Ireland’s Political Culture:
Overlapping Consensus and Modus Vivendi *
Pat Lyons
Department of Political Sociology
Institute of Sociology
Czech Academy of Sciences
Prague
Czech Republic
[email protected]
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the nature of political culture in contemporary Ireland using a unique crossnational survey (ASES) undertaken in eighteen countries in Asia and Europe in late 2000. Using
a liberal democratic framework based on Rawls (1993) basic distinction between “overlapping
consensus” and “modus vivendi consensus” two hypotheses are examined. The research
findings reported in this paper using the ASES survey and other datasets indicates that large
‘objective’ economic changes did not result in an equally large ‘subjective’ opinion change with
the emergence of the Celtic-tiger economy in Ireland. This is taken as evidence of a long-term
and stable “overlapping consensus.” However, attitudes toward specific political actors is more
contextually driven and pragmatic in nature (modus vivendi consensus) and hence liable to be
more changeable in nature. In short, the data analysis undertaken tends to support a liberal
conception of political culture that is based on identifying common stable political values and
shifting attitudes that are responsive to changing events and circumstances.
* Paper prepared for presentation at the International Political Science Association (IPSA) Conference,
Fukuoka, Japan, July 9-13, 2006. Paper to be presented at panel JS01.355: “Renaissance of Political Culture
Research? Confidence in Institution: Asia and Europe.” This research is based on a cross-national survey
ASia Europe Survey (ASES), which was implemented by the Gallup International organisation in nine
European and nine Asian countries between October and December of 2000. The ASES project was
funded by the Japanese Ministry of Education and directed by Professor Takashi Inoguchi, Institute of
Oriental Culture, Tokyo University and Graduate School of Public Policy, Chuo University, Tokyo, Japan.
INTRODUCTION
Ireland presents a unique case for the study of political culture, identity and globalisation.
This small open economy experienced a remarkable rate of economic progress
throughout most of the 1990’s earning itself the title of “Celtic tiger”. However, in very
few other countries have major public institutions been questioned with such intensity in
prolonged judicial investigations accompanied by almost daily media coverage since
1997. One could argue that within Europe only in post-communist states has there been
a similar degree of ‘self-reflection’ of the body politic in the last decade. However, the
common experience of post-communist states has been simultaneous economic
depression, whereas in Ireland there has been an unprecedented economic boom.
A deepening and widening of European integration and major progress on one of the
key issues in Irish politics since the foundation of the state – conflict in Northern
Ireland, have also accompanied these twin changes. In addition, to these changes there
has been the multifaceted impact of globalisation on Ireland’s small open economy.
Given the fundamental nature of all these developments the purpose of this paper is
to examine, using the ASES survey conducted in November 2000, four aspects of Irish
political culture, - Irish peoples sense of identity; confidence in institutions; satisfaction
with politics, life situation and government policy-making; and pattern of political values.
In more general terms this paper will investigate the core values that underpin the Irish
political system and promote stability through the creation of popular legitimacy.
Within the limitations of the ASES data set, and making comparisons with previous
empirical work, the general pattern seems to be that there is much in Irish political
culture and identity that has remained constant. Such a finding suggests that while there
may be considerable economic or “objective” changes in society this does not imply that
there will be an equally great level of attitudinal or “subjective” change.
This still leads to the question of what does such stability mean? Of all the European
liberal democracies founded after the First World War, Ireland has been one of the most
stable through all the conflict and change of the twentieth century (Coakley 1999: 54).
One reason for such long-term stability could be the existence of specific values that are
“latent in the public political culture of a democratic society” (Rawls 1993: 15). The
intuition here is that some attitudes most often related to core or latent values are
characterised by long-term stability while other attitudes, often interpreted on the basis
of self-interest, change with circumstances over time.
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This insight forms a core element in the most influential contemporary theory of
political liberalism.
Within Rawls’ liberal theory latent values are important in the
creation of an overlapping consensus or political stability. In contrast, consensus in
society based on self or group interest, which is subject to change depending on
circumstances, is termed modus vivendi consensus. Characteristics often referred to
generically as ‘political culture’ are seen here to be the basis for an overlapping
consensus.
In Rawls’ theory, political stability is based on citizens choosing “fairness” as the
fundamental principle governing society. This implies that despite all sorts of divisions
and debates in society on religious, moral and other issues the criterion of fairness is
paramount. In practical terms this sets the limits for what should or should not be on
the public agenda. In essence, citizens see it is in their own personal and collective
interest to abide by “the rules of the game.” However, this does not imply that Irish
citizens for example will not strongly disagree with one another over specific aspects of
public policy that involve fundamental values such as sovereignty and identity (e.g.
Northern Ireland, European Union) or religious or moral values (e.g. divorce, abortion).
However, it is important to recognise that the social consensus underpinning a
country’s political culture could also be based on self or group interest that is regulated
by some form of contract. Such a ‘modus vivendi consensus’ is problematic because as
soon as the benefits of defection outweigh those of cooperation the consensus will
collapse. In short, general support for the state based on an overlapping consensus will
exhibit stability.
In contrast, support for policies such as (neo-corporatist) social
partnership or attitudes to globalisation, which based on a modus vivendi consensus, will
be contingent on prevailing economic circumstances.
This distinction has far reaching implications. Opinion formation and expression
built on a modus vivendi consensus will be based on a cost-benefit analysis, limited by
information costs and uncertainty about the future. In contrast, opinion formation
reflecting an overlapping consensus, and thus political culture will be based on principles
or values. Additionally, attitudes reflecting an overlapping consensus will not be based
on blind acceptance of authority or compliance with specific institutional arrangements
based on self or group interest (note, Rawls 1993: 147). On the basis of this theoretical
distinction, it is possible to put forward two hypotheses, which will be examined in this
paper.
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H1. Attitudes, which reflect the publics’ overlapping consensus, while internally
consistent, will appear inconsistent from other perspectives such as economic
ideology.
H2. Media reporting of allegations of political corruption will have little impact on
citizen’s sense of national identity and support for the state, though satisfaction
with particular state institutions or policies will decline.
If one accepts that Ireland is a liberal democratic political state, then given the liberal
political perspective just outlined here (in a very brief manner) one should not be
surprised that despite large “objective” changes in the economy and public institutions
citizens’ “subjective” perceptions should remain intact.
Adopting this liberal
philosophical approach implies that public attitudes based on a modus vivendi consensus
will be less stable than that based on an overlapping consensus in society. The next subsection outlines the context in which the opinions in the ASES survey were expressed.
The Irish Economy
Prior to 1960 Ireland’s economy was largely agricultural (25 per cent of GDP) and
oriented toward export of farm products to the UK, which accounted for 75 per cent of
all exports. Such policies were a failure as living standards remained low and there was a
high level of emigration throughout the 1950s.
From 1960 the Irish government
adopted an “export led strategy” where tax incentives were introduced to promote
industrialisation and foreign direct investment combined with a liberalisation of trade
tariffs. While the Irish economy grew at record levels it still lost ground, in terms of
GNP per capita, to the growth rates being experienced in the European Union (O’ Leary
1997: 51).
After the 1973 oil crisis unemployment and inflation in Ireland increased dramatically.
The government tried to stimulate a growth in employment through increased spending
hoping that this would boost demand for goods and hence encourage firms to employ
more workers.
This policy failed to work as Ireland’s small open economy made
management of demand very difficult to implement effectively. During the early 1980s
the international economy went into recession and successive Irish governments found
that they could no longer intervene in the economy as they had in the 1970s as the level
of national debt and the interest on such debt became prohibitive. In the 1973-1986
period there was a vicious cycle where economic output grew, while employment and
living standards declined (NESC 1992).
Given the severity of the economic situation the Irish government implemented a
dramatic change in economic policy in 1987. The rate of increase of government
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spending was cut and so the budgetary deficit was brought under control. At the same
time financial institutions decided to cut interest rates and this encouraged investment.
These factors combined with the long-term benefits of EU structural funding and a pick
up in the global economy saw an increase in Irish exports to such an extent that exports
exceeded imports for the first time. As a result in the 1990s economic growth in Ireland
converged for the first time on the EU average (per capita GDP). In contrast to the
previous period there has been a ‘virtuous’ trend since 1987 where there has been a
decline in unemployment and an increase in living standards and the emergence of
immigration.
Social Partnership
A central feature of Irish public policy-making since 1987 has been Social Partnership.
This is a neo-corporatist policy in which the government, trade unions, employers,
farmers, and voluntary organisations attempt to promote economic growth and
principles of social justice. Each social partnership agreement, lasts three years and
involves a complex compromise between the social partners on wage rates, taxation,
welfare reform, training and education (O’Donnell and Thomas 1999: 126-29; Cradden
1999: 46-63). The scope of these negotiations has increased considerably from an initial
focus on securing macroeconomic stability to a whole range of other policy issues
relating primarily to social equality. In general, social partnership has had support within
Irish public opinion, despite the misgivings of some economists
Institutions
Political life in the nineties has been dominated by a variety of investigations into public
institutions. In 1991 there was widespread media reporting of three situations where
individuals working in the public sector were alleged to have made public decisions on
the basis of private interest. Later in 1995-’96 similar issues arose again where there was
an apparent conflict of interest in the way government ministers undertook their public
and private business (e.g. Hugh Coveney - May 1995; Michael Lowry - November 1996).
More important have been a series of legal investigations or Tribunals of Inquiry. The
McCracken (1997) and Moriarty (1999) tribunals investigated illegal payments to
politicians, while the Flood tribunal (1998) examined allegations that land developers in
Dublin paid politicians and local government officials to secure favourable urban
planning decisions. All of the tribunals indicated that some parts of Irish politics and
business operated largely on the basis of self-interest. This resulted in considerable
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media speculation as to what effect these revelations would have on public confidence in
politicians.
The primary institution of public morality in Ireland has been the Catholic Church.
Its “privileged” position was evident in certain constitutional provisions, government
acceptance of the Church’s key role in the provision of educational, health and social
welfare services from the nineteenth century (Whyte 1984; Inglis 1998). In addition, the
influence of the Church was evident in the content of the Irish constitution enacted in
1937 and subsequent legislation, but also in its role during recent referendum campaigns
on divorce and abortion.
However, during the nineties a series of media reports
recounted facts that certain members of the Church’s hierarchy had fathered children. In
addition, there were allegations and some legal convictions for child abuse and
paedophilia by priests and members of religious orders. The general consensus has been
that the Catholic Church’s position in Irish society has been irrevocably damaged by all
of these revelations along with a growing secularising trend typified by a decline in
attendance at religious ceremonies.
Northern Ireland and the European Union
Since the foundation of the Irish state in 1922 one of the core political issues within
Ireland has been the constitutional status of Northern Ireland.
The question of
“acceptance” of the existence of the Northern state pending re-integration with the
Republic has been one of the key features of political competition. This fundamental
political question was in a sense “solved” with the peace process and the Belfast
Agreement (1998). In addition, there has been the impact of European integration on
citizens daily lives through not only legislation and policy-making, but also through
European elections and referendums.
DATA
The analyses undertaken in this paper are based on the results of the Irish wave of the
Asia Europe (ASES) survey that was carried out in November 2000. This national multistage stratified cluster quota sample survey was completed using face-to-face interviewing
within respondents homes.
As the ASES survey is based on a quota sample no
weighting variables are used in the analyses reported in this paper. The larger Asia
Europe Survey project was managed by the Gallup International organisation in nine
European and nine Asian countries between October and December of 2000. This
5
project was funded by the Japanese Ministry of Education and directed by Professor
Takashi Inoguchi, Institute of Oriental Culture, Tokyo University and Graduate School
of Public Policy, Chuo University. The ASES survey is unique in a number of respects.
First, the selection of countries represents one of a few surveys that facilitate systematic
analysis of public opinion in Asia and Europe. Second, the focus of this research was on
investigating political culture and attitudes toward globalisation. No other survey has
ever systematically examined these topics on such a wide range of countries. Third the
ASES series of surveys provide scholars with a snapshot of international public opinion
at the beginning of the twenty-first century. For all of these reasons, this survey offers
unrivalled opportunities for students of public opinion to investigate important themes at
both the national and cross-national levels.
IDENTITY
Mass attitudes toward identity in Ireland will be looked at in terms of two broad
dimensions and perceived changes in these dimensions over time. The first dimension
examines perceptions of identity. An examination will be made of ‘internal’ aspects that
relate to definitions of being ‘truly’ Irish, how important is this sense of Irish national
identity and has this changed in the last decade. The ‘external’ aspect of identity relates
to perceived respect and fair treatment of Irish people and the Irish government in the
international arena, and if this has changed during the nineties. The second dimension
relates to levels of identity, that is, whether or not Irish people have strong feelings of subnational, national or European identity.
Perceptions of identity
Looking first at ‘internal’ perceptions of identity and more specifically at sense of Irish
nationality by importance for respondents, one finds that almost 60 per cent felt it was
“extremely important” with a further third saying it was “somewhat important.” There
are some important subgroup differences in the importance of national identity. The
main source of variation occurs in the relative importance of the “somewhat” and
“extremely” important subgroups.
Looking at the “extremely important” response
option there is a 16 per cent difference between the youngest (18-24 years) and oldest
(55+ years) cohorts where older people tend to have a much stronger sense of national
identity. There is an equally strong difference between those who live in urban and rural
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areas – with rural dwellers having a 17 per cent stronger sense of national identity. Also,
those who live alone have a nine per cent stronger sense of identity to all others.
The main picture emerging here is that young urban dwellers find national identity
least important. The effects of education and income tend to be curvilinear, that is are
less important for those with high and low levels of education and income than those
with intermediate levels. With regard to change in the importance of national identity
during the nineties almost half agreed in late 2000 that it had stayed the same, while 30
per cent believed it had become “somewhat more important” and 17 per cent stated it
was “much more important.” The greatest subgroup differences occur between those
who have experienced unemployment in the last decade and those who have not where
the former feel being Irish has become more important (+ 6 per cent). Essentially the
picture is one of “positive stability.”
Given the importance of national identity in Ireland it is worthwhile to examine what
defines this sense of identity in the minds of citizens. The ASES survey indicates that
the Irish have a somewhat legalistic view of national identity. Almost 95 per cent see
having citizenship as being “extremely” or “somewhat important” for being truly Irish
with 86 per cent adopting the jus soli legal doctrine of birth within Ireland. Though
feeling Irish was also seen to be important by 88 per cent of respondents. Being Catholic
or able to speak Irish was seen to be much less important.
Two items – perceptions of international respect and fair treatment in international
affairs, capture the ‘external’ aspect of national identity.
Almost four-in-five Irish
respondents think that other countries respect the Irish, with almost two thirds thinking
that such respect has improved during the nineties. A similar pattern is shown for
perceived fairness in international relations.
In late 2000, more than three-in-four
thought that Ireland was treated fairly and a similar number felt that this situation had
improved since 1990.
Levels of identity
Eurobarometer in examining identity at different levels shows that in the 1975-‘79 period
the primary geographical unit of identification in Ireland in was “locality or town”
followed by country, region, Europe and the world. 1
This gives us a baseline for
examining change over the subsequent two decades. In the ASES survey, in late 2000 a
The Eurobarometer item used was “To which of the following geographical units would you say you belong to first
of all: the locality or town where you live; the region or county where you live; Ireland as a whole; Europe; the world as
a whole?” Respondents were asked to give a first and second preference. See, Duchesne & Frognier (1995: 195).
1
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majority of Irish respondents (62 per cent) did not see themselves as being “part of some
other community or group” with less than one-in-seven identifying with their local area,
village or town. Identification with a local area was strongest among those with lower
levels of education, income and among those living in rural areas. The differences
between the late 1970s and 2000 are most likely based on the different ways in which the
level of identity questions were asked, indicating the need for some caution in making
substantive interpretations of the ASES items. With the ASES survey the identity items
there is the possibility of a so-called priming effect in that answers to the first item on
national identity influenced the follow-up question on other sub-national levels of
identity. In the Eurobarometer question all levels of identity were contained in a single
question.
Identification on the basis of religion was only important for less than seven per cent
of respondents, being most important for the oldest cohort, those with primary
education or less and those living alone. Significantly, identification with “other” groups
is more important than religion. One interpretation of this evidence suggests that in
contemporary Ireland the importance of parochial and Catholic identifications is
relatively weak in comparison to a sense of national identity. More generally, almost twothirds of those interviewed were “very proud” to be Irish. This sense of pride was
highest among those in the oldest age cohort, those with higher levels of education and
income and among those living in rural areas.
In a subsequent item in the ASES survey, respondents were asked how proud they
were of various institutions in Ireland.
This facilitates some assessment of the
institutional basis for this widespread sense of national pride. A principal component
analysis (table not presented) indicates that there is a fairly strong underlying single
dimension of national pride, however the relatively low loading of general pride indicates
unsurprisingly that it relates not only to institutions.
Looking at a net sense of pride in some Irish institutions, the ASES survey results
suggests that there is greatest pride in Ireland’s “economic achievements” (66 per cent)
followed by “political influence in the world” (46 per cent), “armed forces” (43 per cent)
and “the way democracy works” (33 per cent). Irish respondents were equally divided
over pride in the “social welfare system.” Although there is considerable variation in the
net responses for each institution, in general those who earn high incomes and those
who live in rural areas tend to be the groups exhibiting most pride.
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Earlier research by Eurobarometer in late 1994 indicates that Ireland is unique in the
degree to which citizens see national pride as being “natural” as opposed to being “a
duty”. Ireland was 19 per cent higher than the average among eighteen other European
countries. Interestingly, the Greeks were also unique in adopting a strong “duty” view of
national pride. In general, within Ireland, such data suggests that national pride, and
identity more generally, have a strong affective basis.
Given Ireland’s membership of the European Union since 1973 and its comparatively
high level of national identity and pride, it is interesting to see how many Irish people see
themselves as being European?
After more than a quarter century of European
integration in late 2000, 45 per cent of Irish people saw themselves as being European
while a majority did “not think of themselves in this way.”
It is important to note that a sense of European identity with membership of the
European Union (EU) may mean one of two things.
Firstly, a sense of being
“European” may reflect more an evaluation of the benefits of membership of the EU.
Secondly, the development of a European identity may not be an ex nihilo process – that
is the development of a European identity is built upon, rather than against, a strong
sense of national identity. Duchesne and Frognier (1995: 221-223) found that the
development of European identity tended to be evaluative rather than affective and that
it was generally seen as being additional to national identity.
The data shown in table 1 illustrates that, despite the immediate effects of European
Parliament elections and enlargement in 1994/5, the primary identity among Irish people
is toward the nation with an added on sense of Europeaness. Confirmation of this is
given in the ASES survey where a majority of respondents (54 per cent) stated that they
did not think of themselves as being European in addition to being Irish. Less than a
third thought being European was “somewhat” or “extremely” important and this sense
of identity was strongest among those with a university education and with high levels of
income. Of those who stated that they had a sense of being European, a plurality (45 per
cent) thought it had become “somewhat more important” during the 1990s with almost
four-in-ten respondents feeling it had stayed the same. The subgroup most impressed by
integration since 1990 was those in the highest income quintile.
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CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS
Examination of confidence or trust in institutions has been one of the key indicators in
the assessment of democratic values in cross-national comparative studies.
In this
section, examination will be made of confidence or trust in institutions at two levels, the
national and international domains. Confidence in national institutions: There is data
for Ireland on national (and some international institutions) for two decades, which
facilitates observation of stability or change over time. Previous research has found that
Ireland has similar levels of confidence in public institutions to other European countries
and for many institutions “the level of confidence expressed is somewhat greater than
the European average” (Hardiman and Whelan 1994: 103).
Table 2 shows data on public confidence / trust from three different surveys while,
asking the same question, does so in ways which do not make them strictly comparable.
The EVS and ASES items are very similar in both the construction of the items and their
focus on confidence. Eurobarometer questions concentrate on the level of trust and use
dichotomous response options and this makes the marginal distributions somewhat
different.
However, it is possible to deduce informally some general trends by seeing if the
pattern in the different survey series is the same. Four of the sixteen institutions (with at
least two data points) show decline, three show an increase in confidence while eight
have remained the same. The general picture seems to be one of stability. Overall,
public confidence and trust in Irish institutions has remained largely constant since 1981.
Significantly, the only political institution to show substantial decline in confidence and
trust is the Irish parliament (Dáil).
This general picture hides a lot of important differences between various subgroups
within Irish society. The main result from an analysis of net confidence by subgroup for
the ASES data indicates the following ranking of institutions: Police, Military and Civil
Service are the most trusted institutions in Irish society while parties; political leaders and
the government are the least trusted.
This general profile is similar to the results
obtained by EVS in the past as shown in table 2, though the ASES survey has the
advantage of having more political institutions in its question. Such evidence suggests
that extensive media reporting of political corruption from 1997 onwards has not altered
the pattern of public confidence in institutions.
However, such overall stability masks large difference between subgroups.
The
younger cohorts display higher levels of distrust than the older generation. The ASES
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survey evidence also indicates that those with low levels of education (primary schooling
or less) and highest income level and living in rural areas display more confidence than all
others. Those who have been unemployed in the past tend to show more confidence in
the parliament (Dáil), government and political parties, as do those living alone and those
working in the private sector.
It would seem that confidence in the four institutions which show net levels of
distrust is focussed mainly on the young, those with secondary education, who earn
slightly more or less than the average income and who have not been unemployed during
the nineties, do not live alone and who work in the private sector. Significantly, this
would seem to be the generation who entered the workforce as the Irish economy
emerged from depression to boom from the late eighties onwards.
A factor analysis of this indicates that confidence in public institutions at the national
level is not a single dimension, but is composed of two distinct components. This is as
expected, as all the political factors that are characterised by distrust lie along one
dimension while all the institutions, which the Irish public trust, lie along another. It is
interesting to see that the ‘legal system and the courts’ is complex contributing almost
equally to both the trust and distrust dimensions.
Political efficacy: Trust in the Irish political system
A fundamental aspect of any political system and long-term support for democratic
values is the extent to which citizens believe that they have competence to understand
politics (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960; Almond and Verba 1963). This
has been termed “internal efficacy.” Equally important is the related belief that one can
influence what government does – “external efficacy” (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993:
15). The ASES survey has items that measure these variables.
It is important to keep in mind that within Ireland voter participation in all types of
elections has declined consistently since 1981. For example, turnout in national elections
has declined by 13 per cent from 1981 to 2002. One strong argument made to explain
this decline both in Ireland and elsewhere contends that decline in participation is related
to a declining sense of efficacy.
Table 3 illustrates the net level of distrust in politics by the Irish public. The most
salient pattern is that Irish voters do have a strong belief in the importance of voting as
the first three columns indicate. Note that negative values here imply net levels of trust.
There is a significant lack of confidence among Irish voters regarding their ability to
understand politics (column 5 - internal efficacy). There are also relatively low levels of
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external political efficacy as indicated by the data in columns six and seven. What is
perhaps of most significance is the high net figure among the Irish public who believed
in late 2000 that there was widespread corruption in national politics. Nonetheless, as
will be shown in the next section the public did not worry about corruption as a national
problem to the same degree as crime, the environment or public services.
This belief in widespread corruption is not confined to any one particular subgroup.
In contrast, belief in the importance of voting is lowest among the younger cohorts,
those who do not live alone, or work in the public sector. The effects of education and
income are more mixed in that those who have high levels of education and income
where there is high support for voting being a civic duty and that a single vote does
matter, but much less support for the belief that how people vote is the main
determining factor in how the country is run. A sense of internal efficacy is lowest
among the very young and old, women, those with low levels of education, and people
living in rural areas. The profile on the external efficacy items is similar for the education
and income subgroups.
SATISFACTION WITH POLITICS, LIFE SITUATION AND PUBLIC
POLICY MAKING
In the previous section, the evidence presented indicated a considerable degree of
distrust in national political institutions and the political process. This raises the question
of how do these public sentiments translate into overall satisfaction with politics in
contemporary Irish society? In general, the results from the ASES survey show there
was a net level of dissatisfaction with Irish politics overall in late 2000. Dissatisfaction
was highest among the young, women, those with secondary education, average income,
and also among those who have experienced unemployment. Surprisingly, the only
group in Irish society, which was satisfied with Irish politics, were those that had the
lowest levels of education.
While Irish people might be dissatisfied with politics is this dissatisfaction a feature of
their attitude toward life in general? The results from EVS studies which look at
‘satisfaction’ and ‘happiness’, which maybe taken as “alternative measures of overall
subjective well-being”, taken over two decades indicates that “Ireland forms part of a
group of countries that display a relatively positive profile” (Whelan 1994: 190).
Inglehart (1990: 31-32) has shown that there is a strong relationship (r=.67) between
gross national product (per capita) and life satisfaction. Nonetheless, economics still
only explains half the variance in life satisfaction suggesting that economic development
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is only one of the historical factors behind the hypothesis that wealthier nations show
higher levels of life satisfaction than poorer ones. From this economic perspective the
Irish with a per capita GNP less than half that of Germany and Japan in the mid-1980s
were “overachievers” and the Germans and Japanese were “underachievers.”
This
suggests as Inglehart (1990: 28) argues that there is a “durable cultural component
underlying these responses.”
Looking at Ireland in comparison to the European average from 1973 to 1998 using
Eurobarometer data (table not shown) one can see in an informal way the general
optimism of the Irish and also the impact of economic changes. Statistically short-term
fluctuations should be separated from long-term trends. Nonetheless, informally the
evidence seems clear. The 1979-’81 and 1981-’89 were periods of severe economic
austerity within Ireland and these correspond to phases when life satisfaction ratings
were lowest or in the latter case, lower than the European average.
In contrast, during the economic boom years of the nineties the “Celtic tiger”
(Ireland) displayed high levels of life satisfaction that were considerably higher than the
European average.
Apart from these fluctuations most likely based on economic
changes, Ireland’s level of life satisfaction is on average over eight percentage points
higher than the European average indicating an optimistic outlook in Irish ‘culture’ at
least within the framework of the European Union.
The ASES survey data facilitates looking more deeply into this Irish sense of
optimism with life at two levels – the individual or egocentric and the national or
sociotropic level. Looking first at egocentric anxieties, the results shown indicate a net
sense of optimism about life with regard to a number of distinct arenas. Moreover one
notices that the Irish public in late 2000 were most optimistic about proximate situations
such as work, their neighbourhood and family life and much less optimistic about distal
domains such as the “international situation.”
This survey data also illustrates that beneath the national pattern there were some
important subgroup differences. Looking at the “work situation” the young were less
anxious than the old, females were more optimistic than males and those with lower
levels of income and education tended to be more anxious than all others. With regard
to net optimism about the country the very young and old tended to be the least
optimistic as are those living in rural areas, people living on their own and those working
in the public sector.
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Secondly, sociotropic anxieties focussed mainly on issues such as crime (which had
been a key issue in the previous general election in 1997), the environment, public
services and human rights (table not reported). Significantly, given the economic boom
the economy did not cause too much worry, except for those living in rural areas. The
other surprising feature was the relative unconcern about political corruption despite
extensive media reporting of investigations into these matters.
The only subgroup
worried about political corruption was the young – who it is worth noting, is also the age
cohort with the lowest rate of election turnout.
Examination of retrospective assessments of national and international developments
in terms of a five-point scale ranging from “improved a lot” to “got a lot worse” over the
last decade indicates that the Irish public were more satisfied with developments at the
national level than those in the international arena. Again one notices that there was
greater satisfaction in proximate rather than distal domains. Nonetheless, there is some
commonality between the two levels as the correlation between these two items is .56
(p<.01).
An important aspect in citizen support for the state is the extent to which citizens are
satisfied with government effectiveness in policy-making. On the basis of the principal
component analysis a summated rating scale was created to measure public satisfaction
with government policy. The aim is to see the extent to which government satisfaction is
influenced by identity, political perceptions such as confidence in institutions, satisfaction
with policy output and retrospective assessments of developments during the nineties.
The results of this model are shown in table 4.
This regression model has a number of important implications. Firstly, government
satisfaction is based on having a sense of political efficacy, having trust in public
institutions and being knowledgeable about politics. However, there is simultaneously a
powerful undercurrent of dissatisfaction with politics in general. Secondly, satisfaction
with government has a strong economic or welfare basis most especially at the level of
personal concerns rather than national ones. Thirdly, support for government public
policy is almost entirely explained by attitudinal rather than demographic factors.
VALUES
In Ireland there is a widespread view that political competition is not strongly based on
social cleavages such as class (see, Breen and Whelan 1984; Laver 1986a-b; McAllister
and O’Connell 1994). While there has been considerable debate on this issue, this
14
distracts from the fact that other features of the political systems such as mass beliefs
relating for example to left-right ideology or moral conservatism might be important
bases for political action. In this section the focus will be on describing the contours of
political beliefs in Ireland.
Left-Right Orientation
When citizens are deciding what kinds of policies they would like to see implemented by
government it is often discussed within the study of politics in terms of an underlying
ideology. The underlying dimension noted most often has been that of economic leftright (Inglehart 1990: 287ff.). 2 Left-right orientation is seen to be a general concept in
two ways. Firstly, this dimension has been found to be important in many political
systems across the globe. Secondly, this dimension is said to encapsulate new issues
when they arise.
Comparing the distribution of left-right self-assignment in Asia, Europe and Ireland
one notices that Ireland occupies an intermediate location between Asia and Europe.
The Irish public is less left-wing than the European average and less right-wing than the
Asian average. Adopting a centrist position is almost an equally popular option in both
Asia and Ireland. The evidence available from EVS suggests that the relative differences
between Ireland and Europe have remained in broad terms constant over the last two
decades (Hardiman and Whelan 1994: 153-54). This does not mean however that overall
left-right self-placement of the public has not changed over time. Eurobarometer data
indicates that the number of Irish people adopting a left-wing orientation has remained
largely constant, while there has been a decline in the number of right-wing adherents
with more respondents adopting a centrist position.
The ASES survey also asked respondents “how important this idea of left and right
is for you personally.” This information is useful in the Irish context as the left-right
dimension is often noted to be “contaminated” with liberal-conservative issues relating
to moral questions such as abortion. In any case, the ASES data indicates Ireland again
has a somewhat intermediate position with left and right positions being almost equally
important, while in Europe those on left see their position as being more important while
in Asia it is those on the right who see their self-placement as more important. More
The two most salient dimensions in Irish politics are Northern Ireland and economic left-right. See, results obtained
using “expert surveys”, (Laver & Hunt 1992; Laver 1997; Laver 1999), research derived from the analysis of “party
manifesto” data (see, Mair 1986; Budge, Robertson & Hearl: 1987; Laver 1992, Garry & Mansergh 1999; de Vries,
Giannetti & Mansergh 2001) and findings derived from survey research (Sinnott 1989; Hardiman & Whelan 1994: 153;
Sinnott 1995: 160-166).
2
15
generally, within Ireland left-right seems to be of limited importance in the sense that
only a third of the electorate see this ideological dimension as being important.
Left-right self-placement varied considerably between some subgroups in Ireland.
Identification with being left or right wing and seeing this as important has a sharp
division among the age cohorts. The young were more left-wing and the older more
right-wing. There was also a significant gender difference with females more often
stating that left-right is not important for them. Also of significance are the partisan
differences on the basis of left-right ideology. There has been some debate about the
lack of evidence of an ideological component to party competition in Ireland. The
orientation of left and right seems sensible in light of the evidence from expert surveys
and content analysis of party manifestos. Sinn Féin, the Greens, the Workers’ Party and
Labour are on the left while Fianna Fail and Fine Gael are on the right. Similar results
have been obtained from analysis of EVS data (Hardiman and Whelan 1994: 154). The
Progressive Democrats (PD’s) are by most other measures normally ranked as the most
right wing of all Irish parties is unusual in that its supporters profess in the ASES survey
that left-right is not important. This result is most likely influenced by the small sample
size (n = 15). In electoral terms, it is important to remember that about 70 per cent of
the electorate supported right of centre parties when the ASES survey was taken.
Political, economic and social values
Having looked at left-right self-placement an attempt will now be made to examine other
dominant values within Irish political culture. The literature reviewed by Coakley (1999)
and the items available in the ASES survey facilitate testing the importance of four scales
within contemporary Irish society. These scales may be denoted as ‘economic left-right’,
‘social and political conservatism’, ‘authoritarianism’ and ‘isolationism / ethnocentrism’.
All of the items noted were used to create summated rating scales. Tests for the internal
consistency of these scales indicates that none of them is statistically robust.
An alternative strategy was also used where all the value items in the ASES survey
were subjected to a principal component analysis. The results shown in table 5 indicate
the presence of five underlying dimensions in the data. The most important dimension
appears to refer to a latent factor that could be loosely called “Egalitarianism” where
respondents support economic freedom and government intervention to ensure that all
citizens have an opportunity to pursue economic opportunities.
Significantly, given the relative weakness of the economic left-right scale, the
egalitarianism dimension is a mix of social and economic liberal principles combined
16
with support for social welfare policies. This is not that surprising given that four in ten
respondents stated that left-right self-placement was not important and a further twentyseven percent adopted a centrist position. This means that in 2000 only a third of the
Irish population see the world in left-right terms.
In any case, creating a summated rating scale from these items resulted in the most
robust value scale. The principal components analysis also highlighted the salience of
isolationism / ethnocentrism. These results are important in showing the complex
nature of the Irish values system. There is empirical evidence that supports the view that
Irish political culture has aspects of conservatism, authoritarianism and isolationism.
However, the left-right dimension while present seems to be better conceptualised as
an egalitarian dimension which is less based on purely economic concerns but more
based on ensuring equal opportunities for all citizens to participate in both the political
and economic domains. In general, attempts to identify distinct systems of value beliefs
which relate to key features identified in the political culture literature for Ireland did not
work very well using the ASES dataset.
CONCLUSION
The evidence presented in this paper shows that while there may be considerable
economic “objective” changes in a society this does not imply that there will be an
equally great level of attitudinal “subjective” change. Perhaps this is not a surprising
result. And even more importantly from the point of view of political stability this result
is a reassuring one. The key theme outlined in this paper has been that attitudes, which
relate to core values within political culture, or in Rawlsian terms the basis for
overlapping consensus are characterised by long-term stability. Attitudes which are
based on self-interest and which tend to be stable only over the short term are examples
of what Rawls called a modus vivendi consensus. On the basis of this theoretical
distinction two hypotheses were put forward to test this conception of attitude structure
within Irish society.
First hypothesis: The evidence presented in this paper indicates that the Irish public appear
to adhere to “inconsistent” views of economic competition and government
intervention. This is true from the perspective of left-right ideology. One interpretation
of this inconsistency is that this is an example of “pragmatism” which is based on a modus
vivendi consensus. A more plausible explanation is that this inconsistency is an indicator
of an overlapping consensus – that is a core feature of Irish political culture. The
17
explanation here is that the inconsistency noted is based on the assumption that an
economic left-right dimension is the most important way in which Irish people see the
world. However, the concept of left-right is known from existing empirical research to
be relatively weak in Ireland. The ASES survey shows that the concept of left-right is
only very important for a third of the electorate with four-in-ten stating it is not at all
important. This pattern is in part a legacy of the weakness of left-wing parties in Ireland
since the foundation of the state and also derives from the popular view that the left in
Ireland is associated with liberal moral values on such issues as abortion. Thus Irish
“pragmatism” in simultaneously supporting economic competition and government
intervention is not so much based on short term self interest, but on an enduring system
of values that are at the core of Irish political culture. In short the evidence supports the
first hypothesis.
Second hypothesis: Within the Republic of Ireland there is a strong sense of national
identity, with a much weaker sense of sub-national or European identity.
This is
evidence of a central and enduring core value, or basis for overlapping consensus.
Furthermore, confidence or trust in public institutions has been reasonably stable over
time. However, political institutions such as the parliament and political parties are
increasingly distrusted. This would seem to be related to: (a) A relatively low sense of
political efficacy despite a strong sense of civic duty with regard to electoral participation
and; (b) Widespread perceptions of political corruption even though there is relatively
little concern or worry about political corruption in comparison to other issues such as
crime, the environment and provision of public services.
These results support the second hypothesis. The explanation based on ASES evidence
is that despite being dissatisfied with politics Irish people are proud of their national
identity, are generally satisfied with most public institutions and exhibit high levels of
satisfaction with life. These are attitudes that reflect an overlapping consensus in Irish
society.
Media reports of political corruption allegations, while salient, have not
undermined support for the state. In contrast, attitudes relating to self-interest and
circumstances (modus vivendi consensus) appear to be based on influences beyond the
individuals’ daily experiences. For example, personal worries or anxieties tend to be
related more to general international and national concerns and less with issues relating
to the household.
In line with Rawls’ concept of modus vivendi consensus, such
18
attitudes are likely to be responsive to the media and perceived economic changes at the
household level.
Although there is an important distinction between Rawls’ two forms of consensus in
society, this does not imply that attitudes will be solely influenced by one form. A
regression model of public evaluation of the success of Irish government policies shows
that support is most strongly related to citizens’ sense of efficacy, confidence in
institutions and level of political knowledge. In other words, evaluation of policy output
is determined by both long-term support (overlapping consensus) and short-term cost
benefit assessments (modus vivendi consensus).
If an attempt is made to look in more detail at what pattern of attitudes reflect an
overlapping consensus in Ireland one finds on the basis of the previous literature that
there has been an evolution. For example, the ASES dataset does not lend support to
the existence of core values such as, ‘conservatism’, ‘authoritarianism’ or ‘isolationism /
ethnocentrism’. These values have been key themes in discussions of Irish political
culture in the past (Coakley 1999). The evidence presented here indicates two points.
First, the theoretical basis for an overlapping consensus can change with no loss in
political stability. Second, such attitudinal trends are most likely the product of structural
changes in society as outlined in section two of this paper.
In summary, Ireland’s political culture exhibits aspects of evolving long-term stability
based on values and principles and short-term attitude changes based on ‘rational’
assessments of prevailing conditions nationally and internationally. Support for the Irish
state through a strong sense of national identity and belief in a democratic system of
governance has remained intact despite growing alienation from political parties and the
parliament, and a widespread sense of political inefficacy. Rapid change in the Irish
economy throughout the nineties has not modified Irish peoples’ sense of economic
fairness or “egalitarianism”.
Significantly, public attitudes toward globalisation and
immigration reflect a more short-term outlook indicating that Ireland’s political culture is
best seen as being a compound of overlapping consensus and modus vivendi.
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21
Table 1,
Comparison of national and European identity in Ireland, 1992-1998
(per cent)
Level of identity
1992
1993
1994
1995
1997
1998
Irish only
54
48
39
45
51
53
Irish & European
38
45
53
49
42
41
European & Irish
5
5
6
4
3
4
European only
3
2
3
3
2
2
977
966
966
1,923
974
1,947
N
Sources: EB 37.0, EB40, EB42, EB43.1, EB44.1, EB47.1, EB49, EB50.0. Item: “In the near future do you see
yourself as … ?” (Don’t know responses excluded).
22
Table 2,
Irish public confidence and trust in domestic and international
institutions, 1981-2003 (per cent)
EVS
Institutions
Church institutions
Army / military
Education
Trade Unions
Police
Parliament
Civil service
Social welfare system
European Union (EU)
United Nations (UN)
Health care
Justice / legal system
Political parties
Companies (large)
Government
Political leaders
Media
Press
Radio
Television
EB 47 & 52
ASES
1981
1990
1999
1997
2002
2000
Change
78
75
67
37
86
52
54
59
57
50
-
72
61
73
43
86
50
59
71
59
47
52
-
58
63
88
47
86
33
62
59
60
64
58
56
20
-
58
83
54
78
38
61
57
59
20
39
39
-
38
80
46
71
45
64
52
66
58
24
35
43
-
73
71
35
64
55
27
56
34
30
Decline
Decline
Increase
Increase
Same
Decline
Same
Same
Decline
Increase
Same
Same
?
Same
-
43
-
36
-
35
-
37
73
69
45
71
67
51*
-
?
Same
Same
* Refers to “the mass media”. The concept measured in Eurobarometer (EB) was “trust”, while in EVS and ASES it
was “confidence.”
Sources: Eurobarometer (EB) item wording “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in
certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?”
ASia Europe Survey (ASES) item wording “Now, could you tell me how much confidence you have in each of the
following? There may be one or two items on the list that you haven’t thought much about. If so, just tell me and
we’ll go to the next item”. Response options were “A great deal”, “Quite a lot”, “Not much”, “None at all”, “Don’t
know” or “Haven’t thought much about it”. European Values Survey (EVS) item wording “Please look at this card
and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or
none at all?”
23
Table 3,
Subgroup
Net level of distrust among Irish citizens in politics and institutions by
subgroup (per cent)
a
Age
18-24 yrs
-73
25-34 yrs
-75
35-54 yrs
-83
55-64 yrs
-86
65+ yrs
-88
Gender
Male
-79
Female
-83
Education level
Primary or less
-77
Lower secondary
-77
Higher secondary
-82
Third level
-83
Income quintile (monthly)
Lowest
-75
Low
-73
Average
-85
High
-93
Highest
-90
Location
Urban
-80
Rural
-83
Employment
Unemployed
-80
Employed
-81
TOTAL
-81
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
N
-21
-45
-53
-63
-45
-17
-14
-35
-30
-39
23
25
19
15
18
50
31
25
36
52
47
56
45
63
56
59
66
53
55
67
74
69
68
72
62
171
214
378
123
124
-46
-46
-29
-27
22
19
24
46
46
57
58
60
68
70
495
515
-37
-30
-48
-57
-38
-33
-30
-12
21
17
20
23
62
55
33
12
57
60
55
35
63
70
60
47
69
73
71
61
140
146
485
239
-36
-37
-50
-64
-78
-30
-22
-29
-17
-32
20
20
23
17
21
54
21
24
36
-3
56
59
50
39
31
63
60
61
47
45
72
70
66
66
64
405
130
299
109
67
-45
-51
-28
-25
21
19
30
58
52
49
60
52
69
67
830
180
-45
-46
-46
-34
-24
-28
18
22
21
30
37
35
56
49
51
59
59
59
68
69
69
332
672
1010
Note that negative values indicate net levels of trust and positive values net levels of distrust. The data refers to the
net or balance of answers given. The procedure adopted ensures that the net figure receives a lower weight if the
share of respondents who replied “neither agree nor disagree” or “don’t know” was large. Income quintiles were
defined as follows: Lowest (<1,500 euro); Low (1,501-2,000 euro); Average (2,001-3,000 euro); High (3,001-3,500
euro); Highest (>3,500 euro).
Source: ASES survey, Nov.-Dec. 2000, Q201, Now, I have some statements here that people make from time to time.
You might agree or disagree with them. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements.
a) Citizens have a duty to vote in elections; b) There is widespread corruption among those who manage our national
politics; c) Generally speaking, people like me don’t have some say in what the government does; d) Politics and
government are so complicated that sometimes I cannot understand what's happening; e) Since so many other people
vote in elections, it really doesn‘t matter whether I vote or not; f) Generally speaking, the people who are elected
to the Parliament stop thinking about the public's interest immediately; g) I don’t think governmental officials care
much what people like me think; h) The way people vote is the main thing that decides how this country is run.
24
Table 4, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis of satisfaction with
government policy in Ireland
Independent variables
Socio-demographics
Age
Gender (female)
Income (quintiles)
Unemployed in last decade
Religious attendance
Third level education
Lives in rural area (Pop. < 1,500)
Live alone
Works in private sector
Identity
Irish identity * importance
European identity * importance
Political variables
Party attachment (1=yes, 0=no)
Sense of political inefficacy scale; (α = .74)
Trust in institutions scale; (α = .82)
L-R self placement * importance
Interested in politics
Satisfied with politics
Follow politics in national media
Political knowledge scale (low to high)
Retrospective assessments of development
Pessimistic retrospective assessment of Irelands development
Pessimistic Retrospective assessment of international development
Anxiety and satisfaction with life
Personal worries / anxieties (egocentric) scale; (α = .74)
National worries / anxieties (sociotropic) scale; (α = .80)
Satisfied with life (optimistic)
Constant
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of the Estimate
N
B
Sig.
.005
.413
.011
.390
.029
-.229
.041
.650
-.239
.575
.072
.908
.101
.668
.425
.891
.068
.158
.214
-.149
.237
.115
-.167
-.149
-.357
-.036
-.081
.376
-.001
.205
.501
≤ .001
≤ .001
.347
.765
.001
.996
.026
.622
.355
≤ .001
.009
-.123
-.032
.412
.082
.505
≤ .001
14.540
≤ .001
.31
.29
3.27
891
Note the dependent variable is an additive scale (4-20) for satisfaction with govt. policy (ASES q206 a-f); α = .79. All
coefficients are unstandardised. ‘α’ refers to Cronbach’s alpha a measure of reliability for summated rating scale
construction. The political knowledge scale was weighted to give more importance to national political knowledge.
Figures in bold are in most cases statistically significant p<.05 level. The coefficients for some non-significant sociodemographic variables have not been presented.
25
Table 5,
Principal component analysis of the major value dimensions in Irish
society, October-December 2001 (ASES survey)
Rotated factor
Variables
Egalitarianism
Chauvin- Postmat- Economic Internatism
erialism liberalism ionalism
Everyone should have the right to express his opinion
even if he or she differs from the majority (q208b)
.754
.076
.035
-.276
.129
Competition is good because it stimulates people to
develop new ideas (q306a)
.681
-.086
-.067
.096
-.019
People should be allowed to organize public meetings to
protest against the government (q208c)
.681
.076
.155
-.162
.146
The government should take responsibility for ensuring
that everyone either has a job or is provided with
adequate social welfare (q306b)
.539
-.029
.289
.378
-.272
Ireland should limit the import of foreign products
(q208a)
.031
.761
.196
.045
-.096
Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in Ireland
(q208d)
.131
.675
-.137
.286
.053
Ireland's television should give preference to Irish made
films and programs (q208f)
-.106
.651
.090
-.131
.132
A good environment is more important than economic
growth (q412b)
-.060
.063
.808
-.112
.075
Incomes should be made more equal (q412a)
.258
.107
.660
.144
-.014
Individuals should strive most of all for their own good
rather than for the good of society (q412g)
-.049
.209
.136
.671
-.046
Society is better off when businesses are free to make as
much profit as they can (q306g)
-.127
-.104
-.176
.654
.259
For certain problems international bodies such as the
UN should have the right to enforce solutions
(q208e)
.181
.089
-.061
-.019
.801
With regard to most of the big problems we face, what
the IRISH government decides doesn’t make much
difference (q306c)
-.064
-.019
.304
.341
.555
Total
Percentage of the total variance explained
Cumulative percentage of variance explained
1.94
14.92
14.92
1.56
11.98
26.90
1.41
1.87
37.77
1.38
1.64
48.41
1.17
8.97
57.38
Note this principal component analysis was undertaken using varimax rotation. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of
Sampling Accuracy (KMO) is .64, which indicates no significant problem with small partial correlations among the
variables. The Bartlett test of sphericity shows the correlation matrix is not an identity one and factor analysis is
appropriate (Chi-square approx. = 1080.31, p<.001).
26