevail.
fenders of thewTo retreatbehind simplistic Moore is toomodest to say so himself, but
having able politicians at the helm of inter
categories-freetradeversusprotection,
national institutions does not hurt either.@
competitionversusmonopoly,openness
[140]
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS*
Volume82No.3
This content downloaded from 128.112.203.62 on Wed, 17 Jul 2013 15:44:28 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions