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OverviewofJusticeSystem/PurposesofPunishment
I.
Overviewofjusticesystem
a. Casesbeginwithcopswhoarrestsomebody.Thereasonisbasedonsomelevelofprobablecause.It
thengetskickedtotheprosecutors.Oursystemisdifferentthanmostbecauseprosecutorshavemore
discretion.Thediscretionnottochargeisnotdisputable.
b. Iftheycharge,theyhavetohaveprobablecause
c. Mostsentencesareresolvebypleabargainsandveryfewactuallygototrial
d. Theburdenofproofisontheprosecution.
II.
Reasonstopunishcriminals
a. General:Deterrence,incapacitation,rehabilitation,retribution,anddenunciation.
i. Dudleyv.Stephensillustratesdenunciation,retribution,anddeterrence
b. Retribution
i. Theideathatthereneedstobesomepunishmentandthatpeoplewhocommitcrimesare
blameworthyandthattheyneedtosufferinsomeway.Ifyoutransgresssocialnorms,you
shouldbepunishedproportionallyforyourtransgressionàretrospectiveintheideathat
tryingtokeeppeopleaccountableforthecrimesthattheyhavecommitted
c. Deterrence
i. Whatamanperceivesorsupposespaintobetheconsequenceofanact,hewillwithdraw
fromthecommissionofthatact
ii. Ifyoucommitacrimeandarepunished,themessageissenttosociety.Generally,peoplewill
notcommitthecrime.Specificallydeterringyoufromcommittingthecrimeagain.Also
prospective:looksforwardtopreventcrimes
iii. SpecificDeterrence:painofpunishmentpreventsindividualfromcommittingactagain
iv. GeneralDeterrence:painofotherssetsexampletolargersocietyaboutconsequencesofdeath
penalty
d. Incapacitation
i. Incapacitationseekstopreventfuturecrimebyeliminationorrestrictingtheabilityand
opportunityofapotentialcriminaltocommitcrime.Theprimaryrationaleforpunishmentin
CAforsometime—takepeopleoffthestreets—i.e.onecannotrobastorefromaprisoncell
e. Rehabilitation
i. Makespunishmentusefultosocietybyattemptingtoreducefurthercrime
f. Denunciation
i. Punishingthosewhoviolatesociety’sruleshelpstodrawlaw-abidingsocietytogetherby
reaffirmingsocietalvalues
ii. U.S.v.Bergman(casewheretherabbidefraudsthefed.Government)
1. Herethegeneralaimofdenunciationwillstophimfromdoingitagain.Alsoithasan
aimofdeterrence:topreventothersfromdoingittoo.
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Conduct
I.
Conduct:General
a. Legislaturestypicallyrequiresomesortofconductforcriminalliability:“actusreus”
i. Anact:bodilymovement,voluntarybodilymovement(includesspeech),etc.
ii. Cannotpunishsomebodywhenthereisn’tanact,unlesslegalduty,andcannotpunish
somebodywhenthereisn’tanact,unlesslegalduty,andcannotpunishsomebodyforbad
thoughts.
II.
Voluntarinessdefinition
a. MPC:Voluntariness:liabilityisbasedonconductthatincludesavoluntaryactortheomissionto
performanactofwhichheisphysicallycapable
i. A)Areflexorconvulsion
ii. B)Abodilymovementduringunconsciousnessorsleep
iii. C)Conductduringhypnosisorresultingfromhypnoticsuggestion
iv. D)Abodilymovementthatotherwiseisnotaproductoftheeffortordeterminationofthe
actor,eitherconsciousorhabitual(Verylowstandard)
I.e.Martinv.State:plaintiffwasdrunkinsidehishomeandpoliceofficersbringhimtoapublic
highwayinthiscondition—Novoluntarinessbecauseof(D)
b. Anotherdefinition:
i. Avoluntaryactisamovementofthehumanbodythatis,insomeminimalsense,willedor
directedbytheactor,canalsobetheresultofhabitorinadvertenceaslongastheindividual
couldhaveacteddifferently–Involuntarycontrol:thepersonhasnoconsciouscontrol
c. (AR)+(MR)+Causation=CrimeUNLESSDefenses
i. AR:ActusReus:actelementofacrime
ii. MR:Mensrea:mentalelementtoacrime
1. (Attendantcircumstances:circumstancesofthecrimethatneedtobepresent)
2. Attachedtotheconductelement
d. Apersoncannotbepunishedforastatusorcondition(Robinsonv.Powell)
e. Apersoncannotbepunishedforanomissionunlessitmeetsoneofthefourexceptionscreatingalegal
duty(Jonescase)
III.
Timeframing
a. I.e.Peoplev.Decina:Legalissue:Whetherthedrivercanbeaccusedofnegligenceinthatheconsciously
undertooktoanddidoperatehisvehicleonahighwaywithknowledgeofhisillness
i. Theprosecutionissayingthathemeetsthisactrequirementbecausehehasaconscious
elementofacting—voluntariness
ii. Thereare2actsherethatarerelevant:1)fortheprosecution:gettingintothecarwith
knowledgeoftheepilepsy,2)Forthedefense:theproximatecauseisepilepsy:notavoluntary
act
iii. Sotakeaway:toshowthatsometimesitdependsonwhichactyoufocusonthatultimately
determineswhichactwasvoluntary
IV.
Status“Being”versus“acting”
a. Robinsonv.California:Courtsaysthathisadditionalisastatusof“being”andisthereforenotanact—
isn’tactusreusbecauseitreflectshisreflect—it’sastatusbecauseit’sadiseasenotacondition—nota
choiceorcontroloverthisstateofbeing
V.
Omission
a. Liabilitymaybeimposedforfailuretoact
i. I.e.Jonesv.U.S.—appellantchargedforinvoluntarymanslaughterofaninfantthatwasplaced
inhercarebyafamilyfriend
b. MPC:Omission:Liabilityforthecommissionofanoffensemaynotbebasedonanomission
unaccompaniedbyactionunless
i. A)Theomissionexpresslymadesufficientbythelawdefiningtheoffense
ii. B)Adutytoperformtheomittedactisotherwiseimposedbylaw
c. LegalDutiesOwedBecauseofStatusRelationships:4conditionsforalegalduty
i. 1)Statusimposesadutyofcare
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d.
e.
f.
ii. 2)Certainstatusrelationship(i.e.parenttochild,spousestoeachother,employersto
employees,ownerstocustomers,innkeeperstoguests,andcaptainstopassengers)
iii. 3)Contractualdutytocareforanother
iv. 4)Whereonehasvoluntarilyassumedthecareofanotherandsosecludedthehelplessperson
astopreventothersfromrenderingaid.
Omission+LegalDuty=Act
THEREFORE:AnOmissioncansubstituteforanactwhencoupledwithalegalduty
i. Ifyoucandemonstratethelegalduty(1of4conditions)thenfailuretoactmeetstheactus
reusrequirement
Prosecutionhastoprovemoreinomissionbecausehastoprovelegalduty
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MentalStates
MensRea+ActusReus+AttendantCircumstances+(Causation)=CrimeUNLESSDefenses
(Attendantcircumstances:circumstancesofthecrimethatneedtobepresent)—attachedtoconductelement
I.
MensRea:General
a. Mostcrimesinvolveaunionofactusreusandmensrea
i. TheactusreusandtheculpablementalstatesmustbepresentatthesametimeandtheDEF’s
guiltymindmusthavecompelledhisvoluntaryact
b. Therehastobeaunionofactusreusandmensrea:“concurrence”
c. Theremaybemultiplementalstatesresentinastatute
d. Mentalstatesarerelational
e. Mentalstatescomeindegreesthatarehierarchical
f. Legislaturesoftendraftstatutesthataresilentorotherwiseambiguousregardingmentalstates,
leavingittothecourtstodecidewhatmentalstatesshouldapplyorifstrictliabilityshouldbeimposed
g. Mentalstatesmayalsobeusedtoestablishtherelativeblameworthinessofandseverityof
punishmentforcrimes
h. TheMPCseekstoremedythevocabularyproblemsbyusing4primarymentalstates—purpose,
knowledge,recklessness,andnegligence.
i. Thehighestthreementalstatesaresubjective,whilenegligenceisobjectivebecauseofRPPstandard—
Section2.02ofMPC
i. Purposely
1. Apersonactspurposelywhen:iftheelementinvolvesthenatureofhisconductoras
aresulttherefore,itishisconsciousobjecttoengageinconductofthatnature
2. Consciousobjecttoengageintheconductortocausetheresult
3. Awareoftheattendantcircumstancesiftheyarethere(hebelieves/hopesthatthey
exist)
ii. Knowingly
1. Apersonactsknowinglywhen:Iftheelementinvolvesthenatureofhisconductor
theattendantcircumstances,heisawarethathisconductisofthatnature,ortocause
suchresult
a. Awarenessofthenatureofconduct
b. Practicallycertainthattheconductwillcausetheresult
c. Awareofattendantcircumstancesiftheyexist
iii. Recklessly
1. Apersonactsrecklesslywhen:heconsciouslydisregardsasubstantialand
unjustifiableriskthatthematerialelementexistsorwillexistfromhisconductandis
agrossdeviationfromthestandardofconductthatalaw-abidingpersonwould
observeintheactor’ssituation
a. Substantialrisk
b. Unjustifiablerisk
c. Awareness(knowntohim)
d. Grossdeviation
e. Inactor’ssituation(law-abiding)
iv. Negligently:
1. Apersonactsnegligentlywhen:heshouldbeawareofasubstantialandunjustifiable
riskthatthematerialelementexistsorwillexistfromhisconduct.
a. Substantialrisk
b. Unjustifiablerisk
c. Shouldbeaware
d. Grossdeviation
e. Inactor’ssituation(reasonableperson)
II.
Commonlaw:MensRea:Offenseanalysis
a. 3typesofintent:“specificintent,”“generalintent”and“strictliability”
i. Specificintent:requiresintentregardingsomethingnotincludedinthenon-mentalelements
oftheoffense
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III.
IV.
V.
ii. Generalintent:anyoffenseforwhichtheonlymensrearequiredwasablameworthystatesof
mind
1. Wherementalstateisattachedtotheactusreus(conduct)
a. Theword“willfully”ispartoftheactusreusnotthemensreusingeneral
intentcrimes.Thinkofthisasvoluntariness,meaningaslightmovement,
willedordirected
b. MPCdoes“elementanalysis”asopposedtooffenseanalysis
Directv.Circumstantialevidence
a. Directevidence:Establishthepointisofferedtoprovewithoutthenecessaryofinference
b. Circumstantialevidence:Requirestheuseofoneormoreinferencestoprovethept
StrictLiability
a. Argumentinfavorofstrictliability:Itmakesenforcementeasierandmoreeffective
i. Requiresprosecutiontoprovefewerelements
b. MPC’stakeonculpability
i. Apersonisnotguiltyofanoffenseunlessheactedpurposefully,knowingly,reckless,or
negligentlywithrespecttoeachofthematerialelementsoftheoffense.
c. Generally,strictliabilityistheexceptionnottherulebecauseblameworthinessispredicatedonthe
notionofhavingaguiltymind
i. WegetthisfromtheMorisettecase(bombcasingstakeninbroaddaylight—plaintiffthought
theywereabandoned—needamentalstate)
1. StatutorySilenceMPC§2.02(4):Whenastatuteissilentonmensreaweassumethat
thestatuteintendedmensreaandthatthedefaultmensreais“recklessly”
2. StatutoryAmbiguityMPC§2.02:Whenthestatuteisambiguousandthemensreafor
oneelementisrecklessthenitisrecklessforalltherestoftheelements
d. LaFaveStrictLiabilityFactors(ifstatuteissilentonmensrea)
1)Legislativehistoryofthestatuteandcontext
2)Guidancefromotherstatutes
a. Sometimesrelatedstatutesthatwillgiveyouguidancebyanalogyor
distinction
3)Theseverityofthepunishment
b. Thegreaterthepossiblepunishment,themorelikelythatsomefaultis
requiredandconverselythelighterthepossiblepunishment,thelesslikely
thatsomefaultisrequired—i.e.speedingtickets,fix-ittickets
4)Theseriousnessofthepublicharmthatthestatuteseekstoprevent
c. Themoreserioustheconsequencestothepublic,themorelikelystrict
liability
5)Thedefendant’sopportunitytoascertainthetruefacts
d. Thehardertofindoutthetruth,themorelikelythelegislaturemeantto
requirefaultinnotknowing.
6)Thedifficultyofprosecutingofficialswouldhaveinprovingamentalstateforthistypeof
crime
e. Thegreaterthedifficulty,themorelikelythelegislaturemeanttorelievethe
prosecutionofthisburden
7)Thenumberofprosecutionstobeexpectedunderthestatute
f. Thelargerthenumber,thegreaterchancethelegislaturemeantfault
ii. IftheLaFavefactorsshowmensrea,defaultstatuteisrecklessness
iii. Peoplev.Taylor(possessionofcanesword)—showsustheLaFavefactors(Factors4-7donot
existtoacanesword)
iv. TAKEAWAYaboutLaFavefactors:whattheysayaboutastatutethatissilentaboutmensrea
andhowtoapplythemtofigureoutifthereisstrictliability
Mistakeoffact
a. Defendantisclaimingthathedidnotpossessmentalstatedueto1)mistakeor2)ignoranceor3)
accident
b. Mistakeoffactrelatestothementalstate
i. Needtonegateculpablesubjectivementalstatetobeeffected
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c. Definition:Mistakeoffact:Aclaimthatthedefendantdidnotpossessthementalstaterequiredbythe
statutebecauseofmistake,ignorance,oraccident.Bynegatingculpablementalelement,defendantcan
defeatthecrime
i. Defendantmustnegatethesubjectivementalstatetobeeffective
ii. Reasonablenessofmistakeisnotalwaysrequired
iii. Thinkofmistakeoffastasanissuethatgoestothementalstate—generallymistakeof
factevidenceisadmissibleifitnegatesaculpablementalstate,includingrecklessness.
d. 3stepapproachanalysisofmistakeoffact
(1)Whatnon-mentalelementofthecrimeisthepersonmistakenorignorantabout?
(2)What,ifany,mentalstateisrequiredastotheelementaboutwhichthedefendantis
mistaken?
1. Ifstrictliabilityisassignedtotheelement,themistakeorignoranceisimmaterialto
determiningliability
(3)Ifamentalstateisassigned,thendetermineifthedefendanthastherequiredmentalstate
2. Iftheyhavetherequiredmentalstatethenthemistakeoffactdoesn’tnegatethe
requiredmensreaelement
3. (Prob.5.13-5.16aboutdeliveringjarsofcocaine—notknowingly)
e. Case:Peoplev.Rypinski(sayshe’sgoingtoblowthevictim’sbrainsoutbutdidn’tknowthegunwas
loaded—awarenessoftheriskwasnotknowntohim,sonotreckless)
i. TAKEAWAY:Ifyounegatethementalelement(hererecklessness)thenthemistakeoffact
defeatstheconviction
ii. Rypinksirule:Amistakeoffactcanbeusedasadefenseagainstthementalstaterequirement
ofrecklessness
f. Ourstudygroupexample
i. Awomansoldcocainenearschool(whichwasillegal)butdidnotknowshewasnearaschool
(5.13)
1. Sellingcocainenearaschool
2. Knowingtherewasaschoolnearby
3. Shedidn’tknowtherewasaschool—ignorantaboutanon-mentalelement,therefore,
thewomannegatesthemensreaforthatstatute
VI.
LegalWrongDoctrine
a. Evenifthedefendantcanasserta(reasonable)mistakeoffactdefense,heorshewillnotbeexculpated
if,hadthefactsbeenasthedefendantbelievedthemtobe,heorshewouldstillbeguiltyofsomeother
crime.
i. I.e.Iftwo25yearoldsengageinsexbuttheguythinksthegirlsis15isheguilty?Yes.
VII.
MistakeofLaw
a. GENERAL:Ignoranceofthelawisnoexcuse(U.S.v.Baker)
b. Strictliabilityforthemostpart.BUTEXCEPTIONS
Exception1:Ignoranceofthelawcanbeadefensetoacrimeifknowledgethattheprohibited
conductisunlawfulisanelementofthecrime
1. Insuchacasethedefendant’slackofknowledgewillnegatethemensrearequiredfor
thecommissionoftheoffense
a. I.e.Ratzlaf(gamblingcase—structuring)
Exception2:Apersonwhoreasonablyreliesonanofficialinterpretationofthelawthatturns
outtobeerroneous
2. I.e.Coxv.Louisiana(courthousecase—“near”)
a. MPC§2.04
b. Heactinreasonablerelianceuponanofficialstatementofthelawcontained
in…anadministrativeorderorgrantofpermissionoranofficial
interpretationofthepublicofficerorbodychargedbylawwithresponsibility
fortheinterpretation,administrationorenforcementofthelawdefiningthe
offense.
Exception3:Apersonismistakenaboutcircumstancesthatincludealegalelement
3. (I.e.Reginav.Smith—manundoesroofingworktoremovestereo—wasmistaken
aboutthelawofrealproperty)
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VIII.
IX.
X.
Exception4:Undercertainlimitedcircumstances,theprosecutionofapersonwholacksfair
noticeofalegaldutybylawcanviolatedueprocess
4. Notanexceptionwe’recovering—fallsintoconstitutionallaw
ii. (Ontheotherhand:mistakeoffact—anon-mentalelement—whetherornotyoupossessed
cocaine,whetherornotyourkidhadanallergy,etc.)
c. Adefendantcannotavoidprosecutionbysimplyclaimingthathehasnotbrusheduponthelawand
thattheprincipleofignoranceormistakeoflawisvalidtotheextentthatordinarilythecriminallaw
doesnotrequireknowledgethatanactisillegal,wrong,orblameworthy—(U.S.v.Baker—caseofthe
counterfeitwatches)
i. TAKEAWAYofthiscase:Ignoranceofthelawisnoexcuse,solongasyoumeetthemensrea
andactusreusofthecrimeandifthereisnotsomethinginthestatuteindicatingthatyouhad
tknowthatitwasagainstthelaw
MPConMistakeofFact/Law
a. (i)—Mistakeoffact:Ignoranceormistakeastoamatteroffactorlawisadefenseif:
i. (a)Ignoranceormistakenegativesthepurpose,knowledge,belief,recklessness,ornegligence
requiredtoestablishamaterialelementoftheoffenseOR
ii. (b)Thelawprovidesthatthestateofmindestablishbysuchignoranceormistakeconstitutes
adefense
b. Exception2
c. (iii)MPC—duetoabeliefthattheconductdoesnotlegallyconstituteanoffenseisadefenseto
prosecutionforthatoffensebaseduponsuchconductwhen:
i. (a)Thestatuteorotherenactmentdefiningtheoffenseisnotknowntotheactandhasnot
beenpublishedorotherwisemadereasonablyavailablepriortotheconductalleged,or
ii. (b)Heactsinreasonablerelianceuponanofficialstatementofthelaw,afterwarddetermined
tobeinvalidorerroneous,containedin:
(1)Astatuteorotherenactment
(2)Ajudicialdecision,opinion,orjudgment
(3)Anadministrativeorderorgrantofpermission,or
(4)Anofficialinterpretationofthepublicofficerorbodychargedbylawwith
responsibilityforinterpretation,administrationorenforcementofthelawdefining
theoffense.
d. MPC2.04(p.257)
i. Whentheculpabilitysufficienttoestablishamaterialelementofanoffenseisnotprescribed
bylaw,suchelementisestablishifapersonactspurposefully,knowingly,orrecklessly
1. MPC2.02(3)
SpecificIntentCrimes,GeneralIntentCrimesandStrictLiability
a. ComesfromSallyMistook
i. GeneralIntent:noreferencetofutureactortoachieveafutureconsequence
ii. SpecificIntent:referringtoadefendant’sintenttodosomefurtheractorachieveafuture
consequences
iii. StrictLiability:Statuteissilentonmentalstates
Intoxication
a. Intoxicationisadefensetoaspecificintentcrime
i. IntoxicationisNOTadefensetoageneralintentcrime
ii. Didtheintoxicationnegatethespecificintentthatwasrequiredforthecommissionofthe
crime?
b. Purposeofintroducingevidenceofintoxication:
(a)Toshowidentify(ormistakenidentity)
(b)Toshowlackofknowledge
(c)Tonegatemensrea
(d)Tonegateactusreus
c. Intoxicationlawvariesdependingonjurisdiction
(a)Somestatedonotallowintoxicationasadefense,othersallowitonlyifitnegateactus
reus.Stilltheyallowittonegatemensrea,showlackofidentityorknowledge
d. EgelhoffRule:
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e.
i. Itisconstitutionallysoundforastatetonotallowvoluntaryintoxicationasadefenseorto
negatemensreaifthejurisdictionhasdecidednosuchdefensewillbeallowed
Commonlawonintoxication
i. Commonlawatfirstdidnotrecognizeintoxicationasameansofnegatingmensrea.
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Homicide
I.
HomicideGeneral:
a. Allhomicidesrequirethesamethreenon-mentalelements:1)someformofconduct,2)aresultof
death,and3)acausativelinkbetweentheconductanddeath
II.
Homicide:IntentionalHomicide
a. IntentionalHomicide:General
i. RequiresExpressmalice
ii. “Maliceaforethought”hasfourcategoriesandencompassestheintenttokill:1)Intenttokill,
2)Intenttodoseriousbodilyinjury,3)extremerecklessnessthatrevealsanindifferenceto
thevalueofhumanlife,and4)felonymurder.
iii. Needtoconsiderdirect/circumstantialevidenceregardingtoshow
premeditation/deliberation:
1. 1)Planning,2)Motive,and3)Manner
b. IntentionalHomicide:FirstDegreeMurder
i. Inordertohaveintentionalfirstdegreemurder,oneneedstoshow1)Expressmalice(intent
tokill),2)premeditation,and3)Deliberation
ii. Insomestatesifyouhaveexpressmalice+enumeratedmeansorenumeratedfelonies=1st
degreeintentionalmurder
1. I.e.CA:therearemanyenumeratedmeansPenalCode§189
iii. I.e.Commonwealthv.Carroll(Armymankillshiscrazywife)
1. Rule:Whetherthepremeditationandthefatalactwerewithinabriefspaceoftimeor
alongspaceoftimeisimmaterialifthekillingwasinfactintentional,willful,
deliberateandpremeditated)
iv. Premeditationinvolvesthementalprocessofthinkingoverbeforehand,deliberation,
reflection,weighingorreasoningforaperiodoftime,howevershort,afterwhichtheintentto
killisformed. 1. Youcannotinferpremeditationanddeliberationalonefromthemannerofkilling
c. IntentionalHomicide:SecondDegreeMurder
i. Thisisthedefaultcategoryforintenttokillàonlyneed1)expressmaliceWITHOUT
PremeditationandDeliberation
ii. Morrin:Saysthathotblooddoesnotimpactthepremeditationanddeliberationprocesses—
notaheatofpassion
iii. Statev.Bingham:StranglingandkillingLeslieCook(retardedwoman)—reflectionwasnot
shown
d. IntentionalHomicide:VoluntaryManslaughter
i. IntentionalVoluntaryManslaughterGeneral:
1. We’renowunderthemaliceline
2. MPConManslaughter:
(a)Undertheinfluenceofextremementaloremotionaldisturbance
(b)Forwhichthereisareasonableexplanationorexcuse
(c)Fromtheviewpointofapersonintheactor’ssituation
(d)Underthecircumstancesashebelievesthemtobe
ii. TheProvocationDoctrine:typicallyreducesmurdertomanslaughter(Statev.Lawton)by
negatingexpressmalice.
1. Statev.LawtonProvocationDoctrinerules:
1)Provocationmustbelegallyadequate
i. Legallyadequatecategories:Battery,adultery,mutualcombat,
assault,illegalarrest,“violentorsexual”
1. “Merewords”areneverenoughtoconstitutelegally
adequateprovocation
2)Provocationmusthaveimpassionedthedefendant
• ActualProvocation:PennsylvaniaStatute
a)Suddenandintensepassion
b)Resultingfromseriousprovocationby
i)TheindividualkilledOR
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III.
ii)Anotherwhomtheactorendeavorstokill,butactor
negligentlyoraccidentallycausesthedeathofthe
individualkilled
3)Defendantmustnothavehadtimetocooloffbetweenprovocationand
slaying
• Coolingquestion:LouisianaStatute
a)Suddenpassionorheatofblood
b)Immediatelycuedbyprovocationsufficienttodeprivean
averagepersonofhisself-controlandcoolreflection
c)Offender’sbloodmustnothaveactuallycooledORthe
situationmustbesuchthatanaverageperson’sbloodwouldnot
havecooledatthetimetheoffensewascommitted.
4)Defendantmustnothaveactuallycooledoffbeforetheslaying
• Coolingquestion:Statev.Pierce
2. Dennisv.State—(wasnotlegallyadequate)
a. Rule:Onecannotcombine3separategrievances,noneofwhichcan
individuallyconstitutelegallyadequateprovocation,assufficienttogivethe
triggeringeventalegalqualityitdoesnototherwisehave.
3. ProvocationandExtremeEmotionalDistress
a. Statev.Pierce:(LaPortewasthelover)
i. Rule:Noperson,whileunderextremeemotionalstressbroughton
byseriousprovocationreasonablysufficienttoincitehimintousing
deadlyforceshallknowinglycausethedeathofanother.”
ii. Anactcommittedunderextremeemotionalstressisoneperformed
undertheinfluenceofsuddenpassionorintheheatofbloodwithout
timeandopportunityforreflectionorforpassionstocool
4. MPCv.GeorgiaStatuteonVoluntaryManslaughter
a. Georgiastatute:“ModernReasonableMan”Approach:Voluntary
manslaughteriswhensomeoneactssolelyastheresultofasudden,violent,
andirresistiblepassionresultingfromseriousprovocationsufficienttoexcite
suchpassioninareasonableperson.Butifthere’senoughtimewherethe
voiceofreasoncouldbeheard,thekillingismurder
b. MPC:intentionalmanslaughteriswhenitiscommittedundertheinfluenceof
extremementaloremotionaldisturbanceforwhichthereisareasonable
explanation.
iii. ImperfectSelf-Defense
1. InReChristian
a. Rule:Whenatieroffactfindsthatadefendantkillsanotherpersonbecause
theyactuallybutunreasonablybelievedhewasinimminentdangerofdeath
orgreatbodilyinjury,thedefendantisdeemedtohaveactedwithoutmalice
andthereforecannotbeconvictedofanycrimegreaterthanvoluntary
manslaughter.
Homicide:UnintentionalHomicide(Impliedmalice)
a. UnintentionalHomicide:General
b. UnintentionalHomicide:FirstDegreeMurder
i. Yougetherethrough:
1. ImpliedMalice+EnumeratedMeansOREnumeratedFelonies
2. ProvocativeActMurderàNotontheexam
ii. Impliedmalice:(requiredforfirstdegreeandseconddegreeunintentionalmurder)
1. Extremerecklessnessthatrevealsanindifferencetothevalueofhumanlife
a. “Abandonedandmalignantheart”
b. “Depravedheart”
c. UnintentionalHomicide:SecondDegreeMurder
i. ExtremeRecklessness
1. U.S.v.Fleming(∆isdriving80mphandhasaBACof0.315andkillsthevictim)
a. Themurderwascommittedrecklesslyundercircumstancesmanifesting
extremeindifferencetothevalueofhumanlife.
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Malicemaybeestablishedby“recklessandwontondisregardandagross
deviationfromareasonablestandardofcarethatthejurycaninferthat
defendantwasawareofaseriousriskofdeathorbodilyharm.”
i. Standard:1)Personconsciouslydisregards,2)Substantialand
unjustifiablerisktohumanlife,3)riskofdeathisgreat,and4)
justificationfortakingriskisweakornon-existent.
2. Peoplev.Watson
a. Malicemaybeimpliedwhenthe∆doesanactwithhighprobabilitythatit
willresultindeathanddoesitwithabaseantisocialmotiveandwitha
wantondisregardforlife.
3. Berrycase(2.5yroldboyiskilledbyneighbor’sdog)
a. 2standardsforhavingimpliedmalice
1)∆’sextremeindifferencetothevalueofhumanlife—i.e.the
conductinvolvedhasahighprobabilityofcausingdeath
2)Anawarenesseithera)oftherisksoftheconductorb)thatthe
conductiscontrarytolaw.
4. MPCDefinitionofExtremeRecklessness
1)IntenttodoseriousbodilyinjuryOR
2)Extremerecklessnessthatrevealsanindifferencetothevalueofhuman
life
“Abandonedandmalignantordepravedheart”
ii. ExtremeRecklessnessChart
USv.Fleming
CAv.Watson
Peoplev.Watson
MPC
1)Seriousriskof
1)Natural
1)Objectiveriskof
1)Actofkillingis
deathorserious
consequencesare
deathorserious
donerecklessly
bodilyharm
dangeroustolife
bodilyinjury
(SeeMPCdefinition
ofreckless)
2)Defendant’s
2)Theactwas
2)Subjective
2)Extreme
awarenessofthis
deliberately
awarenessofrisk
indifferencetothe
risk
performed
valueofhumanlife
3)Wantonand
3)Byapersonwho 3)Highprobabilityof recklessdisregard
knowsthathis
deathorserious
forhumanlife
conductendangers
bodilyinjury
thelifeofanother
4)Grossdeviation
4)Thepersonacts
4)Wantondisregard
fromstandardof
withconscious
forlifeand/orbase
care
disregardforlife
antisocialmotive
b.
1.
d.
TheFlemingStandardisgoingtobeourcommonlawstandard.
UnintentionalHomicide:InvoluntaryManslaughter
i. UnintentionalInvoluntaryManslaughter:General
1. Hastodowithriskandnotprovocation(Likewithintentionalhomicide)—andmostly
weseearelianceonsomeformofnegligenceorrecklessness
2. MPC:§210.3:Criminalhomicideconstitutesmanslaughterwhenitiscommitted
recklessly
3. MensreaforUnintentionalInvoluntarymanslaughter:“criminalnegligence”à
recklessnessorgrossnegligence
ii. RecklessnessandInvoluntaryManslaughter
1. I.e.Welanskycase(nightclubburntdown)
a. Rule:Toconstitutewantonandrecklessconduct,asdistinguishedfrommere
negligence:
1)Thegravedangermusthavebeenapparent
2)Thedefendantmusthavechosentoruntheriskratherthanalter
hisconductsoastoavoidtheactoromission,whichcausedtheharm
iii. NegligentHomicide
11
NazitaLajevardi
Statev.Williams(parentsto17mtholdbaby—thoughtshehadatoothacheandshe
died)
a. Ordinarynegligence:Failuretoexercisethe“ordinarycaution”necessaryto
makeoutthedefenseofexcusablehomicide.
b. OrdinaryCaution:Isthekindofcautionthatamanofreasonableprudence
wouldexerciseunderthesameorsimilarconditions.
c. Iftheconductofadefendant,regardlessofignorance,goodintentions,and
goodfaith,failstomeasureuptotheconductrequiredofamanofreasonable
prudence,heisguiltyofordinarynegligencebecauseofhisfailuretouse
ordinarycautionwhichisthestandardatwhichtimeanordinarilyprudent
personwoulddeemitnecessarytonottakesuchrisks.
2. MPCandNegligentHomicide:
a. Criminalhomicideconstitutesnegligenthomicidewhenitiscommitted
negligently
i. Itisgrossnotordinary
ii. TougherstandardthantheWilliamsstandard
Homicide:FelonyMurder
a. FelonyMurder:General
i. Afelonisliableformurderwhenakillingiscommittedintheperpetrationoforattemptto
perpetrateafelony.Liabilityisattachedevenifthekillingisaccidental.
ii. Thereisstrictliabilityinregardstothementalstateregardingthedeath.
iii. Limitationsonfelonymurder:1)Enumeration,2)theinherentlydangerousnessrequirement,
3)themergerdoctrine,4)theagencyrule,and5)theresgestaeordurationrequirement
iv. Felonymurderexistsbothinstatutoryandcommonlawforms
1. Commonlawusually:2nddegree
2. Statutory:1stdegree
a. I.e.Stampcase:Theguyisinbadhealthanddoesn’ttakegoodcareofhimself
andhegetsrobbedandhasaheartattackanddies—felonymurdersaysso
what:youtakeyourvictimsasyoufindthem
v. “Anchorfelony”:thefelonywhichiscommitted
vi. CAenumeratedfelonies:1)Arson,2)Rape,3)Carjacking,4)Robbery,5)Burglary,6)Mayhem,
7)Kidnapping,8)Trainwrecking,9)Torture,10)Sodomyminor/againstwill,11)Lewdacton
child,12)Oralcopulationminor/againstwill,13)Anal/genitalpenetrationforeign
object/sexualpurpose/minor/againstwill
vii. Thedifferencebetweenimpliedmaliceandfelonymurder
1. Underimpliedmalicetheory,whenthedefendantkillsapersonwhilecommittingan
actwhich,byitsnature,posesahighprobabilitythattheactwillresultindeath,the
trieroffactmayinferthedefendantkilledwithmaliceaforethought,whereasunder
thefelony-murdertheory,iftheinherentlydangerousactisafelony,thedefendantis
deemedtohavekilledwithmaliceaforethoughtasamatteroflaw.
b. FelonyMurder:FirstDegreeMurder
i. Howtogethere:Anchorfelonymustbefromthelistofstatutorilyenumeratedmeansandthe
killingmustbeinperpetrationofanchorfelony.
c. FelonyMurder:SecondDegreeMurder
i. Limitation1:Enumeration:Theabsenceofafelonyfromtheenumeratedlistexcludesitasa
possiblebasisforafelony-murderfirstdegreechargeandsothehighestyoucangetisSecond
DegreeMurder.
ii. Limitation2:InherentlyDangerousFelony:
1. I.e.Peoplev.Sanchez
a. (Drunkdrivertriedtoeludeofficersandwasdriverfastandhiscarflipped
andonepersondied)
2. Inherentlydangeroustolife:Highprobabilityofdeathintheabstract
a. Ifanchorfelonyisinherentlydangeroustolifeintheabstract,thenitcan
supportasecond-degreemurderconviction.
iii. MustnotbebarredbyTheMergerDoctrine
1. Ifafelony“merges”withahomicide,thatmeansitcannotsupportafelonymurder
charge.”
1.
IV.
12
NazitaLajevardi
I.e.Barnettv.State:Whentheunderlyingfelonyresultsinorisanintegral
elementofthehomicideinquestion,thefelony-murderchargeshallnot
apply
2. Questionstopose:1)Doestheanchorfelonymergewiththehomicide?Isthe
underlyingfelonyasteptowardcausingthedeath?Ifso,it“merges”withthe
resultinghomicide.Doestheactofviolencethatkillsalsofulfilltheconductelement
ofthefelony?
3. IFTHEANCHORFELONYMERGESWITHHOMICIDETHENNOSECONDDEGREE
MURDERCHARGE
iv. MustnotbebarredbyAgencyorinFurtherance
1. MajorityRule:
a. DelawareStatute:Apersonisguiltyof2nddegreemurderwhen:inthecourse
ofandinfurtheranceofthecommissionorattemptedcommissionofany
felonynotspecificallyenumerated,theperson,withcriminalnegligence,
causesthedeathofanotherperson
i. Soherewe’relookingatthecircumstancesofthedeath.
b. Itisnecessarytoshowthattheconductcausingdeathwasdonein
furtheranceofthedesigntocommitthefelony.Mostnotbemerecoincidence.
2. MinorityRule:
a. Statev.Oimen:
i. Adefendantcanbechargewithfelonymurderforthedeathofacofelonwhenthekillingwascommittedbythevictimoftheunderlying
felonywhenthatdeathwascausedbyadefendantcommittingor
attemptingtocommitalimitednumberofinherentlydangerous
felonieswherehisconductisasubstantialfactorinbringingabout
thedeath
v. MustnotbebarredbyResGestaeLimitations:
1. Courtsherefocusontimeandwhetherthefelonywasstillinprogressasthetimeof
thekilling
2. Courtsarealsofocusingonthedistancebetweentheplaceofthefelonyandtheplace
ofthedeath
a. Ifnotmuchtime,nofelonymurder
3. Limits1stand2nddegreefelonymurderconvictionswhenunderlyingfelonyisseento
betoofarintime,distance,ordurationtothekilling
4. “Onecontinuoustransaction”andcloselyconnectedintimeandlaceandcausal
relation.
a. I.e.Statev.Adams:OneContinuousTransactionTest:
i. Statuteapplieswheretheinitialcrimeandthehomicidewereparts
ofonecontinuoustransactionandwerecloselyconnectedinpointof
time,place,andcausalrelation.
ii. IfitisNOTonecontinuoustransaction,thenitisnotwithintheres
gestae
5. OtherInterpretationofResGestaeLimitation:
a. I.e.Williamscase
i. Canbreakupthecaseintomorethancontinuousact
ii. Ifthefelonhasgainedaplaceoftemporarysafetyafterthe
commissionofthefelonyandbeforethedeathofthevictim,the
felonymurderrulegenerallydoesnotapply.
iii. “Placeoftemporarysafety”and“breakinthechainof
circumstances.”
FelonyMurder:MisdemeanorManslaughter
i. General:
1. Iftheprosecutorcanprovethatthedefendantcausedadeathasaresultof
committingorattemptingtocommitamisdemeanor,thedefendantmaybeliablefor
misdemeanormanslaughter
a. Onlyneedtoprovethementalstaterequiredformanslaughter
2. I.e.U.S.v.Walker∆droppedhisguninastairwellanditkilledsomeone)
a.
d.
13
NazitaLajevardi
a.
b.
Typesof
Homicideà
(across)
Degreesof
Homicide(Below)
Rule: Involuntary Manslaughter is the killing of another as the result of an
unlawful act which is a misdemeanor involving danger of injury, such as
carryingapistol,whichisinherentlydangerous
Here:notinherentlydangerousintheabstract(liketheFMrule)
i. Instead:Itisinherentlydangerousinthecommission
IntentionalHomicide
(Expressmalice)
Unintentional(Butculpable) HomicideinCommission,
homicide
orAttempted
(Impliedmalice)
Commission,ofanother
crime
FirstDegree
Murder
ExpressMalice+
Premeditationand
Deliberation
ORincertainstates(e.g.,CA),
Expressmalice+enumerated
meansorenumeratedfelonies
Commonwealthv.Carroll
Dennisv.State(adultery)
SecondDegree
Murder
(defaultverdict)
ExpressMalicewithout
premeditationand
deliberation
Statev.Bingham
ImpliedMalice+
EnumeratedmeansOR
Enumeratedfelonies
(Impliedmaliceandany
statutorilyenumerated
meansorfelonies)
Anchorfelonymustbe
fromlistofstatutorily
enumeratedfelonies
Killingmustbein
perpetrationofanchor
felony
Statev.Sims
Extremerecklessness
Anchorfelonynotonlist
-ImpliedMalice(‘Extreme
ofstatutorilyenumerated
Reckless’or“DepravedHeart” felonies
Murder)
1)Seriousriskofdeathor
Anchorfelonymustbe
seriousbodily
inherentlydangerousto
2)DEF=Awareofrisk
lifeintheabstract
3)Wanton&reckless
disregardfor
Mustnotbebarredbythe
humanlife
MergerRule
4)Grossdeviationfrom
standardof
Mustnotbebarredby
care
agencylimitation
MustnotbebarredbyRes
U.S.v.Fleming
Gestaelimitation
Berryv.SuperiorCourt
MaliceLine
Manslaughter
(voluntaryor
involuntary)
VoluntaryManslaughter:
1)Provocationor
2)Imperfectself-defense
(ISD)
Mitigatesexpressmalice
Statev.Lawton(battery)
InreChristianS(ISD)
Involuntary/Reckless
manslaughter
1)Ordinaryrecklessness
2)Grossnegligence
3)Ordinarynegligence
Welansky
Statev.Williams(negligent
killing)
14
Killinginperpetrationofa
misdemeanor
Misdemeanormustbe
dangerousunderthe
circumstancesofits
commission
OtherF-Mlimitationsmay
applydependingon
jurisdiction
NazitaLajevardi
Causation
I.
Causation:General
a. MensRea+ActusReus(+AttendantCircumstances)+(Causation)+(Harm)=CrimeUNLESSDefenses
b. Causationisa2-stepprocess:1)Causeinfact(But-ForTest)and2)ProximateCause
i. Bothneedtobemettofindcausation
II.
Causation:CauseinFact:“But-ForCause”
a. “Butfor”Cause
i. 1)Whetherwithoutthe∆’sactthedeathwouldnothaveoccurred?
ii. 2)Wouldthedeathhaveoccurredifthedefendanthadnotacted?
1. (Basicallysaying:Butforthedefendant’sacts,theresultwouldnothaveoccurred,and
thereforethereiscauseinfact)
b. “ModifiedBut-forCause”
i. I.e.iftwopeopletrytoindependentlykillVandeitherVdiesfasterthanhewouldhaveifthe
otherwasn’ttryingorVdiesatexactlythesametimeaseachofthetwopeoplekillhimthen:
Defendant is an actual cause if but for the defendant’s act the social harm would not have
occurredwhenorasitdid.
c. Multipleactualcauses
i. “Butfor”thesemultiplecauses,thedeathwouldnothaveoccurredasitdidorwhenitdid
ii. In rare cases where two acts combine to bring about a particular result and each act on its
own would have produced that result, neither act would meet the standard test for cause in
fact.
III.
Causation:ProximateCause
a. InterveningCauses
i. General:
1. Definition
a. Anactoreventwhich:
i. 1) Comes after the ∆’s voluntary act and before the social harm
(death)and
ii. 2)Contributescausallytothesocialharm
b. Ifthereisaninterveningcause,thenweneedtofigureoutwhetherit“breaks
thechainofcausation”(relieves∆ofliability)
2. Iftheinterveningcauseissaidto“breakthecausalchain”thennoproximatecause
3. The proximate cause injury asks the jury to assess blame and responsibility while
causeinfactisconcernedwithfindingoutwhathappened.
4. Proximate cause: concerned with determining who should be held responsible for
whathappened
a. When there are interveners, 3 factors drive the determination of whether a
secondactorinsulatesafirstactorfromcausalresponsibility:1)probability,
2)responsiveness,and3)blameworthiness.
5. If dependent intervening cause, court considers whether intervening cause was
unusualorbizarre.Ifindependent,thecourtconsiderswhethertheinterveningcause
wasforeseeable.
ii. A Dependent intervening cause is an act that occurs in reaction or response to the
Defendant’spriorwrongfulconduct
1. Generally, a dependent intervening cause does not relieve the initial wrongdoer of
criminal responsible unless the response was not only unforeseeable but highly
abnormalorbizarre
a. SoTest:1)Wasitunforeseeable?AND2)wasithighlyabnormalorbizarre?
2. I.e.Statev.Jenkins:(Dependentinterveningcause)
a. Eggshellplaintiffprinciple:takethevictimasyoufindthem:Onewhoinflicts
an injury on another is deemed by law to be guilty of homicide where the
injurycontributesmediatelyorimmediatelytothedeathoftheother.
b. With a medical mistake—only if it is gross negligence—then its bizarre and
unusual
15
NazitaLajevardi
IV.
iii. An Independent intervening cause is a force that does not occur in response to the initial
wrongdoer’sconduct?
1. Test: 1) Did it occur in response to the initial wrongdoer’s conduct? If no, it’s
independent.BUTEXCEPTION:1)Wasitforeseeable
2. I.e.FlennonCase:Fallsintotheexception
a. (Facts: Defendant shoots victim in leg, he gets his leg amputated, 5 weeks
later he dies because of serum hepatitis. It was an independent intervening
causethatwasforeseeable—soliability)
b. Rule: In a case where the wound is not mortal, the injured person may
recover, and thus no homicide has been committed. If, however, death does
result, the accused will be held responsible unless it was occasioned not by
thewoundbutbygrosslyerroneousmedicaltreatment.But,wherethewound
is a mortal one, there is no chance for the injured person to recover, and
therefore the reason, which permits the showing of death from medical
treatment,doesnotexist.
iv. Secondactors
1. Ifasecondpersonisinvolvedinbringingaboutaresultrequiredforcriminalliability,
thecausationanalysisismorecomplex
2. The second actor is referred to as an intervening cause who may break the causal
chainbetweenthefirstactorandtheresult
a. Breakingthecausalchain:meansthatthefirstactorwillnotbefoundtohave
proximatelycausedtheresult.
b. Thementalstateandblameworthinessofthesecondactorplaymajorrolesin
determining whether or not the second will relieve a first actor of causal
responsibility
c. The higher the intervener’s mental state and blame, the greater the chance
thattheintervenerwillbreakthecausalchain
3. When there are interveners, 3 factors drive the determination of whether a second
actorinsulatesthefirstactorfromcausalresponsibility:
a. 1)Probability
b. 2)Responsiveness
c. 3)Blameworthiness
v. DirectCause
1. I.e.RootCase
a. Facts:Victimand∆areillegallyracingonarural2-laneroad.
b. Here,weareinthedirectcausebox,thereisnoforeseeability(thiswasnot
foreseeableenough),andnoblameworthiness.
i. Whentherearenodependentorindependentinterveningcauses,we
mustgobacktothedirectcauseboxandseeifthatistheproximate
cause.
b. DepravedIndifferencetohumanlife
i. I.e.Peoplev.Kibbe
1. (∆wasatabarshowingofhis$100bills.Thenwasrobbedandputinastreetandwas
runoverbyatruck)
2. Rule: Under circumstances where one shows depraved indifference to human life
throughrecklessconductoneengagesinwhichcreatesahighrisktoanotherperson,
whichthereforeleadstothedeathofthatperson,oneisguiltyofmurder.
a. Here:Adriverwouldhavecomealongalmostcertainlyandkilledhim
c. ConcurrentProximateCauses
i. I.e.Statev.Echols
1. Rule: One whose wrongdoing is a concurrent proximate cause of an injury may be
criminally liable the same as if his wrongdoing was the sole proximate cause of the
injury.
Frameworkforunderstandingcausation
a. Wasthecrimearesultcrime?
i. Ifso,theremaybeacausationissue
b. Wasthe“actualcause”requirementmet?
16
NazitaLajevardi
c.
d.
i. Applythe“but-for”test(theanswerisusuallyyes,butifnot,thennocausation)
Was the defendant’s act the direct cause (but-for) of the prohibited result—if the natural and
foreseeableconsequenceandnointerveningcauses,thenyes(barringunusualexceptions)
Whatiftherewereinterveningcauses?
i. Need to figure out whether a dependent/responsive intervening cause or an
independent/coincidental intervening cause (was it a response to the defendant’s voluntary
actORwasitinresponsetothedefendant’svoluntaryact
ii. ThenapplytheruleforthetypeofInterveningcause(useflowchartbelow)
17
NazitaLajevardi
Attempt
I.
Attempt:General
a. Attemptisananticipatoryoffense—attemptislookingforwardtothecommissionofsomeothercrime
or“targetoffense:
b. Attemptisnotaresultcrime,itisaconductcrime.
c. Analysis
1)Conductrequiredforattempt
Conductprovidesconcretecircumstantialevidenceofanactor’sculpablementalstate
2)Thementalstaterequiredforintent
Inthecontextofattempt,“intent”isgenerallyasynonymfor“purpose”
3)Determiningdefenses:“impossibility
Whetherornotapersonwillbeheldlegallyresponsiblefortryingtocommitacrime
thatisnotpossibleforhertocommit
d. 3situationswherewecouldhaveattempt
1)Thosewhotrybutfail
2)Thosewhoareintheprocessoftrying
3)Thosewhotrybutaremistakenaboutsomethingthatmakesthecrimeimpossible
e. Attemptgenerally(butnotalways)carriesalighterpenaltythanthetargetcrime
f. Themensreaforattemptistypicallyhigh(2mensrea)whiletheactusreusforattemptistypically
low.
II.
Attempt:Conduct
a. MPCSubstantialSteptest:(p.667—recheckthis)
i. Apersonisguiltyofattempttocommitacrimeifhepurposelydoesoromitstodoanythingthat
underthecircumstances,ashebelievesthemtobe,isanactoromissionconstitutinga
substantialstepinacourseofconductplannedtoculminateinhiscommissionofthecrime.
1. Substantialstep:
a. Lyinginwait,searchingforthecontemplatedvictimofthecrime
b. Enticingthecontemplatedvictimtogototheplaceforcommission
c. Reconnoiteringtheplacecontemplatedforthecrime
d. Unlawfulentryofastructurewhereitiscontemplatedthecrimewilloccur
e. Possessionofmaterialstobeemployedinthecommissionofcrime
f. Possessionofmaterialforcrimeneartheplaceitwillbecommitted
g. Solicitinganinnocentpersontoengageinconductforthecrime
b. US.V.Jacksoncase(Facts:3peopledecidetorobabankJune11)
i. Here:SubstantialStepTestAppliesforConduct—2parttest:
1)Itmustbeasubstantialstepinacourseofconductdesignedtoaccomplisha
criminalresult.
2)Itmustbestronglycorroborativeofcriminalpurposeinorderforittoconstitute
suchasubstantialstep.
III.
Attempt:MentalState
a. MentalState:General
i. Analysis:2mensreaarerequiredformentalstateofattempt
1)Theintenttocommittheacts,whichconstitutetheactusreusoftheoffense
a. I.e. ∆ must intentionally perform acts which bring ∆ in proximity to
commissionofasubstantiveoffense
b. Mustintendtheactusreusofthecrime
2)Specificintenttocommitthetargetoffense
c. Attemptisaspecificintentcrime
d. Specific intent: is the intent to commit a crime and achieve some future
purposeorconsequence
i. Onecannotintendanunintentionalcrime
ii. So to prosecute someone for attempt must show 1) intent to commit the actus reus of the
attempt,and2)didtheyintendtheactusreusofthecompletedcrime.
b. I.e.SouthDakotav.Lyerla
i. Facts:Dudeplayinggameswith3girlsinacarandtheydie.
18
NazitaLajevardi
IV.
ii. Rule:Thereisnoattemptbecausethereisnopurpose—hedidnotintendtokillthetwogirls
hedidnotkill
1. Themensreaforattemptishigherthanthemensreaforthecompletedtargetoffense
c. MentalStateregardingacircumstance
i. Purposeastoarequiredresultistypicallyneededforanattemptconviction
ii. But“hispurposeneednotencompassallofthecircumstancesincludedintheformaldefinition
ofthesubstantivecrime.”–MPC§5.01
Attempt:Defenses
a. Abandonment
i. Peoplev.Staples
1. I.e.∆wantedtoburglarizethevaultofabank
2. Rule:Therelevantfactoristhedeterminationofwhethertheactsoftheperpetrator
havereachedsuchastageofastageofadvancementthattheycanbeclassifiedasan
attempt.Ifnot,exculpatoryabandonment.
a. Thecharacteroftheabandonmentinthesesituations,whetheritisvoluntary
orinvoluntary,isnotcontrolling.
b. Here:youdonotneedcausationbecauseitsaninchoate/incompletecrime—
youneedactusreusandmensrea
3. Commonlaw:nodefenseatall,noexculpatoryabandonment
ii. MPCandabandonment
1. Theremustbevoluntaryandcompleterenunciationofcriminalpurposeanditisnot
voluntaryifitismotivatedbycircumstancesnotpresentattheinceptionoftheactor’s
courseofconductthatincreasetheprobabilityofdetectionorapprehension.
2. MPCgoestomotivation—itdependsonwhatmotivatesonetovoluntarilyabandon
one’scrime
a. Complete:notmotivatedbyadecisiontopostponeuntilamore
advantageoustimeortotransfertoanotherbutsimilarobjectiveorvictim
b. Voluntary:Notchangingmindbecauseofincreasedprobabilityofdetection
ordifficultyofcommittingcrime
b. Impossibility
i. Factualimpossibility(notadefensetoattempt)
1. ∆ismistakenaboutafactthatmakesitimpossibleforhimtocommittheoffense
2. Factualimpossibilityoccurswhenextraneouscircumstancesunknowntotheactoror
beyondtheactor’scontrolpreventaconsummationoftheintendedcrime.
3. Factualimpossibilityisnotadefensetoattempt
ii. LegalImpossibility(2types—type2isnotadefensetoattempt)
1. Thereare2typesoflegalimpossibilitysituations
a. PureLegalImpossibility
i. Attemptingtocommitanon-existentcrime
ii. Apersoncommitsorattemptsacrimebutinrealitythisdoesnot
qualifyasacrimeunderthelaw
iii. Thisisadefensetoattempt(i.e.girlwhomovedhereandthought
holdinganimalswasillegalbutitsnot)
b. HybridLegalImpossibility
i. ∆’sintendedactiscriminalbut∆ismistakeaboutthelegalstatusof
somefactorrelevanttothecase
ii. Involveserrorsbythe∆regardingsomelegalaspectofthesituation.
Whenthecommissionoftheoffenseisimpossibleduetoafactual
mistakeregardingthelegalstatusofsomeattendantcircumstance
iii. Factualorlegalimpossibilityofcommittingacrimeisnotadefenseif
thecrimecouldhavebeencommittedhadtheattendant
circumstancesbeenastheactorbelievedthemtobe.
iv. Peoplev.Dlugash
1. Facts:∆waswithkillerandvictimandvictimtoldkillerhe
must pay rent and eventually killer shot the victim. ∆ then
shot the victim 5 x afterwards. No medical testimony could
provethathemurderedthevictim
19
NazitaLajevardi
2.
3.
4.
Rule:Itisnotadefense,undertheattendantcircumstances,
thecrimewasfactuallyorlegallyimpossibleofcommission,
“ifsuchcrimecouldhavebeencommittedhadtheattendant
circumstancesbeenassuchpersonbelievedthemtobe.”
Thiscaseabolishesthehybridlegalimpossibilitycategory
Knowthisruleifweareinacommonlawjurisdiction
iii. InherentImpossibility
1. ∆choosesmeansofaccomplishingcrimethatareunlikelytosucceed
2. Themeanschosenbytheactoraremanifestlyunlikelytoachievetheendssought.
3. Onlyisadefenseifsuchimpossibilitywouldhavebeenclearlyevidenttoapersonof
normalunderstanding.(Minnesotastatute)
a. MPCapproachtoimpossibility.
i. Rejectionofthedefensetoimpossibility
ii. KnowhowMPCdealswithimpossibility
4. Overall,itmaybeadefensedependingonthejurisdiction
iv. MPC:andImpossibility
1. Eliminatedthedefenseofimpossibilityinvirtuallyallsituations
2. MPCtoImpossibility:lookstowhatisinthe∆’smindwhenattemptingtocommita
crime,nottoextrinsiccircumstances
3. OnlyinherentimpossibilitywouldbeokforMPC—theMPCwantsyoutodowhat
Dlugashwants.
4. Forexam:Looktoinherentimpossibilityasonlydefense
5. Statute(p.699—looktoit)
20
NazitaLajevardi
Complicity
I.
Complicity:General
a. Accomplice:thosewhodonotpersonallyengageintheconductproscribedbythestatutebutassistor
encouragethosewhodo:theyarecomplicit
b. Complicityisawayofsharingliabilityforacrime
c. Accomplices:treatedthesameasprincipalsinthesensethattheybecomeliableforthesameoffense
astheprincipalandareexposedtothesamepotentialpunishment.
d. ThereisNOTacausationrequirementfortheaccomplicebecausecomplicityisnotanindependent
crime,butonlyderivativeliability.
e. Cannotbe‘guiltyofcomplicity’àonlyguiltyofsustentativecrimes-itsonlyawaytoshareliability
II.
Complicity:Conduct
a. Presence
i. General:
1. Someone’spresenceatthescenecanraiseissuesaboutthecontextofcomplicity
2. Merepresencealonedoesnottypicallysatisfytheactusreusrequirementfor
complicity
ii. Statev.VT
1. Facts:∆waswithagroupthatwastherewhenthefriendstolegunsandacamcorder.
Thereisvideotapeshowingthathewaspresentwhenapawnshopwascalled.∆
appealsthathewasanaccomplice
2. Rule:Inordertobecomplicit,oneneedtohaveadvised,instigated,encouraged,or
assistedintheperpetuationofthecrime—passivepresenceandmereknowledgeis
notenough.
b. Omissions
i. Statev.Walden
1. Facts:∆isamotherwhowatchedherkidsgetbeatupby“Bishop”andisaccusedof
notpreventingtheattacks.
2. Rule:Whensomeonewhoispresentwhenacrimeistakingplaceandhasa
reasonablyopportunityanddutytopreventthecrimeandfailstodoso,theywill
beequallyguiltyastheprincipal.
3. Here,differentthatVTcase:because∆alegaldutytoassistthevictim.
c. MPCApproachtoConductforComplicity
i. Apersonisanaccomplicewhenwiththepurposeofpromotingorfacilitatingthecommission
oftheoffensehe:
1. Solicitstheotherpersontocommititor
2. Aidsoragreesorattemptstoaidsuchotherpersoninplanningorcommittingit,or
3. Hasalegaldutytopreventthecommissionoftheoffenseandfailstomakeaproper
efforttodoso
III.
Complicity:MentalStates
a. MentalStates:General
i. Generally:
1. Anaccompliceneeds2mensrea:
a. 1)Mensreareassistingtheprincipal:∆mustpurposefullyassistthe
principaltoengageintheconductthatformsthebasisoftheoffense,and
i. Soyoumustpurposefullyassist
b. 2)Mensrearethecrimetheprincipalisattemptingorhascomplete(i.e.
mensrearetheunderlyingcrime):
i. Majorityrule:accomplicemusthavethementalstateofpurpose
regardingtheprincipal’scrime(MPC,Beeman)
ii. Minorityrule:accomplicemusthaveknowledgeoftheprincipal’s
crime(Backun)
ii. Peoplev.Beeman
1. Facts:∆’srelativewasrobbedafterhehelpedrobbersdrawupherfloorplanbutthen
hesaidhewantednothingtodowithit
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Rule:Forthemensreaofcomplicityitmustbeshownthatanaiderandabettoracted
with1)knowledgeofthecriminalpurposeoftheperpetrator,and2)withanintent
orpurposeeitherofcommitting,orofencouragingorfacilitatingthecommissionof
theoffense
a. Intentmeanstodosomeactorachievesomeconsequencebeyondtheactus
reusofthecrime
b. Mustsharethespecificintentoftheperpetrator
c. NaturalandProbableConsequenceDoctrine
i. “Theliabilityofanaiderandabettorextendsalsotothenaturaland
reasonableconsequencesoftheactsheknowinglyandintentionally
aidsandencourages.”(Beeman,p.732)
ii. Application:
1. DidPcommittargetcrimeA?
2. Ifyes,didSintentionallyassistinthecommissionofcrimeA,
i.e.,wasSanaccompliceinthecommissionofthatoffense?
3. Ifyes,didPcommitanyothercrimes?
4. Ifyes,werethesecrimes,althoughnotcontemplatedor
desiredbyS,reasonablyforeseeableconsequencesofcrime
A
b. Liabilityforcrimesofrecklessnessandnegligence
i. Washingtonv.Hopkins
1. Facts:∆andherfriendJimmieBurnswenttoachickendinnerandhewasdrunkand
struckanothercarandfled.∆waschargedwithmanslaughter.
2. Rule: One element of manslaughter can be that someone can be charged as grossly
negligentlyresultingintheunintentionaldeathofanother
3. Sheisderivativelyliableforhiscrime
4. Thisisanunintentionalcrime
ii. Analysisforunintentionalcrimes:
1. Accomplice’smensreareassistingtheprincipal:purposeful.
2. Accomplice’smensrearetheunderlyingcrime:mustbethesameasthementalstate
requiredforattemptfornonintentionalcrimes
a. Ergo, no attempt liability for non-intentional crimes (i.e. Lyerla), yet
complicityliabilityfornon-intentionalcrimes(Hopkins,Flayhart)
3. Somust:
1)Intentionallyaidtheperson
2)Butmustnotintendthetargetoffense(recklessness/negligence)willdo
c. TheMPCapproachtomentalstatesincomplicity
i. MPC:General
1. Apersonisanaccompliceofanotherpersoninthecommissionofanoffenseif,with
thepurposeofpromotingorfacilitatingthecommissionoftheoffense,hesolicits
suchotherpersontocommititoraidsandabetstheminplanningorcommittingit.
2. ActusReus:
a. Aidsoragreestoorattemptstoaidsuchpersoninplanningorcommitting
b. Omissionsatisfiestheactusreusrequirementif∆hasalegaldutytoprevent
3. MensRea:
a. Purposeofpromotingorfacilitationthecommissionoftheoffense
b. Whencausingaparticularresult…actswiththekindofculpabilitywith
respecttothatresultthatissufficientforthecommissionoftheoffense.
ii. Peoplev.Flayhart
1. Facts:∆werehusbandandwifetakingcareofhusband’smentallyretardedbrother
whocouldnotcareforhimself,andhewaslivingwiththemandundertheircare.
2. Rule:Itisnotillogicaltoaidandabetcriminallynegligenthomicidewhenonehasthe
mentalculpabilityrequiredforthecommissionoftheoffenseofencouraginganother
toengageintheillegalconduct.
DefensestoComplicity:
a. Abandonmentandotherlimitingprinciples
i. MPC:(usethisruleontheexam)
2.
IV.
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1.
Apersonisnotanaccompliceinanoffensecommittedbyanotherif:
a. He/sheisavictiminthatoffense
b. His/heroffenseis“inevitablyincident:tothecommissionoftheoffense
I.e.purchaserofnarcoticsisnotanaccomplicenthecommissionof
thesaleordeliveryofthecontrolledsubstancetohimself
c. Ifhe/sheterminatesparticipationbeforethecrimeiscommittedAND
1)Neutralizationhis/herassistance
2)Givestimelywarningtothepoliceoftheimpendingoffense
3)Insomeothermannerattemptstopreventthecommissionofthe
crime
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Conspiracy
I.
Conspiracy:General
a. Generally:
i. Conspiracyisbothasubstantivecrimeandameansofestablishingvicariousliability
ii. Conspiracydoesnotmergewithtargetcrime(unlikeattempt)andthereforea∆canbe
convictedbothofconspiracyANDthetargetoffense
iii. Structureofconspiracy:
1. ActusReus+MensRea(substantivecrimeofconspiracyandtargetoffense)+
attendantcircumstances
iv. Co-conspiratorsarevicariouslyliableforcrimescommittedbyotherconspiratorsin
furtheranceoftheconspiracy
b. MPC:conspiracy§5.03:
i. Statute
1. Apersonisguiltyofconspiracyifwithpurposeofpromotingitscommissionheagrees
withanotherthattheywillengageinconductthatconstitutessuchcrimeoragreesto
aidthispersonintheplanningandcommissionofsuchcrime
2. Nopersonmaybeconvictedofconspiracytocommitacrimeunlessanovertactin
pursuanceofsuchconspiracyisallegedandprovedtohavebeendonebyhimorbya
personwithwhomheconspired.
ii. Analysis
1. ActusReus:
a. AgreeingtoengageinconductthatconstitutesacrimeoranattemptOR
b. AgreeingtoaidintheplanningorcommissionofacrimeoranattemptPLUS
c. Overtactinpursuanceofconspiracyrequired(Exceptinfirstandsecond
degreefelonies)
2. MensRea
a. Withthepurposeofpromotingorfacilitatingitscommission.
II.
Conspiracy:Conduct
a. Conduct:General
i. Theconductelementisreallyabouttheagreement
ii. Theactusreus:Anagreementbetween2ormorepartiesinacriminaloranunlawfulact
1. Somejurisdictionsrequireunilateral(oneparty)agreement,othersrequirebilateral
(2party)agreement
iii. Theagreementbetween2ormorepartiesmaybedirectorindirect
iv. Thecommonlawdidnotrequireanactbeyondagreement,themoderntrendistorequirean
act
v. Jurisdictionalvariation:
1. Somejurisdictions(inadditiontoagreement)requireoneofthefollowing:
a. Nothingmorethanagreement
b. Anactinfurtheranceofthecrimebyonememberoftheconspiracy
c. An“overtact”infurtheranceofthecrimebyonememberoftheconspiracy
d. A“substantialstep”inpursuanceofagreement
e. A“substantialstep”towardthecommissionofthecrime.
b. Agreement
i. Martinezv.Wyoming:BigPicture
1. Facts:informantcontacted∆topurchasemorphineforhim
2. Rule:Theagreementessentialtoconspiracyislikea“meetingoftheminds.”Inthe
contextofconspiracythedefinitionismorelaxthanelsewhereandameretacit
understandingwillsuffice,andthereneednotbeanywrittenstatementorevena
speakingofwordswhichexpresslycommunicatesagreement
ii. BilateralorUnilateralAgreement
1. Unilateralagreement:When2peoplediscussthepossibilityofcommittingacrime,
butonlyoneofthemsincerelycommitsherselftotheventure
a. MPCstandard:unilateralagreementissufficient.
2. Bilateralagreement:When2peoplediscussthepossibilityofcommittingacrimeand
bothsincerelycommitthemselvestotheventure:
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a.
Washingtonv.Pacheco
i. Facts:∆workedasaprivateinvestigatorandbraggedabouthishits
tohisbosswhotoldtheFBI.Hewassetup.
ii. Rule:Aconspiracydoesnotexistwhenthesoleconspiratorisan
undercoveragent
1. Bilateralagreementiswhatisintendedby“agreement”in
theconspiracystatute.
c.
III.
IV.
OvertAct
i. Utahcodeannotated:
1. Apersonisguiltyofconspiracywhenheagreeswithoneormorepersonstoengage
inorcausetheperformanceofconductexceptwheretheovertactisnotrequiredfor
thecommissionofconspiracy
ii. Statev.Dent
1. Facts:defendantsmetinjailwhereDenttoldtheotherabouthisex-girlfriend.The
newgirlfriendwasgoingtohelpkillher.Herkidsgetsuspiciousandtellthecops.
TheysetupBalcindetogether.
2. Rule:Conspiracyrequiresonlyanactthatisa“substantialstepinpursuanceofthe
agreement”andpreparatoryconductwhichfurtherstheabilityoftheconspiratorsto
carryouttheagreement
a. Sowhatisnecessary:Substantialstepinpursuanceoftheagreement”
b. UNLIKEattempt:whichwasasubstantialstepforthetargetcrime
c. Testweneedtoknowforactusreusforconspiracy:
i. Wasthereasubstantialstepinpursuanceofanagreement?
1. Thiscanevenmeananinsignificantactandinsomecases
silencecanbeasubstituteforanovertact
Conspiracy:MentalStates
a. MentalStates:General
i. Mentalstateresubstantivecrimeofconspiracyàconspiracyisaspecificintentcrime(∆must
intendtoconspireandagree)
ii. MentalstateretargetoffenseàConspiracytypicallyrequirespurpose/intentrethetarget
offense
iii. Mensreareattendantcircumstancesàsameastheunderlyingcrime
b. Peoplev.Lauria
i. Facts:∆ranthetelephoneserviceforcallgirlactivity
ii. Rule:Mensreaforconspiracycanbedeterminedby1)directevidencethata∆wantsto
participateor2)throughaninferencethatheintendstoparticipatebasedon:a)hisspecial
interestintheactivityorb)theaggravatednatureofthecrimeitself.
c. Mentalstateregardingacircumstance
i. USv.Feola
1. Facts:∆sinaheroinsaleweretryingtoripoffthepoliceofficers
2. Eventhoughthemensreaforconspiracyisspecificintent,ifthereisanattendant
circumstance,themensreaforthatattendantcircumstanceisnotpurposeorintent.It
isthemensreathatisrequiredfortheunderlyingcrime.
Conspiracy:PinkertonDoctrine
a. ThePinkertonDoctrine
i. Soundslikeastrictliabilitystandard
ii. Pinkertonv.US
1. DanielPinkertonwhoisnotevenaroundisconvictedforthesecrimes.
a. Actmustbeinfurtheranceoftheconspiracy
b. Mustbeinthescopeoftheconspiracy
c. Theremustbenoterminationoftheconspiracy
2. Iftwopeopleagree,youcangetonepartywhodoesn’tevenknowiftheactshave
beencommittedforthoseactssolongastheseconditionsaremet
a. Similartocomplicity
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V.
iii. Ifyouhavetwopossibilitiesforvicariousliability,(Secondaryandprimary),youneed
knowledgeorintent.Butiftheyconspire,youdonothavetoworryabouttheirknowledgeor
intentbecauseconspiracyallowsyoutogetthemthroughnegligence.
iv. Co-conspiratorsarevicariouslyliableforthesubstantivecrime(s)committedbyother
conspiratorsif: (questiononthiswilllikelybeontest)
1. Theco-conspiratorisapartytotheconspiracy
2. Theconspiracyisongoing(i.e.notterminated)
3. Thecrimeisinfurtheranceoftheconspiracy
4. Thecrimeisreasonablyforeseeable.
b. DurationofaConspiracy
i. U.S.v.JimenezRecio
1. Marijuanacase
2. Rule:AconspiracydoesnotautomaticallyterminatesimplybecausetheGovernment,
unbeknownsttosomeoftheconspirators,has“defeatedtheconspiracy’sobject.”
Conspiracy:Defenses
a. CorruptMotiveDoctrine
i. Ifconspiratorslackacorruptorwrongfulrationale,theyarenotguilty
ii. Appliesonlytomaluminsecrimes
b. Wharton’sRule
i. Isalimitationonconspiracyliabilitywhenthecrimeisofsuchnatureastonecessarilyrequire
theparticipationof2personsforitscommission?
ii. Aconspiracycannotbeusedtocriminalizetheagreementthatisalogicallyrequired
componentofthesubstantiveoffense
iii. Ifthereisacrimethatneedstwopartiesyoucannotseparateberesponsible
c. Abandonment
i. Commonlaw:
1. NoovertactPLUS
2. Advisingco-conspiratorsofwithdrawalOR
3. InformingpoliceoftheexistenceoftheconspiracyAND
4. Withdrawingfromallinvolvementintheconspiracy
ii. MPCRequires
1. CompleterenunciationAND
2. VoluntaryrenunciationAND
3. Thwartingthesuccessoftheconspiracy
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Defenses:JustificationandExcuses
I.
JustificationandExcuses:General
a. General:
i. Justificationsandexcusesarewaysofdefeatingcriminalliability
1. Justification:Thosewhoactwithalegaljustificationexerciseaprivilegeandactin
conformitywiththelawàisadefense
2. Excuse:Theviolationisunjustifiedbutseekstoexempttheparticularactorfrom
responsibilityfromtheunjustifiedact.Here,arguingthattheactorisnotpersonally
responsibleforhavingcommittedtheact
II.
Self-Defenseofothers
a. General
i. Whenindividualsarefacedwithimmediateaggressionandthepolicecannotprotectthem,the
individualrightofsurvivalreassertsitself
ii. Thefocusisonreasonablenessandimminence
b. MPCSelfDefense:
i. Focusesonperceptionofactoraboutwhetherforceisimmediatelynecessarytoprotectrather
thanwhetherotherpartyisimminentlyplanningtouseforceagainsttheactor.
ii. Notliableforcrimesrequiringpurposeorknowledgebutmaybeforrecklessornegligent
crimes.
1. Noreasonablenessrequirement
2. Individualizedstandard
c. Analysis:
1. ActualBelief
2. ReasonableBelief
3. Imminence
4. Necessity
5. Proportionately
d. Self-DefenseandDomesticViolence
i. General:
1. Self-defensearisesinmanyfactualcontexts.Onesuchinstanceisinthedomestic
violencecontext
ii. Statev.Norman(i.e.)
1. Facts:∆wasextremelybatteredbyherhusbandwhohadforcedherintoprostitution.
Shefinallygotagunandkilledhim.
2. Rule:Ourlawofself-defensehasrequiredthata∆claimingthatahomicidewas
justified,and,asaresult,inherentlylawfulbyreasonofperfectself-defensemust
establishthatshereasonablybelievedatthetimeofthekillingsheotherwisewould
haveimmediatelysuffereddeathorgreatbodilyharm
3. Dissent:Theinstructionofself-defenseisproperbecause1)itappearedtothe∆that
itwasnecessarytoillthedeceasedinordertosaveherselffromdeathorgreatbodily
harm,2)the∆‘sbeliefwasreasonablyinthatthecircumstancesastheyappearedto
herweresufficienttocreateabeliefinthemindofordinaryfirmness,3)the∆wasnot
the aggressor in bringing on the affray, and 4) The ∆ did not use excessive force or
morethanwasnecessary.
iii. So4factorsforperfectself-defense
1) The ∆ believed it necessary to kill the deceased in order to save himself
fromdeathorgreatbodilyharm
2)The∆’sbeliefwasreasonablyinthatthecircumstancesastheyappeared
to him at the time were sufficient to create such a belief in the mind of a
personofordinaryfirmness
3)∆wasnottheaggressorinbringingontheaffray
4)∆didnotuseexcessiveforceormoreforcethanwasnecessary
e. Retreat i. 2waystogoaboutit
1. Traditionally,anon-aggressorwasnotrequiredtoretreatbeforeemployingforce,
evendeadlyforce,iftherequirementsofself-defensewereotherwisemet.
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Morerecently,however,aftertheMPCwasdeveloped,jurisdictionshavebegun
adoptingretreatrequirements.
ii. Exception:CastleRule:
1. Noretreatisrequiredfromone’shome,sometimeslimitedwhensituationinvolvesa
co-habitantorco-worker.
f. InitialAggressorRules
i. Initialaggressorsgenerallylacktherighttoresorttodefensiveforce.
ii. Undercertaincircumstances,however,theycangaintherighttousedefensiveforce.
1. Theactorwithdraws/abandonsfromtheencounterand
2. Theactorclearlycommunicateshisintenttodosobuttheotherpersoncontinuesor
threatenstheuseofunlawfulphysicalforce.
Necessity
a. Necessity:General
i. Anecessitydefensecanbetriggeredwhenanactorengagesinwhatwouldotherwisebea
crimeinordertoavoidagreaterharm.
1. I.e.trespassingontosomeone’slandtoavoidbeinghitbyaspeedingcar
a. Avoidingthegreaterharmofseriousbodilyinjuryjustifiesthetrespassand
exoneratestheactors.
ii. Moreabout“naturalevils”
iii. Necessityisajustificationanda“trueaffirmativedefense”
iv. NYPenalLawonNecessity:
1. Conductwhichwouldotherwiseconstituteanoffenseisjustifiableandnotcriminal
when:Suchconductisnecessaryasanemergencymeasuretoavoidanimminentor
publicorprivateinjurywhichisabouttooccurbyreasonofasituationoccasionedor
developedthroughnofaultoftheactor.
b. MPCTreatmentofChoiceofEvils
i. Whenconductwhichtheactorbelievestobenecessarytoavoidaharmoreviltohimselfor
anotherisjustifiablewhen:
1)Threatofimminentinjurytopersonorproperty
2)∆actstopreventanequalormoreseriousharm
3)∆reasonablyanticipatesadirectcausalrelationshipbetweenhis/herconductand
theharmtobeaverted
4)Noreasonablealternativestocommissionofthecrime
5)∆mustnothavecreatedtheconditionsofhis/herowndilemma
6)Notavailabletoonetakingthelifeofaninnocentperson
c. LimitsonNecessity
i. Somejurisdictionsrequirethatnecessityresultfromnaturalforces
ii. Applicabilitytohomicidequestionable(especiallytomurder)
iii. Somejurisdictionsdonotallownecessityforprotectionoffinancialinterestsorgoodname.
Duress
a. Duress:General
i. Thedefenseofduressservestoexcusebehaviorwhereextrinsiccircumstancescompela
persontoperformunlawfulacts,whichhedidnototherwisedo.
1. I.e.astrangerholdsaguntoanactor’sheadandthreatenshimwithinstantharmif
theactordoesnotcommitacrime—heretheactorismakingareluctantbutconscious
decision
ii. Duressisanexcuse—thereforetheburdenisonthedefensetoprovethattheactwasaresult
ofduress.
b. MPCandDuress—§2.09
i. Itisanaffirmativedefensethattheactorengagedintheconductchargedtoconstitutean
offensebecausehewascoercedtodosobytheuseof,orathreatofuseofunlawfulforce
againsthispersonorthepersonofanother,thatapersonofreasonablyfirmnessinhis
situationwouldhavebeenabletoresist.
1. So“reasonablepersonoffirmness”standardinsteadof“immediatebodilyinjury”
standard
2.
III.
IV.
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V.
ii. Exception:Duressisnotadefenseifittheactorrecklesslyplacedhimselfinasituationin
whichitwasprobablethathewouldbesubjectedtoduress
iii. Exception:Duressisalsonotadefenseiftheactorwasnegligentinplacinghimselfinsucha
situation,whenevernegligencesufficestoestablishculpabilityfortheoffensecharged.
c. TheContento-PachonCase
i. Facts:∆taxidriverwasapproachedbyhispassenger/drugtraffickerandwastoldtosmuggle
drugs.Thenextdayhesaysnoandthelivesofhisfamilyarethreatened.IntheUShesubmits
toscreening.
ii. Rule:3elementsofduress:
1. Animmediatethreatofdeathorbodilyinjury
2. Awell-groundedfearthatthethreatwillbecarriedout
3. Noreasonableopportunitytoescapethethreatenedharm.
d. OurAnalysisforDuress:
1. Animminentthreatofdeathorseriousbodilyharm
2. Well-groundedfear(i.e.reasonablebelief)thatthethreatwillbecarriedout
3. Noreasonableopportunitytoescapethethreatenedharm
4. Notavailabletoonetakingthelifeofaninnocenthumanbeing.
InsanityandMentalState
a. General
i. Insanity:relatestothedefendant’smentalstateatthetimetheoffensewascommitted.
1. Itisanaffirmativedefense
ii. DiminishedCapacity:(effectontherequiredmentalstate):relatestothedefendant’smental
stateatthetimeoftheoffensewascommitted
iii. Incompetence:Here,welookatthe∆’smentalconditionandabilitytounderstandthe
criminalproceedingsàFocusesonadifferenttimeperiodthankinsanity/diminishedcapacity
b. Choosinganinsanitytest
i. Therearetwofamousandwidelyusedteststodefine“insanity”
1. M’NaghtenTest(Whatisnolongerreallyused—cognition)
a. Atthetimeofcommission
b. MentalDiseaseordefect
c. The∆doesnotknow
i. ThenatureandqualityofhisactsOR
ii. Thathisactswerewrong
2. MPCStandard:AmericanLawInstituteTest
a. “Apersonisnotresponsibleforcriminalconductifatthetimeofsuch
conductasaresultofmentaldiseaseordefecthelackssubstantialcapacity
eithertoappreciatethecriminality(wrongfulness)ofhisconductorto
conformhisconducttotherequirementsofthelaw”
b. Analysis
1)∆isincapableofknowingorunderstandingthenatureorquality
ofheractOR
2)∆isincapableofdistinguishingrightfromwrong
3)Atthetimeofthecommissionoftheoffense
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Theft
I.
Theft:General
a. Custody
i. Apersonhascustodyofpersonalpowerwhenheorshehasphysicalcontroloverit,usually
foraveryshortperiodoftimeandusuallyforaverylimitedpurpose
b. Possession
i. Possessionissimilartocustodybutinvolvesalegallygreaterdominionovertheproperty
ii. Someonewhoisinpossessionofpropertyhasactualorconstructivecontroloftheproperty
withtheintenttopossessitandtherighttoexcludeothersfrompossessingitatthattime
c. Title
i. Title=ownership
d. Bailees
i. Abailmentisarelationshipinwhichoneperson,thebailor,entrustspropertytoanother
person,thebailee,foraparticularpurpose
e. Thethreetraditionalformsoftheft
i. (1)Larceny(includesLarcenybytrick),(2)embezzlement,(3)falsepretenses
II.
Larceny
a. Definition:
i. Theftofpersonalproperty
b. Elements
i. Analysis
(1)Takingand
(2)Carryingaway(i.e.asportation)
(3)Personalproperty
(4)Ownedorpossessedbyanother
(5)Bytrespass(i.e.withoutconsentorpermission)
(6)Withthespecificintenttodeprivetheallegedvictimpermanentlyoftheproperty
ii. Trespassorytaking
1. Thekeyissueindecidingwhetheratakingwastrespassoryisascertainingwhether
thevictimconsentedtothe∆’sremovaloftheproperty.
iii. Propertyinpossessionofanother
1. Traditionally“property”referredtotangiblepersonalpropertyonly(thatwascapable
ofbeingpossessedbyanother),notintangibleproperty,intellectualpropertyor
services
2. Modernstatuteshaveupdatedthecommonlaw
iv. Abandonedproperty
1. Abandonedpropertyisnotconsideredtobethepropertyofanyoneanda∆cannotbe
guiltyoflarcenyifhefindsandkeepstrulyabandoned
v. Intenttopermanentlydeprive
1. “Permanently”doesn’tmeanpermanentlyinsometypesofcases:
a. (1)Where∆intendsto“sell”thepropertybacktoitsowner
b. (2)When∆intendstoclaimarewardfor“finding”theproperty,&
c. (3)When∆intendstoreturnthepropertytotheownerfora“refund”
2. Mereborrowingisinsufficientforthecommonlawcrimeoftheft.
c. Larceny:ActusReus
i. General
1. Thetrespassorytakingandcarryingawayofthepersonpropertyofanother
a. “Trespassorytaking”=non-consensualtakingofpossessionoftheproperty
b. Anyslightmovementofthetakenpropertyisusuallysufficient
d. Larceny:MensRea
i. General
1. Specificintenttodeprivetheotherofthepropertyonapermanentbasis
2. Thewrongdoermustpossessthisintentatthetimeofthetrespassorytakingand
asportation
ii. LarcenybyTrick
1. Itislarcenybytrickwhena∆obtainspossession,nottitle,becauseof
misrepresentation
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Elements:
a. Takingpossessionofthepropertyofanother
b. Byknowinglymakingfalserepresentationsastomaterialfactsormaking
falsepromises
c. Withanintenttodefraud
e. Larceny:Defense
i. ClaimofRightDefense
1. Apersonisnotguiltyoflarcenyifhetakespropertybelongingtoanotherperson
basedongoodfaithbeliefthathehasarighttopossesstheproperty
a. Theactor’sbeliefnegatesthespecificintenttosteal
2. Claimofrightgenerallyisnotadefensetoatheftcrimethatinvolvesviolenceorthe
threatofviolence,suchasrobberyorextortion
Embezzlement:
a. Embezzlementistheunlawfulconversionofanother’spropertythatisalreadyinthepossessionin∆.
b. Elements:
i. (1)Entrustofpropertyofanother
1. Victimentrustspropertytothe∆voluntarily.
ii. (2)Conversion(“Misappropriation”)ofpropertyofanother
1. Theremustbeaseriousinterferenceintheowner’spropertyrightsbythe∆who
takesthepropertyforhisorherownuse.
iii. (3)Specificintentoffense
1. ∆mustdemonstratehisintenttofraudulentlyconvertthepropertytopersonaluse,
butneednotbetopermanentlydeprive.
Embezzlementv.Larceny
a. Embezzlementoccurswhenthethiefobtainslawfulpossessionthenconvertsittohisorherownuse
b. Larcenyoccurswhenthethieftakesthepropertyfromsomeoneelse’spossessionbutisnotgiven
possessionbythatperson.
FalsePretenses
a. Falsepretensesisastatutoryoffenseinwhichthe∆knowinglymisrepresentsapresentorpastfact
whichinducesthevictimtogivethe∆titletoproperty
b. Doesnotapplyto:
i. –Opinions(i.e.pufferybyseller’sofproducts)
ii. –Misrepresentationsregardingfutureconduct
c. ActusReus
i. Falserepresentationregardingapastorpresentfact
1. Omissionmaybethebasisforfalsepretenseschargeifthe∆hasadutytomakethe
disclosurethevictim
ii. Takingthetitleofthepropertyofanother
d. MensRea
i. Knowledgethatfactisfalse
ii. Intenttodefraud
e. Causation(Reliance)
i. Thevictimmustrelyonthefalsestatement,whichmustbematerialtothetransaction
transferringtitle(i.e.importanttoit).
FalsePretensesv.LarcenyByTrick
a. BothFalsepretensesandlarcenybytrickrequireintenttodefraud
b. However,FalsePretensesapplieswhenthe∆obtainstitle(asopposedtopossession)totheproperty
throughdeceit.I.E.
i. Ifthevictimthinksheisgivingsomethingtothe∆forever(Title),thecrime=FalsePretenses
ii. Ifthevictimdoesnotknowheisgivingupsomethingforever(possession),thecrime=
LarcenybyTrick
Larcenyv.LarcenybyTrick
a. Larceny=Trespassorlackofconsentbytheinitialpossessortopartwithpossessionofitem
2.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
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b. LarcenybyTrick=Apparentorostensibleconsentvitiatedbythefraudortrick
VIII.
Consolidation:Theft
a. Modernstatutestendtogroupdifferenttypesoftheftcrimestogethertoavoidarcanedistinctionsthat
leadtotechnicalloopholes.
IX.
MPC(823-825)
a. ConsolidationofTheftOffenses
b. Theftbyunlawfultakingordisposition
c. Theftbydeception
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