EVIDENCE LAW, CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE TOPICS
TAUGHT IN U.S. LAW SCHOOLS
Daisuke Beppu, Blakemore & Mitsuki
WINTER 2013
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
* All cases used are excerpts only and have been edited accordingly.
Please do the reading for that week prior to the lecture. I will assume that you
have read the materials before class, and I plan to call on members of the class
during the lecture to contribute to discussion.
LECTURE 1:
EVIDENCE LAW: INTRODUCTION AND RELEVANCE ··············································· 3
A.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE ······································································································ 3
B.
WHY HAVE EVIDENCE RULES? ······························································· 5
C. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FEDERAL RULES AND
COMMON LAW····································································································· 6
D. RELEVANCE·········································································································· 7
E.
RELEVANCE: BACKGROUND TO OLD CHIEF V. UNITED
STATES ·················································································································10
● Case: Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) ············12
LECTURE 2:
EVIDENCE LAW: HEARSAY ··································································································25
A.
INTRODUCTION TO HEARSAY ·································································25
B.
THE DEFINITION OF “HEARSAY” ·····························································26
C. HEARSAY RISKS ······························································································27
D. WHAT IS A “STATEMENT”? ·········································································29
E.
BACKGROUND TO WRIGHT v. DOE d. TATHAM ······························32
● Case: Wright v. Doe d. Tatham, 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (1837)····33
F.
ONE MORE CASE·····························································································37
● Case: Cain v. George, 411 F.2d 572 (1969)··································38
LECTURE 3:
CRIMINAL LAW: INTRODUCTION ·······················································································42
CHAPTER ONE
Reasonable Doubt and the Presumption of Innocence ················································44
● In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) ······································································46
● Owens v. State, 93 Md.App. 162 (1992) ····························································49
CHAPTER TWO
The Need for Clarity in Criminal Statutes and Statutory Interpretation···················54
● City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) ··············································55
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●
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998) ·········································64
LECTURE 4:
CHAPTER THREE
Criminal Law: An Introduction to Homicide ········································································73
● Model Penal Code 10·································································································76
● California Penal Code ································································································78
● New York Penal Law ··································································································80
● Illinois Criminal Code ··································································································86
● Michigan Penal Code ·································································································89
● People v. Eulo, 63 N.Y.2d 341 (1984) ·································································92
● State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657 (1995)··························································· 102
LECTURE 5:
CHAPTER FOUR
Criminal Law: An Introduction to Justifications: Self-Defense and Defense of
Others ············································································································································· 107
● Model Penal Code [selected provisions] ························································· 109
● United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222 (1973) ······································· 114
● People v. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96 (1986) ····························································· 122
● State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash.2d 221 (1977)······················································ 129
● People v. Kurr, 253 Mich. App. 317 (2002) ···················································· 134
LECTURE 6:
CHAPTER FIVE
Why Study Criminal Procedure? ······················································································· 139
● The Constitution of the United States [selected provisions] ···················· 142
CHAPTER SIX
The Fourth Amendment: An Introduction to “Unreasonable Searches and
Seizures” ······································································································································· 149
● Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) ·············································· 151
● Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)······························································· 156
● Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)··································································· 162
LECTURE 7:
CHAPTER SEVEN
The Fifth Amendment: Miranda and the Right Against Self-Incrimination·········· 176
● Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)························································ 179
● New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) ···················································· 199
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LECTURE 8:
CHAPTER EIGHT
The Sixth Amendment and the Right to an Impartial Jury and the Right to Have
Appointed Counsel ···················································································································· 210
● Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) ····························································· 212
Back ground to Gideon············································································································ 220
● Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ·················································· 221
Back ground to Duncan··········································································································· 227
● Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) ···················································· 228
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LECTURE 4:
CHAPTER THREE
Criminal Law: An Introduction to Homicide
One of the important aspects of the study of criminal law is, of
course, the study of specific criminal laws. In other words, the study of
specific crimes is an essential aspect of the study of criminal law.
Realistically speaking, the crimes that you will be studying have
common law roots, but usually are creatures of statute, and, as such, they
are bound by certain specific requirements which can only be fully
appreciated by analyzing the relevant statute with care.
That
notwithstanding, the elements of a crime can be generalized as follows:
(1) Actus Reus: some kind of physical act, which must be
performed voluntarily;
(2) Mens Rea: some kind of state of mind or intent at the time the
act was performed;
(3) Timing: the actus reus and the mens rea existed at the same
time;
(4) Result of Harm: some kind of harm resulted;
(5) Causation: there is a causal link between the harm and the
act.
As you can probably guess, the above elements may change
depending on the kind of crime one is dealing with. For instance, there
are crimes that involve a specific kind of intent or mens rea, which will be
identified in the statutory language itself. There are other crimes, such
as statutory rape, that do not require a mens rea element (such crimes
being strict liability crimes). Moreover, the more “heinous” or “horrible”
the mental state of mind is proved to be, the higher the level of crime will
be deemed. If the mental state is, on the other hand, of a lesser level,
then the level of crime will be reduced accordingly.
As an example, consider homicide, which is the subject to which
we will now turn. At common law, homicide was classified into justifiable
homicide, excusable homicide, and criminal homicide. The third class of
criminal homicide was further divided into (i) murder, (ii) voluntary
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manslaughter, and (iii) involuntary manslaughter, which are described in
some detail below:
(i)
Murder: the unlawful killing of another human being with
malice aforethought.
(ii)
Voluntary Manslaughter: the killing that would otherwise
be murder but is distinguishable by the existence of
adequate provocation.
(iii)
Involuntary Manslaughter: death of a human being that is
caused by criminal negligence, or a killing caused by an
unlawful act.
Now, you will be expected to study these points at common law
because it is from this tradition of common law that homicide statutes
come from. Moreover, common law principles of homicide can be
considered to be “general” principles of law regarding homicide, and
“state-specific” principles will be reflected in the state statutes.
For instance, it would not be at all uncommon for you to have to
study, say, common law principles of homicide for the “multistate” portion
of the bar examination, and NY-statute-based homicide principles for the
state portion of the NY bar examination.
Another aspect of the study of criminal law is the need to
familiarize yourself with the Model Penal Code, which was drafted by the
American Legal Institute (ALI) in the 1960s. As you know, generally
speaking criminal law is within the jurisdiction of each state. Therefore,
there is the risk that there may be a lack of uniformity (on a base level)
among the states in their approaches to crime. Therefore, in order to
make some effort to sort of standardize criminal concepts and principles
on a kind of overall level, the ALI came together to draft the Model Penal
Code, which itself has no force of law but serves as a strong reference
tool for students and legislators. In fact, many legislatures used the
Model Penal Code as a reference when drafting their own criminal laws.
Therefore, it is important to at least be aware of the need to acquaint
yourself with the Model Penal Code when studying criminal law.
Unfortunately, we do not have enough time to cover the topic of homicide
completely, but we do have time to at least introduce ourselves to some
topics, and to view some cases from state courts in order to see
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STATE v. GUTHRIE
194 W.Va. 657 (1995)
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
CLECKLEY, JUSTICE:
The defendant, Dale Edward Guthrie, appeals the . . . jury verdict . . . finding
him guilty of first degree murder.b In May of 1994, the defendant was
sentenced to serve a life sentence . . . .
I.
...
It is undisputed that on the evening of February 12, 1993, the defendant
removed a knife from his pocket and stabbed his co-worker, Steven Todd
Farley, in the neck and killed him. The two men worked together as
dishwashers . . . and got along well together before this incident. On the night
of the killing, the victim . . . was poking fun at the defendant who appeared to
be in a bad mood. He told the defendant to “lighten up” and snapped him with a
dishtowel several times. . . . The dishtowel flipped the defendant on the nose
and he became enraged.
The defendant removed his gloves and started toward the victim. . . . The
defendant then pulled a knife from his pocket and stabbed the victim in the
neck. . . .
It is . . . undisputed that the defendant suffers from a host of psychiatric
problems. He experiences up to two panic attacks daily and had received
treatment for them . . . for more than a year preceding the killing. He suffers
from chronic depression (dysthymic disorder), an obsession with his nose (body
dysmorphic disorder), and borderline personality disorder. . . .
The defendant testified he suffered a panic attack immediately preceding the
stabbing. He described the attack as “intense”; he felt a lot of pressure and his
heart beat rapidly. . . .
II.
b
Under West Virginia law: “Murder by poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving,
or by any willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or in the commission of, or
attempt to commit [specified felonies] is murder of the first degree. All other murder
is murder of the second degree.” (Emphasis added.)
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...
[T]he defendant asserts the trial court’s instructions regarding the elements of
first degree murder were improper because the terms wilful, deliberate, and
premeditated were equated with a mere intent to kill.
The jury was instructed that in order to find the defendant guilty of murder it
had to find five elements beyond a reasonable doubt: “The Court further
instructs the jury that murder in the first degree is when one person kills another
person unlawfully, willfully, maliciously, deliberately and premeditatedly[.]” In
its effort to define these terms, the trial court gave three instructions. State’s
Instruction No. 8, commonly referred to as the Clifford instruction, stated:
The Court instructs the jury that to constitute a willful, deliberate and
premeditated killing, it is not necessary that the intention to kill should
exist for any particular length of time prior to the actual killing; it is
only necessary that such intention should have come into existence for
the first time at the time of such killing, or at any time previously.
See State v. Clifford, 59 W. Va. 1, 52 S.E. 981 (1906). State’s Instruction No.
10 stated: “The Court instructs the jury that in order to constitute a
‘premeditated’ murder an intent to kill need exist only for an instant.” State’s
Instruction No. 12 stated: “The Court instructs the jury that what is meant by
the language willful, deliberate and premeditated is that the killing be
intentional.” State’s Instruction Nos. 10 and 12 are commonly referred to as
Schrader instructions. See State v. Schrader, 172 W. Va. 1, 302 S.E.2d 70
(1982).
The linchpin of the problems that flow from these instructions is the failure
adequately to inform the jury of the difference between first and second degree
murder. Of particular concern is the lack of guidance to the jury as to what
constitutes premeditation and the manner in which the instructions infuse
premeditation with the intent to kill.
...
In addition to Clifford, there are several cases that have made specific attempts
to further define premeditation. In State v. Dodds, 54 W. Va. 289, 297-98, 46
S.E. 228, 231 (1903), we said:
The next ingredient of the crime is that it must be deliberate. To
deliberate is to reflect, with a view to make a choice. If a person
reflects, though but for a moment before he acts, it is unquestionably a
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sufficient deliberation within the meaning of the statute. The last
requisite is that the killing must be premeditated. To premeditate is to
think of a matter before it is executed. The word, premeditated, would
seem to imply something more than deliberate, and may mean that the
party not only deliberated, but had formed in his mind the plan of
destruction. (Emphasis added to last sentence).
...
The source of the problem in the present case stems from language in State v.
Schrader, 172 W. Va. 1, 302 S.E.2d 70 (1982). . . . [W]e gave it a different
definition than that approved in State v. Hatfield, 169 W.Va. 191, 286 S.E.2d
402 (1982). . . . In Schrader, we stated:
Hence, when the West Virginia Legislature adopted the Virginia
murder statute in 1868, the meaning of “premeditated” as used in the
statute was essentially “knowing” and “intentional.” Since then, courts
have consistently recognized that the mental process necessary to
constitute “willful, deliberate and premeditated” murder can be
accomplished very quickly or even in the proverbial “twinkling of an
eye.” . . . The achievement of a mental state contemplated in a statute
such as ours can immediately precede the act of killing. Hence, what
is really meant by the language “willful, deliberate and
premeditated” . . . is that the killing be intentional. (Emphasis added).
The language emphasized above supplied the legal authority and basis for
State’s Instruction Nos. 10 and 12.
While many jurisdictions do not favor the distinction between first and second
degree murder, given the doctrine of separation of powers, we do not have the
judicial prerogative to abolish the distinction between first and second degree
murder and rewrite the law of homicide for West Virginia . . . . On the other
hand, we believe within the parameters of our current homicide statutes the
Schrader definition of premeditation and deliberation is confusing, if not
meaningless. To allow the State to prove premeditation and deliberation by
only showing that the intention came “into existence for the first time at the
time of such killing” completely eliminates the distinction between the two
degrees of murder. Hence, we feel compelled in this case to attempt to make the
dichotomy meaningful by making some modifications to our homicide common
law.
Premeditation and deliberation should be defined in a more careful, but still
general way to give juries both guidance and reasonable discretion. . . .
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...
. . .To the extent that the Schrader opinion is inconsistent with our holding
today, it is overruled. . . .
Finally, we feel obligated to discuss what instruction defining premeditation is
now acceptable. What came about as a mere suggestion in Hatfield, we now
approve as a proper instruction under today’s decision. . . .
The jury is instructed that murder in the first degree consists of an
intentional, deliberate and premeditated killing which means that the
killing is done after a period of time for prior consideration. The
duration of that period cannot be arbitrarily fixed. The time in which
to form a deliberate and premeditated design varies as the minds and
temperaments of people differ, and according to the circumstances in
which they may be placed. Any interval of time between the forming
of the intent to kill and the execution of that intent, which is of
sufficient duration for the accused to be fully conscious of what he
intended, is sufficient to support a conviction for first degree murder.
III.
...
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
is reversed, and this case is remanded for a new trial. . . .
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Notes and Questions on Guthrie
1. By now, you will have noticed that the cases that we have read so far
have both dealt with the issue of jury instructions, and whether jury
instructions given to a jury were proper or not given the
circumstances and given the nature of the criminal law statutes that
are involved. As you can imagine, a jury that is composed of a
group of laymen may not necessary be able to understand fully the
criminal statutes, and in particular some of the complexities that are
involved. Therefore, generally speaking the judge will provide the
jury with instructions about how the statute is to operate, and how the
jury must consider the evidence in the context of the way in which the
statute operates, etc. Under this system, if a judge were to give an
improper instruction to the jury, or if the judge were to overemphasize
one aspect of the law in favor of another, etc., there is the strong risk
that the jury could overemphasize certain facts over others, based on
a mistaken understanding of how the statute operates, etc.
2. What were the jury instructions given here?
3. What is the defendant’s argument here about the jury instructions?
4. What is the significance of the court’s discussion of the case State v.
Schrader? What does the court do regarding the holding of
Schrader?
5. Please read the facts again regarding Guthrie’s acts. Based on
those facts, do you think that he is guilty of first degree murder or of
second degree murder?
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