DOCTRINE
13
DOCTRINE
2007
# 13
C.D.E.F
Forces Employment
Doctrine Center
WINNING THE BATTLE
BUILDING PEACE
FOREIGN STUDIES EXCLUSIVE
AN INTERVIEW
HANS-OTTO BUDDE
GERMAN ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF
OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL
FT-01
FT-01 is also now available for general public distribution in a French version entitled Les Forces Terrestres dans les conflits aujourd'hui et demain
(Land Forces in Present and Future Conflicts), prefaced by General Cuche,
Army Chief of Staff.
FT-01
TAKING THINGS FURTHER
Doctrine
Armée de Terre, Winning the Battle, Building Peace (FT-01 (ENG)), Centre
de doctrine d’emploi des forces, Paris, décembre 2007, 84 pages, is now
available.
W I N N I N G T H E B AT T L E - B U I L D I N G P E A C E
OCTOBER
2007
General military review
WITH FT-01
>> Lessons learned
The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989
Freedom of speech
Table of contents # 13
Directeur de la publication :
Général (2s) Jean-Marie Veyrat
Doctrine
Rédactrice en chef :
Lieutenant Marie-Noëlle Bayard
Tél. : 01 44 42 35 91
Winning the Battle - Building Peace
Land Forces in Today’s and Tomorrrow’s Conflicts
p. 7
Stabilization and Land Forces’ Adaptation
p. 13
Logistics, a well Running Organization
p. 16
Adapting Military Education: A Crucial Choice between Deepening or Widening
the Scope of our Knowledge
p. 18
Relecture des traductions :
Colonel (ER) Philippe Jolly
The support function
The realization of an armament operation is
naturally followed for the industrial partner by
taking into account the manufacturer’s support
(period of legal and contractual guarantee) and
the maintenance in operational conditions of
equipment on the theater. The issue should be
considered at an early stage and solutions should
be found allowing then to guarantee the good
running on the ground knowing that the
manufacturer’s support on site may be envisaged.
There is however limits to the action of civilians on
the theater of operations. The following list aims at
triggering the reader’s reflection while considering
a certain number of possible answers but also
specific constraints which can be solved only case
by case.
• Setting a priori spare parts and tool kits.
• Hot line, or the capability to repair remotely
directly in the field 6.
• Problems of time gaps according to theaters
and local work laws.
• Closures during holiday periods (locate
the employees).
Land Forces and New Types of Conflicts
p. 4
New conflicts
Traductions :
New War, New Model
p. 24
COL (CR) Daniel Sillon
LCL (CR) Jean-Claude Laloire
LCL (CR) Donatien Lebastard
LCL (CR) Jacques de Vasselot
LCL (CR) Alain Pérignon
War and City
p. 28
Schémas : Nathalie Dujardin
Crisis Response Operations Management by the European Union (EU)
p. 30
The French Air Force during Stabilization Phases
p. 33
“Winning the Battle - Building Peace” the Adaptation of the Operational Readiness
of the Company Teams at the CENTAC
p. 36
CSS Units Protection in Operations
p. 39
Adapt and coach
Adapting Military Education & Training to Nowadays Commitments
p. 41
The Land Forces Requirements’ Evolution in matters of Capacities
p. 45
Responsive Adaptation
p. 49
Crédits photos : (1re de couverture)
ECPAD & SIRPA Terre
(4e de couverture)
ECONOMICA
The DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) Process
p. 53
Diffusion : Etablissement de Diffusion,
d’Impression et d’Archives
du Commissariat de l’Armée de Terre
de Saint-Etienne
“MILITARY THOUGHT: THE OFFICERS PUBLISH”
Impression :
Point d’impression de l’armée de terre
de Saint-Maixent-l’Ecole - 07-0542
THE GERMAN ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF EXPRESSES HIMSELF IN OUR COLUMNS:
Création : amarena
Tirage : 2 000 exemplaires
Dépôt légal : à parution
ISSN : 1293-2671 - Tous droits
de reproduction réservés.
Revue trimestrielle
Conformément à la loi «informatique
et libertés» n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978,
le fichier des abonnés à DOCTRINE a fait
l’objet d’une déclaration auprès de la CNIL,
enregistrée sous le n° 732939.
Le droit d’accès et de rectification
s’effectue auprès du CDEF.
Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi des Forces BP 53 - 00445 ARMEES.
Fax : 01 44 42 52 17 ou 821 753 52 17
Web : www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr
Mel : [email protected]
Armed Forces and State Reconstruction
p. 58
Bibliography
p. 62
Main Abbreviations and Acronyms
p. 64
Interview with General Sir Rupert Smith
p. 68
Foreign studies
Protection and Operational Efficiency within the German Army
A Response to Current and Future Challenges
p. 71
Future Challenges for Land Forces: a British View
p. 75
Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq
p. 80
Winning the Peace - The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations
p. 88
So you Want to Be an Adviser
p. 94
Comprehensive Action: A Key Disposition to Resolve the Colombian Conflict
p. 97
Lessons from the British Experience in Malaya
p.100
The German Concept for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)
p.104
Lessons learned
Roles and lessons Learned from European Union’s Military Operations
p.108
Order and Security in Kosovo Which Missions for the Land Forces?
p.112
The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989
p.116
Freedom of speech
The Land Forces in Today and Tomorrow’s Conflicts...
For Going Deeper in our Toughts
p.119
Forces Commitment and the Other’s Rationale
p.124
The Reactive Adaptation - The Industry Point of View
p.128
MBDA/M. Toineau
Maquette : Christine Villey
Tél. : 01 44 42 59 86
Act and control
are as many risks capable to disturb the good
running of the operation:
• time needed to supply components composing
the system;
• concept of strategic materials;
• price of raw materials and equipment ordered in
emergency conditions;
• presence or not of “state” or industrial stock;
• concept of tight flow not allowing a manufacturer
to store worthy components likely to be used one
day...maybe;
• Recurrent problem of obsolescence especially in
the area of electronics and IT.
We also find for procurement function a particular
sensitivity regarding complex ammunition. For
information, a period of around two years is to be
considered between the day we buy and the day we
receive a MISTRAL missile self-steering device in
the scope of an order justifying to re-launch a
production chain.
1 Équipe de programme intégrée : integrated program team.
2 IM Instruction ninistérielle : Government Department
Directive.
3 Decree 2004-16 dated 7 January 2004 know as “defense
decree”.
Art 2-III: Negotiation without prior advertising and without
tendering.
Art 3: Exchange of letters in case of emergency
incompatible with the drafting of documents composing a
contract.
4 Fiche de caractéristiques militaires : military
characteristics sheet.
5 Spécification technique du besoin : requirement technical
specification.
6 This kind of support very promising in terms of efficiency,
already usual in the civilian world, should see shortly
developments for combat service support and repair of
military assets on the theater of operations. This is due to
reactive adaptation which may only consist in repairing an
unavailable weapons system requiring for instance a return
to the factory.
Achieving in the framework of a reactive adaptation an armament operation is something possible. This is
however subject to meet some military demands to clearly specify the just needed requirement, some
contractual demands to operate lawfully and in compliance with the rules of public procurement and some
industrial demands to be fully aware of capabilities and to assess efficiency. An integrated and lean team built
with three representatives of the Service staff, of the French Defense procurement agency “DGA” and the
manufacturer should benefit from a sufficient freedom of action to act efficiently within the boundaries of
technical and financial capacities. The goal is to achieve good performance enabling then to respond to the
requirement identified by combatants in the field.
OCTOBER 2007 131 DOCTRINE # 13
Editorial
need also long periods of time to be met. We could not
understand that speed is often by itself counterproductive because it does not allow to understand well
and even less to adapt. We thought that our army was
fitted to the 21st century’s more and more dangerous
environment and to its always changing types of conflict,
while it had been built according to a format dictated by
the wrong good idea of the peace dividends and shaped
according to the central paradigm of pin-point destruction
from safety distance. We had not perceived that the
expeditionary character of the forces made them paradoxically ill fitted for the new 21st century’s expeditions.
I
t’s commonplace to say that September 11th 2001
constituted a break up; what is less usual is to consider
that the consequences of this dramatic event have
really made it unavoidable to progressively transform
the employment conditions of the armed force.
The collapse of the Soviet empire had first left space to an
all-might’s euphoria, the belief that Western world could do
everything owing to the ingredients which had given it
success. Able to do everything, it owed everything: the
“interference right” decade was born from the conjunction
of this new moral duty with the certainty that usual power
attributes - as they were perceived fifty years ago - allowed
easily to impose anywhere the just law and the right ethics,
ours.
Unfortunately, the horizon progressively gets overcast.
The political efficiency of our military power was
questioned step by step. The Balkans and the force’s
inability to solve easily the differences here should have
shown us that something had changed. However we have
long thought that these conflicts were exception whereas
they had become the rule of a new reality. We have just
changed the semantics by categorizing crisis as
“operations other than war” and by making, wrongly, an
opposition between “coercion” and “violence control”
operations modes.
Afghanistan, then Iraq and Lebanon were necessary for us
to fully understand that, if our military power is unable
to reach easily the political required final end state,
it’s because the model of war had changed; therefore if
we apply a force that had been designed in a context
that had disappeared, and according to methods that
had also been designed for this very context, that force
is to be useless. War had indeed taken a new face while
the constant evolution of the circumstances turned
adaptability into a crucial quality of the armed forces in
front of opponents much more clever than us for
innovation.
We had built up an expeditionary type force, therefore
founded on density and swiftness for logistics constraints;
it was aimed at conducting short brutal campaigns, being
sure that the constant acceleration of the decision making
loop would by itself allow to win. It was without taking into
account Clausewitz’s reciprocal actions law; we considered
“the other” as another ourselves; we despised the
adaptation capability of “the other”. We were not aware
that in front of an opponent who does not “play our game”,
who evades the power and its best applications, in front of
an opponent who chooses not to follow our logics but to
establish himself voluntarily in the long term, the tool that
we had conceived was actually able to operate faster and
faster, but also often at the wrong moment and more and
more with the wrong effects. We forgot that due to their
political impatience, our democracies could difficultly
act in such spaces where the time span is the long run,
in order to reach social and political objectives that
C•D•E•F
Nevertheless we have progressively understood that
the achievement of the desired political effect required
much more than technical and tactical victory, than
the punctual effect. At the same time, we have perceived
the shift from the old industrial war model to the new one,
the war among populations: there, every operation,
either major or minor, is first to be conceived as a
communication operation. We have realized that
societies and people were the new environment for action;
we have observed, downstream, the consequences of
these evolutions on conception and use of weapons as
well as the coordination with non-military actors. We have
regained the absolute need for “control of the
environment” i.e. to be present on the ground, in
numbers and for a long time. We have understood that, in
opposition to the too common false obviousness, to be in
numbers is by itself a quality, and that, for many
reasons, it is the condition for efficiency as well as
protection. We have understood that fire-power was
indispensable but that it could not compensate for
scarcity in manpower. We are from now on aware that “to
understand” is much more important than “to know”.
We have learn that it is in the stabilization phase - the
decisive phase of the operations - that conditions for
strategic success are built up ; for these, de-escalation of
violence as well as assistance to the populations and the
re-establishment of their “social contract” are vital. We
have understood that force employment alone is not any
more the basics of armed forces efficiency but they
nevertheless need to retain the best tools to apply
the force: they are indispensable for the success of the
intervention phase and after it, they contribute decisively
to deterrence and if needed to coercion.
However there is still a need to develop each one of these
lessons learned, because the consequences of these
evolutions weigh heavily on the armed forces in general and especially on the Army - in terms of doctrine,
equipment, military education, operational function
changes, training, joint and civilian-military co-operation.
These are the topics developed in the present issue of
Doctrine which intends to go further, in all these different
domains, than what permitted the voluntarily reduced
volume of the brochure which is at its heart: “FORCES
TERRESTRES 01 : gagner la bataille, conduire à la paix”
(Land forces 01: Winning the battle, Building peace).
Major General Vincent DESPORTES
Commander, Forces Employment Doctrine Center
OCTOBER 2007
3
DOCTRINE # 13
Land
Forces
and New Types of Conflicts
ar hasn’t changed. It remains a political action resulting from a struggle between two independent
willpowers.
W
We are still impressed by that concept which eventually prevailed for the last forty years and according to
which war was a technical confrontation between two arsenals and consequently, the more powerful the
arsenal, the greater the chances to win. Gradually, too much gradually, today’s crises however make us
understand - slowly, much too slowly - that an accumulation of technical power could very well be the
illustration of a corresponding accumulation of political impotence if we wouldn’t understand at the same
time that the military force employment conditions have changed.
Nevertheless the obviousness that even our most sophisticated weapons may have it very difficult to
achieve the desired political objective must make us - the military as well as the politicians who, at the end,
make the decisions about force structure and employment - reflect upon and understand that we have
to adapt to the new conditions of the war if we want the military force to keep on being useful to
the State.
History demonstrates that, should it want to be able to have an effect on the Nation’s destiny, should it want
to have an important position on the world stage, the State must have a military force at its disposal, a
useful military force.
And this is the very heart of the issue.
BY
MAJOR GENERAL VINCENT DESPORTES, COMMANDER, FORCES EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE CENTER
New circumstances
Although war hasn’t changed, war circumstances have.
What has changed the most is that these circumstances are
nowadays particularly variable, evolving, uncertain and
always renewed.
Yesterday’s circumstances, those upon which had been and
are still being built our forces balancing and structures
were, except at their periphery:
- the fixed circumstances of an absolute force on force
conflict which opposed a strong opponent to another
strong one,
- circumstances that made it paramount, in front of the
maritime and air enemy that then prevailed, to keep one’s
freedom of action on the seas and in the air until the last
moment,
- circumstances that had turned destruction capability into
being the military efficiency’s major factor,
DOCTRINE # 13
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OCTOBER 2007
- circumstances which, consequently, induced armed forces
into developing in priority destruction capabilities, the
tools to destroy the opponent’s means that were intended
to express its willingness, i.e. its naval, air and ground
arsenals,
- circumstances where land forces constituted the service in
charge of achieving the operational coherence of an
overall system of forces, of which they weren’t then the
central element.
But war circumstances have changed. It is not possible
anymore to envision - at least in a foreseeable future - an
absolute, force on force confrontation of symmetric types
of arsenals, even if it remains fundamental - but in a lesser
proportion - to keep the capability to deal with that type
of confrontation.
As a matter of fact, these capabilities are indispensable to
maintain a conventional deterrence capability which - on
the top of the nuclear deterrence capability - led to put to
Doctrine
sleep the concept of a “major classical type of war”; in
addition, it is also absolutely obvious that western forces will
have periodically to be able to use the full conventional
power and the violence it allows during a short period of
the confrontation in order to brutally impose their willpower
onto a “traditional” or State opponent.
well known today - is being built ex post, renders this
reversibility capability indispensable.
This allows us to notice the importance that the world
changes gave back to the land forces. Of course, today
more than ever, land forces cannot operate without being
supported by air and maritime components. These two
services appear more and more as being indispensable
since they provide the coherence for an action whose main
focus is on the ground, at the contact and in the duration.
France’s willingness to operate throughout the world to
support its politics imposes that 80% of the deployed
forces belong to the land component. But what would be
these 80% if they weren’t supported by the remaining 20%
which prepare the major action, support it, and render it
possible by providing coherence to the overall action?
Contrarily to a not so good idea which is too often widely
spread today, it becomes again obvious that massive
deployments and destructions may be indispensable to the
achievement of the expected psychological effect of forces
and weapons employment. As from now on it is well known,
surgical type of destruction doesn’t constitute the alpha
and omega of a political tool whose efficiency is mainly of a
psychological nature.
What changed the most amongst circumstances is that, from
now on, these short periods of war are not capable anymore
to achieve by themselves the strategic objective that was
established by the political authorities. Destruction,
especially when conducted from a remote security distance
doesn’t constitute anymore the major efficiency factor. As a
matter of fact, our current and forthcoming engagements are
primarily built around control and influence maneuvers where
force, as they have always done it, except during the twentieth
century, will have most often, after and also during
the destruction phase, to conduct rebuilding activities during
a stabilization phase. That stabilization phase follows
the violent and only preparatory initial intervention phase;
it is often protracted and is conducted at the contact of human
societies and it is crucial for achieving the strategic effect.
During that crucial phase, it will then be a question of
materially rebuilding, but even more important, at the contact
of reality, within the populations, at the very heart of human
societies, it will be a question of rebuilding a “social contract”
- or rather “their” social contract, which makes a big
difference - and all what it implies in matter of reorganization
of the environment in crisis into which we intervene.
The major characteristic of the circumstances is thus their
inherent uncertainty. This is fundamental since it’s
absolutely impossible to foresee with some degree of
certainty which will be the next crisis into which the
government will choose to get military involved. This is
fundamental because consequently it is impossible for us to
foresee what our future enemy will look like.
We are thus today in a reactive posture. Reaction first to the
circumstances of the crisis that will induce our military
reaction and, then very rapidly, right after the initial and
rapid intervention phase, reaction to the new contour of
future enemies and threats, since the only certainty we
have about our future and irregular opponent is that it will
adapt very rapidly to our forces’ characteristics in order to
transform them into weaknesses. This is the most obvious
lesson learned during the course of the last ten years; it is
obvious that our opponent is more clever than us at
innovating.
When confronted to diversified crises with characteristics
that are not very much foreseeable and into which we must
be able to achieve the expected political effect, we have
thus two obligations. First, we must have at our disposal,
not a set of multipurpose tools - good for all, good for
nothing - but rather a real “tools box”. The overall
operational capacity, the one that is deployed in accordance
with the circumstances, must be comprised, in accordance
with the circumstances, with a diversified combination of
The systems of forces that demonstrate today their relevance
are those that are capable to achieve a peaceful end-state
better than the previous one -this is the objective of any
confrontation - those systems of forces capable to both
destroy and rebuild, those that can at the same time deter at
the contact, be powerful and capable of mastering the
violence, that can immediately feel the slightest changes
of the situation, and keep a deep understanding of human
beings, situations and cultures. Those are the only systems
of forces - weapons systems but also and above all human
beings - which are capable to become the tools necessary to
resolve crises and not only the muscle tools, the crisis
management tools or even the demonstration tools.
In that sense the capability to reverse an operational posture
immediately at local level becomes an essential condition for
the forces’ political efficiency. And when thinking of it, it
becomes obvious that the action legitimacy which - as it is
SIRPA TERRE/ADC DUBOIS
Forces capable to achieve a peaceful end-state better
than the previous one
OCTOBER 2007
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DOCTRINE # 13
different means which have a wide scope of capabilities
circumstances, the land forces’ capabilities constitute today
an indispensable support to France’s external and internal
within their own domain of action. Secondly we must, more
security, a major factor of France’s position on the world
than ever, be able to adapt, and to adapt rapidly our
stage, of its ability to react and to demonstrate its political
operational postures, in the short, medium and long term,
willingness.
in the field, and also our staffs which must be able to
rapidly respond to the new
Of course this is not a French
requirements since we’ll never be
Winning a war means
specificity. Many are the States which
confronted to the opponent we had
controlling the environment. reinforce their ability to operate on the
envisioned and very seldom our
ground or close to the ground. Among
equipment will be used under the
those, and in order to maintain their
conditions it had been developed for.
rank amongst the nations and to preserve their ability to
We also have two certainties. First, we have to get ready for
operate throughout the world and to the benefit of their
three major types of intervention.
own populations, the Norwegian, the Australian and the
Canadian governments have decided to increase the volume
The first one is a rapid conventional confrontation where
of their land forces respectively by 25 and 15 %. The British
technology will play an indispensable role of force
did the same and even more the Israeli government recently
multiplier. Technology - high technology - is indispensable
decided to increase by 25% their land forces; not to forget
since, and although war remains a human confrontation,
the United States Congress which has obtained an increase
technology serves as a human efficiency’s multiplier. High
in volume of 92,000 troops, 65,000 for the Army and 27,000
technology is indispensable, absolutely indispensable, but
for the US Marine Corps.
it has also to be sensible since it is being financially traded
The second certainty is that we have come back to the truth
against quantity and, contrarily to well accepted wrong
of the war. War is fundamentally a struggle to keep one’s
ideas, the extreme widening of the spaces of engagement
freedom of action. This is the very essence of the war. This
continues to impose quantity and thus to respect the wise
means that the ultimate mission at war is “to control”. You
concept of keeping the “right technological sufficiency”.
may destroy, you may strike with accuracy, you may
The second type of intervention is the war among
the populations, and this will constitute, by far, the most
disintegrate, you may cruise the high seas, you may fly over
frequent occurrence and the longest type of intervention
a territory for years, you may nuke it, if you don’t control it,
because from now on, populations constitute the major
it’s useless. You may control sky and sea, if you don’t
interventions’ stake since war, which often takes place in
control the ground - the very heart of human societies - it’s
urbanized areas, is mainly conducted within the
useless. And in order to control, since the beginning of the
populations.
world, there is only one solution, be it on the national
The third type is the engagement to the benefit of “our
territory or abroad, should you want to control, you’ve got
populations” to the benefit of their security, to help them.
to be present there in numbers, in that physical
This is fundamental because this constitutes the very root
environment where crises were born, where they develop
of the forces’ existence. In that domain, land forces
and where they can be resolved, i.e. on the ground. Ask the
constitute a major asset for the success of the State’s
question to our American or Israeli friends, they do know
fundamental missions since they are able, on a very short
what it means.
advance notice, to deploy important volumes of forces, well
organized and that are capable - thanks to their
Winning a war is not to conduct a few surgical destructions
professionalism and the experience they gained during
even if it is indispensable. Winning a war means controlling
the environment. Our western difficulties in Afghanistan, in
actions at the contact of populations - to restore degraded
Iraq and elsewhere acutely remind us the Hegel’s word who
conditions.
was evoking Napoleon’s forces failure in Spain: he spoke
about the “victory’s impotence”. Napoleon had won the
The land forces provide an indispensable support to battle but was unable to “control” the environment.
France’s security.
These generic characteristics of our future military
interventions have a clear consequence: due to the current
Today, the land forces, thanks to their specific characteristics, and being part of a political efficiency and
coherence logic rather than a demonstration one, represent the major political tool of France’s engagement
into the most complex crises which are also and unfortunately the most probable. The understanding of that
evolution progresses in the right direction and the political authorities are more and more conscious of that
reality which has become evident, abroad as well as in France.
DOCTRINE # 13
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OCTOBER 2007
Doctrine
Winning
the
Battle
Building Peace
Land Forces in Present
and Future Conflicts
A Summary of the FT- 011 Booklet
M
ilitary action is changing. No longer is destructive capability the main parameter for an
instrument that does not lead directly to the achievement of the strategic objective, but
merely contributes to it. It does this with a broad set of actors who all play a role in success
or failure and with whom armed forces need to operate and co-ordinate.
The cohesion and aim of operations have been modified as a result. The initial intervention stage,
where a force generally acts with all means at its disposal, now prepares the way for a stabilisation
phase. This phase, both decisive and fundamental to the operation takes place essentially in the
land environment.
The objective of this publication, which results from a collective reflection work conducted within
the French Army, is to describe these essential evolutions which heavily impact land forces as they
are engaged on many theaters of operations. Located at the heart of these engagements, they have
their full efficiency when resolving crises which are not anymore struggles between States, but
rather confrontations within societies.
Within this new type of environment, the French Army asserts and implements a twofold
requirement: force control and power.
LUC DU PERRON DE REVEL CHIEF RESEARCH & LESSONS LEARNED DIVISION (DREX)
FORCES EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE CENTER (CDEF)
BY COLONEL
AT THE
OCTOBER 2007
7
DOCTRINE # 13
First part: The new face of war
New world - New conflicts
Our armed forces intervene nowadays within systems that
are characterized by disorder, the violation of the rule of law
or threat to peace; they have to restore an order that often
depends on having re-established a stable social and
political system. Military achievements lead only to
the establishment of the minimum conditions for the
achievement of the strategic success.
Stabilization, the decisive phase in present conflicts
Intervention constitutes an indispensable phase in which
the military gets primacy over the diplomat. It is the time
of the armed confrontation. Its objectives are usually clearly
established and its conduct has a heavy influence on the
follow on operations.
Stabilization is the decisive phase of a military operation,
during which armed forces establish the conditions for
strategic success. It is the time of complexity, the time to
manage opposing factors, the time when armed forces must
restore stability thanks to an overall control of the area and
the reestablishment of mutual trust among the protagonists.
That phase establishes the foundations for State and
nation’s reconstruction and its success rests largely on its
anticipation and preparation.
Normalization is the phase where a lasting political, legal
and social system accepted by all protagonists of the conflict
is established and strengthened.
From symmetrical warfare
to asymmetrical conflicts
Symmetrical and dissymmetrical
conflicts - traditional types of
armed conflicts - can be
differentiated by the difference of
power between the belligerents.
They oppose institutional armed
forces using similar types of means
and courses of action. Since they
offer most chances of success to
the most powerful of the
antagonists, they may lead the
weaker toward an asymmetrical
type of engagement which
constitutes his only chance of
winning against the stronger one.
In an asymmetrical conflict, one of
the belligerents places himself in a
domain that is totally different from
the one where his opponent
DOCTRINE # 13
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OCTOBER 2007
presents a marked superiority and thus the emphasis is
placed on the total disparity of the nature of means and
courses of action to be employed. In this way, he emphasizes
his own factors of superiority, even more so since they are
materially, psychologically and morally distinct from those of
his opponents and he intends to transform the operational
domination of his opponent into impotence or weakness.
Since the Western armed forces’ technological and military
supremacy induces responses that are more and more
asymmetrical, such conflicts have taken a growing
importance in the course of the last decades. The best
examples of these conflicts can be found in insurrections,
guerrilla warfare, terrorism or the manipulation of
populations; and they should be seemingly, for some time,
the reference for the French armed forces whose capabilities,
that had been developed to respond to symmetrical or
dissymmetrical types of wars, are partly less adapted to
asymmetrical conflicts.
A new use of force
By changing its final purpose, the use of force adapts to
the changes in international relations. The defeat of the
enemy is not sufficient anymore to ensure the success of
the engagement and no longer constitutes the main
objective of the use of force.
On a single theater, the intermingling of all actions
(assistance to the populations, fighting, support to public
services ...) constitutes the daily bread and butter of
the military whose job is taking new dimensions.
However the military forces, which must also control
Doctrine
geographical areas that are everyday larger and operate in
areas that are difficult to access, now concentrate their
action in towns. These urbanized areas constitute the
asymmetrical war’s privileged battlefield and are one of
the last areas where determined guerrillas may hope to
win or resist in front of modern armed forces.
In areas of operations, inhabitants who have become an
essential actor and a major stake of the conflicts are now in
the very heart of the concerns of military forces since the
latter are now conducting war operations among the people.
And thus, the land environment, where crises occur and can
be resolved, remains the major domain for the action of
the armed force which is manifested by the control of the
environment; this is the essence of the stabilization phase
that implies numerous resilient forces and an ability to
regenerate.
A new role for the soldier
The French soldier belongs to a society that is evolving and
whose demand for an increasing level of security, for the
preponderance of the rule of law and whose desire for
immediate information impose heavy constraints on him in
the exercise of his duty.
While developing an aptitude for dialogue as well as
the capacity to take into account many constraints even
at the lowest echelons, the soldier must also maintain
the indispensable balance between a necessary proximity
and distance that remains the guarantor of the effectiveness
of his actions.
And last, he remains inevitably confronted to conditions
that are tough and situations that are extreme. Harshness,
chances, exhaustion and doubt remain some of the
constants of the soldier’s engagement.
Second part: Conducting
the operation and achieving
peace
Acting
Combined arms combat, which is inseparable from land
action, has become even more necessary due to the
preponderance of combat in urban areas and to the variety
of situations or conditions for the use of force. In addition,
that type of combat which was limited to the combined arms
(battalion) task force and above levels becomes now more
and more necessary at the lowest tactical levels.
Besides, the land forces’ capability requirements now involve
a reduced need for means of destruction and aggression and
an increase in means for the purpose of control of the
environment and security.
The diversity of the engagements places land combat within
a permanently joint framework which transcends the specific
capabilities of each Service and grows stronger everyday.
Though other Services may play a major role during some
phases of the operation and benefit from the support of the
land component, it is most often the land component which
holds a position that is essential and even preponderant all
along the conflict. During interventions, the land component
is the only one to have the capability to secure and control
an area or to defeat enemy forces. During the stabilization
phase its engagement on the ground at the contact of
different actors and its ability to discriminate in the use
of force are indispensable to achieve success.
In a growing multinational environment, an increasing
European integration will multiply the number of common
engagements whereas NATO remains partially the framework
for the definition of the interoperability and training of our
forces. However, ad hoc coalitions could become the
privileged framework for many of the forthcoming
operations, even though one should thus keep in mind that a
multinational engagements imply multiple constraints.
Although multinationality is an important factor of
legitimacy, it is not intrinsically a factor of military efficiency.
Controlling
Managing the use of force
In the course of the conflict, the use of force remains closely
linked to the political and military objectives. When
intervening through force, land forces must dominate the
opposing forces in order to force them to stop fighting.
However at the end of the combat phase the use of force
loses part of its efficiency due to the changes of situation
and to the definition of new objectives.
Within that framework, land forces must in permanence
retain reversibility capabilities necessary for deterrence
capabilities. Controlling the use of force does not mean
timidity in action. Engaging a land force imposes to have
enough means available to reach the defined objective.
Populations are at the very heart of the planning and
conduct of operations since they are always one of the key
factors to success and even the center of gravity of some
operations. So in order to take the advantage over, or to
defeat the opponent, one of the land forces’ objectives is to
induce the populations into not supporting the opponent,
and isolating or rejecting it.
It is also of prime importance to limit the scope of
destructions. The constraints imposed on the use of force
in order to protect the populations, the infrastructures,
religious and cultural sites are the guarantees for future
success.
The improvement of the population’s overall situation is also
a significant factor of the progressive return to stability. The
security of the people and, beyond that, an overall feeling
of security, are essential elements of that restoration.
In addition, by privileging the improvement of security, land
forces have a direct impact on the non military lines of
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DOCTRINE # 13
operations (economical, humanitarian ...) by allowing others
to restore those services that are essential to the life of
the populations (drinking water, energy, transportation,
medical support...)
Controlling the use of force is at the very heart of
the operational rules of engagement which, in spite
of the complexity of the situations, must be simple and
applicable by all.
confronted to a sometimes overwhelming superiority of a
military force, the opponent generally shifts towards a form
of combat of a different nature that tends to negate the
technological supremacy he is confronted to. Thus, without
questioning the undeniable advantages technology can offer,
one should however correctly assess the contribution of new
technologies and focus their use in the service of the fight
in the asymmetrical context.
Technology is a multiplier of effectiveness for our land
forces - especially for what regards information and
protection domains - and it allows them to maintain an
ascendancy over their opponent. It provides the most
significant advantages in the context of dissymmetrical
arfare and helps achieving military victory thanks to the
increased power and to the superiority it provides. However
the high technological level of a force could also sometimes
cause interoperability problems when operating within
coalitions where different countries have different standards.
Technology doesn’t take away the fundamental role of
the human being in solving crises. There even seems to be a
paradox linked to strategic modernity according to which
technological progress would reinforce individual
responsibility since it tends to multiply the consequences of
individual actions.
However land forces are more than others confronted to a
human dimension that often takes over technical means.
In the harshness of the operations, soldiers find themselves
more often confronted with their own physical and
psychological limits since the violence and distress they are
the witnesses of, the tiredness, stress and fear that stalk
them are far removed from their usual environment.
The asymmetrical form of the conflicts as well as the primacy
given to the stabilization phases do not allow anymore
measuring land forces capabilities by the yardstick of the
sophistication of their weapons only. In addition, when
It is however not a question of choosing human beings to
the detriment of equipment. Human beings and technology
are equally necessary to enable land forces to face the
current conflicts.
Mastering technology
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Doctrine
Controlling time
Adapting
For land forces, the action’s pace will have a new tempo
which doesn’t correspond only to the accelerated timing
of the battle. Time management and control become thus
essential.
From waging the battle to setting the conditions
for peace
The operational capacity of the Army is partly based on its
ability to conduct emergency interventions which rely on
an adapted organization and can only be maintained by a
permanent effort. But speed of reaction has a cost; it should
not lead to a large number of troops being held at high
readiness levels which are disproportionate to the real
needs.
Land forces which are often constrained to conduct
unexpected deployments have also to be ready to
participate in conflicts that might last for years. In these
conflicts, the equipment deteriorates rapidly. It is thus
necessary to adapt their conception and management to
the irregularities of an unforeseeable operational tempo.
But, above all, it is the men, who remain the very heart of
the land forces’ ability to endure. Their training, their
endurance and a rotation system that preserves the
operational requirements as well as personal stability
guarantee that ability.
Transitioning from the intervention phase to the stabilization
phase means transitioning from a tactical objective to a
strategic one which is not only dependent on the military
force. It implies a change in tactics. The harmonious
transition which has to be conceived as early as possible
paves the way for future success.
Command and control adaptation is an essential part of it.
HQs must evolve while paying attention to avoid a natural
tendency to hypertrophy. On the ground units must reorient
their courses of action and their organization when
destructive power becomes less necessary than human
presence, contacts and overall security in order to build
peace.
It is also necessary for land forces to adapt to all those
people they encounter: populations, political authorities,
organizations, belligerents, enemies; they’ll do that by
developing at all levels a necessary open mindedness in
order to be able to understand them.
Facing up to increasing asymmetry
Controlling violence
Land forces are confronted to a multitude of different
forms of violence often made worse by fanaticism and
by the denial of Western values and which affect all actors
involved in the conflict. Urban guerillas, outbursts of hatred
or barbaric internal fights without mercy, are the most
frequent illustrations of this type of violence. Their
persistence and the difficulty to prevent them could hurt
the forces’ credibility and constitute a very significant
challenge.
In order to control the level of violence in a theater of
operations it is necessary to assess the very nature of this
violence and the risks of its occurrence. They depend on
each party’s objectives as well as on the means the land
forces have at their disposal to oppose those objectives.
Force protection is a necessary balance between dedicated
equipment and units in charge of that mission; it requires
adapted tactics on the ground. Although it is a requirement,
it should not lead the land forces to isolate themselves from
an environment, a sound understanding of which
contributes to their own security.
In order to attempt to eradicate violence or to control its
effects, the use of force might be required. In front of hostile
crowds or to control their excesses, land forces must have
a large array of means and courses of action at their
disposal. Crowd control techniques as well as low lethality
weapons and ammunitions constitute one dimension of
those means and courses of action.
Understanding asymmetry means first understanding
the actors involved in the conflict and the consequences
of their fight. Each level of command must identify its
domain of action and define its space of maneuver in order
to preserve its freedom of action. Fighting against
asymmetrical threats implies that leaders and command
systems demonstrate agility as well as a rapid innovation
capacity.
Intelligence is a major function of the operational
engagement and a key to success. It is the combination of
technical and human dimensions that makes sense, because
although technology increases capabilities, it mainly
provides awareness, whereas it is often more about
understanding.
Information operations form a permanent part of the
asymmetrical type of combat, permanent since part of
the opposing actions rely on the exploitation of that same
dimension. Forces must make “fighting through media”
a necessary dimension for air land operations.
Mentoring
Land forces participate in the implementation of, or the
provision of support to, specific actions that contribute to
the stabilization of the environment. As the overall security
improves, they widen their scope of activities to encompass
new domains. It is often through the success or failure of
that mentoring that ultimately the legitimacy of the
operation is being built or destroyed.
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Military action is thus evolving and no longer
suffices, on its own, to “win wars” whose
forms have changed. It leads to the
establishment of the minimum conditions for
strategic success which develop during the
stabilization phase, the new decisive phase
of the conflicts.
The land forces which operate within a joint
framework are, more than ever, at the very
heart of the operational commitments
amongst the populations where the human
factor has the primacy and where action on
the ground and the capacity for discrimination
in the use of force are indispensable to achieve
success.
The land forces, which have at their disposal
Disarming the combatants
the power, a permanent ability to control
The disarmament of the combatants constitutes always an
essential stage of the peace restoration process. Land
forces are involved in that process; they must adopt an
organization adapted to that mission and establish a
dialogue with all concerned actors.
the effects of that power, and a reversibility
capability, operate in close co-ordination with
non military actors in order to stabilize the
environment and contribute to the reestablishement of stable social and political
systems in countries in crisis, which most
Training local forces
often constitutes from now on the desired
strategic objective.
The training of local defense and security forces constitutes
an indispensable aspect of the restoration of the rule of law
in a country. Land forces are equally largely involved in that
process. Their efforts determine the ability of the local forces
to relieve them and, in part, to reinforce the success of the
operation.
Supporting State building
Together with other actors, land forces operate to the benefit of
the populations when the need is to locally re-establish certain
vital functions or in response to distress or emergencies.
Thanks to their action in the field, land forces contribute to
the re-establishment of a stable political and social system.
1 CDEF- January 2007.
“The act of war has been the means for the creative act, that is restoring peace and life,
and for that purpose, war has been an invaluable means”.
Maréchal Lyautey
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Doctrine
Stabilization
and Land Forces’ Adaptation
O
ur land forces are engaged in operations that are characterized by a single continuum, permanently in
contact with the populations. The intermingling of all actions of different nature that take place especially
during stabilization - the decisive phase of a military operation - has consequences that are essential to
forces’ positioning, role and conditions of employment. Today, more than ever, it is essential to find the right
balance between keeping the know-how that is inherent to the job, and the in-reaction adaptations that must
be conducted simultaneously in the domains of doctrine, capabilities, training and procedures.
The action general framework has dramatically changed during the last few years. The classical types of conflicts
have been replaced by multifaceted crises where asymmetric type of threat is present mainly in urbanized areas
at a level of violence which corresponds to the one of the political or religious extremism that primes it. At any
time, the forces are confronted to varied actions and multiple tasks, e.g. to make use of all options available, to
confront blind violence, to support a hurt population or to train the local forces before being relieved by them.
Simultaneously the notion of enemy has lost its meaning. Most often, “the one in front” is an opponent more
than an enemy. It can be a versatile crowd that greets or confronts, and is able to reverse its hatreds just because
of a sign, an image, an instruction. In that regard there is an issue that de facto arises: the legitimacy of the land
forces’ action and the one of the actors of the crisis. And last, the situations’ volatility and complexity within a
socio-cultural environment that is difficult to comprehend, implies at once the involvement of all levels of
responsibility. (e.g. a mere hostage taking situation involves the presidency as well as the victim countries).
BY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JEAN-LOUIS PY, COMMANDER, LAND FORCES
Three complementary processes to solve a crisis1
The solution of a crisis responds to a well known phasing
that includes well mastered processes, be it resorting to
brutal force with heavy means during the intervention
phase, or, more usually, controlling the violence during
the stabilization phase, that type of action being the more
complex to implement. In any case, the normalization
phase requires the achievement of the following three
complementary processes:
- Political: first, it is necessary to restore the State’s
foundations which implies the existence of a constitution,
elections to be held, the creation of Assemblies of
representatives, and the establishment of a government
acting within a supervised and controlled framework
(e.g. the Bonn or Rambouillet Agreements); it also implies
the restoration of local governance (governors, state
representatives) that can ensure the coverage of, and
efficiently administer the entire country. That stage is
however not sufficient. Most often, it is necessary to also
accompany and support the Nation concept’s
development. As a matter of fact, nothing can actually be
done as long as a “tribal” type of feeling might block
any willingness to adhere to a common project.
The development of a national feeling is a prerequisite for
an exit of crisis; this is well illustrated by the examples of
Cambodia, the Ivory Coast and perhaps tomorrow
Afghanistan.
- Security: it is indispensable to restore a security system
that is efficient and well adapted to the regional culture
and mentality in support of the legal government.
The approach is well identified and follows several steps:
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the reorganization of the armed and security forces relying
as much as possible on “former loyalists”, the controlled
implementation of the DDR process (disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration of former militias while
taking into account the evolving balance with the new
security and police forces and avoiding to leave security
gaps), weapons storage and destruction, without
forgetting the legal and judicial systems’ restoration
(tribunals, jails).
- Reconstruction: all countries in a situation of exit of crisis
have a vital need for an economic jump start without
which all efforts will remain vain. It can only take place if
that boosting process has been initiated as of the
stabilization phase and is intended to serve as an actual
support of the military operations that can be conducted
during that phase (e.g. Afghanistan). It is thus a question
of mobilizing the international community, to accompany
the NGOs’ intervention by generating funding, expertise,
and projects while maintaining a close control of the
financial circuits to avoid any risk of corruption at all levels
of the governmental chain. It is also essential to reestablish the education system in order to restore
the necessary layers of administrators and technicians
required for a good functioning of the country. And last, it
is vital to establish a competent and dependable corps of
institutional agents. They will have to produce
considerable efforts, which should mobilize all
the international community’s attention in terms of
training, supervision and monitoring.
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OCTOBER 2007
It is only by restoring public order and jump starting
the economy - which should allow everybody to find a job
and positive financial, family and social perspectives - that
a country in crisis can be stabilized lastingly.
Adapting to the real world when it comes to forces
employment
Militarily speaking, what are the main lessons to be
learned?
The conflicts evolutions as well as the exit of crises
processes have heavy implications on forces’ positioning
and employment conditions. Several current factors have to
be taken into account, which validate the adaptations that
have to be undertaken:
- The new engagements and their consequences:
the probability for an “old type” of combat to occur characterized by massive confrontations -, decreases
inexorably without however guaranteeing that a strategic
surprise would never occur. Simultaneously, the
description of a specific enemy is quite difficult to be
made. Today’s opponent, the one that might have to be
fought against, might become tomorrow’s partner who will
have to be associated to the solution of the conflict. He
may be linked to mafia-like or terrorist organizations.
Intelligence is at the very heart of the problem; without it,
Doctrine
no action is possible. And last, it becomes thus difficult
for the forces to find the right posture (what type of
actions and in front of whom?). They are often placed in a
reactive posture and thus have it very difficult to keep
the initiative except at the cost of their own freedom of
action, especially during stabilization phase.
- Adaptation requirement relates to many domains:
capacities, doctrine, and tactics. The courses of action’s
diversification as well as the development of the civilian
tasks that are entrusted to the military should allow
achieving the desired end state which is of a
political/military nature. In addition, the in-reaction
adaptation process - a close and well-practiced loop
between lessons identified and corrective measures - must
be applied for the development of specific equipment
and procedures.
- Adaptation to the level of engagement: on a theater,
the force has to deal with issues that relate to all levels,
from political to tactical. Actions have to be carried out
on the ground, in a protracted way and they are conducted
at the permanent contact of populations by a force that
must remain rustic taking into account environment
constraints. Due to their structures, and their proved
ability to integrate the operational dimensions, French
land forces are the best suited to deal with these levels of
command. The deployed force’s environment has become
a constraint that participates to the dimensioning of
the action. Dimensions that were well known by the French
forces during the colonial wars are now taking back all
their importance, e.g. the understanding of the country’s
culture, the deterrent presence of forces on the ground,
knowledge and respect of the local traditions...
doctrine and capacities. This regards forces preparation
and training as well as the revision of the current
procedures.
- From a doctrinal viewpoint, force evolution has to be
conducted through the conception and the
implementation of adapted courses of action (LOT,
PROTERRE, new military occupations specialties) and, from
a capability viewpoint, through the implementation of a
combined arms mix at the lowest level possible and with
proportions that may vary.
- Maintaining the know-how that is specific to the job while
acquiring those that are the most required for an
operation implies a permanent and well focused
adaptation of the training. In that respect it is necessary
to find the right balance between coercion actions and
those intended to violence control. In addition, units
adaptation requires an adequate balance of capacities
(more intelligence, less fire support), as well as a sound
knowledge of the rules of behavior. And last, the training
that should reflect as closely as possible theater’s reality
requires a sound mastery of the courses of action and an
early in the process awareness of the zones of
engagement’s social, cultural and religious environment.
- A permanent re-evaluation of our procedures is necessary
to be able to stick to reality and respond to the theaters’
financial and material requirements. That iterative
assessment process relates to optimizing the command
structures by adequately tailoring them and to
permanently taking into account the lessons learned
process.
Conducting the required transformation in matters
of capacities and doctrine
What should be done? In order to respond efficiently to
the engagements’ requirements, the in-reaction adaptation
process must be supported by improvements in matter of
1 Intermediary headings have been added by the editorial staff.
Stabilization remains the most complicated and intricate phase of an operation. As a matter of fact it is a
question of gaining hearts and minds in a protracted way and in contact with populations that have generally
been traumatized. The French land forces, that are widely recognized for being able to commit themselves in
these crises, prepare and adapt themselves in order to master these crises as well as best possible and
participate in their resolution. They usually succeed; it is however necessary that sufficient political and
economic conditions be achieved to allow peace to be restored.
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Logistics,
a well Running Organization
Winning the battle, building peace” describes the framework and principles which guide today the land
forces’ action. Conflicts in which military engagement is not sufficient to win the war have succeeded to
the brutal confrontations whose success was a condition for achieving the strategic objectives. Winning a
battle is one step only of the sometimes very protracted peace restoration process. This explains why we
have been present on some theaters for more than thirty years.
“
Within that context, logistics holds a very important position whose significance has not to be proved
anymore; It is a function that is indispensable for the success of any operation, and it proves to be a factor
of efficiency, be it during the initial maneuver or during the stabilization phase where coercion and
population accompaniment actions come one after the other and sometimes overlap. That key role comes
from the fact that, far from having frozen principles and structures, logistics is always capable of evolutions
and is reactive in both doctrine and engagement domains.
BY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JEAN-LOUP MOREAU, COMMANDER, LAND LOGISTIC FORCE
A significant improvement in quality1
The logistics branch, when confronted to the expeditionary
deployments’ reality, has had to conduct its own bottom up
review and to achieve significant improvements in matters
of concepts and equipment. That transformation, which is
less visible today, continues however in order that the most
state-of-the-art technologies in matter of command and
information systems enable the branch to provide land
forces with a more reactive logistical support.
During the last decade of the 20th Century, a modern
logistics organization was implemented, well adapted to
the expeditionary deployment concept. Since the fall of
the Berlin Wall, it has constantly evolved and the DAGUET
operation has offered an opportunity to demonstrate which
changes were to be undertaken in order to support an
expeditionary force. The succession of the interventions that
followed highlighted the need for mastering its essential
phase, the projection, for taking into account as early as
possible the dimensioning of that component thanks to
multidisciplinary planning groups and for mastering as well
its flows through Information Systems (SILCENT)2. For what
regards doctrine, fundamental changes have been
endeavored, especially for what regards the definition
DOCTRINE # 13
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OCTOBER 2007
of the new logistical support functions that would respond
to the new requirements, definition also of new command
and deployment structures, and the rewriting of concepts
and regulations.
And last, in order to match the challenge of our new all
professional armed forces, a professional logistic force has
been implemented, based on the concept of “reservoir of
forces”; its first operational command, the CFLT has been
established, regrouping all the Army’s units related to that
function.
That logistical tool didn’t stop evolving; its mutation went on
during the last six years. The development of an intelligence
chain allowed taking into account the related important
requirements linked to the specificities of that organization
which is deployed in the entire depth of the force’s zone of
action. The eminently logistical activity of in-processing a
force in the theater has been formalized and experimented.
The concern for improving the inter- service co-operation
has been integrated within the on going studies and the
training of the HQs, in particular at French NSE (National
Support Element) HQ or at GST3 levels. The international
environment is also being taken into account through the
studies related to the NRF4 and to the JLSG concept5. And
last, the digitization process continues eagerly in liaison
with the Land Forces Command; that process is expected to
Doctrine
provide a lot of advantages to the benefit of the logistical
support chain in terms of logistical flows management,
supply optimization, proactive reactions and adaptation to
the rhythm of the combined arms maneuver.
A need for permanent adaptability
All the above described measures allowed the development
of solid foundations supporting the preparation and
accompaniment of the evolution of the land forces
engagement context as it is described in the FT-01 pamphlet.
However, recent engagements’ experience shows that there is
a requirement for continuing that permanent adaptation effort.
Because conflicts last, because the logistical reservoir is strictly
dimensioned without any extra resources, just because of
funding limitation, new approaches have to be explored
without any restriction.
Thus the logistical organizations deployments must be
adequately dimensioned and strictly respond to the expected
effects. This means that doctrine should not be a bring
limitations to the structural adaptations necessary to support
forces deployments. Within that logic, the efforts to be made
should result into heavily manned structures, especially during
the phases of entry into and exit out of a theater as well as
during the coercion phases. On the other hand they should be
reduced as soon as the stabilization phase begins.
That reduction should be sought for two main reasons. To
physically reconstitute our reserve of intervention at home
thanks to the repatriation of every element that is not useful
anymore to achieve the mission, with both personnel and
equipment. It is also intended to reconstitute soldiers’ morale
in order to avoid too rapid a psychological decay. That policy
must be accompanied by an outsourcing of certain functions
whose implementation process will improve as time goes by,
while maintaining the reversibility capability required to
rapidly reconstitute a robust and coherent logistical
organization; the fact of the matter being that one of the major
characteristics of these conflicts is the impossibility to be sure
that what appears to be an improvement of the situation will
last. That process requires a detailed analysis of risks and
opportunities.
The framework of employment, as it is described in FT-01, will
affect particularly the logistics in the domains of insecurity
and asymmetric threats. The issues related to convoys and
deployments protection will have a particularly significant
impact at the combined arms command level. Protection
requires first an adapted type of training for the logisticians
who must first be combatants before being technicians,
specialized in their own domain. To that respect, the
specialized centers, like the CPF6 must develop specific training
tools dedicated to logistic support units, belonging to either
the FAT7 or the FLT8.
In addition, the personnel must be provided with tools adapted
to that new context. Re-supply vehicles must be hardened and
the weapons must also evolve so that French convoys do not
become easy to attack preys. The medias being everywhere on
the theater, the media battle must be won at that level, while
avoiding to give them the opportunity to broadcast too often
pictures of logistical vehicles destroyed and being burned.
And last, within the context of the actions that will be
conducted by our forces, logistics is obviously an efficiency
multiplier. Not thanks to the technologies that it implements
but thanks to the resources that it is the only
one able to mobilize in order to, within
immaterial domains, support and reassure
the populations concurring thus to achieving
the desired effect.
CFLT
1 Intermediate headings have been added by the
publication staff.
2 SILCENT: Centralized logistical information system.
3 GST: Land Logistical Support Group.
4 NRF: NATO Response Force.
5 JLSG: Joint Logistic Support Group.
6 CPF: (French) Army National Training Center.
7 FAT: Land Forces Command.
8 FLT: Land Logistic Force.
Preparing our forces for the reality of operational engagements means to anticipate the difficulties they will be
confronted to. In the logistical support domain, a lot has already been done to reach a good operational level. Only
a logistics organization that is perfectly organized and conceived, adaptable and reversible, is able to achieve high
level operational results that will allow a force to be engaged for quite a long time and to win the peace.
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DOCTRINE # 13
Adapting Military Education:
A
Crucial
Choice
between Deepening or Widening
the Scope of our Knowledge
o we provide an education well adapted to the current engagements? That provocative question has
to be asked for at least two reasons.
D
First, because education is one of the major foundations of the army’s operational capability. As a matter
of fact it contributes directly to its homogeneousness, its identity and its coherence thanks to the delivered
education’s progressiveness, convergence and general consistency.
And second, because French forces at the difference of the Americans and the British in Iraq, or the Israelis,
haven’t been submitted lastingly to heavy casualties recently. This doesn’t mean of course that one should
underestimate the seriousness of our losses in operations. Tribute should be paid now to all those of ours
who sacrificed their life. It is not also the place to make any inferiority complex vis-à-vis our allies, but rather
to remain sensible while trying to respond to this question. It is indeed indispensable that the education’s
general organization and doctrine be regularly reoriented and readapted to the reality of the engagements
to avoid making again the dreadful misunderstanding that history sanctioned heavily: after 1870, the 1940
defeat has been first, and on strictly military aspect, an intellectual defeat before turning into a politicomilitary fiasco. The Battle of France had been lost long before May 1940, it had been lost during that period
of time between both Worlds Wars, and first of all in the doctrinal field. We might be now, once again, at a
crossroad since the engagements’ nature changes. The duty to understand precedes another duty that is as
essential, the one to adapt: this conditions the right employment of force and its political usefulness. That
process must of course feed the educational system. Why and how to adapt it, according to which main
orientations and under which constraints?
LIEUTENANT GENERAL PIERRE GARRIGOU-GRANDCHAMP, COMMANDER, COFAT1
The analyses that have been published in the document Forces
terrestres - 01 (FT- 01) constitute for CoFAT an equation with
four unknowns: getting ownership of the knowledge, its
general equilibrium, its nature and the right time to acquire it.
The purpose and nature of the operations described in FT-01
lead to widen the scope of the competencies whose mastering
requires an improvement of the abilities and a reassertion of
the priority to be given the know “how-to-behave”.
As a matter of fact, the multifaceted aspect of the military
engagements should not hide the permanent characteristics of
the war. That discernment is indispensable to discriminate
what is linked to conjuncture from what is fundamental, not to
neglect or negate any adaptation but to identify what must
remain permanent to serve as a basis for the education’s
indispensable evolution.
35e RI
BY
DOCTRINE # 13
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OCTOBER 2007
Doctrine
Contemporary engagements: between
mutations and permanence
offers many examples to illustrate the friction phenomenon7.
That irreducible truth can be explained by three factors that
keep all their relevance today.
Observation #1: The war “grammar” is changing
First, uncertainty. It is linked to the limited rationality of
strategies and tactics. Very precisely conceived and planned,
they remain always confronted to the fog caused by an
insufficient awareness of situation and intentions. In our
modern engagements, it is sensible to believe that the more
the involved parties (NGOs, Allies, warring factions, ...),
the more the opponent or enemy is asymmetric, vanishing,
reactive, thus the more that uncertainty grows due to a lack of
visibility of opponents’ intents and processes, and to a
coordination that becomes more complicated amongst allies,
between armed forces and NGOs. Technology allows to reduce
the problem’s intensity but it doesn’t make it disappear.
The military action’s objective has changed: it is again a line
of operations among others just like it was during our colonial
pacification campaigns. The influence capacity takes over
the destruction one since a military engagement’s objective is
to support a country’s security and political reconstruction:
population becomes thus established as a major actor and
stake. This is in line with what Carl von Clausewitz wrote: war is
less and less “the confrontation of forces” and more and more
“the confrontation of willpowers”.
Force employment modalities evolve accordingly: the major
characteristics of our current engagements include an
autonomous engagement of the lower tactical echelons, an
The moral factors constitute the second building block of the
evolution of the space-time framework caused by
friction. “During a war, one has to deal with moral forces and
the digitization of the battlefield, the reversibility of
effects that cannot be mathematically computed”8. “In combat,
the situations, or even the overlapping in space and time
two moral actions, rather than two material actions are
of actions involving coercion and
confronted, the strongest wins”9.
violence control, the flows of
information, the heterogeneousness
And last, the opponent’s freedom
“at war the moral over material
of coalition forces, asymmetrical
completes that friction phenomenon.
ratio is three to one”
process used by opponents in
General Beaufre’s definition of
complete contradiction with our
strategy which applies to operational
ethics, the legal, media and
art and tactics is illustrative in that
environmental constraints, the required mastering of the force
domain: “Strategy lies in that abstract game that results from
in order to keep the populations’ adhesion, the convergence
the confrontation of two willpowers [...] the willpowers
of effects and maneuvers, ...
confrontation results into a struggle for freedom of action”10.
Simultaneously these major changes that imply significant
In the absence of ethics related to tactical processes and to the
consequences in the education domain, are paralleled by the
weapons being used, and in the presence of a logistics which
fielding of weapon systems that are always more sophisticated
is often reduced to the minimum, asymmetry widens the field
and fast evolving, whose mastery requires a specialization and
of the possibilities and threatens as much freedom of action.
segmentation of the know how. We can thus observe that know
Similarly, the fact that the population has become the major
how change, multiply, and become more complex. However the
engagements’ stake multiplies enormously the number of
basic truth of the war remains unchanged.
difficulties to arrest the centrifugal forces, whatever might be
their origin - historical, ethnic, political - that can easily be
fuelled up by the forces in presence. Implosion in former
Observation #2: friction, the war’s unchangeable
Yugoslavia and internal struggles in Iraq constitute convincing
truth remains
illustrations of that phenomenon.
“In war, on the other hand, the commander of an immense
whole finds himself in a constant whirlpool of false and true
information, of mistakes committed through fear, through
negligence, through precipitation, of contraventions of his
authority, either from mistaken or correct motives, from ill will,
true or false sense of duty, indolence or exhaustion, of
accidents which no mortal could have foreseen. In short, he is
the victim of a hundred thousand impressions, of which
the most have an intimidating, the fewest an encouraging
tendency”2. Clausewitz calls that fundamental characteristic of
war the friction. “In war everything is simple, but to secure this
simplicity is difficult. These difficulties accumulate and produce
a friction, which no man can imagine exactly who has not seen
war [...] this enormous friction, which is not concentrated, as in
mechanics, at a few points, is therefore everywhere brought
into contact with chance”3. All major thinkers, all commanders
in chief in the past or nowadays, Thucydide4, Wavell5, Liddell
Hart6, to only name a few, agree on that topic. Military history
Observation #3: the primacy of the psychological
field over the material one remains
Ardant du Picq reminds us that “Man remains the first combat
tool”11 and that tool holds a major place since, according to
Napoleon “at war the moral over material ratio is three to
one”12. Two contemporary evolutions impose us to keep the
strengthening of the moral forces at the very heart of military
leaders’ education and of forces’ training. Technical evolution
allows and favors the autonomy of the small detachments
which must be morally very robust since any mission creep
could be immediately exploited by the media according to
the now widely disseminated “strategic corporal” concept.
Situations reversibility which has already been mentioned,
requires a high level of moral strength. That’s why the
extraordinary technological progresses should not make us
forget that primacy of the psychological over the material.
OCTOBER 2007
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DOCTRINE # 13
“Victory, just like defeat, is first of a moral nature; few are
the thinkers who disagree. Divergences result even more from
the place that the moral factor has to hold in the objective’s
definition; the brains of all opponents - political authorities,
military leaders, soldiers, populations - can thus be regarded
as either intermediate objectives or as being the ultimate
objective of the action”13.
According to the Fuller’s trilogy, mental strength, physical
strength and moral strength constitute the military action’s
structure and explanatory matrix. Physical strength results
from means and forces. Mental strength generates impulsion
and direction. Fuller regards moral not as a single element by
itself but rather as a mediator between the two first elements,
“a link between willpower (mental strength) and action (physical
strength)” consequently, beyond the “grammatical” evolutions
that must be integrated in the education process, war
understanding as well as a right balance between the building
blocks of the Fuller’s trilogy must be guaranteed. The objective
is dual faceted. Two tripwires have to be avoided: first
understanding the war without mastering its conduct (widening
the scope of the know-how whereas their mastering would be
piecemealed because of their number) and second, deepening
the know-how’s study without understanding their objective.
As a matter of fact, its objective is to provide the future leaders
with the ability to produce synthesis, with the practice
of generic ideas, with the notion of the mutual relations of
the factors that enlighten the action’s highest levels and with
the ability to make decisions that will not relate to the details
whereas they would neglect key elements. It is thus this
appreciation of the circumstances which, much more than
theoretical and technical knowledge, constitutes the leader’s
highest quality. By contributing to the development of
situation, the understanding, the discernment, the loftiness of
ideas, the acquisition of a military culture participates in
rooting action into reflection. By multiplying the points of
convergence between implementation of know-how and
expression of a know-how-to-behave, it contributes to their
harmonious combination and constitutes an indispensable
factor of excellence.
Indeed, knowledge must be adapted to the rank since the
nature of the military action doesn’t apply similarly at all levels.
The lower the level, the more the power of action and
implementation is important and the less important for the
intellect and the judgment are the difficulties to be resolved.
The scope of the possible is much more limited as well as the
one of the objectives and means, information is more reliable,
most often in direct view.
Axes of effort
Without going too much into the details of the
education that is provided within CoFAT’s schools,
let’s remind that the three fundamental principles
that organize that education intend to focus the
effort on the abilities that guarantee the possibility
to adapt to the above described evolutions and to
respond to the lasting characteristics of war. These
abilities are promoted and developed in a way that
is variable in time and in accordance with the
responsibilities that are to be held, but they
constitute however a triptych onto which are
based the military leader’s competence and
performance.
“Learn to think”
“The reality of the battlefield is that it is not a
place where to learn; one can only do what he can to apply
what he knows. This implies that, in order to be able to do a
bit, one has to know a lot and well”14. In order for the
commander to know a lot and well, it is necessary to organize
his education around three axes: development of his agility
of mind, of his personal reflection capacity, and the
understanding of his environment.
When reading Bergson “act as a thinker and think as a doer”,
Foch in the first chapter of the “Principes de la guerre”,
or De Gaulle in “le Fil de l’épée”, where he asserts that general
knowledge is the true command school, it results that the
ability to judge is worth more than the belief in unmovable
principles which may result in altering judgment and
adaptation ability.
DOCTRINE # 13
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OCTOBER 2007
However, it is not possible to physically inject intellectual
agility in somebody else’s mind, it can only be acquired
through permanent well thought, progressive and continuous
work. That’s why two inflections have been brought to the
young officers’ education and these inflections are supported
by the continuum of their education.
The first one aims at inciting them to build their own military
culture, to reflect and debate - based upon the reading of
books - during conferences or staff rides on issues to which
they’ll be confronted15. That innovative, structuring and long
term project serves an ambition: the strengthening of our
officers’ competence as well as individual and collective
competitiveness. It favors a rupture in the way to acquire this
Doctrine
culture by allowing to go from an
acquisition process that focused on
the initial education and on the
preparation to higher military studies
to a longer term progressive and
continuous effort adapted and
common to all officers, whatever
might be their origin.
“an order must include everything that
cannot be decided by the one who
receives it, but only that.”
The second inflexion consists in training our officers in
the tactical domain at the command of a level immediately
superior to their current one. As one can only command well
if he has learned to obey with intelligence, one can maneuver
well if he has learned how his action was included within the
overall tactical environment. That inflexion should also allow a
better autonomy in matters of reflection and decision and thus
in matters of disciplined adaptation at the lowest echelons that
are more and more often isolated.
However, this doesn’t mean that to think is to will. To think is
not enough. There is a significant gap between the knowing
and the willing, between knowing and being able to, even if
the in-depth knowledge of the military thinking and history
allows passing from the objective form of the knowledge to
the subjective form of the ability. A knowledge which is being
developed to guarantee the rightness of the decision is a
condition indispensable for the action but which however
remains insufficient. To be provided with a good ability to
reflect doesn’t prevent the leader from having to be first, a
leader of men.
...and learn to lead...
“It is the whole feeling of the dissolution of all physical and
moral power, it is the heart-rending sight of the bloody sacrifice
which the commander has to contend with in himself, and
then, in all others who directly or indirectly transfer to him their
impressions, feelings, anxieties and desires. As the forces in
one individual after another become prostrated, and can no
longer be excited and supported by an effort of his own will,
the whole inertia of the mass gradually rests its weight on the
will of the commander”16.
Learn how to federate. The military commander must know
how to federate his unit. It is vital to highlight the fundamental
specificity of the soldier’s profession. The military are entrusted
with the force that the political authorities, representing
the national willingness, estimate having to oppose to
the violence which could threaten France’s integrity, interests
and engagements throughout the world. In the name of
the nation that provides them with legitimacy, the soldiers hold
the responsibility to deliver destruction and death at the risk of
their own life and of the life of those under their command.
That’s the reason why a military leader is, before all, a leader
of men, since the soldier, at the time of the engagement,
confronted to his limits, split apart between the need to deliver
death and the fear of being killed or injured, will fight because
his commander gives the example, reflects, and because all
soldiers count on him. This group dynamic, this adhesion, this
intelligence of the solidarity is
being built in the every day life
by the leader of men, before,
during and after combat
actions. He must thus acquire
a deep knowledge of his
soldiers17.
Learn how to decide and how to take risks. To lead one’s
soldiers should not be considered as the alpha and the omega
of leadership. The commander must also know how to dare
decide, and to take risks. He has also to go over the friction
phenomenon and surround the opponent with a fog that he
must find how to thicken. In order for him to be able to decide
appropriately, he has to develop three qualities. The first one
relates to spirit of initiative18 and to the appropriate use of
autonomy based on well accepted discipline. These
dispositions should rely on a clear understanding of the effect
the commander seeks to achieve. According to Moltke “an
order must include everything that cannot be decided by the
one who receives it, but only that”19. Foch associates discipline
and reflection: “ ... discipline equals mind activity, use of one’s
temperament. Laziness of mind leads to indiscipline as well as
to insubordination. In both cases, the fact is a fault, it is guilty.
Inability and ignorance cannot be regarded as attenuating
circumstances, since knowledge is within the reach of all those
who look for it”20.
The second quality relates to determination. “As there is room
for uncertainty on the one hand, so on the other hand there
must be courage and self-reliance in proportion to the room
left”21. However, determination is not stubbornness (which
represents the degenerated form of determination), it is rather
the expression of a firm and energetic willingness, and it gets
organized with flexibility and pragmatism in the longer term.
That relation with time implies the development of rusticity and
strengthening of the warrior’s qualities, which constitute
the foundations of moral strengths. Physical and psychological
strengthening constitutes a prerequisite to which must satisfy
all officers and NCOs engaged in an operation. They are not
restricted to the only physical training which develops
endurance, taste for effort, ability to last, and which constitutes
an important and permanent part of education. It goes further.
The ability to command when being tired and in a destabilizing
context rests upon a personal ability to cope, a resistance to
stress, the familiarization with pain, and even with the
possibility of dying and thus upon some sort of serenity...
And last, the third quality: he has to learn how to make a
decision based upon ethical basis. The studies about ethics
prepares the officer to confront situations that can sometimes
be inextricable and in which values may sometimes go up
against each other and put his consciences in tough dilemmas:
the efficiency that must remain subordinated to the law, the
implementation of the law that may appear contrary to honor,
allegiance versus loyalty...; situations where emotions and
instinct go up against reality. Reflecting upon case studies,
prioritizing principles, putting into perspective contexts and
decisions, providing a line of conduct, illustrating the
complexity, all this constitutes domains to be explored by our
students to allow them to structure their reflections and favor
the emergence of a common code of conduct.
OCTOBER 2007
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DOCTRINE # 13
What about the taking of risks? Foch tells us about the
importance of that issue: “it’s not possible to do everything,
and if one wants to do everything, without taking any risk he
will be first condemned to impotence and then to defeat”22.
The taking of risk must be integrated and encouraged
throughout the education.
Once both the ability to reflect and the one to lead are
established as fundamentals, they provide the military leader
with that agility indispensable to the conception and execution
of an adapted maneuver.
us into mechanisms that are so much constraining that they
could take all the space which should be left to creativity
and to the adaptation of the processes and courses of action
to the reality of the situation. They must remain a guide and
never a constraint.
In particular, reversibility must be an actual part of
the pedagogical processes being taught during education
and training. It is a question of acquiring an agility of mind
and clear-mindedness that would lead to adopting a posture
relevant to the situation and would also lead to training to
anticipate potential changes.
... To be able to maneuver and adapt
Simultaneously, a specific effort should focus on mastering
the environment, since the army remains, first and before all, a
force that is, in the long term, at the contact with physical and
human environment. In the modern conflicts the populations
have actually become hostages as well as stakes and they are
placed at the very heart of the military forces’ concerns.
Controlling them is made even more complex by the fact they
nowadays live mostly in towns. An urbanized area is the
asymmetric war’s preferred battlefield and one of the last
maquis where guerrillas can expect winning against modern
forces or at least to resist lastingly.
It is now necessary to go beyond the argument that opposes
low and high intensity, coercion and violence control. “He who
can do the most can as well do the less” this has for long been
the motto that was invoked to render unavoidable the
acquisition of technical and tactical know-how. When following
that motto too closely, one takes the risk not to deliver an
education that would be adapted to the reality of our
engagements. But on the other hand if training to symmetric or
asymmetric combat was neglected, one would take another
risk, the one of loosing some know-how, which could interdict
several options for the selected courses of actions, especially
during the enforcement phase. It is thus sensible to establish
a new motto as a principle: “he who can do the most can also
do it differently” ... under certain conditions.
The procedures whose importance must not be
underestimated, especially for what regards coordination,
interoperability and drill training, should however not lead
DOCTRINE # 13
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OCTOBER 2007
And last the acquisition of technical or tactical know how
cannot be multiplied infinitely. An education corresponding to
the right requirements should be the objective. It must
guarantee the mastering of the basics ... and allow the
understanding of the environment. In matter of know how,
universality cannot be an objective.
Doctrine
Education must respect a general equilibrium between the how-to-behave and the technical and tactical
know-how, since the intrinsic value of the leader rests in the well achieved mastering of that complex
equilibrium. That’s why the learning of the permanent topics, those that build the military leader’s basic
qualities should not be used as a variable of adjustment in front of the multiplication of the “invading”
requirements linked to procedures and technologies. Maneuver must take back the first position over
procedures, reflection over duplication and tactics over technology. It is not a question of opposing the one
to the others but rather to subordinate the seconds to the firsts. This will condition forces employment’s
flexibility and realism. More generally, priority should be given to the acquisition of the how-to-behave, a
combination of acquired or widened intellectual abilities with an assimilated and embodied strength of mind
based upon a corpus of common values. The military leader is the one who must federate and mix, at the
highest possible level, action with reflection, acting with being, in the most intelligible and coherent way23.
1 Commandement de la formation de l’armée de terre: Basic and
Advanced Military Education Command.
2 Clausewitz, On war, III; 7, p. 157.
3 Clausewitz, op.cit. I, 7, p.85.
4 “when it develops, war generally becomes an affair of chance,
chance to which no one can escape and of which we must face the
risks in the darkness”: Thucydide, History of the Peloponnesian War,
1 ch 3, s 78.
5 “La guerre, c’est le désordre”: Wavell, Speaking Generally,
Macmillan, Londres, 1946, p. 79.
6 Liddell Hart, Strategy, Penguin Groop, 1991, p. 337.
7 On that topic La logique du grain de sable by Erik Durchsmied or
Great military blunders by Jeoffrey Regan, Channel 4 Books,
London, 2000.
8 Clausewitz, Théorie du combat, Economica, Paris, 1998, p. 58.
9 Colonel Ardant du Picq, Etudes sur le combat, édition Champ Libre,
Paris, 1978, p. 77.
10 André Beaufre, Introduction à la stratégie, Hachette, Paris, 1998,
p. 14.
11 Colonel Ardant du Picq, Etudes sur le combat, édition champ libre,
Paris, 1978, p. 3.
12 Peter G. Tsouras, Warriors’s Words: A Dictionnary of Military
Quotations, Cassel, London, 1994, p. 226.
13 Général Desportes, Comprendre la guerre (“Understand war”),
Economica, 2001, p. 246.
14 Maréchal Foch, Des principes de la guerre de Foch, Imprimerie
nationale, Paris, 1996, p. 92.
15 Definition of the military culture: it is an acquisition, a dynamics,
upon which can be based the capacity to reason about from military
knowledge and sciences.
16 Clausewitz, On War, 1999, I, 3,.
17 This knowledge has been very well described in Volume 2 of
the “Cours de tactique de l’Ecole de Guerre” dedicated to moral
strengths. That tactical course has been republished by CDEF.
18 Initiative is the demonstration of a personal willingness supported
by judgment and acting in the direction set by the senior commander
(Von der Goltz).
19 Quoted by von Schlichting, in le Testament de Moltke,
Ecole supérieure de guerre, Paris, 1903, p. 23.
20 Foch, Des principes de la guerre. (“Principles of war”),.
21 Clausewitz, On War, I.
22 Maréchal Foch, Des principes de la guerre (“Principles of war”),.
Imprimerie nationale, Paris, 1996, p.153.
23 See on that topic the pedagogical document produced for the Field
Grade Staff Course within the framework of the one of the Army
Higher Military Education College.
OCTOBER 2007
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DOCTRINE # 13
New conflicts
New
War,
New Model
he adoption of a new model of war initiates a huge undertaking which should feed on ones’
experience as well as on others’ doctrinal studies. This article lists only a series of ideas
related to the armed forces’ engagement in a world that is different from the one where they
come from. It aims at fueling reflections and doesn’t pretend to be exhaustive.
T
The form of war is in perpetual evolution and the collapse of the industrial model was balanced by the
emergence of a new prevailing model: war among the populations. Consequences for the armed forces
are plenty, be it in the way they now have to operate in conjunction with an increasing number of non
military actors, or in their operational organization. Both consequences imply indispensable evolutions.
BY COLONEL
LUC DU PERRON DE REVEL DREX/CDEF
A change of the prevailing model of war
Conflict resolution has, for long, depended on the military
forces’ direct action and it is the armed forces’ own
transformations that have induced combat transformations
and, more generally speaking, transformations of the forms
of the war. Progresses in weapons development and
transformation of the military organizations that reciprocally
fed each other have been the motors of the transformations
of war. That phenomenon that has always been true
throughout history, developed during the 19th century; it
reached its peak with World War I, and ended with
the collapse of that form of war on the 6 and 9 August 1945
when two single bombs dropped over populations led to
the end of the combats.
Forty years of nuclear freezing and of deadly “peripheral”
type of conflicts, generally based upon a different model of
war, have not brought any change to that collapse of the
industrial war model. The final jolt of that model during
the Gulf war has however brought back war in the very heart
of several western forces’ concerns; it was not anymore for
them a hypothetical future but their main activity. However
the nature of war has changed and it doesn’t evolve
anymore at the technological progress’ pace. In the past, it
was the military tool that transformed
the nature of the war; nowadays it is
the nature of the war that transforms
the military tools.
War, which is the fuel of the nations’
identity and a factor of legitimacy for
the States, has modeled the world.
However, on this “completed” earth,
where there is no piece of emerged
land that doesn’t belong to a
recognized political authority, war is
less and less often an instrument of
territorial supremacy. The geographical environment is, less and less
the object of armed conflicts; it loses
part of its value even if several
recent, current or potential conflicts
illustrate all the interest which is still
attached, here and there, to
DOCTRINE # 13
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OCTOBER 2007
Doctrine
territorial conquests: political hegemony, natural resources,
demographic tensions ...
The international system cannot be confused anymore with
interstates relations only. It rests upon three major logics
which have each their own strong internal coherence:
States dynamics, economical integration, and societies’
interpenetration. In addition to the fact that States have lost
most of their ability to resolve by force the conflicts that
affect the last two of these dynamics, the ways to manage
peacefully the economic disagreements as well as the
decrease of the number of interstates conflicts emphasize
the societies’ antagonisms. The populations that, for a long
time, have been mere objects of the wars are now their
main subjects. Conversely, the military forces are now only
one tool among others. The center of gravity of the
Clausewitz’ trilogy - government leaders, armed forces,
peoples - moved from the armed forces towards the
peoples.
Human environment is now the new battlefield. It is
heterogeneous by nature and covers so many different
types of realities that the word “population”, which is often
used to simplify, remains an abstract and generic notion.
Over a single area, population is comprised of the
overlapping of groups that are either linked by solidarities
or divided by antagonisms; it is also a collection of human
beings out of which emerge leaders of all kind. From now
on, war actors stand in front of that human complexity, and,
by the way, some of these actors are directly part of that
complexity. It is thus the leaders, immerged inside the
population that have to be reached in order to associate
with them, to operate with them or to fight against them,
there are multiple connections that have to be discovered.
We have therefore to find our way in that new environment.
Armed forces are actually poorly equipped to do that. They
operate on theaters of operations with equipment and tools
that can give them only a few keys to be efficient in such an
unknown environment. Human environment’s cartography
is as necessary as was, up to now, the physical
environment’s one. Each conflict has its own map. A region’s
cultural features, history, languages, human, economic or
political relations, constitute a sort of specific terrain
description that all soldiers should have, at least, some
awareness about. Each group’s specific history or narratives
constitute the lines of altitude of this “terrain”. They result
from its history, its myths and expectations and behave as if
they were the source of their internal behaviors. All wars
have a cause and the above described narratives constitute
simultaneously their origin and consequence. In any conflict
it is thus essential to comprehend the protagonists’
founding narratives while identifying what in our own
could help structuring our own actions.
To act differently at war
Time constitutes an essential dimension of a conflict. It is
not a common value for any of the actors, even if,
confronted to crises complexity, some of them may regard
elapsing time as the only possible solution at this moment.
Opposite to the political voluntarism which is hostile to any
compromise and negotiation, many diplomats’ constructive
ambiguity intends to progress wherever it is possible while
expecting that time could bring together what is
irreconcilable and resolve what is insolvable. But in spite of
its virtues, time may have a negative effect if it is not
soundly used and resemble thus to a dilatory type of policy.
It serves then only to harden the positions of those who do
not foresee any political solution and thus transform
intervention force into occupation force in the eyes of a
population manipulated by those who have an interest in so
doing. The more the actors able to intervene delay the
intervention the narrower will be their freedom of maneuver.
Confronted to actors’ passiveness, the conflict’s dynamics
has many chances to develop and shift towards war.
In addition, for those actors who intervene, time is a
consumer of both human and financial resources whose
investment is expected to result into a satisfactory political
profitability.
The new model of war doesn’t intensify nor does it reduce
the use of violence in comparison with other types of war.
It just modifies it. Having reached its peak, the “industrial”
war has demonstrated the atrocious character of an
unleashed violence by placing the population at the same
level as the combatant forces and transforming them into a
legitimate objective for destruction. Conversely, in a war
among the populations, these ones become the main subjects
of the violence whereas the combatants are only the
secondary ones. But that violence is never blindly applied.
Even if it appears to be applied in an undetermined way, its
use serves objectives that can be tactical, strategic or political.
The extreme violence of the massacres, resulting from
political calculations or from fear and hatred that nothing
can stop, aims to destroy a group of population or even to
wipe it out in its ultimate form, the genocide. Terrorism
constitutes the archetype of the use of violence against the
populations. Terrorism is sometimes defined as an action
aiming at killing anyone, anywhere at any time, its
violence’s first objective is to instill terror in order to collect
political benefits. It targets more the local populations than
the forces, and it illustrates the effort of its sponsors to
erode the populations’ willpower in order to influence the
Nations. Guerrilla is referred to as terrorism or armed
resistance depending on which faction is speaking. It makes
use of indiscriminate violence that targets mostly the
military forces to erode and attrite them and whose
objective is to reach the States willpower through their
populations’ support.
However the force’s irruption in the game, even a legitimate
armed intervention, establishes or increases a “de facto”
level of instability that may fuel up the violence. The
difficulty rests in the ability to control that temporary
instability in order to achieve a greater and fairer level of
stability later on. In the course of their operations, the
intervention forces may sometimes be a cause for that
violence in reason of an inappropriate or excessive use of
OCTOBER 2007
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DOCTRINE # 13
New conflicts
force1 which contributes to a loss of legitimacy. In addition,
violence doesn’t reach only those whom it targets but also
those who make use of it. It is thus essential that the forces
establish strictly its limits and the rules for its use. This is
that accepted and claimed inequality between the soldier who has to obey the law - and the terrorist - who is
unrestrained - that, in spite of the difficulties linked to it,
may provide the soldier with the prospect that he’ll be able
to control and then deescalate the level of violence.
When confronted to this violence, the forces get most of
their internal and external legitimacy from the security
they provide. The populations do not support those who
promise to deliver freedom and democracy but rather those
who actually provide daily order and security. Indeed,
political progress and security of the populations are
closely linked but, although they progress and regress
generally together, they don’t do it at the same pace. Since
security affects most people, it remains a priority for them.
The soldiers have thus a duty to protect the populations,
which everywhere remains their essential contribution to
the political settlement of the conflict whose responsibility
rests on other actors.
That major contribution to security should not be regarded
as being restrictive, failures always hit back the forces as
well as the legitimacy of their action. Sometimes, for
reasons linked to politics or to lack of
boldness, a too strict respect of the
mission’s mandate may cause serious
drawbacks that a better implementation
of the spirit of the mission could have
prevented.
Security is not the responsibility of the
intervening forces only; the local force’s
involvement is in the best interest of the
intervening nation. It is thus necessary to
keep in mind that the battle, should it
becomes necessary, doesn’t solve anything,
it’s only a first step which, at the best,
establishes a new situation. Is it necessary,
just like in Iraq, to obliterate the past and
not keep anything of what existed before;
or is it necessary to maintain the military
and police structures that were supporting
the former regime? A society without State
structures collapses. If the right to make a
legitimate use of the force is removed from
the local armed forces and police
responsibilities, other actors will take hold
of it or will have to assume it: private,
ethnic or mafia like militias, or the occupying power for which
it becomes thus a duty. And history shows how difficult it is to
try to impose imported State structures as well as the
enormous cost of such an option.
Lastly, and although the idea might appear to be seducing,
it seems to be illusory to want to “win hearts and minds”
on a theater of operations. Attempting to make the local
DOCTRINE # 13
26
OCTOBER 2007
populations to like us or to adopt the intervention forces’
vision is useless and doomed to a failure. The actions
intended to support the populations or more simply to
provide charity assistance merely allow to influence the
local populations and to make them understand that it is in
their best interest to be on one side rather than being on
the other. It’s rather the soldiers’ hearts and minds that
have to be opened to the populations while avoiding
however any touch of sentimentalism in order to maintain
the right distance and impartiality that are indispensable
for being able to keep a sound judgment and to conduct
operations. Keeping in mind the irreducible dignity of
the human being is essential and should be used as an
infallible compass.
To adapt forces’ organization
War is a business that needs a work force. That fact, which
has been partially forgotten in the course of the last
decades, proves that it is again true. The protection of the
populations and the struggle against violence require to
cover large areas and for quite a long time. All forms of
guerrillas mobilize against them armed forces that are much
more numerous than the guerrillas themselves. The Spanish
Civil war, the campaign of the Arabs against the Turks from
1916 to 1918, the French resistance or the conflict in Iraq
prove that fact. When to be in numbers becomes also a
quality, it is necessary to have forces that are able to
conduct a lasting engagement among the populations,
which might be antagonistic, rather than forces that are
only intended to conduct an industrial type of war,
Blitzkrieg-like, or a short defensive battle on our home
territory.
Doctrine
Guerrillas and terrorism operate most often in a very
decentralized way using proxies that have a great autonomy
under a simple overall direction. These actions which are
conducted at lower tactical echelons imply that most of the
engagements are conducted by the smaller units which
must thus be provided with the required means. Mobile,
reactive and well connected to each other, they must
constitute the building blocks of flexible forces capable to
conduct autonomously a large array of missions. The
ability to assume the largest possible environment
functions as well as the associated capacities of command
and control and of action are required. Those functions,
which are partly regrouped at higher echelons and “kept as
general support”, should be devolved to lower tactical
echelons where the essential is being conducted.
While keeping their role of conception and general
coordination of the maneuver, higher echelons should
respond to a type of force and command organizations
perhaps different from those inherited from the industrial
and symmetric wars’ requirements. Is it necessary to keep
the division level, even under a different name, when corps
and brigade levels are almost everywhere the only higher
levels of engagement? Is the differentiation between
strategic, operational and tactical levels adapted to a war
conducted among the populations?
The operational level has been recently created within
the French armed forces. It seems to be linked mostly to a
vision of conflict management2 that is essentially military,
whereas civilian partners and opponents usually have only
two levels: strategic direction and tactical execution.
Operational level’s implementation renders sometimes
more complex command and control structures that might
from time to time have to be fictitiously split into different
levels, including within single cells. In addition, the
predominance of the strategic level over the tactical one, as
well as the growing joint integration at basic tactical unit
level weakens the potential added value of the operational
echelon.
The military operations are now only one element of the
overall action, and thus armed forces operate often only in
support of the political action, including at tactical level,
and do not lead anymore the overall maneuver. A study
could therefore be conducted to open staffs to civilian
actors who are more capable than the military to take into
account their domains of expertise; or plan for the
implementation under a single commander of operational
command structures that would be truly civilian-military. All
lines of operations would thus be better taken into account.
In that regard, and in spite of all the current awkwardness
and imperfections, the UN theater of operations’ direction
structures might be interesting to study. Could this be the
true operational echelon which has to be reinvented?
1 “whereas the combat spread over southern and eastern provinces,
NATO and the coalition forces often request air support, with all
the risks presented by bombing troubled areas where the rebels
fight in the midst of the population. In the same way, the nature of
the combats, in particular the suicide bomb attacks or the roadside
explosive devices result into turning all Afghan into enemies,
multiplying thus the risks of mission creep” Le Monde Des opérations militaires américaines et de l’OTAN font plus
de 50 morts en trois jours (American and NATO operations cause
more than fifty casualties in three days) - 4 may -i 2007.
2 PIA - 00.102 (Operational level concept)
Strategic level: The level of political direction and military command
at which a nation or a group of nations determines national or
multinational security objectives and provides resources, including
military to be deployed on various theaters. It translates the
designated objectives into military objectives and supervises their
achievement.
Operational level: higher level of the military command deployed on
a theater or responsible for a geographical area, and at which
operations are planned, conducted and supported by one or several
forces in order to achieve the military objectives designated by
the strategic command and thus contribute to the achievement
of the desired end state. Operational command is exerted by a single
authority and covers military, CIMIC and politico-military dimensions.
It is joint by essence.
Tactical level: subordinate level of the military command deployed on
a theater or an area of operation and at which actions are planned
and executed in order to achieve the theater military objectives and
thus contribute to the achievement of the desired end state with
means assigned within each of the components. If required, that level
of command may be derived into several components. It essentially
covers military and CIMIC domains.
War, which does not shape anymore the States and does not appear anymore to depend on technical progress
for boosting its evolution, has discarded the “industrial model”. From now on war among the populations
requires a new equilibrium between all actors when the use of force is not anymore the major factor of
success. The armed forces, for which this is a major concern, should not anymore be organized to win
the battle but to build peace. With all other actors.
OCTOBER 2007
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DOCTRINE # 13
New conflicts
War and City
ven though for a long time battle names have also often been towns (or villages) names, for
centuries armies went “to the field”. Until recent days, most of the confrontations took place out of
agglomerations. Nevertheless, we should mention a few famous exceptions: the sieges - which were a
very important part of the whole history of wars - and the devastation and looting of towns - but this
usually followed a siege. And also the political and social struggles between factions during civil wars,
which constantly occurred along civilizations’ history. But, during the past decades, fighting in open
countryside (in a very general acceptation) has lost more and more their importance for the
benefit of fighting in urban or suburban areas.
E
BY
LAURENT HENNINGER SPECIAL PROJECT OFFICIAL BY THE CEHD1
The war for the town
Let us begin with the strategic issue i.e. the true war for
the town, beyond the mere notion of siege, that is present
at almost any time, even though in an indirect way. After all,
we should remind that the very essence of civilization is to
be urban (civis = the city). And thus the city represents at
least virtually the major stake of war considered as “the
continuation of politics by other means”. As early as the
Middle Ages, towns are considered as controlling the
territory; therefore to occupy the latter implies to occupy
the former even in a so agrarian society as the medieval
one. Beginning in the 17th century, their status as major
stakes was reinforced with the appearance of modernity:
development of pre-capitalistic economy, leading to an
exponentially growing role of towns as industrial and
financial centers, but also development of the modern
State and of its gigantic bureaucratic apparatus,
concentrated in agglomerations too. Napoleon will try to
destroy the enemy’s army in order to capture its capital city.
During the French-Prussian war of 1870-71, the capture of
Paris definitely decided the fate of France. In 1941 and 1942,
the German offensives in the USSR were directed towards
Moscow, Leningrad and then Stalingrad - or towards Cairo
and Alexandria in the Near East - while, at the same time, in
the Pacific, the Japanese had Hong Kong, Manilla,
Singapore and Rangoon as their objectives. Beginning in
1943, all the re-conquest attempts of the Allies were also
directed at large towns, without mentioning the bombing of
the large German and Japanese agglomerations. Towns
were mainly at stakes even during the Cold War with the
conflicts that steeped in blood the Third World: Beijing,
Suez, Algiers, Havana, Jerusalem, Hué, Saigon, Kabul,
Grozny, Bagdad... But the consequence of their fall will not
be always the surrender of a party, evidence that its
resistance willpower and capacity are not forcedly
consolidated in there. It would be a strategic mistake to
over-estimate the importance of towns and especially of
capital cities.
The war inside, at and against the town
ECPAD
So it was mostly from the 19th century on, from the industrial
revolution and thus “the social issue” that followed from it,
that war inside, at and against towns began to become
the rule. This shift in the warfare art was by itself the
consequence of a change in the civilization: the urban
world had from then on become absolutely predominant
DOCTRINE # 13
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OCTOBER 2007
Doctrine
over the rural one. Thus it is necessary to take into
consideration the fact that war in town always owns a very
important political and social dimension, directly related to
its most “tactical” aspects, and most often intermingles
with some civil war of one kind or another. Therefore the
consequence is that situations become extremely complex;
the “ground” is both material and human, physical and
political, related to space and society... War deserves there,
better than anywhere else, the qualifier of “total” meaning
“global”. Already during the longer sieges, from the
Antiquity to the 19th century, when towns used to fall like
ripe fruit, it usually resulted from political and social
processes. As eartly as the Antiquity, the authors of treatise
about the art of siege, like Eneas the tactician, were
haunted by the fear of treason caused by internal
dissensions. Therefore when an army penetrates into a city,
especially if it doesn’t want to destroy everything on its way,
it will have to fight inside and upon a “fluid”, versatile and
ever changing terrain, thus being very difficult to control not to mention that physically, it is multi-dimensional by
nature. But it is also very “fragile” because being indeed
human. Units will tend to scatter, which will make their
coordination all the more complex, but over all, possibly
huge political and social responsibilities will weigh upon
all the officers and NCOs... Logistics issues are not to be
neglected since they put many sieges to an end - the
stronghold or the besiegers may have suffered so many
deficiencies - ; in modern wars, the ammunitions
consumptions and the amount of casualties may literally
explode, not to mention the supply of all consumable
products (food, water, fuel), and the local civilian
populations will have to get some benefit too. Finally it is
clear that, on such a “terrain”, military forces must
determine themselves to complement their culture and their
action with some know-how completely alien to them, and
even beneath them or contemptible: for example the ones
that are normally the privilege of police forces - or
“constabulary” - fire-men, civil protection, politicians and
civil servants, if not of spies and other intelligence
community.
The equalizing role of the town
Other evidence: the urban environment plays often a defacto equalizing role by dramatically reducing the efficiency
of a number of weapons systems and their fire-power,
especially because the terrain is not deep enough. This may
give some advantages to a so called “asymmetrical”
enemy. Urban terrain fighting can thus mix most archaic
combat methods and means with the most technically
sophisticated ones. The combatants may take advantages
of all the productions and the resources of civilization,
either material or moral, positive or negative, simple or
complex, evident or unexpected. By the way, this makes
even more necessary a good understanding of the
combined arms and even joint maneuver. As a corollary:
the principles of concentration of efforts and economy of
forces are at least disrupted, and sometimes become
actually null and void.
And above all, the classical military thinking does not say a
word about that issue, or so. By lack of a theoretical tool
able to found the reflection and the planning, we have only
to rely on the experience and its oral impartation: for
instance, in 1945, the Red Army assigned General
Tchouikov, the former commander of the 62nd Army at
Stalingrad, as the commander of the troops in charge of
the seizure of Berlin. Between the two world wars, Soviet
military theoreticians, whose reflections and writing were
rich and numerous yet, had written almost nothing on the
subject. There even more than elsewhere, for the final
assault against the 3rd Reich’s capital, the 1945’ Soviet
military leaders had just to improvise and experiment. Red
Army casualties, that had constantly decreased for two
years when major operations were conceived according to
operational concepts developed fifteen years before,
became again frightening.
1 CEHD - Defense historical studies center (Château de Vincennes – Paris).
2 Intermediary headings have been added by the editorial staff.
Let us conclude this short historical review by adding that all these factors are always intermingled to give
war in cities a characteristic of absolute violence, lethality and cruelness. On this “terrain” indeed - which
constitutes by itself a full-fledged “actor” as we have explained here above - terror and/or terrorist tactics and
strategies will appear very soon. And they are very often committed by all parties in presence, the
“asymmetrical” combatants who will optimize its equalizing effects, as well as even the regular armed forces
that will be easily tempted to resort to them, but with different modalities (reprisal against populations,
hostages taking, torture, voluntarily undifferentiated use of fire-power, or even strategic bombing as it will be
the case during World War II). For all these reasons, war in cities is surely the perfect symbol of the hypermodernity we have now entered into.
OCTOBER 2007
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DOCTRINE # 13
Act and Control
Crisis Response Operations
Management
by the European Union (EU)
The remits and ambition level for EDSP (European Defense and Security Policy)
T
hough European building started about 60 years ago, EDSP has just started. Only in 1999 - during
the Cologne and Helsinki European summits - and December 2000 - during the Nice summit - did
the various Heads of State and Government within the EU (15 members at that time) agreed with the EDSP
principles, its organization, its capabilities, the way it runs and its assets. This late appearance can be
explained by different approaches among member states about the political building of Europe and
especially among those who wanted to fit Europe with a “Defense” capability and those who did not need
it and preferred to remain within the sole framework of the Atlantic Alliance. We had to wait for the FrenchBritish Saint-Malo summit in 1998 to find a medium way among these conflicting positions and to give
birth to an EDSP with limited ambition level and assets.
BY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL (RET) JEAN-PAUL PERRUCHE, FORMER COMMANDER, EU HQ
As for many other EU policies, EDSP is thus the result of a
compromise among diverging policies. All this explains why
the arrangements settled by the Nice treaty do not reflect all
what the Europeans could do together but only what they
accept to undertake within the EU framework on a consensus
basis.
Thus, military commitments out of the territory of its member
states can only be considered for limited crisis management
operations by the EDSP (with a reference to the former
missions defined for the WEU (Western European Union) at the
Petersberg meeting); collective defense and large operations
remain the province of NATO. Earmarked assets for EU
operations are also limited. The Helsinki objective
considers a maximum available strength of
60,000 soldiers, 100 warships and 400 aircraft of
different kinds that could be mobilized within 2
months for a one-year mission at most without
any rotation. Of course, this assets’ availability
completely depends on contributing states, as it
is the case for NATO. Furthermore and contrary to
NATO, the EU is not fitted with a permanent C2
(Command and Control) structure, to avoid
“useless duplications” with NATO, which means
that it has to set up a contingency one when
needed.
SIRPA TERRE/ADC DUBOIS
EDSP organization, structures
and capabilities
Though its ambitions and its asset are limited,
the EDSP however has realistic and efficient
organization, structures and capabilities to
operate.
DOCTRINE # 13
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OCTOBER 2007
Doctrine
Thanks to its design, EDSP comes within a common CFSP
(Common Foreign and Security Policy) and its purpose
consists in reinforcing its credibility. Operating on the basis of
an intergovernmental mode - i.e. through consensus-made
decisions among member states (currently 27) - it is being
implemented by the Secretary General/Higher
Representative - currently Javier Solana - supported by the
Secretary General of the Council made of 4 bodies: the
political unit, the foreign general directorate, the common
situation center and the EU Military Staff (EUMS). These
organizations are the executive component of the EDSP
managing system, whereas the decisional system is the
province of the Council and of subordinate councils:
COREPER1, COPS2 and the EUMC3 regulating body. Thus, with
this organization and these structures, the EU is in a position
of taking decisions - when being aware of an operation being
launched and having to be controlled - and of carrying out
the political control and the strategic management of this
operation.
It is important to notice that the EUMS - which is thus
reporting both to the General Secretary / Higher
Representative and to the Military Committee - is the only EU
permanent military integrated structure; and it is positioned
over operational C2 structures. Being tasked to bring in
military expertise to the political level, its missions focus on:
the observation of potential crisis theaters throughout the
world in coordination with the SITCEN, (Combined Situation
Center) preparing for strategic options for EU operations in cooperation with other relevant directorates within the Council
Secretary and the Committee, as well as setting up
capabilities and assets fitted to EU ambitions and following
them up.
It includes a little more than 200 manpower broken down
into 6 divisions, among which 5 correspond to the functions
of a conventional staff (capability planning and policy,
intelligence, operation and exercises, logistics and resources,
and CIS (Command and Information Systems). The 6th one is
the CIMIC (Civil-Military Co-operation) planning cell set up in
2004 that should enable, on the one hand to integrate and
coordinate the civilian and military aspects as early as the
early planning phase of a EU operation, and on the other hand
to set up an OHQ within the EU HQ’s infrastructure on short
notice when the Council decides to do so. This operational HQ
could operate very rapidly after an implementation decision
since it includes some forty “earmarked” officers from the
EUMS - always available to work in it - in addition to the
permanent staff from the CIMIC cell. The additional staff that
is also earmarked in national OHQs should enable the
operation center to reach its full operational capability (with a
strength of about 90 in less than 20 days).
This last possibility to set up an operational HQ (at a strategic
military level) in Brussels for military operations including a
civilian component supplements both other possibilities
already identified in the early EDSP stages: resorting to NATO
global assets (among others SHAPE) according to the terms
of the so-called “Berlin +” agreement or using one national
HQ among those declared by 5 EU member states (FR, UK,
DE, IT, GR) according to the framework nation concept. These
provisions aim to compensate for the lack of a permanent
operational chain of command within the EU.
Results from EDSP’s first 6 years of operation
Despite limited ambition level and assets because of its
structure, the effective results from EDSP could be considered
as highly encouraging. With 16 launched operations - among
which a dozen are still in progress - the EU has become a well
known actor for world stability. As it had been hoped for, the
Common and Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) has increased its
credibility thanks to concrete actions from the EDSP; Javier
Solana, its Higher Representative, is a recognized
representative much in demand and his opinion is highly
valued in international negotiations. It is obvious that his
influence and therefore Europe’s one is all the stronger as
the positions that he is defending are strongly supported
by all the member states.
The first EU military operations started in 2003 with
operation “Concordia” in Macedonia - a commitment limited
to 350 people - that enabled to practice cooperation measures
with NATO, then with operation “Artemis” in DRC (Democratic
Republic of Congo) - a self-contained EU operation including
the commitment of 2,000 service men and women, with
France as the framework nation. This operation played a major
role in setting up close cooperation links with the UNO.
Since December 2004, the EU has taken over from NATO in
Bosnia with operation “Althea” and the early commitment of
7,000 personnel - the chain of command using NATO assets.
This operation is going on successfully, which enables us to
consider a significant reduction in strength that should
decrease to 2,500 by the turn of the year 2007.
From July to December 2006, a second self-contained EU
operation occurred in DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo)
in support of MONUC (United Nations Organization Mission
in DRC) during the critical poll phase with the commitment of
about 2,500 personnel. The chain of command included an
OHQ with a German core (Potsdam) and a FHQ with a French
core (Kinshasa).
Since late 2004, the EU has also been committed in Darfur
within the framework of a PSO (Peace Support Operation) in
support to the African Union, responsible for operation AMIS,
which is its first peace support operation. So far, EU support
consisted of an important funding (25 million euros) and of
observers, EU civilian (police officers) and military experts at
the various levels of the chain of command.
To these more specifically military operations, we have to add
the so-called civilian EDSP missions; all of them largely
resorted to military assets and expertise, in particular during
the planning phase. It mainly deals with “monitoring”
operations, like Aceh in Indonesia or the Rafah check-point in
Palestine, or operations in support of defense changes, like in
RDC, or police changes, like in Bosnia, Palestine, DRC or
Darfur. Two new civilian operations are being planned in
Kosovo and in Darfur.
OCTOBER 2007
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DOCTRINE # 13
Act and Control
Observations and lessons learned
EU operation features
These numerous and various EDSP operations were also
concrete tests that enabled us to draw overall lessons
learned pertaining to crisis management, but also to gradually
define a style for EU operations.
Put at a disadvantage by all the restrictive measures towards
its ambition level and its assets, the EU has a natural
tendency not to favor the use of its military capabilities.
When it uses them, it makes sure that the political objective is
clearly specified and it commits itself within a well limited
time-space framework for very specific tasks. On the contrary
and thanks to the numerous and various tools at its disposal,
it always chooses a multidisciplinary approach for crisis
management; it basically tackles roots and it carries out welltargeted commitments either within the framework of the
overall treatment of a situation for a protracted length of time,
like in Bosnia, or to gain limited effects, like in RDC, in Aceh or
in Palestine. This explains why EDSP operations always seem
to be tailor-made and are low observable ones; but so far, all
of them resulted into success.
Overall lessons learned
1. Each crisis is unique and requires a specific treatment even
if there are common features to crisis situations, such as:
urgent measures to be taken, the importance of the media
factor, relationships between interest at stake and return to
safety, or the inability of the current government to bring a
solution to a degraded situation that cannot be accepted by
the international community.
2. Crises are being managed for a protracted length of time
according to an overall and gradual approach.
3. The multinational management of crises - which is the only
one providing a required legitimacy - creates additional
difficulties that come from differing national interests or
from the lack of a clear strategy.
1 Committee of Permanent Representatives.
2 Political and Security Committee.
3 EUMC = EU Military Committee.
4. There is no purely military answer to crises, which,
basically, are political. And yet, most of the time, the
commitment of military assets is a contingency one with
hardly clear and realistic political goals; and naturally
focusing onto security aspects, which are obviously the
most visible ones.
Results and perspectives
Fitted with efficient decision and C2 structures, and satisfactory follow-up structures for possible crisis
situations, and relying on a span of tools favoring overall treatment, the EU - despite restrictions imposed on
its capabilities - has become a credible and well-known actor for global security that has already been
committed on three continents.
It could do better and even increasingly take part into the stabilization of a turbulent world, if its member
states decide to do so. Current crises are characterized by their suddenness and a requirement for
contingency operations. The EU has taken it into account by improving its rapid reaction capabilities with
small-sized deployable units. These are Battle Groups 1,500; two of them being ready for deployment on a
standing basis. However, it is still necessary for operational C2 assets to have the same availability. A standing
operational chain of command, even with a reduced strength, would be a decisive and economical move into
the right direction and an obvious coherence measure.
Besides, simultaneously carrying out a dozen operations of various kinds and sizes makes it necessary to have
a permanent C2 center for all EU operations. It does not mean a change in the ambition level for EU-led
operations but only a coherent approach for assets with respect to the mission decided by the council. Peace
in the world is longing for it.
DOCTRINE # 13
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OCTOBER 2007
Doctrine
The
French
Air
Force
during Stabilization Phases
or nearly one century, air power has substainted the use of the third dimension in armed conflicts. It is required
in front of an enemy that is equipped with it; only because of the asymmetry it provides, it is still necessary
in the new kinds of conflicts in front of those that have not got it. Moreover, it is effectively included into all
the areas of governmental action when solving conflicts.
F
Currently tasked to take part in the resolution of numerous crises throughout the world, while preparing for future
threats, defense should - according to the French Armed Forces Chief of Staff - “... arbitrate on the one hand
between the effective commitment level that we intend to reach in current operations and on the other hand,
the efforts that we intend to make, to maintain and develop our armed forces in the prospect of the most serious
crises1”. Air power that has become airspace power should thus get ready to fight looming threats, symbolized
by WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction), without impairing both its role in French daily safety and in crises in
which France is currently committed.
Today, a large number of soldiers carry out this mission for France through overseas operations, at great risk to
their own lives, with an iron-willed personal commitment coming from very strong moral values and specific
training, and with equipment that has often been procured within the bipolar strategic environment we are
aware of. The Air Force takes part in each phase of such crises and in nearly the whole array of missions.
The stabilization phase has become prevailing, as well because of required skills as with strengths committed
during protracted periods.
Its starting point will be - among others - a consequence of the way a crisis is perceived by the political authorities,
of assets available to the French Government or to the international community to prevent it from getting worse,
and possibly of the moral state of the population when combats are over.
BY
AIR FORCE BRIGADIER GENERAL GUILLAUME GELEE, DIRECTOR OF THE CESA2
Thinking of COAs (Courses of Action)
during a stabilization phase by using common
defense capabilities3
According to their order in the forces’ employment concept,
defense missions consist in defending the country’s vital
interests, in taking part in the protection and the defense of
the European airspace, in participating into operations to
the benefit of peace and in complying with international
law, and eventually in taking part in public service tasks.
Our capabilities ought to be oriented towards these
missions; a major difficulty - both for equipment and for
personnel training - consists in arbitrating when resources
are in conflict with the requirements that are considered as
necessary to fulfill these missions. The will for defense to
be improved is thus favorable to debates about priorities in
these fields. As regards the issue we are dealing with - the
participation of armed forces to a stabilization phase - the
issue at stake will then consist in knowing whether we
should orientate our defense towards peace support forces
or towards armed forces protecting us against emerging
hazards, embodied by WMDs and very active terrorism,
sometimes fitted with high-tech equipment.
We cannot focus our thoughts on the stabilization phase
regardless of the defense capability context. Though a force
trained for a specific mission is able to carry out other
missions, arbitrations will have to be carried out, in terms
of planning, military education and forces’ training. In this
case, “... we will always be tempted to give up an always
uncertain future to the present time that lays down its
law4”. Currently, it is thus sensible to think about courses
of action to be implemented in stabilization phase by use
of the common defense capabilities, without “setting our
sights toward the stars” by expecting yet unknown
arbitrations.
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DOCTRINE # 13
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Adapting current air assets
Stabilization will come out of
previous phases’ achievements
SIRPA AIR
The first phase among these major
phases is about the way a conflict
sets up, during which intelligence
has a prevailing importance.
Beyond a deep knowledge of the
history and the culture of a country,
and of the opposing parties,
accurate data will be necessary.
Airspace power has its role to
perform, thanks to imagery,
information and communication
capabilities (satellites, eavesdrop
aircraft, and soon drones fitted
with specific payloads, skilled
specialists ). At this stage, a
government has a large number of
combinations available regarding
various diplomatic, economic and military action tools.
Should a military operation phase start, it will have to be
carried out while avoiding getting committed into violence
escalation. The purpose is not to make a clean sweep of the
opponent but to set up the conditions for a return to peace.
During this phase, tactical intelligence has a key value, as
it enables to cripple the enemy through operations decided
within short notice by striking accurately and in due time.
Violence, when badly measured out, wrongly oriented, and
applied at the wrong moment results into a feeling of
humiliation within the population towards the forces that
impose the will of foreign countries. Thus, a balance
between deterrence, violence and the absence of
operations should be found. The capability of fighter aircraft
to strike at the right time, within short notice and accurately
is well known to everyone. Nevertheless, it should increase
its span of effects by adapting current weapons systems
in order to improve fire effects by degrees from gun fire
and 250 kg bombs.
The whole of available means (military, diplomatic,
economic, and even cultural) will have to be taken into
account in order to carry out an operation, whose purpose
will consist in bringing warring factions back “to the
negotiation table” in conditions enticing them to find again
a balance - if possible with the population hoping for the
end of conflicts - in order to start the stabilization phase in
the best possible conditions.
Using the capabilities of airspace power
Land operations during the stabilization phase are
described in the booklet “Winning the battle, building
peace”. It will have to be carried out in coherence with
other Government operations. The qualities of airspace
power can be used according to two different aspects:
DOCTRINE # 13
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OCTOBER 2007
either directly by the decision-maker at political-military
level, or in support of land operations.
In both cases, its capabilities are linked to “holding high
grounds”. Schematically, they can be gathered into five
categories.
Air superiority in the area, which decreases the risks for
forces on the ground. It could take several aspects
according to the various theaters, from the mere
observation of the airspace up to an active protection by
intervention assets. It is absolutely necessary to be aware
of air activity to protect personnel and facilities on the
ground. Usually, the airspace remains open to enable
economic activity to be performed. Then, it is highly
dangerous to let air traffic increase without distinguishing
between commercial flights and those which are potentially
dangerous. This function - with a low cost in manpower and
equipment - is too often neglected and the price to pay
could be very high. If an air threat is a known fact, air
defense active assets (ADA batteries and fighter aircraft)
will then be essential to protect personnel during
stabilization operations.
Violent action, accurate and within short notice, denying or
deterring enemy combat operations, like those described
above; during a stabilization phase - as during other phases
- it decreases action possibilities available to an enemy
opponent? By confining him in areas invisible from the sky.
If considered to be the time for a blocking action, it could be
carried out on political or military order, through a targeted
action, even through a mere threat to carry it out. A few
minutes after the decision to get committed has been
made, air assets are able to carry out a gradual operation,
from a mere presence5 to target destruction. The
psychological impact of this kind of action is likely to
moderate his warlike fervor.
Intelligence, images, communications - in particular cell
phone listening and radio listening by Transall Gabriel - and
Doctrine
electronics, when the enemy is equipped with modern
assets, such as the Hezbollah, is a currently much used
activity. Moreover, the standing presence of air observation
assets - in particular UAVs (Unmanned Air Vehicles) beyond providing us with images of the current situation in
real time, compels the enemy to remain concealed for its
actions, thus limiting his initiative capability. Some other
reconnaissance capabilities seem to be less known: a patrol
of Mirage F1CR can set up the geo-referenced map of an
area, even an urban area, a few hours after having been
requested to. Thus, it will enable to update the interest area
extremely accurately, an effect multiplier for forces on the
ground.
Eventually, the Air force provides support, thanks to airlift,
from France or within a theater, and to deployed air bases
that can accommodate any kind of unit and provide them
with living support, technical support and logistic support
together with a high level of security.
Air operations have always had to meet collateral damage
hazards. The first theoreticians of air power - Douhet,
Mitchell - have even seen a strategic effect when not
distinguishing targets from environment. Dresden bombing
purpose not only consisted in decreasing German industrial
manufacturing capabilities; it also aimed at undermin a ing
people’s moral and to show the allied power to its leaders.
As early as in the 50s, the nuclear deterrence doctrine
included this strategy pertaining to population bombing.
This voluntary kind of collateral damage has thus
disappeared from the conventional concept inventory.
As modern society has enabled to put the price of life at
the top of the value scale, collateral damage - a euphemism
for undesired death and destruction during combat - are
now very badly accepted and they are likely to spoil the
image of a country. Thus it is our duty to reduce them impact accuracy and target definition - and to limit their
consequences.
Only technology enables to have a better impact accuracy,
by using laser guidance, and homing systems with infrared
and radar imagery. For this reason, it is significant to see all
the efforts recently devoted to air-to-ground and ground-toground weapons systems. As an example, the fitting kit for
AASM6 (Modular air-to-ground weapons) bombs will have
such a device, enabling to reach a metric accuracy. A better
target definition will be obtained from accurate geographic
co-ordinates and target images, in particular for the
weapon’s guidance system. Eventually, we have to adjust
the explosive power of our ammunition, as explained
above, in order to get the required effect, and no more. This
set of improvements will only be exploited by increasing
common training between air and land forces. In particular,
the French Army CENZUB (MOUT warfare training center) is
an outstanding tool to promote a common combat culture.
Eventually, the impact of collateral damage is directly linked
to their media coverage. It is not a matter of hiding them or
ignoring them, but of having common sense when
assessing them. If the media have a capability of
overestimating such damage - through tight photo plans or
specific commentaries - servicemen have all the data to
correctly balance the actual consequences and let it know.
Finally, collateral damage is linked to the use of force, which
is unique to the military. Of course, if a high firepower is
necessary, the consequences of mistakes will be more
serious. Intending to get rid of combat collateral damage
means abstaining from using high fire power, which is
non-sense, even during a stabilization phase.
1 Opening address to the 14th “Peace and Defense” parliamentary conference,
on February 5th, 2007.
2 Airspace Strategic Studies Center.
3 Intermediary titles were added by the editorial staff.
4 Opening address to the 14th “Peace and Defense” parliamentary conference,
on February 5th, 2007.
5 Show of force: fighter aircraft flight showing our capability to bring power to
the very heart of opponents’ interests.
6 Modular air-to-ground weapons, a guidance and propulsion kit fitted onto a
bomb body, which will be fielded in coming months
7 Institute of Higher National Defense Studies.
In conclusion, airspace power remains necessary during all the stages of military operations, from planning
to the withdrawal of military units. Too often limited to the destruction of ground targets, it is essential to
safety, as regards air threats, to information, to intelligence, to transport, and it is likely to be an efficient
support thanks to theater airbases.
During the stabilization phase, it contributes to better situation awareness and it will be essential for some
rapid action within short notice. Its qualities can only be exploited with specific training. The numerous
exercises including land and air forces are a guarantee and a recent land-air presentation to IHEDN7 students
showed that co-operation can still be reinforced.
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DOCTRINE # 13
Act and Control
“Winning the Battle
Building Peace”
The Adaptation of the Operational Readiness
of the Company Teams at the CENTAC1
ithin the CPF (Army National Training Center) the CENTAC which prepares the forces to intervene in open
terrain and the CENZUB (Military operations in urban terrain -MOUT- training center) which prepares the
forces for actions in built-up areas, are quasi exclusively dedicating themselves to the operational preparation
of combined arms company teams. Opened in September 2006, the CENZUB is presently in its building up phase
and does not have yet all its assets. Therefore, this article is based upon the example of the CENTAC to present
the undergoing evolutions within the centers of the CPF.
W
Having considered the crises and conflicts which took place these last years in the world, and after thoughts and
forecasts pertaining to likely future operations, the French army decided to change noticeably the modalities of
the operational preparation of its forces. Without excluding the possibility of a strategic surprise that imposes to
preserve the capabilities necessary for conducting “classic” warfare, the army must know how to conduct
operations during crises that are characterized by the intrication of actions of different natures, security actions
aiming at maintaining the level of violence at the lowest level, very violent combat actions, often short and
geographically localized, and humanitarian actions. The general framework has also changed; the armed forces
no longer intervene in a world at war, resigned to unavoidable collateral damages, but in a world that is “officially
in peace” amongst populations who continue to live under the permanent eye of the medias that broadcast
the smallest event throughout the world.
BY BRIGADIER GENERAL COLAS DES FRANCS COMMANDING GENERAL, (FRENCH) ARMY NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER
These new types of engagements require troops that are
adapted to reversibility, i.e. capable of alternatively switching
from combat to the maintenance of public security or to
humanitarian missions with the subsequent changes of the
rules of engagement. In addition, within such a framework, a
local action decided under emergency at a lower level might
have major consequences (notion of the “strategic corporal”)
and that imposes a solid preparation of the (officers and NCOs)
units at contact. Therefore, the Army CoS has decided to turn
his effort on the operational preparation at combined arms
company team level. A company team is a combined arms unit
of roughly 200 men, of a prevailing combat nature - infantry
and armored - reinforced by one engineer platoon, one artillery
observer and one TACP2; it is commanded by a captain.
Propose diversified tactical situations3...
ECPAD
Today, the CENTAC proposes to the forces that come for
training diversified tactical situations. For this, it relies upon
the CDEF (Forces Employment Doctrine Center), which
disseminates the changes in doctrine, the lessons learned
DOCTRINE # 13
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OCTOBER 2007
Doctrine
from the theaters in which France is committed but also
those coming from the engagements of our allies in order to
better apprehend the “extreme violence” situations that our
forces are likely to meet. It develops scenarios in order to come
as close as possible to the present types of engagements
during the intervention and stabilization phases 4,
systematically including some behavior changes in order to
train the forces to reversibility. In this way, a captain might be
called to negotiate with a militia, played by the OPFOR (two
permanent units at Mailly that fulfill the role of the opposing
force), to monitor the local implementation of a theater
agreement, whilst the day before his company team fought
against this militia in the camp of Mailly.
Although the OPFOR perfectly fulfill the role of enemy units,
mechanized or wheeled armor, they also fulfill the role of
opponents, such as militias mounted on pick-ups, of terrorists
and even simulate civilian crowds: population and refugees
(however crowds still remain very difficult to simulate
realistically).
The CENTAC builds the company teams’ opponent based on
the TTA 8085, favoring dissymmetrical and asymmetrical
combat phases with a somewhat favorable ratio of forces but
facing a maneuvering, flexible and always aggressive enemy.
It places emphasis upon the asymmetrical dimension of
operations6. Today a company team must simultaneously cope
with all forms of threats in hostile terrain, during the “first
entry” of the intervention phase with the evacuation of foreign
citizens as well as during the longer phase of stabilization,
during offensive and security operations, by day and night. For
all that, this evolution does not suppress the armored threat
but changes it, the classical combat between armored mobile
elements giving way to actions involving armored vehicles.
The force coercion systematically remains present during
exercises, but other specific courses of action are included:
harassment on the rears, searching for weapons caches,
intermingling of armed elements and civilians, discovery of
mass graves or of civilian victims of exactions, management
of the medias present on the theaters of operations.
The CENTAC strongly integrates the logistic component in
combats: taking care of the wounded, security of supplies and
logistic routes. The matter is to compel the company teams to
take into account this essential dimension of operations. The
company teams can no longer exclusively rely upon their
specific medical assets and must systematically involve their
platoons into the casualty collection. The battalion forward
combat train, which has already been involved in real supply
actions, must move in insecure areas and ensure their own
security during halts as well as during movements. This
constraint compels the unit commanders to give a real logistic
dimension to their maneuver, by anticipating possible
casualties and by selecting a sketch of recovery and evacuation
of the wounded that is in sync. with the tactical situation.
Within this framework, it becomes more necessary than ever
for the land forces to preserve the effort granted for the benefit
of the units by enriching, during the rotations, the environment
of the company teams thanks to the deployment of performing
white cell articulated around a battalion taskforce CP and a
battalion rear combat train that are effectively deployed7.
To train the company teams and especially their
command and control personnel...
The CENTAC must face material and technical limitations
pertaining to the terrain, to its strengths and simulation
constraints, but it strives to bring pragmatic answers to
preserve the realism of exercises, as the essential still remains
to play, thanks to a force on force exercise, the confrontation of
two wills. On top of these constraints can be added those
pertaining to the simulation assets, which cannot perfectly
render the psychological impact of the employment of
weapons, especially those having an area effect (mines,
artillery). Last, the representation of snipping and of IEDs8 is
still imperfectly solved and this sometimes renders the
perception of the vulnerability of units incomplete. Similarly,
the sight of blood and the impact of the suffering of the
wounded can only be scarcely rendered as they are difficult to
prepare9.
Above all, the target of the CENTAC is the command and
control personnel of a company team. Confronted to multiple
availabilities and planning difficulties, the battalions send to
the CENTAC some units, whose composition is often close to an
“ad hoc coalition”, relatively speaking. The first objective
really is the preparation and the putting into situation of a
sometimes heterogeneous command and control team,
thanks to computer assisted tactical learning exercises
(SYSIMEV IA10) and to the systematic practice of the combined
arms dialog during the exercise. In the continuity of a combat
in which the management of tiredness is essential (96 hours
non stop), the matter is to preserve during the maneuver a
period during which the combined arms command and control
personnel could elaborate together the maneuver of the next
phase.
On the tactical level, rather than implementing predefined
sketches, based on regulations, with standardized structures of
forces, the CENTAC tries to promote tactical reasoning based
on simple principles. The leader in contact must adapt his
courses of action with the forces he locally has at hand to fulfill
his mission. In order to carry out a local action, rather than
using a “formula”, he must be sure he has all assets at hand:
one covering element facing the dangerous direction, one
combat support element, one element in reserve, intelligence
on the specific location, one maneuver element, available and
ready logistical assets, etc.
By putting ourselves in a common evaluation
and improvement approach
The CENTAC is using a common evaluation and improvement
approach that is personalized for each command and control
team (coupling between the players, the analysts and the
observers/controllers/advisors is created upon the troop’s
arrival). Before the rotation, the expectations of the exercises
are defined by the combat formations participating in the
exercise. They are the only ones able to evaluate the
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DOCTRINE # 13
Act and Control
instantaneous level of their units. The exercise files are drafted
in close cooperation with the battalions. The systematic After
Action Review (AAR) at the end of the daily tactical phase
clearly demonstrates this will to improve the playing units,
by “dissecting” the actions of the preceding day and night
and by deriving the axes of effort for the coming night and day.
A standardized evaluation tool is gradually implemented.
Rather than giving a unique too arbitrary mark, it will translate
into the elaboration of a “tactical evaluation standardized set
of marks” focusing on the assessment of the mastering of the
fundamental aspects at company team level that will later
allow the battalion commanders to evaluate their units based
upon clear and identical standards11.
Since the summer of 2006, the CENTAC has widened its
mission to the collective training of units. Based upon a smart
management of the Mailly camp facilities, it offers a “ready
to use” collective training program to the units. Before
the classic 15 days rotation that includes the company team
level combined arms integration and the training and control
phase per se, a third optional week is proposed12. It is
dedicated to the revision of collective training skills (team,
squad and platoon levels)13.
6 An exercise based upon the “CEDRE” file was played during the
1st semester of 2007; it tried to reproduce an action areas organization
similar to the one of operation DAMAN in Lebanon.
7 Last February the 35th régiment d’infanterie (Inf Bn) took the
opportunity of the engagement of two company teams to deploy its
CP that was able to put into practice the procedures using the SIR
(Bn level CIS) and its rear combat trains that was evaluated by the Bn
commanding officer.
8 Improvised Explosive Devices.
9 Mass graves can be made by making up a dozen of persons during
the exercise; in fact, they are still an exception.
10 Combined arms virtual training simulation system.
11 The CENTAC relies on a tool of the CENTAURE system. Without putting
aside the notion of success of the mission, the matter is to make effort
on the evaluation of the global level of the company team: drafting and
dissemination of orders, conduct of the action, circulation of
information, mastering of elementary acts, sense of the maneuver,
adaptation to threats and constraints, etc.
12 Taking advantage of the financing of transports by the Land Forces
Command, the formations may increase the length of their stay (4 to
6 days) at the CENTAC before their rotation.
13 Taking the form of exercises of drills, of firing course and of tactical training
and education sequences.
1 French Force on Force Training Center.
2 Tactical Air Control Party.
3 Intermediate headings have been added by the editorial staff.
4 The Army remains globally well prepared to this latter type of
situation thanks to the acquired experience during these last
years. Therefore, the effort must be focused on the actions that
the forces are the least involved in.
5 Nicknames “SABLE” (SAND), “GLAISE” (CLAY) and “ABSINTHE”
(ABSINTH) enemy, reference to scenario 2, French engagement
carried out under UN mandate within the framework of a
coalition.
ECPAD
Other evolutions are under study such as putting the
rotating units, immediately upon their arrival, in a
tactical atmosphere at the Sainte-Suzanne bivouac
at Mailly. During the two weeks of the rotations, they
would be living as a troop on operation, guarding
their stationing, ensuring the security of all their
movements, being subjected to OPFOR attacks, IEDs
during their movements, etc.
Without losing sight of the significant limits in order to render all the characteristics of present conflicts,
namely mainly the intermingling of the players (combatants, population) in an environment that is more and
more urban, the CENTAC enables to tackle with the utmost possible realism the present engagements
context, i.e. to employ all the available options of the force, be confronted to indiscriminated violence, bring
one’s assistance to a bruised population (or later maybe, educate and train some local forces to take over).
In this way, the CENTAC permanently adapts itself in order to take into account the evolutions of crises and of
courses of engagements on the ground, in order to offer to the forces a performing operational preparation
that is adapted to their missions.
DOCTRINE # 13
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OCTOBER 2007
Doctrine
1
CSS
Units
Protection in Operations
n Iraq, Road 250 has been nick-named “Ambush Alley”. The attack against the 507th Maintenance Company,
on March 23rd, 2003 at Nasiriya, has painfully demonstrated logistics convoys’ vulnerability. This ambush
that was widely media covered as “the Jessicah Lynch affair”, took the lives of 11 American soldiers while 9
other were wounded and 7 captured.
I
The investigation that was immediately conducted showed that this ambush resulted initially from an
orientation mistake and it recommended first to reinforce basic combatant training among CSS units’
personnel and second to improve their protection and self-defense capacities. The numerous attacks that
American forces had to face on their rears afterwards induced the chain of command to implement concrete
measures to protect logistical deployments and flows, and also as training and equipment are concerned.
Until these lessons learned from the US Army in Iraq, the French Army had a solution to protect its CSS units
based on the principle that the logistician is first of all a soldier; and, if needed, by reinforcing deployments
and convoys with protection and escort units. This concept indeed is in line with the operational situations
that French land forces have experienced, but it is obvious that they would be insufficient if confronted to an
Iraqi-like conflict. It is thus necessary to have our doctrine and assets evolve.
BY MAJOR PATRICE CUDENNEC, CFLT2
Towards a better protection of units in operations3...
As soon as 2004, an action plan conducted by the CDEF
(Forces Employment Doctrine Center) dealing with the
protection of logistics, initiated works and doctrinal
developments, determine training activities and equipment
efforts to be made. By the end of 2006, under the direction
of CICDE4, a study was undertaken aiming at drafting a
concept and then a doctrine for units’ protection in
operations, this being in a joint framework. As a complement
to the joint works, studies have been conducted inside the
Army in order to establish precise rules well adapted to CSS
units organized in convoys and deployed in urban areas5.
It is necessary to make an effort to protect the force during
all the phases of an operation. This effort aims at preserving
the combat effectiveness of our units, and thus participates
in the keeping of their freedom of action, of their credibility,
in spite of the complexity of the operational situations
(versatile situations, non-linear dispositions, fighting in
empty spaces, populations involvement, fighting in built-up
areas, economic and social disrepair...). Because threats may
come from everywhere, and they are present in all the depth
of the theater of operations, CSS units protection is a direct
responsibility of the Force Commander. He must take into
account that the CSS units by themselves have only limited
protection capabilities that allow them to cope with just a
mere immediate safety against a low intensity threat. They
may go somehow beyond it, but at the expense of their main
mission, to provide logistic support.
CSS units’ protection must be examined as soon as the
planning work begins and be translated into concrete
measures when forces are generated in order to limit
adaptation changes during the engagement which would
deprive the force from some of its maneuver units. In this
framework, a number of criteria are to be integrated into the
preparatory works: insecurity level, deployment area,
deployed forces strength, type of the engagement,
foreseeable duration, phases... It is also necessary to take
into account which will be the different contributors to the
CSS unit protection: host nation units, PROTERRE (land
protection) units, traffic control units... as well as their
equipment, should it be specific or not. Finally, under which
operational control procedures will the protection units
operate must be beforehand defined in order to avoid any
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DOCTRINE # 13
Act and Control
conflict of interest or subordination. It will be crucial to fix
their status as soon as forces are being generated in the
home countries (assignment to a major unit, temporary
attachment, OPCON, TACON).
...through a better training to react to emergencies,
especially in urban areas, with a well-fitted equipment
In front of an actually true threat, well aware of it due to
numerous lessons learned, CSS units must strive to train for
reacting to emergency situations and be prepared to be
engaged in an urban terrain.
The best token for protection in operations remains training.
In this purpose, the (French) Land Logistic Force (FLT) must
train its units at all levels, to learn in France all the safety
know-how necessary to survive in operations. This training
must develop the tactical-logistical cohesion and the
uniqueness of the operational support chain. It is the
purpose of the conjunctive exercises FAT6-FLT like
“FATEXTEL-AETIUS”. In the domain of logistics, the
operational preparation is as much the FAT’s responsibility
as the FLT’s one. A systematic integration of logistical
modules into training exercises at all levels will help gain
such an indispensable coherency.
Tours of training in specialized training centers and battle
seasoning centers are the most profitable times to
consolidate individual and collective know-how that are
indispensable to logisticians. PROTERRE missions
performed by medical and transportation battalions, along
with their specific preparation based on MICAT (common
missions of all Army units), give irreplaceable training
opportunities for safeguard processes. This is why units
should keep performing these missions and be able to
prepare for them in the best conditions.
Corner stone of combat training, a tour in CENZUB7 is a
necessity for CSS units. A transportation unit had the
opportunity to exercise in this training center for fighting in
built-up areas (FIBUA), for the first time in 2006; they
noticed the quality and the relevance of training there. This
center offers an adequate training for the FLT’s units and it
would be worthy to have some logistics detachment training
together with a combined arms company team, or even with
a PROTERRE company in charge of its protection.
In addition to these training activities, FLT must be fielded
equipment well fitted to its missions as performed in
asymmetrical conflicts.
Traffic control platoons will lately receive light protected
vehicles (PVP). In Lebanon, in the frame of operations
“BALISTE-DAMAN”, an armored vehicle fitted traffic control
platoon had to be deployed as a condition for the right
achievement of the initial deployment.
Armored driver’s cabin kits will be available in operation.
Convoys will be equipped with jamming devices against
IEDs. Protective shields are under study to protect
dismounted personnel in built up areas...
CFLT
1 CSS = Combat Service Support.
2 Land Logistic Command / Training and
studies division / Doctrine section /
Evaluation.
3 Intermediary headlines have been added
by the editorial staff.
4 Joint Center for Concepts, Doctrine and
Experimentations.
5 Doctrine du soutien logistique en zone
urbaine (Doctrine for logistical support in
urban area) (approuvé le 5 juillet 2006 sous
le n°482/DEF/ CDEF/DEO/BLOG - Edition
2006). Mémento sur la protection et
organisation des convois logistiques en
opérations (Memento for logistical convoys
organization and protection in operations)
(approuvé le 10 octobre 2006 sous le n°
358/ELT/DEP/BEGD/LOG - Edition 2006).
6 FAT: (French) Land Forces.
7 CENZUB: Military operations in urban
terrain (MOUT) training center.
8 CEITO: Infantry operational shooting training
center.
The potential hazards to which CSS units are submitted in operation are known and identified. However,
the budgetary constraints, the units high rotation rate, the capacities for specialized centers like CEITO8
and CENZUB to receive such units, don’t allow to meet the requirements that an Iraqi-type engagement would
demand. The important thing is to get a level of training and a level of equipment which permit, when time
comes, to rapidly fill the quality gap for the CSS units to be able to face any high threat situation.
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Doctrine
Adapting Military Education
& Training to Nowadays Commitments
“The misjudgment of all those who organize armies is to consider the current instant as a permanent
situation. They forget that, to stay alive, an army should be shaping itself in accordance with the events
curve.” (General von Seeckt, 1866-1936).
P
rofessional Military Education (PME) & Training delivered in army schools has always been somehow
laughed at, and sometimes very sternly. PME is indeed frequently based on lessons from the conflict last
fought (transmitted by the already old instructors teaching there). It is also considered as few reactive to
the evolutions that forces are simultaneously experiencing on new battlefields. Some major defeats
experienced for two centuries on almost all continents illustrate, unfortunately with blood, the sharp
criticism from a Liddel-Hart. According to him, the most difficult thing in the world is not to introduce a new
concept in an army but to get rid of an old one.
However, the Army, at the beginning of the 21st century, is really an army of employment. The strength of its
personnel being deployed every year on a large variety of theaters shows that an effort is to be made in
order that each leader having completed a program of instruction be prepared to accomplish the missions,
in relation to his level, in more and more complex environments. On its part, the world of schools is no
longer, and since long, the temple of immobility as it was blamed for in a schematic way. It is indeed
maintained in close contact with people on operations. This is done first by partnering with forces. Without
it, the education of future leaders would be meaningless, for want of maneuver units subordinated to
schools. Contact is also maintained by schools through the constant participation of their staff in on-going
operations. Thanks to this contact, PME organizations (especially branch schools, the cradle of battalions)
are fully aware that they only exist through and for forces. They ought then to be perfectly in line with
the new guidance issued by the Army Chief of Staff in summer 2006 and expressed in the document
“Winning the Battle, Building Peace”.
Partly anticipating this new deal, CoFAT is adapting to it by launching ambitious programs addressing
almost the full chain. That contributes to provide the Army with the leaders, soldiers and citizens it needs
to accomplish the whole spectrum of missions they will be assigned. These are to be carried out in a
constantly evolving strategic and budgetary context.
We have quickly considered the comprehensive principle linking all these programs, namely looking for a
balance between acquisition of know-how, technical as well as tactical, and behavior in compliance with the
army’s culture. We have now to describe the main challenge for CoFAT. It lies with the preparation of army
leaders for commitments of any kind in urban areas, as they are the main feature of nowadays operations.
We will then precise the topics composing the complement indispensable for achieving this objective.
BY
LIEUTENANT COLONEL NICOLAS TACHON, COFAT1 STAFF
OCTOBER 2007
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Adapt and Coach
Freedom of action through control of effects
The guideline of the education policy aims at placing any
leader having completed a PME class in intellectual
conditions enabling him, at his level, to maintain his freedom
of action, following from his senior’s.
Indeed, the use of force leads to coordinate the use of weapons
systems, communication tools and pieces of equipment. These
operate technologies so complex that the time needed to learn
to master them, even considering only the user’s guide, has
dramatically increased. Such speeding up mainly tends to
reduce the tactical training to a strict minimum, as the time
span granted to PME cannot be extended without limits. Must
an infantry platoon leader himself be mastering the whole of
systems he will be in charge of coordinating the operation?
Should he know how to drive his vehicle? Should he be an
experienced marksman for all his weapons, from FAMAS2
to Eryx missile? Should he solve any problem on his PR4G 3 or
his SIT4? We can obviously wish it, but the current trend is not
to extend the duration of courses to allow, in comfortable
conditions, to learn first how to operate all systems then to
combine them in a series of tactical exercises. It is then
important not to be drifting on the flooded river of technical
know-how, reducing then tactics to the application of
schemes but rather to rehabilitate the maneuver. This would
inspire each leader the control of effects his cell has the
capacity to produce, this would make him aware of those that
other leaders may generate for him, and this would enhance
his capacity to anticipate. All this will be better for him than to
gather recipes to react to events in succession.
photo fournie par Lt-col Tachon
However, such control of effects is only possible if the physical
and human environment, he is living in, as well as the assets
he has been allotted (or with which he will have to cooperate)
are perfectly known down to the lowest levels. In the material
impossibility to generate, as frequently as we would wish, the
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conditions combining all these parameters, education should
then aim at making understand well rather than making do
just a little. It enables to acquire a capability that experience
to be gained later in battalions will translate into a true
competence.
Subsequently, he has really to learn to master the basics of
combined-arms 5 combat and to acquire a comprehensive
viewpoint enabling him to understand the general action, that
is to say his commander’s action. The military leader will then
be in a position to fulfill the complicated missions
characterizing nowadays operations, mainly in urban areas,
facing an enemy (reduced to the status of “opponent” but
having the same lethal power) disseminated among a
population switching from an enthusiastic welcome to real
hostility.
The “education” mandate of AZUR6 policy
Accompanying the CENZUB7 build-up, the AZUR policy is the
important reform aiming at providing the army with the means
to prepare itself more efficiently to intervene in urban areas.
This is done thanks in particular to a re-written regulations
package and upgraded training facilities. CoFAT was then asked
by the Army Staff by the end of 2005 to “increase the part
currently dedicated to the education of leaders for combat in
urban areas. This has to be considered in a rationale of
continuity from open terrain to urban areas, from basic course
to the Field Grade Staff Course8”. An action plan was then
drafted to respond to the forces expectations within a time
period as short as possible.
The main task remains difficult. It is about adapting the
content of courses, from basic course to the higher military
education, practically on a case by case basis, considering
Doctrine
each school particulars and specific circumstances. Meanwhile,
resources and time available are obviously restricted.
Moreover, this adaptation should be evolving in line with
the delivery of facilities financed within the framework of
IVODECO9 plan. It should also progress with the tempo of
CENZUB build-up. This dedicates indeed, once a year, a slot
of its activities to CoFAT10 educations needs. It also contributes
to the education of “primary instructors” from schools.
The method consists then in progressively inserting
the training classes appropriate to each level, changing some
exercises in the open field to exercises in urban areas, in order
to avoid the too famous “mille-feuilles11” effect which consists
in, as new needs are tabled, adding classes to the program
of instruction without extending courses duration.
In addition to facilities appropriate for maneuver and life
fire, this approach will necessarily be supported by the
development of education tools from various kinds.
Simulation tools are widely used in schools for each level of
education. They should be able to represent the particulars
of commitments in urban areas, especially the movements
of combatants in three dimensions (from underground levels
to upper floors) and the differentiated effects of weapons on
infrastructure. The requirement is obviously different from
the simulator enabling a vehicle driver to learn how to move in
the narrow space of a street to the one used by the company
commander to conduct the maneuver of his company team.
A range of evolving audiovisual products, made available to
trainees, should come to complete the academics and
the practical education delivered by the instructors. It will
display attractively the technical and tactical processes,
the documents illustrating the effects of ammunition on
materials, the lessons learned from past operations, as well as
the main doctrine documents. Schools trainees are not the only
ones to take advantage from these facilities and pedagogical
tools. The choices prevailed to the selection of such training
area for the upgrading of a training site to the advantage of a
school (for instance camp des Garrigues or Saint-Maixent).
These choices also took into account their distribution over
the territory and the possibility for the forces to use them,
in the scope of partnering or not.
But this policy fundamentally depends on how the effort to
re-write regulations references, with which instructors should
feed, is to be progressed. Indeed, since shortly, most branch
schools can base their education on doctrine foundations
clearly integrating the urban environment. However, this is
not the case of basic courses for NCOs and officers. The army
common missions build the foundation of the tactical training
delivered in Saint-Maixent12 and Coëtquidan13. They are
however not really fitted for a PROTERRE14 basic tactical unit to
fulfill them in an urban area. However, training for a PROTERRE
type commitment should be considered as learned at
the time trainees join their branch schools. In these, they will
be exclusively trained for their core trade, frequently
exclusively based on technical or administrative know-how.
Beyond that, PME is starting to take into account the document
related to self-protection when facing a hostile crowd15.
Meanwhile, on-going reflections to elaborate a joint doctrine
to fight IEDs should end as shortly as possible to integrate
the know-how associated to the education of leaders who are
likely to confront these threats on current (and certainly
future) theaters of operations, as soon as they have
completed their course.
A comprehensive approach
Far from being an end by itself, the AZUR action plan from
CoFAT fits in a wider policy. This is described in the directives
distributed to each of the PME organizations. It aims at
optimizing the room occupied by education of leaders in
the continuum of preparation of forces to operational
commitment.
So, consistently with the outcome from forces units that had
stayed at CENZUB since its opening in September 2006, the
implementation of the directive on E2PMS16 and the hardening
policy should contribute to reinforce a culture of rusticity,
indispensable for any combatant facing hard realities, both
physical and psychological, in operations in urban areas.
The objective should nevertheless be adapted to each
function’s particulars. This is expressed for each school by
looking for a specific fitness pedagogical program, designed
to prepare young leaders to grueling realities they have to
confront in the accomplishment of their duty.
Even more than the sole physical resistance of personnel,
the increased complexity of nowadays operations is also
testing their ability to draw from a wider and wider reference
system of know-how. That imposes to harmonize more the
contents of courses. This would avoid that some school, indeed
responsible due to its prerogatives as a lead of domain, ends up
being too much brought forward from the others in regard of
taking into account some aspect of the commitments.
Subsequently, the definition of common-core syllabus of
knowledge in terms of logistics, intelligence and NBC defense
should respond to this need of harmonization, while supporting
continuing education within units. The generalization of IST-C17
should, in the short term, enable to provide forces with leaders
straightaway qualified to supervise the practice of such training
method within units. This also fits in the concern of not letting
two continents arise that would be connected by only narrow
footbridges: one for combatants and one for technicians.
Because any serviceman should before all be prepared to
become a soldier18.
This approach, launched with the continuum of officers’
education especially through the combined-arms common link
and the directive related to military culture, is above all calling
for shaping minds to enable leaders, at every hierarchy
level, to reason and understand a situation related to
the higher level. Effectively, what happens daily in current
operations demonstrates how much each decision made, even
by a sergeant in charge of surveillance of a crossroads, is
based on a thorough knowledge of the opponent, of the
population, of the environment; and there is a constant threat
of legal and media consequences from any improper action.
Schools have then, not to certify the acquisition of methods
applicable in any circumstances but to favor the development
of a range of capacities. Among them are reflection,
reversibility, information management and sense of initiative.
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Adapt and Coach
photo fournie par Lt-col Tachon
Reading books carefully selected, in
association with other pedagogical
practices (conferences, debates,
exercises of historical reflection on site
known as staff-ride...) will helpfully
complete the learning of technical and
tactical know-how. This aims at
providing any future military leader
with a background the content of which
was considered much earlier than when
Clausewitz and Foch took any interest
in it19.
1 COFAT : Commandement de la formation de l’armée de terre : Army
Professional Military Education & Training Command.
2 FAMAS : French assault rifle. Erix: short range ATGM.
3 Poste radio de 4e génération : 4th generation radio set.
4 Système d’information terminal : terminal information system.
5 Combined arms combat: the full integration of combat arms in such a
way that to counteract one, the enemy must become more vulnerable to
another. (Marine Corps P 5- 12C).
6 Actions en zone urbaine : actions in urban areas.
7 Centre d’entraînement aux actions en zone urbaine : MOUT (military
operations in urban terrain) training center.
8 Mandate terms.
9 Investissement à vocation de développement de la capacité
opérationnelle : investment with a vocation to develop operational
capacity.
10 Mainly during combined arms training periods of the officers’ basic and
advanced courses.
11 “Pile up effect”. After a popular French pastry composed of several
layers of paste and cream, figuratively a storage of activity sheets one
upon another.
12 ENSOA: French NCOs School.
13 ESM Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan: French Military Academy.
14 Protection Terre : Land protection.
15 Letter n°464/DEF/CDEF/DEO/Bureau engagement dated 30 June 2006.
16 Education et entraînement physique militaire et sportif : US equivalent
would be Army Physical Fitness Training.
17 Instruction sur le tir de combat : field fire marksmanship training.
18 War only emphasizes the eternal difference between the military and
the soldier: we become a soldier when we have faced the sacrifice of
our lives, Jacques MEYER in les Soldats de la Grande Guerre (Great War
Soldiers), Hachette-Littérature, 1998, p.15.
19 “ ...It is important that the samurai be able to grasp the current reality
with the reference of past’s stories. Because, in spite of his mind and his
shrewdness, il will be very difficult for him to judge the validity of his
decisions in some circumstances.“ Yuzan DAIDOJI en 1730, in Budo
Shoshinshu - young Samurai’s Code), Editions de l’éveil, 2006, p.118.
New guidance, as expressed by the Army Chief of Staff further to the Army’s senior commanders and staff meeting, has
already been planned or conducted “on the move”. This is complying with the spirit of reactive adaptation but within the
limits of the constraints which are bearing upon the schools capacity of anticipation (scheduling partnering two years in
advance, time allowance not extendable, appropriation of new competences by the instructors...). The measures taken fit
all in an approach aiming at achieving again a balance between learning a full set of “know-how-to-do” with a “knowhow-to-be”. The final aim of it is to provide the forces, after each professional military education course, with leaders
able immediately to cope with their assignment duties, whatever the circumstances.
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Doctrine
The Land Forces Requirements’
Evolution in Matters of Capacities:
Towards a Transformation of Combat
at the Contact through “Info-valorization”1
of the Forces and Control of the Effects
T
he evolution of the armed forces’ framework of engagement - very much linked to the geostrategic
upheavals of the end of the 20th century and to the contribution that new information and
communication technologies have brought to information management - has made emerge new
factors of operational superiority which now guide the development of the land forces’ new capacities.
In order to meet the engagements that are assessed today to be the most probable within the
forthcoming decade, it is now necessary to find the right balance of specific operational capacities
the army should have in order to allow a force to impose lastingly its willpower in the field, and
within the populations which constitute today one of the military intervention’s major stakes.
That balance relies on three major axes of capacity development:
- Continuing the effort in the information control domain;
- Decreasing combat support and combat service support tasks’ weight;
- Developing forces’ adaptation and reaction capabilities.
What does “preparing for the future” mean? It means thinking today about how to protect ourselves
from tomorrow’s threats in order to reduce their effects or at least to control their associated risks.
And this is where rests all of that task’s difficulty and paradox: envisioning today how to face the most
probable threats of tomorrow, using as a starting point today’ capacities that had been developed
to counter yesterday’s threat.
It also means finding a way to make the current land forces’ capacities evolve while maintaining a
lasting operational superiority, keeping in mind the fact that although the threat of a large scale
symmetric conflict is blurring away it has however not completely disappeared.
Within the joint and even multinational framework where all engagements take place today,
the solution rests on finding the right balance among the operational functions that structure the Army,
keeping in mind the fact that the operational contract imposes capacities with dual characteristics,
and also on the ability to re-expand certain functions that would be required for a symmetric type of
engagement within a coalition.
BY COLONEL
FRANCIS AUTRAN, CHIEF BCSF 2 AT THE ARMY STAFF
OCTOBER 2007
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Adapt and Coach
The emergence of new factors of operational
superiority3
the military actions, whatever form they might take: very
violent combat operations, actions to stabilize a crisis area,
peace support operations, assistance to the populations.
The evolution of the land forces’ engagement framework
as well as the new technologies’ contribution have made
emerge new factors of operational superiority that
transform completely the aspect of the military action on
the ground and induce differentiated requirements in
matters of capacities.
With the 9/11 ordeal, a new era was born and warfighting
concepts entered into a phase of deep mutation which,
“de facto”, induced a clear evolution of the military
interventions’ nature and conditions for the forthcoming
decade.
As a matter of fact, technical solutions - emerging or already
implemented - offer realistic expectations in at least three
domains. First the researches on miniaturization, digitization
and propulsion let us envision a significant reduction of the
platforms’ weight and an increase of the observation and
surveillance means’ performances. Interesting expectations
exist also in the armament and environment systems domains
which would allow an improved performance/weight ratio,
especially for what regards protection. And last the exponential
acceleration of the mutations within the information and
communication technologies’ new domains transforms
completely the problematics of data transfer and sharing of
situation awareness. The interconnexion of all actors
(command posts, sensors, information collection assets and
effects production means) will constitute a major improvement
beyond the systems’ interconnexion which currently exists or is
being implemented. These new technologies will be used to
shorten the decision making cycles and to break complex
processes into segments in order to make all material and
immaterial effects work in synergy.
In spite of the foreseeable violence of the potential
confrontations aiming at neutralizing an opponent, it is now
more necessary to lastingly deter, monitor and to control
the environment and the populations rather than destroying
opposing forces methodically and entirely, be these opposing
forces military or not. These military interventions will most
often consist of counter guerillas operations conducted against
terrorists or even criminal networks: opponents that are hard
to identify, always elusive, and who maneuver in a
decentralized or even autonomous way, and are able to employ
the most modern technologies.
These engagements, which are conducted outside of
the national territory and necessarily within a joint framework,
will take place where the terrain exerts an equalizing power
over classical forces and imposes that all actors get very much
intermingled the ones with the others, rubbing thus out the
notion of front during combat operations. Urbanized areas, that
are complex by nature as well as those areas that are difficult
to access or to go through, become thus a privileged domain of
action for the land forces. The populations must be regarded as
being simultaneously a stake and an actual actor which cannot
be dissociated from the military action during the operations.
The technological revolution’s contribution within a renewed
engagement framework makes emerge new factors of
operational superiority which serve now as a guideline for the
development of land forces’ new capacities.
The controlled and timely sharing of necessary information is
the first of these factors. The second one is the control of the
airland battle’s tempo which is based upon effects and
trajectories optimization, upon a better control of the forces’
regrouping-dispersing movements, and upon the
implementation of fast-track decision making processes. And
last a precise and well balanced remote control of the effects
completes that list of factors.
Towards a new balance among the functions in the Army
Beyond that scramble of the actors in complex environments, it
is the modus operandi4 themselves that can overlap during one
single phase and even within the unit itself. As a matter of fact,
the rather artificial split between high and low intensity
operations has not anymore today a tactical reality. This is well
illustrated by the current French and allied engagements.
Similarly, the stabilization phase has become essential in the
crisis solution process, the force must thus be able to control
lastingly the environment as well as to change rapidly its
posture in order to operate against or to react to a threat while
grading its weapons’ effects.
And last, these engagements may have consequences on the
national territory which implies an ineluctable defense-security
continuum and puts as of the outset the military action into an
interministerial framework.
In front of the constraints that exist in matter of operational
employment, of joint integration and of interoperability,
the technological revolution brings a response to new
requirements for what regards the technical efficiency of
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OCTOBER 2007
From now on, the operational requirements’ priorities - such
as intelligence, reactive intervention, or force protection necessary to respond to the new types of threats within
complex environments, require that the land forces
operational capacities evolve and also call for a new balance
among the functions that structure the Army.
These major evolutions of the forces’ engagement framework
led the Army to develop a project called “Forces terrestres
20255” that aims at establishing a new balance among the
operational capacities, relying on a realistic equipment policy.
That project is both a long term objective for the evolution of
capacities and simultaneously a dynamic process of adaptation
to the requirements of the current types of engagements and
of those that are assessed to be the most probable. Within the
framework of the operational situations that have been defined
by the Armed Forces Joint Staff (EMA), this project intends to
render Army forces more multipurpose oriented, better
protected, powerful, and “info-enhanced”. Able to conduct
first-entry operations and to lastingly control the airland
Doctrine
environment, land forces will be
organized around a reinforced
multipurpose contact battle system
that will be provided with capacities
enabling it to be confronted to many
different types of engagements.
Three major axes
for capacity development
It is thus possible to establish three
major axes of evolution for the
forthcoming decade. They take into
account both the lessons learned from
the current engagements of French and
allied forces on different theaters of
operations, and the technological
improvement that are reaching
maturity, they also rely on the already
implemented processes such as forces
digitization. That adaptation of the
land forces capacities will involve all
of the Army’s operational functions
and it will be conducted under the
constraint of the availability of
resources needed for acquiring
capacities, preparing the forces and
conducting the operations.
SIRPA TERRE/ADC DUBOIS
The continuation of a significant effort
to control information and to acquiring
tactical situation awareness is
obviously the first of these priorities. It
contributes to preserving the
commander’s freedom of action and
provides the capability to anticipate
forthcoming events by getting in due
time the information that is essential
for the maneuver. It covers the
development of an actual networking of
the force and the improvement of
communication reliability to secure that network. It also implies
the capacity to process and transfer more and more data in
almost real time and to guarantee their protection. It also
regards the development and integration of intelligence and
counter-intelligence (CI) means. In that respect there are six
additional capacities to be mentioned:
• General and targeted surveillance, reconnaissance of the
force’s area of interest thanks to the implementation of
robots, UAVs, ground surveillance radars, and to the
information collected by IMINT means;
• Detection of emitters over the entire electromagnetic
spectrum;
• Neutralization of the opponent’s transmissions and
disorganization of its coordination assets.
The second direction of evolution relates to rationalizing
the command and control means and to reducing those
means dedicated to combat support and combat service
support in operations, in order to keep the most critical
resources for the tasks that are really decisive in terms of
effects on active threats or on human environment.
• Data and information processing;
• Common operational picture sharing at tactical and theater
level;
• Actions in the immaterial domains;
Operation future command and control systems should
preserve the initiative in the entire spectrum of operations
thanks to an organization and to systems that are robust,
dispersed, remotely positioned, flexible, and which are
systematically of a more joint and multipurpose nature.
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Adapt and Coach
That decisional superiority relies on three key concepts:
• The merging of component command level with the theater
command one in order to establish a new level that could be
referred to as tactical-operational;
• The implementation of the “reach-back” principle (remote
pole of expertise) to reduce the weight of the deployed HQs
and facilitate their maneuver;
• A modular and info-centric architecture of the future
operations centers.
Combat service support’s optimization aims at rationalizing
logistical flows and to provide logistical components with the
ability to operate anywhere, especially within a complex and
hostile environment (protection of the logistical vehicles, as
with the “multipurpose land cargo vehicle” program), in due
time and with means that are strictly sufficient, within a
permanently evolving field organization. However, the logistical
support functions contribute also to most of the notspecifically military stabilization tasks, especially those
intended to assist the populations. Consequently, it is more a
question of adequately proportioning them rather than
reducing their footprint on the ground.
employment but well protected against the most powerful
threats, able to merge within complex human types of
environment and that would still keep significant and visible
firepower which would thus allow them to constitute also a
deterring force.
That transformation of the contact battle system will be
conducted while remaining permanently concerned about strict
sufficiency, cost control, and technological risks, and without
impinging on the units’ operational efficiency. It aims at making
the action at the contact more fluent and at improving forces’
efficiency. In that respect priorities are given to:
• Acquiring awareness before operating, thanks to the sharing
of the common operational picture and to the
implementation a various sensors (robots, mini-UAVs);
• The development of multipurpose platforms;
• Combining, varying, and grading the effects adapted to the
targeted objective (concentration of various trajectories, use
of low lethality weapons, fires beyond direct line of sight,
weapons with concentrated effect or thermobaric);
• Protection improvement and reinforcement, with active
passive and distributed type of protections while looking for
reducing the overall weight.
While keeping as a prerequisite the fact that the objectives in
matter of networking and joint integration have been achieved
with the required reliability and protection levels, it will become
possible to contain the resources allocated to the functions of
C2 support, fire support, and logistical support without
creating shortcomings in matters of effect, while reducing their
vulnerability.
The development of the combat and environment control
means’ adaptability and reactivity constitutes the third major
direction to respond to the new tactical realities’ requirements.
The studies that are conducted about the future contact battle
system are federated through the SCORPION6 comprehensive
project. In order to be able to be confronted to a widened
spectrum of operational situations for longer periods of time
and within the populations, it is necessary to have contact
battle forces that are adaptable but robust, flexible in their
1 Informational enhancement or “info-enhancement”.
2 BCSF - Bureau de conception des systèmes de forces - Land Forces
Systems Development/Plans branch.
3 Intermediary headlines have been added by the editorial staff.
4 Also referred to as the “Three Block War”.
5 “Land Forces 2025”.
6 Synergie du COntact Renforcée par la Polyvalence et l’InfovalorisatiON
(Synergy of the contact function reinforced by multipurpose capacities
and “info-enhancement”).
That land forces’ evolution in matters of capacities should not be conducted only through technological
improvements which could restrain doctrine and robotize the action. Although command art has to adapt to
the consequences that technological revolution has on the conduct of the maneuver, the commander’s morale
strength as well as the role of the human factor and its place within the land combat system should today
more than ever remain essential.
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Doctrine
Responsive
Adaptation
W
ithin the sophisticated environment where our forces are being committed, having efficient, missiontailored equipment and cutting-edge technologies is undoubtedly a critical operational superiority
factor. The equipment procurement process for the forces does not always enable to optimize military
requirements and equipment to be permanently mission-tailored. Thus, it is necessary to think about
the ways to improve this process, in order to meet these requirements at best and on a standing basis.
In the introduction, in a first part, we will remind of the overall conditions pertaining to a weapons system
processing. Then, we are going to show the limits of such a process within an increasingly sophisticated
environment, and therefore, the requirement for a responsive adaptation that we will try to define. Then,
we are going do define the characteristics of such a responsive adaptation, and eventually endeavor to
recommend solutions to set up a responsive adaptation process, in particular in terms of procedures,
organization, and chain of decisions.
This presentation is focused on procedures about procurement on behalf of the forces. It is already
necessary to precise that responsive adaptation is not only limited to this aspect, but includes other
capability aspects, such as military education and operational training, doctrine and organization.
BY
ARMAMENT ENGINEER GENERAL JACQUES LEVET, EPF1 ASSISTANT DCOS, FRENCH ARMY STAFF
A weapons system procurement process
A weapons system procurement operation is directed by
Ministerial directive Nr. 1514. Without providing here with details
about this process, it seems useful to remind some basic
features, necessary to get a good awareness of the responsive
adaptation process.
A weapons system procurement operation encompasses all
the work pertaining to equipment and aiming to meet a
capability requirement expressed by headquarters. This
process starts with the Statement of Need, and it goes on until
the operational fielding, and up to decommissioning or
the destruction of equipment.
Different actors and authorities from the ministry take part in a
weapons system procurement operation, each of them with
specific missions and responsibilities; the whole of this process
evolves in a spirit of cooperation in order to have coherence and
to ensure a continuity of action and decisions all along this
process with the basic aim of in fine meeting consumers’
requirements.
In particular, this process relies on the following principles.
- The armed forces have to define the “right operational
requirement” by taking into account the overall context, and
in particular financial, technical and industrial constraints
while avoiding any overstatement of needs, which costs a lot
regarding spans of time and money.
- Meeting requirements should be the major purpose. It not
only means complying with a performance level, spans of
time and costs, but also assuring that programs are
coherent, as well as a timely setting-up of the support
system and of all that is required for training and for
operational use.
- Complying with legal and statutory obligations is
“unavoidable”. These obligations are about accounting
and public purchase rules, safety regulations (health or
occupational safety, pyrotechnic safety, defense security)
and also rules pertaining to environment protection.
Notice. We observe that people committed into the
management of armament programs are increasingly
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constrained by legal requirements. In these conditions,
complying with safety and the legality of purchase operations
could sometimes lead us to consider that complying with
delays is a less important criterium. At operational customers
level, it could result into some frustration not to have a
specific piece of equipment “in time”.
Directive Nr. 1514 also includes a requirement about
“responsiveness to the evolutions of need during the life
cycle of equipment”. We’ll come back to it later on.
Eventually, this directive includes deadlines, which are
compulsory rendez-vous with an authority, authorized to
decide whether a program will go on (or not):
- at the end of the preparation phase, decision to launch
the concept phase, made by the Ministry of Defense or
the DGA’s2 director regarding operations that are not set up
as programs;
- at the end of the design phase, decision to shift to the
achievement phase, also made by the Ministry of Defense
or the Defense Procurement Agency director;
- Decision to field the asset, made by the Service Chief of Staff
using it.
Why a need for responsive adaptation?
The above mentioned process leads to a cycle of equipment
development, whose time unit is the year. This cycle seems to
be well fitted to the setting-up of major equipment, as it both
enables to comply with regulations, operational requirements
to mature in order to strive towards the “just requirement”
concept, to properly take technological developments into
account, and to take decisions at the “right level” in order to
meet users’ requirements in the best conditions.
However, the threats that our forces are facing and the
conditions for their commitments are increasingly diversified
and subject to new constraints. Thus, the Army must meet
highly diversified and changing commitment conditions that
could go from violence control to unbridled violence.
Thus, committed forces could have to face difficulties at any
time when carrying out their missions, either because of
the lack of a piece of equipment or of an asset, or because
of the lack of a functionality in a fielded piece of equipment,
the need of which had not been felt and thus not stated
initially.
Directive Nr. 1514 clearly includes the possibility of taking a
new requirement that had appeared during the equipment’s
life cycle into account. Quite often however, the contract
rooted the equipment specifications into a specific state, and
taking a new or additional requirement into account requires
resuming the deal with the manufacturer. In order to minimize
the delay between the appearance of this new requirement
and its application to a specific asset, no doubt solutions go
through looking for more flexible contractual processes and
through shortened decision loops. This is a first approach to
responsive adaptation, relying on anticipating the changes in
requirements and implementing protective measures providing
the equipment with possible changes.
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Responsive adaptation mainly deals with a requirement
that most often is linked to the present situation, requiring
to procure a “light” piece of equipment, most of the time
available “off-the-shelf ” at a retailer’s or requiring a
minimum of changes. But getting it within a short span of
time, in accordance with the requirements of the operation
theater, roughly a few weeks or at most a few months, is for
a theater commander a necessary and imperative condition
for the success of a mission or to protect our forces.
In order to schematically organize requirements, the matter
could be either about improving existing pieces of
equipment, or about procuring assets with the same
functionalities as those already fielded but more performing
ones, or even about procuring assets with new
functionalities in comparison with those already fielded.
But in any case, this requirement is:
- considered as urgent ;
- dealing with assets or pieces or equipment, whose users
are aware of their existence. Most often, it will not be about
developing a new piece of equipment ex nihilo (a counterexample is about the development of computer projects).
Currently, there is no simple “from start to finish”
procedure (i.e. from the Statement of Need to the
operational fielding of the piece of equipment, including
qualification, education or operational training) enabling
to meet these requirements.
The procurement contract code and contingency
management
However, the procurement contract code includes
arrangements enabling to carry out purchases “as a matter
of operational urgency”.
This code is governed by the overall principle of competitive
call. For it to operate, it is necessary to settle minimum time
spans. We have to admit that these time spans are
sometimes incompatible with the requirements to be met
by the administration, in particular when these requirements
are urgent. Resorting to the operational urgency procedure
requires three conditions: the urgency aspects must be real;
the event should be unexpected and independent from
the will of the public entity.
Still in compliance with the competition principle, such
urgency can then be dealt with through several procedures,
such as decreased delays to tender (both for applications or
offers), the setting up of provisional limit prices, or the
cancellation of preliminary advertising. Another method
consists in preparing markets with order forms, without any
minimum or maximum amount in advance - that could be
used later on - with several incumbents, these incumbents
being consulted when an urgency situation occurs.
On the other hand, we can accept that the specifications sheet
or offers are not as sophisticated as they normally are.
Doctrine
ECPAD
The specific defense decree imposes a specific procedure
enabling to further reduce contract time spans, in case of
urgency incompatible with the preparation of the documents
included into a contract: the exchange of letters. This
administration is responsible for this procedure (receiving
notice of a contract within three months at most) as well as
the incumbent, as far as a work schedule is concerned. This
letter should be accompanied with a documentary evidence
report set up by the State, proving the urgency of the
procedure.
What is responsive adaptation?
It is clear that meeting a requirement of the kind of those that
have just been mentioned and that require a responsive
procedure cannot be dealt with an “empirical” procedure.
Indeed, we cannot consider:
- not to formalize it, at least with a statement of needs;
Eventually, there is still a requisitioning procedure available for
the State, but only in extreme situations.
- not to submit to an appointed authority a decision to procure
equipment, whose effects at operational employment level,
and doctrinal and political levels have been assessed;
Responsive adaptation and technological evolution
- ordering a piece of equipment or an asset without any
formality;
We have explained the necessary responsive adaptation by the
necessity to meet a new requirement as a matter of urgency
to the benefit of committed forces.
- intervening on equipment in use in conditions that are not
consonant with the rules pertaining to their maintenance.
This need for responsive adaptation could even be increased
by rapid technological changes, which enables to consider new
weapons systems over very short cycles; it could even result
into COA (Courses of Action) deep changes and even into deep
organization changes.
It is neither desirable not to meet a requirement, owing
to its urgent character. Unfortunately, a lack of decision
could result into not following up an urgent operational
requirement, which would then shift the risk at the level
of the committed forces.
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Thus, responsive adaptation consists in steering a
shortened weapons system procurement operation that
complies with regulations in use (Nr. 1514), and among
others, the rules about public purchases, safety rules,
decision loops and milestones (at a level to be specified,
which is certainly not the Minister!), the concept of
operational requirement (in terms of performance, costs,
delays, as well as of training, and operational commitment
doctrine), and the concept of users’ satisfaction.
1 Studies, Planning and Budget / Army staff.
2 French Defense Procurement Agency.
It is also a matter of making the most of the possibilities
granted by current laws, in particular the procurement
procedure “as a matter of operational urgency”.
Proposals for responsive adaptation
A working group, jointly chaired by the French Army Staff and the CDEF (Forces Employment Doctrine
Center), has been tasked to put forward solutions aiming to set up a responsive adaptation process, in
terms of procedures, organization, chain of decision, etc.
Without anticipating the conclusions of this group, expected to be issued later in 2007, we can already put
forward some main lines of thought.
Statement of need. Despite urgent requirements and well-known “off-the-shelf” technical solutions, it is
absolutely necessary to define the need in terms of functionality by describing the operational end-state it
enables to reach and the capability gap it enables to fill. First, this requirement should be okayed by
the theater commander, who is at a level both close to the ground and enabling to assess the urgent and
necessary characters of a requirement, and the necessity to meet it by procuring a piece of equipment.
The decision of procurement will then be taken by an appointed authority within the EMA (French Armed
Forces Joint Staff) or within the DGA (French Defense Procurement Agency), in order to guarantee the
capability coherence and comply with the cooperation spirit, without “going back” to the DGA level or
a fortiori to the Minister of Defense level.
Organization. Then, an ad hoc structure would be tasked to manage the operation, such as a program team
does. Thus, this program team would have to manage:
- the requirement analysis;
- the working-out of a technological, technical and industrial answer;
- the procurement and qualification process;
- the working-out of employment concepts;
- the fielding and support.
The person responsible for this structure would have to report his/her action to an appointed authority
within the headquarters (EMA, or Service Staff by delegation), and to submit this authority the main
decisions taken at major operation’s milestones.
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Doctrine
The DDR (Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration)
Process
T
he DDR process enables to carry out the social and economic reintegration of former combatants so that they
become directly involved into their country’s development process. With the aim of taking part in security and
stability during a post-conflict phase for reconstruction and development to start, it is a sophisticated process
with human, political, military, security and socio-economic aspects. It has to tackle the issues that combatants
are facing when they happen to be without any resources and without any living and their country’s
reconstruction. It should also enable to set up the country’s capabilities for the reintegration of former
combatants and to support the communities that welcome them.
Forces, and in particular committed-to-be land forces, will have to be involved as early as the design of the
assessment process for required military assets to be implemented and for their use to be specified. They are
only committed within an international framework environment between the end of a conflict (legitimacy), on
request from the host nation and they do not lead this process. Within this context, they will be tasked to carry
out numerous missions: securing the structure, intelligence pertaining to armed groups and weapons and
support to the elements taking part in DDR.
The role of forces will be the most important, most visible and most dangerous one during the disarmament
phase, which is the initial phase and also the most dangerous one (collecting, destroying or transporting
weapons, inventory management for collected weapons and ammunition).
During the demobilization phase, and in case of deficiency or lack of specific organizations, forces could have to
be tasked to identify and record former combatants, and set out their profiles; some of them could possibly be
integrated into reorganized local security and defense forces or that may be just in the process of being
reorganized during the reintegration phase.
BY
COLONEL ALAIN CAPLAIN, SPECIAL PROJECT OFFICER, CDEF (FORCES EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE CENTER)
The context
Local situation: neither peace nor war
SIRPA TERRE/ADC DUBOIS
Security and political situation: DDR is
normally carried out within a particularly
unstable environment. A “neither peace nor
war” situation, even if a cease-fire or peace
agreements have been signed. If the
parties have generally committed
themselves to settle the conflict peacefully,
minds are still deeply affected by the war
and its violence. Many weapons are still
available and armed forces or armed
groups are still powerful. Current political
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leaders are not often familiar with proper governance whereas
Government’s structures remain weak. Violence - whatever its
kind - remains present on the whole territory or part of it; it
takes advantage of scattered light weapons, of underemployment but also of some individuals’ choice of life. Human
rights violations occur frequently and they are not often
punished because of inefficient police forces or justice.
Social and economic environment: Armed conflicts generally
result into tremendous casualties; they destroy the society
and the social fabric, they result into huge population
displacements, they increase inequalities, they damage
the health situation and they increase violence. Population
migrations and brain drain or elite drain are commonplace.
Generally, the population has lost confidence and hopes
to get rapidly the benefits of a longed-for peace. The
reconstruction of the social fabric happens to be
sophisticated and tricky, such as restoring major services
(education, health, water supply, sewage), which are
generally out of order or no longer provided. Very often,
the country is weakened, sometimes ruined, whereas
production, consumption, and the living standard have
fallen, and a parallel economy even an underground one
could have developed.
Actors: a large number of participants
DDR actors are numerous and they are broken down into
national and international ones.
National authorities and opposing parties:
• Government: it designates the national institutions that are
responsible for DDR.
• Political parties: they should permanently take part in the
course of the process.
• Local armed forces: alongside with the government and the
various process actors they assess the size of the future
forces.
• Signatory groups: in coordination with the other signatory
parties, they take decisions about the numbers to be
demobilized.
• Non signatory groups: their case should be dealt with
specifically.
• Civilian society: it should be consulted formally and
informally. It is a partner in this process.
• Media: their role consists in informing the population about
the process by giving it trust. A communications strategy
should be developed.
• World Bank: it takes part in the budgetary mechanism for
the different actions and it often manages funds with several
sponsors.
• International NGOs: they are committed into humanitarian
and development programs and they are also committed into
the demobilization and reintegration phases.
• Major international economic private groups: they could
support economic or reconstruction programs and they
should take part in them as early as the planning phase.
• PMCs (Private Military Companies): they could be present on
the territory for sundry purposes.
• Research centers: they take part in program control and they
contribute to the appraisal of the situation.
• International armed forces: under UN mandate or not, they
have an important role to perform in this process, but they
are more specifically suited to intervene in the disarmament
and the demobilization phases, and to a lesser extent in
the reinsertion phase. They should take part in the process
as early as the planning phase. Their capabilities and their
expertise are essential in some areas.
Sophisticated relationships among actors
The stabilization phase (then, by the way, the normalization
phase) will be carried out by superimposing 3 different
processes (security, political, and reconstruction) that will
result into servicemen and more specifically land forces generally committed to a large extent - dealing with numerous
actors - most of them civilians. Differences between military
and civilians are about structures, organization, the way they
operate, budgets, goals, attitudes and behavior on the ground.
The unavoidable dialogue that will be established and that has
generally started with some of them prior to the decision to get
committed, will become increasingly sophisticated as and
when we tend to normalization, as exchanges will increase in
order to design, coordinate and broaden the effects of
everyone’s activity. The implication of civilian actors, whose
numbers tend to increase, intensifies whereas it is generally
the contrary for servicemen as we shift from stabilization to
normalization.
Moreover, within a humanitarian action framework, most
organizations do not accept or hardly accept supervision by
military authorities; other organizations refuse to co-operate
and other ones limit contacts. Besides, servicemen keep a low
profile while operating.
Eventually, local actors operate according to their own COAs
(Courses of Action).
International actors:
• UNO system: the Special Representative of UNO’s Secretary
General is responsible for the whole process.
• Regional organizations: they could have been involved in
the conflict or in the crisis and its solution.
• Framework nation: it has a critical role at political, diplomatic
and military levels.
• Partner states: they act as guarantors of this process and
they support both the transition political process and
reconstruction program sponsors.
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The disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration phases
DDR is broken down into 3 stages.
Three major stages
Disarmament: Disarmament consists in inventorying,
Doctrine
collecting, checking and destroying small-caliber weapons,
ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons from
the various combatants and often from the civilian population.
Disarmament also includes the development of programs for a
responsible management of weapons.
Some categories have a specific treatment, adapted to their
situations2. Eligibility criteria define the conditions to be met to
take advantage of the whole process or part of it.
Demobilization: demobilization is a formal and supervised
process to discharge active combatants from the armed forces
or from armed groups. It includes two steps.
There are numerous obstacles from combatants’ circles, even
from these very combatants to escape DDR, in particular
through dissimulation (a group conceals some of its
members as it considers them to be essential to their
survival or because they had been the victims of violence or
they had perpetrated acts of violence and they fear reprisals
to be taken against them).
Obstacles for people to be included into DDR:
The first step consists in placing individual combatants into
temporary centers, in regrouping armed groups into camps
designed for this purpose (quarter’s sites, camps, gathering
areas or barracks).
The second step encompasses the support program for
demobilized people (primary reinsertion). Primary reinsertion
consists in supporting former combatants during the
demobilization phase, prior to a long-term reinsertion program.
Thus, primary reinsertion is a kind of temporary support
enabling to meet the basic needs of former combatants and
those of their families. It could include allowances, food,
clothes, shelters, medical support, and short-term period of
apprenticeship, training, job and tools. Whereas reinsertion is
a long-term and standing economic and social development
process, primary reinsertion is a material and/or financial
short-term support corresponding to immediate needs. It could
last up to one year.
Land forces’ role
Reintegration: Reintegration is a process according to which
former combatants obtain a civilian status and find a job and
an enduring income. Reintegration is mainly an economic and
social process with an open schedule and taking place within
communities at local level first. It is part of the global
development of a country and it is a national responsibility
often requiring a long-term external help.
Thus, the final purpose consists in supporting former
combatants for them to become citizens again by reintegrating
them into the country’s life. It is a process whose aims are longterm ones. It is an essential stage to bring back peace.
Intelligence and situation assessment, (identifying armed
groups, their strengths, their locations, their states of mind,
the credibility of their leaders, the presence of women, children,
and injured or sick people); information about the kinds of
weapons, locations, quantities, state; awareness of supply
circuits and sources, of the existence of dumps and caches;
information about gathering points and disarmament sites.
Disarmament
Disarmament operations are broken down into 4 stages:
Stage 1: preliminary operations
Planning: defining the procedure to be followed on
predetermined locations or the recovery of weapons by mobile
teams fetching them locally or by combining both processes;
definition of teams to be set up: teams’ structure: size,
armament, required skills (safety, expertise in weapons
systems, ammunition, mines and booby traps).
Assessment of risks linked to armed groups: state of mind of
groups to be disarmed, attitude towards the force, reactions to
eligibility criteria; technical risks (weapons, ammunitions,
explosive devices).
In principle, forces are only concerned by the disarmament
phase during the demobilization phase only. They could be
committed to secure demobilization sites often taken in charge
by international organizations and/or by NGOs. They could also
co-operate in identifying and screening former combatants,
recording them, and guiding them, in particular for those who
are likely to be integrated into defense and security forces.
Information, consciousness raising: of the population, of the
forces and of armed groups about the process’ progress, and
checking the way forwarded information is understood.
DDR recipient groups should be clearly identified and meet
specific criteria in order to be taken in charge on the account of
the whole process or part of it.
Generally, 5 main groups are concerned by DDR:
• Armed forces and armed groups;
• Forced combatants, generally abducted1;
• People depending from armed groups;
• People back home;
• Populations, various communities.
SIRPA TERRE/ADC DUBOIS
DDR recipients and eligibility criteria
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Demobilization
Screening: combatants should be submitted to a checking
process to check the eligibility of those who wish to take part
in the whole of DDR or in part of it. Armed group commanders
are generally required to bring in their men to the various sites.
The screening purpose consists in checking that the people
meeting the eligibility criteria are actually registered and that
they will be taken into account as regards DDR3. Indeed, armed
group commanders may have a tendency to exaggerate their
strength and to conceal some categories of people (women,
children); or they may attempt to allow some relatives (family,
clan, ethnic group) to benefit from it. Non combatants,
common-law criminals, and even armed citizens cannot apply
for DDR. Screening is generally carried out by servicemen
supported by members from various groups or organizations
(NGOs, representatives from the armed group, the faction or
the ethnic group with which a person identifies).
Whereas the disarmament phase mainly deals with the military,
the demobilization phase is mainly the province of the civilian
component but supported by the forces in some areas.
Demobilization could be carried out either through a “static”
procedure or through a “mobile” procedure.
Setting up buffer zones and security corridors: absolutely
necessary for the safety of disarmament teams and even of
armed groups; they should be set up depending upon the
situation to secure gathering areas, and the access to
disarmament sites. Clearly identified and accepted by the
different parties, they are monitored by the force in charge of
the disarmament process; as regards confidence measures,
patrols in these areas should include members from the
opposing parties.
Defining and/or laying out gathering areas: secured
locations or areas where armed forces or groups gather
before moving toward disarmament sites. They have to be
accepted by the different parties and they should be secured
and easily accessible.
Disarmament at collecting points and in disarmament sites:
this specific and sensitive operation takes place in several
steps and according to specific rules that will have to be
explained to the people to be disarmed4.
Recording weapons: all weapons and ammunition should be
recorded in order to facilitate the monitoring of ALPC (small
caliber weapons and small arms) traffic.
Stage 3: storage of weapons and ammunition
Temporary storage: this stage should be as short as possible;
then weapons should be rapidly destroyed or stored in depots
if they are to be redistributed later on to the benefit of regular
forces. Safety measures to be applied will have to be defined
beforehand.
Stage 4: destruction of weapons and ammunition
Specific issues: beyond technical considerations that are
the province of experts (kinds and quantities of weapons and
ammunition to be destroyed), other factors are to be taken into
account: informing the population, operations’ state of
progress, selecting witnesses during destruction operations
(representatives from the various parties, media ...), etc.
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Stage 2: disarmament
Missions or task more specifically entrusted to servicemen
Overall protection but also selection of the various DDR
locations and of their accesses; these areas should be cleared
of any weapon5.
Operations normally carried out by civilian actors:
Registering and checking lists with all the people identified
during the gathering of armed factions and during the
disarmament phase. Identification enables to sort people by
category. Screening enables to determine people eligible to
demobilization.
Eventually, registering will make easier the follow-up of
individuals.
Reintegration
Normally, forces are not directly concerned by this phase;
however, they could be requested for temporary support.
Selecting: forces could be requested in many areas (medical
checkups, tests and various examinations), in particular for
people applying for jobs in the armed forces.
Training: we may have to take part in the training of armed
forces or defense and security forces, sometimes after having
supported their reorganization, and by incorporating former
combatants if need be.
Doctrine
1 Categories considered as combatants: armed force members and
armed group members; any people that actively takes part in military
operations or in hostilities, or that is involved into recruiting or
training combatants or combatants-to-be; any people that is
commanding or authorized to take decisions among forces or armed
groups; any foreign people that has come with weapons or in uniform
or as a member of a military organization; any foreign people that has
come as a civilian but is in one of the above mentioned situations.
2 Women: they are broken down into 3 categories: combatants, support
to combatants, and dependents (combatants: women and girls that
took part in combats, having taken up arms or not; support to
combatants: they took part in operations as auxiliaries: carriers,
nurses, spies, administrative managers, radio operators, medical
auxiliaries, interpreters, sexual slaves; dependents: they are part of
the group or depend on it: wives, widows, distant family’s female
members;
Children, teenagers and young men (between 15 and 24 years old);
Sick and injured people, escheated people;
Cross-border armed groups: foreign combatants, children with a
foreign nationality linked to combatants, people depending on groups
or press-ganged;
Mercenaries.
4 Disarmament: combatant are made aware of the way operations are
going to progress; we start by feeling, then screening luggage; then
by identifying combatants with ammunition or explosives by them;
these latter ones are then directed towards the ammunition area;
people with dubious ammunition or explosives are directed towards
the destruction area; checking of dubious ammunition and explosives
by an expert, then destruction or storage; delivery of weapons into
the weapons area; they are recorded then transported to
demobilization sites; delivery points and disarmament sites can be
merged; similarly as regards disarmament and demobilization sites.
5 Setting up, building and supplying the sites: selecting locations and
building demobilization sites should be carried out according to
the following criteria: accessibility: roads, navigable waterways,
railroads, airports, airfields, railroads. Seasonal meteorological
factors should be taken into account; accommodation capabilities
(number of people that can be accommodated together, capability
to carry out disarmament and demobilization simultaneously; site
protection (protection carried out easily); conveniences: water,
electricity, accommodation and storage capabilities, cleaning-up.
Different kinds of sites could be used: schools, plants, warehouses,
farming facilities, barracks. Servicemen can be tasked to rehabilitate
infrastructures, event to build them.
3 Methodology: cross-checking could be carried out to confirm
the eligibility of DDR applicants. This operation will be efficient only if
a reliable local team can be linked to it. It will have to include females
for former female combatants. Biometric recording methods (“iris
scanning”, fingerprints) can be used to make identification and
traceability easier. Computerized data and methods should be
standardized, so that they can be used on the various sites. Other
identification methods: language and culture tests (foreigners) to
prove nationality, weapon test to confirm combatant quality;
identification of militia members by representatives from
the communities they identify with.
Very often, the DDR process has been launched by the political process and financed by international
organizations (UNO, EU). Thus, our forces being committed under international mandate will have to come
as close as possible to the rules defined by these organizations, as regards DDR.
Some key points will absolutely have to be complied with: awareness and information both to groups to be
disarmed and to populations; specific categories of people to be taken into account (women, children,
teenagers, and injured people); complying with proportional disarmament.
As regards land forces that will have to permanently adapt themselves to the different kinds of missions,
the disarmament phase will be the trickiest one, the most sophisticated one and the most dangerous one,
as it includes numerous aspects, which - if underestimated or not properly taken into account - could lead
to failure and even to combats being resumed.
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Armed
Forces
and State Reconstruction
ews headlines highlight regularly the difficulties the international community encounters when confronted
to crises for which it has a very hard time to find solutions. That painful observation incites us to analyze
N
those difficulties in order to draw lessons that could help finding adequate solutions and facilitate the
approach to future crises.
Although it is rather easy to engage military personnel in a crisis in order to demonstrate the international
community’s resolve, it is much more difficult to offer a comprehensive solution that would allow a return to
normal life. The major stake is thus not the initial military intervention but it is rather the local society’s
recovery and its re-taking control of its own future in order to get out of the chaos through a protracted
restructuration process. What would thus be the armed forces’ role in the reconstruction of the State? Does
that role stop as soon as the arms become silent, what’s the limit of the military actions?
After having defined what actually means State reconstruction, we’ll study how armed forces can play a
determining role in that process, without however replacing the many other actors who sometimes still
hesitate to get involved as much as it would be necessary.
BY COLONEL
CHRISTOPHE DE SAINT CHAMAS, SPECIAL PROJECT OFFICER AT THE CICDE1
What is State reconstruction?
A long term international
stake
Reconstruction, which is generally
presented as being the intervention’s
final phase, is to be prepared before
the military engagement starts, as
soon as the desired end state is being
developed. This end-state expresses
the political determination; it is
the result of an interministerial staff
work which expresses the national sometimes international - involvement
in the crisis management and
reconstruction process. It also
encompasses as widely and precisely
as possible the reconstruction
domains and the actions to be
conducted all along the continuum
that covers coercive actions,
stabilization and normalization.
State reconstruction is generally
the longest phase since it targets long
term objectives. However, as soon as
the coercion operations are being
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OCTOBER 2007
Doctrine
conducted and then during the stabilization phase, there are
many activities that participates directly in its success.
Crises complexity, their international dimension as well as
the large quantity of actors demonstrate that an intervention
cannot be conceived as a military engagement intended to
get the weapons silent, which would be followed by a
political process intended to reconstruct the country. And
last, the International Community gets its legitimacy from
the intervention’s legal framework which is most often
validated by the United Nations Security Council.
Lyautey’s time, the French soldier’s dual role - military and
political - is not to be proved anymore. Though it is true that
the military’s role may be regarded as being paradoxical
since they have to fight and then to reconstruct, their
contribution to reconstruction is significantly more important
than it is usually thought to be. Arriving very early in the theater,
the military have a role that may prove to be determining in a
good or in a bad way.
A key role in interministerial relationships
Each time a specific case
Maréchal Lyautey wrote2 “... there is a method called
flexibility, elasticity, adequacy to places, times and
circumstances”. The undeniable experience of such an expert
highlights the fact that it is illusory to set an intangible rule
for such a topic. Each crisis constitutes a specific case,
the same for reconstruction.
It is thus essential, for each crisis, to undertake as soon as
possible an interministerial analysis that will allow to
define as precisely as possible what will have to be
reconstructed. In fact, the goal is to define the desired endstate. A good approach requires an in-depth knowledge of
the crisis’ context (environment, requirements, background,
history, geography, religions, cultures, contentious issues,
wealth, weaknesses ...). Only a comprehensive approach will
allow to envision in a relevant way a consistent and adapted
type of reconstruction while avoiding to choose a too much
“westernized” approach of what are the population’s real
needs and expectations.
The success of any reconstruction operation rests upon
the international community and local populations’ joint
determination. French and German’s reconstruction efforts
were successful after World War II, and their determination
of not having ever to live again such havoc considerably
boosted their common projects. The Marshall Plan followed
by the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community
demonstrated the shared willingness of the convalescent
countries to take in their own hands their own destiny. These
examples show that reconstruction rests mostly on the local
populations’ willingness to succeed.
In the current crises, the military can recurrently measure
how difficult it can be to bring together all the actors
concerned by the reconstruction process. It is thus necessary
to define precisely the military actions’ boundaries in order
not to undertake actions that others can do, know how to do
(and should do) as well as, and even better, than the armed
forces. The temptation is permanent to try to bridge the gaps,
but if the military intend to be the ones who reconstruct in place
of others, this may prevent the legitimate actors to play their
role!
An essential and delicate role
The actions conducted by the armed forces as soon as they
deploy to the theater concur to reconstruction, provided that
process has been prepared in advance. Since Gallieni and
Today, everybody acknowledges the need for a global
approach prior to any intervention. The armed forces
contribute actively to that reflection by sharing with
interministerial and international interlocutors their analysis
and experience, their methods for planning and conducting
complex operations. These very fruitful exchanges concur to
the development of a political decision with full situation
awareness.
This role of expert should not however result in the military
being put in the driver’s seat for what regards reconstruction.
It is not because the soldiers arrive amongst the first that
they should have to accomplish tasks that do not belong to
their domain of action. However they play a role that is
essential since it facilitates the taking into account of all
the reconstruction aspects by the experts who are
competent and renowned as such on the international stage.
Direct decisive actions
The reconstruction process can progress only if security is
achieved. Armed forces play thus a decisive role that shapes
any further progress. In addition they may, from the outset
of the operation on, offer an initial CIMIC expertise to
the actors who arrive in the theater, facilitate the start up
of their actions, accompany and protect them if required.
While being attentive to guaranteeing their own freedom
of action, the military participate often in re-establishing
the vital functions that concur to the country’s
reconstruction. That is the case, for instance, when they
rebuild a water distribution network, install power grids or
restore lines of communications. They may also have to re
open harbor facilities or to restore air traffic control.
However the efforts that are undertaken must always be part
of a logic that includes a future transfer of these functions
towards international experts or local authorities. Armed
forces must always pay attention to avoid being regarded as
the reconstruction leaders since they are only an actor in
charge of facilitating the others’ activities.
Since State reconstruction often includes the restoration of
the security organizations, armed forces may be required to
accompany the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration
(DDR) process as it is established by the UN. That process
allows to transform the many uncontrolled factions’ violence
into a controlled use of the force at the service of the law
and of the institutions. But the military are neither
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DOCTRINE # 13
Adapt and Coach
the initiators nor the main actors of that process. They may
act in support of the process, the main actors being
the local community that complies with that project and
the international community that provides both the initial
political thrust and the funding. The military may, in
particular, assist in planning, facilitating weapons collection
and gathering, ensuring sites security, and training
restructured forces. The gendarmerie may, if required,
participate in the local police forces’ training.
SIRPA TERRE/ADC DUBOIS
Reconstruction may also imply Security Sector Reform
(SSR), in lieu of or as an addition to DDR. SSR was
conceived by OSCE and it aims at restoring the proper
functioning of security and justice. The military are generally
involved into that process in a more remote manner; they
may be employed as experts or advisors, especially
the gendarmes which may accompany the local police forces’
reorganization.
In the same way, the military may bring some support during
the major phases of the State reconstruction, e.g. during
elections that are often supervised by OSCE experts, by
providing the most critical sites with a secure environment
or by providing selected logistical support and secure
transportation of the ballot boxes.
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OCTOBER 2007
And last, the success of any reconstruction requires a close
coordination of all actors. For that purpose active duty or
reserve soldiers can be inserted into the various
reconstruction and coordination structures in order to
provide the other actors with the military expertise they
gained in the theater.
The list of direct actions conducted by the military is of
course not exhaustive. It has however to be kept in mind
that although they are capable to react very quickly when
confronted to an emergency situation, they are not intended
to replace the competent experts. It would be very counter
productive to envision a State reconstruction conducted
by the military only.
Permanent indirect actions and a facilitator role
The actions conducted by the military as soon as they arrive
in the theater may have an indirect impact on reconstruction.
Security operations activities facilitate civilian and international
actors’ mobility thus reinforcing the credibility of the existing or
developing institutions they support. They may sometimes
have dual characteristics and thus serve both the military and
the other actors and populations.
Doctrine
A use of force adapted to the reconstruction context allows
avoiding the escalation of the tensions. When armed forces
protect vital, coveted or symbolic infrastructures, they must
act in a visible way and to the benefit of the general
appeasement and reconstruction process.
In addition, the military field organization established in
the vicinity of the populations offers an opportunity to win
their trust and respect thanks to a sound knowledge of
the environment. The links that are established with the
population allow to accompany, explain and legitimate the
reconstruction activities in front of destabilization attempts
and criticisms that could be endeavored in order to make
the international community’s action loose credibility. At any
time, the military support the local population’s adhesion to
the process.
A sound knowledge of the zone of action facilitates also
the acceptance of the international community’s presence.
A cultural vision of the local heritage and wealth allows to
preserve it and thus induces the local population into
express a strong gratitude. It’s the same for what regards
education, when stability is restored it is possible to re-start
the schooling system and thus to prevent the local youth
from joining militias.
In addition, the armed forces have often to play an
indispensable role in support of the non military actors:
information sharing, anticipation, maintained relations,
awareness, selected humanitarian assistance....
Therefore the armed forces’ activities evolve as times
passes in order to go from show and use of force actions to
the assistance brought to interministerial and international
actors. Simultaneously, the military presence can be
adjusted in order to provide security in a way that, in time,
will become less visible and more deterrent. All actions
participate in maintaining mutual trust and developing
populations’ adhesion, which constitutes a fundamental
dimension of an efficient reconstruction process.
1 Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d’expérimentations.
Joint Center for Concepts , Doctrines and Experimentations.
2 “Letters from Tong king and Madagascar”.
Military actions conducted to the benefit of State reconstruction are not always
directly visible and their efficiency may not always be assessed as being as good
as it should. They remain however indispensable, perhaps not in the broad light
in front of the international community but in a way that allows all actors to whom
security is provided to get fully involved in that process which is critical for
reconstruction, i.e. the progressive taking into account of the normalization
process by local structures that are accepted by both the local populations and
the international community.
That quiet efficiency should however avoid falling into the proactivity trap which
could lead it towards a militarization of the reconstruction process; another trap
would be the lack of communication which would allow any opponent to the
process to emphasize and exploit the slightest coordination mistake which could
occur amongst State reconstruction actors.
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French Forces
Employment Concepts
& Field Manuals
Strategic level
- Notice provisoire sur la participation aux opérations de maintien de la paix menée sous l’égide des Nations unies,
[Manual (provisional) for the participation in peace support operations under United Nations aegis] approuvé sous le
n°573/CDE/BEE/SECE du 15 décembre 1994.
- Instruction provisoire sur la contribution des armées aux missions de sécurité publique dans les opérations de
soutien de la paix, [Armed forces contribution to public safety missions in the frame of peace support operations
(provisional directive)] approuvé sous le n°496/DEF/EMA/EMP1/NP du 12 juin 2002.
Operational level
- Concept d’emploi des forces terrestres en phase de stabilisation, [Land forces employment concept in stabilization
phase] approuvé sous le n°980 /DEF/EMAT/BPO/EO/10 du 21 juin 2005.
- PIA 09-100 – Concept et doctrine interarmées de la coopération civilo-militaire, [CIMIC joint concept and doctrine]
approuvé sous le n°262/DEF/EMA/EMP1/NP du 3 mars 2005.
Tactical level
- FT-01 Gagner la bataille - conduire à la paix, [Winning the battle - Building peace] CDEF/DEO, février 2007.
- Doctrine des forces terrestres en stabilisation, [Land forces doctrine for stabilization] approuvé sous le
n°744/DEF/CDEF/ DEO/BENG du 23 novembre 2006.
- Doctrine d’emploi des armes non létales, [Non lethal weapons employment doctrine] approuvé sous le
n°397/DEF/EMAT/BCSF/CTC du 13 mai 2004.
- Concept d’emploi des forces terrestres en contrôle de foules, [Land forces employment concept for crowd control]
approuvé sous le n°857/DEF/EMAT/BPO/EO2 du 31 mai 2005.
- TTA 950 – Manuel provisoire d’emploi des forces terrestres dans le contrôle de foules, [Field manual (provisional)
land forces employment for crowd control] approuvé sous le n°528/DEF/EMAT/BCSF/CTC du 28 juin 2004.
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Bibliography
General works
- La stabilisation, fonction stratégique, phase décisive, [Stabilization, a strategic function, the decisive phase] Doctrine,
n°12, juillet 2007.
- Des chefs français, [French commanders] Doctrine, numéro spécial, janvier 2007.
- Les transformations de la guerre, [The changes of War] Général Colin, Economica, 1989.
- La guerre et la ville à travers les âges, [War and cities through ages] cycle de conférences 1997-1998 du CEHD, Paris,
ADDIM, 1999 (ouvrage disponible sur demande au CEHD dans la limite des stocks disponibles).
- La France face au terrorisme, [France in front of terrorism] Livre blanc du gouvernement sur la sécurité intérieure face
au terrorisme, La documentation française, Paris, 2006.
- Guerres urbaines, nouveaux métiers, nouveaux soldats, [Urban wars, a new profession, new soldiers]
Antonin Tisseron, Economica, 2007.
- Introduction à la politique africaine, [An introduction to African politics] Mamoudou Gazibo, Les Presses de
l’Université de Montréal, 2006.
- Les artisans de la paix, [The craftmen of peace] Margaret MacMillan, JC Lattès, 2006.
- 60 ans de conflit israélo-arabe, [Sixty years of Arab-Israeli conflicts] Boutros Boutros-Gali et Shimon Peres, Editions
Complexe, 2006.
- Sortie de conflit et obstacles à la paix, [Conflict exit and stumbling blocks to peace] Les Champs de Mars, sous la
direction de Bertrand Badie, La Documentation française, 2005.
- La fin du risque zéro, [The end of zero dead risk] Xavier Guilhou et Patrick Lagadec, Editions Eyrolles
– Les Echos, 2002.
- The Utility of Force, Général Sir Rupert Smith, Economica, 2007.
- La Bosnie-Herzégovine : dix ans après Dayton, un nouveau chantier de l’Union européenne, [Bosnia - Hercegovina:
ten years after Dayton, a new undertaking for the European Union] rapport d’information n°367 (2004-2005)
de MM. Hubert Haenel et Didier Boulaud, fait au nom de la délégation pour l’Union européenne.
- La ville, enjeu et théâtre des conflits, [Cities: stakes and theater of conflicts] les Cahiers de Mars n° 181,
3e trimestre 2004.
- Grande histoire de la ville - De la Mésopotamie aux Etats-Unis, [“A complete history of town - From
Mesopotamia to the United States”], Charles Delfante, Paris, éd. Armand Colin, 1997.
- La ville et la guerre, [“Town and War”], Antoine Picon (dir.), Besançon, les Editions de l’Imprimeur, 1996.
- Site Internet : http://metropoles.revues.org/
OCTOBER 2007
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Main Abbreviations and Acronyms
Principaux sigles et acronymes
used in the articles of the review
concernant les articles de la revue
US Army
United States Army
FYROM
Former Yougoslav Republic of Macedonia
ARYM
Ancienne République yougoslave
de Macédoine
FIBUA
Fighting in Built-Up Areas
AZUR
Actions en zone urbaine
Infantry operational shooting training
center
CEITO
Centre d’entraînement de l’infanterie
au tir opérationnel
Defense historical studies center
CEHD
Centre d’études d’histoire de la Défense
Army Chief of Staff
CEMAT
Chef d’état-major de l’armée de terre
Force on Force Training Center
CENTAC
Centre d’entraînement au combat
Military Operations in Urban Terrain
(MOUT) Training Center
CENZUB
Centre d’entraînement aux actions
en zone urbaine
Land Forces Command
CFAT
Commandement de la force d’action
terrestre
Joint concepts, doctrines
and experimentations center
CICDE
Centre interarmées de concepts,
de doctrines et d’expérimentations
CIMIC Civil-Military Co-operation
CCM
Coopération civilo-militaire
(Avant: ACM Actions civilo-militaires)
European Union Military Committee
CMUE
Comité militaire de l’Union européenne
(Army) Basic and Advanced Professional
Military Education Command
COFAT
Commandement de la formation
de l’armée de terre
Army COS
EUMC
Armée de terre américaine
COIN
Counter- insurgency Operations
(United Kingdom)
OPS Cdr
Operation Commander
COPER
Commandant de l’opération
PSC
Political and Security Committee (EU)
COPS
Comité politique de sécurité (UE)
Committee of Permanent Representatives
in the European Union
COREPER
Comité des représentants permanents
de l’Union européenne
(French) National Army Training
CPF
Centre de préparation des forces
Operational Reserve Company
CRO
Compagnie de réserve opérationnelle
Disarmement, Demobilization,
Reintegration
DDR
Désarmement, démobilisation et réinsertion
"Gendarmerie" (French MP) Detachment
DETGEND
Détachement de gendarmerie
OMLT
Operational mentoring
and liaison teams (Afghanistan)
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OCTOBER 2007
Contre-insurrection (Doctrine britannique)
Détachement de liaison et d’assistance
opérationnelle
Abbreviations
IED
EUMS
PRT
Logistic support detachment
DETLOG
Détachement logistique
(French) Defense procurement agency
DGA
Délégation générale de l’armement
Integrated program team
EDPI
Equipe de programme intégrée
Improvised Explosive Devices
EEI
Engins explosifs improvisés
Armed Forces Joint Staff
EMA
Etat-major des armées
Army Staff
EMAT
Etat-major de l’armée de terre
European Union Military Staff
EMUE
Etat-major de l’Union européenne
Studies Planning Finances (Section)
EPF
Etudes planification et finances
(Military) Physical training and sports
E2PMS
Education et entraînement physique
militaire sportif
Province Reconstruction Team
Equipe d’aide à la reconstruction dans les
provinces afghanes
Ivory Coast's National Armed Forces
(Governmental)
FANCI
Forces armées nationales de la Côte
d’Ivoire
Columbian Revolutionary Armed Forces
FARC
Forces armées révolutionnaires de Colombie
(French) Land Forces
FAT
Force d’action terrestre
Military characteristics sheet
FCM
Fiche de caractéristiques militaires
International Security Assistance Force
FIAS
Force internationale d’assistance
à la sécurité (Afghanistan)
(French) Land Logistics Force
FLT
Force logistique terrestre
OPFOR
Opposing Force
FORAD
Force adverse
AIF
Anti-Iraki Forces
Forces anti-iraquiennes
EUFOR
European Force
Force européenne
SAS
Special Air Service
Forces spéciales des forces armées
britanniques
IDF
Israeli Defense forces
FDI
Forces de défense israëliennes
LLSG
Land Logistical Support Group
GST
Groupement de soutien Terre
JSLG
Joint Support Logistic Group
BG 1 500
Battle Group 1 500
(European Union Combined Arms Task
Force)
GT 1 500
Groupement tactique interarmes UE
Field fire markmanship training
IST-C
Instruction sur le tir de combat
ISAF
Groupement de soutien logistique
interarmées
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Investment with a vocation to develop
operational capacity
IVODECO
Investissement à vocation dedéveloppement
de la capacité opérationnelle
Albanian Kosovars
KOA
Kosovars d’origine albanaise
Serbian Kosovars
KOS
Kosovars d’origine serbe
Kosovo Force
KFOR
Force de l’OTAN au Kosovo
Army common missions
MICAT
Missions communes de l’armée de terre
UNMIK
United Nations Mission in Kosovo
MINUK
Mission des Nations unies au Kosovo
MNSTC-1
Multinational Security
Transition Command–Iraq
MNSTC-1
Force multinationale transitoire de sécurité
en Irak
TCN
Troop Contributing Nations
NBC
Nuclear, biological and chemical
NBC
Nucléaire, biologique et chimique
NRF
NATO Response Force
NRF
Force de réaction rapide de l’OTAN
Observers/Controlers/Advisors
OAC
Observateurs – Arbitres – Conseillers
OECD
Organisation for economic cooperation
and development
OCDE
Organisation de coopération et
de développement économiques
GO
Governmental Organizations
OG
organisations gouvernementales
OHQ
Operation Headquarters
NGO
Non-Governmental Organizations
ONG
Organisations non gouvernementales
OPCOM
Operational command
OPCOM
Commandement opérationnel
OPCON
Operational Control
OPCON
Contrôle opérationnel
OEF
Operation Enduring Freedom
KFOR
Nations fournissant des troupes
PC ou QG d’opération
Opération Enduring Freedom
Overseas operations
OPEX
Opérations extérieures
Illegal Columbian communist party
PCCC
Parti communiste colombien clandestin
FHQ
Force Headquarters
CFSP
Common Foreign and Security Policy
PESC
Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune
ESDP
European Security and Defence Policy
PESD
Politique européenne de sécurité et de
défense
(French) Gendarmerie's surveillance and
investigation platoon
PGSI
Peloton de gendarmerie de surveillance
et d’investigation
PPDA
PC ou QG de force
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan
4th generation radio set
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Parti démocratique du peuple afghan
PR4G
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Poste de radio de 4e génération
Abbreviations
Land protection (unit or mission)
(Protection mission to be performed by any
unit without its organic heavy equipment)
PROTERRE
Protection Terre
(Mission de protection concernant toutes les
unités et assurée sans les matériels lourds
organiques)
Hardened small vehicles
PVP
Petits véhicules protégés
SHAPE
Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers in Europe
DRC
Democratic Republic Congo
RDC
République démocratique du Congo
LL
Lessons Learned
RETEX
Retour d’expérience
SSR
Security Sector Reform
RSS
Réforme du secteur de sécurité
SFOR
Stabilization Force (in Former Yugoslavia)
SFOR
Force de l’OTAN en Ex-Yougoslavie
(Combined arms) Company Team
SGTIA
Sous-groupement tactique interarmes
Centralized logistical information system
SILCENT
Système d’information logistique centralisée
Terminal information system
SIT
Système d’information terminal
Situation centre (EU)
SITCEN
Centre de situation (Union européenne)
Requirement technical specification
STB
Spécification technique du besoin
Combined arms virtual training simulation
system
SYSIMEV
Système de simulation d’entraînement virtuel
interarmes
TACON
Tactical Control
TACON
Contrôle tactique
TACP
Tactical Air Control Party
TACP
Equipe de guidage pour l’appui air-sol
Forward Bn. Combat train
TC1
Trains de combat n° 1
Rear Bn. Combat train
TC2
Trains de combat n° 2
Kosovo's Liberation Army
UCK
Armée de libération du Kosovo
Western European Union
UEO
Union de l’Europe occidentale
SITCEN
WEU
Quartier général des puissances alliées en
Europe
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Military Thought
Extracts from preface by General Bruno Cuche, French Army Chief of Staff (CEMAT)
The book written by General Sir Rupert Smith is fundamental to throw light on our prospective reflections about
our models of forces. Moreover, it is really revolutionary. The author indeed draws precise conclusions that go
against generally accepted ideas. I consider, however, that a large number of them are quite relevant.
General Sir Rupert Smith’s thoughts place back opportunely the human factor at the heart of operational stakes.
It is then taking the place of material and technological factors that were predominant at the time of the industrial
war. The success of a war is, at the end, a matter of “control”. This can be achieved only on the ground, among
human societies, in contact with others, generally in the long term […].
This book has the courage of rehabilitating the concept of war. It allows to break with the confusion maintained
for too many years about the idea that there is no war anymore. It enables to reconsider the adequate use of
force that we marginalized and restricted to the industrial war. It kills the destructive myth of “great war” as a
reference still alive with some of us. Then it necessarily gives structure to our organization and mindsets. Force is
required, but its structure and its use should be appropriate […].
General Sir Rupert Smith’s thesis has then the merit to be daring and to remind how urgent the choices to make
are. In broad outline, it looks very much like our analysis on a necessary re-assessment of our force model to
adapt it to real and most likely commitments.
Interview
with General Sir Rupert Smith
In your book The Utility of Force you say war
no longer exists, why?
After 40 years of service I have come to the conclusion
that war as it is understood, as a defining experience
where you seek to win a trial of strength and thereby
break the will of your opponent, to dictate the result, the
political outcome you wished to achieve, no longer exists.
For all my service I was trained and equipped for the type
of war I have described but we went and did operations
instead.
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What is the difference?
I call the former model ‘Industrial War’ and argue that it
ceased to be the model of war as it is practised with
the dropping of the Atomic Bomb in 1945. I call the model
we are in “War Amongst the People”. We have lived
through a paradigm shift. In this new model you seek to
change the intentions or capture the will of your opponent
and the people amongst which you both operate, to win
the clash of wills and thereby win the trial of strength.
The essential difference is that military force is no longer
The officers publish
used to decide the political dispute, but rather to create a
condition in which the strategic result is achieved. We are
now in a world of continual confrontations and conflicts in
which the military endeavour to support the achievement
of the desired outcome by other means.
What is the difference
between confrontation
and conflict?
Confrontations occur all
day in everyday life they
are the basis of all
politics. They occur when
two or more groups of
people have a different
outcome in mind. There
may be a confrontation
between two parties over
an issue; one or other
party may be persuaded
by argument or have other
reasons to adopt the
other party’s position or
desired outcome, or they
agree on a position which
more or less compromises
both of their original
intentions. However, if one
or other party will not
agree and will not follow a
set of rules or the law to
resolve the confrontation
then they may adopt
conflict as a course of action.
In Industrial War the conflict was intended to win the trial
of strength so as to impose ones will, the desired outcome
to the confrontation. In War Amongst the People the
object of the conflict is to create a condition, to change
intentions, so that the opponent adopts the desired
outcome.
But that difference occurred with Industrial War?
Yes, but it occurred at the political level and only in part
because if you won the conflict you imposed your will. In
War Amongst the People the change from confrontation to
conflict is often down at the tactical level. For example:
in Bosnia in 1995 UNPROFOR, even with the Rapid
Reaction Force supported by NATO’s 5 ATAF, never used
force above the tactical level. The UN was in a complex
confrontational situation; UNPROFOR was in a
confrontation with all the parties to the larger
confrontation that existed between the Bosnian Serbs and
the Federation, and when conflict, or military force, had
been used by the UN it had failed to improve the UN’s
position with the Serbs in particular. Indeed they improved
their position in the confrontation. This erosion of the UN’s
position contributed to the disaster of Srebrenica.
However, in late August when UNPROFOR supported
by NATO attacked initially the Bosnian Serbs around
Sarajevo, the tactical
engagements in the conflict
were sufficiently successful to
create a condition in which
Richard Holbrook, the US
Diplomat, could win
the confrontation and
the Dayton Accords were
signed.
In sum: instead of being in
a world in which peace is
understood to be an absence
of war and where we move in a
linear process of Peace-CrisisWar-Resolution-Peace, we are
in a world of continuous
confrontation. The opponents
in confrontation seek to
influence each other with
military acts. To be effective,
these acts must be coherent
with and allied to the other
measures that affect intentions
so as to gain advantage in
the confrontation. Our
institutions of governance are
not well suited to handing this
new world.
But we could still have an industrial war, couldn’t we?
I am not saying that you won’t get big fights, or large
forces deployed. But the fighting will not be for the
purpose of Industrial War; to impose ones political will by
force of arms. It will be to create a condition. The fighting
between Israel and Hezbollah in July/August 2006 gives
an example. The initial operation to invade Iraq in 2003
gives another. Furthermore, where are the production lines
for men and materiel to sustain Industrial War? And with
modern weapons systems, both WMD and precision
weapons, the ability to destroy mass faster than it can be
created whether in the factories or the field is evident.
So does military force work anymore?
Yes. If it does not why are we so bothered by terrorism,
nuclear proliferation and so on? We have to understand
how to use it in the new paradigm of war, War Amongst
the People. Take the example of the United States, a state
OCTOBER 2007
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DOCTRINE # 13
Military Thought
with the largest best-equipped military forces in the
world, which are unable to dictate the desired outcome
as they did in World War 2. Their forces have limited
utility in relationship to their opponent’s. In the present
confrontations and conflicts, military forces with great
potential to exert power are unable to do so to advantage
when challenged by forces that are by the same
standards ill-equipped and disorganised. We must find
and learn the way to use our forces so that they have
utility in achieving our ends in these confrontations.
What should we do to make this change?
The first thing to do is to change the way we think about
the use of military force, to recognize the change in
paradigm. It is as important for the institutional thinking
process to change as it is for the individual to think
differently; after all, our institutions whether military,
governmental or administrative and whether national or
international, have all evolved to conduct the old model
of war, Industrial War. We must understand the strategic
objectives for the use of military force are not the hard
decisive objectives of Industrial War. In War Amongst
the People they are malleable objectives to do with
setting a condition in which the confrontation can be
resolved by other means.
In Industrial War we operated
to the simple logic
of firepower.
logics running together: the logic of the confrontation
and the logic of the conflict. The currency of the
confrontational logic is information; it is with information
that you gain your position in a confrontation. The logic
of the conflict has not changed it is firepower.
The difficulty is for commanders to understand which
logic they are operating to and in particular at what point
in the chain of command the logics change.
What changes to our weapon systems
and organisations should we make?
I do not think we should make any changes until we have
changed the way we think. Until we understand War
Amongst the People and have worked out our method in
general terms we are likely to make the wrong decisions
about equipments and organisations.
We must learn to understand the forceful military acts
in relation to the overarching confrontation. In Industrial
War we operated to the simple logic of firepower; how to
bring the maximum necessary to achieve our objective
while preventing the enemy from doing the same to us.
In War Amongst the People it is complex, we have two
“Brilliant re-interpretation of western military history”
Etienne de Durand, IFRI, Politique étrangère
“A book which helps us to understand how politics work",
Javier Solana
DOCTRINE # 13
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OCTOBER 2007
foreign studies
Protection and Operational Efficiency
within the German Army
A Response to Current and Future
Challenges
ust two decades ago, the success of armed forces in operation was
quite easy to define: to establish the outcome of a war conducted with
regular armed forces, to win a conflict, symmetrical for the most, to defeat
the opponent. Structures, training and equipment of armed forces were
optimized to meet this objective. For Germany, security was then
usually a synonym for deterrence and defense capacity in order to
preserve its territorial integrity. The German army was organized
the change
according to this view. Since the end of the Cold War,
of paradigm in the area of security policy had modified this equation
in an unexpected and incredible way.
J
BY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL HANS-OTTO BUDDE, GERMAN ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF
Future challenges
The danger of a symmetrical war neutralized by the sole equality of
forces at nuclear level - has been
progressively replaced by new risks
and threats: multiethnical conflicts,
religious extremism and fanatism,
entire regions breaking apart with
the loss of state monopoly of violence,
cross-borders or international
terrorism but also proliferation up
to the danger represented by
underground fabrication of nuclear
weapons. New risks and dangers, such
as attacks against information systems
with their usual and very quick
repercussions at an international
scale, represent also a kind of threat
unknown up to now. Meanwhile, for
around twenty years, we have been
watching an increasing privatization of
war actions. It is indeed impossible in
the future to exclude any conflict and
war between states, but the slow
falling apart of the state monopole
forms here the decisive evolution.
the success in operations is twofold:
enforcing peace thanks to a relatively
short but intense engagement and
contributing for a long period to
the establishment of state structures.
These two dimensions should
be controlled in order to achieve
the goal associated to each of them.
The leading principles of the defense
policy, the design of the Bundeswehr
and the White Book of the federal
government on Germany’s security
policy take into account the new
challenges from the 21st century related
to our security. The priority clearly
granted to the operations of German
armed forces in the framework of
international management of crisis
and conflicts is going with these
challenges. The German Army is then
required to be ready to conduct
operations within the full spectrum of
missions. These go from large combat
operations to operations of nation
building support, and this all over
the world. For the German Army,
OCTOBER 2007
Forces and capabilities
fit for each mission
To achieve this, appropriate military
forces are required to be capable to
cover without gaps the full range of
missions and operations. The German
Army has available for this a unique
reservoir of forces. In it, units differing
by their mission and their scope of
action and allotted with specific
capacity profiles may be put together
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DOCTRINE # 13
by modules. They can be reinforced
according to the foreseen commitment
with elements from the special
operations division and the
aeromobile operations division.
particularly adequate to maintain a
secure environment. The German army
provides currently this kind of forces
for the ISAF mission in the north of
Afghanistan.
This relates to forces especially
appropriate to conduct large combat
operations against an adversary with
essentially military structures. The aim
is to enforce peace through a
multinational action mainly
information-centered led. In addition,
these forces are capable to conduct
rescue and evacuation operations but
are also mastering stabilization
operations. They are the perfect choice
to establish a secure environment.
Moreover, the German Army have
forces available to conduct enduring
multinational operations. These are,
generally speaking, either low or
medium intensity operations fitting in
the range of measures of peace
stabilization. These measures are
Stabilization operations - the situation
in the south of Afghanistan
demonstrates it - can however be of
high intensity on a tactical level.
Forces usually in charge of peace
stabilization are, for this reason too,
also capable to intervene in combat
situations. These units are not “light
version” units, though the table of
organization and equipment (TOE)
allows, at brigade level, for specific
capacities to conduct stabilization
operations (for instance engineers,
signals, combat service support and
reconnaissance units).
DOCTRINE # 13
Such a capacity centered forces
disposition is however not sufficient:
military capacities should always be
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OCTOBER 2007
integrated into a national interconnected policy. That is to say a
comprehensive policy involving the
whole of ministries and agencies in
charge of duties related to security on a national level as well as on an
international level. For us as
servicemen, from the point of view of
the final objective, success in
operations lies in the fact of enforcing
and maintaining a secure environment
and, so to speak, of building the bases
on which other political and civilian
measures can and should be taken.
The military are first in charge of
security - which includes, of course,
fighting. As soon as security is being
established, military measures can be
reduced to be replaced by non military
measures. Every serviceman is also
required a complete capacity profile.
Any soldier should before all be
capable to implement the mandate he
has been assigned, even in case of
resistance and subsequently be
foreign studies
capable to fight. This capacity is what
binds the German Army. But the
spectrum of required capacities does
not stop here. Every soldier in the
German Army should be in a position
to protect people and properties that
he is in charge of. He should also be
able to act as a mediator between the
parties of the conflict and to assist in
distress situations. This is to be
achieved out in a geographic,
climatical and cultural environment not
familiar to him.
The desired strategic objective is to
associate security and reconstruction.
On an operational and tactical level, it
corresponds to a “protection and
operational efficiency” approach. On
the one hand, regarding the
population to support, it is necessary
to protect it and to contribute to
the reconstruction of destroyed
structures. The inhabitants’ hearts and
minds should be winned, subsequently
their trust is to be gained. Such trust
cannot be generated without a direct
contact with individuals. On the other
hand, regarding the military themselves
who should precisely achieve this goal,
the necessary proximity leads always,
in the same time; to increasing risk for
every soldier. This is why we consider as
very important the protection of our
servicemen in operation: a protection
in view of being able to achieve
the mission, to remain capable to act
on a political level. Our servicemen’s
protection is part of the support we
have to provide them with.
The protection itself is not sufficient.
operations, this item is of primary
importance. A defense system against
ballistic threats is developped in
parallel. Third is the vehicles
protection. Various kinds of vehicles
with various levels of protection are
required to perform command and
control, reconnaissance, combat,
combat support or combat service
support duties realized in the scope of
operations. One sole type of vehicle is
not enough to achieve this variety of
duties. The new armored transport
vehicle BOXER has, in particular, the
advantage of a level of protection for
wheeled vehicles unique in the world.
The capability to generate a precise
effect cannot be dissociated from
the protection. Protection and
operational efficiency are the two
sides of the same medal.
Protection
According to the German Army, only
an appropriate combination of the three
factors, namely the superiority in
terms of information and command,
the capability to produce strong and
precise effects, grants the required
credibility to the mission. The protection
in the German Army is an integral
system of active and reactive elements
including equipment, armament and
training focused on operational matters
as well as the employment doctrine and
operational procedures. The protection
and operational efficiency concept is
expressed through very concrete
programs. The German Army focuses its
efforts in protection matters on four
areas.
Its great mobility and its huge loading
capacity make the BOXER an ideal
basic infantery vehicle. These clearly
demonstrate that it could be used as a
command post, a transportation or a
medical vehicle. Fourth is the
identification capability. Friendly fire
hitting accidentally our own forces or
the civilian population during the
operations represents a risk which
should be actively mitigated. Reliable
and fast identification of our own
forces as well as friendly, enemy or
neutral forces is precisely, in this
context, of primary importance
considering the increased range of
modern weapons, sensors systems
and the speeding up of decisionmaking and combat processes.
First are high quality individual
protection systems. They enhance
the survival capacity of servicemen in
operation. We speak here of the
“infantryman of the future” system that
was widely proven in Afghanistan and
the “soldier in operation” system for all
those ouside infantry. The introduction
of a new generation of individual
weapons also improves the soldier’s
protection. Second is the protection of
camps and facilities. Our facilities being
obviously threatened during
Protection within the German Army
also includes the systematic use of
modern technologies and capacities
such as robotized systems. Such
systems may be tasked dirty,
uninteresting or dangerous work.
Subsequently, they are the ideal tool
to allow the military to dedicate to
worthier duties. Robotics shows, from
this point of view, a strong capacity for
the future in regard of all categories
of forces.
Operational efficiency
Bundeswehr
Especially in the scope of operations,
protection should be considered in
conjunction with the capacity to
generate the desired effect. Success
in operation, then, finally, the degree
of mission achievement, effectively
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DOCTRINE # 13
Bundeswehr
require, the capacity to operate assets
in the right place, at the right time and
in a targetted way. Fundamentally,
when facing an opponent, we should
show superiority. This concerns
rapidity, precision, capacity to operate
remotely and achieved effects. We
should also impose our rules in order
to take or to keep the initiative.
The progressive implementation of
the capacity to conduct info-centric
operations, another central element
of the German armed forces
transformation, is a prior conditions
for an efficient capacity to produce
the desired effect and to assert
oneself. The fielding in the army of a
new command and information system
is the first step of the implementation
of a joint information network
gathering the whole of capacities of all
command echelons and all branches
in a comprehensive system. Within
the German Army, the better efficiency
in operations is expressed through
very concrete programs: with
the LEOPARD 2 A 6, it has
the advantage of one of the best MBTs
in the world. This continues in
particular to be optimized by an
operational upgrade for stabilization
operations. Additional mine-protection
or new ammunition with multiple
effects are some examples. The PUMA
air-transportable infantry fighting
vehicle is one of the main armament
programs of the German army. For its
domain, it meets the highest demands
in terms of capacity to dominate,
mobility and protection thanks to its
modular design. The TIGER multipurpose attack helicopter equipped
with PARS 3 long range missiles as
primary armament is itself also an
example of efficiency in operation.
The TIGER achieves then all its
efficiency in the whole of courses of
actions when engaging high value
targets or for convoys protection.
Thanks to the TIGER and the fielding
since December 2006 of the medium
utility helicopter NH90, the German
Army made an innovative progress
being promising in the future on
quality plan as well as a decisive step
towards aero-mechanization. In
the area of tactical combat support,
realization of GMLRS guided rocket for
MARS rocket launcher will allow to
enhance significantly the capacity to
operate distantly and precisely.
The fielding of first systems is
scheduled beginning in 2009. In this
context, it remains to acquire a system
enabling to engage isolate or sporadic
objectives while minimizing collateral
damages. This is naturally carried out
in conjunction with unmanned aerial
reconnaissance systems (for instance,
mini-drones for locating objectives).
The commitment of German armed forces is never an end by itself. The protection and operational efficiency
concept exists today. In the future, it will stay as the specifically military contribution to the security and
reconstruction concept. The protection and operational efficiency always relates to individuals. They are both
actors and objectives of political and military actions. This is why protection and operational efficiency are
playing a primary role during the commitment of German servicemen in the scope of international crisis
management. Providing our servicemen with the best possible protection and efficient weapons for
achieving their mission is, in the same time, a demand and an obligation. This implies the systematic use of
the whole of available technologies and assets. Protection and operational efficiency are however constantly
placed within the scope of the mission to be accomplished. Sometimes, they are conflicting with it. All
servicemen are aware of that. This is part of the understanding they have of their job.
DOCTRINE # 13
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OCTOBER 2007
foreign studies
NOTICE: THE HERE UNDER SET FORTH TEXT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED WITH THE KIND
AUTHORIZATION OF THE MILITARY REVIEW. IT IS AN EXCERPT OF THE ARTICLE PUBLISHED
IN THE APRIL 2007 ISSUE WHICH THE READERS MAY REFER TO.
Future Challenges for
Land Forces: a British View
T
he world faces an uncertain, rapidly changing and competitive future in the early decades
of the twenty-first century. Nations and their armed forces will have to manage the
consequences of crises and shocks, both natural and man-made, in a geopolitical landscape
characterised by volatility, complexity and surprise. The possibility of interstate conflict,
although reduced, still exists. Meanwhile, we are faced by a proliferation of irregular threats in
the form of international terrorists, criminals and insurgents, some with access to
sophisticated technology and weapons. With the multiplication of these threats to our
security, the British Army is being used for very different purposes, further afield than we
might have expected a few years ago, and in very demanding operational circumstances.
The next few years will be challenging. It is critical that we determine what the British Army
must do to achieve strategic and tactical success both now and in the future. Against this
background, it is vital to recognise what part land forces will play in the future and understand
why they will play the significant role in future conflicts. After an analysis of the nature of
future conflict and adversaries, this article will conclude by examining the challenge for land
force development in the coming years.
BY
BRIGADIER GENERAL LAMONT KIRKLAND, UK ARMY
The current military contextrapidly shifting trends
by technology, rapidly overwhelming
the enemy. Wars were going to be
shorter and fought with fewer forces,
which would result in fewer casualtieson both sides. In the United States,
the neo-conservatives were adamant
that US forces did not do ‘nationbuilding’, and that follow-on stabilising
operations could be left to
the Europeans.
If this article on future warfare had
been written in 2003 it would have
told a remarkably different story. Just
four years ago, in the wake of the
“defeat” of the Taliban, and the
successful rout of the Iraqi Army,
the military writing was all about
“Transformation”. The language of
Transformation described highly
deployable forces, conducting
infrequent expeditions, and, aided
OCTOBER 2007
The evangelists for Transformation
were preaching that the combination
of new technology and networking
were going to change the character of
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DOCTRINE # 13
helping to define where we stand now.
We need to assess which of the shifting
trends will change the way we do our
business in the future. While war has an
enduring nature, there are social,
political and technological factors which
can impact on its character. So here are
the key deductions that can be drawn
about the character of future warfare
which will lead to changes in our
capabilities, education, training and
doctrine.
warfare and provide Western armies
with a competitive advantage. Network
Centric Warfare1 was going to result in
battlefields that were transparent,
giving us information superiority and
allowing us to see first and act first. It
now appears that these views resulted
from an impatient rush to judgment
based on wishful thinking, losing
sight of the fact that the enemy gets
a “vote”.
Because just a short time later, and
in the light of considerable recent
experience, the military context is
looking quite different. Priorities have
changed; national defence and security
policies have a quite different tone.
Governments are rightly more
concerned with defeating terrorism and
homeland security. Now, all the
language is about Irregular Warfare,
non-state actors and asymmetric
threats. Intervention has been replaced
by Stabilisation, and operations seem to
be inconveniently enduring and
protracted. Furthermore, we have been
reminded rather sharply that the first
phase of an intervention is not the
decisive phase that we had wished, but
is in fact simply the enabling phase for
the peacekeeping and nation-building
that inevitably follow.
Future conflicts
Future conflicts will be more about
influencing people than destroying
their armies or their equipment
One of history’s enduring lessons is
about the predominant role of
the human dimension in warfare. Wars
will be fought over ideas and values, not
territory. Objectives will be intellectual
and moral, not physical. War is about
defeating the enemy’s will, not his
means. So our future operations will
be more about the minds and will of
the people-those in the area of
operations, those in neighbouring states
and those in the nations providing
the forces involved4. We need to
recognise that, in most of our
operations, the population will
constitute the vital ground. Winning its
support will be a key objective for all
concerned and will be a critical factor in
determining the character of the conflict.
Meanwhile, we have relearned
the importance of the soldier-reliance
on the man not technology. The
battlefield, far from being transparent,
is actually more opaque. The enemy, far
from being easily overcome, has proven
to be an adaptive, thinking, wily animal.
So instead of the presumption that that
we would be the dominant power and
retain the initiative, we have often found
ourselves on the back foot, reacting to
an unseen enemy who is using superior
local knowledge to exploit the situation
and is leaving us at a competitive
disadvantage.
This helps to explain why the military
cannot act alone in such conflicts.
Our activities must be embedded within
a comprehensive approach which
addresses and considers the overall
situation, not just its military aspects.
This requires the better coordination
and coherence of all actors, principally
the political, diplomatic and economic
players, and non-governmental
organisations, to achieve a favourable
lasting outcome.
Above all, we have learned the hard way
that these modern threats, which are
often a conflict of values, cannot be
defeated by ‘Shock and Awe’2 -the use
of hard power alone. There is wider
international recognition of the
importance of a combined approach
-the use of both hard and soft power3.
So much for the current context in
DOCTRINE # 13
This also explains why the information
battle is supreme. The battleground is
opinion, and here perception matters
probably more than reality. We should
bear in mind that soldiers are
transmitters: everything they do, or fail
to do, sends a message. Consequently,
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OCTOBER 2007
there is a pressing need to ensure that
we understand the context of
the conflict, together with the culture
and language of both our opponents
and the local population.
Time, quantity, violence
Conflicts will be protracted, manpowerintensive and more violent.
Because of the centrality of ideas in
conflict, crises are more likely to be
long and drawn-out, with a protracted
battle of wills to win the vital ground,
and where the notion of success is
extremely difficult to define. The US
Army is now referring to this as
“The Long War”. The British Prime
Minister has recently said that
“the battle will be long”, and that
defeating the Taliban will take a
generation5.
Providing stability in failed states,
rebuilding institutions and promoting
reconstruction are going to take time.
The “exit strategy” never quite
delivers, and we will invariably be left
policing and guarding a plethora of
former hot spots where we can never
quite take the decision to withdraw
entirely, our initial status as liberators
souring as we are increasingly seen as
occupiers. Providing stability is also
manpower-intensive where quantity
has a quality all of its own. This has
been the driver behind the recent
decision by three nations (Australia,
Canada and the United States) to
increase the size of their land forces.
And given the likelihood of multiple
crises, it is likely that armies will be
involved in continuous, simultaneous
and enduring conflicts which we now
recognise will involve greater levels
of violence than was anticipated by
some. With hindsight, it now appears
that the relatively low levels of
violence encountered in ten years of
Balkans peacekeeping were an
aberration rather than a defining trend.
Conflict will be multi-dimensional and
multi-faceted. Future wars will be
multi-dimensional rather than divided
into the clearly defined separate
phases that we previously imagined.6
foreign studies
seek out ways to negate our
technological and industrial
advantage, as Hezbollah did very
effectively against the Israel Defence
Forces (IDF) in Lebanon in
August 2006.
Furthermore, these adversaries will be
highly adaptable and will not only
rapidly change their tactics and
methods but will change shape from
criminal to warlord, to terrorist, to
insurgent. And in confronting these
adversaries, no single solution will
succeed: its very perfection will ensure
its irrelevance. For an adaptive enemy
will ruthlessly eliminate the vulnerability
the solution seeks to exploit. In short, if
it works today, it may be obsolete by
tomorrow.
UK.mod
Adversaries will retreat into
complex terrain
No conflict will exist at just one point
of the spectrum, and its intensity will
vary with time and place. Soldiers will
no longer be presented with obvious
contrasts between peace and war,
civilian and enemy, friend and foe.
There will be a proliferation of nonstate actors, and intervening forces
will be confronted by combinations
of transnational irregulars, political
and sectarian violence, tribal groups
and religious extremists.
In these conditions, land forces will
have to be extremely agile to conduct
a range of operations including
warfighting, counter-insurgency,
stabilisation, capacity-building
and humanitarian tasks in the same
theatre. General Charles Krulak first
described he “Three Block War”
in 19977. Now our adversaries are
forcing us to fight a Three Block War
on a global stage, and while certain
phases have a temporary geographical
basis, the conflict as a whole will
range far and wide, as the adversary
shifts resources and activities to those
areas least accessible to us. So we can
expect many of our operations to be
conducted at strategic distance from
the United Kingdom, and in theatres
Modern technology will continue to
improve the lethality and precision of
weapons and increase the probability
of kill ratio. When combined with
the enormous potential of remote,
unmanned sensors, benefiting from
advances in nano-technology,
miniaturisation and robotics, it will
lead to the point where our militaries
will reasonably expect to destroy
something if they can see it. But we
should not expect that our adversaries
will be so easily found. They will strive
to remain below our detection
threshold by retreating into complex
terrain and into those environments
for which we are least prepared. Above
all, they will hide amongst the people
in predominantly urban areas, where
they cannot be easily targeted or
engaged with stand-off weapons. This
will apply as much to regulars as
irregulars, as the IDF found when
trying to locate Hezbollah positions
built underground in cities.
likely to be characterised by large
size and harsh terrain.
So we need soldiers who are agilecapable of destruction and
construction; we need armies that can
win the battle and then go on to win
the peace. As T. E. Lawrence
memorably remarked, “. . . war upon
rebellion was messy and slow, like
eating soup with a knife.8”
Adversaries
Adversaries will be more adaptable
and complicated, and less
constrained.
Our future adversaries will be more
complicated, less geographically
constrained and less containable than
before. They will be asymmetric in
nature, shape, means and motivation.
They will not value what we value;
they will not be bound by any of
the modern day constraints of warfare
and will be unfettered by any sense
of morality.
In such terrain, battles will be meeting
engagements with reconnaissance
often being carried out by fire, and
the unseen enemy usually firing the first
shot. The importance of surviving these
encounters will drive attempts to
continually improve levels of force
They see their strategic advantages as
terrorism and time, and will avoid our
strengths while playing on our
vulnerabilities. They will relentlessly
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DOCTRINE # 13
protection, as we have seen vividly in
the Army’s changing requirements for
the FRES vehicle programme9. It will
also drive the requirement to introduce
sophisticated unmanned
reconnaissance sensors into our
inventory.
operations will be conducted in full
media glare, in the shadow of
international lawyers, within an
increasingly ambiguous legal
framework and under ever-tightening
moral and ethical standards.
The pervasive media and the wide
availability of digital, real-time
personal communications will make
our actions on operations more
transparent to the viewing public and
politicians-the strategic stakeholders,
whose continuing support and
confidence are vital to our freedom
of manoeuvre, particularly in
circumstances where their expectations
of a “quick win” cannot be realised. This
will place a significant burden on junior
commanders to make tactical decisions
under detailed scrutiny, and places a
premium on the education, training
and preparation they receive.
Decisive engagements
Decisive engagements will occur
at lower levels than before. In
tomorrow’s conflicts, particularly in
complex terrain, it will be the platoons
and sections that will have to win
engagements; they, not the divisions
and brigades, will carry the decisive
burden. The battlespace will be
unpredictable and non-linear. Contacts
with the enemy will be fleeting and
sporadic, often at his initiative, not
ours. Given the spontaneity and
immediacy of combat, we must ensure
that these small units are so well
networked that they too can call for,
and communicate with, the jointservice assets providing their fire
support. Air/land integration will take
place at levels far below that normally
expected, and all forces will have
to understand how to incorporate
“Air Manœuvre” within their plans.
The future land environment
If we strip away technology and
machinery, the fact remains that land
warfare is fundamentally a human
endeavour, a battle of wills.
Constrained by the tyranny of terrain,
we operate in a world of friction and
position. It is dynamic and adversarial,
and still involves close combat.
Soldiering will still be dangerous,
brutal, chaotic and uncertain.
This will result in assets and
capabilities originally designed for use
at the strategic level being driven
down to the tactical level. This also
means that tactical headquarters
(brigade and battle group) will have to
integrate joint assets and perform
functions that were previously the
preserve of corps and divisional
headquarters.
And while land warfare will be affected
by improved networking, technology
will not lift the fog of war. In microterrain, land forces will be fighting for,
not with information, perhaps unlike
our colleagues in the maritime and air
forces, whose systems and weapons
will rely to a much greater degree on
strategic ISTAR systems11. In future
conflicts, land forces will still be
required to detect, locate and shape
the enemy for the joint force. In this
way, the soldier remains the sensor, as
he has always been. We will continue
to rely upon the man, not technology.
The conditions will be uneven
Moreover, the conditions will be
uneven. The threshold for the
enemy to be successful against us
is lowering: he only needs the
occasional good result to maintain
profile and recognition. Or, as the IRA
used to taunt us: “We only need to get
lucky once; you need to stay lucky all
the time10” For us, on the other hand,
the threshold continues to rise. Our
DOCTRINE # 13
the foreseeable future. There are
compelling and enduring reasons
why this will be the case. Armies will
remain the principal instrument
through which a nation or coalition
forcibly imposes its will upon another.
Only land forces can comprehensively
defeat other land forces, and only land
forces can seize and hold key terrain.
Land forces have the greatest impact
on civil populations, and their
presence provides the essential
elements of security that allow other
actors and agencies to operate.
The deployment of land forces
normally represents the strongest
evidence of political commitment to a
crisis, and when they are deployed
they will invariably be the supported
component. Finally, decisive resolution
in a joint campaign is most likely to
occur within the land environment,
because that’s where the people are
found.
Future roles for land forces
Against these trends, it is most
unlikely that land forces will find
themselves under-employed in
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1 Known as Network Enabled Capability
in the United Kingdom.
2 The term “Shock and Awe”, technically
known as ‘“Rapid Dominance”, was first
coined by Harlan K. Ullman and James
P. Wade in Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid
Dominance (Washington, DC: National
Defense University, 1996).
3 Tony Blair, “Our Nation’s Future”, Prime
Minister’s RUSI address on board HMS
Albion, 12 January 2007.
4 General Sir Rupert Smith described this as
“war among the people” in The Utility of
Force: The Art of War in the Modern World
(London: Allen Lane, 2005).
5 PM’s address, op. cit. in note 3.
6 Lieutenant General James N. Mattis USMC
has referred to future conflicts as “Hybrid
Wars”.
7 General Charles C. Krulak,
31st Commandant of the US Marine Corps.
The reference is to urban scenarios where,
in the space of three blocks, soldiers may
have to engage in fighting, peacekeeping
or humanitarian action.
8 T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom,
ch. LXXX.
9 Future Rapid Effects System, a British
medium armoured vehicle.
10 Well-known Belfast street mural
in the 1980s.
11 Intelligence, Surveillance, Target
Acquisition and Reconnaissance.
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The challenge for land force development
None of these trends will make future soldiering any easier. In fact, taken together, they describe an
immensely more complex and multi-faceted environment than we had previously prepared for. This will
call for a more sophisticated and agile response than hitherto, and will place greater demands on
the judgment and personal skills of individuals. The implications for land forces are significant and may
require us to alter our current direction of travel and capabilities. Although the predominant trend for
the next 20 years (a generation) is operations that will largely be conducted “among the people”, we cannot
prudently rule out a return to warfare requiring large-scale warfighting.
The challenge we all face is that of preparing individuals and forces to be fully aware of their role in
delivering the security line of development within a civilian-led campaign plan, set within a multinational,
joint and inter-agency context, while sustaining the capability to conduct combined arms high-intensity
warfare. In the United Kingdom, we have already adjusted our expeditionary model along the lines of
the “Balanced Force”, to reflect the enduring nature and intensity of these operations, and we are now
assessing whether to make further changes, particularly to our educational base to prepare our people
for complexity.
And while technology is important, future “wars among the people” will not be won with some new piece
of equipment. They’ll be won by changing the way we think and the way we approach the problems. And
the supreme test will be to adapt rapidly to circumstances that, even now, we cannot foresee. It is a
competitive learning environment.
In these circumstances, our manpower will remain the most important resource for responding to crises
effectively and successfully. It is the critical thinking, flexibility and adaptability of soldiers and officers that
will provide the foundation for success in future operations. Hence the key to success is the adaptation
of our education, training and doctrine to properly prepare our people for a very uncertain and complex
future.
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NOTICE: THE HERE UNDER SET FORTH TEXT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED WITH THE KIND
AUTHORIZATION OF THE MILITARY REVIEW. IT IS AN EXCERPT OF THE ARTICLE PUBLISHED
IN THE OCTOBER 2006 ISSUE WHICH THE READERS MAY REFER TO.
Learning Counterinsurgency:
Observations from
Soldiering in Iraq
T
he Army has learned a great deal in Iraq and Afghanistan about the conduct of
counterinsurgency operations, and we must continue to learn all that we can from
our experiences in those countries.
The insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan were not, in truth, the wars for which we
were best prepared in 2001; however, they are the wars we are fighting and they
clearly are the kind of wars we must master. America’s overwhelming conventional
military superiority makes it unlikely that future enemies will confront us head on.
Rather, they will attack us asymmetrically, avoiding our strengths-firepower, maneuver,
technology-and come at us and our partners the way the insurgents do in Iraq and
Afghanistan. It is imperative, therefore, that we continue to learn from our experiences
in those countries, both to succeed in those endeavors and to prepare for the future.
BY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID H. PETRAEUS, U.S. ARMY
Soldiers and Observations
In an effort to foster learning as
an organization, the Army
institutionalized the process of
collection, evaluation, and
dissemination of observations,
insights, and lessons some 20 years
ago with the formation of the Center
for Army Lessons Learned.1
Writing down observations and
lessons learned is a time-honored
tradition of Soldiers. Most of us have
done this to varying degrees, and we
then reflect on and share what we’ve
jotted down after returning from the
latest training exercise, mission, or
deployment. Such activities are of
obvious importance in helping us learn
from our own experiences and from
those of others.
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In subsequent years, the other military
services and the Joint Forces Command
followed suit, forming their own
lessons learned centers. More recently,
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OCTOBER 2007
the Internet and other knowledgemanagement tools have sped
the processes of collection, evaluation,
and dissemination enormously.
Numerous products have already
been issued since the beginning of
our operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq, and most of us have found these
products of considerable value as
we’ve prepared for deployments and
reviewed how different units grappled
with challenges our elements were
about to face.
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For all their considerable worth,
the institutional structures for
capturing lessons are still dependent
on Soldiers’ thoughts and reflections.
And Soldiers have continued to record
their own observations, particularly in
recent years as we have engaged in so
many important operations. Indeed,
my own pen and notebook were
always handy while soldiering in Iraq,
where I commanded the 101st Airborne
Division during our first year there
(during the fight to Baghdad and the
division’s subsequent operations in
Iraq’s four northern provinces), and
where, during most of the subsequent
year-and-a-half, I helped with the socalled “train and equip” mission,
conducting an assessment in the
spring of 2004 of the Iraqi Security
Forces after their poor performance in
early April 2004, and then serving as
the first commander of the MultiNational Security Transition CommandIraq and the NA TO Training MissionIraq.
in taking the initiative, and want
to get on with business. Yet, despite
the discomfort in trying to follow
Lawrence’s advice by not doing too much
with our own hands, such an approach
is absolutely critical to success in a
situation like that in Iraq. (...)
Fourteen Observations
Empowering Iraqis to do the job
themselves has, in fact, become
the essence of our strategy -and such
an approach is particularly applicable
in Iraq. Despite suffering for decades
under Saddam, Iraq still has
considerable human capital, with the
remnants of an educated middle class,
a number of budding entrepreneurs,
and many talented leaders. Moreover,
the Iraqis, of course, know the situation
and people far better than we ever can,
and unleashing their productivity is
essential to rebuilding infrastructure
and institutions. (...) I simply want to
emphasize the importance of
empowering, enabling, and assisting
the Iraqis, an approach that figures
prominently in our strategy in that
country.
Observation Number 1 is “Do not try to
do too much with your own hands.”
T.E. Lawrence offered this wise counsel
in an article published in The Arab
Bulletin in August 1917.
Continuing, he wrote: “Better the Arabs
do it tolerably than that you do it
perfectly. It is their war, and you are to
help them, not win it for them.
Actually, also, under the very odd
conditions of Arabia, your practical work
will not be as good as, perhaps, you
think it is. It may take them longer and it
may not be as good as you think, but if
it is theirs, it will be better.”2
Lawrence’s guidance is as relevant in the
21st century as it was in his own time in
the Middle East during World War I. Like
much good advice, however, it is
sometimes easier to put forward than it
is to follow. Our Army is blessed with
highly motivated Soldiers who pride
themselves on being action oriented.
We celebrate a “can do” spirit, believe
Observation Number 2 is that, in a
situation like Iraq, the liberating force
must act quickly, because every Army
of liberation has a half-life beyond
US ARMY
What follows is the distillation of a
number of observations jotted down
during that time. Some of these
observations are specific to soldiering
in Iraq, but the rest speak to
the broader challenge of conducting
counterinsurgency operations in a
vastly different culture than our own.
I offer 14 of those observations here in
the hope that others will find them of
assistance as they prepare to serve
in Iraq or Afghanistan or in similar
missions in the years ahead.
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DOCTRINE # 13
which it turns into an Army of
occupation. The length of this half-life
is tied to the perceptions of
the populace about the impact of
the liberating force’s activities. (...)
do not want to downplay the
importance of winning hearts and
minds for the Coalition, as that
extends the half-life I described
earlier, something that is of obvious
desirability. But more important was
the idea of Iraqis wanting the new Iraq
to succeed. Over time, in fact, we
began asking, when considering new
initiatives, projects, or programs,
whether they would help increase the
number of Iraqis who felt they had a
stake in the country’s success. (...)
Observation Number 3 is that, in an
endeavor like that in Iraq, money is
ammunition. In fact, depending on
the situation, money can be more
important than real ammunition - and
that has often been the case in Iraq
since early April 2003 when Saddam’s
regime collapsed and the focus rapidly
shifted to reconstruction, economic
revival, and restoration of basic
services. Once money is available,
the challenge is to spend it effectively
and quickly to rapidly achieve
measurable results. This leads to a
related observation that the money
needs to be provided as soon as
possible to the organizations that have
the capability and capacity to spend
it in such a manner. (...)
The essence of Observation Number 5
- that we should analyze costs and
benefits of operations before each
operation - is captured in a question
we developed over time and used to
ask before the conduct of operations:
“Will this operation,” we asked, “take
more bad guys off the street than it
creates by the way it is conducted?”
If the answer to that question was,
“No,” then we took a very hard look at
the operation before proceeding. (...)
In the main, however, we sought to
carry out operations in a way that
minimized the chances of creating
more enemies than we captured or
killed. The idea was to try to end each
day with fewer enemies than we had
when it started. Thus we preferred
targeted operations rather than
sweeps, and as soon as possible after
completion of an operation, we
explained to the citizens in the
affected areas what we’d done and
why we did it. (...)
Beyond being provided money, those
organizations with the capacity and
capability to put it to use must also be
given reasonable flexibility in how they
spend at least a portion of the money,
so that it can be used to address
emerging needs-which are inevitable.
This is particularly important in
the case of appropriated funds.
The recognition of this need guided
our requests for resources for the Iraqi
Security Forces “train and equip”
mission, and the result was a
substantial amount of flexibility in
the 2005 supplemental funding
measure that has served that mission
very well, especially as our new
organization achieved the capability
and capacity needed to rapidly put to
use the resources allocated to it.3
That, logically, leads to Observation
Number 6, which holds that
intelligence is the key to success.
It is, after all, detailed, actionable
intelligence that enables “cordon and
knock” operations and precludes large
sweeps that often prove counterproductive. Developing such
intelligence, however, is not easy.
Substantial assets at the local (i.e.,
division or brigade) level are required
to develop human intelligence
networks and gather sufficiently
precise information to allow targeted
operations. (...)
Gathering this information is hard;
considerable intelligence and
Observation Number 4 reminds us
that increasing the number of
stakeholders is critical to success.
This insight emerged several months
into our time in Iraq as we began to
realize that more important than our
winning Iraqi hearts and minds was
doing all that we could to ensure that
as many Iraqis as possible felt a stake
in the success of the new Iraq. Now, I
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operational assets are required,
all of which must be pulled together to
focus (and deconflict) the collection,
analytical, and operational efforts. But
it is precisely this type of approach
that is essential to preventing
terrorists and insurgents from putting
down roots in an area and starting
the process of intimidation and
disruption that can result in a
catastrophic downward spiral.
Observation Number 7, which springs
from the fact that Civil Affairs are not
enough when undertaking huge
reconstruction and nation-building
efforts, is that everyone must do
nation-building. This should not be
taken to indicate that I have anything
but the greatest of respect for our Civil
Affairs personnel - because I hold them
in very high regard. I have personally
watched them work wonders in Central
America, Haiti, the Balkans, and, of
course, Iraq. Rather, my point is that
when undertaking industrial-strength
reconstruction on the scale of that in
Iraq, Civil Affairs forces alone will not
suffice; every unit must be involved. (...)
Observation Number 8, recognition of
the need to help build institutions,
not just units, came from the Coalition
mission of helping Iraq re-establish its
security forces. We initially focused
primarily on developing combat unitsArmy and Police battalions and
brigade headquarters-as well as
individual police. (...) In fact, lack of
ministry capability and capacity can
undermine the development of
the battalions, brigades, and divisions,
if the ministries, for example, don’t
pay the soldiers or police on time, use
political rather than professional
criteria in picking leaders, or fail to pay
contractors as required for services
provided.
This lesson underscored for us
the importance of providing sufficient
advisors and mentors to assist with
the development of the security
ministries and their elements, just as
we provided advisor teams with each
battalion and each brigade and
division headquarters.4
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two major obligations to these junior
leaders: first, to do everything possible
to train them before deployment for
the various situations they will face,
particularly for the most challenging
and ambiguous ones; and, second,
once deployed, to try to shape
situations to minimize the cases in
which they have to make those
hugely important decisions extremely
quickly. (...)
US ARMY
My next-to-last observation, Number
13, is that there is no substitute for
flexible, adaptable leaders. The key
to many of our successes in Iraq, in
fact, has been leaders- especially
young leaders - who have risen to
the occasion and taken on tasks for
which they’d had little or no training, 6
and who have demonstrated
enormous initiative, innovativeness,
determination, and courage.7 (...)
Observation Number 9, cultural
awareness is a force multiplier, reflects
our recognition that knowledge of
the cultural “terrain” can be as
important as, and sometimes even
more important than, knowledge of
the geographic terrain. This
observation acknowledges that
the people are, in many respects,
the decisive terrain, and that we must
study that terrain in the same way
that we have always studied
the geographic terrain. Working in
another culture is enormously difficult
if one doesn’t understand the ethnic
groups, tribes, religious elements,
political parties, and other social
groupings-and their respective
viewpoints; the relationships among
the various groups; governmental
structures and processes; local and
regional history; and, of course, local
and national leaders. Understanding
of such cultural aspects is essential if
one is to help the people build stable
political, social, and economic
institutions. (...)
Observation Number 10 is a statement
of the obvious, fully recognized by
those operating in Iraq, but it is one
worth recalling nonetheless. It is that
success in a counterinsurgency
requires more than just military
operations. Counterinsurgency
strategies must also include, above
all, efforts to establish a political
environment that helps reduce support
for the insurgents and undermines
the attraction of whatever ideology
they may espouse.5 In certain Sunni
Arab regions of Iraq, establishing
such a political environment is likely
of greater importance than military
operations, since the right political
initiatives might undermine
the sanctuary and assistance provided
to the insurgents. (...)
My final observation, Number 14,
underscores that, especially in
counterinsurgency operations, a
leader’s most important task is to
set the right tone. This is, admittedly,
another statement of the obvious,
but one that nonetheless needs to
be highlighted given its tremendous
importance. Setting the right tone
and communicating that tone to his
subordinate leaders and troopers are
absolutely critical for every leader at
every level, especially in an endeavor
like that in Iraq. (...) Setting the right
tone ethically is another hugely,
important task. If leaders fail to get
this right, winking at the mistreatment
of detainees or at manhandling of
citizens, for example, the result can
be a sense in the unit that “anything
goes.” Nothing can be more
destructive in an element than such
a sense. In truth, regardless of
the leader’s tone, most units in Iraq
have had to deal with cases in which
mistakes have been made in these
areas, where young leaders in very
frustrating situations, often after
having suffered very tough casualties,
took missteps. The key in these
situations is for leaders to ensure that
appropriate action is taken in the wake
of such incidents, that standards are
Observation Number 11- ultimate
success depends on local leaders - is
a natural reflection of Iraqi sovereignty
and acknowledges that success in Iraq
is, as time passes, increasingly
dependent on Iraqi leaders. (...)
Iraqi leaders are, in short, the real key
to the new Iraq, and we thus need to
continue to do all that we can to
enable them.
Observation Number 12 is
the admonition to remember the
strategic corporals and strategic
lieutenants, the relatively junior
commissioned or non commissioned
officers who often have to make huge
decisions, sometimes with life-or-death
as well as strategic consequences, in
the blink of an eye. Commanders have
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clearly articulated and reinforced,
that remedial training is conducted,
and that supervision is exercised to try
to preclude recurrences. (...)
number of implications for our effort in
Iraq (and for our Army as well, as I
have noted in some of the footnotes).8
It goes without saying that success in
Iraq - which clearly is important not
just for Iraq, but for the entire Middle
East region and for our own country will require continued military
operations and support for the
ongoing development of Iraqi Security
Forces. Success will also require
continued assistance and resources
for the development of the emerging
political, economic, and social
institutions in Iraq. (...)
Implications
These are, again, 14 observations from
soldiering in Iraq for most of the first
2-1/2 years of our involvement there.
Although I presented them as discrete
lessons, many are inextricably related.
These observations carry with them a
In a 1986 article titled “Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm,” General John R. Galvin observed
that “[a]n officer’s effectiveness and chance for success, now and in the future, depend not only
on his character, knowledge, and skills, but also, and more than ever before, on his ability to
understand the changing environment of conflict.9 General Galvin’s words were relevant then, but
they are even more applicable today. Conducting counterinsurgency operations in a vastly different
culture is exceedingly complex.
Later, in the same article, noting that we in the military typically have our noses to the grindstone
and that we often live a somewhat cloistered existence, General Galvin counseled: “Let us get our
young leaders away from the grindstone now and then, and encourage them to reflect on
developments outside the fortress-cloister. Only then will they develop into leaders capable of
adapting to the changed environment of warfare and able to fashion a new paradigm that addresses
all the dimensions of the conflicts that may lie ahead.”10 Given the current situation, General Galvin’s
advice again appears very wise indeed.
And it is my hope that, as we all take time to lift our noses from the grindstone and look beyond the
confines of our current assignments, the observations provided here will help foster useful discussion
on our ongoing endeavors and on how we should approach similar conflicts in the future-conflicts that
are likely to be the norm, rather than the exception, in the 21st century.
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1. The Center for Army Lessons Learned
website can be found at <http://call.
Army.mil/>.
2. T.E. Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven Articles,”
Arab Bulletin (20 August 1917). Known
popularly as “Lawrence of Arabia,” T.E.
Lawrence developed an incomparable
degree of what we now call “cultural
awareness” during his time working with
Arab tribes and armies, and many of his
27 articles ring as true today as they did
in his day. A website with the articles can
be found at<www.pbs.org/lawrence
ofarabia/revolt/warfare4.html>. A good
overview of Lawrence’s thinking,
including his six fundamental principles
of insurgency, can be found in “T.E.
Lawrence and the Mind of an Insurgent,”
Army (July 2005): 31-37.
3. The FY 2005 Defense Budget and
Supplemental Funding Measures
approved by Congress provided some
$5.2 billion for the Iraqi Security Force’s
train, equip, advise, and rebuild effort.
Just as significant, it was appropriated in
just three categories-Ministry of Defense,
Ministry of Interior, and Quick Reaction
Funds-thereby minimizing substantially
the need for reprogramming actions.
6. As I noted in a previous footnote,
preparation of leaders and units for
deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan now
typically includes extensive preparation
for the kind of “non-kinetic” operations
our leaders are called on to perform, with
the preparation period culminating in a
brigade combat team mission rehearsal
exercise at either the National Training
Center or the Joint Readiness Training
Center. At each Center, units conduct
missions similar to those they’ll perform
when deployed and do so in an
environment that includes villages,
Iraqi-American role players, “suicide
bombers,” “insurgents,” the need to work
with local leaders and local security
forces, etc. At the next higher level, the
preparation of division and corps
headquarters culminates in the conduct
of a mission rehearsal exercise conducted
jointly by the Battle Command Training
Program and Joint Warfighting Center.
This exercise also strives to replicate-in
a command post exercise format driven
by a computer simulation-the missions,
challenges, and context the unit will find
once deployed.
4. Over time, and as the effort to train and
equip Iraqi combat units gathered
momentum, the Multinational Security
Transition Command-Iraq placed greater
and greater emphasis on helping with the
development of the Ministries of Defense
and Interior, especially after the mission to
advise the Ministries’ leaders was shifted
to the Command from the Embassy’s Iraq
Reconstruction Management Office in
the Fall of 2005. It is now one of the
Command’s top priorities.
7. A great piece that highlights the work
being done by young leaders in Iraq is
Robert Kaplan’s “The Future of America-in
Iraq,” latimes.com, 24 December 2005.
Another is the video presentation used
by Army Chief of Staff General Peter
J. Schoomaker, “Pentathlete Leader: 1LT
Ted Wiley,” which recounts Lieutenant
Wiley’s fascinating experiences in the first
Stryker unit to operate in Iraq as they
fought and conducted nation-building
operations throughout much of the
country, often transitioning from one to
the other very rapidly, changing missions
and reorganizing while on the move, and
covering considerable distances in short
periods of time.
5. David Galula’s classic work,
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and
Practice (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer
Publishing, 2005) is particularly
instructive on this point. See, for
example, his discussion on pages 88-89.
8. The Department of Defense (DOD)
formally recognized the implications of
current operations as well, issuing DOD
Directive 3000.05 on 28 November 2005,
“Military Support for Stability, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction Operations,”
OCTOBER 2007
which establishes DOD policy and assigns
responsibilities within DOD for planning,
training, and preparing to conduct and
support stability operations. This is a
significant action that is already spurring
action in a host of different areas. A copy
can be found at
<www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/htm
l/300005.htm>.
9. Galvin, 7. One of the Army’s true soldierstatesman-scholars, General Galvin was
serving as the Commander in Chief of
U.S. Southern Command at the time he
wrote this article. In that position, he
oversaw the conduct of a number of
operations in El Salvador and elsewhere
in Central and South America, and it was
in that context that he wrote this enduring
piece. He subsequently served as the
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and
following retirement, was the Dean of the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at
Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts.
10. Ibid.
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The New US Approach
in Iraq
eneral Petraeus was assigned as the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq – MNF-I, on
February 10th, 2007.
G
In concordance with his principles, as expressed in an article published in the Military
Review and mostly reproduced in this issue of Doctrine, early in June, he gave ten new
directives1 to the coalition forces in Iraq. They concretely translate the new american
approach for the conduct of operations, namely: concentrate on civilian population security
with priority put on Bagdad City.
1. SECURE THE PEOPLE WHERE THEY SLEEP.
Primary mission, it is also a protracted one. Once the areas are secure, they must be controlled and
protected 24 hours a day by the coalition forces until Iraqi police forces be able to take over.
2. GIVE THE PEOPLE JUSTICE AND HONOR.
It is necessary to treat the population with respect and dignity, but also to act rapidly and openly when
fighting any kind of injustice.
3. INTEGRATE CIVILIAN/MILITARY EFFORTS. THIS IS AN INTERAGENCY COMBINED
ARMS FIGHT.
The coordination of military and civilian efforts is vital and must be supported by the competences of
the PRTS that operate by the side of the coalition forces.
4. GET OUT AND WALK, MOVE MOUNTED, WORK DISMOUNTED.
Efficiency is conditioned by a better understanding of the environment. Consequently we have to work
in direct contact of the population and thus we must conduct a maximum of patrols dismounted.
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5. WE ARE IN A FIGHT FOR INTELLIGENCE ALL THE TIME.
We should not wait for intelligence from upper echelons of command. Every tactical echelons must be
able to collect, analyse and use the information they have gained by the contact of the population, from
the security forces and the environment.
6. EVERY UNIT MUST ADVISE THEIR ISF PARTNERS.
Since the Military Training Teams (MITTS) cannot be everywhere and in a sufficient number, the coalition
forces must permanently support and assist the Iraqi security forces for which all the coalition forces are
to set a good example.
7. INCLUDE ISF IN YOUR OPERATIONS AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL.
Iraqi security forces and coalition forces complement each other. In order to integrate more easily the
Iraqi population (language, culture) while keeping optimised fighting capabilities, it is necessary that
members of the Iraqi security forces be part of the operations down to the lowest tactical echelons.
8. LOOK BEYOND THE IED, GET THE NETWORK THAT PLACED IT.
Fighting IEDs will just be actually efficient when we can engage the networks that position them.
9. BE FIRST WITH THE TRUTH.
Even though the Public Affairs Officers and the organizations in charge of information operations can
help relay command messages, the most efficient tool remains the soldier in daily contact with the
population. Commanders must regularly and swiftly give the whole troops some situation awareness
briefings and communication elements in order to get advantage of this kind of "amplifier box".
10. MAKE THE PEOPLE CHOOSE.
The purpose is that the majority of the population take side durably with the legal government. To do so,
it is necessary to be supported by the existing traditional links (tribes, clans, religious community) and
protect people who made that choice.
1 An abstract out of the weekly message from the Military Mission by the French Embassy in the United States, dated June 14th, 2007.
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NOTICE: THE HERE UNDER SET FORTH TEXT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED WITH THE KIND
AUTHORIZATION OF THE MILITARY REVIEW. IT IS AN EXCERPT OF THE ARTICLE PUBLISHED
IN THE OCTOBER 2006 ISSUE WHICH THE READERS MAY REFER TO.
Winning the Peace
The Requirement for
Full-Spectrum Operations
ou [military professionals] must know something about strategy and tactics and logistics, but also
economics and politics and diplomacy and history. You must know everything you can know about
military power, and you must also understand the limits of military power. You must understand that
few of the important problems of our time have, in the final analysis, been finally solved by military
power alone.-John F. Kennedy1
Y
For the last 3 decades serving as an Army officer, the traditional military training model prepared
me to win our Nation’s wars on the plains of Europe, or the deserts of the Middle East. (...) But in
Baghdad, that envisioned 3-decade-old concept of reality was replaced by a far greater sense of
purpose and cause. Synchronization and coordination of the battlespace was not to win the war,
but to win the peace. (...)
BY MAJOR GENERAL PETER W. CHIARELLI, U.S. ARMY AND MAJOR PATRICK R. MICHAELIS, U.S. ARMY
The proverbial “point of penetration”
for the 1st Cavalry Division and the
coalition occurred on 30 January 2005.
Millions of eligible Iraqi citizens, from
across the sectarian divides, triumphed
over a fractured insurgency and terrorist
threat in a show of defiance never
before seen across the Middle East. The
purple index finger, proudly displayed,
became a symbol of defiance and hope.
The Iraqi people proved to the world
their willingness to try democracy in
whatever unique form evolves. Task
Force Baghdad’s campaign to “win the
peace” in Iraq has forced us, as an
instrument of national power, to change
the very nature of what it means to
fight.2 (...) We witnessed in Baghdad
that it was no longer adequate as a
military force to accept classic military
modes of thought. Our own mentality of
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a phased approach to operations boxed
our potential into neat piles the
insurgent and terrorist initially exploited.
We found that if we concentrated solely
on establishing a large security force
and targeted counterinsurgent combat
operations-and only after that was
accomplished, worked toward
establishing a sustainable infrastructure
supported by a strong government
developing a free-market system-we
would have waited too long.
The outcome of a sequential plan
allowed insurgent leaders to gain a
competitive advantage through
solidifying the psychological and
structural support of the populace.
Further, those who viewed the
attainment of security solely as a
function of military action alone were
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mistaken. A gun on every street corner,
although visually appealing, provides
only a short-term solution and does not
equate to long term security grounded
in a democratic process.
(...) On 3 August 2004, following a
tenuous ceasefire agreement between
Task Force Baghdad and the forces of
Muqtada Al Sadr in Shi’a-dominated
Sadr City, over 18,000 city residents
went to work for the first time earning
sustaining wages by rebuilding
the decrepit infrastructure that
characterized the 6- by 8-kilometer
overpopulated area located on
the northeast corner of Baghdad. (...)
But on 5 August 2004, 72 hours after
an entire city had been mobilized to
improve their infrastructure, Muqtada Al
Sadr’s forces attacked. (...)
But the task force (...) maintained
foreign studies
orientation on a well-founded operational
campaign plan balanced across five
integrated conceptual lines of operations
(LOO s). Each LOO was tied to a robust IO
capability (equating to a sixth LOO ),
moving incrementally and cumulatively
toward decisively accomplishing the
ultimate goal of shifting Baghdad away
from instability and a fertile recruiting
ground for insurgents, to a thriving
modern city encompassing one-third of
Iraq’s population. (...)
The Demographic Battlespace
(...) We needed to develop a keen
understanding of demographics as
well as the cultural intricacies that
drive the Iraqi population.3 (...) We
operationally divided the populace
into three categories that help define
the battlespace: anti-Iraqi forces,
supporters, and fence-sitters.
Anti-Iraqi forces. The first group defined
as insurgents (and terrorists) were those
who cannot be changed, who cannot be
influenced, and who, although politically
and ethnically different in scope, had
essentially the same desired endstate-to
perceptually de-legitimize the current
Iraqi Government and drive a wedge
between the Iraqi populace and coalition
forces.4 (...)
Terrorist, aims do not lie with the
interests of the Iraqi populace but,
rather, global objectives played out on
the world stage through manipulation
of media and the resonance
associated with a “spectacular event.”
Direct-action killing or capturing the
terrorist was (and is) the only option
to immediately mitigate their strategic
effect. We also chose an indirect
approach, through co-option of the
populace using information
operations, to deny the terrorist
physical and psychological sanctuary
in an effort to thwart their objectives.
coalition forces. The, reality is that, when
queried, most supporters preferred
the removal of coalition forces from
Baghdad and Iraq, but they
simultaneously recognized the relative
importance of the security provided and
the flow of funding from these
contributing nations to the short- and
long-term future of Iraq. (...)
of gravity for insurgents and coalition
forces-those on the fence-through
promotion of essential infrastructure
services; establishing a capable,
legitimate government; and creating
opportunities for economic independence through a free market system.
Fence-sitters. Finally, we had those on
the proverbial fence. We considered
the fence-sitters as the operational center
of gravity for both Task Force Baghdad
and insurgent forces. They are the bulk
of the populace, and they are waiting to
decide who will get their support. (...)
The fence-sitters become the base from
which power is derived. Strong evidence
exists that suggests Muqtada Al Sadr’s
attacks against coalition forces in early
August 2004 were initiated because of
the visible signs of progress manifested
by the number of projects and local labor
force hires that threatened his scope of
power and ability to recruit fighters within
the Shi’a population. (...)
The Balanced Approach:
Full-Spectrum Operations
Tackling the task of executing multiple
operational themes into a full campaign
plan, the task force defined (...) critical
conceptual lines of operations (...).
The task force had to simultaneously
work along all five equally balanced,
interconnected lines of operations. (...)
Combat operations. Combat operations,
the foundation of our skill set, was
oriented on targeting, defeating, and
denying influence to the insurgent base
throughout the area of responsibility
through lethal use of force. (...)
From Task Force Baghdad’s perspective it
was clear: shape operations for decisive
results by optimizing the support of
those who see through the coalition a
future; kill, capture, or disrupt the
insurgents and terrorists by denying
influence and sanctuary; and, finally,
decisively engage the operational center
Train and employ Iraqi security forces
(military and police). The migration of
training and equipping foreign internal
security forces from the unconventional
to the conventional force presented
challenges and opportunities to task
force leaders. (...)
Supporters. The second demographic
consisted of supporters who
represented the coalition force base of
support throughout neighborhoods,
districts, and the government. The
supporters see the future of Iraq
through cooperation with the currently
established Iraqi Government and
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(...) In addition to training and equipping
Iraqi Army forces, the task force also
conducted task training and resourced
the Iraqi Police Service (IPS).5 (...)
With a firm grasp of the complexity of
the Arab culture and the value placed on
extreme concepts of “honor above all,”
the task force concluded that erosion of
enemy influence through direct action
and training of Iraqi security forces only
led to one confirmable conclusion-you
ultimately pushed those on the fence into
the insurgent category rather than
the supporter category. In effect, you
offered no viable alternative. Kinetic
operations would provide the
definable short term wins we are
comfortable with as an Army but,
ultimately, would be our undoing. (...)
If there is nothing else done other than
kill bad guys and train others to kill bad
guys, the only thing accomplished is
moving more people from the fence to
the insurgent category-there remains no
opportunity to grow the supporter base.
(...) The task force could win
engagements by killing or capturing an
insurgent emplacing an improvised
explosive device, and it could win
battles by targeting, disrupting, and
killing off insurgent cells. But it
could only win the campaign if the
local populace revealed insurgent and
terrorist cells and, accordingly, denied
sanctuary. Cultural awareness and
understanding how insurgents gain
support from the center of gravity
became the important campaign
consideration.
From this, the task force adopted
the next three nontraditional lines
of operation to achieve sustainable
gains across Baghdad and greater
Iraq.
Essential services. When U.S. forces
liberated Baghdad, it was a city with
virtually no traditionally functional city
services (...).
support, thereby leading, to enhanced
force protection. Creating symbols of
true progress by establishing basic local
services and providing employment
within neighbourhoods ripe for insurgent
recruitment directly attacked the
insurgent base of support. (...) A direct
correlation existed between the level of
local infrastructure status,
unemployment figures, and attacks on
U.S. soldiers. The findings were an
epiphany to the task force-this was about
force protection. These were breeding
grounds for anti- Iraqi forces. The choice
was to continue to attrit through direct
action or shape the populace to deny
sanctuary to the insurgents by giving
the populace positive options through
clear improvement in quality of life. (...)
Most of the task force commander’s
actions were weighted toward shaping
funding to support the tactical
commander’s desired infrastructure
repair effort. (...) Concentrating on
and balancing act of maintaining a
functioning city system. Sewage, water,
electricity, and solid waste removal all
exist below the noise level of normal
The First Mile
As the “first among equals” line of
operation, opportunities for direct
infusion of visible and tangible signs
of progress with repair (or creation) of
basic first-mile city services through
use of local contractors and labor
(creating jobs) became a critical
component of the task force campaign
plan to deny the insurgent a base of
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city life.6 (...) Local-level infrastructure
repair led to an abrupt realization of
the complex interconnectedness.
The restructuring effort of already
programmed funding moved swiftly to
effect immediate local results across the
most desperate areas of Baghdad,
coupled with hiring local labor. (...)
Factoring in the additional 0.5 more
service-oriented jobs per job created as
economists proclaim, potentially took
out of the insurgent base a pool of about
60,000 men. (...)
(...) The task force had given the
populace another option. During the 10week period of fighting from early August
to mid-October 2004, attacks against the
coalition topped out at 160 a week. From
the week following the cease-fire until the
present, they averaged fewer than 10. In
mid-February 2005, over 200,000
residents of Sadr City awoke to the first
running water system the city had ever
seen. Built by local labor, the system
created a psychological divide between
the insurgent and the fence-sitters.
It created another option, and it gave
foreign studies
Some level of criminal activity will always exist, so not all can be attribued to AIF/MM incidents
hope. Across Baghdad, infrastructure
repair became the immediate impact
theme that set conditions for long-term
security. (...)
Governance. Integral to infrastructure
improvement was the promotion of both
the legitimacy and capacity of the Iraqi
Government to govern on behalf of
the populace. The government’s ability
to “secure and provide” targeted
the shadow-government attempts of
the insurgent; (...)
The method set in motion to create
an ability for the local and national
government to govern and to develop
legitimacy within the eyes of Iraqi
citizens, was through reinforcement
of the Coalition Provisional Authorityemplaced neighborhood, district, and
city advisory councils. (...) Careful
structuring, checks and balances,
training, and funding help instill
democratic, rather than autocratic, ideals.
Economic pluralism. We cannot create a
sustained economic model by creating
essential service jobs alone-these last
only as long as the contract is open, and
although they create spinoff, they
are not enough to promote a mature
economy. (...)
Promoting economic pluralism by
working closely with NGO s and through
the local government’s identification of
potential areas of exploitation
(simultaneously working toward
achieving the objective for the
governance LOO, legitimizing their
purpose) and basic business practices
and methods, we helped local and city
governments (...).
The last three lines of operationsessential services, governance, and
economic pluralism- oupled with
aggressive counterinsurgent operations,
and training and equipping Baghdad’s
police and security force, produced an
integrated, synergistic approach to
accomplishing objectives within the Task
Force Baghdad Campaign Plan. (...)
strategic level in an instant. Shaping
the message and tying that message to
operations is as important, if not more
so, to the desired individual effect as
the previous five lines of operations.
Understanding the effect of operations
as seen through the lens of the Iraqi
culture and psyche is a foremost
planning consideration for every
operation. (...)
In many ways, the manifestation of
the five lines of operations by
enhancing information operations
became the indirect approach to
targeting the terrorist threat. We
knew visible signs of progress, an
understanding of the uniqueness of
governance through democracy and a
federalist system, and the creation of
jobs in concert with training Iraqi
security forces and directly combating
insurgent activity could in essence
reduce and freeze insurgent influence
and recruitment by creating an
irreversible momentum. But, only
through co-option of the people of
Baghdad and Iraq could we defeat
the international terrorist threat. (...)
Information operations. A significant
reality of the task force campaign is
that it is fought on the local, national,
and international stages. The actions of
soldiers and leaders and their efforts
on the ground can resonate at a
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Our Changing Role from an
Operational Perspective
professionally grounded in the
controlled application of violence, yet
exposed to a broad array of expertise
not normally considered as a part of
traditional military functions, will help
create the capacity to rapidly shift
cognitively to a new environment. We
must create an organization built for
change, beginning with the education
of our officer corps. (...)
It is no longer sufficient to think in
purely kinetic terms. Executing
traditionally focused combat
operations and concentrating on
training local security forces works, but
only for the short term. In the long
term, doing so hinders true progress
and, in reality, promotes the growth of
insurgent forces working against
campaign objectives. (...)
Our traditional training model, still
shuddering from the echo of our Cold
War mentality, has infused our
organization to think in only kinetic
terms. (...) This demands new
modalities of thinking and a renewed
sense of importance to the education
of our officer corps. Critical thinking,
The full-spectrum campaign approach
forces the imperative of achieving
balance across multiple lines of
operations. This predictably will cause
shifts in the main effort (...).
Transitional indicators associated with
the full spectrum of operations
weighed against a campaign plan
tailored for the environment might be a
better method of conflict evolution. (...)
The Lopsided Approach
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This campaign’s outcome, as
the outcomes of future similar
endeavors will be, was determined by
the level of adaptation displayed and
the intense preparation by the smallunit leader. (...)
A decisive, exhilarating “win” along one
of the lines of operations would only
create a salient to be predictably
eroded by the insurgent. The broad
collection of small, decisive victories
along all the lines of operations,
supporting each their in a delicate
balance of perception and purpose,
would move the campaign toward
positive results.
The campaign plan executed by Task
Force Baghdad created the conditions
to keep our soldiers safe and our
homeland sound. (...)
foreign studies
1. President John F. Kennedy (remarks to the graduating class of the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 7 June 1961), on-line
at<www.jfklink.com/speeches/jfk/publicppers/
1961/jfk232_61.html>, accessed 18 July 2005.
2. Mayor Tamimmi, discussion with MG Peter
W. Chiarelli, Abu Nuwas District, Baghdad,
July 2004.
3. During the deployment to Baghdad, over
22,000 soldiers went through training on
cultural awareness, which became an
integral part of any operation. During the
ramp-up to Ramadan, the division enacted a
full-spectrum command information
operations campaign to create
understanding and empathy for the
religious event.
4. Bard O’Neil, Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside
Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Dulles, VA:
Brassey’s Inc., 1990). O’Neil defines
categories of insurgents across seven
objectives: anarchist, egalitarian,
traditionalist, pluralist, secessionist,
reformist, and preservationist. When
talking of insurgents, we run the spectrum
from anarchist to pluralist. The current
foreign terrorist element in Iraq can be
characterized through an anarchist
objective. Anarchists do not necessarily fit
the traditional description of insurgent as
we discuss them. Although in size and
scope they are relatively small, the effects
they achieve resonate on a strategic scale.
5. In January 2005, the Iraqi National Guard
was renamed the Iraqi Army by the Iraqi
Interim Government.
6. Task Force Baghdad resourced the Baghdad
city-wide survey, January 2005.
7. Ibid, Kennedy.
Exploitation
The election of 30 January 2005 was the “point of penetration” in accomplishing U.S. objectives in Iraq.
Accurately expressing in words alone the culmination of emotions that rippled throughout Task Force Baghdad
that incredible day is simply impossible. Every soldier in the Task Force who witnessed democracy in action
will forever look at the simple act of voting in a different way. But, as I reflect on the last year, I am concerned
about the “exploitation” phase through the shaping and immediate targeting of the remaining funds associated
with the $18.4 billion supplemental and other donor-nation contributions. How you target that funding is just
as important as getting the funding. Within Task Force Baghdad, we were still short funding of approximately
$400 million to accomplish what was needed to achieve the same effect encountered in Sadr City, Haifa Street,
Al Rasheed, Al Soweib, and other areas across all of Baghdad to completely isolate insurgent influence.
Many people question why a military force is concerned with infrastructure repair, governance, and economic
pluralism: why not rely on the state, USAI D, and NGO s? It comes down to a simple answer of capacity
relative to the situation. The, U.S. military is built to create secure conditions. But true long-term security
does not come from the end of a gun in this culture; it comes from a balanced application of all five lines of
operations, within a robust IO apparatus. It is easy to advocate a lopsided approach of physical security before
infusing projects, economic incentives, and governance for short-term political gain or bureaucratic
positioning. But true progress, in the face of an insurgent threat that does not recognize spans of control or
legalistic precedence (yet takes advantages of those same inefficiencies of organizations designed for another
era), should be weighed against accomplishing the mission and protecting the force by using a more
balanced, full-spectrum, transitional approach. It is time we recognize with renewed clarity the words of
President Kennedy, who understood “that few of the important problems of our time have, in the final
analysis, been finally solved by military power alone.”7
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NOTICE: THE HERE UNDER SET FORTH TEXT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED WITH THE KIND
AUTHORIZATION OF THE MILITARY REVIEW. IT IS AN EXCERPT OF THE ARTICLE PUBLISHED
IN THE OCTOBER 2006 ISSUE WHICH THE READERS MAY REFER TO.
So you Want to Be
an Adviser
Your ideal position is when you are present and not noticed.
Lieutenant-colonel T.E. Lawrence, 19171
BRIGADIER DANIEL P. BOLGER, US ARMY
(...) If you look at the
beginning of the latest
Quadrennial Defense
Review, you’ll see this flat
declaration: “The United
States is a nation engaged
in what will be a long war.”2
The passive voice might be
kind of awkward, but I think
we all get that one quite
clearly. This Long War,
the Global War on Terror,
World War IV, or whatever
you want to call it, has fully
encompassed all of us in
uniform. It will do so for
many years to come. Such a
stark reality carries some
freight.
Our enemies are cunning,
ruthless, and numerous.
They move in the dark
corners of many regions of
the world. They lash out on
their schedules, not ours.
SIRPA Terre
BY
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foreign studies
Because of those characteristics, they
defy conventional solutions. (...) The
goal here is to destroy the terrorists, not
disperse them. That takes presence and
persistence in a lot more places and
times than we can fill with troops,
planes, and ships. Even an aspiring
hyperpower has limits. So we have
needed and will continue to need help.
Fortunately, we have that, and in great
numbers. We have more countries
working with us in Afghanistan, Iraq,
the Horn of Africa, and other theaters
than we had in the Korean War. (...)
The Coalition is willing, but sometimes
the flesh is weak.
That’s where I came in, old enough but
of some use, I guess. Like many, I got
the call to join this Long War not with
U.S. forces, but with Iraqis. If I ever
thought somebody might need me for
the real thing, I sure never expected it
to be with foreign troops. All my life I
had read about advisers like
Lieutenant Colonel T.E. Lawrence in
Arabia, General Joe Stillwell in China,
and Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann
in Vietnam. I couldn’t help but notice
that these famous ones were often
eccentric, regularly frustrated, and
commonly came to unpleasant ends. I
resolved right then and there not to be
famous, and I’m happy to say I’ve
succeeded very well in that aim. Your
goal as an adviser is to make your
counterpart famous, not you.
A combat adviser influences his ally
by force of personal example. (...)
The way to do that seems simple to
explain, but it has been hard to
accomplish. To create an effective Iraqi
military, you must accomplish three
tasks:
We have advisers of all types in Iraq,
about 4,500 counting those with the
new Armed Forces and the Police.
About 3,500 advisers work in the field
with Iraqi battalions, brigades, and
divisions or with Police units. A few
hundred advise at fixed logistics
bases, schools, and training centers.
SETTING THE EXAMPLE
IS THE HARDEST THING
AN ADVISER DOES.
Set the Example
At heart, Soldiers are hero worshipers.
All of us have somebody who inspires
us to keep going when we’d rather
quit. (...) Under fire, you follow
the guys who know what they are
doing, the ones who show by physical
example what to do next. There is a
reason the big statue in front of Infantry
Hall at Fort Benning depicts a leader
upright, with rifle in hand and arm
raised, hollering “Follow me!” (...)
The adviser does not command his Iraqi
counterpart, though if the local leader
is not cutting it, we can and do push
that up the chain for action. (...) This
emphasis on leading in action has had
consequences, mostly good. Iraqi units
follow their leaders (...).
(...) Everybody fights.4 In Iraq, it
means that every adviser must be
ready to locate the armed hostile
among a crowd of scattering civilians,
administer an intravenous drip to a
wounded buddy, move through an
ambush by vehicle or on foot, and
shoot to kill. (...)
You need energy and stamina to spare
in 120 degree heat when running down
a street under fire, carrying that happy
80+ pounds of armor, ammunition,
water, and other essentials. (...)
Advisers who intend to fight must be
experts with weapons and
communications. (...)
They stand and fight. (...) Where goes
the adviser, so goes the counterpart.
We’ve seen this time and time again. (...)
Setting the example is the hardest
thing an adviser does. It means he or
she is always being watched and
mimicked, for good or ill. Because
even the greatest actors and
professional players need their own
space, ensure that you and your team
have a small area that can be
designated, when appropriate,
“advisers only.” (...)
The Iraqis are watching... and learning.
Fight to Sustain. Sustain to Fight
- Partner each Iraqi organization with a
similar Coalition formation, usually
American, but in some areas Australian,
British, Danish, El Salvadoran, Italian,
Korean, or Polish. (...)
Today’s Iraqi forces have been trained
and equipped to a recognized
standard. Even without Coalition
advisers and partner units, they would
still fight - for about 12 hours. In our
proper determination to rush trained
Iraqi battalions into action in 2005, we
consciously did not build combat
support and combat service support
organizations beyond a bare minimum
of training centers and rudimentary
base camps.5 (...)
- Provide a small team of combat
advisers to live, train, and fight day
and night with their Iraqi brothers.3 (...)
To be effective in war, this had to
change. (...) With advisers watching
and helping, units know who they have
- Train and equip to a uniform
standard. (...)
and who they don’t have. (...)
Accounting for equipment naturally
comes next. (...)
(...) As with personnel, advisers play
key roles in establishing procedures to
issue and track weapons, personal
equipment, unit items, and
expendable supplies. (...)
Of course, having a weapon, truck,
or radio is only part of the answer.
The rest involves keeping it functional.
(...) To stay in the fight at maximum
capability, Soldiers and units must
train every day. (...)
Everybody Fights
OCTOBER 2007
Strength and Honor
In the popular film Gladiator,
the Roman General Maximus greets
his legionaries by banging his
breastplate and sounding off with
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“Strength and Honor.”6 Had the
filmmakers wanted to go with Latin, he
would have said “Integritas,” which we
often translate as “integrity.” But the
term implies more than that. At the
Roman Army’s daily inspection (yes,
they did that too), when his centurion
walked the ranks, each legionary
would bash his metal breastplate with
his right fist, striking over his heart
and shouting “Integritas.”7 This meant
that he was armed and ready to fight.
He’d completed his pre-combat checks.
(...) The loud, confident report and
the fist to the heart demonstrated that
the Roman Soldier stood ready to use
his arms for the right purpose - honor.
“Strength and Honor” summarizes
the role of the adviser. (...) Today, Iraqi
battalions do fight with strength and
honor, energized by the strong and
steady examples of many American
and other Coalition sergeants and
officers.
3. Brigadier General Daniel P. Bolger, U.S.
Army, “Notes on Commanding General,
Multi-National Force-Iraq Military
Transition Team Update,” 16 March 2006.
The count runs from 1 September 2004,
when Iraqi forces trained by MNSTC-I began
to carry out combat operations.
1 . Lieutenant Colonel T.E. Lawrence, British
Army, “Twenty-Seven Articles,” The Arab
Bulletin, 27 August 1917, Article Number 8.
Lawrence’s Article Number 15 is often
quoted in the present war: “Do not try to do
too much with your own hands. Better
the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it
perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help
them, not to win it for them. Actually, also,
under the very odd conditions of Arabia,
your practical work will not be as good as,
perhaps, you think it is.”
4. Robert A. Heinlein, Starship Troopers (New
York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1959), 4. In
the book, the full motto reads: “Everybody
drops. Everybody fights.” In the 1997 movie
Starship Troopers, directed by Paul
Verhoeven, this became “Everybody fights.
Nobody quits.” The key point in both the
novel and the movie is that in the Mobile
Infantry, there could be no rear echelon.
To use current U.S. Army terms, all had to
possess the Warrior Ethos. Today’s war
without fronts demands no less.
2. United States, Department of Defense,
Quadrennial Defense Review Report
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 6 February 2006), v.
6 . Ridley Scott, dir., Gladiator (Hollywood,
California: Dreamworks SKG, 2000).
7. For references to this tough Roman
discipline, see Flavius Vegetius Renatus,
The Military Institutions of the Romans,
trans. Lieutenant John Clarke, British Army,
on-line at <www.pvv.ntnu.no/~madsb/
home/war/vegetius/>, accessed 26 March
2006, in particular the chapter “The Arms
of the Ancients.” Former U.S. Marine Corps
Commandant General Charles C. Krulak
often referred to this practice in speeches
on leadership and discipline. See, for
example, General Charles C. Krulak,
USMC (Ret.), “Remarks at Joint Service
Conference on Professional Ethics,”
27 January 2000, online at
<www.appleseeds.org/krulak_integrity.htm,
accessed 26 March 2006.
5. Cordesman, 231.
So you want to be an adviser? Pick up your rifle and let’s go. It’s a long war.
DOCTRINE # 13
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foreign studies
Notice from CDEF1
The Colombian example
For decades, Colombia’s Armed Forces have been fighting in a war against guerilla. They developed during these
last past years the concept of “comprehensive action”. It is first the outcome from the experience collected by
units fighting an adversary while being in direct contact with the people. It also comes from a strategic reflection
and a strong involvement of the political authorities.
We can find large similarities between “comprehensive action” and the current reflections about the
commitment of forces among population. Their final objective is the reconstruction of the State and the social
services contract in areas progressively recovered from the FARC2. Multiple cross-agencies operations lines,
coordination of military and non-military actors, mastering the use of force, collection of intelligence and
environment understanding etc are common features as well.
However, the Colombian situation also presents features that our forces do not meet on overseas operations
theaters: a war being conducted on their own land, a common language and culture between opponents, the
involvement of the State which can mobilize the required resources to develop its own territory, a standing crossagency co-ordination structure for comprehensive action, etc.
Subsequently, even though it should be replaced in its very specific context, the Colombian example, and its
concept of “comprehensive action”, is of the highest interest. In particular, because this concept is implemented
on the ground and is progressively leading to the desired end-state.
Comprehensive Action:
A Key Disposition to Resolve
the Colombian Conflict
A
constant threat against democracy for more than 40 years, a firm government, a close
institutional cooperation, stronger and committed Armed Forces: all factors are
converging in order for the comprehensive action strategy to end the armed conflict.
CAPTAIN (NAVY) JESÚS ALBERTO BEJARANO MARÍN,
IN CHARGE OF JOINT COMPREHENSIVE ACTION WITHIN COLOMBIAN ARMED FORCES HIGHER COMMAND
OCTOBER 2007
97
DOCTRINE # 13
The armed conflict
power. They called it the “political war”.
It clearly considers using tactical and
operational courses of action such as
direct attacks against the Armed Forces
and the civilian population, sabotages,
terrorist attacks. It also includes the
unlawful acquisition of financing
(abductions, extortions, thefts of cattle,
hold ups, intimidations). They also
considered carrying out political and
diplomatic actions at national as well as
international level (propaganda,
indoctrination, legal actions, population
uprising, substitution of the State’s
authority) and, of course, infiltrating key
sectors of the society (Armed Forces,
trade unions, private sector, universities).
Colombia’s contemporary history falls
in the scope of an armed conflict.
The main ground of it is the partisan
confrontation at the end of the forties
between the members of the two main
political parties of the country:
the liberal party and the conservative
party. On April 9th, 1948, the liberal
candidate for the presidential election,
Jorge Eliezer Gaitan was assassinated.
The following hours sparked the
“Bogotazo” then “La Violencia” eras.
These periods of unrest and civil war
torn Colombia apart from 1948 to 1965.
the Colombian government as well as by
most members of the international
community. These organizations
referred to as “narco-terrorist” are
producing every year around 700 metric
tons of cocaine, mostly to be forwarded
to the US and Europe.
All these elements let think that narcoterrorist organizations have no
established legitimacy. The outcome is
the ever increasing gap between
the society they claim representing and
the more and more visible shrinkage
of their spaces for discussions, for
thinking and for re-positioning their
revolutionary ideals.
Establishment of a strategy
cgfm.mil.co
During the full period of time described
above, the Colombian Armed Forces
assumed the responsibility of fighting,
with military means, organizations such
as the FARC and the ELN. The mere
presence of Armed Forces as well as of
the National Police guaranteed security,
defense of sovereignty but also peace
and development.
The most striking consequence of this
period of violence was the rise of liberal
guerillas during the fifties. In 1966,
some of them became convinced by
Leninist-Marxist and Maoist arguments:
their initial political plans turned
progressively into an insurgency plan
mainly aimed at seizing the power. The
guerrilla led by the FARC (Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia) and some
time later by the ELN (National
Liberation Army) is, in regard of this
matter, clearly illustrating this process.
The strategy of “political war” stems out
of Mao’s “revolutionary war” process.
This means the progressive adhesion of
the population to the Revolution in order
for them to legitimate the power taking
over by force. As Mao said: “the people
is for the guerrilla what the sea is for
the fish”.
In the eighties, organized crime enters
the structures of the FARC and the ELN
as well as other unlawful processes and
activities. These includes terrorism,
weapons smuggling, use of antipersonnel mines, forced recruitment of
children, illegal immigration as well as
abductions of foreigners on Colombian
land. Today, the FARC and the ELN are
designated as terrorist organizations by
In 1966, during the 20th congress of
the (Illegal) Colombian Communist Party,
the FARC agreed upon the necessity of a
“combination of all forms of fighting” as
a military and political strategy to seize
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OCTOBER 2007
Such position taken by the Armed
Forces denied the State’s role in this
fight. The State was however strong by
its economic, political and social powers
and of course by its military power. Its
investments in the area of social
services, its support to the development
of economic infrastructure, the
improvement of the quality of life, the
processes of citizens’ participation and
the local development plans taken into
account are illustrating that.
The State with all the resources it can
implement, should then gain the
adhesion of the populations to
legitimate authorities as well as the
rejection of connections with “narcoterrorist” organizations.
The question was then raised of knowing
who will be in charge of opposing
the “political war” of narco-terrorist
organizations, of stopping guerilla’s
action towards the civilian population
and more specifically rural population?
The population is providing new recruits
to these organizations which are
structured in militias (urban as well as
foreign studies
rural). These are supporting the armed
branch of the guerrilla through
intelligence, food, supply of weapons,
ammunition and explosives. They even
provide finance support through drug
trafficking, extortions and kidnappings.
How could we attract these populations
back to legality and State institutions?
What was the alchemy to go beyond
conjunctures and gather all the state’s
might for the common good? How could
we gain support to public policies from
the civilian population? The answer to
all these questions lies with the
strategy of comprehensive action.
Comprehensive action strategy was
thought up within the Armed Forces.
During the past 50 years, military
commanders achieved actions known as
“civilian-military” actions in their areas
of responsibility. These actions were
conducted by several organizations
employing regular and reserve officers.
These actions were aiming at providing
comfort to the most destitute
populations through a variety of means:
free medical services, entertainment,
improvement of community basic
infrastructure such as schools, libraries,
child care and medical centers. The other
state agencies had however no place in
this process. Moreover, the range of
these actions remained limited while
hardly responding to the most essential
needs from the various communities.
Colombia’s Armed Forces then
established a new strategy in 2001. It
aimed at strengthening the State base
structures in order for it to guarantee
liberties and rights. This required before
all that political, economic, social and
military actions be coordinated and this
permanently. Thereby came the term of
“comprehensive action”.
This initiative was widely strengthened in
2002. President Uribe, at the beginning
of his first mandate, established the
coordination center for comprehensive
action. Such cross-agency organization
was headed by the President himself. Its
main role was to assure legitimacy,
governance and presence of the State
in the strategic areas of the territory
recaptured by police and military forces.
regional and investment problems.
The contributions from each organization
are subsequently enhancing the final
outcome while saving forces and
avoiding them to be scattered.
It also relates to flexibility. It opens
spaces of communication between
the various State’s organizations, Armed
Forces, national Police, central
government agencies, regional and local
authorities, and the civilian population.
Ultimately, it aims at establishing an
organization between agencies and
institutions, which, being well aware of
actual needs, can be in a position to gain
development and public investment.
Comprehensive action,
the keystone of conflict resolution
Coordination between State institutions
and the population is conducted through
comprehensive action; this remains
before all an interactive mechanism. It
aims at the efficiency of public policies in
order to re-conquer, on the one hand
internal security and, on the other hand
to establish conditions favorable to
economic development and investment.
Subsequently this achieves the ultimate
objectives of the Nation’s Constitution
which are public good and population
well-being. In this scope, the Armed
Forces are fighting narco-terrorism, thus
regaining step by step the integrity and
control of the territory. By this process,
they enable the national government to
achieve its consolidation task in the
same time as the police, for their part,
grant the possibility to “live together”
and provide security to the civilian
population.
Comprehensive action strategy is
behind a new strategic vision. Before
all, it is looking for strengthening
democracy. In any type of war or in
the case of a State under a terrorist
threat as it is currently the case in
Colombia, the collaboration of the
civilian population plays a major role
in the definition of the parameters for
peace. Collective consciousness should
take into account the requirement for
denying any relevance of violence and
other illicit activities in the resolution
of the various economic, political
and social conflicts.
The “comprehensive action” strategy
quickly built up as a synergy and
flexibility tool.
It relates indeed to synergy. As the
various State’s strata are
encompassed, it contributes to the
merger of all resources but also it takes
advantage of everyone’s solutions to
1 Forces Employment Doctrine Center.
2 Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces.
In conclusion, we have been resorting to mechanisms of counter-power and democracy control; we had the
willpower to establish efficient solutions for the poorest population to be able to achieve the common wellbeing. Both approaches were conducted by using comprehensive action and this enables all citizens to
become aware of the role vested in themselves for the country’s development and the State’s consolidation
all over the national territory.
OCTOBER 2007
99
DOCTRINE # 13
The Unwinnable War
Defeating Popular Insurgency
Lessons from the British
Experience in Malaya
T
raditionally, the study of conventional, high-intensity warfare has provided the main
emphasis for military thought and doctrine. With the current insurgency in Iraq and
Afghanistan, counterinsurgency warfare has emerged as the top priority for those armies
involved. This should not come as a surprise, as counterinsurgency is not a recent
phenomenon. The situation in Iraq and Afghanistan is difficult, and many lessons are being
learnt and re-learnt, but, despite certain opinions to the contrary history has proof that
insurgencies can be defeated.
The British Army fought a communist insurgency in Malaya from 1948 to 1960 and won.
As at today, the Malayan Emergency remains the only conflict in which the West has defeated
Communism. It is a conflict largely ignored by the modern military, British aside for obvious
reasons, whereas Western failure such as in Korea and Vietnam remains more in the collective
awareness.
BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES RUTTER, UK LIAISON OFFICER TO CDEF
Before analyzing any method of
defeating insurgency, its nature
needs to be understood. An
insurgency is a situation where an
attempt is made to overthrow or
oppose a state or regime by force of
arms; it can also be seen as a
guerrilla war. It is a powerful weapon
for those who cannot oppose their
enemies with traditional conventional
warfare. The government’s attempt to
preserve its place as the legitimate
political authority within the state can
be defined as counterinsurgency.
Insurgency usually springs from
political grievances and manifests
itself through violence, and, as a
result, governments use force to
preserve law and order. In order,
therefore, to prevent this cause and
effect, a government must address
political grievances through policy
changes. Because of the dual nature
of an insurgency, one of the most
important principles in defeating it is
the integration of a coherent political
and military strategy.
Insurgency and the need to counter it
is not a recent development.
Throughout the 19th and 20th
centuries, the armies of Britain,
France and the United States have
fought several counterinsurgency
DOCTRINE # 13 100 OCTOBER 2007
campaigns and colonial wars with
varying degrees of success.
Counterinsurgency doctrine has
an equally long history. The British
Army developed tactics, techniques,
and procedures for dealing with
insurgencies during the late
19th century. However, among
the West’s experiences in South
Africa, Kenya, Malaya, Indochina,
Algeria, Vietnam and the Philippines,
it is Malaya that stands alone as
any kind of success story. Does
the British experience of that
campaign, therefore, offer lessons
for today’s political and military
decision-makers?
foreign studies
r l’auteur
The measures improved
security throughout
the populated areas, but a
policy of establishing protected
villages in the more isolated rural
areas, with services such as schools
and medical facilities, was less
successful; the communist guerrillas
managed to infiltrate the population
and continue to influence it. If left
unopposed, there was a danger of the
Chinese rural population coming
under Communist domination. Clearly,
the “new villages” alone would not
provide the solution to the insurgency.
By early 1952, it was clear that,
although the Briggs Plan had achieved
a certain measure of success, the
communist hold on Malaya was still
strong and the crux of the problem lay
in the need to win the confidence and
loyalty of the majority of the Chinese
population.
to
ho
Militarily, the British reorganized
the Malay police force, increasing its
numbers and providing better training
for its officers. The police began to
patrol villages and perform local guard
duties allowing the military to
concentrate on “search and destroy”
missions in the jungle. However, the
enemy was able to evade these
conventional large-scale, slow,
multiple-battalion sweeps. The British
realized that they needed to adapt
their approach and strategy
by adopting an integrated strategy for
winning the support of the Malayan
population, including its ethnic
Chinese elements. Military change
came in the form of improved jungle
warfare training and in recognizing
the value of Special Forces. The British
SAS conducted long-range patrols
deep into the jungle over several
months’ duration; tracking terrorists,
laying ambushes, destroying supplies,
and performing reconnaissance and
surveillance tasks. In addition,
the creation of the Federal Joint
Intelligence Advisory Committee, to
coordinate the collection and
management of intelligence
In June 1950, the then British
director of military operations, Lt Gen
Sir Harold Briggs, outlined a strategy
aimed at gaining the support of
the population and isolating
the terrorists from their supplies
and intelligence sources. In
the “Briggs Plan”, the police
concentrated on normal police
functions, while the military would
cover those areas which the Police
could not. The civil service would
ensure effective administration.
The plan concentrated on winning
the support of the population, rather
than defeating the insurgents by
force of arms and in confidencebuilding measures. Key to its
success were the twin goals
needed to ensure an end to
the insurgency: protection
of the population and its
isolation from the guerrillas.
pa
rnie
fou
The Malayan Emergency was an
intense 12-year jungle war fought by
British, Commonwealth and Malay
forces against the army of the Malayan
Communist Party (MCP). It started in
early June 1948, when communists
launched a series of terrorist attacks,
destroying property and murdering
Europeans. On 17 June 1948, the high
commissioner, Sir Edward Gent,
declared a state of emergency and
the troops and police in country were
reinforced by another infantry brigade.
Initially, British administrators
approved and enacted emergency
measures that authorized the use of
detention, deportation, and the
collective punishment of entire towns
and villages. The early harsh
application of the emergency
regulations by the police and military
fostered the belief among many of
the ethnic Chinese population that
the government was unconcerned with
their welfare.
throughout the peninsula, and
the Federal War Council, which included
civil, military, and police officials,
proved a significant success, marking
the beginning of a coherent political
strategy for dealing with the insurgency.
p
The Emergency
Political change was reflected in
the new British government’s choice of
General Sir Gerald Templer to provide
the leadership and vision necessary to
adapt British strategy, making it much
more effective, and integrating
the political and military aspects into
a single, coherent, and ultimately
successful design. To achieve this,
Templer obtained complete political
and military control of the situation
in Malaya, thereby centralizing civil
and military authority. This formed
the basis for operations for the next
decade. In this, he was supported
by the British Permanent Secretary
of Defence for Malaya, Sir Robert
Thompson, who believed that the
establishment of a free, independent,
united, viable and politically and
economically stable country was the
first axiom of counterinsurgency. This
view anticipated current joint doctrine
and has echoes in current operations.
It meant that Britain had a clear
political objective to underpin
military action in a true
comprehensive approach.
A promise of independence within
the British Commonwealth also
effectively denied
the insurgency its
main justification.
By word and deed,
the new approach
helped limit the appeal
of insurgency.
Templer immediately energized
the British effort in Malaya through
his strong personal leadership. He
continued the successful use of small
scale patrols and Special Forces
proficient in jungle combat. Lessons
learned were incorporated into the
curriculum of the Jungle Warfare
School and turned into doctrine. He
provided incentives for the population
to support the government’s efforts in
combating the guerrillas. He repealed
many of the draconian emergency
regulations and established the
concept of “white areas”. These were
he more stable and secure areas
where travel restrictions, curfews and
food restrictions were lifted. He made
good use of propaganda and improved
it as a tool by starting “Radio Malaya”
and using mobile propaganda units to
OCTOBER 2007 101 DOCTRINE # 13
Templer further integrated political and
military strategies by reorganizing
the command and control structure of
government in Malaya, allowing closer
coordination between the military,
the police, and civilian administration.
Military force was subordinated to
the rule of law and rules of engagement
established, resting on the principle
of minimum force. This restriction of
security force powers contributed to
convincing a previously sceptical ethnic
population to accept the rule of law as
the source of legitimate government.
It also created an acknowledged
security role for the military and police
forces within civilian society and
contributed greatly to the success
of British objectives in Malaya.
This comprehensive approach and
integrated strategy allowed the British
to address the fundamental political
issues that fuelled the insurgency and
to preserve the image of a “force for
good” in advance of today. By 1954,
the policies were bearing fruit and
enjoying increased popular support.
Later that year, the Federation of
Malaysia held its first national
election. Templer left Malaya in
May 1954 and, although the
Emergency was not declared over until
Malaya’s independence in 1957,
and the insurgency dragged on for a
further 3 years until 1960, this early
photo fournie par l’auteur
travel from village to village showing
pro-British films and extolling
the benefits of living in ‘safe’ areas.
He increased the use of ethnic Malay
and Chinese police and soldiers in
the interface with the local population.
These effective political and military
measures were followed up by an
integration of civil and military effort
from the top down. Templer
consolidated the mainly military
Federal War Council with the mainly
civilian Federal Executive Council and
created subordinate War Executive
Committees, which controlled each
state or district. These committees
were comprised of a soldier, police
officer and civil servant, thereby
forcing the three branches of
government to work together to solve
the problems in their respective
regions.
version of the ‘comprehensive
approach’ had ensured the necessary
conditions for ultimate success.
Lessons
The British experience in Malaya,
much as today in Iraq, was a case
in which doctrine was wanting; yet
the deficiency was offset by innovation
and common sense. Success in
countering the insurgency can be
attributed to many factors, but
especially that of the civil-military
relations that were forged between
the military, police, and civil leaders.
These linkages were created over time,
through hard work and under trying
conditions. Even though doctrine was
lacking at the time, the British
approach embraced sound principles
and, in a sense, it could be argued that
events in Malaya anticipated current
doctrine. Both the government and
security forces were crucial in Malaya,
the manner in which political and
military leaders defined their roles
and synchronized operations led to
success.
The most important lesson of
the Malayan campaign is that a fully
integrated political and military
campaign plan provides the most
effective means of addressing
the causes and results of popular
insurgency. There, the integration of
DOCTRINE # 13 102 OCTOBER 2007
the political and military strategies
directly addressed the dual nature
of the insurgency. From this
“comprehensive approach”, 3 major
lessons emerge. One, military and
police forces operated within the law
and force was controlled. By restricting
the use of force to the minimum
necessary, the British demonstrated
the importance of the rule of law and
this, in turn, provided political
legitimacy to the government. Two,
the creation and use of programs such
as the White Areas, Radio Malaya,
and the State and District War
Executive Committees, provided for
the civic needs of the Malay
population and directly addressed
the political issues leading to
the insurgency. Three, strong
centralized leadership and a
willingness to adapt to circumstance
leads to success. Templer’s
pragmatism and personal leadership
qualities provided a strong basis for
strategic direction. The willingness of
the troops on the ground to adapt to
the changing demands of counter
insurgency warfare, to learn and react
accordingly, as illustrated by
the creation of the Jungle Warfare
School and the publication of the
Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations
Handbook, formalised lessons learnt.
Sir Robert Thompson’s analysis has
provided the basis for British COIN
doctrine up to the present day.
foreign studies
A Template for Success?
These lessons hold true today; but cannot be seen as a simple
template for success in every insurgency. Iraq is not Malaya and,
although the lessons and experiences of the Malayan Emergency have
proven useful to commanders and officials during the current crisis,
the situation and factors involved make the use of a simple Malayan
‘blueprint’ inadvisable. The war in Iraq has illustrated the difficulties of
the practical application of the Malayan lessons in a world very
different from South East Asia in the middle of the last century.
The world was a simpler and less complex place then, and the
insurgency was less complicated or ‘high tech’, and smaller in scale
and resources. In Malaya, the British strategic objective was the
creation of a stable and independent state and the establishment of a
legitimate national government provided the British with an exit.
A democratic, stable and independent Iraq should do the same for
the coalition; however, there is a long way to go yet. Adaptability,
patience, commitment and a clear political objective to underpin
military action in a true comprehensive approach, all learnt in
Malaya, should provide a good foundation on which to achieve it.
OCTOBER 2007 103 DOCTRINE # 13
The German Concept for Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRT)
The Army’s Principles of Employment
and Experience in Matters of Peace Stabilization
The federal government’s concept for Afghanistan: PRTs’ role and value
within an inter-agency approach
T
he German forces’ engagement in Afghanistan was initiated during those conferences that were
intended to finalize international assistance coordination (2001 in Bonn - Petersberg; 2002 in
Tokyo; 2004 in Berlin, and 2006 in London). That series of high level consultations highlights
the requirement for adapting political military instruments in order to transform the military
victory over the Taliban into a political success.
The intent was to bring back Afghanistan towards the international community after 22 years of
war. The war had almost entirely destroyed the country’s material and institutional infrastructure.
About 6 out of the 27 million inhabitants of Afghanistan had sought refuge in the neighboring
countries. For years there had not been any regular schooling system and women as well as
minorities had very few opportunities to blossom in the public life. The dissolution of the country’s
political, economical and social structures had caused its isolation on the international stage.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL (I. G.1) HORST WALTHER, G4 AG JACOP2
On 15 October 2003, the federal
government decided to take the
leadership of the Kunduz PRT - which
was up to then under American control
- and to send there an interagency
reconstruction team. PRTs are
essential elements of the
international engagement outside
Kabul. PRT Kunduz which covers both
Kunduz and Takhar provinces has been
conceived as being a pilot project with
international participation aiming at
spreading out stabilization efforts in
Afghanistan. As an integrated
institution of the federal government,
PRT is in charge of getting together
the activities of four federal
ministries, i.e. Foreign Affairs,
Economic Cooperation and
Development, Interior, and Defense.
LTC (r) Jacques de Vasselot
BY
DOCTRINE # 13 104 OCTOBER 2007
foreign studies
In the fiefdom of the former Northern
Alliance, it is intended to first establish a
secure environment in order then to
support the reconstruction efforts. The
integration of military and civilian
efforts, in a limited time and space
context is intended to improve peace
stabilization operations.
Within PRT Kunduz the Bundeswehr’s
mission consists in:
- Reinforcing regional stability,
- Establishing a secure environment for
the PRT,
- Promoting and supporting the
establishment of security structures,
- Providing support and advice to the
demilitarization, demobilization and
reintegration (DDR) process of the
Afghans who had remained in place
or who are returning, and
- Providing the Afghan National Army
(ANA) with a training support thanks
to the Operational Mentoring and
Liaison Teams (OMLT).
Military activities focus mainly on the
liaison tasks in order to observe and
influence the security situation thanks
to a system of contacts throughout the
PRT’s area of responsibility. Up to now,
liaisons have been established with
more than 150 formal and informal,
political and religious leaders.
The Bundestag’s mandate allows
the commitment of up to 450 German
soldiers in Kunduz. In May 2007, about
420 German and 30 international (BEL,
CHE, HUN, ROM and FRA) soldiers were
serving in the PRT.
Each of the “civilian ministries” has sent
up to 5 representatives. Police and civil
experts, serving as advisors or
coordinators, are able to reach a large
part of the society and they have the
support of local police forces
instructors, local collaborators as well
as governmental and non-governmental
organizations which have a multiplier
role.
By comparing the figures, it has to be
noticed that the military, thanks to their
presence, establish first the secure
environment into which civilian forces
can operate. These “boots on the
ground” require however a rather high
number of soldiers.
PRT Kunduz has a multinational
vocation. As far as the civilian
component is concerned, promises for
additional advisors support have been
made. France, among other nations
intends to send there a cultural advisor.
The civilian component’s mission
consists in:
- reinforcing the central government’s
influence,
- reinforcing the civil society,
- promoting reconstruction and
sustainable development,
- establishing and reinforcing political
and administrative structures as well
as the legal state foundations,
- promoting the development of police
and security forces.
PRT’s integration within ISAF’s
structures
On the initiative of Germany, PRT
KUNDUZ has been the first to leave
the US led Operation enduring
freedom (OEF) command and control
organization, and to be placed under
ISAF and thus NATO’s authority. That
step was motivated by the differences
that exist between OEF and ISAF as far
as popularity is concerned and as a
consequence, differences in their
political efficiency.
Within ISAF structures, the PRTs are
organized according to the Lead Nation
concept and they regroup a large
array of capacities brought by the
international forces. This guarantees
a global and international type of
approach; the efficiency of the action
and the transfer of capabilities induce
synergy effects.
The implementation of a large set of
means should guarantee a flexible
execution of the operations.
German PRT’s structure
and functioning
PRT KUNDUZ organization is placed
under dual headed leadership: a military
commander and a diplomat from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They ensure
an optimal cooperation between
civilian and military forces within
the PRT.
In the Kunduz region the engagement in
matter of development within a
guaranteed secure environment consists
in:
- proposing emergency assistance
programs focusing on development,
- long term investments in the social and
economic infrastructure (e.g. road
construction and provision of drinking
water),
- promotion of private investments,
- job creation,
- assistance to business creation by
former military and repatriated
refugees,
- promotion of women’s participation in
all reconstruction domains, and
- promotion of the legal administration
and State.
In order to establish and maintain links
and contacts, PRT members visit
everyday the local and regional officials,
dignitaries and decision makers. Thanks
to that personal presence, it is possible
to exert some influence and to
contribute to the security situation’s
stabilization. Patrols complete that
network organization. They observe the
local specificities in order to collect
information on the actors’ interactions
and intermingling. The combination of
the local and international forces’
capacities should allow the Afghan
institutions to assume more and more
security missions in an autonomous
manner.
In that respect, the PRT’s camp serves
as a “bridgehead” to progressively
widen the PRT’s zone of influence. A
satellite of PRT Kunduz has been
opened in Taloqan (Takhar province).
Additional satellites are planned.
The Army’s contribution
to the PRT concept
From March to June 2007, the 10th
armored division provided the personnel
for ISAF 13; most of the operational
contingent belonging to the 30th
Mechanized brigade. The military
element is comprised of the staff, the
HHQ company, the protection company,
the medical company, the military police
OCTOBER 2007 105 DOCTRINE # 13
PRT protection and regional security
missions are entrusted to an infantry
company that regroups three light
infantry and one reconnaissance
platoons. They provide most of the
personnel in charge of the daily
patrols, they conduct about 20 patrols
during the day and 2 at night; and in
addition, 2 long distance patrols per
week and between 9 and 15 patrols
conducted jointly with Afghan National
Army or Afghan National Police forces.
The PRT Kunduz’s area of operations in
the Kunduz and Takhar provinces covers
an area three times the size of Belgium.
OMLT is in charge of training a Kandak
(battalion size unit). Within the
framework of the Kandak’s training,
Afghan forces are integrated into
the multinational force’s security and
patrol service in order to take
advantage of the synergy efforts
conducted with the Afghan military
whose number totals about 270.
The objective, at the end of the
training, is to progressively transfer
the responsibility for regional security
to the ANA forces.
The PRT military element’s power results
from an astute combination of an
armed presence with the work of the
liaison elements and the conflicts
management activities. This has not
anymore anything in common with
the traditional concepts according to
which the armed forces can only be
employed within the framework of
the use of military force. However
the fact that in Afghanistan the situation
is by nature unstable should not be
underestimated. An authority capable to
confront the many weapons bearers
present in the region is absolutely
indispensable. Without the military
being present to stabilize the country,
LTC (r) Jacques de Vasselot
company, the OMLT company and an
office in charge of the administration
of the defense in engagement area. In
order to conduct the operations,
additional elements were available: a
CIMIC platoon, two tactical PSYOPSteams (TPT), three military intelligence
teams, an electronic warfare task
force, plus a Belgian platoon in charge
of reconnaissance and neutralization
of ammunitions and IEDs.
humanitarian projects can be
developed but no reform of the
security sector can take place. The
initial fear that the military could
hinder the humanitarian assistance’s
independence was not confirmed. On
the opposite, most of the time the
civilian forces’ engagement may only
take place under military protection.
Possibilities and limitations
of the co-operation with
governmental and nongovernmental organizations
For all actors, the guiding principle
consists in integrating all measures
within the national development
framework that was established
between the Afghan government and
international donors. The active
governmental organizations include
the Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst
(DED) - German Development Service-,
the Gesellschaft für technische
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) - Technical Cooperation Service and the Kreditanstalt
für Wiederaufbau (KfW) - Institution for
financing reconstruction efforts.
The non governmental organization
efforts include the Arbeitsgruppe
Entwicklung und Fachkräfte (AGEF) Working group for development and
qualified personnel, and the Deutsche
Welthungerhilfe - German Agro Action.
The relations between NGOs and PRT
DOCTRINE # 13 106 OCTOBER 2007
Kunduz, were initially tense, but now
most of these tensions have cooled
down. Actors are still guided by
interests that are different and they
may have diverging assessments of
the situation. However they agree on
the fact that reconstruction can only
be achieved in a secure environment.
An open type of communication
allowed to clarify the distribution of
tasks between PRT and NGOs, and
even, in several domains, it permitted
to reach a high level of cooperation.
The CIMIC platoon’s main mission is to
cooperate with IOs and NGOs thanks
to liaison and project teams that
explore the infrastructure in the
countryside, towns and villages and
submit collected information and well
targeted projects to the humanitarian
actors. In order to do so, the CIMIC
teams operate as if they were
the IO/NGOs’ “fact finding teams”.
It has been widely admitted that
the military element and the civilian
assistance to reconstruction one need
each other. Without the military,
stability is missing; without the NGOs,
development and prosperity, which
have positive and lasting effects on
security and stability, are missing.
1 Führungsakademie certificate.
2 Joint And Combined OPerations working group.
foreign studies
Conclusions about the efficiency and sustainability of the conduct of the missions
and the reconstruction projects
The reconstruction process raised several conflicts related to the objectives definition. In the regions priority
is given to the provision of stabilization by preventing local armed conflicts outburst. This could be opposite
to the development objectives of the Kabul central government and those of the international community.
The essential key words are the engagement in favor of democracy, of a legal state and against drug.
A confrontation strategy based on a drug war would deprive the PRTs concept of its meaning. Within
the framework of the PRT concept, it is thus a matter of contributing indirectly to the anti drug operations,
e.g. by ensuring a secure environment for the police forces to work and providing them with intelligence. This
is a difficult task which imposes to merge the actual complex challenges with the available capacities and
the international willingness to take chances.
The PRT concept is starting to bear fruit. Those who oppose that situation which is being stabilized are also
conscious of that fact. As a consequence the successes of the reconstruction process or the improvement of
the security situation are becoming the targets of the insurrection’s attacks. This results into terrorist actions
that are being noticed at international level (e.g. the murder of humanitarian assistance truck drivers). This
imposes to regularly study the concrete successes as well as their origin in order to reinforce and adapt
accordingly the relevant approaches.
Within that context, it is necessary to influence the erroneous perception that is generated by part of
the international media and according to which the international community is engaged in a mostly military
way in Afghanistan. Given the fact that Afghan security organizations able to operate are missing,
the multinational military force provides an essential contribution. Consequently, it will be possible to
redeploy the NATO soldiers, only when Afghan police and armed forces will be able to protect their countries
institutions. That vital military contribution should however not appear to be the only suitable one.
No other stabilization and reconstruction project, but the PRT Kunduz’s one, encompasses and integrates
such a multitude of aspects. It has acquired a symbolic status and brings a practical evidence of the fact that
the international actors’ indispensable coherence may work.
Indeed diverging interests may entail disagreements which constitute specific challenges to be upheld by all
involved actors in order to achieve the desired political end-state: an autonomous development accepted by
the majority of the Afghan population. Thanks to a common approach by four different ministries, the PRT pilot
project is reaching an integration level that had never been achieved before, and which links closely the
direct military management of crises and security, the security sector reform, with short, medium and longterms measures in favor of the development of institutions and support to the economy and to the civil society.
To conclude with the essential, PRT concept is a success. This is also illustrated by the German PRT Feyzabad
which operates in the Badakhshan province as well as by the planned deployment of additional PRTs.
OCTOBER 2007 107 DOCTRINE # 13
Roles and Lessons Learned
from European Union’s Military Operations
T
he European Union has currently the advantage of an encouraging experience gained in
the consolidation of international security. Acting in the scope of ESDP1 and Petersberg2,
missions, it conducts stabilization operations in Central and Eastern Europe, but also
intervention and normalization operations in central Africa.
MS. CLÉMENCE DUCASTEL - SEARCHER IN TRAINING AT CDEF/DREX3
CPAD
1. Intervention operations. “Artémis”
has just ended the chaos generated
by the too early withdrawal of the
Ugandan4 army from Bunia (Ituri
region within CDR5) in 2003. On June
12th, according to resolution 1484, the
EU Council launched “Artemis”. It is
an operation initiated by France. Its
role is to secure the area and
the population up to September
1st, 2003. On the request of UNO’s
Secretary General, France accepts to
lead the force under two conditions: to
act within a defined space-time
framework (4 months) and to clarify
the rules of engagement (ROEs) of
the mandate under chapter VII of the
UN Charter (recourse to force).
DOCTRINE # 13 108 OCTOBER 2007
2. In 2006, CDR experiences its first
elections for 45 years. From June 12th,
to November 30th, the EU is mandated
in the framework of a normalization
operation - EUFOR RD Congo - to
secure them. They occur in a tense
atmosphere. France and Germany are
contributing in equal parts to the two
thirds of the Force’s strength6. The EU
also provides economic7, security8
and police9 support in the region.
3. EU presence in Central and Eastern
Europe takes the shape of
stabilization operations. First EU-led
operation, Concordia takes place in
FYROM10. Made fragile by a “Great
Albania” project (Kosovo and
the North of Macedonia), FYROM is
threatened by the guerrilla from
Macedonia’s Albanians. Ohrid
agreements on August 13th, 2001
ended up a six-month conflict. NATO
launched then its stabilization
operation, but the war in Iraq,
beginning on March 20th, 2003,
obliged it to transfer the case to
the UE. Urgently launched,
“Concordia” took place from March
31st to December 15th, 2003, in a
context of mafia-like trafficking and
inter-ethnical competition. As the
framework-nation, France nominates
Major General Maral as the operation
commander. His mission was to
provide “a military component to the
EU Special Representative11” in order
to enforce Ohrid agreements. Second
in time but the first large operation,
“EUFOR Althea” was launched on
December 2nd, 2004 in BosniaHerzegovina. It was conducted in the
scope of chapter VII of UN Charter.
The EU managed to convince the US
who were reluctant about the validity
of EUFOR relieving SFOR12. EU
insisted on the efficiency of civilian
and military operations led by a sole
organization. EUFOR Althea was in
line with 1995 Dayton/Paris13
agreements. It contributed to
reinforce a secure and stable climate
in the region while maintaining
deterrent military forces. Considering
the efforts made by Bosnians, a
stabilization and association
agreement was on its way and had
been finalized since November 2005,
despite persistent problems:
communities division, unstable
economy, circulating light weapons,
organized crime and corruption. This
slowed down reforms and the entry
of this state into the EU.
EU operations were first decided then
established by the resolutions of UNO
Security Council14. The aim was to
reinforce or to relieve an international
operation with an extinguishing
Lessons learned
mandate. According to some
observers, the absence of selfsufficiency in the initiative of these
actions, especially in regard of NATO,
as well as the absence of permanent
command structure at strategic level
(OHQ15), kept the 27 member Europe in
an unsteady position or at least as a
second class power. However, despite
its structure and conjuncture
difficulties, the EU became a major
actor for peace and security in the
world. This was done against the
unwillingness of some member states
to implement its comprehensive
concept of crisis management. The EU
achieved this ranking in drawing two
kinds of lessons from these operations:
those related to planning and theater
of operations issues and those related
to tactical command.
Strategic
and operational lessons
They are from three kinds. First, the
procedures with the political level
ought to be clarified. In all operations,
the legal framework should be defined
by the political authorities in liaison
with lawyers and issued to the force
before its deployment. Political
considerations should never jeopardize
the military principles, the force
protection and the operational
coherence of unit deployment. During
“EUFOR Althea”, the EU should make
allowances between KMT16 and KST17.
We had then to accept that the forces
performed duties which they were not
prepared for. That was one of the
sensitive topics of the first year of
“EUFOR”. For “Concordia”, the lack
of experience of troops from some
nations in terms of military operations,
or the difference in national caveats
from a state to another (“EUFOR
Althea”), were perceived. In spite of
some imperfections in procedures, the
decision-making process enables, from
now on, a better reactivity, especially
for “EUFOR RD Congo”. But the
European forces on the theater should
constantly adapt. First EU’s military
operation, “Concordia” enabled to
grasp the crisis management and
to enjoy a “political, military, security,
economic, institutional and
administrative” success, as underlines
Major General Maral18. Nevertheless,
the short notice for the transfer of
authority - ten days- generated “late
guidance, real estate facilities issues
not settled before the force arrival,
incomplete assets, non-existing
European procedures”.
Then, the European Union should
assert its military might in becoming
more self-sufficient in respect of NATO.
The EU, since “Concordia”, benefits
from “Berlin-Plus” agreements while
distinguishing itself from NATO. With
“Concordia”, a clearer and seamless
chain of command established itself
within a progressive autonomy.
European and non- NATO command
enabled a good communication with
the belligerents despite Union internal
tensions. However, this operation
underlines, regarding a more efficient
transfer of authority between NATO
and the EU for the operations to come,
the necessity of a better definition
of the chain of command, favoring
relationships between COPER19 and
COMEUFOR20. Regarding the task
of “EUFOR Althea”, it got more
complicated on three points. Bosnia
aspires to join NATO, but also
the European Union - like other westBalkans countries: these are seeing
Brussels as an ultimate strategic
perspective. EUFOR relaying SFOR did
not generate any significant change21.
The number of remits that EUFOR
shares with NATO takes away any
possibility of full self-sufficiency. This is
stressed as there was a risk during
the transition period to see the Alliance
keeping all the “noble” part of
the operation and leaving the less
prestigious duties to the European
Union.
Finally, efforts in terms of planning
should be continued in reinforcing
the concept of framework-nation and
improving the OHQ-FHQ relationships.
Unlike “Concordia” and “Artémis”,
the absence of framework-nation
in “EUFOR Althea22” prevents
the organization to be really rational.
This concept has the advantage of a
higher reactivity compared to a usual
multinational concept. “Concordia” and
“Artémis” have their lead-nation as
well as “EUFOR RD Congo” which has
two. The EU implements this concept
in operations requiring emergency
OCTOBER 2007 109 DOCTRINE # 13
SIRPA Terre
planning, reconnaissance, deployment
or first entry on the theater. One sole
nation taking in charge these tasks
avoids the length of negotiations and
translations, or overlapping
encountered during multinational
operations. Framework-nation and
chapter VII enable a clear
interpretation of the ROEs. Some
perceive this feature as a temporary
measure until a European HQ is
capable to set up an operation based
on a multinational disposition. The
solution of framework-nation seems
however to be the best in the
management of some crisis, as in Ituri,
where MONUC encounters big
difficulties in the enforcement of its
mandate. It is all the most the best as
the EU has not yet established a
permanent OHQ. Subsequently, this
should be maintained, as a pledge of
coherence and efficiency, in the
operations to come in a European
framework. The success of “Artémis”
demonstrates it. According to Major
General Thonier, the operation
commander, it enabled the EU to
develop three capacities legitimating
ESDP: “emergency entry on a
territory”, “building an air base from
beginning to end”, and “planning,
elaborating and conducting joint
operations”.
As a consequence, the OHQ-FHQ
relationship should be at the heart of
concerns. This has especially been an
issue for “EUFOR RD Congo” as the late
FHQ build-up generated a poor coordination between strategic and
operational commands. This was
emphasized as OHQ and FHQ were
held by two different lead-nations.
Subsequently, these two headquarters
should be built up in the same time
and conduct a simultaneous “parallel
planning” to preserve their
prerogatives. Being located in different
places, a system of exchange of
liaison teams should be established;
then communications between the
main troops contributing nations
(TCNs23) should be favored through a
secure CIS24.
DOCTRINE # 13 110 OCTOBER 2007
Lessons in respect
of tactical command
They are also from three kinds. Firstly,
it is about optimizing logistics matters.
As a test operation, “Concordia”
highlighted the necessity to draft
agreements for equipment transfer
from the planning stage, and the admin
and logistic directive earlier than
the force deployment. “Artémis”
experience shows that the concept
of “lead-nation” can cope with the
shortage of contributions from TCNs,
the logistic support being then mainly
performed by France. “Concordia” as
“EUFOR RD Congo” suffered from a
theater reconnaissance being too short
and too general, all concerned
specialists not being involved.
In a second step, the manning issue is
also to re-assess. “Artémis” was finally
satisfied with the manning taken over
by the EU from NATO procedures.
In the future, we should however be
prudent and make sure of a better
distribution of the positions within
the command between the various
TCNs on a theater of operation.
Concordia made we feel the need for
a J8-budget/finance specialist.
In a third step, problems in connection
with information exchanges should be
settled. Lessons from “Concordia”
highlighted the importance of
cooperation in respect of CIS and
the involvement of specialists from
the planning phase to the engagement
phase. That was done for “EUFOR RD
Congo” and contributed then to its
success. It remains today to improve
interoperability between TCN forces at
tactical level. Providing secure
operating environment for these assets
Lessons learned
was defective for “Concordia” while for
“Artémis” rebels and locals militias
were equipped with modern
communication assets (mobile phones
among others). Such aspect should
then be seriously considered in order
to protect communication and in
particular intelligence. The EU should
necessarily keep a independence at CIS
level for mastering better its networks.
Regarding command information
systems, Concordia confirmed that
the Union had not its own assets to
equip and to master the whole of
networks to ensure its full selfsufficiency. NATO support will then be
required to define common protection
levels.
Any conclusion is, by definition, provisional, but, currently
the six points mentioned above are to be reminded.
Organization and running of the operation should not
necessarily be equally shared between each TCN, unlike
political responsibility. At strategic level, along its various
military operations, the EU improved its process of politicalmilitary planning; it acquired then a higher autonomy vis-à-vis
NATO. Success is fundamentally based on the frameworknation, prevailing concept until the establishment of a European
headquarters for permanent planning of strategic command
(OHQ). This depends on the Twenty-seven’s will. On a tactical
level, a better European logistic support should be highlighted
as well as a better allocation of positions between TCNs and the
development of CIS interoperability within the European Union.
1 European security and defense policy.
2 Petersberg Declaration on June 19, 1992.
3 Forces Employment Doctrine Center/
Research & Lessons Learned Division.
4 Rivalries between Hemas and Lendus
tribes has urged Uganda to occupy the
region since 1997.
5 Congo Democratic Republic (in French
République démocratique du Congo
or RD Congo).
6 The remaining part includes forces from
Turkey and from the 21 UE member states.
7 Thanks to the European development fund
8 Operation “EUSEC RD Congo” since
June 2005.
9 Operation “EUPOL Kinshasa“ since
April 2005.
10 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
11 Interview of Major General Maral, Doctrine,
February 2007.
12 Stabilization force (OTAN).
13 Agreements from general framework
for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
14 United Nations Organization.
15 Operation Headquarters.
16 Key Military Tasks: EU tasks reassuring
the population and deterrent.
17 Key Supporting Tasks: assist the Higher
Representative in environment tasks (fight
against organized crime).
18 Major General Maral, the account of Major
General Pierre Maral, former Commander
of the European Union operation in
Macedonia (CONCORDIA) from March 31,
to December 15, 2003, in Doctrine special
issue, February 2007 page 49.
19 Commandant de l’opération : Operation
Commander.
20 Chef militaire (niveau opératif) : Military
Commander (operational level)
21 www.senat.fr “La Bosnie-Herzégovine :
dix ans après Dayton, un nouveau chantier
de l’Union européenne“. Information report
n° 367 (2004-2005) by MM. Hubert Haenel
and Didier Boulaud, on behalf of
the delegation for the European Union.
22 The UK is acting as lead-nation.
23 Troop contributing nations.
24 Communication and Information Systems.
OCTOBER 2007 111 DOCTRINE # 13
Order and Security in Kosovo
Which Missions for the Land Forces?
W
hen they deployed to Kosovo on 12 June 1999, NATO forces entered into a territory that
the Yugoslav authorities were getting out of. The military technical agreement that was signed
three days before between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and NATO stipulated that all
Yugoslav forces, including police, had to progressively leave the country as land forces were moving forward1.
BY
MR. VIRGILE MÉJEAN - SEARCHER IN TRAINING AT CDEF DREX2
Yugoslav forces. And Kosovo had also
to recover stability thanks to the
establishment of a true legal state
framework, in which law would be
respected and justice rendered
equitably.
That was the sense of UNSCR 12443
that provided for the deployment of an
SIRPA TERRE/ADC DUBOIS
This vacuum of leadership granted thus
the International Community a dual
responsibility. It was first necessary to
ensure the collective security and
prevent any hostility to resume
between Albanian speaking and Slavic
speaking communities, or even to
prevent the intervention of the Serbian
DOCTRINE # 13 112 OCTOBER 2007
International Security Force, in charge of
“deterring renewed hostile activities,
demilitarization of UCK, establishing a
secure environment and ensuring public
law and order until an international civil
presence is able to take over”. Once
deployed and equipped with sufficient
means, the International civil presence
Lessons learned
was assigned the following mission for
what regards security: “maintain law
and public order, especially by
establishing local police forces and,
meanwhile, deploying international
police personnel serving in Kosovo4”.
individuals and vehicles are also part of
that course of action. From that
viewpoint, the collective security
mission entrusted to the land forces
didn’t call for new courses of action or
know-how.
A third mission was assigned to the
KFOR land forces, to supervise law and
civilian code of justice implementation,
i.e. Law enforcement. Due to a
deployment that went more slowly than
planned, the United Nations Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK) was unable to assume
that mission and thus entrusted it to
the KFOR on 4 July 1999 5. It was thus
necessary to take advantage of
the “Golden Hour”, i.e. that period of
time which is particularly favorable to
the establishment of security, since
the force benefited from a very positive
opinion - sympathy and authority - from
part of the population. The military
forces had thus the responsibility to
have the law implemented and
respected6. It was necessary to avoid
any feeling of impunity which would
have favored criminal organizations’
emergence or development.
The second mission consisted in
“maintaining public order and
security“, according to the words of
UNSCR 1244. The execution of that
mission implied to rediscover a course
of action that was forgotten but that
had already been implemented by
the forces: “crowd control”7. Mitrovica,
large city in the Northern sector under
French command, was the theater
of many inter-ethnic confrontations
between Serbian Kosovars, living North
of the Ibar River, and Albanian Kosovars
living south of the river. Confrontations
between both communities crystallized
around the famous western bridge.
French forces were regularly confronted
to Serbs or Albanian crowds attempting
to cross the bridge. These situations led
the French authorities to require the
presence of a “Gendarmes mobiles8”
company, capable, thanks to its training
and equipment, to manage these
movements of crowd. However the
threat of an escalation of the collective
violence9 as well as the low level of
availability of the Gendarme mobile
companies10 led French authorities to
train land forces to perform by
themselves crowd control and they also
had to be equipped for these types of
mission. An operational reserve
company11, that was responsible for
guarding the Western Bridge, received a
specific training provided by gendarmes
mobiles before it deployed to Kosovo.
It received also an adapted type of
equipment: helmet, baton and shield.
The army was thus provided with
equipment necessary to manage crowd
movements at the lowest level of
violence without however loosing sight
of the fact that an a priori peaceful or
with low level of violence demonstration
could rapidly turn into a mission of
combat in urbanized area. This is where
the difference lies between crowd
control and maintaining law and order
as it is taught by the gendarmes
mobiles. Crowd control allows land
forces to maintain the level of violence
at the lowest level possible while
keeping the possibility to conduct a
coercion action12.
Within that context, KFOR land forces
mobilized their traditional know-how as
well as more innovative courses of
action, such as crowd management in
unstable environment. By so doing they
have been able to perform temporarily
the entire spectrum of security
missions, contributing thus to a lasting
stabilization of the situation.
Relations with UNMIK police forces
were more difficult. Although the
transfers of authority were conducted
jointly, the cooperation between both
entities suffered from a lack of
coordination and mutual knowledge.
Many lessons can be drawn from that
unique experience of police and
security missions.
The span of the land forces’
police missions
Ensuring collective security calls for
the use of one of the land forces’
traditional know-how: area control. It
implies static guard of key localizations
(Serbian enclaves, monasteries),
dismounted and vehicle-mounted
patrols, establishment of fixed or mobile
check points. Regular searches of
Law enforcement and implementation
were the two last types of mission that
were entrusted to the land forces. This
was the course of action the most far off
the traditional missions of the forces
that were engaged in Kosovo
operations. The execution of this
mission required the engagement of the
gendarmerie, which demonstrated the
fact that a police force with a military
status is a major asset for a country that
has to perform stabilization missions.
The surveillance and investigation
gendarmerie13 platoon that was
integrated in the KFOR conducted
investigations which allowed
normalizing the implementation of the
law in Kosovo. Gendarmes with their
status of legal police officers have been
able to perform legal police activities
similar to those they perform in France,
i.e. conducting investigations, arresting
and transferring individuals suspected
of crimes to UNMIK14 designated
judges.
Land forces contributed also to
the execution of that mission thanks
to the logistics support as well as
sometimes the combat support (during
risky arrests) they provided, and also by
forwarding collected information15. It
appeared to be necessary to formalize
more precisely the relationships and
thus the complementary functions of
Army and Gendarmerie.
From military security to
civilian security
There is a legal chronology of
security in Kosovo16 that parallels
the chronological approach of
the operations - intervention,
stabilization, normalization.
Although the initial coercion phase has
been rather short, during the first days
of the entry into Kosovo, the forces were
in such a situation that they were the
only one able to provide security. The
local state organization had
disappeared following the Serbs military
and civil servants departure. KFOR had
thus all legal, administrative and
military powers. That period of time
could thus be referred to as being the
stabilization initial phase.
The second phase started with the
establishment of the UNMIK’s authority
and the transfer of the legal police
prerogatives to UNMIK-Police. It was
OCTOBER 2007 113 DOCTRINE # 13
ECPAD
thus the UN that was in charge of the
implementation of the civilian code of
justice.
And last, the crisis management’s third
phase - usually called normalization corresponds to a return to a legal state.
During that phase, the military
authorities transfer back to the civilian
authorities the remaining power they
still had in their hands, i.e. being
administratively in charge of law and
order.
1st step: transfer of legal police
responsibilities
Land forces had succeeded to reduce
significantly the level of violence during
the early days of the deployment. Since
the UN civil administration was
progressively deploying, time had thus
come to transfer certain responsibilities
in matters of security to the “blue beret
police”. In the French sector, that
transfer of the investigation
responsibility, which started in October
1999 for the city of Mitrovica, was
achieved for the entire sector North on
2 August 2000 with the signature by
General Suchet and commissioner SvenErik Larsen of a memorandum of
agreement. The transition agreements
were concluded in a decentralized way
by sectors, and following a joint
assessment of the situation.
Police primacy was transferred when
the multinational brigade north’s
commander and the UNMIK police
regional commander were certain that
UNMIK Police was mastering its area
of responsibility and was equipped
with sufficient means, in personnel
and equipment. That transfer occurred
rather easily. It was then the
international police officers, who were
from then on sufficiently numerous,
and thus became responsible for
accomplishing the so-called traditional
police missions.
According to the memorandum of
agreement, KFOR (Sector North) troops
were then entrusted with preventive
tasks:
- Restricting freedom of movement,
- Collective security,
- Curfew,
- Crowd control.
These missions related to both area
control and to maintaining public law
and order. The responsibility for all
these missions was referred to as
“tactical primacy”. KFOR superimposed
its presence to the UNMIK one by
DOCTRINE # 13 114 OCTOBER 2007
establishing fix and mobiles check
points and continuing dismounted and
vehicle-mounted patrols. As a matter of
fact, KFOR was providing a security
environment within which UNMIK police
was able to accomplish its police
missions.
That memorandum didn’t prevent
some misunderstandings to occur.
Isolated lacks of coordination
between KFOR and UNMIK Police
have had very significant
consequences. In April 2002, a UNMIK
Police team from Pristina decided after
a long effort of investigation to arrest
an individual living in Northern
Mitrovica. That team didn’t notify
the KFOR of its intent. An incident
provoked the gathering of several
hundreds of people. The police were
attacked with offensive grenades and
they responded with their hand guns.
The KFOR troops had to restore peace
and stillness later in the day17. That
example is representative of both
military and civilian doctrines’
intermingling during stabilization
phases. A simple arrest turned into
a threat to collective security.
The situation may switch from
the police to the military domain of
action. This is why the separation
of the tasks and missions should not
imply a lack of cooperation and
coordination between land forces and
local or international police
representatives.
2nd step: reducing forces’ presence and
visibility
In May 2002, KFOR authorities and
the UNMIK administrator signed
the security and transition strategy18,
better known as the “unfixing strategy”.
It provided a joint framework which
allowed military and civil police to
initiate the transfer of responsibilities in
matters of surveillance of buildings, key
facilities and border crossing points.
Since the situation was improving, it
was then an opportunity to force
Kosovo to make a step forward, from a
military type of security to a civilian
one.
KFOR and UNMIK-Police had thus to
assess what were the risks associated
to the transfer process in accordance
with their mandate and their logic of
action. They both had also to evaluate
the probability of an aggression against
transferred sites. But they had also to
evaluate the consequences of it with
respect to their own mandates. UNMIKPolice had thus to wonder how an
attack against a site could question its
ability to maintain law and order and to
guarantee public security. For KFOR, it
was a question of evaluating how a
hostile action would affect
environment’s safety and security.
Lessons learned
However that joint framework of
evaluation didn’t allow both forces to
mutually assist each other during
the 2004 riots. It took a long time for
KFOR to realize that the troubles were
more serious than usual and that the
police couldn’t cope. When KFOR
intervened, the movement had reached
a considerable size and scope.
The result of these two days of riot was
terrible: it totalled 19 dead and more
than 1,000 injured; 4,000 Serbs, Roms
and Ashkalis were displaced,
730 houses and 36 churches or
monasteries were looted and burned
down.
1 Technical Military Agreement between the
International Security Force (“KFOR”) and
the governments of the Federal republic
of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia,
9 June 1999.
2 Research & Lessons Learned Division/
Forces employment doctrine center.
3 Resolution 1244 of the United Nations
Security Council, 10 June 1999.
4 Ibid.
5 Statement on the right of KFOR to
apprehend and detain, Press communiqué,
UNMIK/PR/7, 4 July 1999.
6 On the prevention of access by individuals
and their removal to secure public peace
and order Regulation UNMIK/REG/1999/2,
12 August 1999.
7 I It has to be noticed that crowd control as
implemented in Kosovo aimed chiefly at
avoiding confrontations between Serbian
and Albanian Kosovars by interposing
troops between both opposing parties.
It could be compared to what the French
Gendarmerie Mobile calls “maintien de
l’ordre” (maintaining Law and Order).
However it is only one of the courses of
action linked to crowd management and
control that is currently implemented by
the French Army which envisions also
actions against or in spite of these crowds
(see TTA-950 and FT-01 pp.63-64).
8 French “gendarmes mobiles” are
responsible for missions of law and order
enforcement, whereas “regular gendarmes”
(gendarmerie départementale) are
responsible for legal police actions.
9 That went up to the employment of
offensive and defensive grenades and light
weapons.
10 Usually very busy back home in France.
11 Compagnie de réserve opérationnelle.
12 The issue of crowd control has already
been tacked in detail in CDES/CDEF
publications. See in particular Objectif
Doctrine about “Land forces employment
in crowd control” (#°30-2002).
13 Gendarmerie nationale.
14 According to BG (Gendarmerie) Vicaire,
the 125 gendarmes of the gendarmerie
detachment has identified more than
3 000 crimes in less than 3 months.
15 Which sometimes caused problems, the
land forces regretting no being kept aware
of what the information they had brought
had permitted to achieve.
16 According to Brigadier General Vicaire’s
word (BG Vicaire was the first gendarmerie
detachment commandant in Kosovo).
17 Jean-Paul HANON, Thierry NOGUES, Police
et ordre public au Kosovo, DAS/ LARES,
2002, p.89 et suivantes.
18 KFOR/UNMIK Security Transition Strategy,
29 mai 2002.
The Kosovo intervention constitutes, for the land forces, an unprecedented experience of restoration of public
order and security. Land forces were confronted to all the problems currently linked to a stabilization mission:
establishment of a secure environment and restoration of a legal state organization, crowd management, civil
military cooperation, and transfer of responsibilities.
The French armed forces, including the gendarmerie, demonstrated their great adaptation capability during
the execution of these missions. They allowed thus the civil administration to bring Kosovo on the road to
normalization and they did so in the Sector north’s rather explosive environment. Beyond the weaknesses of the
UNMIK-Police means, which was the regularly invoked excuse to explain the problems, most of the issues that
rendered difficult the relationships between military and civilians in Kosovo were due to a lack of coordination
and a lack of knowledge of each other’s procedures and capabilities. Co-operation between land forces and
police remains however crucial to achieve a lasting peace.
OCTOBER 2007 115 DOCTRINE # 13
The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan
between 1979 and 1989
n the late 70s, reassured by its success in Czechoslovakia and sure of its superiority, the Soviet Army
was considered as one of the most powerful forces in the world. When the Soviets entered Afghanistan
on December 27th, 1979, the country was in a disastrous political state and in the grip of a civil war.
Afghan resistance groups got organized against the central power. Coups succeeded to each other,
leaving a government unable to rule the country. Wishing to restore a new stable Afghan government
with a communist feature and strengthen the relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, so
invaluable within a cold war context, the Soviets got committed on the basis of the friendship treaty
dated December 5th, 1978.
I
BY
MISS MARIE-PAULINE SALIN - SEARCHER IN TRAINING IN THE CDEF/DREX1
Late on Christmas day 1979, the 40th
Soviet Army carried out a conventional
assault onto Kabul and onto other key
points in Afghanistan: operation
STORM 333. On December 27th, 1979,
the Soviets deposed President Amin
and a Soviet sympathizer, Babrak
Karmal, was appointed the Chairman of
the new Revolution Council, Prime
Minister to the Afghan government and
secretary of the Afghan communist
party2. On December 28th, the new
Afghan government officially required
“political, moral, economic, and
military support” from the Soviet
Union, on account of provocations
coming from all the “foreign enemies of
Afghanistan”.
In April 1980, the Status of Armed
Forces Agreement was signed between
the Afghan government and the USSR
on President Karmal’s initiative. During
the first three years, the Soviets
extended their control over the country,
but two thirds of the regular Afghan
Army deserted. In front of the extreme
determination of the mudjahidins, the
Soviets soon gave up their control over
the whole territory and they limited
themselves to conquered areas.
In 1986, Khad commander Mohammed
Nadjibullah3 replaced Babrak Karmal4
at the head of the Afghan State.
According to the principle of an Afghan
Perestroika, he started to negotiate
with the rebels through a national
reconciliation process. In 1986,
the mudjahidins started to get US
ground-to-air FIM-92 Stinger missiles,
which resulted into the Soviets losing air
space control. The balance of forces
changed.
In February 1988,
Mikhail Gorbatchev
decided to withdraw,
a decision supported
by the international
community during the
Geneva agreement.
The withdrawal of
Soviet forces came
into effect one year
later, on February
15th, 1989.
What are the lessons
learned that we can
draw from this war?
Does the analysis of
this crisis management
enable to highlight
the difficulties that all
Western armed forces
are confronted to, when
they are facing guerilla
despite an undisputed
force and power?
DOCTRINE # 13 116 OCTOBER 2007
An inappropriate Soviet
military analysis?
In Vietnam, the Americans endeavored
to control the whole country. In
Afghanistan, the Soviets limited
themselves to occupy and protect key
communication axes and areas, after
Lessons learned
they had in vain tried to destroy
resistance groups. The basic purpose
consisted in gaining undisputed victory
on the ground and hence, in creating
favorable military conditions to
establish an Afghan communist party.
Far away from their initial will, just to
retain their influence and their
presence while limiting the cost in
equipment and human lives, the USSR
committed itself into an attrition war in
which the Soviet military doctrine kept
being harmed.
to the tactics of counter-guerilla
warfare in the mountains. The Red
Army was about to change the
structure and the operating
environment of its units and gradually
adapt its divisions’ equipment: a
massive use of helicopters, among
others the MI-24 Hind and an increased
use of SFs (Special Forces): the
spetsnaz. Despite that fact, it did not
thoroughly change the general aspect
of its forces in Afghanistan and
globally, its equipment remained
unsuited to its needs.
An inadequate employment doctrine
The Soviets could not impose
themselves without using armored
vehicles. But these vehicles could not
be used very often because of highly
mountainous areas. As regards the
Soviets, the major difficulty was the
unwieldiness of equipment and their
lack of light infantry units. For that
reason, a static surveillance of the
country by enormous armored columns
appeared to be fruitless.
The Soviet doctrine supporting a major
offensive materializes with a rapid
victory resulting from a massive use of
firepower. Populations and resistance
fighters are then compelled to find
shelter in the mountains. Yet, the
Soviets regularly suffer situation
reversals.
From the very start, the Soviet Army
held the important axes and the major
key points of Afghanistan, rapidly
defining the concept of “useful
Afghanistan”. Thus, the looked-for aim
consisted in completely controlling
some areas of the country considered
as sensitive. This reasoning was
completely inappropriate compared
with local distinctive features:
important rurality, dispersed
mudjahidin forces and especially
environment. Initially, the Soviets were
determined to rapidly destroy guerilla
through major offensives. These
actions were carried out according to a
COA (Course of Action) corresponding
to battlefields located in Central
Europe, but in no way according to
counter-guerilla warfare in Central Asia.
For that reason and according to Soviet
doctrine, criteria which were supposed
to be critical throughout a successful
operation were indeed ineffective.
Major offensives carried out by the
Soviets, in particular those which took
place in Panshir, had no enduring
successes.
Adapting too slowly to guerilla
techniques
The Soviet Army was held in check
because it was unable to adapt itself
A failing co-operation
The Afghan Army which operated
alongside the Red Army constituted
one of the reasons why the Soviets
were unable to control the whole
country and to impose a stable
communist regime. Indeed, this armed
force on which the Soviets had to rely
was also unreliable, whereas the
support of the Afghan Army would
have considerably reinforced the Soviet
legitimacy and imposed an outlaw
status for the mudjahidins. The fact
that the government and the armed
forces were only puppets in the eyes
of the Afghans also contributed to
reinforce the determination of the
population and of the freedom fighters.
Several factors explain the reason why
the Afghan Army failed in its support
and legitimacy roles.
• confrontation with its own peoples;
• the fact that the Afghan Army refused
to operate under the Soviets;
• the weakness of the Afghan
government;
• its structure (lack of officers, of
trained and proficient soldiers);
• frequent mutinies and desertions;
• weapons smuggling;
• Collusion with the enemy.
Wrongly managing
the relations with the Afghans
The Soviets knew neither their
enemies nor the Afghan natural
environment. This deficiency was the
cause of basic errors. Thus, they
ignored the nature of the conflict they
were about to start and they lacked
initiative. The Soviet armed forces were
too often limited to a defensive role
because of lack of information on the
Afghan rebels.
Insufficient awareness about the
population and the enemy
For the Afghans, the Soviet
intervention appeared as the worst
challenge in their history. Indeed, this
foreign aggression was about to stress
their best qualities, “their love for
independence and their abnegation in
front of death”5. The Soviets shattered
the fragile structures and the
institutions of the Afghan State, which
had gradually modernized from 1919.
As for this country, it imploded into
several ethnic groups, tribes and
seigniories. Only a couple of common
and essential factors (from previous
centuries) were left to the Afghan
resistance movement: Islam and
ethnic solidarities.
Afghan traditions were absolutely not
understood by the Soviets. Then,
communism was opposed to Islamism
and to the refusal of any interference.
We could think that a better knowledge
of this Afghan “culture” would have
enabled the Soviets to have their
initiative supported by the populations.
The Afghans did not lack experience
and techniques on a terrain favorable
to asymmetrical warfare carried out for
centuries: guerilla warfare in the
mountains. Unlike the Soviets, they
operated in the mountains without any
difficulty. This mountainous area (85 %
of mountains) with a harsh climate (on
average, temperatures ranged from 14°C to 52°C) made living conditions
very difficult to the Soviets. Guerilla
tactics relied on intelligence,
ambushes, cunning6 and sabotage. In
the case of an unpopular foreign
occupant like the Soviets in
Afghanistan, resorting to guerilla
OCTOBER 2007 117 DOCTRINE # 13
points, the Soviets implemented
violent - more or less efficient7 destruction policies, induced
starvation and the displacement of
populations towards neighboring
countries.
These actions resulted into “emptying
some areas”8 and they contributed to
strengthen mudjahidin opposition.
The use of force - according to brutal
and undiscriminated techniques - only
drove the population into the
mudjahidins’ arms.
warfare made the cost of a military
presence prohibitive and it compelled
them to withdraw.
the population. Inevitably, it resulted
into a deterioration of their links and it
hindered them to negotiate with the
enemy through the Afghan population.
Gradual retrenchment
of the Soviet Army
Very quickly, the “legitimacy” of
the intervention force disappeared.
For the Afghans, it became an
occupation force.
The Soviets carried out a relatively
constant defensive warfare. During
the first months, the rebels only
attacked government infrastructures
and communication lines.
Consequently, the Soviets had to
protect facilities by themselves: they
built 862 outposts that mobilized
20,200 personnel i.e. 1/5 of the Soviet
Army. Thus, the Soviets took refuge
inside protected camps to keep roads
and key points, which deprived Soviet
soldiers from any contact with
Operations reinforcing
the determination of the enemy
and of the population
The Red Army contributed by itself to its
inability to apprehend the enemy and
especially to control the populations, a
favored breeding ground for enlistment
within the mudjahidins. In order to
protect occupation areas and strategic
1 Research & Lessons Learned Division of the
CDEF (Forces Employment Doctrine Center).
2 PDPA: People’s Democratic Party of
Afghanistan.
3 Khad: Afghan secret service.
4 As his policy against guerilla had not been
very efficient, he was gradually considered
as incompetent.
5 Michael BARRY The kingdom of insolence:
Afghanistan between 1504 and 2001 page 40,
Flammarion.
6 According to Sun Tsu, war is the art of
deception. It was opposed to the Clausewitz
concept that strongly recommended an
unlimited use of brute force (a point of view
shared by the Soviets).
7 “Search and destroy”: operations pertaining
to harvest destruction, and intensive
bombing of areas and valleys.
8 “Free Fire Zone”: zone where fire is opened
on any people within this area, without any
distinction between mudjahidins and the
local population.
For ten years, the Red Army had occupied the country and fought against mudjahidins. It was commanded and
controlled by a generation of military leaders convinced of the relevance of their commitment doctrine and reluctant
to any change. When the Soviet armed forces got committed in December 1979, they were strengthened in their
beliefs thanks to a lack of any resistance from the Afghans. However, at the outcome of this conflict, the Red Army
was no longer the same, shaken in its beliefs; it was the very image of the USSR that had fallen into decline.
Should there have been a failure, it mainly came from the basic mistake of the Soviet Union that had carried out a
political and military assessment that did not correspond to the realities of this country. Indeed, the Soviets lacked
information and knowledge about the enemy and the country. Shifting from a cooperation force to an occupation
force, the Soviets were then doomed to failure.
Eventually, guerilla fighters were not destroyed, communism did not set up and Islamic extremists, the Taliban,
seized power a few years after the Soviet withdrawal.
Currently, the coalition force in Afghanistan should draw lessons from these ten years of Soviet occupation, not to
be considered, in its turn, as an “occupation force”.
DOCTRINE # 13 118 OCTOBER 2007
Freedom of speech
The Land Forces
in Today and Tomorrow’s
Conflicts ... Going
Deeper in our Thoughts
By way of introduction
etting ready for the most probable types of combat implies willing to avoid finding oneself
on any theater, totally surprised by an unforeseen threat. In that respect, the lessons that can
be drawn from the visit of the magnificent and recently open museum of the Cavalry at Saumur are
surprisingly contemporary. In addition to the famous Reichshoffen cavalry charge which was broken
under enemy’s fires, the museum presents the heroic assault conducted by the 8th Régiment de
Cuirassiers1 where, not only their breastplates proved to be unable to protect the soldiers from
German weaponry, but above all, at the tactical level, the assault was stopped in the village of
Morsbronn and the soldiers were defeated by Infantry units that were installed in the houses’
upper floors and on the roofs! Combats in urbanized areas were already causing huge damages ...
G
For that reason, the new document published by the CDEF2, constitutes a significant step forward
in the 21st century’s tactical studies. It demonstrates our willingness to adapt to the most probable
types of conflicts, while keeping in mind that the most intense of them should not be put aside,
even if the international situation allows us to believe that there should be sufficient advance
notice.
However, starting from what has been written and without questioning it, I believe that it is
possible to go much further in the reflection, once again in order to avoid finding our units armless
in front of an unforeseen threat and our commanders in total disarray while they would repeat
these terrible words: “if I had known ...”
That’s why it is suggested to bring a contribution to both of the “FT-01” chapters; the first one
dealing with situation analysis, and the new look of the war, and the second dealing with our new
types of engagement.
BY
MAJOR GENERAL BRUNO DARY, ARMY INSPECTOR (COMBAT ARMS UNITS)
OCTOBER 2007 119 DOCTRINE # 13
Additional opinions on “Winning the Battle, Building Peace”
The new face of war
It has to be recognized that all our potential
opponents have well understood that they would
never be able anymore to achieve the air
superiority which would allow then to gain
control of the land space. Thus, we progressively
switched from a symmetrical type of enemy,
towards a dissymmetrical and then an
asymmetrical one. This enemy, wanting to avoid
any face to face confrontation, intended to melt
into the environment which resulted into seeing
the conflicts logically move towards difficult
types of terrain: be it the jungle or the mountain,
which remain however places where human
beings have it difficult to survive, or towards
urbanized areas, where it is easy to seek shelter
in houses, to rely on the local economy and to
find concealment in the midst of the population.
One of the modern conflicts’ major
characteristics thus appears: the more
the weapons in circulation, the less the people
in uniform.
SIRPA Terre ADC DUBOIS
From countryside to town
above all it allows us to define more easily our
own position in the crisis, often as impartial
forces, i.e. forces engaged in a theater of
operation to fulfill a mandate given most often
by the UN.
From enemies to antagonists
A deeper look at the population
One of the modern conflicts’ major evolutions
rests on the vanishing of the traditional
“friendly-enemy” opposition, of its force ratio
consequence, and of the Manichean situation
conception and analysis. Recent experiences
have shown that during a single conflict,
yesterday’s friends could rapidly turn into
enemies and vice versa. That’s why the word
antagonist seems preferable. Nowadays,
theaters show that there are scarcely two parties
only to a conflict but rather several, each of
which intending to achieve its own objective.
Let’s take the example of the Ivory Coast: how
could be affiliated the “Forces nouvelles”3 to
whom we were confronted early in the conflict,
with whom we negotiate daily, and about whom
we cannot be sure that one of their sectors
commanders will not take hostage one of our
soldiers? And what about the FANCI (Ivorian
national armed forces), that we came to support
at the request of their president and which shot
at us on a day of November 2004? And the
“Young Patriots” who several times besieged the
Port Bouet camp? And the population? And the
different political parties?
Since the action takes place in an urbanized
area, it becomes then obvious that the
population takes a very particular, not to say
essential, dimension. It can take five different
aspects:
- It is first the logical environment of today’s
crises; this characteristics is significant for what
regards weapons employment and accuracy,
collateral damages, freedom of action, ...
- It is then an object that is at stake. As a matter
of fact, like it is shown later on in the
document, the major stake of the crisis is not
anymore to defeat designated enemy forces,
but rather to pilot peace, i.e. to win the battle of
the hearts;
- It is also an actor, or one of the antagonists,
and not the less significant, since an active
minority can influence it, and through it,
efficiently counter our actions, or even achieve
critical results by other means; the memories of
Tien An Men Square must remain a significant
illustration of what a strong-minded group of
people can do under the compassionate
attention of the media;
- It can also be used as a human shield by any of
the many unscrupulous antagonists who look
for making us fall into a trap; remember
Mogadisciu and the snipers hiding in the
middle of groups of women; remember Bosnia
The word antagonist is more generic, it may
encompass any type of actors intervening into
the crisis, armed or not, military or civilian; and
DOCTRINE # 13 120 OCTOBER 2007
Freedom of speech
and the guns concealed in schools or in the
vicinity of a hospital; remember Afghanistan
where the Taliban were harassing the NATO
forces by means of indirect fires from villages in
order to provoke counter battery fires against
the local population;
- And last it is the victim and the first victim in all
modern conflicts. Let’s keep in mind those
figure which should render all armed forces
very modest; in the course of World War I,
10% of the victims were civilians and 90% were
soldiers; on the opposite, in the course of the
conflicts that took place during the last decade
of the 20th century, the ratio was reversed; and
the crises of the beginning of the 21st Century
confirm that heavy trend.
(
“ this is not a soldier’s job, but only
the soldiers can do it !”
)
The soldier’s role: a new role but always
tactical and at the service of a strategy
Forces engagement has a dimension which is
always tactical, and that must remain at the
service of a strategy. To forget that statement
could cause grave failures or serious disillusions:
- During the initial intervention phase, the armed
forces play an essential role, not to say “the”
essential role, since the transition to the next
phase depends heavily on the tactical success;
but in order to reach the tactical objective,
the soldier must keep in mind that there will be
a stabilization and reconstruction phase to
follow; it has also to be kept in mind that all
that has been broken will have to be fixed,
including what has been broken in the hearts
and minds; how to explain to a woman that her
door has been broken up, not because there
was a threat but because that technique is part
of our normal procedures? How to tell a local
civilian that if his house has been burned down,
it was for his own good? And what about
explaining to the community chief whose village
was burned down that it was not because of
the proven existence of a threat but to liberate
the region?
- Conversely during the following stabilization
phase, the soldier’s role must progressively
vanish to allow a return to normality. But just
like Karl Bildt noticed it very wisely in Bosnia:
“this is not a soldier’s job, but only the soldiers
can do it!” And this is the problem, most often
the soldier must become a builder, a teacher,
a doctor, and without loosing sight of his
presence’s raison d’être, the security.
To win the peace
The French Army in his recent history has lived
twice the trauma of loosing a war having won the
battle; in Algeria and in a lesser way in Suez, but
the reasons were mostly political. On the other
hand today, we are confronted to the following
paradox: although an initial victory remains a
necessary condition, it is neither determining
nor is it sufficient to build the peace. This
observation demonstrates vividly that the
following - stabilization - phase is certainly more
difficult due to its complexity, its duration and
the scope of the relevant domains. There are
many examples of the armed forces having
succeeded to defeat their opponent and that
remain confronted to the many difficulties linked
to bringing back security to the zone of
operations. Several observations can be made.
Public security: a priority
The stabilization phase begins with a priority:
public security. It consists in ensuring the
security of the populations and of their
belongings, which implies guaranteeing their
freedom of movement since, everywhere in the
world, individual security is regarded as being
a fundamental right of the people and a
preliminary indispensable condition to the
implementation of all freedoms and to the
development of any country.
The courses of actions related to public security
belong to four domains:
- General intelligence, in order to collect and
gather general information about the theater
environment and ambiance;
- Security building, that aims at exerting a
continuous surveillance of the areas of
operations, at conducting deterring activities
thanks to the sole presence of the forces and, if
required, at fighting against paramilitary groups
that would oppose it; that’s the current
situation in Iraq;
- Restoration of law and order, which aims at
containing, controlling and overcoming any
hostile outburst linked to meetings, gatherings
or demonstrations, just like to any individual
activities; this was the case for many months in
Kosovo;
- Support to anti criminal activities, which aims
at preventing any criminal activity, keeping in
mind that the armed forces are not intended to
OCTOBER 2007 121 DOCTRINE # 13
Additional opinions on “Winning the Battle, Building Peace”
fight against those organizations, whatever
they might be, paramilitary, ethnical or mafia
like ; they can only bring their support to the
local or international police forces. That
dimension should however not be forgotten,
otherwise the forces might get into that
paradoxical situation to have to bring back
order in a country whereas simultaneously
mafia like groups would proliferate and take
advantage of that return to peace and stillness
to conduct their illegal and simply immoral
activities.
Joint and inter-agencies dimension
That definition of public security implies, from
the outset of the stabilization phase, a close cooperation with the security forces, be it the
Gendarmerie or the local, the European or the
International police forces, which shows the
importance of the presence of these forces. The
joint nature of the force is conceived first at that
level, especially when operating in urbanized
areas; and, although at operational level, the HQ
is joint by nature, it is actually very much landheavy with a strong involvement of the police
forces.
Another consequence is the CIMIC dimension of
the overall maneuver that the armed force must
conduct in liaison with local and multinational
organizations. Security and development go
together: there is no security without
development and certainly no development
DOCTRINE # 13 122 OCTOBER 2007
without security; that’s why, starting from the
very first instants of the stabilization phase, it is
crucial to undertake restarting the country’s
institutions in all of its components, social,
economics, education, legal, cultural, etc. It
would be a mistake to reject all existing
structures as it was observed in Kosovo and Iraq,
even though it is highly desirable to modify what
already exists.
The issue about responsibility
It is easy to understand, and those who were
involved in the Kosovo operations had a live
experience of it, one of the major difficulties of
that phase rests upon the transfer of authority
between those in charge of the operations in the
theater and the relevant civilian authority, be it
an international community representative or a
local authority of that country we came to
support.
The fact that the force has received the mandate
to ensure public security is essential, especially
for what regards force development, nature of
the missions and rules of engagement.
Otherwise, forces can operate only on request for
assistance, which most often renders the task
execution trickier. But the difficulty remains, i.e.
the indispensable transfer of authority between
military and civilian authorities which often
marks the transition between stabilization and
normalization phases.
Freedom of speech
Mastering our “weaknesses” and understanding our limits
To all the various domains that the force will
have to master, one essential topic can be
added; it might not seem essential to us but it
actually is for our potential opponents who will
attempt to harm us by all means available, and
above all by trying to exploit our weaknesses.
One should never underestimate an opponent or
any of the various antagonists. Our limits as
much as our weaknesses constitute the source
of their strengths and they belong to several
domains:
- Culture: these interventions take place in
foreign countries; language constitutes the first
barrier; knowing the country’s culture and
religions is a must, especially when we must
operate within the population;
- Timing: one of the first concerns of the national
authorities, before deciding to potentially
commit armed forces into an operation is
the planned duration of it, and, above all, to
avoid being stuck in there for ages; remember
that word of an African president: “everyone
looks at his watch, but I’m the one who sets
the time!”
- Costs: it is very much linked to duration and
also to the volume of forces that are engaged;
the OPEX4 overcharge is a burning issue to
which everyone is confronted whatever might
be the level of responsibility, be it only because
of the strength of the engaged unit;
remember the “zero killed” theory, which is
less talked about since the beginning of
the war in Iraq...
Conversely, for most of potential antagonists,
human life is not worth a lot, sometimes less
than a Kalashnikov or a pick-up truck!
- Moral: and this is the most sensitive issue.
Our ethics sets for us rules of behavior, where
as most antagonists which can be found on
theaters of operations do not have any;
especially terrorists who target mostly
the innocent populations, instead of attacking
foreign armed forces. It is true that in the short
term these deontological rules can be seen
as restricting our freedom of action in daily
operations; one should however be convinced
that, in the longer term, they are the only ones
that will allow us to win, since populations see
well what’s right and who among all antagonists
respects them and who kills their children.
1 Heavy horse cavalry regiment. Now armored battalion.
2 Forces Employment and Doctrine Center.
3 “New Forces“.
4 Expeditionary deployment.
5 Military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) training center.
6 Combined Arms (Battalion) Task Force.
- The price of human life: it is obvious that one
soldier killed in action is always one too much,
but that risk is part of our job; however, today
in most western countries, the price of human
life has been placed at such a high level that
one should wonder if there is still a cause that
would justify to sacrifice a life to defend it:
It is essential today to get ready for what should be the most probable types of combat and to train for
engagements in urbanized areas.
Let’s hope that CENZUB5 grows up rapidly!
And most of all, let’s hope that CENZUB schedule will allow many GTIA6 to be trained and that the combined
arms dimension of the training in urbanized area - the most difficult to master - will be one of the major
concerns of all!
OCTOBER 2007 123 DOCTRINE # 13
Additional opinions on “Winning the Battle, Building Peace”
A warning from CDEF
Like all articles published in the "Freedom of speech" columns, the following
article represents the sole personal opinion of the author.
Forces Commitment
and the Other’s Rationale
arewell to old Europe! Here is the army faced again with “small wars”. These are occurring outside
Europe or on its limits among populations that are both stakes and actors. These conflicts remind
the military commanders that thinking and strategic or tactical action are by nature interactive.
Subsequently, the army doctrine is insisting on the need to understand that adversaries and populations
among which military forces are operating may have rationales different from ours. These people are indeed
living another story in another environment with other living conditions1.
F
There is here a tremendous
intellectual challenge. French
elites are educated in a thinking
system which claims for the
universality of its vision of
Mankind. They are then kept in
the ignorance of disciplines
such as anthropology which
open minds to the existence of
other conceptions of the human
condition. Regarding military
elites, no education other than
sporadic transmits them these
models of patient observation
and asceticism at “the Other’s
school”. These were incarnated
long ago by a group of French
officers put to the test of
colonization and decolonization. Today, the army doctrine recommends to find back its philosophy and practical sense, so to say,
be on the lookout for the Other’s rationale. Such nice challenge is however full of traps. These few lines are
quickly spotting some of them, among the most concealed.
BY
COLONEL (RETIRED) ANDRÉ THIÉBLEMONT
DOCTRINE # 13 124 OCTOBER 2007
Freedom of speech
Ethnocentrism
To each his own. To consider the world from one’s
sole point of view is Mankind’s original sin.
Modern times have not washed him from it. Each
civilization, each culture, each human group have
their own point of view on the world and on others.
This is structured by thinking systems, ideal- and
myth-led rationales. These are more or less
conscious as they are coming out of always
particular stories. Western world is claiming for
universal values. Long ago, these legitimated the
colonial conquest. Today, they organize this vision
of the world which prevails at UNO. This is also
borne by the project of global peace and protection
of human rights registered in the UN Charter. But in
the nineties, Asian officials claimed that “Asian
values are universal values” and “European values
are European values2”. Philippe Delmas observed
how different democracy conceptions are around
the world; “each of them convinced of its own
legitimacy”. He noted that each culture or
civilization “draws its certitude from centuries of
history”3. Due to its history, our civilization pushed
very far the individualization of the human person;
the Shoah4, especially provided us with “an
unequalled awareness (...) of human rights” 5.
This conceals that other civilizations, other
cultures experienced different historical
progressions: where identity and responsibility
remain collective as in Japan or China, the
individual’s rights are not understood as we do.
Elsewhere, the individual may be understood as
inseparable from multiple adhesions: to a faith, a
clan, ancestors, natural environment, invisible
powers, etc.
In Europe, the world of war has become unknown
to us. War is perceived there as a social pathology
and the warrior “almost became the repressed of
collective representations systems” 6. However,
elsewhere, war or more concretely the combat may
be recognized as usual. This is in particular the
case where the state crisis (sometimes combined
with a disputation of western modernity) releases
old antagonisms, religious fanaticisms and
activates political/mafia-like network etc. War may
then be a necessity7 in respect of identity, religion,
economics etc. People then live in war, from the war
and sometimes for the war which may be total.
French military commanders are used to structured
and pacified universes, they are idealizing peace as
the ultimate end of their mission, with their minds
formatted by ethical and legal rules. Are then
French military commanders in a mindset to
understand these worlds of violence in which
they are suddenly deployed8? Their operational
tour is short, too short. Before acting, the most
clear-headed will ask themselves the question.
“What is really happening here?” Except if prepared
deeply and for long to leave their ethnocentrism,
they will tend to project their mind structure on
the unknown.
In former In Former Yugoslavia, at least at
the beginning of the crisis, they did not grasp
the internal process of the conflict. Dissidences
occurred within a faction, mafia-like complicities
were binding opposed factions according to
the interests of local powers or of mafia-like
organizations9 with political connections. Some
FORPRONU units were then immersed in an
imbroglio of “mafia-like financial systems
the rationales of which bypass(ed) and even
contradict(ed) the general configuration of the
conflict10”. Believing that they were dealing with
legal local authorities, battalion commanding
officers negotiated and signed agreements with
“militiamen-contractors” looking for a rent. Some
even brought them their support while having a
clear conscience, as it was the case in the Bihac
pocket with local despot Fikret Abdic11.
Such internal processes were differentiating the
stakes of confrontations from one territory to the
other. Doing that, FORPRONU units encountered
local or political-mafia-like militias with postures
differing locally according to dissidences or
allegiances in relation to circumstances. As they
did not envisage a political-military organization
other than centralized and obeying to a hierarchy,
some officers interpreted these divergences as
the persistence of action compartmentalization
after “half a century of communist regime” 12.
Such stereotypes projected on the conflict were
preventing from any question about its
complexity. Quite frequently, they concealed
the faction commanders’ ins and outs playing with
FORPRONU to pursuit their war objectives, up to
concede humanitarian convoys passage to take
their cut13 on them.
It can be relatively easy to adapt to some features
of the culture regarding indigenous populations.
It is more difficult to grasp how much their history,
their environment and their living conditions are
structuring their expectations. In Afghanistan,
opium poppy cultivation enables an agricultural
economy to survive when it was devastated by
twenty years of war and some years of drought.
Western law and order demand it to be eradicated.
From the Afghan peasant’s point of view, it is an
injustice. The Taliban understood that lately. Over
there, law and order for small peasantry depend on
how this poppy economy is regulated, how other
cultivations may be substituted or which lawful
outcomes that may be offered for opium production
especially for the pharmaceutical industry14.
OCTOBER 2007 125 DOCTRINE # 13
Additional opinions on “Winning the Battle, Building Peace”
Ethnocentrism is a universal and unavoidable
burden of thinking. Having a critical awareness of it
is the best defense.
Neutrality and communication
Neutrality or impartiality claimed by a third party
interposing between two parties in a patent or
latent conflict constitutes another expression of
this ethnocentrism. In this matter, the point of view
of the opposing parties is the important thing:
there is effective neutrality only if the posture of
the third force is perceived as such by the adverse
parties. This is never or seldom the case. One
reason would be that this third force intervenes in
the sequencing of events.
At the beginning of the nineties, in Croatian Krajina
or on Mount Igman, French soldiers interposed
between Croatian or Bosnian war-fighters and Serb
war-fighters. They were then surprised by the
hostility of the first ones to them: they were neutral
and they were there to stop this “damned war” 15.
They did not understand that from the point of view
of Croatians or Bosnians, FORPRONU was not
neutral as its presence authenticated the separatist
Serbs’ conquest. Croatians or Bosnians have been
chased from these territories. Some could see even
their torched house. “Tcheknik battalion”, that was
the name given by Bosnian war-fighters to BATINF 5
in autumn 1994 on Mount Igman.
Indeed, the third force will express its neutrality
willingness through voice and action: palaver with
the two parties, prohibitions imposed to its
elements, reasoned operations looking for a similar
processing of the two parties etc. Nothing will do.
Sometimes, the initial interposition situation will be
vitiated. When, in 1992, the first French battalion
arrived in Croatian Krajina, it multiplied the actions
to “establish a confidence climate” with Croatians
and separatist Serbs. In the eyes of the first, the
mission in itself was tainted with partiality: implying
indeed demilitarization - and not evacuation - from
territories unduly conquered by separatist Serbs
between the signature of the cease-fire and the
arrival of FORPRONU (areas designated as “pink” or
pink zone), it consecrated by facts a territorial
sharing. This favored separatist Serbs and was not
provided for by the agreements16. Then, in itself a
material disposition of interposition between
belligerents can only maintain an impartiality
feeling. The third force is in the center. From their
points of view, the belligerents observe its smallest
movements. According to their rationale, their
specific history, an incident, of what happens
elsewhere and not here, etc, each adverse faction
will give a meaning to the third force’s collective or
individual actions as it perceives them. However,
DOCTRINE # 13 126 OCTOBER 2007
this sense will seldom be complying with the third
force intents. It is the same with local interposition
dispositions: they build as much restricted
operational areas where, like in a village, news are
spread and deformed. In Croatia and Bosnia,
behind the curtains of their defense system,
factions observed each other and watched for the
smallest doings of the foreigner displaying UNO’s
virginal colors. They invited him and tried to get him
on their side. Each demonstration of blue helmets
was subsequently gauged by each adverse faction
in regard of tactical interests or local stakes.
Rumors that accused FORPRONU of complicity with
the adverse party were numerous. Unconscious of
the multiple factors that thwarted their neutrality
intents, French officers interpreted these rumors as
“intoxication” or “opinion manipulation”.
These terms drive me to quick considerations on
the information maneuver accompanying the forces
engagement17. F-B Huygues deals with information
in war while referring to sciences acquisitions. He
objects to “any simplistic conception of persuasion
or omnipotent manipulation”. He qualifies the
power of medias -“technique authorizes, it does not
establish - and insists on the interaction of
rationales of thinking and beliefs: “beyond (...) the
medias illusion (...), our universes of thinking, our
pasts and our symbols conduct their own war” 18...
Then, he invites to “conceive simultaneously the
dialectics of intelligences animating the conflict,
techniques that authorize and organize into a
hierarchy, beliefs that build the world of
representations” 19.
Regarding indigenous populations, we should
think as well of their insertion in a history, in a
culture, in an environment, in a social group and in
an universe of competing signs. These are not
“targets” easily falling down under the impact of
words or pictures, as much convincing they can be
for their producers. Indeed, at these limits where
army units are deployed, a number of satellite
dishes enable the reception of electronic pictures in
Freedom of speech
homes. However, these are not deciding what is
said and thought. Relationships of confidence,
indifference or hostility established with the
emitting organization give these electronic pictures
more or less credibility, up to return against this
organization the argument of “opinion
manipulation”; the meaning of these pictures is
interpreted through beliefs and myths; they are
commented upon, disproved by retentive rumors,
the respected say of the old or the customary
authorities, etc. Here, encountering a favorable
echo, they will impress; elsewhere, in a universe of
thinking that is politically, socially, culturally closed,
they will be denied or turned away.
Conversely, the military formation operating among
populations will be able to put forward its fight and
its point of view all the more so the sensitive
understanding of its men would have indeed
entered into a network of sympathies from multiple
exchanges of signs and products, actions and
services delivered. There - like in many other
domains - the anthropological report validates
the validity of French soldier’s traditional
practices: “any communication shows two aspects:
the content and the relationship, such as the
second encompasses the first” 20. The relationship
that is established in the time between the One and
the Other is a condition to their communication. We
should however include another statement: “we
cannot avoid to communicate”21. The military
formation communicates, whether they want it or
not, by their signs, their equipment and their
products, their individual or collective behaviors,
etc. Such close communication cannot always be
mastered. If, during a local contact, a unit generates
an unfortunate incident, if its misunderstanding of a
feature of local culture is offending a native, etc.
then the rumor, carrying distrust will do its task.
Subsequently, it is only in the length of their
exchanges with a population that the military
formation can build the foundation of affectivities,
cross-knowledge and receptive attitudes to his say
on which the bad rumor will slip.
1 Cf. Centre de doctrine d’emploi des forces (CDEF) Forces
Employment Doctrine Center, Gagner la bataille et
conduire la paix (Win the Battle; Proceed to Peace) Paris,
janvier 2007, p.23 et 68.
2 Cf. E. Nguyen, L’Asie géopolitique, de la colonisation à la
conquête du monde (Geopolitical Asia from Colonization to
the conquest of the world), Studyrama, p.110.
3 Ph. Delmas, Le bel avenir de la guerre (the nice future of
war), Paris, Gallimard, 1995, p.145.
4 Translator’s note: the Holocaust in Hebrew.
5 R.D. Kaplan, La stratégie du guerrier (the warrior’s
strategy), Paris, Bayard, p.131.
6 Cl. Barrois, Psychanalyse du guerrier (psychanalysis of
the warrior), Paris, Hachette, 1993, p.24.
7 Cf. Ph. Delmas, op.cit., p.178-213.
8 For the analysis of the gaps between our pacified
conception of the world and the not so new forms of war
we are faced to, let us quote in particular, Ph. Delmas,
op.cit., R.D Kaplan, op.cit., M. Van Crefeld,
La transformation de la guerre (war transformation),
Paris, Editions du Rocher, 1998.
9 Cf. X. Bougarel, Bosnie - Anatomie d’un conflit (anatomy
of a conflict), Paris, La Découverte, 1996.
10 Ibidem, p.128.
11 Cf. A. Thiéblemont, Expériences opérationnelles dans
l’Armée de terre - Unités de combat en Bosnie
(operational experiences within the army - combat units
in Bosnia), Paris, Les documents du Cessd, 2001, Tome1,
p.47 et suiv.
12 Cf. Ibidem, Tome2, p.243-245.
13 Cf. ibidem, Tome1, p.55-56 et F. Debié. De Brioni à Dayton :
une très étrange diplomatie de la paix (a very strange
peace diplomacy), in (Cot J. Gal, dir), Dernière guerre
balkanique (last Balkans war), L’Harmattan, 1997,
p.47-85.
14 Cf. A. Labrousse, Afghanistan, Opium de guerre, opium
de paix (Afghanistan, war opium, peace opium), Paris,
Fayard, 2005.
15 For the development of what is hereafter, cf.
A.Thiéblemont, op.cit., Tome2, p.240 et suiv. et 252-264.
16 Cf. ibidem, Tome1, p.33-35 et F. Debié, op.cit., p.62.
17 Gagner la bataille, conduire la paix (winning the battle,
building peace), op.cit., p.72.
18 F-B Huygues, Croire contre, Croyances en guerre (believe
against, believe in war), Les Cahiers de médiologie n°8,
II/1999, p.10-18.
19 Idem, Société de l’information, société du conflit,
société du secret, dans Les champs de Mars, II/1999,
p.112.
20 P. Watzlawick, Une logique de communication (a
communication logic), Paris, Seuil, 1979, p.49 et suiv.
21 Ibidem, p.46.
Make the effort to understand the Other, in order either to fight him or to become attached to him. This
beautiful challenge forwarded to the army elites should not become dead-letter. Doing it assumes - as it was
brought to mind - the contacts length with indigenous populations: the current turn-over of units is hindering
it. Moreover, military elites’ education is required. Supported by assets of human sciences, it should free
them from the technology dream, harden their critic thought, provide them with a political and cultural sense of
the terrain of commitment. Acting out is far from obvious, but this is another matter.
OCTOBER 2007 127 DOCTRINE # 13
Additional opinions on “Winning the Battle, Building Peace”
The Reactive Adaptation
The Industry Point of View
M
eeting an operational requirement in emergency conditions is a real problem. Nowadays, land
forces have regularly to face it on theaters of operations. Thanks to the lessons learned, these
requirements are better identified, their boundaries are then better defined. This enables to
provide units with adequate equipment or with additional parts. Such form of “reactive adaptation”
involves not only the military but also the defense industry.
BY MR. MARWAN LAHOUD, FORMER MBDA CHAIRMAN
For a variety of reasons, requirements of armed
forces may evolve quickly especially in the area
of equipment and ammunition. Accelerations
have been reported for a couple of years. On
the one hand, they are related to the evolution of
geo-strategic situation, of the environment and
the level of commitment of forces especially land
forces. On the other hand, they are related to
the theaters variety. These accelerations are
acting on a number of de-stabilizing parameters
capable to disturb the normal and traditional
sequencing of armament programs.
Against this relatively new situation,
the armaments industry is reacting and has to
propose adequate and quickly available
solutions. Everything is not possible immediately.
However, when taking into consideration and
resolving problems of a contractual, industrial
and economic nature, a lot can be done in an
operational emergency context. The first Gulf War
demonstrated if need be, that the reactive
adaptation is not an hairy idea from
headquarters, but a reality intensely and jointly
experienced by the forces and the armament
industry.
We should however precisely define the
boundaries of action and the role of each
protagonist in order to be able to act efficiently in
emergency cases without rush.
DOCTRINE # 13 128 OCTOBER 2007
The general environment
of an armament operation
in a reactive adaptation
To successfully achieve an armament operation in
contingency conditions, the defense industry
should be supported by a clear and precise
requirement from the forces, a non-questionable
contractual framework, a dialogue and a constant
monitoring throughout all the operation.
The operational requirement should be clearly
identified, voiced and limited. It should also fit in
an operation effectively achievable within an
explicit time-schedule. Expressions such as “as
soon as possible” or “do the best you can”
should be banned.
The various possible operations
The response to requests from combatants on
the ground may appear under several forms
which represent as many particular cases of
achievable operations:
- either with a piece of equipment not allotted to
the forces but off-the-shelf available and designed
for military and even civilian applications,
- or a piece of equipment in an advanced
development phase or just in a prototype status,
Freedom of speech
- or a piece of equipment currently fielded with
the forces but requesting improvements or
identified adaptations.
From a pure manufacturer’s point of view, these
various categories allow to assess the technical
feasibility, to estimate the time needed for
realization. This includes the steps of qualification
and certification indispensable in particular to
meet safety requirements.
Among possible operations, improvement of
weaponry software versions is certainly offering a
very wide area of investigations, considering
the number of weapons systems developed for
land forces. These are more and more calling for
information technology either as an assistance
tool for decision-making or simply to enable its
functioning and operation.
A particular case still lies with ammunition. This
problem may be the more difficult to solve in
emergency conditions. We must report that
the trend of western armed forces is to acquire
complex ammunition, because they are precise
and shot from security distance but produced in
limited quantity. Besides that, these same armed
forces are likely to be committed in conflicts with
a high intensity phase highly ammo consuming.
We should looking at the phases of intense
combats for two recent operations (Lebanon and
Iraq) conducted by western type armed forces:
this demonstrates the need for significant stocks.
Emergency replenishment of such ammunition
would require times for production and supply.
These are however hardly compatible, considering
emergency conditions of some operational
situations.
The decision-making process
and the conduct of such operation
Let us now consider that the various operations
to achieve are registered and well identified,
the concerned manufacture actors well localized,
the operational requirement clearly explained,
the budgets available and adequate. All
components are then in place to efficiently
conduct a “reactive adaptation”. Such
convergence of factors is however possible only if
state interlocutors, organized in “EDPI”1 are in
a restricted number, enjoy a significant
maneuver space and can conduct and coordinate
the operation from the beginning to the end.
The industry partner is then required to maintain
a dialogue with officers and armament
procurement engineers. These should have
gained a good knowledge of the right requirement
voiced by on-the-ground combatants. They should
be capable to make decisions quickly without
systematically referring to their hierarchy. It would
then be dangerous and completely unproductive
to see the good ideas elaborated commonly after
due hearing of state and industry representatives
being diluted and to fall apart in muffled
mysteries of headquarters. The industry partner
can commit himself only from firm decisions,
made durable through contracts and not from
blurred promises. Whatever are the details and
the form of the action undertaken, the goal is to
define correctly the operation to achieve in
regard of expected performances, of associated
costs and time limits to take into account.
ECPAD
Aspects related to contracts
and regulations
Achieving a reactive adaptation
operation can be imagined only
within a laws and regulations
framework. Considering emergency,
typical procedures sequencing an
operation (IM2 800, IG 1514...) are
not applicable as they are, given
the incompressible periods related
to tender processes.
The Code for Public Contracts in its
“defense decree”3 allows for
emergency procedures in case of
an operational need. The holy
competition rule is no longer an
obligation subject to the
operational emergency to be
proven and formally recognized.
OCTOBER 2007 129 DOCTRINE # 13
Additional opinions on “Winning the Battle, Building Peace”
This operating method is then reinforced by the
recent text referred to as “European code of
conduct”. This explicitly authorizes a departure in
case of operational emergency. It avoids then
further disputes about the operation legitimacy.
The reactive adaptation is possible in the area of
equipment. Everything is not achievable but
isolated operations can perfectly be envisaged
within a legal and regulations framework. This is
however subject to wanting it and implementing an
adequate decision-making process.
The project elaboration and
realization in close co-operation
(conduct of the project)
Regarding forces equipment, this reactive
adaptation may concern a variety of operations.
These are considered hereafter. The defense
industry is in main cases unavoidable, though
some local arrangements cannot be excluded.
These may relate to emergency means supported
by a “rely on yourself” rationale. This is however
rarely meeting compliance with applicable safety
rules and product durability.
Concepts of time limits, performances and costs
cannot be dissociated from a reactive adaptation.
They should be from the beginning the topics of a
dialogue between representative(s) from
the government (EDPI) and a project manager
from the industry partner.
The three pillar structure:
performance, costs, time
The requirement is first identified and voiced, then
validated by an official from the central
administration. It is then of primary importance that
it is forwarded on the content (military expression
of the requirement in a “FCM”4 format) as well as
on the form (technical outlines for realization in a
“STB”5 format) to the manufacturer in charge of
meeting it. The expected performance must meet
this requirement but be limited to it. The inflation
danger from the ones or the others, frequently
aiming at perfection, is a pitfall that should be
avoided at any price. Even if it is legitimate in a
theoretical environment, it can generate extra-costs,
technical and time drifts. It may then trigger
the operation failure in the mid-term.
An emergency manufacturing generates
unavoidably additional costs that we must keep in
mind to allow the adequate budget for. Effectively,
emergency for realization means certainly higher
risk taking for the involved manufacturers. This is
DOCTRINE # 13 130 OCTOBER 2007
due to additional work outside regular hours then
higher wages for employees, sub-contracting,
employing temps, purchase of equipment and raw
materials at prices very likely to be higher than
those gained in usual negotiation conditions.
The concept of time needed is also a parameter
conditioning the success of the operation. The
armament industry is capable of a lot but cannot do
everything immediately. Some operations are
achievable very quickly, others require
incompressible technical periods of time, even if it
is possible to speed up realization to work in
parallel or even in advance on some phases of the
project.
Every reactive adaptation operation is specific.
Concepts of performances looked for, associated
costs and time compatible with the achievement of
the operational requirement are inter-dependent
and should be the object of choices and
compromises between the three involved parties.
Industrial constraints to overcome
Among the difficulties encountered, some
specifically relate to the manufacturer. We should
however keep them permanently in mind to try to
bypass them or to integrate them into the overall
rationale. Without expecting to be exhaustive, we
list hereafter for the various stages of the product
realization, the main problems which may arise
and limit the action in terms of reactive
adaptation:
The functions of definition, realization,
production
We should remind here that action in emergency cannot bear improvisation and any operation as modest it
could be, will require analysis for definition especially
regarding the application of safety rules. Indeed, in
any case, these cannot be infringed; they should
comply with standards more and more complex and
frequently high demanding.
The concept of just-in-time methods and
optimization of realization costs does not allow to
keep production lines dormant. These would not be
active and would be re-started in emergency
conditions. This is sensitive in particular in the area
of emergency replenishment stocks of complex
ammunition such as missiles; it should be subject
to a particular attention from military officials
because only anticipation of the requirement can
avoid combatants to be without what they need.
The procurement function
Such function is of primary importance and may be
the design parameter. The manufacturer could
indeed have to face the following problems which
Freedom of speech
MBDA/M. Toineau
The support function
The realization of an armament operation is
naturally followed for the industrial partner by
taking into account the manufacturer’s support
(period of legal and contractual guarantee) and
the maintenance in operational conditions of
equipment on the theater. The issue should be
considered at an early stage and solutions should
be found allowing then to guarantee the good
running on the ground knowing that the
manufacturer’s support on site may be envisaged.
There is however limits to the action of civilians on
the theater of operations. The following list aims at
triggering the reader’s reflection while considering
a certain number of possible answers but also
specific constraints which can be solved only case
by case.
• Setting a priori spare parts and tool kits.
• Hot line, or the capability to repair remotely
directly in the field 6.
• Problems of time gaps according to theaters
and local work laws.
• Closures during holiday periods (locate
the employees).
are as many risks capable to disturb the good
running of the operation:
• time needed to supply components composing
the system;
• concept of strategic materials;
• price of raw materials and equipment ordered in
emergency conditions;
• presence or not of “state” or industrial stock;
• concept of tight flow not allowing a manufacturer
to store worthy components likely to be used one
day...maybe;
• Recurrent problem of obsolescence especially in
the area of electronics and IT.
We also find for procurement function a particular
sensitivity regarding complex ammunition. For
information, a period of around two years is to be
considered between the day we buy and the day we
receive a MISTRAL missile self-steering device in
the scope of an order justifying to re-launch a
production chain.
1 Équipe de programme intégrée : integrated program team.
2 IM Instruction ninistérielle : Government Department
Directive.
3 Decree 2004-16 dated 7 January 2004 know as “defense
decree”.
Art 2-III: Negotiation without prior advertising and without
tendering.
Art 3: Exchange of letters in case of emergency
incompatible with the drafting of documents composing a
contract.
4 Fiche de caractéristiques militaires : military
characteristics sheet.
5 Spécification technique du besoin : requirement technical
specification.
6 This kind of support very promising in terms of efficiency,
already usual in the civilian world, should see shortly
developments for combat service support and repair of
military assets on the theater of operations. This is due to
reactive adaptation which may only consist in repairing an
unavailable weapons system requiring for instance a return
to the factory.
Achieving in the framework of a reactive adaptation an armament operation is something possible. This is
however subject to meet some military demands to clearly specify the just needed requirement, some
contractual demands to operate lawfully and in compliance with the rules of public procurement and some
industrial demands to be fully aware of capabilities and to assess efficiency. An integrated and lean team built
with three representatives of the Service staff, of the French Defense procurement agency “DGA” and the
manufacturer should benefit from a sufficient freedom of action to act efficiently within the boundaries of
technical and financial capacities. The goal is to achieve good performance enabling then to respond to the
requirement identified by combatants in the field.
OCTOBER 2007 131 DOCTRINE # 13
DOCTRINE
13
DOCTRINE
2007
# 13
C.D.E.F
Forces Employment
Doctrine Center
WINNING THE BATTLE
BUILDING PEACE
FOREIGN STUDIES EXCLUSIVE
AN INTERVIEW
HANS-OTTO BUDDE
GERMAN ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF
OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL
FT-01
FT-01 is also now available for general public distribution in a French version entitled Les Forces Terrestres dans les conflits aujourd'hui et demain
(Land Forces in Present and Future Conflicts), prefaced by General Cuche,
Army Chief of Staff.
FT-01
TAKING THINGS FURTHER
Doctrine
Armée de Terre, Winning the Battle, Building Peace (FT-01 (ENG)), Centre
de doctrine d’emploi des forces, Paris, décembre 2007, 84 pages, is now
available.
W I N N I N G T H E B AT T L E - B U I L D I N G P E A C E
OCTOBER
2007
General military review
WITH FT-01
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