Government Support of the Semiconductor
Industry: Diverse Approachesand
Information
Flows
Daniel Holbrook •
Departmentof History
CarnegieMellon University
Intensiveresearchanddevelopment
duringthe SecondWorld
War had resultedin new technologiessuchas radar,the proximity
fuse, and the atomic bomb, all of which contributed to the Allied
victory.The ColdWar markeda newerain governmentfundingfor
researchand development,however,as new geopoliticalpressures
convincedmilitary and civilian policymakersto maintain R&D
expenditures
at a levelfarexceeding
thatof theprewaryears.
2 The
majorityof government
research
dollarsafterthewar wentto a small
numberof industries,most prominentlyaerospaceand electronics
[Mowery and Rosenberg,1989, p.132], amply supportingboth
fundamental
andappliedresearch.
3
Governmentfundingof industrialR&D hasreceiveda great
deal of attentionfrom scholarsin a numberof disciplines. In
particular, historiansand economistsinterestedin technological
•I wouldliketo thankDavidHounshell,
SteveKlepper,
WesCohen,
DavidJardini,
Bob
Gleeson,MargaretGraham,andRobertCuff for their commentsand suggestions.Archival
research
wasfundedby an NSF Dissertation
Improvement
grant,a RovenskyFellowship,
anda ChandlerFellowshipfromHarvardBusiness
School.
2Thefederal
government
contributed
overhalfof all R&D fundsuntilwellintothe1970s.
The militaryin turnaccounted
for thegreatest
proportion
of federalR&D expenditures
in
industryfor sometimeafterthewar. In onlyoneyear,1966,did themilitary'sportionof
federalR&D spending
fallbelow50 percent
[MoweryandRosenberg,
1989,pp. 123-168].
3Fortheremainder
ofthispaper
theterm"government"
willmeanthemilitary
andNASA,
whichwerebyfarthegreatest
federalsources
of R&D fundingfor theelectronics
industry.
BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC HISTORY, Volume 24, no. 2, Winter 1995.
Copyright¸1995 by theBusiness
HistoryConference.ISSN 0849-6825.
Daniel
Holbrook
/ 134
innovationhaveexploredthe questions
of whethersuchfundinghas
stabilized
or distorted
thegeneraleconomy;
howgovernment
funding
affected industrialsectorsand technologies;and whether some
technologiesand industrieswere favoredover others. They have
addressed
questions
aboutthe efficiencyandworthiness
of federal
R&D funding.
4 Theyhaveexplored
the effectsof government
fundingon the directionof scientificinquiry,with debatebetween
thosewho believethatthe militaryorientationhasdivertedscientific
inquiryfrom moresociallyvaluableavenuesandthosewho believe
that no such"distortion"took place [Leslie, 1993;Forman,1985;
Kevles,1990;Geiger,1992,1993].s
The Case of Microelectronics
The microelectronics
industryin particularhas attracteda
considerable
amount
of investigative
effort.
6 Mostdiscussion
of the
effectsof government
support
for thisindustryhastakenplacein the
contextof economicand policy argumentsaboutthe efficiencyof
industryandtechnologysupportprograms.The consensus
among
industryanalystsseemsto be thatthe government,
throughits direct
and indirect procurementpolicies, provided an early and
price-insensitive
marketthatpromotedmovementalongthe learning
curveandallowedtheindustryto decrease
pricesasit learnedhowto
4MoweryandRosenberg
[1989,PartIll, "Thedevelopment
of thepost-war
system,
1940-1987"]provides
a capsulation
of thesetopics.CohenandLevin[1989]provides
an
excellentsummaryof someof therelevanteconomics
literature.
5Forthe"distortionist"
view,seeforexample
Leslie[1993]whichuses
MIT andStanford
Universityasillustrativeof theeffectsthatfederalfundinghadon thedirectionof scientific
inquiryin academia;
seealsoForman[1985]. The anti-distortionist
campincludesKevles
[1990] andGeiger[1992, 1993, 1994].
6Thisindustry
ismorecommonly
referred
toin the1990sasthesemiconductor
industry.
In the 1950s,however,materialsother than semiconductors
were important,and
"electronics"
includedtubetechnology:
thusI will use"microelectronics
industry."
Government
Support
of theSemiconductor
Industry
/ 135
makeitsproducts.Theseanalystscredittheexistenceof thepotential
government
marketwith inducingprivateinvestmentin R&D. They
also generally agree that governmentsupportof semiconductor
researchin universityand industrylaboratoriescontributedto the
welfareof the semiconductor
industryby buildingsubstantial
bases
of scientificandtechnicalexpertisethere. The analystsconcludethat
the various federal agencies and institutionsestablishedan
atmosphere
conduciveto technicalinnovationby requiringdeviceand
systemperformancebeyondthe stateof the art.
Several studiesof the microelectronicsindustry,however,
make mentionof anotherway in which governmentsupportof the
industryhascontributed
to its success:
"It is evidentthat government
agencies have made a useful contribution to the diffusion of
technologicalexpertisein their role as informationclearinghouses"
[Golding, 1971, p. 334; Utterbackand Murray, 1977, p. 34; Asher
andStrom,1977,p. 57].7 Thisobservation
deserves
moreattention.
By creating,supporting,and disseminatingdiverseapproachesto
technicalinnovationin semiconductor
microelectronics,
government
agencieswere extremelyimportantin the overall developmentof
microelectronictechnologyandthusalsoin the developmentof the
microelectronics
industry.
Diversityin approaches
to technicaladvance,combinedwith
flows of technical and scientific information, gains particular
significance
becauseof thecomplexityof microelectronic
technology.
The design and production of microelectronicdevices involve
chemical, mechanical,metallurgical,and photographicprocesses,
eachcomplexin itself. Furthermore,becausemicroelectronics
is a
science-rich
technology,it frequentlybenefitedfrom, while not being
7Theoriginalquotation
is fromGolding[1971,p. 334];it alsoappears
in Utterback
and
Murray[1977,p. 34].
Daniel Holbrook
/ 136
subsidiary
to, advances
in scientific
knowledge.
8 Althoughthe
desiredendof technicalinnovationin microelectronics
wasusually
clear--i.e., better performanceaccordingto commonlyaccepted
criteriaof whatthatconstituted--the
complexityof thetechnology
and
its use of knowledgefrom engineering,scientific,and empirical
sourcesmeantthat the routeto innovationwasnot alwaysclear and
thatopportunities
for innovationexistedin manyanddiverseareasof
researchandengineering.
Herein lies the root of what is commonlyreferredto as
"technicaluncertainty."NathanRosenberg
put it thisway:
The essentialfeatureof technologicalinnovationis
that it is an activity that is fraught with many
uncertainties.This uncertainty,
by whichwe meanan
inabilityto predictthe outcomeof the searchprocess,
or to predeterminethe mostefficient path to some
particulargoal,hasa very importantimplication:the
activitycannotbe planned[Rosenberg,1994,p. 93].
Technological
complexityincreases
thevarietyandscopeof areas
of technicalopportunity,
multiplyingthetechnicalandscientific
uncertainty.Rosenbergcontinues:
No person,or groupof persons,is cleverenoughto
plantheoutcomeof thesearchprocess,in thesenseof
identifyinga particularinnovationtargetandmoving
in a predeterminedway to its realization.
[Rosenberg,1994 p. 93].
In the contextof the 1950smicroelectronics
industry,such
uncertaintymeantthatno onefirm couldhopeto perceiveor tackle
8Ofcourse,
R&Din science-rich
technologies
canalsoleadtothecreation
of newscientific
knowledge.
At differentpointsin thehistoryof suchtechnologies
sciencemaybemoreor
lessimportant.
Government
Support
of theSemiconductor
Industry
/ 137
all of the areasworthy of investigation.In practice,managersof
firmsfacedwith choicesamongtechnological
opportunities
differed
intheiridentificatiofi
ofparticular
innovation
targets
andthusinduced
differencesin firms' R&D activities. This "heterogeneity
of the
human input"--that is, differences in "skills, capabilities, and
orientations"
[Rosenberg,
1994,p. 95]-- hada profoundinfluenceon
the developmentof microelectronics
technologies.
In circumstancesof uncertainty and diversity in the
perceptions
of innovation
targets,
theimportance
of flowsof technical
informationamonginnovators
increased.The significance
of these
flows stemmedfrom and dependedon the complexity of the
technology;
theirexistence,in turn, stemmedfrom anddependedon
socialandeconomicaswell astechnicalfactors. In the caseof early
microelectronics
technology,
theU.S. governmenthelpedprovidean
environmentconduciveto bothhighflowsof technicaland scientific
informationanddiversityin approaches
to innovation.
Information
Flows
In theearly1950sBell TelephoneLaboratories
(BTL) wasthe
world's richest source of technical and scientific information
about
transistorsand semiconductor
materials. BTL garneredthe first
militarycontractfor R&D in transistortechnology,a JointServices
contractissuedin 1949 and extendedconsistentlythroughoutthe
1950s. The 1956consentdecreethatfinally settleda 1949antitrust
suitobligatedAT&T, amongothermandates,
to distributeits patent
informationat reasonable
costto all interested
parties.AT&T was
already following a policy of making such informationeasily
available to licensees. The legal power of the consentdecree
reinforcedthefirm's prior actionsandensuredan ongoingandwide
distributionof information[Smits, 1985,p. xii].
A provisionof theJointServicescontractrequiredBTL to holda
symposiumin 1951 for invitedmilitarypersonnelandcontractors.
"We have been in touch with membersof the three Military
Departmentsregarding recent transistordevelopmentsin Bell
Daniel Holbrook
/ 138
TelephoneLaboratories,"D. A. Quarles,a vice-presidentof Bell
Labs,wroteto thosenominatedto attend. The developments
"may
haveapplicationin the field of militaryequipment,"and so "it has
seemed desirable to make this information
available
at the earliest
feasible date to as many in military and in military contractor
organizationsas can be accommodated"[Quarles, 1951]. The
attendees
includedpersonnelfrom government
agencies,the military
services,andresearchers
andexecutives
fromuniversities
andleading
industrialfirms.
ø This eventmarkedone of the first postwar
government
effortsto disseminate
technicalandscientificinformation
aboutsemiconductor
devicesand physicswidely to industryand
academia.The subsequent
1952 symposiumon transistorscience,
engineering,
andmanufacturing
for AT&T licenseesfurtherspread
the technology.
to The variousmeansby whichthe government
assuredthe distributionof Bell Labs' informationwere crucialearly
eventsin the historyof thistechnologyandindustry.
Another feature of the 1949 Joint Services contract (and its
extensions)was a final clausegiving the governmentthe right to
distribute
information
produced
underthatcontract.
• Because
Bell
Laboratoriescarried on internally funded researchalongsidethe
military work, it oftenproveddifficult to distinguishbetweenthese
9Theattendees
includedpersonnel
from variousmilitarylabsandcommands;
British,
French,and Canadianrepresentatives;
researchers
from 22 Americanuniversities;and
personnelfrom 88 commercialfirms. Some 119 defensecontractorsin all are listedas
havingsentrepresentatives
['q'ransistorSymposium,"List of Guests,1951]. Note that this
is a considerably
largernumberthanattendedthe licensees'symposium
heldthefollowing
year.
•øAttendees
of the 1952symposium
included
representatives
fromtwenty-six
domestic
companies
andfourteenforeignfirms.
llForexample,
Article51 of Contract
#DA 36-039SC-64618,
whichstates
in part:"The
Contractor
agrees
toanddoesherebygrantto theGovemment...therighttoreproduce,
use
and disclosefor governmental
purpose. . . all or any part of the reports,drawings,
blueprints,
dataandothertechnicalinformationspecifiedto be deliveredby theContractor
to the Governmentunderthis contract..." [AT&T Archives,419 06 02 03].
Government
Support
of theSemiconductor
Industry
/ 139
bodiesof knowledge.Nonetheless,
informationdeemedto havebeen
paid for by the governmentwas subjectto distributionto other
defensecontractorswith an interestin microelectronicswork, most
oftenin the form of quarterlyreportswrittenby theresearchers
and
submittedto the militarysponsor.
•2 "[S]oundlycursedby the
developers
who hadto preparethem,"thesereportsnotonlyserved
thepurposeof "keepingthe militaryabreastof currentdevelopment
but also [of] teachingand stimulatingothermilitary contractors
in
industryandacademia"[AndersenandRyder,n.d, p. 186].
Themilitarysponsors
believedthisdissemination
of technical
and scientificinformationimportant,and thosewho receivedthe
reportsrealizedtheirvalue. The occasional
tardinessof Bell Labsin
submittingthe reports,accordingto onecompanyofficial, causeda
"great delay in disseminating
data which is first learnedfrom a
perusalof the reports,"which in turn "prevent[ed]a more rapid
utilizationby industryof the advancements
in transistortechniques
developedby the Laboratories"[Morgan, 1956].
Bell Labs'quarterlyreportswere, in fact,widely distributed.
Filesin the AT&T archivesare repletewith requestsfor the reports,
bothfromlargefirmssuchasWestinghouse
andGeneralElectricand
from smaller firms including Baird Associatesand Microwave
Rectifiers[Case#26237-89]. BTL officialsreferredsuchrequeststo
theArmy SignalCorps,the contractadministrator.
Such dissemination clauses were not exclusive to contracts
with Bell Laboratories.For example,a 1954 Texas Instruments
contractwith theAir Forcecontained
a clauseallowingthequarterly
reportsto be "transmitted
according
to a distribution
list furnished
by
URelease
of private
information
supplied
tothegovernment
undercontract
wasnotallowed
without permissionfrom the producer. The contractsystemwas, however,inherently
"leaky." As Danhof[1968] notes,contractproposals
from privatefirms maycontain
proprietaryinformation.Suchinformationrisksbecoming"partof thecommonstockof
knowledge"[p. 249].
Daniel
Holbrook
/ 140
theAir MaterielCommand"
[Memo,1955].•3 Similarly,BellLabs
itselfreceived
information
produced
undercontract
byotherfirms.•4
The disseminationof quarterly reports appears to have been
widespread.
The AT&T consentdecreeassuredthat patentsgeneratedby
BTL becameeasilyavailable. For otherfirms, patentsthatresulted
from military projectswere subjectto compulsory,royalty-free
licensing for military purposes. Because most if not all
microelectronics
manufacturers
werealsomilitarycontractors,
patents
were not an effectivebarrierto the flow of informationin the early
years
ofthemicroelectronics
industry.•5
Thispatent
policywaspart
of a consciousgovernmenteffort to promotethe usefulnessand
efficacyof its researchoutlays. Justas industrialoutputhad been
crucial to the World War II effort, the federalgovernmentdeemed
"industrial preparedness"essentialto victory as the Cold War
threatenedto heat up. The distributionof technicaland scientific
informationwas as essentialto this plan as increasedfunding for
R&D and for largerandmoremodernproductionfacilities.
The electronics
industrywasa majorbeneficiaryof industrial
preparedness
policies. The postwarmilitaryandits weaponrywere
increasingly
relianton electronics
for communications,
commandand
•3Thedistribution
listin thisfoldercontains
thenamesof firmssmallandlarge.
•4Foroneexampleamongmany,BTL receivedGeneralElectric's
monthlyreportson a
transistor
projectfromtheAir Force[NewarkAir Procurement
Districtre contract# AF33
(600)-28956, letterto BTL, AT&T Archives,419 06 01 12].
•SFor
various
reasons
muchthatwaspatentable
in theindustry
wentunpatented.
Asherand
Strom[ 1977,pp.27-28] containsa briefbuteffectiveexplanationof the role of patentsand
patentpolicy in the industry.In the early years,firms frequentlyinfringedeachothers'
patents,
in explicitrecognition
of theneedfor innovations
on manydifferenttechnicaland
scientificfronts.Patentholderscalculatedthatprosecuting
infringerswouldhalttheirown
access
to theinfringers'innovations;
aslikelyinfringersthemselves
theywerenot interested
in promotingprosecution.This dynamicchangedas the technologymatured,innovative
opportunities
becamelesscommon,anda few firmscameto controlcrucialpatents.
Government
Support
of theSemiconductor
Industry
/ 141
control, and computation. The rapid and wide deploymentof
electronicsacrossthe military establishmentwas crucial to the
developmentof the so-calledNew Look military, dependenton
superiorintelligence-gathering
andanalysis,mobility,andweapons
delivery. Advancesin microelectronics
technologydependedon
sophisticatedscienceand engineering. Widespreadaccessto
scientificandtechnicalinformationfacilitatedchange.The industrial
preparednesspolicy bore fruit in short order following the
development
of thetransistor
at BTL, asotherfirmsmadeimportant
technical and scientific contributionsto the art.•6
The services themselves had specific programs for
disseminating
informationabouttheirtechnicalresourcesandneeds.
The Army, for example,establishedthe QualitativeDevelopment
Requirements
Informationprogram"to alertindustryto the unsolved
problemsconfrontingthe Army," the Army ResearchTechnical
Studiesprogram"to informindustryof thecurrentresearchprograms
underway,"andthe UnfundedStudyProgram"to encourage
industry
to submit unsolicitedproposalsthat might benefit the future
development
of Army materiel"[U.S. Army, 1963,p. 20]. The Air
Force and the Navy organized similar programs, establishing
informationnetworksthat servedthe needsof both the military and
themicroelectronics
industry
[Kleiman,1966,pp.179-180].
•?
Other governmentagenciesalsomandateddisseminationof
scientific and technical information.
The National Aeronautics and
SpaceAdministration
(NASA), for instance,
bornoutof a fermentof
political,military,ideological,andeconomicfactors,from the outset
•6Raytheon,
forexample,
quicklyappliedtransistors
to oneof its products,
hearingaids;
PhilcoCorporationsoonproducedjunctiontransistors
by anelectrochemical
process;
GE
produced
junctionsby analloyingprocess.
For Raytheon,seeScott[ 1974,pp.206-207]; for
PhilcoandGE, seeBraunandMacDonald[1978,pp. 55-57].
17See
alsotheOfficeof NavalResearch
publication,
Directory
ofDepartment
of Defense
InformationAnalysisCenters(Washington,D.C., 1966), which lists sometwenty-two
official military sourcesfor technicalandscientificinformation.
Daniel Holbrook
/ 142
includeda divisiondevotedto distributingtechnicalinformationto
industry.
•8 Theexplicitpurpose
of NASA'sOfficeof Technology
Utilization was to seethattechnologies
developedin the courseof
space-relatedR&D made their way quickly and efficiently into
industry'shands.The agencynow knownastheDefenseTechnical
InformationCenter(DTIC), whosepredecessor
hadbeenformedat
the end of World War II, collectedreportsand publicationsfrom
defensecontractorsand distributedthe data amongthem and other
interesteddefensecontractors.•9
The governmentalso contributedto the disseminationof
knowledge in two ways beyond the formally mandated and
contractualfunctionsdiscussed
earlier. The first derivedprimarily
fromthecharacteristics
of militaryelectronicequipment;the second
wasa productof the collateraleffectsof civilianadvisoryboardsto
the military.
State-of-the-art
electronicsgrew increasinglycomplexin the
1950s. Early computers,an areaof intensemilitary interest,used
circuitscontainingmany thousandsof components[Basheet al.,
1986; Cortada, 1993]. Requirementsto transistorize,miniaturize,
make more durable,and increasethe performanceof components
addedto the difficulty of developingreliablesolidstatecircuitry. It
was a technicaltaskof the highestorder.
The natureof themilitary'stechnological
demandspractically
forcedcooperation.Largeandcomplexmilitary systemsweremost
often developednot by singlefirms but by coalitionsof contractors
•8McDougall
[1985,chap.7, pp.177-194]givesa goodpictureof theeventsandsituations
that led to the formation of NASA.
•9Whis
agency's
originalmandate,
whenit wastheArmedServices
Technical
Information
Agency,was to take chargeof capturedGermantechnicaldocumentsand evaluatetheir
possiblemilitary and industrialuses. Its name waschangedafter the war to the Defense
Documentation
Centerand its mandatewas expandedto be a centralrepositoryand
clearinghouse
for technicaldocuments
produced
undermilitarycontract.The agency'sname
was later changedagain to its presentform.
Government
Support
of theSemiconductor
Industry
/ 143
andsubcontractors.
The ArmySignalCorps'micromodule
program,
for example,fundedfrom 1957to 1963,involveda multiplicityof
large
and
small
microelectronics manufacturers.
The
compartmentalizationof labor and the need to coordinate
components' physical and performance parameters required
participating firms to communicate technical and scientific
information
rationally
andopenly.
2ø
Like the micromoduleprogram,the MinutemanI and II
missileprogramsrequiredtheparticipationandcooperationof many
firms.
Autonetics
was the main
contractor
for the Minuteman
guidancesystems.The military considered
the "teamconceptof
Autonetics
andits suppliers"
usedfor MinutemanI sosuccessful
that
it wasadaptedfor MinutemanII [AsherandStrom,1977,p. 22]. The
list of Minutemansubcontractors
includedmany of the industry's
most prominentfirms, which cooperatedand communicatedwith
each other. Fairchild SemiconductorCorporation(FSC), for
example, consultedregularly with Autoneticson the design and
performance
of integratedcircuitsfor MinutemanII [FSC, Stanford,
88-095].2• Bell Labsdidsubcontract
workandsupplied
technical
information,andMotorolaalsoparticipated
in the effort [Asherand
Strom,1977,pp. 19-23]. Missiledevelopment
wasonlyoneof many
complex projectsin the field of military and spaceelectronics.
2øRCA
wasthemaincontractor
forthisproject.Anexecutive
of thatfirmstated,
"thisis a
programwhichrequirestheskillsof theentireelectronics
industry..." [Watts,1959,p. 55].
Some articlesmentionup to one hundredfirms participatingduring the life of the
micromoduleprogram;the Army'sfinal reporton the projectlists seventy-one[Elders,
Gerhold,Tenzer,andAzoff, 1964,Table5, n.p.]. I thankHerb Kleimanfor thisdocument.
The DiamondOrdnanceFuzeLabs,anArmylab,andtheArmy SignalCorps'Laboratories
at FortMonmouth
playedmajorrolesin theproject.Information
aboutthisprojectis spread
outamongmanysources
in thetradeandtechnicalpress.See,for example,Danko,Doxey,
andMcNaul [1959], Shergalis[1959], Granville[1960], Dummer[1967], Boehm[1962].
2tGordon
Moore,a founderof Fairchildanditsdirectorof R&D from 1958to 1967,states
thattheMinutemanprogramwasvery importantfor the success
of Fairchildandthe wider
industry[Moore, interviewswith author,FebruaryandJune,1994].
Daniel
Holbrook
/ 144
Solid-stateconversionsof computing,communications,control,
radar,andguidanceequipmentwereall underway.
The rangeof complexprojectssponsored
by thegovernment
had a lasting effect on the structure and practices of the
microelectronics
industry. The "commonalityof interestamongthe
contractorsto the federalgovernment,"wrotetwo scientistsclosely
associated
withtheindustry,"promoted
thehighdiffusionrateof new
information in semiconductorelectronics" [Linvill and Hogan,
1977].22Thepatternof information
transfer
demanded
by military
contracts,combined with the pervasivenessof such contracts,
establisheda pattern of communicatingtechnicaland scientific
informationamongotherwisecompetingfirmsthatpersistedwell into
the 1960s [Holbrook, 1994]. Bell Labs' policy of information
dissemination,as well as the general scientific ethos of free
communication
of information,alsocontributed
to thisbehavior?
The complexityof thetechnology,
however,reinforcedthetendency.
Finally, the civilian boardsthat acted as advisorsto the
military in the postwar era contributedto the disseminationof
information,thoughusuallyof a more generaltype. Prominent
scientistsfrom boththeacademicandtheindustrialspheresaswell
as businessleadersfrom defense-related
companiesmade up the
22Hogan
wasa Harvard
physics
professor
whobecame
Motorola's
manager
of semiconductor
operations
in thelate1950s,thenheadedFairchildSemiconductor
Corporation
afterRobert
NoyceandGordonMoore left thatfirm to foundIntel. Linvill wasa researcherat Bell Labs
who wentto StanfordUniversityin the mid-1950sto takechargeof its semiconductor
physicsprogram.
:3BellLabsdirector
MervinJ.Kelly"recognized
thatthemostrapiddevelopment
of thisnew
fieldwouldtakeplaceifi notone,butmanycompanies
participated
in thework. To thisend,
he encouragedBell Labs' first major PatentLicensingSymposium,as a meansof
disseminating
knowledge..." [Fisk,n.d.]. The symposium
"seta standard
for thefreer[sic]
interchangeof informationin the semiconductor
arena,a standardthat prevailedfor many
years"[Smits,1985,p. 30].
Government
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of theSemiconductor
Industry
/ 145
advisory
boards? Theirregularmeetings
andcommunications
among board membersacted as conduitsfor information about
defenseresearch
andprocurement
projects.The extentto whichthe
advisory board network was used to disseminateinformation is
difficult to ascertain,but certainlyit did not slow the flow.
Many advisoryboardmembershadcontributedtheirefforts
to the militaryduringthe war; the advisorycommitteesallowedthe
continuationof wartime contactamongentrepreneurialscientists,
business
people,andthemilitarypersonnel
whograntedandoversaw
R&D andprocurement
contracts.William Shockley,for example,a
co-inventor of the transistor,went into the transistorbusinessfor
himselfin 1955. He servedat varioustimeson advisoryboardsof all
threemilitarybranches--participation
thatallowedhim to fulfill his
senseof patrioticduty,but alsoprovidedhim with an insidechannel
for information
aboutmilitaryneedsandprogress
onothers'projects.
Shockleycorresponded
with manyindividualswithin the military
R&D establishment.
For example,in 1957he wroteto GeneralJ. D.
O'Donnell, Chief SignalOfficer, U.S. Army, concerninga meeting
of oneadvisoryboard:
ß.. we discussed
thefuturepotentialof transistors
or
other
semiconductor
devices.
I indicated
that I
thoughtconsiderable
insightintofutureperformance
couldbe hadby theoreticalstudiesnow thatmanyof
theessential
physicalconstraints
areknown[Shockley
Collection, March 18, 1957].
He followedup thisobservation
by solicitingsuchcontractsfor his
firm. Similar correspondence
went out regularlyfrom Shockley's
24Members
of theAirForce's
Scientific
Advisory
Board,
forexample,
included
scientists
and
executives
frommanycommercial
firms,universities,
andotherfederalagencies.SeeSturm
[1986].
Daniel Holbrook
/ 146
firm to othermilitaryresearchagenciesand laboratories[Shockley
Collection,90-117].25
Mutuallaboratory
andcorporate
visitsalsoplayeda rolein the
dissemination of information?
Such visits cannot be attributed
wholly to the existenceof the advisoryboards;theywere (and are)
partandparcelof thescientificworld. The committees
did,however,
addto thepossible
pathsin thenetwork,usuallyona highmanagerial
level? The growthof technology
andbusiness
depends
on the
diffusion
of information.
As Diana
Crane writes in her Invisible
Colleges,"In technology... socialinteractionfacilitatesthe diffusion
of knowledge,but little is known aboutthe natureof this type of
socialinteraction"
[Crane,1972,p. 98]?
25Forexample,to peopleat ARDC, DOFL, ChinaLake,Wright-Patterson
AFB, Ft.
Monmouth, etc.
26Therecords
of Shockley's
firmcontainmanyreports
of suchvisits,asdorecords
from
FSC, BTL, andRCA. FairchildCollection,StanfordArchives,88-095; ShockleyPapers,
StanfordArchives,90-117;AT&T Bell LabsArchives;andRCA Collection,HagleyLibrary.
I thankRossBassettfor providingme withthe lastitem.
27Thisis an interesting
areafor furtherinvestigation.Previousstudyof scientificand
technicaladvisory
groupsto thegovemment
hasmainlyconcemed
theirrolesin nuclearand
scientificpublicpolicy. See,for example,Kevles[1979], whichdiscusses
theoriginsof
scientificadvisoryboardsbetweenthe warsaswell astheirpostwarrole. Little hasbeen
doneon the implicationsfor industryand technologyof the communications
and social
networksfosteredby theinteractions
of universityandcommercial
researchers
duringand
after serviceon military advisoryboards.
28Collins
[ 1974]examines
indetailthesocial
ne•tworks
of scientists
•nvarious
labsworking
onthedevelopment
of a typeof laserandtheexchange
of knowledgewithinthatnetwork.
SeealsoTaylor [1972].
Government
Support
of theSemiconductor
Industry
/ 147
Diverse Approaches
The developmentof complex, science-richtechnologies
dependson diverseapproaches
to technological
advanceoperating
within an environmentof high informationflows. As with the
establishmentof a formal information clearinghouseand the
development of informal modes of information diffusion, the
promotion of diversity derived from social, economic, and
technologicalcomponents.
The complex, intensive,and extensivenatureof R&D on
semiconductordevicesand productionprocessespresentedrich
opportunitiesfor innovation:in the 1950sfew technicalareaswere
settled. On the scientificside, an ample supplyof projectsin
chemistry,optics,physics,physicalchemistry,metallurgy,and all
theirpossiblepermutations
awaitedresearchers.
Tasksin equipment
designandconstruction,
materialsprocessing,
processcontrol,and
otherengineering
andmechanical
tasksalsoneeded
attention?
The immaturestateof the technologyalsoallowedroom for
differencesin perceptionabout which approacheswere worth
pursuing. Deciding what researchprojects to take involved
considerations
of existingresourcesand expertise,strategicaims
(bothcorporate
andmilitary),andperceptions
of marketpotentialas
well as purelytechnicalmatters. Human factors,notesRosenberg,
also impingeon the problem: "Not only do humanagentsdiffer
considerablyin their attitudestowardsrisk; they differ alsoin their
skills,capabilities,
andorientations,
howeverthosedifferences
may
have been acquired"[Rosenberg,1994, p. 95]. R&D managers,
regardless
of institutional
venue,haddifferentperceptions
of thebest
approach(or approaches)
to take, basedon their commercialand
scientific or technical experiencesand expectations. This
"heterogeneity
of humaninputs,"combinedwith theuncertainstate
29Transistor
technology
didnotstabilize
untilthemid-1960s
withtheemergence
of the
epitaxialplanardiffusion/oxide-masked
deviceandits eventualpredominance.
Daniel Holbrook
/ 148
of thetechnology,
createda fertilefield for diversityin approaches
to
innovation.
Governmentagenciesalso had reasonsto pursuediverse
approaches
to technicaladvancein semiconductor
technology.The
threemilitarybranchesandNASA, for example,haddifferentneeds,
basedon thetypesof equipmenttheyrequiredandthe usesto which
theyput them,andthoserequirements
conditionedthe technological
approaches
theypursued.The Air Forcevaluedsmallsize,the Navy
reliability,andthe Army reliabilitycombinedwith ruggedness
and
ease of repair [Kleiman, 1966, pp. 56-58, 180-184; Braun and
MacDonald, 1978, pp. 92-95]; only the space program held
miniaturizationas a primary goal, with reliability a closesecond
[Kleiman,
1966,p.58].30Costs
andconcerns
aboutsupply
convinced
the servicesto supporteffortsto increasethe mechanizedproduction
of electroniccomponentsand circuits [Latta, 1960; Bull, 1960;
Hirshon,1960].3•
Interservice rivalry no doubt also played a role in the
military'sbackingof alternative
technological
approaches,thoughit
is difficult to documentand shouldnot be overemphasized
in this
case.Certainlysuchrivalryplayeda partin otherfieldswith regard
tobothR&D andprocurement,
32buttheexistence
andpersistence
of
Joint Serviceseffortsbeliesthe preeminenceof petty rivalriesin
3øFor
specific
information
ontheArmy'sdemands,
seeU.S.ArmySignalCorpsPlanning
Guidefor Long-RangeR&D, 1956, pp. 34-37, U.S. Army Military History Institute
Archives,Carlisle Barracks,Pa.
3•Themilitarywasnot asconcerned
aboutinitialprocurement
costsasit wasaboutthe
maintenance
costs,whichfor complexelectronic
equipment
couldbeseveraltimestheinitial
costs. See Latta [1960], Bull [1960], and Hirshon[1960].
32See,
forexample,
thediscussion
concerning
thedebate
overcontrol
of thespace
program
foundin McDougall[1985, pp. 164-176].
Government
Support
of theSemiconductor
Industry
/ 149
semiconductor
technologies.
33 Further,industrygroupsandthe
military both supportedeffortsto establishcoherentand consistent
standards
formanufacturers
of electronic
components?
Leadersof all the military brancheswere well awareof the many
fronts on which technicalprogresshad to be made if solid-state
deviceswere to play the role the servicesenvisagedfor them. The
diverseresearch
areasoutlinedearlierall receivedsupport,sometimes
even in a singlecontract. The 1949 BTL contract,for example,
consisted
of a numberof specified"Tasks,"which spannedscience,
engineering,
andeducation
efforts? JointServices
Agencyand
Signal Corps contractswith industrybacked "many different
approachesfor producingdifferent components"[Utterback and
Murray, 1977,p. 23].
Further, the military realized the benefitsof widespread
participationin researchand developmentwork andthe importance
thatdifferences
in approaches
couldmake. The needfor diversityin
approachesis implicit in a statementfrom JamesGavin, the U.S.
Army Chief of R&D: "The total benefit to be derived from the
ingenuityandknow-howof Americanindustrycannotbe obtained
3•l'hemilitary
branches'
resistance
tocentralized
control
iswellknown.During
theongoing
debateoverthewasteinherent
in pursuing
multipleapproaches,
all threebranches
expressed
their revulsionfor the "socialistic"
aspects
of centralized
planning.SeeStarr[1955] and
Komons [1966].
V•l'he
ArmedServices
Electronics
Standards
Agency,
headquartered
atFortMonmouth,
N.J.,
was a joint organizationof the Army, Navy, andAir Forcethat established
standards
for
components
andmaterials.TheJointElectronTubeEngineering
Council(JETEC),among
otherprofessional
andindustrialorganizations,
established
standards
to makecomponent
buyingandcircuitdesigneasierfor commercialconcerns["GroomingTransistors,"1957,
pp. 66-70]. The NationalBureauof Standardsworkedto establishmeasurement
standards
fortheresistance
of semiconductor
materials,
alsoin aidof industry.Thisworkcontinued
well into the 1980s[Kalos, 1983,pp. 91-106].
3Yl'here
wereoriginally
fiveorsixtasks,
butcontract
extensions
hadexpanded
themtonine
by 1959.
Daniel
Holbrook
/ 150
without the participationof small businessas well as large. The
Army is anxiousto encouragesmall businessinterestin its R&D
programs" [Gavin, in Researchand Development,1956]. The
military had reachedthe same conclusionas had many industry
participants:continuedinnovationin the microelectronics
sector
would requirea broad array of approaches
to achievemaximum
progress.
Factorson the corporatesideof the ledgerhelpedcreatethe
diversityof approachesthat the governmentsupported. Different
firmsandindividualswithinfirmspossessed
differentperceptionsof
the needs
of their
customers
and of
their
internal
needs
and
capabilities.Someexamplesfromeffortsto integratecircuitryserve
to illustratethisargument.
Approachesto Integration
As military and commercial applicationsof electronics
increased,circuits became increasinglycomplex. Large circuits
posedseveralinterrelatedproblems. Reliability suffered;systems'
failurerate,statistically
andin practice,increasedwith the numberof
components,
eachof which had a specificfailure rate. The sheer
numberof interconnections
betweencomponents
in complexcircuits
produceda larger reliability problem, becausethe connections,
usuallymanuallysolderedor welded,wereoftenimperfector simply
failed. Thoughthetransistor
mayhaveremovedsomeof theheatand
powerlimitationsof tubecircuitry,it did little to resolvethisproblem,
whichJ. A. Morton of Bell TelephoneLabscameto call the "tyranny
of numbers"[Morton, 1958]. Integrationofferedthe possibilityof
alleviating
thisdifficulty,
aswellasof miniaturizing
thecircuitry.
36
36Miniaturization
andreliabilityare positivelycorrelated,
thoughthe directionof the
causative
arrowwas(andis) unclear;for an extendeddiscussion
of therelationship
between
the miniaturizationmovementandeffortsto increasereliability,seeKleiman[1966, pp.
54-77].
Government
Support
of theSemiconductor
Industry
/ 151
If the pressures
to integratewere several,so too were the
approaches
to theproblemin the mid-1950s. Solid-stateelectronic
circuitsuseda varietyof semiconductor
materialssuchasgermanium,
silicon,andcompound
materials.
37Firmsdesigned,
built,andsold
bothpoint-contact
andvarioustypesof junctiondevices,usinga wide
rangeof production
processes
andtechniques.Out of thisdiversity
emerged
themainapproaches
to integrating
circuitry:modularization,
thinfilms,hybridthin-film/discrete
circuits,"molecularelectronics,"
and monolithic
semiconductor circuits.
Althoughwe knowthatthemonolithiccircuiteventually
won
out, in the mid-1950s that outcome was far from obvious. The
uncertainty
inherentin integrationandthe differingperspectives
of
theparticipants
led to thepursuitof all the approaches.Eachhad its
militarychampion:
theArmy backedmodularapproaches;
theNavy
thin films and hybrids;the Air Forceventuredinto the wild blue
yonderof molecularelectronics.Commercialfirmsalsohadspecific
reasonsfor backingoneor anotherof theseapproaches.
Motorola, for example, displayedinterest in integration
beginningin themid-1950s.DanielNoble,the firm's chief scientist
and headof its semiconductordivision, advocatedmodularized circuit
elements in 1954 [Noble, 1954]. Later in the decade, when
integrationpressureshad increased,Noble wrote an editorial,
"Necessity
is theMother,"thatadvocated
modules
butalsoarguedfor
continuedthin-films researchalong with a longer-rangeoutlook
pursuing molecular electronicsideas [Noble, 1959]. Still later,
Noble's successor as head of the semiconductor division wrote:
In each case the technologyyou would choose
depends
ontheparticularcircuit,andon theparticular
37Germanium
wasprevalent
foractivedevices
(transistors
anddiodes).TI hada monopoly
on silicon devicesfor roughlytwo yearsfollowing its introductionof the first silicon
transistorin 1954. Compoundsemiconductor
materialssuchasindiumarsenidecameunder
increasingscrutinybut provedrecalcitrant.Attemptsto makeboth activeand passive
components
fromtantalumalsoreceiveda gooddealof attentionwithoutmuchlong-term
success[Stone, 1962].
Daniel
Holbrook/152
application.Sometimesonetechnologyis obviously
superiorto another;sometimes
a combination
of these
technologiesappearsto optimize the system. We
think that monolithic integratedcircuits, hybrid
integrated
circuits,thin-filmintegrated
circuitsareall
important,andthat is why we havenot concentrated
on just one, but have developedin our facilitiesa
capabilityin all fields [Hogan,1963].
Motorola was a conservative firm that consistently
emphasized
givingits customers
thebestproductfor thepurposeand
price. Motorolahesitated
tojump on anytechnological
bandwagon,
preferringinsteadto keepresearch
effortsunderway in severalareas
in orderto bestserveits clients. In no sensewas the firm opposedto
technicaladvance;its conservativestrategymerely militated against
the exclusive adoption of any one of the new integration
technologies?Thusthe finn continued
to advocateandmake
modularcircuitry,aninherently
conservative
approach
to integration,
until well into the 1960s,by which time the monolithicintegrated
circuitwasclearlybecoming
dominant.
39Motorola's
product
strategy
was conservativein other ways as well, emphasizingdiscrete
componentswell into the 1970s,even as the companydeveloped
capabilities
in integrated
circuittechnologies.
The modularapproachattractedmanyotherfirms. A survey
byElectronicIndustriesin 1962foundthatthirty-fiveof thefifty-nine
respondents(59 percent) were engaged in modular packaging
activities. Thirty-fourfirms (57 percent)were pursuingthin-film
38Infact,Motorolahadestablished
a research
centerin Phoenix
in 1948at theurgingof
Noble,whosewartimework andperceptions
of postwardevelopments
convincedhim that
futureelectronicswouldbe dominatedby solid statedevices. The finn did not produce
transistorsfor the commercialmarketuntil ten yearslater [Mueller, 1960].
39See
MotorolaEngineering
Bulletin,
vol.13,no.2, 1965,wherein
articles
advocate
hybrid
andmodularcircuitry.
Government
Support
of theSemiconductor
Industry
/ 153
approaches,whereasonly fifteen (25 percent)were investigating
monolithicapproaches
["Microelectronics
Today," 1962, pp. 9299].40
Molecular electronics was Westinghouse's choice of
technologyfor integration.In an attemptto movebeyondexisting
technologyand normal circuit design practice, they hoped to
manipulatenew and existingmaterialsto impartto them inherent
electronic
functions.
The Air Force was the main backer of this
approach,
fundingit from 1959until 1962with a totalof some$2
million [BraunandMacDonald,1978,p. 95].
Westinghouse
chosemolecularelectronics,accordingto one
account, because the firm had fallen behind in conventional
microelectronics
technologyandsowantedto "leapfrog"directlyto
thenextgeneration
of technology.Molecularelectronics"wasborn
in the firm's laboratories,
partiallyfrom pureresearch
effortsand
partlyfroma response
withinWestinghouse
to developa newproduct
to fill its semiconductor
void" [Kleiman,1966,pp. 188-189]. The
Air Force, however, claims that the molecular electronics idea arose
in 1953 within its laboratories
at Wright PattersonField [U.S. Air
Force, 1965]. The Air Forcechoseto backthisapproachas a way
bothto distinguish
its effortsfrom thoseof the otherservicesandas
a consciousmove to incubatenew approaches
to microelectronic
circuitry[AsherandStrom,1977,pp. 14-17;BraunandMacDonald,
1978,p. 95].4• Persistent
enthusiasm
fortheconcept
withintheAir
4øThese
numbers
clearlyindicate
thata numberof firmswerepursuing
morethanoneof
theseapproaches,
as wasthe casewith Motorola.
4•Alberts
[1962]states:
"If thegoalisstillmoreminiaturization
andreliability
improvement,
thena stillmoresophisticated
approach
mustbe found. It is the opinionof manyAir Force
membersthat this sophistication
will be accomplished
throughthe studyof materialsand
phenomena
withtheexpresspurposeof performinganequipmentor circuitfunctionin the
simplestpossiblemanner without referenceto previouscircuitry configurationsor
conceptions"
(p. 235). Albertswastheresearch
directorof theU.S. Air ForceAeronautical
Systems
Division,Wright-Patterson
Air ForceBase,andwasinstrumental
in mostAir Force
microelectronics
efforts.
Daniel Holbrook / 154
Force finally found a sympatheticear at Westinghouse.Powerful
allies in the defense establishmentpushed the program and its
potential
benefits
andurgeditssupport
[Kleiman,1966,p. 202].42
The firstmolecularelectronics
contractborea title relatingto
a crystal-growingproject,thoughthe researchperformedspanned
several experimentalareas, including semiconductor,magnetic,
metallic,andcrystallinematerials,andcombinationsthereof,aswell
asinvestigations
of varioustreatmentsthatcouldalter the electronic
characteristics
of thematerials.
43Themolecular
electronics
project
asoriginallyconceivedborelittle fruit. By 1962,Westinghousehad
altered its use of the term to mean monolithic integrated
semiconductor
circuitry,therebysomewhatconcealingthe failure of
theoriginalconcept
[Stelmak,
1962].
44
If modular approacheswere conservative,requiring the
adaptationof moreor lessstandardcomponentsandprocesses,
and
the molecularelectronicsapproachrepresented
a blue-sky,radical
mode of integration,then thin-film technologyfell somewherein
between. Printed circuitry, with origins in wartime work at the
Army's Diamond OrdnanceFuze Labs, utilized films of conductive
materialsappliedto non-conductive
substrates
to provideelectrical
connections between active circuit elements such as vacuum tubes or
42Amain supporterwas JamesM. Bridgesof the Office of DefenseResearchand
Engineering,DOD.
43Detailed
technical
information
of theearlyphases
of themolecular
electronics
program
is
elusive.Mostreferences
to it mentionthegoalsof theprojectwithoutspecifyinghow these
goalswereto be obtained. See Haggerty[1964], "SpecialReport"[1962, p. 174], and
"ElectronicsGoes Microscopic"[1959, p. 34]. This last article specificallymentions
germaniumandsiliconas"theraw materialsfor [molecularelectronics]
devices,"making
it clear,however,thatthiswas"mostlyan accident"becausethesematerialswerethenthe
bestunderstood.The expectationwasto be ableto usea "widervarietyof raw materials,"
including molybdenum,aluminumoxide, tungsten,tantalum,iron, nickel, and silicon
dioxide.
n•Thisarticlementions
onlysemiconductor
materials.
Stelmak
workedforWestinghouse.
Government
Support
of theSemiconductor
Industry
/ 155
transistors.Printedcircuitryreducedthe failurerateof solderedwire
connections
and thusconstituted
an earlyattackon the "tyrannyof
numbers"problem[Danko and Gerhold, 1952]. The materialsand
techniqueswere simple,sometimesevencrude. Conductivepastes
silk-screenedor stenciledonto ceramic,resin, or plastic boards
formedconnectivelines. Basicpassivedevicessuchasresistorsand
capacitors
werequicklydeveloped.
45Thenaturalnextstepseemed
to be thedevelopment
of thin-filmactiveelements[Lessor,Maissel,
and Thun, 1964].
The relativesimplicityattractedmanyfirms, includingsome
outsidetheestablished
electronics
industry.The materialsemployed
in thin-filmpassivecircuits--metals,
ceramics,glasses,andplastics-were commonlyusedoutsidethe electronicsindustry. Firms with
experiencein thosematerialsbecameattractedto the potentialfor
diversificationinto the microelectronicsindustry. Corning Glass
Works,for example,longa supplierof materialsfor microelectronics
and a makerof somepassivecomponents,
had participatedin the
micromoduleprogramaswell. In the late 1950s,Corningmanagers
contemplateda move into active electronic components,using
thin-film integratedcircuitsas their entree [Boehm, 1962, p. 99].
Otherfirmsbothlargeandsmallalsopursued
thisapproach.
46
Although thin-film researchflourishedin the early 1960s,
success
with thin-film activedevicesproveddifficult to attain. As
onearticlecharacterized
theproblems,"themajorobstaclehereis the
nSActive
devices
in a circuit,
suchastransistors
andrectifiers,
amplifyorswitch
thecurrent.
Passivedevices,suchasresistors
andcapacitors,
storeor restraintheenergy,adjustingit for
feedingto an activedevice.
46Inthe1965Industrial
Research
LabsoftheUnitedStates,
thirty-one
firmsmention
thinfilm researchactivities. Many large firms, from diverseindustries,are includedin this
group:AMF, BendixCorp.,FordMotor Co., RCA, SylvaniaElectricProducts,General
Electric,MartinMarietta,Motorola,Raytheon,TexasInstruments,
UnitedAircraft,Xerox.
SmallerfirmssuchasStupakoffCeramicandManufacturing
of Latrobe,Pa.,andHalexInc.,
foundedin 1959, alsosoughtto moveintothin-film electronics.SeealsoGartner[1959],
BusinessWeek[May 5, 1962,p. 116], Rasmanis[1963], andDummer[1967].
Daniel Holbrook / 156
difficultyin depositing
thin singlecrystallayersof semiconductors,
or in depositinga polycrystalline
film so thin and pure that
recombinationat dislocationsand grain boundariesdoes not
deteriorate
thecurrent
amplification"
[Gartner,
1959,p.42].47The
growingsuperiorityof monolithicintegratedcircuitsby the
mid-1960shastenedthe demiseof thin-filmprojects.
Hybridcircuitsusedthin-filmpassiveelementsandconventional
semiconductor active elements such as transistors and diodes. This
approachdid not, as a rule, emphasizemicrominiaturization;
proponents
mainlysoughtlow priceandhighreliability. By using
two well-known technologies,hybrid circuits suited many
applications
thatdid notrequirehighstandards
of compactness
but
did needreliabilityandeaseof manufacture.Hybrid circuitsposed
noneof the circuitperformance
limitationsthataccompanied
other
integration
techniques.
IBM, for example,usedhybridcircuitsuntil
well intothe 1970sfor exactlysuchreasons
[Basheet al., 1986,pp.
406-415; Pugh,Johnson,andPalmer,1991,pp. 48-112].
Monolithicintegrated
circuits,thelastapproach,
consistof a
pieceof semiconductor
material,mostcommonlysilicon,treatedto
constructtransistors,
diodes,andpassiveelementswithin(or upon).
it. This approach,the mostcommontoday,was inventedalmost
simultaneously
in 1959 by Jack Kilby at Texas Instrumentsand
RobertNoyceat FairchildSemiconductor
Corporation.Thesetwo
individualsand firms possessed
the skills necessary
to make such
devices,thoughthey differedin importantways. Althoughstill a
relativelysmallfirm in 1959,TexasInstruments
occupieda leading
positionin themicroelectronics
industry.Activein manyareasof
semiconductor
research,
includingall of theapproaches
to integration
described,the firm partookextensivelyof militaryR&D funds. By
47Gartner
mentions
research
beingdonein thisareaasearlyas 1959butunfortunately
does
not mentionany firmsby name. The author,however,wasChiefScientist,SolidState
DevicesDivision,Electronic
Component
Research
Dept.,U.S. ArmySignalResearch
and
Development
Laboratory,
sotheworkmentioned
mayhavebeentakingplaceeitherthere
or undermilitarycontract.He wentonto becomemanagerof Semiconductor
R&D at CBS
Hytronin 1960.
Government
Support
of theSemiconductor
Industry
/ 157
contrast,Fairchild was only two years old in 1959. Though
immediatelysuccessful,
it wassmallandstayedfocusedon a single
type of product. Noyce'sconceptionof the integratedcircuitcame
directly out of Fairchild's experiencemaking silicon transistors
[Wolff, 1976; Noyce, 1977]. Texas Instruments'integratedcircuit
came from Kilby's experiencesmaking transistorsat Centralab,a
division of Globe-Union[Wolff, 1976, p. 46; Kilby, 1976]. The
differences
between
the two correlated
with
the differences
in
technological
approaches
thetwofirmsused.Noycechosesiliconas
hismaterialanda methodof interconnection
madepossibleonlyby
use of planar construction,a Fairchild invention. Kilby used
germanium
and interconnected
his deviceusingwires.
48 Both,
however,citedthe importanceof the "broadbaseof semiconductor
technology"
in theUnitedStates,aswell as"theimportanceof early
contributions
by manypeoplein theirowncompaniesandin therest
of theindustry"[Wolff, 1976,p. 53].
The military very quickly supportedthe monolithicidea.
Texas Instrumentsreceiveda developmentcontractfrom the Air
Forcein 1959. Fairchildresistedtakingdirectmilitarysupportfor its
R&D, thoughthegovernment
remaineditslargestcustomer
for some
time[Wolff,1976,p. 53].49Bythemid-1960s
monolithic
integrated
circuits had achieved widespread acceptancedespite their
performancelimitations,andby 1970 the otherapproaches,
though
notdead,hadlostmuchof theirresearchappeal.
48Kilby's
prototype
usedthese
materials;
I donotmeantoimplythatTexasInstruments
went
forwardstrictlyaccordingto Kilby's model.
n9Mostof FairchildSemiconductor's
products
wenteitherdirectlyor indirectlyto the
military, and thusits successwas dependenton military monies. In 1959 JohnCarter,
president
of FairchildSemiconductor's
parentfirm,FairchildCameraandInstrumentCorp.,
statedthatthesemiconductor
division'sbusiness
was80 percentmilitaryand20 percent
commercial[Palo Alto Times,October9, 1959;clippingin diary of William Shockley,
StanfordUniversityArchives].
Daniel Holbrook
/ 158
Conclusion
Governmentsupportfor the microelectronics
industryin the
1950s consistedof more than simplyprovidinga market for the
industry'soutput and building a trained personnelpool. The
govemment
established
an atmosphere
conduciveto innovationon a
widerbasethanthelure of largeprocurements
andR&D contracts.
It took concretestepsto establishand encouragethe transferof
technicaland scientificinformationamongotherwisecompeting
firms, with profound consequencesfor the developmentof
microelectronics
technology. The governmentwas not the sole
sourceof suchinformationflows; AT&T's policiesof opennessas
well asthe scientificethosof freeexchangeof informationmustalso
entertheequation.
soNevertheless,
theactions
of various
government
agenciesserved to expand and reinforce existing information
exchangenetworks.Diverseinformationmovedoverthesechannels:
bothscientificandtechnical,it concerned
notonlytransistors
or any
onedevice,type of device,process,or approach,but many.
The problemof integrating
circuitrycertainlybenefitedfrom
thepursuitof diverseapproaches.
Lookingbackward,we canclearly
seethe contributions
of the otherapproaches
to the successof the
monolithicintegratedcircuit. Thin-films research,for example,
advanced
theartof puttingdowndelicatebutpreciselayersof metals,
ceramics,and semiconductor
materials,all of whichplay a part in
modern integratedcircuits. Similarly, the far-reachingmolecular
electronics
program,thoughit failedto meetthegoalsestablished
for
it, nonetheless
contributed
knowledge
of materialsandprocesses
that
founda placein moresuccessful
technologies.Suchtechnicaland
economicfailuresaremorethansimplywrongpathsor deadends;
theyplayanimportantrolein technological
development,
particularly
in complex,science-rich
technologies
suchasmicroelectronics.
søOther
conditions
underwhichotherwise
competing
firmsmightexchange
information
informallyare modeledin yon Hippel [1986].
Government
Support
of theSemiconductor
Industry
/ 159
The case of the microelectronicsindustry has other
implications
aswell. The business
environment
duringtheColdWar
was markedby the interminglingof the militaryandits money,the
varied motivationsof industry participants,and technological
uncertainty. Companieswith differenthistoriesand thus different
perspectives
chosedifferentlyhow, when,andin which areasto use
government
support.The militarybrancheswith theirown differing
setsof interestsandneedschoseto supportdifferenttechnologies.
Each technologicalapproachwas able to satisfy some sets of
perceptions
andreceivedreadysupportfrombothsides.Thus,various
approaches
to circuitintegration
weresupported
at the confluenceof
organizational
perceptions
andaims. Somehistorians
observethat
militarysupportat leastgreatlyaffected,if it didnotactuallypervert,
the direction of academic research [Leslie, 1993; Forman, 1985].
There is little doubt that commercial electronics firms, on the other
hand, largely maintainedcontrol of their researchagendasand
profitedsignificantly
fromtheirassociation
with themilitary.
The existenceof diverse interestsmade the military and
business
environments
of
the
late
1950s
well-suited
to
the
development
of microelectronics
technology,but it alsocomplicates
the taskof delineatingthe technology'shistory. It is not simple,or
perhaps
fruitful,to pointto a singlefactorthat"explains"
the success
of themicroelectronics
industryor eventhefailureof individualfirms
or projects.Eachof the factorsdescribedcanitselfbe brokendown
further,therebyfurthercomplicating
theanalysis.Simplifyingit by
ignoringanyof the factors,however,risksmissingimportantnuances
in the development
process.
Neithershouldwe overlookthe importanceof the demandsof
the technologyitself. Microelectronics
demandedinputsnot only
from the scientificrealmbut alsofrom engineering,empiricaltests,
and"blackmagic.
"5•Thetechnology
required
bothscientific
research
S•This
termwasusedby semiconductor
researchers
to coverthevastareasof physical
and
manufacturing
processes
that theydid notfully understand.It coversa largebodyof tacit
knowledge.
Daniel Holbrook / 160
and extensivedevelopmentefforts. Technologicaldevelopment
remainsinadequately
"unpacked,"
especiallybut notexclusivelyby
economists,whose
dominantview of theinnovativeprocess
is still overly
Schumpeterian, in its preoccupation with
discontinuities and creative destruction, and its
neglectof the cumulativepowerof numeroussmall,
incremental
changes
[Rosenberg,
1994,p. 126].52
The incrementalchangesin earlymicroelectronics
accumulated
from
the pursuit of diverseapproachesto problems,with the pursuers
connectedby both formal and informalchannelsof information
exchange.
Examiningtherolethatthegovernment
playedin thecreation
and supportof diverseapproachesto technicaladvanceand of
avenues
of knowledge
transfercanalsoprovidesomeinsights
intothe
moregeneralthemeof industryandtechnology
policy. In thecaseof
microelectronics,
the governmentdoesindeedhavea badrecordof
pickingtechnology
"winners,"if by winnerswe meansilicon-based
monolithic
integrated
circuits,themainstay
of today'sindustry?
Indeed,pickingthe eventual"winner"wouldhave beenprescient;
veryfew of thoseintimatelyinvolvedwiththetechnology
at thetime
managed
to doso. Fromthewiderperspective
offeredby thispaper,
however,the government,
evenin its supportof economic"losers,"
52There
arecertainly
exceptions
to this. NelsonandWinter[1982],though
theyadopta
Schumpeterian
(or neo-Schumpeterian
- p. 39) perspective,
aresensitiveto thecumulative
and evolutionaryaspectsof innovation. Their interestin "an explicittheoryof industry
behavior"ratherthanin "individualfirm behavior"(p. 36), however,allowsthemto theorize
aboutfirms' routineswithouthavingto considerthehistoricaloriginsof thoseroutines.
53Many
analysts
of thegovernment's
rolein thetechnology
andindustry
makethispoint
[AsherandStrom,1977;Kleiman,1966;Golding,1971,forexample].Noneexplorein any
depththecontributions
of the"losers"thegovernment
picked,however.
Government
Support
of theSemiconductor
Industry
/ 161
did muchto advancethe winningtechnologyand thusthe industry.
By supportinga diversesetof projectsandby eitherdemandingor
encouraging
the sharingof the knowledgeproducedthereby,the
governmenthelpedto createa successful
technologyand industry.
The importantspilloversfrom thesegovernment-sponsored
projects
werenotproductsbuttechnicalandscientificinformation.And if, as
NathenRosenberg
states,
technological
innovationis souncertain
that
it cannotbeplanned,thenencouraging
diversityis thebest"planning"
we cando [Rosenberg,1994,p. 93].
Diversity and disseminationare thus powerful tools for
industrialpolicy. Whethertheydo or will work as well with other
technologiesand in other industriesremainsto be seen. The
conditionsthat reignedduringthe development
phaseof integrated
circuitry,a ColdWar fedby bothan armsanda spacerace,nolonger
exist. Urgent economicand competitiveness
problemsdo exist,
however,and technologyresidesat the centerof many of them.
Furtheringdiversityanddissemination
seemsonly prudent.
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