Intervention
in Syria
Jouman
MILITARY INTERVENTION IN
SYRIA IS NOT A VIABLE
POLICY OPTION
By Natalie Swabb
A
s the nearly two-year civil war in Syria continues
and the death toll rises, the debate on military
intervention as a means to end the conflict has
intensified. Although Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s
January 6 speech gave no indication that he would step down
from power, the international community, should not
overreact by using it as a justification for intervention.
Military involvement in Syria would be an irreparable policy
mistake leading to potentially devastating consequences for
an already delicate regional situation. Although the
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine has its merits, it would not
be advisable to employ value-driven principles in a uniform
manner across a diversity of cases without considering their
wider implications.
The R2P norm established by the United Nations
asserts that a state has the responsibility to protect its
population from mass atrocities and if it is unable to do so,
the international community has the responsibility to assist
the state. If both of these efforts fail, intervention comes into
play, with military intervention as a last resort. Aimed at
preventing genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and ethnic cleansing, R2P served as the justification for
military intervention in Libya in 2011.
However, Syria is not Libya. The Libyan
intervention was a special case and should not be used as
point of comparison for Syria. Protests against Qaddafi
began in February 2011 and the international community
worked in a surprisingly harmonious fashion to freeze his
assets and impose sanctions. When the situation worsened,
the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973 and by late
March there was a NATO-administered no-fly zone. By
October Qaddafi was dead and Operation Unified Protector
was over.
While the application of R2P in Libya could be
taken as precedent for Syria, the similarities between the
cases are actually quite limited. Libya’s lack of strategic
importance to members of the UN Security Council and the
weakness of Qaddafi’s army and air force made intervention
an easy political decision. However, in Syria, even after
nearly two years of conflict, Russia and China continue to
halt UN diplomatic efforts. Syria was a strategic Russian ally
Ford Institute for Human Security
Opinion Piece / February 2013
and the Russians have provided the Assad regime with the
majority of its military power. Compared to Libya, the
Syrian army poses a much greater threat. With a stronger
Syrian air force, implementing a no-fly zone constitutes a
greater risk of foreign military boots on the ground if there
were to be an intervention.
In fact, there are more points of comparison with the
case of Iraq. The Bush Administration went outside of
accepted diplomatic circles in 2003 when the US invaded
Iraq. The invasion and nearly nine years of war destabilized
Iraq, pushed it closer to Iran and damaged US relationships
in the region. Military action in Syria poses similar threats.
Like Iraq, the post-intervention scenario presents important
considerations. With a fractionalized Syrian opposition, who
would take power once the regime falls? Would an Assadfree Syria ignite Iran and Hezbollah? Would the Islamists
that are hostile to the US that are known to be among the
Free Syrian Army capitalize on the weakness of Syria
without a strong dictator? These are issues military
intervention could cause, not fix.
Just as the logistics in Syria are not conducive to
military intervention, neither is the academic research. The
existing research on civil wars can better inform
policymakers on the harmful short and long term
consequences of military intervention. Studies indicate that
intervention prolongs the duration of the conflict, especially
when the conflict attracts opposing interventions.1 Other
studies take the intervention critique a step further, arguing
that intervention actually inhibits the development of
democratic institutions post-conflict.2
Although current logistics and academic research are
not on the side of military intervention in Syria, the
international community does have policy options.
Diplomacy is crucial. For example, the US and its allies
should work diligently to persuade Russia to stop its support
for the Assad regime because opposing interventions (as we
see with Russia supporting Assad and the Friends of Syria
supporting the rebels) can prolong the duration of a conflict.
In addition to diplomatic efforts, the international
community can continue to fund and supply the rebels. We
can increase sanctions and freeze the assets of the Assad
cronies. We can work with local and international
1
Regan, Patrick M. and Aysegul Aydin. “Diplomacy and Other Forms of
Intervention in Civil Wars.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 5
(2006): 736-756.
2
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and George W. Downs. “Intervention and
Democracy.” International Organization, 60 (2006): 627-649.
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Intervention
in Syria
Jouman
Opinion Piece / February 2013
organizations to streamline the humanitarian aid process. We
can begin working on a plan with the Syrian National
Coalition for Opposition and Revolutionary Forces to
promote local security when Assad falls.
In the long term, revaluating the one-size-fits-all
R2P approach is crucial.3 R2P is stuck between a rock and a
hard place. Working within R2P framework is far too
politically tinged and working outside it is seen as
imperialistic. The international community needs to find
some streamlined, middle-of-the-road policy options to assist
in the prevention mass atrocities that are not subject to such
heated debate.
About Ford:
The Ford Institute for Human Security engages in
independent and collaborative research on causes of
political violence, the effects of conflict on civilians, methods
of conflict resolution, and transitions from conflict to stable
peace. We make our research findings available through
publications, presentations and consultation to national and
international policy makers, non-governmental
organizations and other interested parties. For more
information visit: www.fordinstitute.pitt.edu
About the Author:
Natalie Swabb is a Master in Public and International
Affairs candidate at the University of Pittsburgh expected to
graduate in April 2013 with a major in human security.
3
Pape, Robert A. “When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard of
Humanitarian Intervention. “International Security 37, no. 1 (2012): 4180
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