Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
European Commission
Lot 2: Retrospective and prospective evaluations on
the common fisheries policy, excluding its international
dimension
RETROSPECTIVE EVALUATION OF
SCRAPPING AND TEMPORARY
CESSATION MEASURES IN THE EFF
Final Report
November 2013
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Consortium Contact: Dr. Ian Payne, Executive Director
MRAG Ltd, 18, Queen Street, London, W1J 5PN, UK
Tel: +44 (0)20 7255 7755 (General) Fax: +44 (0)20 7499 5388
Email: [email protected] Web: www.mrag.co.uk
Project no:
Issue ref:
Date of issue:
Prepared by:
Checked/Approved
by:
ZF1455S03
V4
November 2013
RC/SR/BR/MZ
RA
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Executive Summary
The use of permanent and temporary cessation measures has featured in successive EU
fisheries funds. In the European Fisheries Fund (2007-2013) has an estimated €1.3 billion
of its €4 billion budget allocated to Axis 1, which includes these measures. The objectives of
these schemes have primarily been to:
• For permanent cessation / scrapping: reduce the size of the European fleet and
fishing capacity in order to contribute to a sustainable balance between resources
and fishing capacity; and
• For temporary cessation: maintain activity and jobs in periods where activity is
interrupted for reasons beyond the control of fishermen.
This retrospective evaluation focuses primarily on the permanent and temporary cessation
schemes financed by the EFF with some comparisons made with previous cessation funding
under the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) in the 2000-2006 period.
In addition to analysing reports and other sources of data, the study focuses on 9 Member
State case studies1, which account for nearly 90% of scrapping spending and 60% of
vessels removed under the EFF permanent cessation measure. Temporary cessation was
implemented in all but 3 case studies2.3 The evaluation had a counterfactual element, i.e. it
aimed to answer the question: “What would have occurred without the measures?”
Permanent cessation schemes: contribution to the reduction in fleet size and capacity
Between 2000 and 2011, the EU fishing fleet showed a continuous decrease in terms of the
number of vessels (-25%) and Gross Tonnage (GT) (-24%).
Largest reductions (> 30% of fleet capacity removed) are observed in the North Sea and
Baltic areas (BE, NL, DK, SW, LV, EE) and in large-scale fishing fleets in ES, ITA, FR, UK
(reductions of 24% to 30% in GT terms).
The decrease in fleet capacity mainly comes from the trawler segments (75% of exited GT).
EU support to permanent cessation was generally more focused under the EFF than under
the FIFG programme, in particular on large vessels operating with trawls.
The amount of scrapping carried out under EFF is smaller than under FIFG: around 800
vessels/year and 35,000 GT/year under the EFF programme compared to about 1,600
vessels /year and 50,000 GT/year were scrapped between 2002 and 2006.
The contribution of EFF permanent cessation measures to overall fleet exits is greater than it
was under the FIFG. The EFF contributed to about 78% of the fleet capacity scrapped (in
GT) in the nine MS case studies, compared to about 50% under the FIFG (2000-2006).
The number of vessels scrapped without funding support has decreased steadily from 2005
to 2010 and most of these were small vessels. The incentive to scrap without support
diminished following an end to funding for vessel construction in 2004, as construction
applicants were not allowed to apply for scrapping.
Permanent cessation implementation was affected by the high fuel costs and low fish prices
experienced in 2008-2009 along with the global economic crisis. The capacity scrapped
during these two years was above average with over 40,000 GT/year and the proportion of
vessels receiving EFF support increased to more than 80%. During the economic crisis EU
support was used more as a crisis management tool rather than as a resource driven
1
Denmark, Estonia, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Denmark, Estonia and the UK
3
Denmark, Estonia and the UK
2
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
restructuring tool. In this respect, the crisis acted as an accelerator for the reduction of
vessel numbers.
Permanent cessation schemes: contribution to the overall sustainability of the fleet
Funding permanent cessation (scrapping) of fishing vessels is only one of several measures
that can be taken to reduce fishing capacity. Making no public intervention is one option,
while another option is the introduction of rights-based management systems (e.g.:
Individual Transferrable Quotas (ITQs)).
The potential for ITQs to remove fleet capacity (at a much lower cost to the state compared
to decommissioning) has convinced Denmark and other Member State authorities (UK,
Sweden and Estonia) that permanent cessation should not be the primary tool for
rebalancing capacity with resources.
With no public intervention it may take too long to achieve conservation objectives: a vessel
is a long-term investment and so vessel owners will often continue operating with
unprofitable vessels in the short term. This also poses the significant risk, particularly in
mixed fisheries, that biological resources will continue to be overfished.
From interviews with Managing Authorities and industry organisations, it is found that most
public administrations and stakeholders consider that permanent cessation measures are
relevant to address the issue of fleet capacity. This is despite the fact that in the latest fleet
report, 10 out of 22 MS claim that fleet capacity is now broadly in balance with resources.
The evaluation concludes that it is difficult to establish a clear link between the impact of
permanent cessation schemes and the reduction in fishing capacity. This is because there
are a number of other factors that play a role. For example, from 2001 to 2011, the total
catch of EU fishing fleet decreased faster than the fleet number and the fleet capacity for a
variety of reasons including a reduction in fishing opportunities and greater competition from
imports as well as a reduction of fleet size.
The evaluation also concludes that reductions in fishing activity during the EFF programme
are more related to regulatory restrictions (e.g. through quota and effort management) than
to the reduction of the fleet size itself. A removal of vessels from quota-managed fisheries
simply results in a redistribution of quota between the remaining vessels. However, some
Managing Authorities interviewed claimed that regulatory restrictions are easier to implement
and more effective (less over-fishing or illegal fishing) if the fleet is reduced at the same time.
The interviews conducted in the evaluation confirm that several MS administrations
recognise the lack of a clear link between fleet capacity and resource status and an inability
to measure the impact of cessation measures. Despite this, some MS have implemented
cessation schemes to:
•
Support broader fishery recovery measures (including by facilitating compliance);
•
Improve the economic efficiency of the fleet (e.g., Scotland);
•
Remove fuel inefficient vessels (e.g., Denmark); and
•
Modernise the fleet (e.g., Estonia)
Poorly targeted schemes were found to be counterproductive. The evaluation found that
46% of scrapping beneficiaries with more than one vessel reinvested the monies to some
extent. However 75% of beneficiaries scrapped their only vessel and therefore most did not
reinvest in other vessels (22% invested in fishing with only 6% purchasing a new vessel). As
to the counterfactual element of the evaluation, only 12% of vessel owners surveyed said
they would have scrapped their vessel anyway, without any subsidy.
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Scrapping funding has had a discernible impact on modernisation, mainly by slowing down
the underlying trend of increasing average vessel age. In Estonia, scrapping was used to
restructure an entire segment of the fleet.
The evaluation concludes that the coherence of EFF funding with other aspects of the
Common Fisheries Policy has improved with the obligation for MS to establish strategic
plans and Fishing Effort Adjustment Plans (FEAPs). The best synergies have been obtained
when scrapping and temporary cessation schemes have been implemented in the
framework of specific fisheries management programmes.
In terms of acceptability, sector stakeholders still generally perceive both permanent and
temporary cessation measures positively, but the cost of the measures and the lack of
evidence of impact on the resource make it increasingly difficult to justify to the wider public.
Temporary cessation schemes
Temporary cessation in the EFF has been used to compensate for unexpected loss of
fishing opportunities (as applied in the Baltic during the cod fishery closure or as applied in
France for pollution events) or to freeze capacity at certain times of the year (as applied in
Italy during the Fermo Biologico). Temporary cessation is therefore not attempting to reduce
fishing capacity in the European fleet; rather it aims to maintain fleet viability during
unexpected periods when fishing opportunities are drastically reduced. Arguably, this
counters the permanent cessation objective of adjusting capacity in the fleet.
Given the fact that temporary cessation schemes are implemented due a compulsory stop to
fishing activity, the evaluation concludes that public funding has been more useful in
rendering the measures politically acceptable than in actually reducing the amount of fishing.
This is especially the case in instances, such as Italy, where temporary cessation subsides
have become entrenched and incorporated into yearly payments to cover vessel owners’
fixed costs during periods where they would be inactive anyway or fishing with other gear.
Moreover, in no country under study did the case study conclude that the measures had
been effective at curtailing fishing effort in relation to the counterfactual.
For temporary cessation, industry and managing authorities interviewed state that without
funding some of the regulatory restructuring would not have been accepted by the sector.
Recommendations
The efficiency of cessation measures in the long-term is questionable and there is
agreement amongst most member states that overcapacity has been addressed in many
fleets. Therefore, any future re-introduction of EU funding for cessation measures should be
limited and highly targeted.
A cap on EU funds to be spent on permanent cessation would encourage MS to focus on
where they are most needed, while leaving MS enough flexibility to take into consideration
their different needs (type of the fleet, stocks status, industry organisation, etc.).
A cap on EU funds to be spent on temporary cessation measures should be accompanied
by greater efforts to ensure that funding is used for the intended purposes of maintaining
jobs during unforeseen fishery closure events rather than regular, anticipated payments.
Cessation measures should only be used in conjunction with the recovery of specific fishery
resources. This would ensure they are justified in relation to resource management
objectives and are explicitly linked to fishery target reference points such as reductions in
fishing mortality, not just fleet capacity reduction targets. Although permanent cessation will
not reduce fishing effort beyond that envisaged in a recovery plan, it will make the reduction
more politically and socially acceptable.
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Permanent cessation schemes with a competitive bidding process have shown they could
improve efficiency by ensuring appropriate premiums are set and this can be considered as
good practice. However, care should be taken to ensure this does not result in overly
complex application procedures that may be a disincentive particularly for small-scale
operators.
Competitive bidding could be linked to weighting selection criteria in line with the objectives
of EU and national policy. For example, if a scheme has a specific fishery recovery objective,
selection criteria should favour those vessels catching most in the fishery. This would ensure
that scrapping funding is allocated in such a way as to contribute to sustainability and work
towards higher-level policy objectives.
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Résumé
Les mesures d'arrêts définitifs et temporaires sont un élément historique des fonds
européens dans le secteur de la pêche. Le Fonds Européen pour la Pêche (2007-2013)
prévoit 1,3 Md € de dépenses alloués à l’axe 1 dont relèvent ces mesures, sur un budget
total de 4 Md €. Les principaux objectifs de ces mesures sont :
•
•
arrêts permanents / démolition des navires: réduire la taille de la flotte et la
capacité de pêche européenne en vue de contribuer à un équilibre durable entre
les ressources et la capacité de pêche ;
arrêts temporaires : maintenir l'activité et l'emploi dans les périodes où l'activité
est interrompue pour des raisons indépendantes de la volonté des pêcheurs.
Cette évaluation rétrospective porte principalement sur les régimes d'arrêts définitifs et
temporaires financés par le FEP (2007-2013), avec quelques mises en perspectives par
rapport à la mise en œuvre de ces fonds au titre de l'Instrument financier d'orientation de la
pêche (IFOP) pour la période 2000-2006.
Outre l'analyse des rapports et autres sources de données existantes, l'étude s’appuie sur
neuf études de cas dans neuf États membres4 qui représentent près de 90 % des dépenses
et 60 % des navires retirés au titre de la mesure de cessation définitive du FEP. La mesure
pour les arrêts temporaires a été mise en œuvre dans la plupart de ces études de cas sauf
trois5. L'évaluation comporte un élément contrefactuel, c'est à dire qu’elle vise à répondre à
la question : «Que ce serait-il passé sans les mesures ?"
Arrêts définitifs : contribution à la réduction de la taille et de la capacité de la flotte
Entre 2000 et 2011, la flotte de pêche de l'UE diminue de façon continue aussi bien en
nombre de navires (-25 %) qu’en taille totale de jauge brute (GT) (-24%).
Les réductions les plus importantes (> 30 % de la capacité de flotte initiale) sont observées
dans les zones de la mer du Nord et de la Baltique (BE, NL, DK, SW, LV, EE) et pour les
flottes de pêche industrielle en ES, ITA, FR, UK (réductions de 24 % à 30 % en GT).
La diminution de la capacité de flotte provient principalement du segment des chalutiers
(75% des GT sortis). De façon générale, le soutien de l'UE à l'arrêt définitif a été plus ciblé
sous le FEP que sous le programme IFOP, et a visé en particulier les navires de grande
taille opérant avec des chaluts.
Le rythme des arrêts définitifs dans le cadre du FEP est inférieur à celui de l’IFOP: près de
800 navires / an et 35 000 GT / an dans le premier cas contre environ 1 600 navires / an et
50 000 GT / an entre 2002 et 2006.
La contribution des mesures d'arrêt définitif du FEP aux sorties de flotte est en revanche
supérieure à ce qu'elle était sous l'IFOP. Le FEP a contribué à hauteur d’environ 78 % de la
réduction de la capacité de flotte (en GT) sur la base des neuf études de cas réalisées,
contre environ 50 % dans le cas de l'IFOP (2000-2006).
Le nombre de navires démolis sans soutien financier a diminué de façon constante de 2005
à 2010 et les navires concernés sont principalement de petits navires. L'incitation à sortir
sans soutien a notamment diminué avec la fin de l’aide à la construction en 2004, puisque
les candidats à cette aide ne pouvaient pas bénéficier d’une aide à la démolition.
La mise en œuvre de la mesure a été influencée par les coûts élevés du carburant et les prix
bas des poissons en 2008-2009, ainsi que par la crise économique mondiale. La capacité
4
5
Danemark, Espagne, Estonie, France, Italie, Pologne, Portugal et le Royaume-Uni
Danemark, Estonie et le Royaume-Uni
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
sortie au cours de ces deux années a été supérieure à la moyenne de la période, avec plus
de 40 000 GT sortis par an et une proportion de navires bénéficiant de l’aide du FEP qui a
atteint plus de 80%. Pendant la crise économique le soutien de l'UE a été davantage utilisé
comme un outil de gestion de crise, que comme un outil de restructuration lié aux
ressources. A cet égard, la crise a agi comme un accélérateur de la réduction du nombre de
navires.
Arrêts définitifs : contribution à la durabilité globale de la flotte
L’aide à la cessation définitive (démolition) des navires de pêche est seulement l’une des
alternatives visant à réduire la capacité de pêche. L’absence d’intervention publique ou
l'introduction de systèmes de gestion fondés sur les droits de pêche (comme les quotas
individuels transférables - QIT) sont également des possibilités.
Le potentiel des QIT pour réduire la capacité de la flotte (à un coût beaucoup plus faible
pour l’Etat que les aides à l’arrêt définitif) a convaincu le Danemark et quelques autres États
Membres (Royaume-Uni, Suède et Estonie) que les aides à la destruction ne devraient pas
être l’outil principal de rééquilibrage de la capacité de pêche avec la ressource.
Le temps nécessaire à l’ajustement de la capacité en l'absence d'intervention publique peut
en revanche ne pas être adapté aux objectifs de conservation: un navire est un
investissement à long terme et les armateurs peuvent souvent continuer à opérer même
avec des navires non rentables à court terme. Cela pose un risque important d’une
surexploitation prolongée des ressources, en particulier dans les pêcheries mixtes.
Les entretiens réalisés auprès des autorités de gestion et des organisations professionnelles
montrent que la plupart des administrations publiques et des parties prenantes considèrent
que les mesures d'arrêt définitif restent pertinentes pour traiter la question de la capacité de
la flotte. Ceci en dépit du fait que dans le dernier rapport annuel sur la flotte, 10 des 22 États
Membres affirment que la capacité de celle-ci est à présent globalement en équilibre avec la
ressource.
L'évaluation conclut qu'il reste difficile d'établir un lien clair entre les arrêts définitifs et la
réduction de la capacité de pêche. En effet, il existe un certain nombre d'autres facteurs qui
jouent un rôle. Ainsi, de 2001 à 2011, la quantité de captures de la flotte de l’UE a diminué,
plus rapidement que la taille et la capacité de celle-ci, et ce pour plusieurs raisons : la
diminution des possibilités de pêche et la concurrence accrue liée aux importations, ainsi
que la réduction de la taille de la flotte.
L'évaluation conclut que les réductions de l'activité de pêche au cours du programme FEP
sont plus liées aux restrictions réglementaires (ex : quota et gestion de l'effort de pêche)
qu’à la réduction de la taille de la flotte en elle-même. Dans le cas des pêcheries sous
quota, la sortie de navires équivaut en effet à une simple redistribution des quotas entre les
bateaux restants. Certaines autorités de gestion interrogées soutiennent cependant que les
restrictions réglementaires sont plus faciles à mettre en œuvre et plus efficace (moins de
surpêche ou de pêche illégale) lorsqu'elles sont accompagnées d’une réduction de la flotte.
Les entretiens réalisés au cours de l'évaluation confirment que les administrations de
plusieurs États Membres reconnaissent le manque de lien clair entre la capacité de la flotte
et l'état des ressources ainsi qu’une incapacité à mesurer l'impact des mesures d'arrêt sur
celles-ci. Malgré cela, certains États membres ont mis en place des régimes d’aide à la
cessation, dans le but de :
•
•
•
Soutenir plus largement les mesures liées à la reconstitution des stocks (y
compris grâce à un meilleur respect des règles) ;
Améliorer l'efficacité économique de la flotte (par exemple en Écosse) ;
Sortir les navires énergivores (par exemple au Danemark), et
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
•
Moderniser la flotte (par exemple en Estonie) ;
Les plans peu ciblés ont été jugées contre-productifs. L'évaluation a révélé que 46% des
bénéficiaires de l’aide possédant plus d'un navire avait en partie réinvesti les fonds.
Cependant 75 % des bénéficiaires ont démoli leur unique navire et la plupart d’entre eux
n’ont donc pas pu réinvestir l’aide dans la flotte restante (22 % ont investi dans le secteur
de la pêche et seulement 6 % dans l'achat d'un nouveau navire). En ce qui concerne
l’analyse contrefactuelle, seuls 12% des armateurs interrogés ont déclaré qu'ils auraient
détruit leur navire dans tous les cas, même sans subvention.
L’aide à la démolition a eu un impact perceptible sur la modernisation de la flotte,
principalement en ralentissant la tendance au vieillissement des navires. En Estonie, l’aide a
aussi été utilisée pour restructurer une partie entière de la flotte.
L'évaluation conclut que la cohérence du financement FEP avec les autres aspects de la
politique commune de la pêche s'est améliorée avec l'obligation pour les États Membres
d'établir des Plans Stratégiques Nationaux et des Plans d’Ajustement de l'Effort de Pêche
(PAEP). Des synergies plus importantes ont été obtenues lorsque les aides à la destruction
ou à la cessation temporaire ont été mises en œuvre dans le cadre de programmes de
gestion de pêcheries spécifiques.
En termes d'acceptabilité, les professionnels du secteur perçoivent encore généralement
ces mesures comme positives, mais leur coût et le manque de preuves de l'impact sur la
ressource est de plus en plus difficile à justifier pour le grand public.
Les régimes d'arrêt temporaire
Dans le cadre du FEP, les arrêts temporaires ont été utilisés pour compenser des
fermetures non prévues de certaines pêcheries (fermeture de la pêche à la morue dans la
Baltique ou pollutions en France) ou pour stopper la pêche à certains moments précis de
l'année (comme en Italie avec la « Fermo Biologico »). L’aide aux arrêts temporaires n'a
pas vocation à réduire la capacité de pêche de la flotte européenne, mais plutôt à maintenir
la viabilité des flottilles pendant les périodes où les possibilités de pêche sont
considérablement réduites, normalement pour des raisons imprévisibles. Cet objectif peut
dans une certaine mesure être considéré comme contradictoire avec celui de la réduction de
la flotte.
Compte tenu du fait que les régimes d'arrêt temporaire sont mis en œuvre suite à des arrêts
obligatoires de l'activité de pêche, l'évaluation conclut que le financement public a plus servi
à rendre les mesures de restriction acceptables qu’à réduire effectivement la pêche. Cela
est particulièrement vrai dans des cas comme l'Italie où les aides à l'arrêt temporaire sont
récurrents et donc incorporés dans les calculs des armateurs pour couvrir leurs coûts fixes
dans les périodes où ils seraient de toute façon inactifs ou obligés de pêcher avec d'autres
engins. De plus, dans aucune étude de cas, l’analyse contrefactuelle réalisée à partir des
enquêtes n’a permis de conclure que les mesures avaient été efficaces en termes de
réduction de l'effort de pêche.
L'industrie et les autorités de gestion interrogées déclarent aussi que sans financement une
partie de la restructuration réglementaire n'aurait pas été acceptée par le secteur.
Recommendations
L’efficacité à long terme des mesures d'arrêt est discutable et la plupart des États Membres
s’accordent sur le fait que la question de la surcapacité a été réglée dans de nombreux
segments de flottes. Par conséquent, toute future réintroduction de financement de l'UE
pour ces mesures doit être limitée et très ciblée.
Un plafonnement des fonds UE alloués aux arrêts définitifs encouragerait les États Membres
à concentrer ceux-ci dans les cas où ils s’avèrent le plus nécessaires, tout en leur laissant
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
suffisamment de souplesse pour tenir compte des différents contextes (type de flotte, état
des stocks, organisation du secteur, etc.).
Un plafonnement des fonds UE alloués aux mesures d'arrêt temporaire devrait également
être accompagné par des efforts accrus pour garantir une utilisation des fonds en vue du
maintien de l'emploi lors de périodes de fermeture liées à des évènements imprévus et non
pour des paiements anticipés réguliers.
Les mesures de cessation ne devraient être utilisés que conjointement à des mesures de
reconstitution de stocks précis. Cela permettrait d’assurer le lien avec les objectifs de
gestion des ressources et de fixer des objectifs quantifiés par rapport à un point de
référence donné tels que la réduction de la mortalité par pêche, et plus seulement des
objectifs de réduction de capacité de la flotte. Bien que l'arrêt définitif ne permette pas de
réduire l'effort de pêche au-delà de ce qui est prévu dans un plan de reconstitution, il peut
permettre de rendre celui-ci plus acceptable politiquement et socialement.
Les régimes d’arrêt définitifs avec appel d'offres ont montré qu'ils pouvaient améliorer
l'efficacité en assurant un montant de subvention plus ajusté aux besoins, et peuvent donc
être considérés comme une bonne pratique. Des précautions doivent toutefois être prises
pour s'assurer que cela ne se traduise pas par des procédures de candidatures trop
complexes induisant un effet dissuasif en particulier pour les petits armateurs.
Les appels d'offres pourraient recourir à des critères de sélection pondérés permettant de
s’inscrire dans les objectifs de l'UE et de la politique nationale. Par exemple, si un
programme vise la reconstitution d’un stock spécifique, les critères de sélection devraient
favoriser les navires avec des captures élevées pour cette espèce. Cela permettrait de
garantir que l’aide aux arrêts permanents est allouée de manière à contribuer à la durabilité
de la ressource et à progresser vers des objectifs plus élevés.
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Table of Contents
1! Introduction ......................................................................................................................1!
1.1! Context ........................................................................................................................1!
1.2! EFF cessation spend ...................................................................................................2!
1.3! Future cessation funding .............................................................................................2!
1.4! Objectives ....................................................................................................................3!
1.5! Report structure ...........................................................................................................4!
2! Intervention logic .............................................................................................................5!
3! Methodology .....................................................................................................................7!
3.1! General approach ........................................................................................................7!
3.2! Information sources .....................................................................................................7!
3.3! Detailed methodology ..................................................................................................8!
3.4! Analysis .....................................................................................................................12!
3.5! Challenges encountered ............................................................................................13!
3.6! Survey respondent profiles ........................................................................................14!
4! Counterfactual analysis ................................................................................................17!
4.1! Challenges in counterfactual analysis .......................................................................17!
4.2! Differences between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries .........................................17!
4.3! Expected actions without cessation funding ..............................................................19!
4.4! Summary ...................................................................................................................20!
5! Relevance .......................................................................................................................22!
5.1! Are measures other than EU-funded cessation measures (e.g. the market,
transferable quotas) capable of addressing capacity in the European fishing fleet? If not, to
what extent are they insufficient and why? ........................................................................22!
5.2! To what extent are the objectives of permanent cessation measures appropriate to
address capacity in the European fishing fleet? .................................................................27!
6! Effectiveness ..................................................................................................................30!
6.1! To what extent have permanent cessation measures contributed to a reduction in the
size of the European fishing fleet? .....................................................................................30!
6.2! To what extent have permanent cessation measures led to a sustained reduction in
European fishing capacity (the overall catching capacity of the fleet)? ..............................41!
6.3! To what extent have permanent cessation measures contributed to the
modernisation of the European fishing fleet? .....................................................................47!
6.4! To what extent have temporary cessation measures led to temporary drops in fishing
activity? ..............................................................................................................................50!
6.5! To what extent have temporary cessation measures assisted vessel owners to adapt
to emergencies and other shifting conditions? ...................................................................52!
6.6! To what extent have temporary cessation measures contributed to the maintenance
of jobs in the fishing sector? ...............................................................................................52!
6.7! Have the effects of permanent and (to a lesser extent) temporary cessation
measures contributed to environmental, economic and social sustainability in the
European fishing sector?....................................................................................................53!
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
7! Efficiency ........................................................................................................................61!
7.1! Have the effects of permanent and temporary cessation measures been achieved at
a reasonable cost? Could similar effects be achieved in a more cost effective way? ........61!
7.2! Are the procedures, processes and rules of the cessation measures conducive to
enabling the Commission and Member States to fulfil their respective roles cost
effectively? .........................................................................................................................66!
8! Coherence ......................................................................................................................68!
8.1! To what extent do the cessation measures complement other initiatives at EU and
national levels? Are there any areas of duplication that could be avoided? Could similar
initiatives be expected by the Member States or other actors without EU support? ..........68!
9! Acceptability ...................................................................................................................73!
9.1! What are managing authorities’ views of the current system for cessation measures
in relation to other potential ways to reduce fishing capacity? ...........................................73!
9.2! To what extent do vessel owners rely on the current level of funding for cessation
measures and are there other interventions that could fulfil a similar role? .......................73!
10! Evaluation Summary .....................................................................................................74!
10.1! Evaluation approach ..................................................................................................74!
10.2! Relevance ..................................................................................................................74!
10.3! Effectiveness .............................................................................................................74!
10.4! Efficiency ...................................................................................................................76!
10.5! Coherence .................................................................................................................77!
10.6! Acceptability ...............................................................................................................77!
11! Conclusions ...................................................................................................................78!
11.1! To what extent have EU-funded measures in permanent cessation helped to adapt
fishing capacity to available resources? .............................................................................78!
11.2! To what extents have EU-funded measures in temporary cessation helped to
maintain activity and jobs in periods where activity was interrupted for reasons beyond the
control of fishermen? ..........................................................................................................79!
11.3! To what extent would measure equivalent to permanent and temporary cessation
have been developed without EU support? .......................................................................80!
11.4! What have been the socio-economic impacts of both types of measures on coastal
economies? ........................................................................................................................80!
11.5! Recommendations for the future use of cessation measures ....................................81!
12! References ......................................................................................................................82!
Appendix 1 Evaluation questions matrix ............................................................................84!
Appendix 2 Managing Authorities & organisations interviewed .........................................90!
Appendix 3 Vessel owner questionnaire ............................................................................93!
Appendix 4: Vessel owner survey counterfactual analysis: methodology and results. ....104!
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Annexes: Case study reports
Annex 1
Denmark
Annex 2
Estonia
Annex 3
France
Annex 4
Italy
Annex 5
Poland
Annex 6
Portugal
Annex 7
Spain
Annex 8
Sweden
Annex 9
United Kingdom
Table of Figures
Figure 1. Cessation measures intervention logic .....................................................................6!
Figure 2: survey respondents by country ...............................................................................14!
Figure 3: proportion of owners surveyed who had received scrapping support ....................15!
Figure 4: enterprise details ....................................................................................................15!
Figure 5 Beneficiaries reasons for seeking scrapping support .............................................18!
Figure 6 Ownership structure.................................................................................................18!
Figure 7 Responses to 'likely action without permanent cessation funding' by beneficiaries 19!
Figure 8:Reasons for not receiving support for scrapped vessels .........................................20!
Figure 9 Factors affecting profitability given by non-beneficiaries .........................................20!
Figure 10: Long-term evolution of the EU15 and EU10 fleet .................................................31!
Figure 11 : Evolution of the number of fishing vessels by MS and programming period .......32!
Figure 12: Decrease in number of vessels per gear per programming period – EU 15 ........33!
Figure 13: Long-term evolution of the EU15 and EU10 fleet (GT) .........................................33!
Figure 14: Evolution of the fleet capacity (GT) by MS and programming period ...................34!
Figure 15 : Breakdown of the decrease in GT per gear per programming period – EU 15 ...35!
Figure 16: Share of vessels scrapped with FIFG or EFF support ..........................................36!
Figure 17: Share of vessels scrapped with aid and vessels scrapped over total exits ..........37!
Figure 18: Share of vessels scrapped with either FIFG or EFF support by MS (2002-2012) 38!
Figure 19: Likely actions without permanent cessation support by Member State ................38!
Figure 20: Likely actions without permanent cessation support (weighted by GT) ................39!
Figure 21: Evolution of total catch, fleet number and fleet capacity in EU15 and EU10 ........42!
Figure 22: Evolution of catches and fleet capacity for the 9 case studies since 2004 ...........43!
Figure 23: Total catch/vessel evolution by MS for the 9 case studies ..................................44!
Figure 24: Evolution of catch/unit in the 9 case studies since 2004 ......................................45!
Figure 25: Evolution of Fleet average age .............................................................................47!
Figure 26: Answers about the choice of vessels to scrap ......................................................49!
Figure 27: Answers about the use of permanent cessation funding ......................................49!
Figure 28 Cessation spend per GT and per vessel (as of July 2012) ....................................61!
Figure 29: Comparison of the subsidy with vessels market value (350 answers) .................63!
Figure 30: Likely actions without temporary cessation measures (199 answers) ..................64!
Figure 31: How did the funding cover vessel expenses during the period ? (199 answers) ..64!
Figure 32 Vessel owner opinions on Permanent cessation application process ...................66!
Figure 33 Vessel owner opinions on Temporary cessation application process ...................67!
Figure 34 Logic tree – complementarities of EFF fleet measures with other interventions ...70!
Tables
Table 1: EFF Axis 1 spend 2007-May 2013 ............................................................................2!
Table 2 Proposed Treatment and Comparison Groups .........................................................11!
Table 3 Proposed treatment & comparison group samples by gear type ..............................12!
Table 4: Average age of scrapped and active vessels in the nine case studies ....................48!
Table 5: Temporary cessation by Member State ...................................................................50!
Table 6 Assessment of key target stocks for fleets subject to fleet adjustment schemes .....55!
Table 7 Managing Authority and Industry interviews .............................................................90!
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
1 Introduction
1.1 Context
The Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG)6 for 2000-2006 and the European
Fisheries Fund (EFF)7 for 2007-2013 include fleet measures with their main objectives to:
•
Help adapt fishing capacity to available resources (permanent cessation / scrapping);
•
Maintain activity/jobs during periods when activity is interrupted for environmental
and other reasons beyond the control of fishermen (temporary cessation).
The permanent cessation of fishing vessels fishing activities could be achieved by the:
•
Scrapping of the vessel;
•
Permanent reassignment of fishing vessels for purposes other than fishing; or
•
Permanent reassignment for the purpose of the creation of artificial reefs.
Until 31 December 2004, it was also possible to reduce fishing effort through the permanent
transfer of a vessel to a third country, including under the framework of a joint enterprise, but
this measure was eliminated in the framework of the 2002 CFP reform.
The European Commission’s (EC) total FIFG funding between 2000 and 2006 was €3.2
billion. The additional Member State contributions to FIFG funding varied by the type of
measure being funded, the size of the recipient vessel or business and the region where it
was based. Member State FIFG contributions amounted to €1.7 billion, giving a total of €4.9
billion of funding from the FIFG Programme. About 17% of this figure was for scrapping
(15%) and temporary cessation (2%). Over the FIFG period, roughly similar FIFG funds were
also spent on new vessel construction or fleet modernisations.
The EFF also funds cessation measures under Axis 1 (permanent cessation measure 1.1,
temporary cessation measure 1.2). The 2011 EFF interim evaluation8 reports that most
Member State reports indicated that Axis 1 had helped to mitigate the social impact of the
ongoing economic crisis and that “overall these measures have contributed to the reduction
of the fleet capacity (at least three Member States have already over-achieved their final
targets) even though the net effect of the EFF is not always clear as indicators do not always
specify if the reduction of capacity concerns the entire fleet or only the vessels that received
support.”
The 2011 Special Report by the European Court of Auditors9 concluded that the removal of
overcapacity through public aid such as scrapping had proven ineffective; despite €1.7
billion spent since 1994, actual fishing capacity has not decreased in most of the European
Union (EU) fleets. This is partly due to the difficulty of adequately defining fishing capacity
and ensuring that vessels are removed from fleets in fisheries where overcapacity exists.
6
Council Regulation (EC) No 1263/1999 of 21 June 1999 on the Financial Instrument for Fisheries
Guidance
7
Council Regulation (EC) No 1198/2006 of 27 July 2006 on the European Fisheries Fund
8
http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/studies/effevaluation/indexen.htm
9
European Court of Auditors. Have EU measures contributed to adapting the capacity of the fishing
fleets to available fishing opportunities? Special Report 2011/12
1
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
1.2 EFF cessation spend
An estimated €1.3billion of the €4 billion EFF budget is allocated to Axis 1, with a large
majority allocated to permanent cessation.
Table 1 illustrates the situation with EFF spend under Axis 1 up to May 2013 for all EU
Member States. A significant amount of these funds has gone into financing permanent
cessation measures, although from 2011 onwards the spending on scrapping measures has
slowed down. .
Table 1: EFF Axis 1 spend 2007-May 2013
Measure
Number of Total cost
operations
National
EFF
public
contribution
contribution (€ million)
% EFF
committed
compared
to total MS
committed
%EFF
committed
compared
EFF Total
allocation
1.1
permanent
cessation
4,025
860m
357.8m
501.6m
17.3%
11.6%
Action 1:
Scrapping
3,976
834m
329.6m
486m
16.8%
11.3%
Action 2:
Reassign
outside
fishing
49
24m
10m
14m
0.48%
0.32%
350m
135.7m
214.3m
7.4%
5.0%
1.2 temporary
54,785
cessation
Total EFF
committed
Total EFF
allocation
2,898m
4,302m
*Missing MS: Romania
Source: DG MARE
1.3 Future cessation funding
The Commission's proposal in December 2011 for the main financial instrument in support of
the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy is the European Maritime Fisheries Fund
(EMFF)10. The Commission proposal for the EMFF does not provide for EU support for
temporary or permanent cessation schemes, arguing that successive evaluations had
demonstrated that temporary and permanent cessation aid schemes were poorly targeted,
not cost effective and often used with little regard to the objectives of capacity reduction at
the level of the overall fleet and therefore did not address the imbalance between capacity
and stocks.
In July 2013, the EU's Council of Ministers adopted its position on the Commission's
proposal, which retains a number of subsidies that exist in the current European Fisheries
10
COM(2011) 804 final Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund [repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1198/2006 and
Council Regulation(EC) No 861/2006 and Council Regulation No XXX/2011 on integrated maritime
policy
2
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Fund, albeit accompanied by a series of stricter conditions including ceilings set for financial
assistance available at EU level.
In preparation for the next generation of EMFF programmes (2014-2020), a more in-depth
analysis is needed of how permanent and temporary cessation measures have been used,
as well as their effectiveness and efficiency. The trilateral discussions between the
Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament should be informed by
the findings of this analysis. The results are also expected to be useful for the discussions
with Member States in the preparation of the next generation of EMFF Operational
Programmes.
1.4 Objectives
The objectives of this evaluation are to assess the degree to which the existing permanent
cessation/scrapping and temporary cessation measures have met their objectives, namely
•
•
For permanent cessation / scrapping: help adapt fishing capacity to available
resources; and
For temporary cessation: maintain activity and jobs in periods where activity is
interrupted for reasons beyond the control of fishermen.
As a retrospective evaluation, it evaluates permanent cessation (scrapping) and temporary
cessation measures in place, in line with the Commission’s evaluation guidelines. It does this
by considering the:
•
Relevance (i.e. the extent to which an intervention’s objectives are pertinent to
needs, problems and issues to be addressed);
•
Effectiveness (i.e. attaining the specific objectives set and achieving the intended
results):
•
Efficiency (i.e. the best relationship between resources employed and results
achieved);
•
Coherence (i.e. the extent to which the intervention logic is non-contradictory / the
intervention does not contradict other interventions with similar objectives) and
•
Acceptance (i.e. the extent to which stakeholders accept the policy in general and the
particular instrument proposed or employed).
According to the ToR, the key questions to be examined in this study (further explained and
expanded on in section 2 on the evaluation framework) are:
1) To what extent have EU-funded measures in permanent cessation helped to adapt fishing
capacity to available resources? The study will 1) clarify whether or not this measure was
needed or if there would have been a better way to reach this objective and 2) if the
measure was needed, to what extent it was effective and efficient in reaching its goals.
2) To what extent have EU-funded measures in temporary cessation helped to maintain
activity and jobs in periods where activity was interrupted for reasons beyond the control of
fishermen (temporary cessation)? The study will 1) clarify whether or not this measure was
needed or if there would have been a better way to reach this objective and 2) if the
measure was needed, to what extent it was effective and efficient in reaching its goals.
3) To what extent would measure equivalent to permanent and temporary cessation have
been developed without EU support? This relates to the issue of additionality, and the
added-value of EU financial support.
3
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
4) What have been the socio-economic impacts of both types of measures on coastal
economies (in terms of development, job creation / destruction, income to remaining vessels,
etc.)?
The study provides country-specific findings on how permanent and temporary cessation
measures have been implemented in practice in a number of Member States, specifically:
Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), France (FR), Italy (IT), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES),
Sweden (SE) and the United Kingdom (UK).
1.5 Report structure
The report is primarily structured around the evaluation questions that frame the evaluation’s
assessment of relevance, effectiveness efficiency, coherence, acceptability. These are
informed by EU-wide analysis and by the nine case studies that are provided as annexes to
this main report. The structure of the report is as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
4
Evaluation framework, including the evaluation logic, evaluation questions and
evaluation questions matrix (section 2);
Final methodology, including a detailed sampling methodology for the vessel owner
survey and approach to analysis (section 3);
Counterfactual survey and analysis (section 4);
Evaluation questions incorporating analysis across all case studies to consider
relevance, effectiveness efficiency, coherence, acceptability against 14 evaluation
questions (sections 5-9);
Conclusions summarising the findings (section 10);
Appendices providing further information on 1) the evaluation questions matrix; 2)
managing authorities and industry organisations interviewed; 3) vessel owner
questionnaires; 4) vessel owner survey counterfactual analysis: approach & findings;
Annexes providing the nine case study reports.
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
2 Intervention logic
An intervention logic is commonly understood as the formulation of a series of key concepts
that then characterise a given project, programme or policy, together with the intended
causal relationships between them (usually represented graphically).
The intervention logic also helps structure an evaluation, linking various aspects of a
spending programme or other intervention to objectives, rendering it easier to understand
precisely what is to be done and what it is to be achieved. This in turn enables the evaluation
team to expand on the research questions provided in the ToR, allowing the evaluation to
gauge the difference between how the cessation measures were intended to work and what
they have led to in practice. Agreement on the intervention logic ensured that the evaluation
team and DG MARE have a common understanding of the cessation measures and the
objectives of this evaluation, providing an opportunity to clarify any misunderstandings
before the data collection stage.
Our interpretation of the intervention logic is shown in Figure 1 on the next page. As
described, it illustrates the hierarchy of objectives from inputs (i.e. funding) to the ultimate
intended impact, linked up with the general objective of the CFP, sustainable exploitation of
living aquatic resources. In large part the evaluation will seek to test the extent to which the
cessation measures have achieved the objectives as expressed in the intervention logic, in
accordance with the evaluation questions, judgement criteria and indicators found in
Appendix 1.
NB: The intervention logic was prepared based on the following sources:
• Council Regulation (EC) No 1263/1999 on the Financial Instrument for Fisheries
Guidance:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1999:161:0054:0056:EN:PDF
•
Council Regulation (EC) No 1198/2006 on the European Fisheries Fund:
•
Council Regulation (EC) No 744/2008 instituting a temporary specific action aiming to
promote the restructuring of the European Community fishing fleets affected by the
economic crisis:
•
5
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:223:0001:0044:EN:PDF
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:202:0001:0008:EN:PDF
The EFF website: http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/eff/indexen.htm#
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Figure 1. Cessation measures intervention logic
6
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
3 Methodology
3.1 General approach
The approach to this evaluation followed the ToR, and involved three sequential tasks:
Task 1 - Developing the methodology,
Task 2 - Undertaking Member State investigations, and
Task 3 - Analysing the findings.
The evaluation focuses on case studies in nine Member States (proposed by the
Commission and where either permanent cessation or temporary cessation or both schemes
had been financed by the EFF), using in-depth interviews with key stakeholders and a
survey of vessel-owners as the key study tools, in addition to substantial desk research. The
interviews and surveys were administered in the selected Member States using a mix of
face-to-face and telephone contact. Once all the data was collected, it was collated (via a
web-based survey tool, surveymonkey) and analysed to inform the evaluation questions.
A mixture of qualitative and quantitative data was gathered for each case study via in-depth
interviews with Member State Managing Authorities (MA) and industry representatives
(Producer Organisations or other relevant organisations) and surveys of vessel owners
(beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of permanent and temporary cessation measures). A
counterfactual element to the survey methodology has attempted to explore what would
have happened without cessation support.
The focus/scope of the evaluation is on cessation schemes implemented and fleet
development during the current EFF programming period (2007-2013), although where
relevant, events during the previous FIFG programme (2000-2006) are considered.
3.2 Information sources
Primary data was collected from interviews with the MAs, the POs and vessel-owners (see
questionnaires in Appendix 2).
The following secondary data were used by the evaluators:
7
!
EU documents:
o Annual reports on Member States' efforts to achieve a sustainable balance
between fishing capacity and fishing opportunities (based on annual reports
from Member States): 2008 to 2010;
o FIFG 2000-2006 ex-post evaluation (2009);
o EFF interim evaluation (2011);
o National EFF evaluation reports (2011) and assessment sheets from the desk
officers;
o Synthesis of national EFF implementation evaluations (2011);
o European Court of Auditors Special Report 2011: “Have EU measures
contributed to adapting the capacity of the fishing fleets to available fishing
opportunities?”
!
Member State planning and monitoring documents:
o National Strategic Plans (NSP): according to Art. 15 of Reg. (EC) 1198-2006,
National Strategic Plans should lay out the priorities, objectives and financial
resources allocated to the common fisheries policy, including “the
management and adjustment of the Community fishing fleet and, in particular,
the adjustment of fishing effort and capacity with regard to the evolution of
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
o
o
o
o
o
fisheries resources, the promotion of environmentally-friendly fishing methods
and a sustainable development of fishing activities”;
Operational Programmes (OP): according to Art. 20 of Reg. (EC) 1198-2006,
operational programmes should contain a description of the sector and
specific targets for each priority axis, usually expressed for Axis 1, in terms of
a targeted reduction of the fleet capacity in number of vessels, KW, and/or
GT;
Annual Fleet reports from 2008 to 2011: they provide available data and
analysis on the balance between fleet capacity and fishing opportunities; the
fishing effort schemes and the fleet situation and evolution;
Implementation reports 2011: financial execution and qualitative analysis on
implementation;
Monitoring data (Data on operations to be communicated on request to the
Commission, Art. 40 of Reg. 498/2007): individual data by operation funded
under the EFF containing financial execution and result indicators(see Annex
for details of the request);
The list of FEAP and FAS and, when available the number of boats actually
scrapped by plan or scheme.
!
Other studies:
o Annual Economic Fleet Reports from the JRC;
o ICES reports;
o STECF working group reports.
!
Fleet Register data: individual data by vessel (port, name, events, kW, GT, etc.).
3.3 Detailed methodology
The methodology presented in the proposal was developed and finalised with the
Commission as part of Task 1.
A number of sub-tasks were completed as follows:
Sub-task 1.1 collation, distribution & analysis of background material
Sub-task 1.2 Sample design
For permanent cessation, quantitative data collection was gathered based on surveys of
vessel owners. The vessel owners surveyed include those having benefitted and those
having not benefitted from public funds for permanent cessation. The group of vessel owners
not receiving scrapping funds are effectively a comparison group for those who did use
scrapping funds, in order to build a counterfactual case. A priority comparison group are
those vessel owners that applied but were rejected for scrapping.
As agreed at the inception meeting, a representative sample was defined for the assessment
of permanent cessation measures only. The analysis of temporary cessation was carried out
based on interviews with managing authorities, industry representatives and a small sample
of vessel owners. Additional field sampling time was allocated to case studies where
temporary cessation has been used (six of the nine case studies).
The survey sample design adhered to standard methodological principles and takes the
following into account:
•
•
population of interest and relevant sampling units,
selection frame containing the unit of the population,
These are described further below.
8
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
3.3.1
Sample selection
The selection of the sample units for each of the Member States under investigation was
made to ensure statistical reliability of the outcomes within reasonable bias limits.
A counterfactual evaluation requires the selection of a treatment group (i.e. vessel owners
receiving aid to scrap) and a comparison group (i.e. vessel owners that did not receive
scrapping aid). The comparison group is therefore all owners of vessels in the fleet at the
time that did not receive scrapping aid, some of whom may have applied for scrapping aid
but were rejected (the most useful comparison group), some were subsequently scrapped
without aid and some remained in the fleet. The selection frame was therefore made up of
two populations of vessel owners, identified via the vessels:
a. Treatment Group: In the nine case study Member States there were 10,720 vessels that
exited the fleet from 2008 to 2012. Of those, 3,720 were scrapped and 1,823 were scrapped
with EU aid11. As table 2 illustrates, a further 775 vessels have been accepted for scrapping
aid and EU funds committed, but these actions are not completed and therefore may not yet
have left the fleet. The owners of the 1,823 vessels where scrapping operations have been
completed using EU aid in the nine case study Member States make up the treatment group.
DG MARE provided a list of all vessels exiting the register from 2003 onwards. Information
on the year when each vessel exited, whether it was scrapped or re-assigned, the country,
sea basin, vessel code, vessel name, GT, kW, vessel port, type of measure applied, type of
financial support, and the main fishing gears used are provided for each vessel.
b. Comparison group: The comparison group comes from a population consisting of all
owners of vessels present at the time the vessels were scrapped with EU aid that would also
have been eligible for scrapping aid. These vessel owners, especially those, who applied for
scrapping aid and were unsuccessful, made up the comparison group.
DG MARE provided a sample of vessels from the fleet register as at 2008 that operated the
same main gear as those in the treatment group. This selection frame refined the population
to better ensure that the vessels in the comparison group population would have been
eligible for scrapping aid.
In the case of permanent cessation, we wanted to know the reasons for and consequences
of one vessel being scrapped with aid, while another similar vessel was not scrapped with
aid. Rather than selecting a random sample where vessel characteristics may vary, it is
useful to identify similar vessels in the two groups and pair these in sampling and
subsequent analysis. The treatment and comparison groups should therefore be as similar
as possible, recognising the risk of selection bias and contamination (see section 3.5 on
risks and challenges).
A key sub-population of the comparison group is rejected applicants as these vessel owners
clearly wanted aid to scrap their vessel, but were not given that aid. What happened to this
group subsequently is clearly of interest to a counterfactual evaluation.
No applicants were rejected for under-subscribed schemes or where arrangements ensured
that all those who apply are funded. Also in some cases it was not possible to identify
rejected applicants ahead of survey sample selection. However, where there were rejected
that could be identified, the evaluators prioritised rejected applicants in the comparison
11
These totals differ to the total number of scrapped vessels. This total derives from data on
completed scrapping operations in nine Member States up to the end of 2012, while the available total
spend in table 4 derives from all 22 coastal Member States but only up to July 2012.
9
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
group. In these instances the treatment group sample was matched to the rejected applicant,
rather than vice versa.
3.3.2
Sampling procedure
To ensure sufficient similarity between treatment and comparison group, a matching
procedure was conducted. The comparison group sample was selected through comparing
variables with the treatment group sample. Samples were paired to reduce incidental
variation, i.e. variation expected to be present but that is irrelevant to the hypothesis being
tested.
To find the best possible match for each member of the treatment group, Propensity Score
Matching was used. This technique uses a very intuitive and simple concept. For each
member of the group that participated in the programme it is necessary to find the nonparticipant that most closely resembles it according to a defined set of characteristics. To
achieve this, linear regression is used. The applicable procedure for un-complicated
samples (i.e. not including large numbers of strata) is based on matching participants with
non-participants and creating treatment or comparison group, using the nearest neighbour
matching (a mathematical method for finding the closest point to a defined set of points).
The counterfactual procedure assumes one-to-one matching, meaning that the size of
sample for the comparison group is the same as for treatment group. The procedure also
took into account:
1. The aim of the research, especially with regard to the taking a counterfactual
approach and the best possible comparison group.
2. Database structure and the possibilities for finding matching pairs with given
characteristics.
3. The amount of time available to conduct the interviews.
The sampling for the evaluation followed certain steps:
1. Definition of the population (see selection frame section above).
2. Division into two groups: treatment (scrapped with EU contribution) and comparison
group (not scrapped with EU contribution).
3. Selection of key characteristics under which the matching will be conducted. These
are:
a. Main gear used on vessels.
b. Tonnage.
c. Engine power.
4. Comparison of the two groups to determine whether it is possible to find matching
pairs using criteria within the above mentioned characteristics.
5. Sampling for treatment group, assuming that the acceptable level of confidence is
95% and the margin of error + or - 4%.
6. Revising the minimum number of interviews required for each country to verify
whether the research will be feasible. As a result the number of interviews in Spain
and Italy had to be decreased. For these countries the confidence level remains the
same (95%), but the margin of error was increased to + or - 5%.
7. Identifying rejected applicants as priorities for inclusion in the comparison group in
case studies where EFF schemes were over-subscribed and rejected applicants are
known (Italy, Sweden, Denmark and Portugal).
10
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
8. Sampling from the remaining population of vessels in the fleet as at 2008 for the
comparison group based on logistic regression, which is an iterative procedure for
finding the criteria in the comparison group which best resemble the corresponding
criteria in the treatment group.
The results of this sampling procedure are presented in Table 2. As one-to-one matching
was undertaken the target treatment and comparison group samples are the same size.
Gear type is the primary distinguishing characteristic to better ensure matched vessels are
likely to be operating in the same fishery. The iterative procedure (step 8) is undertaken on
the comparison group using the GT and kW to find matched vessels of similar capacity.
Table 2 Proposed Treatment and Comparison Groups
DK
No. of
vessels
scrapped
32
% of
vessels
scrapped
2%
TREATMENT
GROUP
Sample % of
size
sample
size
8
2%
EE
18
1%
4
1%
ES
505
28%
86*
24%
FR
332
18%
80
22%
IT
660
36%
112*
32%
PL
PT
85
57
5%
3%
20
14
6%
4%
SE
31
2%
7
2%
UK
103
6%
25
7%
Total
1823
100%
356
100%
MS
11
COMPARISON GROUP
N/A
Rejected
applicants
Estimate of target
fleet size
Sample size
13
668 active,
commercial fishing
vessels.
8 (as many as
possible are
rejected
applicants.)
4
71 Baltic trawlers
8 long-distance
vessels
N/A
28 adjustment plans 86
(incl. FAS) with
various gears/ size/
regions/fisheries
N/A
11 adjustment plans 80
(incl. FAS) with
various
gears/size/regions/fis
heries
241
Over 13,000 vessels 112 (as many
as possible
rejected
applicants)
N/A
700+ vessels in fleet 20
14
9 adjustment plans
14 (as many
(incl. FAS) with
as possible
various gears/size/
rejected
regions/fisheries
applicants)
44
101 licensed for cod 7 (as many as
in Baltic
possible
171 Western sea
rejected
licences
applicants)
0 for EFF
22 beamer trawlers
25 (as many
schemes: 4 2,500 English u10
as possible
beamers
fleet
rejected
under FIFG 630 over10m
applicants)
Scottish vessels
75
356
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Table 3 Proposed treatment & comparison group samples by gear type
Sub-task 1.3 Questionnaire and interview design and guidance notes
Questionnaires were developed for:
•
•
•
•
Managing Authorities (MA)
Producer Organisations (POs) (or other organisations with the necessary links to
industry such as Fishermen’s Associations or FARNET FLAG groups).
DG MARE desk officers and officials involved with or prior experience of MS
cessation schemes.
Vessels owners (Appendix 2). To facilitate comparison, a single questionnaire was
developed that addressed both the treatment and the comparison group (including
some that may have applied unsuccessfully to do so) for permanent cessations as
well as questions on temporary cessation.
Sub-task 1.5 Piloting questionnaires
The draft questionnaires developed for vessel owners were reviewed following interviews
with authorities, industry representatives. The vessel owner questionnaires were then
piloted with a few select vessel owners in two case studies. The piloting assessed the:
•
•
•
•
Length of time taken and whether it is considered acceptable;
Clarity and comprehensibility;
Suitability of responses for providing answers to the evaluation questions;
Balance of multiple-choice and open response questions;
After piloting, the survey questionnaires were revised and updated with the final version
presented in Appendix 2.
3.4 Analysis
Task 3 involved a thorough analysis of all available data, including secondary data and the
primary data collected via the case study surveys. There are four broad areas of analysis
proposed to answer the evaluation questions (given in Appendix 1), namely:
12
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
1. Analysis of EFF spend on cessation measures
This analysis examined the contribution of temporary and permanent cessation measures to
changes in fleet capacity (at EU, Member State and fleet segment levels). Other areas of
interest were also explored such as the characteristics of scrapped vessels (with and without
aid).
2. Vessel owner surveys
The vessel owner surveys enabled both quantitative and qualitative analysis of results. A key
aspect in this counterfactual evaluation is a comparative analysis of responses by treatment
and comparison groups. The vessels owner survey was analysed across all nine case
studies as well as at individual Member State level. The results were considered for each
Member State within the case studies and on a comparative basis across all nine case
studies in the main report. This allows the analysis to take the individual Member State
context into account, such as other capacity control measures including the presence or
absence of transferable fishing rights.
3. Impact of permanent cessation measures on resources
As the key objective of the measures is to balance capacity with available resources, part of
the analysis involved an examination of available evidence to determine what could
potentially be attributed to capacity reductions. This was a difficult task given the large
number of variables influencing stock status (including other methods of control on fishing
mortality). Recent work by the EC and STECF explores this issue to some extent, but the
issue of overcapacity itself (or how it is measured) is beyond the scope of this study. This
analysis was, however, able to highlight the extent to which specific fleet segments were
reduced, other control measures in place (quota and effort) and the status of key target
stocks within those fisheries.
4. Impact of cessation measures on financial performance
Through the Annual Economic Report (AER) and other Member State data, analysis of the
financial performance of specific fleet segments was carried out. As with the impact on
resources mentioned above, it was difficult to distinguish the specific impact of cessation
measures alongside other factors (such as fuel and fish price). However, comparative
analysis of vessel performance before and after schemes as well as between fleets that
were and were not targeted in scrapping schemes will enable some conclusions to be
drawn.
As this is an evaluation study, the above analysis is structured around the evaluation
questions (presented in Appendix 1).
3.5 Challenges encountered
3.5.1
Contact details
A key challenge for the project was the provision of vessel owner contact details. Data
protection concerns prevented agencies and industry stakeholders from providing contact
details. This delayed the consultants being unable to complete the proposed sample
numbers for the case study surveys. This is particularly the case for vessel owners not in
receipt of public funds as, unlike for recipients of EFF funding, there is no obligation to cooperate with evaluations. A contingency of early and extensive engagement with industry
was adopted to establish Managing Authorities ability to provide the necessary contact
details. Where these were not forthcoming, industry representatives were approached.
13
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
The lack of co-operation from vessel owners identified was addressed through each pairmatching being a cluster of similar vessels. If the first contact was uncooperative the second
was approached and so on.
3.5.2
Data quality
The treatment group and comparison group samples were selected on a vessel basis from a
data run of the Community Fleet Register (CFR) provided by DG MARE. When attempting
to contact the owners of the vessels it became apparent in at least six of the nine case
studies that data were inaccurate and inconsistent with national records. There were
numerous instances of vessels still occurring on the fleet register in 2008 (and so selected
for sample) that had actually been scrapped or left the fleet prior to 2008. There were similar
inconsistencies in the treatment group sample of vessels that were reportedly scrapped with
aid, but in fact had either previously exited or were still active. This is not necessarily a result
of fraudulent behaviour, but does highlight the inaccuracies in the CFR which severely
hampered implementation of the survey.
3.6 Survey respondent profiles
Overall, the survey reached 734 vessel owners, with a Member State breakdown according
to the chart below. While this corresponds in large part to the sampling frame set out above,
there are some notable differences. Mainly, these stemmed from discrepancies between the
data provided to the study team and the actual status of vessels. For example, a
considerable number of vessel owners included in the comparison group had actually
benefited from scrapping funding. Additionally, it was not always possible to reach former
owners of vessels who had scrapped their vessels. Nonetheless, the chart makes clear that
the study team obtained the vast majority of envisaged responses.
Figure 2: survey respondents by country
Respondents by country, n=734
United Kingdom
58
Spain
177
Sweden
12
Portugal
27
Poland
37
Italy
222
France
173
Estonia
10
Denmark
18
0
50
100
150
200
250
Just over half (353) of respondents had received scrapping support, while only 6% scrapped
without support and over 40% did not scrap a vessel. In addition to what is shown in the
chart, 248 respondents had engaged in temporary cessation, of which 82% had received
support.
14
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Figure 3: proportion of owners surveyed who had received scrapping support
Vessel owners receiving scrapping support, n=687
Yes
43%
51%
Scrapped without
support
Didn't scrap a vessel
6%
Vessel owners were also asked to comment on aspects of their businesses, namely how
many vessels they owned, how many employees they had and their ownership structure.
Not surprisingly, a substantial proportion (no longer) owned any vessels and were no longer
in activity. Nevertheless, 14% of the sample was multi-vessel owners.
The results show that most respondents were single vessel owners with a very small number
of employees, as shown in the charts below.
Figure 4: enterprise details
Number of vessels owned, n=665
2%
1%
11%
24%
None
1
2
3
4
62%
15
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Number of employees, n=595
1%
9%
0
8%
32%
1
2-5
6-10
11-50
30%
>50
20%
16
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
4 Counterfactual analysis
The following section explores the counterfactual aspects of the vessel owner survey.
These responses have been used to inform the evaluation questions in the subsequent
sections of this report and in answering the counterfactual: what would have happened
without permanent and temporary cessation measures?
4.1 Challenges in counterfactual analysis
The counterfactual is a comparison between what actually happened and what would have
happened in the absence of the intervention. However, we cannot truly observe what would
have happened to those affected by the intervention if the intervention had not happened. To
help overcome this issue, a comparison group is selected (as described in section 3.3) that
is like the treatment group in every way, except that these individuals were not subject to the
intervention.
There is a potential bias through ‘contamination’ of the comparison group from the
intervention causing spillover effects. To ensure similarity of treatment and comparison
groups, a common approach is to draw these groups from the same geographical area as
the project. But the closer the comparison group to the project area, the more likely it is to be
indirectly affected in some way by the intervention. To avoid this as far as possible, the
geographic location (port) was not a variable used to select the comparison group sample.
However, some vessel owners receiving scrapping aid were likely to be from the same ports
as others who did not and this remaining potential contamination is recognized.
Another bias results from ‘external contamination’ of the comparison group from similar
interventions, or even somewhat dissimilar interventions but which affect the same
outcomes. To address this problem the survey collected data on other interventions in the
comparison group (a question of other public aid is included in the questionnaire).
Self-selection bias will also result from beneficiaries not being a random sample of the
population. So the comparison group should also not be a random sample, but rather drawn
from a population with the same characteristics as those chosen for the intervention. The
sample design sought to address this through matching individuals in the treatment group
and the comparison group. However, the matching exercise did not deliver perfect matches
due to:
a) Available data for sample selection provided defining characteristics were limited to some
physical vessel characteristics and not vessel owner circumstances (which may have more
influence on whether to scrap or not);
b) Some adjustment plans targeted specific sections of the fleet and so similar vessels were
no longer present (e.g., in Sweden the largest trawlers in the fleet were removed and so the
vessels in the comparison group were smaller than those the treatment group.
c) Data quality (as described in section 3.5.2) hindered the identification of matches.
4.2 Differences between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries
From over 700 vessel owners surveyed, 51% received scrapping support, 43% did not scrap
a vessel and 6% scrapped without support. The responses of these beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries were compared (see Appendix 4 for the approach to and results of various
tests of significance).
Many differences in the response by beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are the result of
receiving scrapping funding rather than differences that could distinguish the two populations
17
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
prior to the intervention. For example, most beneficiaries only owned one vessel and so
scrapping effectively removed their ability to continue in fishing unless (as in 6% of cases)
another vessel was purchased.
One telling characteristic is the older average age of those owners that scrapped (57 years)
compared to those that did not scrap and those that scrapped without support (both
averaging 50 years). Of the beneficiaries, those that no longer had an active vessel
averaged 59 years of age, older again compared to the average of beneficiaries. This
suggests that scrapping was more likely to be an option chosen by those reaching retirement
age, which is one of the main reasons given by survey respondents for seeking scrapping
support (Figure 5).
Figure 5 Beneficiaries reasons for seeking scrapping support
The most popular reason for scrapping was that ‘the activity was not profitable enough’. This
is reflected in survey responses on the levels of profitability in the last year of operation: 36%
of beneficiaries made a loss compared to non-beneficiaries (24%).
Another noticeable difference between the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries is the
company structure, as illustrated in Figure 6. A similar number of individual enterprises are
represented in both populations, but the number of beneficiaries in partnership is far lower
(9%) compared to non-beneficiaries (23%) and the proportion of individuals (persons not
registered as an enterprise) is far higher (32%) for beneficiaries compared to those that did
not scrap (13%). Agreeing to scrap may be more difficult for those in partnership than for
sole operators, which is evidenced by other reasons for scrapping given by beneficiaries
being ‘opportunity for early retirement’ and ‘did not have a successor’.
Figure 6 Ownership structure
18
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
4.3 Expected actions without cessation funding
The vessel-owner survey shows that only a minority of vessel-owners (12%) would have
scrapped, at the time they did, without permanent cessation support (Figure 7). Other
vessel-owners split about equally between those who would have continued fishing (43%)
and those who would have sold their vessels (45%). This shows that selling the vessel is
very often considered as an alternative to scrapping. It should, however be noted that selling
a vessel generally results in a transfer of a vessel’s capacity rather than its removal.
Two-thirds of vessel-owners who answered they would have continued fishing did not say for
how long, the break-down between the other third was about half and half between more
than five years and less than five years. In total, about 8% of the vessel-owners would have
continued fishing, but for less than 5 years.
Figure 7 Responses to 'likely action without permanent cessation funding' by beneficiaries
4.3.1
Scrapping without support
When excluding Poland (where only vessel-owners who had scrapped their vessel were
interviewed), 6.8% of the vessels in the comparison group were scrapped without a subsidy
(all others vessels have not been scrapped). This figure is significantly higher only in
Denmark (28.6%) and Estonia (25.0%) but in both cases, the samples are small (16 in
Denmark and 9 in Estonia) and in the case of Denmark the survey focused on rejected
applicants.
The sample of vessels scrapped without support is not large enough to be statistically
representative. However Figure 8 shows that one of the main reasons (44% of the answers)
to scrap without a subsidy is to replace the vessel, in which case the fleet capacity is not
reduced.
19
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Figure 8:Reasons for not receiving support for scrapped vessels
Total$
I$wanted$to$build$a$new$vessel$
United$Kingdom$
Spain$
I$did$apply$but$my$vessel$was$
not$selected$
Poland$
Italy$
ApplicaHon$procedures$were$
too$complex$
France$
Estonia$
I$wanted$to$be$able$to$sell$parts$
and/or$equipment$separately$
Denmark$
0%$
4.3.2
20%$
40%$
60%$
80%$
100%$
Influence of scrapping on the remaining fleet
A further consideration in the counterfactual is the extent to which permanent cessation has
influenced the remaining fleet, which in counterfactual terms is an indication of internal
contamination of the comparison sample by the intervention itself. Only two per cent of nonbeneficiaries stated that the scrapping schemes had influenced their profitability (83% stating
that scrapping schemes had not). Figure 9 presents the main factors that affect profitability
according to non-beneficiaries;, the most significant being fuel price, fishing opportunities
and fish price.
Figure 9 Factors affecting profitability given by non-beneficiaries
4.4 Summary
The objective for permanent cessation is at a fleet or fishery level rather than for individual
recipients and therefore some impact on non-beneficiaries (i.e. the remaining vessels in the
fleet) was expected and in some cases was a secondary (economic) objective. Therefore
despite attempts to minimise sources of bias in the counterfactual analysis, biases inevitably
remain.
Beneficiaries were older (averaging 57 years) than non-beneficiaries (averaging 50 years).
Beneficiaries were also more likely to be sole operators and less likely to be in partnership
than non-beneficiaries.
20
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
A minority of vessel-owners (12%) would have scrapped, at the time they did, without the
cessation support.
The remaining vessel-owners that scrapped their vessel stated they would have continued
fishing (43%) or sold their vessels (45%), which would not have resulted in capacity
reduction.
Without permanent cessation funding owners of larger vessels would have been more likely
to continue fishing while owners of smaller vessels would have been more likely to sell their
vessel.
7% of respondents in the comparison group scrapped without funding. About 1/3 of these
vessel-owners declared they had applied and were not selected. The main reason given for
not receiving scrapping funding (44% of respondents) was that the owner wanted to build a
new vessel.
83% of non-beneficiaries stated that the scrapping schemes had not influenced changes in
their profitability (only 2% claimed scrapping schemes had influenced profitability). The main
factors affecting profitability were fuel price, fishing opportunities and fish price.
21
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
5 Relevance
The following section considers the relevance of the cessation measures to address capacity
in the European fleet. The Guidelines for Evaluation of EU activities (EC, 2004) defines
relevance as: “the extent to which an intervention’s objectives are pertinent to the needs,
problems and issues to be addressed.”
5.1 Are measures other than EU-funded cessation measures (e.g. the market,
transferable quotas) capable of addressing capacity in the European
fishing fleet? If not, to what extent are they insufficient and why?
According to Milazzo (1998), capacity refers essentially to vessels, gears and labour and
how all of these are put to use. Excess capacity (i.e. overcapacity) can be defined as the
difference between current fishing capacity and target capacity (FAO, 1998). If the objective
is to rebalance capacity to align with available biological resources, the target capacity would
be the level of fishing capacity that results in sustainable biological resources.
The intervention logic (Figure 1) shows that the objective for permanent cessation measures
is to reduce the number of active fishing vessels, resulting in a reduction in the size of the
European fleet and fishing capacity, leading to the desired outcome of a sustainable balance
between resources and fishing capacity. In other words, the rationale for scrapping
measures relies on the assumption that the European fishing fleet has too many vessels,
and that cutting the number of vessels would reduce capacity and hence the level of fishing
pressure.
Temporary cessation is not a measure to address fleet capacity, as it serves to sustain,
rather than cut, the number of vessels. On the contrary, it may help retain capacity that
would otherwise exit the fleet. In certain circumstances where effort control and/or passive
gears feature, temporary cessation can reduce fishing capacity at certain periods by limiting
the effort in a fishery, but there is no guarantee that fishing mortality would be reduced.
When addressing capacity in fleet terms (measured in numbers, GT or kW of vessels), the
focus is therefore on permanent cessation. Here we explore whether permanent cessation is
a relevant measure to achieve the desired outcome and to what extent other measures may
be capable of reducing capacity.
The most direct approach to managing resources is via control of stock removals.
Controlling fishing mortality (represented by F) is one of the few factors that can be managed
actively (recruitment and natural mortality being outside managers’ control) and is usually via
setting Total Allowable Catches (TAC). However, a TAC is not set for some species and
even where TACs are set, incidental catches in target and non-target fisheries result in
additional fishing mortality. Consequently high levels of fleet capacity can contribute to high
levels of incidental fishing even in fisheries with output controls such as quota and other
input controls such as effort and technical measures.
For some fisheries, it is acknowledged that, the removal of vessels will not adequately
address an imbalance between fishing capacity and resources. For example, the Estonian
Marine Institute recognised that removing vessel capacity in the coastal fishery would not
tackle overfishing as they operate passive gears and therefore technical measures limiting
the gear should be applied rather than removing vessels (see Estonian case study in Annex
2).
Nevertheless, the Commission’s Green Paper identified overcapacity as a fundamental
problem of the CFP (EC, 2009) as it encourages overfishing. The Commission’s position in
its proposals for the reform of the CFP and for the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund
22
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
(2014-2020) has been to discontinue EU funded measures to reduce fleet capacity through
permanent and temporary cessation.
The focus of the evaluation question is the means by which fleet capacity reduction is
achieved. Measures other than cessation schemes include leaving the level of fleet capacity
to be corrected by the market or through the introduction of transferable quotas. These are
explored below.
5.1.1
Absence of public intervention
The European fishing fleet is part of an economic sector operating within the common
market, a key pillar of which is the free movement of goods and services around Europe.
However, perverse incentives in the fishing sector, mostly of the variety described in “the
tragedy of the commons”12, would lead self-interested rational economic agents to overfish
and deplete the supply of aquatic resources (negative externalities in production). This
justifies regulatory intervention in the market, in ways such as those laid out in the Common
Fisheries Policy, to ensure this public good is exploited sustainably.
The challenges of intervening effectively include the different timescales seen in fleet
investments (20 years or more) and fishing opportunities (allocated and variable on an
annual basis). With reduced fishing opportunities, the vessel owner’s assets in terms of
vessel, license and quota also reduce in value making owners less willing to sell. As a result,
vessel owners often remain in the sector even where fishing opportunities are limited to the
extent that businesses are not viable and an imbalance develops between the fleet capital
and the available resource.
CFP reform is committed to a transition to Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY). With the
current status of many assessed stocks (and many still not assessed), many stakeholders
argue that without intervention the market alone may have been unable to achieve the
reductions in capacity by the deadlines set for these sustainability targets.
As vessels often target more than one fishery and can move from one fishery to another,
there is a substantial risk that vessels will continue to overfish a resource, depending on the
economic importance of the resource for the profitability of vessels, well after the point when
that fishery alone would not be economically viable. Therefore full stock collapse may occur
with devastating biological consequences for the resource along with adverse economic and
social impacts on the owners and crew dependent on that resource.
5.1.2
Transferable quotas
Rights-Based Management (RBM) approaches to fisheries management can promote
biologically and economically sustainable fisheries through encouraging industry/community
stewardship of resources. There are many different forms of rights, including (Valdimarrson,
2011):
• Catch shares / limited access privilege programmes/designated access programmes;
• Customary tenure systems;
• Territorial user rights;
• Group user rights; and
•Transferable rights, including Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs)
12
Hardin, G., “The Tragedy of the Commons”, Science, 162 (3859): 1243-1248, 1968.
23
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Quotas and effort reductions are being used to reduce fishing pressure in certain fisheries
and many authors13 view these as more effective tools than decommissioning (that is to say,
scrapping) schemes. UK authorities interviewed for the study, for example, attribute this
greater effectiveness to compliance; “if the amount of quota is adhered to, the number of
boats catching that quota can be resolved by the market” (Annex 9: UK). In practice this is
limited, however, with a risk that if unregulated, excess capacity simply shifts to fisheries
without the scientific evidence to determine sustainable exploitation or the management to
fully control it. Therefore, tweaks to the market alone are unlikely to fully address the
systemic issues identified in many European fisheries.
Whilst fisheries management is an EU responsibility, under the framework of the reformed
EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), economic management of fishing rights is a national
responsibility and in practice, many Member States have already implemented RBM
approaches in a range of fisheries across the EU (MRAG et al, 2009). However it is the
ability to transfer rights that has been identified as a potential mechanism to adjust capacity
in a fishery, often over a comparatively short timescale and at little public cost, as shown in
the paragraphs below.
The introduction of ITQs in Denmark in 2007 is often held up as the example of how ITQs
can achieve fleet efficiencies and bring about fleet capacity reduction. As the Danish case
study describes (Annex 1) in 2006, FIFG monies were used to provide for decommissioning
as an option for vessel owners who did not want to join the general ITQ-scheme. Relatively
few owners chose this decommissioning option before the ITQ scheme was introduced in
2007 for the demersal fleet. Of the total capacity reduction since 2007, 66% (GT) and 63%
(kW) respectively can be attributed to the ITQ and quota-pooling system compared to the
34% (GT)/37% (kW) capacity reduction that can be attributed to the FIFG and EFF
measures applied during the same period. These figures illustrate that the change in the
overall management regime to an ITQ-system has been far more effective in terms of
capacity reduction than the public aid schemes applied. This has convinced other MS such
as Sweden that introducing ITQs is the most appropriate measure to control fleet capacity,
recognising that there are challenges in applying ITQs in mixed fisheries (Annex 8: Sweden).
The Danish example certainly shows ITQs to be effective, but it should be noted that the
Danish authorities used permanent cessation measures to buttress the change in
management regime. Denmark also has no open access fisheries and good levels of
fisheries control to prevent the excess demersal fleet capacity from entering other fisheries.
This is not the case in every Member State (MS). The likely concentration of capacity sparks
concerns that ITQs also concentrate ownership within a small number of operators and
makes some Managing Authorities reluctant to introduce ITQ schemes or other fully
transferable rights. This issue was raised by Spanish small-scale fishers interviewed who
found decommissioning preferable to the introduction of ITQs that would concentrate fishing
in only a few ports (Annex 7: Spain).
5.1.3
Opinions from case studies
Managing Authorities interviewed across the nine MS case studies generally believe
permanent cessation measures remain relevant. This is despite also suggesting that the
13
E.g. Costello & Deacon (2007) “The Efficiency Gains from Fully Delineating Rights in an ITQ
Fishery”, Marine Resource Economics, 2007. Volume 22 and MRAG, et al (2009) An analysis of
existing Rights Based Management (RBM) instruments in Member States and on setting up best
practices in the EU.
24
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
main problems associated with fleet capacity have been addressed and so the need for
capacity reduction measures (including scrapping schemes) is now much reduced.
From the interviews and survey results in Denmark, there is a general agreement among
managing authorities, fishermen’s associations, and POs that the permanent cessation
schemes prior to EFF (i.e. up to 2006) have met the objectives of reducing excess capacity
in “crisis fisheries”, i.e. those with poor stock status or where vessels are not profitable.
Since the implementation of ITQ management systems in 2006/2007, fleet capacity is not a
major concern in Denmark and scrapping measures are therefore less relevant going
forward. Most Swedish stakeholders interviewed or surveyed in the study share the view that
individually transferable quotas (ITQs) are a more direct and efficient method for adjusting
capacity than scrapping schemes. At the same time, it is difficult to compare the
effectiveness of these two methods as practised in Sweden, since large-scale scrapping
campaigns began before the move towards ITQs.
The experience in Italy with the Bluefin tuna fishery differs to that seen in Denmark. Quotas
allocated to a single vessel owner have been transferable since 2008, but this did not alone
result in reduced fleet capacity. A specific fishing effort adjustment plan including a
permanent cessation measure funded by the EU was applied to the purse seiners holding
tuna quota. This, in combination with the introduction of a minimum quota per vessel, has
allowed a concentration of catch quotas for tuna and a reduction in capacity. Arguably, even
though the scrapping of vessels occurred in 2010 after the introduction of ITQs, with
knowledge of the proposed FEAPs, vessel owners were aware of the imminent funding for
scrapping and therefore held on to vessels until cessation funding was available. This
anticipation of support undermines the impact of a scrapping scheme, which is discussed in
more detail in the following section 4.2.
The same is true with the introduction of ITQs for Bluefin tuna in Spain. Authorities
interviewed for the study suggest that introducing the ITQ system increased vessel-owners
responsibility towards the resource management, but it would not have been a sufficient
incentive to scrap by itself, as the market price of ITQs is worth much less than the vessel
itself.
There is consensus among the Spanish authorities and representatives from the sector
interviewed or surveyed in the study that ITQs can be effective in the long run for the
industrial fleet (e.g. the “300 fleet” of trawlers, longliners and gillnet vessels between 24 and
42 meters long, fishing in non-Spanish EU waters).
Generally in Italy and Spain, the removal of vessels has permanently removed licences that
are tied to the vessels and representatives from industry and Managing Authorities surveyed
for study argued that permanent cessation measures had been highly relevant to the
reduction of capacity for many fleet metiers.
In Portugal non-transferable individual quotas are allocated only in those fisheries under
recovery plans (hake & Nephrops, Greenland halibut); the remaining fisheries operating via
a pool of quota managed by the Producers Organisations. Removal of vessels from these
fisheries simply results in a redistribution of quota between the remaining vessels.
In France the 19 different scrapping schemes under the EFF removed 483 vessels between
2007 and 2012 compared to 280 under the FIFG. Therefore, representatives from the
managing authorities and industry representatives interviewed/surveyed in the study
considered scrapping as a relevant measure under the EFF. According to managing
authorities and non-beneficiary respondents to the vessel owner survey, the 19% who didn’t
benefit from public aid for scrapping were either not eligible or sought to build a new vessel.
The authorities therefore consider scrapping relevant in permanently removing capacity from
the fleet.
25
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Polish authorities interviewed in the study found that it takes some time before the fleet
reacts to market and stock conditions and some of the fisherman will still keep on fishing,
seek alternative income (tourism) or enter the grey market (and/or illegal fishing). Therefore
Polish authorities believe that without the scrapping measures, vessel numbers would not
have fallen to current levels.
According to the Estonian National Fishermen’s Organisation, without the scrapping scheme
in Estonia there would be more vessels, with lower levels of catches and lower turnover per
vessel. UK authorities interviewed for the study also suggest permanent cessation measures
have contributed to reductions in capacity and improvements in stock status. However stock
improvements are occurring under comprehensive recovery plans that involve quota and
effort restrictions. These latter measures are viewed by UK Management Authorities as more
directly significant to stock recovery as fleet capacity is considered too crude a gauge of
fishing effort.
5.1.4
Summary
The relative efficacy of ITQs compared to decommissioning in removing fleet capacity (at a
much lower cost to the public purse) has convinced Denmark and other Member States (UK,
Sweden and Estonia) in recent years that permanent cessation should not be the primary
tool for rebalancing capacity with resources. Some MS (10 out of 22 according to the 2013
fleet report, EC 2013) claim that fleet capacity is now broadly in balance with resources,
although the majority recognise that issues remain in certain fisheries.
The introduction of transferable rights poses a number of challenges in fisheries with limited
management and stock information. There are also concerns amongst some Member States
that ITQs lead to a concentration of ownership, which can have negative social impacts.
No intervention (i.e. leaving capacity issues to be addressed through market correction) is
unlikely to achieve fishery management objectives. Investments in vessels are long-term
investments and owners will remain in a fishery despite years of loss-making. This leads to
the risk of continued overfishing, particularly in mixed fisheries or where vessels may switch
between fisheries.
Due to these issues with ITQs and market correction, the direct removal of capacity with
scrapping is still a consideration for MS management authorities, interviewed or surveyed in
the study, though more as a way to manage the size of the fleet than as a way to address
overfishing.,
However, scrapping schemes may also be ineffective in situations where significant latent
capacity exists. In addition, for fisheries involving passive gears, fishing effort is less tied to
vessel capacity, relating instead to the amount of gear used. In these instances the direct
removal of vessels to reduce fleet capacity may be ineffective in reducing fishing capacity.
A combination of management measures is generally needed to achieve effective
management of a fishery. Rights must be supplemented by biological and technological
measures such as protecting juveniles, selectivity of fishing gear and other measures
(Pomeroy, 2004). Therefore the opinion of most MS Managing Authorities interviewed or
surveyed in the study is that although permanent cessation has been shown to be less
effective and more costly than other measures, national authorities would like to retain
permanent cessation measures as an option in case there is a need for swift, targeted
removal of capacity.
26
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
The interview and survey results confirm that the use of permanent cessation measures to
reduce fishing capacity remains relevant for many industry stakeholders and national
authorities and can be more rapid than other measures. However experiences in the case
studies and other fisheries suggest managing fishing capacity is less relevant to resource
management per se than other measures such as licensing, quota and effort control (see
section on effectiveness).
5.2 To what extent are the objectives of cessation measures appropriate to
address capacity in the European fishing fleet?
The FAO International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity (IPOACapacity) calls on states to achieve an efficient, equitable and transparent management of
fishing capacity to reduce, and eventually eliminate, all factors, including subsidies, which
contribute, directly or indirectly, to the build-up of excessive fishing capacity (FAO, 2003).
Under the ‘good, bad and ugly’ categorisation of subsidies by Sumaila and Pauly (2006),
both temporary and permanent cessation measures fall into the ‘ugly’ category; programmes
that have the potential to lead to either investment or disinvestment in the fishery resource.
Temporary cessation could be revenue enhancing from EU or national budgets and increase
dependence of fisheries communities on public funds while having no discernible impact on
biological resources. Permanent cessation can reduce fishing pressure and foster resource
management goals; however their effectiveness has been seriously questioned (EC, 2011;
Holland et al. 1999; Munro and Sumaila, 2002; Clark et al. 2005) Scrapping can also create
and, arguably, has created a culture of dependency and expectation. OECD guidelines
argue that "decommissioning schemes should be designed as part of one-off structural
adjustment programmes in order to avoid becoming incorporated into the expectations of the
sector and distorting current and future investment incentives and plans" (OECD, 2009).
At first glance, a scrapping scheme could potentially be used to address capacity as it
directly funds the removal of vessels from the fishery. There are, however some challenges
to reducing fleet capacity through this approach:
•
•
•
Given the difficulties in measuring fishing capacity, it is difficult to use as the basis for
managing the resources being targeted.
If vessels are not fishing at full efficiency (as is likely to be the case where
overcapacity exists or where fishing opportunities are small), in isolation the removal
of vessels could simply increase the efficiency of the remaining vessels in the fleet
and not address total fishing pressure (quotas will just be redistributed across less
vessels).
If the fishery is profitable, capacity could seep back into the fishery unless effective
access is restricted If a buy-back scheme is anticipated by vessel-owners, they can
factor them into financial planning, leading to perverse incentives.
Newer vessels have more efficient engines with the same ability to fish as older vessels with
higher kW. This along with other improvements to gear and fish finding equipment (often
termed ‘technical creep’) suggests that the current metrics to measure capacity (GT and kW)
do not adequately take fishing capacity into account. The contraction in European fleet
numbers and scale is evident, but this does not take into account newer vessels having the
ability to catch relatively more fish. Removing two old vessels to enable one new vessel to
enter the fleet does not necessarily halve the fishing capacity; indeed, it could even increase.
Even if the reintroduction of capacity is prevented, as was foreseen in the permanent
cessation schemes financed by the EFF, Clark et al (2005) show that these subsidies can
readily both intensify long-run economic inefficiency in the fishery, and serve to undermine
the conservation of the resource. If decommissioning schemes can overcome the “seepage”
27
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
problem, they can have a beneficial impact upon conservation – provided the schemes are
unanticipated by the vessel owners. If the schemes are anticipated, however, even though
the “seepage”14 problem has been eliminated, the subsidies can have a strong negative
impact, both in terms of conservation of the resource, and in terms of economic efficiency
(Clark et al, 2005).
For cessation measures under the EFF, the level of planning (and so forethought) is evident
with an Operational Programme to specify what will be funded over the six-year
programming period. In theory, and in line with the EFF regulation, the level of planning
should have increased through the introduction of Fishing Effort Adjustment Plans (FEAPs),
to better target public funds. However as illustrated in the case studies, the first FEAPs were
too general, with the Court of Auditors report noting that “the EFF regulation does not
sufficiently define the content of FEAPs in order to ensure that they are adequately targeted
and reduce fishing effort” (ECA, 2011).
In terms of vessel-owner anticipation, FEAPs have also served to increase certainty that
specific fleets will be eligible for scrapping schemes (as is indicated in the Italian blue fin
tuna fishery for example). In relation to Clark et al’s hypothesis, scrapping schemes under
the EFF have attempted to avoid the seepage of capacity back into the fleet, but these
schemes have been anticipated by vessel owners and consequently are likely to have been
ineffective. This is recognised in the Commission’s Green Paper on CFP reform ‘experience
shows that permanent support for scrapping does not effectively reduce capacity, as
operators simply factor the scrapping premium into future investment decisions. One-off
scrapping schemes are more likely to be efficient’ (EC, 2009, page 8).
Temporary cessation has been used to compensate for unexpected loss of fishing
opportunities (as applied in the Baltic during the cod fishery closure or as applied in France
for pollution events) or to freeze capacity at certain times of the year (as applied in Italy
during the Fermo Biologico). Temporary cessation is therefore not attempting to reduce
overcapacity in the European fleet; rather it aims to maintain fleet viability during unexpected
periods when fishing opportunities are drastically reduced. Arguably, this counters the
objective of adjusting capacity in the fleet.
5.2.1
Opinions from case studies
MS authorities and the industry interviewed/surveyed for the study view permanent
cessation measures in general as an appropriate tool to address fishing capacity.
In Spain there is a consensus among both the administration and the sector that permanent
cessation measures combined with socio-economic measures are the most appropriate way
to reduce the fleet significantly over a small time frame, especially when it comes to smallscale fisheries, with single owner-operators with limited alternative job opportunities. The
lack of fishing opportunities and reduced profitability are assumed to be a disincentive for
capacity to re-enter the fishery.
French management authorities interviewed state that permanent cessation measures are
“by far the most appropriate tool for adapting fishing capacities”. Their rapidity of
implementation... enables the necessary capacity reductions to be achieved very quickly.
This tool is well accepted and recognised by fishing professionals and has enabled
considerable fleet reductions which could not have been achieved otherwise”. Two indicators
show that the reduction in the French fishing fleet capacity significantly increased with the
implementation of EFF permanent cessation measures:
14
Defined as……….
28
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
The pace in the reduction of capacity (in GT) strongly increased from 2007 (-4% / year
during EFF 2007-2012, against only – 1% / year during FIFG 2000-2006);
For the first time, the fishing fleet capacity decreased significantly more than EU regulatory
ceilings. In December 2012, the French fleet capacity was around 24,500 GT under the
ceiling, which is approximately the tonnage reduction having benefited from the EFF support.
Stakeholders across all case studies also point out that the EFF was more targeted than the
FIFG, aimed at, say, specific stocks rather than larger segments of the fleet or a Member
State’s fleet as a whole. In Portugal for example it focused on vulnerable stocks only: hake
and Norway lobster, Greenland halibut (temporary cessations only), bivalve molluscs,
swordfish (TC only), black shrimps and small pelagics for the continental fleet; small pelagics
and black scabbardfish in Madeira.
The Estonian Marine Institute performed a study on fleet capacity before the implementation
of each scrapping round in order to focus the scrapping measure on the fleet segments with
the largest impact. All stakeholders interviewed/surveyed for the Estonian case study agree
that scrapping helps the fleet to adapt and reduce its capacity.
UK authorities interviewed/surveyed for the study recognise that decommissioning can be
ineffective if not properly targeted. It was known that the latent capacity evident in the
inshore fleet would undermine the impact of decommissioning inshore vessels and this
proved to be the case. The scheme was viewed as one of a number of measures to
rebalance capacity in the inshore fleet that may not be very effective in the long term, but
was immediate and acceptable to industry.
Denmark authorities used decommissioning monies to remove capacity, but this was
primarily to remove inefficient vessels and view ITQs and other control measures as a more
appropriate tool for managing fishing capacity.
Italian authorities and POs agree that permanent cessation was an appropriate tool as it
contributed to reduced fishing capacity via 22 FEAPs specific to particular fisheries or
geographical areas, which set specific fleet reduction targets.
Swedish authorities believe that they applied permanent cessation measures appropriately
via two highly target schemes, but concur with the Danish view that there are more
appropriate tools for reducing capacities.
Polish authorities and industry recognise that scrapping schemes were an appropriate tool to
permanently remove capacity, without which vessels with reduced fishing opportunities had
tied-up but would resume fishing when possible.
Overall, managing authorities suggested that permanent cessation was appropriate for
reducing fleet capacity, but that this has largely been achieved (especially in Denmark,
Poland, Portugal and the UK). Therefore, in the future they felt that within the EMFF only
limited, highly-targeted scrapping schemes would be required.
5.2.2
Summary
The EFF foresees as a direct objective of EU funded permanent cessation (removing
vessels) schemes, the aim of reducing capacity in the European fleet. However, as research
and the results of this study have shown, unless permanent cessation measures are applied
in a highly targeted manner that is not anticipated by vessel-owners, the overall result can be
counter-productive. Scrapping monies can become additional revenue that is factored into
investment decisions resulting in a fleet that continues to be over-capitalised (and which may
not significantly reduce in capacity).
Case studies show that often scrapping has been combined with other management
measures and that it was the combination of all these measures that yielded results.
29
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
6 Effectiveness
The following section considers the effectiveness of the cessation measures in reducing
capacity in the European fleet. The Guidelines for Evaluation of EU activities (EC, 2004)
defines effectiveness as: “the extent to which objectives set are achieved”.
6.1 To what extent have permanent cessation measures contributed to a
reduction in the size of the European fishing fleet?
6.1.1
Methodology, data and limits
To answer this question in the absence of comprehensive and straightforward data, the
evaluation team employed a variety of research tools and triangulated between them,
allowing some conclusions to be made. The principal sources drawn from include Eurostat
and Community Fleet Register data. These are supplemented with data from national
sources and, where applicable, stakeholder interviews and responses to the vessel owner
survey.
Fleet data in Eurostat are only available until 2010 and do not allow detailed analysis.
Therefore, the Community Fleet Register (CFR) data was used in order to provide analysis
until December 2012, as well as for entry-exit analysis, the evolution of vessels age and
analyses by gear. However using CFR data requires extensive data processing and does
not always exactly match official data (Eurostat or national data).
For recent entrants to the EU, data are only available from their year of accession (2004 or
2007) onwards and the evolution of their fleet under the FIFG was influenced by their
upcoming entry into the EU15. Therefore some of the comparative analysis between the two
programming periods will focus on the EU 15.
6.1.2
Difference in number of fishing vessels before and after implementation
Long-term evolution of the fleet in the EU shows that the number of vessels has been
consistently decreasing since 1998.16 Overall, the number of vessels dropped by 27% in the
EU 15 between 1995 and 2010, and by 12% in the EU 10 between 2004 and 2010.
The second graph illustrates the different trends among MS for the EU-15 MS where case
studies were conducted. There is a general decreasing trend in all these MS, although with
varying paces. The three MS where the number of vessels decreased the most are
Denmark, Sweden and Spain, where different strategies were implemented in terms of fleet
management. Spain only relied on permanent cessation measures to reduce the fleet size,
whereas both Sweden and Denmark implemented ITQ systems in combination with the
cessation measures.
15
Croatia was not included in the study as in joined the EU in 2013.
Note that the stagnation, observed between 1995 and 1998 relates mostly to the regularisation in
France en masse of about 2,000 under 10m vessels in the outermost region, rather than an actual
change in prevailing (downward) trends during this time.
16
30
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Figure 10: Long-term evolution of the EU15 and EU10 fleet
Source: Eurostat
The following analyses focus on the comparison between the last two programming periods.
Under the last two programming periods, the fleet size decreased by at least a third in 6 MS,
Lithuania (-58%), Spain (-39%), Poland (-36%), Belgium (-36%), Denmark (-34%), and
Germany (-33%). Overall, the fleet number has been reduced by 30% in the EU 15 since
2000, and by 11% in the EU 10 since 2004.
The number of vessels only increased in 3 MS, Ireland (+39%), Estonia (+30%) and Cyprus
(+20%), but in the case of Estonia, as with France, this relates to the registration in 2012 of a
large number of under-12 meter vessels that were previously excluded from the fleet
register.
So, the reduction of the fleet size under the last two programming periods is
significant and has occurs across the EU.
31
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Figure 11 : Evolution of the number of fishing vessels by MS and programming period
Source: Analysis from CFR data
The comparison of the two programming periods also shows that, on average, the fleet size
decreased slightly faster under the FIFG than under the EFF, respectively -2.4%/year and 1.9%/year for the EU 15, and -1.4%/year and -0.2%/year for the EU 10. For EU-10 MS, it is
mainly related to a major restructuring in some MS following the entry into the EU, in
particular in Lithuania and Poland.
In the EU 15, the reduction of the fleet size accelerated only in four MS under the EFF,
Spain, Belgium, Germany and France. The explanation comes from both different situations
in terms of the fleet capacity - interviews for the case studies showed that in Portugal and
the UK for instance, it is considered that the restructuring undergone before the EFF was
sufficient – and from different strategies for the European funds implementation - for
instance, Spain relied heavily on the construction measure until it was ended in 2004, and
the reduction of the fleet has accelerated since then.
32
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Figure 12: Decrease in number of vessels per gear per programming period – EU 15
Source: analysis from CFR data
Under the FIFG, 66% of the fleet number decrease came from the hooks and lines segment.
This resulted mainly from the reduction in the number of long-liners in the Mediterranean
Sea, especially in Greece, where this fleet segment went from 13,479 vessels in 2000 down
to 5,511 vessels in 2007. However this was related to gear changes more than scrapping
since about 5,000 long-lines were changed to gillnets and trammel nets. The same
comparison without Greece shows that, overall, the breakdown by gear category remains
similar under the EFF to the one observed under the FIFG. In other words, there was no
significant change under the EFF as far as the focus on specific gears was concerned (at
least not for the fleet number).
6.1.3 Difference in fleet capacity before and after implementation of permanent
cessation measures, taking prevailing trends into account
Figure 13: Long-term evolution of the EU15 and EU10 fleet (GT)
Source: Eurostat
33
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
The analysis in GT shows similar trends as those observed with the evolution of the fleet
number. The EU 15 fleet capacity measured in GT decreased by 24% between 1995 and
2010, and the EU 10 fleet capacity decreased by 17% between 2005 and 2010. Again, there
is a general decreasing trend over the period. Most important reductions (over a third) are
observed in Sweden, Denmark and Belgium, with mainly industrial fleet.
Note that the increase in capacity in France between 1995 and 2001 comes from a
progressive regularisation of the calculation of GTs, which were initially under-estimated
when the reference changed from tonnage to gross tonnage (GT).
Figure 14: Evolution of the fleet capacity (GT) by MS and programming period
Source: Analysis from CFR data
In the EU 15, most MS reduced their fleet size by over 20% since 2000. Sweden and
Denmark both reduced their fleet size by around 40%, Belgium reduced it by 36% and the
Netherlands and Italy by around 30% each. The reduction in Spain is not as important as the
34
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
one observed for the fleet number because of the structure of the fleet and the importance of
small-scale fisheries in this MS.
In the EU 10, most MS reduced their fleet size by over a third and two MS, Cyprus and
Lithuania, reduced it by over 60% since their entry into the EU. Lithuania, which used to own
the largest fleet in the EU 10 in GT, decreased it from about 70,000 GT in 2004 down to only
25,000 GT in 2012. This resulted mainly from the exit of 11 very large mid-water trawlers
(over 40-m, between 2,000 and 5,000 GT per vessel), 6 of which are recorded as scrapped.
The capacity reduction was more important under the FIFG, as the main restructuring
occurred shortly after the entry into the union.
In contrast to the results for fleet numbers, capacity reduction in GT terms in the EU
15 was more important under the EFF than the FIFG for 10 of the MS, which indicates
that larger vessels were removed during the current programming period.
Figure 15 : Breakdown of the decrease in GT per gear per programming period – EU 15
EU#15#
73%$
79%$
Trawls$
Hooks$and$lines$
10%$
1%$
Seines$
9%$
6%$
Gillnets$
7%$
7%$
Traps$
0%$
Others$
Dredges$
2%$
0%$
2012/2007$
2007/2000$
8%$
0%$
!1%$
!20%$
0%$
20%$ 40%$ 60%$ 80%$ 100%$
Source: Analysis from CFR data
The decrease in fleet capacity mainly comes from the trawler segments
under FIFG and 73% under EFF). Overall, trends are similar
programming periods. The main difference results from the reduction
hooks and lines segment, which mainly comes from the scrapping of
longliners.
35
(79% of exited GT
during the two
of capacity for the
over 200 Spanish
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
6.1.4
Impact of permanent cessation measures on fleet exit trends
This analysis only applies to the 9 cases studies covered by the study.
Figure 16: Share of vessels scrapped with FIFG or EFF support
Source: Analysis from CFR, Art. 40 and Infosys data
Because of EFF and FIFG overlap in 2008 and early 2009, the analysis looks at the
cumulative effect of both programmes. The main conclusions are:
•
There is a general decreasing trend of the use of scrapping, both in terms of capacity
and in terms of the number of vessels;
•
The number of vessels scrapped without support has decreased steadily between
2005 and 2010, following the end of the construction measure and remains fairly
stable after 2010; the capacity scrapped without support dropped between 2003 and
2010, but increased slightly in 2011 and 2012;
•
Consequently, the impact of permanent cessation measures is greater under the EFF
than it was under the FIFG; this is particularly obvious when looking at the evolution
in GT, which indicates that most vessels scrapped without support under the EFF are
small vessels;
•
The peak in GT scrapped in 2009 and 2010 results from the fuel package
Reg.744/2008 in response to the oil and economic crisis, which increased demand
for scrapping in several MS.
The following graphs show the impact of permanent cessation measures before and after
the end of the construction measure for the different vessel size categories. The analysis
relies on length rather than tonnage to take into account the selection criteria set in several
MS to concentrate funds on larger vessels. The breakdown used is the one used by the
STECF for the annual economic report of the European Fleet.
After the end of the construction measure (2004), between 70 and 80% of vessels over-12m
scrapped received public support.
36
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
The same ratio is much lower for under-10m vessels and has even decreased from 33% to
26%, for several reasons, according to the information gathered for the case studies:
•
Administrative costs are proportionally higher for smaller vessels; in most cases
vessel-owners would prefer to sell their boat to another vessel-owner who will then
scrap it to increase capacity on existing vessels or build a new vessel;
•
Under-10m vessels were excluded from many fleet adjustment plans.
Figure 17: Share of vessels scrapped with aid and vessels scrapped over total exits
Source: Analysis from CFR, Art. 40 and Infosys data
Overall, scrapping represents about 40% of the vessels exiting the fleet register; the
remaining 60% are either exported to third countries or become inactive without being
scrapped. The actual impact of inactive vessels on fleet capacity is difficult to assess as
those vessels can re-enter the fleet.
The analysis by MS for the number of vessels and the GT highlights again the significance of
vessel size. The share of the capacity (in GT) scrapped with support has increased in all MS
selected for the case studies, except in the UK. In this MS, however, most of the fleet
reduction had occurred before the EFF. Since 2008, the UK fleet has only been reduced by
1% both in fleet number and in GT (see graphs above); vessels scrapped were on average
smaller than over the previous period (43 GT on average compared to 88), which
corresponds to the fact that only two adjustment plans were implemented, one in Scotland
and one limited to under 10m vessels in England.
37
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Figure 18: Share of vessels scrapped with either FIFG or EFF support by MS (2002-2012)
Source: Analysis from CFR, Art. 40 and Infosys data
6.1.5 Difference in behaviour between comparable vessels benefitting and not
benefitting from permanent cessation measures
In addition to the analysis of the vessel owner survey presented in section 4., the following
analysis considers differences between MS in terms of vessel owner actions without
permanent cessation funding being available.
Survey responses indicate that overall, about 12% of the vessels would have been scrapped
at the same time without the subsidy.
There is no clear relationship between the implementation of the measure, or the
combination with other instruments and the level of dead-weight effect, i.e. owners would
have scrapped their vessel anyway (Figure 19). Dead-weight is highest in Portugal (29% but
only based on 7 observations), where the schemes were highly targeted and in Poland
(26%) where the scheme was open to the entire fleet. No beneficiaries in the UK, Sweden,
Estonia and Denmark responded that they would have scrapped their vessel anyway.
Figure 19: Likely actions without permanent cessation support by Member State
Total$
United$Kingdom$
Sweden$
Spain$
Scrapped$the$vessel$
Portugal$
ConHnued$fishing$
Poland$
Italy$
Sold$the$vessel$
France$
Estonia$
Denmark$
0%$ 10%$ 20%$ 30%$ 40%$ 50%$ 60%$ 70%$ 80%$ 90%$ 100%$
38
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
The following graph shows the same analysis, but weighted by the vessels size in GT. The
overall dead-weight effect is about the same (11%). However the proportion of the fleet that
would have continued fishing is higher than in the previous analysis (55% instead of 43%). In
other words, larger vessels would have tended to continue fishing while smaller vessels
would have been more likely to be sold. This is partly a result of most schemes targeting
trawlers, which tend to be larger than static gear vessels (that were not eligible under many
permanent cessation schemes). It is also the result of smaller vessels being sold, to allow
vessel-owners to add their fishing entitlements (in terms of capacity, licences or quotas
depending on allocation systems in place) onto other vessels.
The results for Portugal are difficult to interpret as it is based on only 7 answers. However,
for Poland it seems clear that the deadweight effect was considerably higher than in other
MS (over 40% of the capacity).
Figure 20: Likely actions without permanent cessation support (weighted by GT)
Share#of#fleet#capacity#(GT)#
Total$
United$Kingdom$
Sweden$
Spain$
Portugal$
Poland$
Italy$
France$
Estonia$
Denmark$
Scrapped$the$vessel$
Sold$the$vessel$
ConHnued$fishing$
0%$ 10%$ 20%$ 30%$ 40%$ 50%$ 60%$ 70%$ 80%$ 90%$100%$
The question of what would have happened without permanent cessation funding is further
informed by the subsequent actions of rejected applicants. Information provided by
managing authorities and results from the vessel-owner survey show that:
39
•
In Denmark: 6 of the 13 rejected applicants under the first Fleet Adaptation Scheme
(FAS) received a subsidy under the second FAS, but with a smaller premium. Of the
8 rejected applicants interviewed, 1 received support under the second FAS, 2
scrapped their vessel without support and 5 did not scrap their vessel.
•
In Italy: around a quarter of rejected applicants interviewed are not in activity
anymore. They scrapped their vessels without support or sold them. The remaining
three quarters of rejected applicants are still in activity.
•
In Portugal: 3 out of the 14 rejected applicants were interviewed and all three of them
are still in activity. In addition, data provided by the managing authority shows that
the only one who eventually scrapped did receive a subsidy under a different
scheme.
•
Overall, about 1/3 of vessel-owners who have scrapped without subsidy declared
they had applied and were not selected for permanent cessation funding.
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
6.1.6
Summary
Between 2000 and 2011, the EU fishing fleet showed a continuous decrease in terms of the
number of vessels and of capacity (measure in GT). The number of vessels dropped by
about 25 % over the decade while the capacity decreased by 24%.
Significant decreases in fishing fleet capacity are observed in all EU MS, but at different
paces and levels, underlining that restructuring needs were different among MS in the
observed period. Significant fleet restructuring occurred before 2000 in some MS (e.g. the
UK & Finland).
The evolution of fishing fleet capacity between 2000 and 2012 (FIFG and EFF) is different
depending on the MS in question: the more important reductions (> 30%) are observed in
the North Sea and Baltic areas (BE, NL, DK, SW, LV, EE). But trends are similar (-24% to 30% in GT) in the large fishing fleets of other MS (ES, ITA, FR, UK).
The decrease in fleet capacity in terms of GT mainly comes from the trawler segments (75%
of exited GT).
The pace of scrapping in the 9 MS concerned by the case studies slows under the EFF
programming period compared to the FIFG 2000-2006. About 1,600 vessels /year and
50 000 GT/year were scrapped between 2002 and 2006, compared to around 800
vessels/year and 35 000 GT/year under the EFF programme (2007-2012).
The implementation of permanent cessation measures of the EFF was affected in 20082009 by the sector crisis (high fuel costs and low fish prices) and the global financial crisis,
with the consequence that the capacity scrapped during the two years was over 40 000
GT/year and EFF support was at maximum (more than 80% of the vessels scrapped
benefited from public aid). The redirection of funding towards Axis 1 and particularly
cessation measures was also facilitated by derogations allowed by the fuel package (Reg
744/2008).
The synthesis of interim evaluations of EFF (2011) concluded17 that during this period the
EU support was used more as a crisis management tool than as a resource driven
restructuring tool. However, the overall view among the interviewed actors in the study is
that the crisis acted as an accelerator for the reduction of fleet size (even if some
deadweight effects are likely to have occurred).
Overall, the analysis of scrapping during FIFG 2000-2006 and EFF leads to the following
main observations:
17
•
A general decreasing trend is observed in scrapping, both in terms of capacity and in
terms of the number of vessels;
•
The number of vessels scrapped without support has decreased steadily since 2005,
after the end of the construction measure (until 2004, most of the vessels scrapped in
Spain did not benefit from public support in order not to reduce the national capacity
reference), the same trend can be observed with the fleet capacity;
•
Consequently, the impact of permanent cessation measures is greater under the EFF
than it was under the FIFG, this is particularly obvious when looking at the evolution
in GT, which indicates that most vessels scrapped without support under the EFF are
« Out of the 11 reports that make explicit judgements about Axis 1 implementation, 8 assess that
Axis 1 has contributed to mitigate the social impact of the economic crisis…but there is no evidence
that it has encouraged more strategic implementation either. The selection criteria for applicants
under FEAP do not always allow to adequately target the potential beneficiaries. Interim evaluation of
the European Fisheries Fund (2007-2013) - Synthesis of the 26 national evaluation reports,
December 2011
40
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
small vessels (mainly because of a proportionately higher administrative cost and
ineligibility);
•
The dead-weight effect under the EFF is limited (12% of vessels would have been
scrapped anyway).
These observations show that:
•
The ”need” for scrapping decreased under FIFG 2000-2006 and EFF programmes,
This conclusion is in line with the general opinion of stakeholders that the adjustment
of fleet capacity has been achieved in most of the MS (although some issues remain,
in particular in the Mediterranean area).
•
Except for a few adjustment plans that focused on small-scale fisheries (e.g.
Andalusia and England), EU support for permanent cessation focused on larger
vessels under the EFF than under the FIFG 2000-2006, therefore increasing the
impact on fleet capacity reductions.
•
As a result, EFF contributed to about 78% of fleet capacity reductions (in GT) in the 9
MS with case studies, against about 50% for FIFG 2000-2006.
•
According to the vessel-owner survey, only 11% of this 78% GT reduction would
have been scrapped without the subsidy, and if taking into account those who would
have continued fishing for less than five years, another 5% may have been scrapped
during the current EFF programme. Therefore, it can be estimated that the net
contribution of the EFF to the fleet capacity reduction is about 66%.
•
The intense mobilisation of EFF during the crisis has accelerated the permanent exit
of capacity, which could have been maintained for at least some years (see results of
the survey) without economic incentives.
6.2 To what extent have permanent cessation measures led to a sustained
reduction in European fishing capacity (the overall catching capacity of the
fleet)?
6.2.1
Methodology and limits
The main limitation to the methodology is the lack of a common, and objective, definition of
fishing capacity. One possible definition would the “ability to catch fish”18, which in turn
depends on various factors:
•
The overall fleet size;
•
Vessel capacity (GT and kW);
•
Vessel productivity (technological improvements, time spent at sea, resource
availability, etc.).
The evolution of fleet size and capacity in GT are the focus of the previous question, the
conclusion of which will be used here.
There is no available indicator to measure the impact of technological improvements on
productivity (radars, sensors, etc.), so analyses will rely on indicators used by the Scientific,
18
Term used in the COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1198/2006, of 27 July 2006, on the European
Fisheries Fund, regarding the selection criteria for investments on board.
41
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) in its Annual Economic Report to
measure capacity and productivity, such as catch/vessel and catch/GT.
The contribution of permanent cessation measures to the reduction of the fishing capacity
will be explained in terms of how its impact on reductions in fleet size and capacity result in
decreases in catch volumes.
6.2.2 Difference before and after implementation of permanent cessation measures
in Catch per unit effort, taking prevailing trends into account
Figure 21: Evolution of total catch, fleet number and fleet capacity in EU15 and EU10
Source:(Analysis(from(Eurostat(data(
$
The analysis for the EU 15 shows mainly two periods since 1995:
19
•
Up to 2003, total catch decreased much faster than the fleet number and fleet
capacity, respectively –26%, -15% (kW) and -8% (GT) (not taking into account data
issues related to erroneous calculations of GTs in early implementation); during that
period the decrease in catch was mainly related to the implementation of year-to-year
management of TACs and quota allowances (1996) and the lack of resources, while
the restructuring of the fleet aimed at mitigating socio-economic effects of the
reduced fishing opportunities, in particular for small-scale fisheries19.
•
From 2004, catches and fleet capacity show similar trends; catches reduced by 17%
and the fleet capacity (in GT) by 16%, while the fleet number decreased by 11%; as
analysed in the previous question, this illustrates the greater focus on exiting larger
vessels in the recent period, in most MS, however it does not establish a causal
relationship between the fleet capacity and catches. In the EU10, trends in catches
seem to be disconnected from the evolution of the fleet size and capacity. Total
catches decreased slightly over the entire period, but after increasing significantly
Ex-post evaluation of the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) 2000-2006 for the EU
Commission, 2010
42
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
between 2006 and 200920, while the fleet number and the fleet capacity decreased
continuously. The fisheries sector went through major restructuring in these MS.
Some of the vessels scrapped were inactive or used well-below full capacity levels
and remaining vessels were modernised after the entry into the EU.
As mentioned in the Estonian case study, the fleet was considered by the National Authority
and professional organisations to be largely inefficient before joining the EU. The Estonian
system, based on a combination of ITQ and scrapping has allowed the trawler segment to
be highly restructured in the last decade, but it is impossible to assess the specific impact of
each instrument.
Figure 22: Evolution of catches and fleet capacity for the 9 case studies since 2004
Source:(Eurostat(
$
These two graphs highlight the difficulty to draw general conclusions as well as the variability
of catch volumes, independent of the evolution of the fleet capacity.
Fleet capacity has decreased continuously in all MS, except in Poland, but the significant
increase in 2007 could be related to data issues (it is only caused by the import of a very
large trawler - about 8000 GT - which was exported to a third country in 2012, according to
the fleet register).
Most important annual fluctuations in volumes of catches come from fishing highly migratory
species (skipjack tuna in Spain in 2008, sprats in Poland in 2009, sardines in Portugal in
2007).
Catches decreased the most in France (-39%) and Denmark (-34%) – despite increases
between 2007 and 2010 – and Italy (-33%).
The decrease in Denmark comes from the reduction of TACs on sand eels from 902,200 t in
2005 to 178,238 t in 2007, and the decrease in catches of European sprats (300,000 t in
2004 to 140,000 t in 2007), despite fairly stable TACs. The fleet structure also consolidated
after the implementation of ITQs in 2007 for demersal species (ITQs for the pelagic fleet
20
The high level of catch in 2009 is mainly caused by a 50% increase in European sprat catches by
Poland, it does not reflect a structural evolution of the sector.
43
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
were implemented in 2003), which can explain the increase in catches despite the reduction
in fleet capacity between 2007 and 201021.
This analysis on overall catches only highlights the importance of external factors (other
systems implemented, interactions among fleet segments, stocks variability for certain
species, etc.) and the difficulty to assess the actual relationship between the fleet capacity
reduction and catches reduction.
With this in mind, the following analysis examines the evolution of the fleet productivity,
measured in catch/vessel and catch/GT.$
$
Figure 23: Total catch/vessel evolution by MS for the 9 case studies
Source:(Eurostat(data(
Over a long period, the catch/vessel tends to decrease in the EU15 (-17% between 1995
and 2010). On the contrary, it has increased steadily in the EU10 since 2004, which again
illustrates the restructuring effort undertaken in these countries following entry into the EU.
The analysis by MS for the 9 case studies shows that the evolution is far from homogeneous
in the different MS. The differences in catch/vessel also highlight the structural differences
between primarily industrial fleets in Northern MS (Denmark, Sweden, Poland, and to a less
extent Estonia and the UK) and the more small-scale oriented fleet in Southern MS (Italy,
Portugal, Spain).
The graphs below compare the evolution of catch/vessel and catch/GT in the 9 MS. The
comparison starts in 2004 in order to have a common starting point for all the case studies
and to point out a potential turning point with the implementation of the EFF.
21
AER report 2012
44
$
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Figure 24: Evolution of catch/unit in the 9 case studies since 2004
Source: Eurostat data
There is no significant change in the productivity trends after 2007, except in Denmark,
where it clearly increases, with the combination of the extension of the ITQ system to the
demersal fleet and the implementation of restructuring plans, partially funded by the FAS
(Reg. 744/2008) which were targeted at the most energy-consuming (and least profitable)
fleet.
Although productivity is likely to be enhanced by technological innovation in the fields of fish
detection and geo-localisation, the trend of catch/GT is rather stable since 200422, except in
Estonia, where the industrial fleet was significantly restructured. The most important
decrease in productivity is observed in France, with a 28% decrease in the catch / vessel
and 19% decrease in catch /GT between 2004 and 2010. Overall, it is clear that the
decrease in the fleet capacity has not been overcompensated by productivity gains, mainly
because of the evolution of quotas, which have contributed to limit catches.
6.2.3
Opinions from case studies
It is clear for national authorities and professional organisations interviewed for the case
studies, and it has been demonstrated in the previous question, that permanent cessation
measures have significantly contributed to reducing the fleet size. However the link with
actual fishing capacity is more difficult to establish. In Italy, data provided by IREPA and the
managing authority shows that the fishing effort (measured in GT x days at sea) has
decreased by 24% between 2006 and 2011, and that the fleet capacity reduction was the
primary factor for this reduction as the average days at sea only reduced by 4% over the
same period.
Yet what this does not show is what would have happened if the fleet capacity had
decreased at a slower pace (i.e. without permanent cessation measures). In that case, two
scenarios could have occurred:
22
The evolution of discards are not taken into account here.
45
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
•
For fisheries under regulatory restrictions the fishing effort would probably have
reduced approximately in the same way; because of limited fishing opportunities, the
average days at sea then would have reduced faster (as well as vessels profitability,
most likely);
•
For fisheries without regulatory restrictions, the decrease in fishing effort would have
been smaller.
This is the only analysis available from the case studies aiming at measuring the link
between the evolution of the fleet capacity and the fishing capacity.
A few MS also drew attention on some issues limiting the contribution of the measure to the
reduction of fishing activity.
In Denmark for instance, both plans were implemented under Reg.744/2008, so reducing
fishing capacity was not the primary objective, which was to restructure the fleet and exit the
most energy-intensive fleets, and especially the least profitable ones. This is actually
reflected in the above analysis.
In Sweden, there is a commonly held view among stakeholders that a large majority of
fishermen reinvest their premium in the sector, potentially increasing capacity.
Finally, in the UK, under 10m skippers opted to scrap their vessels targeting quota species
and re-invest in non-quota fisheries that they were able to enter. Therefore there is some
contribution to a net reduction in some segments, but the scheme may also have contributed
to an increase in other sectors such as potting.
Despite these limits the general perception in the 9 case studies is that permanent cessation
measures have contributed, at least to some extent, to the reduction of fishing capacity.
6.2.4
Summary
From 2001 to 2011, the total catch of EU fishing fleet decreased faster than the fleet number
and fleet capacity. The catch reduction was particularly important, in volume and %, in
Denmark, Spain and France.
Different factors are responsible for this heavy drop in the total catch of the EU fleet, among
which:
•
The reduction in fishing opportunities (because of conservation measures restricting
the access to fisheries and output as a result of the overexploitation of most of the
fish stocks and);
•
The reduction in the fleet size in GT and kWs (only partly compensated by a higher
effectiveness of modern fishing vessels) as a result of permanent cessation
measures and the fuel crisis.
The analysis of the trend in fishing fleet productivity (measured as catch / GT) shows that
catch of scrapped vessels are only partly “recuperated” by remaining vessels, partly because
fishing and/or market opportunities continue to decrease, and partly because some vessels
remaining in activity do not have the technical capacity for exploiting the same areas and
species as scrapped vessel (e.g. deep-sea fisheries).
46
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
6.3 To what extent have permanent cessation measures contributed to the
modernisation of the European fishing fleet?
6.3.1
Methodology
Permanent cessation measures do not have the objective of modernising the fleet. However
this could be considered as a side-effect since arguably, the removal of out-dated vessels
can contribute to modernising the fleet.
Analyses here will therefore focus on the evolution of fleet age; first on the overall evolution
of the fleet, and then on the potential impact of scrapping measures.
6.3.2 Difference before and after implementation of permanent cessation measures
in age of vessels, taking prevailing trends into account
Figure 25: Evolution of Fleet average age
33$
31$
29$
EU15$
EU10$
Sweden$
Denmark$
Italy$
Spain$
Portugal$
Poland$
UK$
France$
Estonia$
27$
25$
23$
21$
19$
17$
15$
2000$ 2001$ 2002$ 2003$ 2004$ 2005$ 2006$ 2007$ 2008$ 2009$ 2010$ 2011$ 2012$
Source:$Analysis$from$$CFR$data$
$
The figure above shows a continuous increasing trend in the vessels average age, despite
permanent cessation measures, and the construction measure until 2004. However the
increased pace is far less than a year per year. Therefore exits of old vessels and entries of
new constructions contributed to slow down the ageing of the fleet.
Overall the 9 MS follow similar trends, except:
47
•
Spain, where the average age decreases between 2007 and 2008: about 1,400
vessels (mostly <10-m) were retrieved from the fleet register (but not recorded as
scrapped);
•
Portugal: likewise, the small decrease in average age in 2005 is largely related to the
retrieval of about 800 under-10m vessels from the fleet register, as well as the
scrapping of 300 others.
•
Estonia: the significant increase, compared to EU-10 average, can be traced to the
apparent non-renewal of small-scale fisheries (the under-10m and 10-12m segments
have aged by about 7 years between 2004 and 2007). The drop in 2012 is related to
the registration of about 450 under-10m vessels, (17 years old on average).
Therefore, this is mainly related to a change in registration policies for small vessels.
$
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Spain and Portugal, the two MS where the age decreased under the FIFG, saw the greatest
increases under the EFF. On the contrary, in Sweden, France and Denmark, where average
age increased the most between 2000 and 2007, it tends to increase less during the current
programming period and even decreased in Denmark.
In Denmark, this corresponds to the implementation of ITQs in 2007 as well as the exit of a
few large vessels under the fuel package in 2009 (31 vessels, 40 year old on average).
Likewise, Sweden and France reduced the fleet capacity more under the EFF than in the
previous period (see section 5.2).
On the other hand, although the overall fleet capacity decreased faster in Spain during the
current programming period, this MS relied heavily on the construction measure under the
FIFG, where it was used to contribute to the construction of about 300 new vessels on
average per year between 2000 and 2007 (representing a total engine power of about
50,000 kW/yr). Between 2008 and 2012, unaided constructions only represented about 70
new vessels per year and less than 5,000 kW per year. Scrapping also decreased between
the two programming periods from an average of 600 vessels representing about 75,000 kW
per year down to an average of 350 vessels for about 50,000 kW per year.
6.3.3 Age difference between active vessels, vessels scrapped with aid and vessels
scrapped without aid
Table 4: Average age of scrapped and active vessels in the nine case studies
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
25,5
25,52
26,02
26,53
27,01
27,46
Scrapped vessels w/aid
29,69
29,90
32,08
35,66
35,41
Scrapped vessels w/o aid
33,42
33,77
34,17
36,66
34,80
Active vessels
Source: Analysis from CFR data and Art. 40 data
The above figures confirm that scrapped vessels tend to be older than the average. However
there is no evidence that vessels scrapped with aid are older than those scrapped without
aid, despite the age limit of at least 10 years for the subsidy.
The analysis by MS shows again some differences:
•
In Denmark, Estonia, Italy, Poland and Portugal, vessels scrapped with aid are
consistently older than those scrapped without aid;
•
In France and Spain, they are consistently newer;
•
In the UK and in Sweden it varies depending on the year.
In Denmark, the most outdated fleet was clearly targeted by the adjustment plan (reg.
744/2008) and in Portugal the age criteria was raised to 20 year-old in the main adjustment
plans, but information available in other MS do not provide explanations for those
differences.
6.3.4
Results from the vessel-owner survey
Share of vessel-owners having scrapped their oldest or most out-dated vessel
There are only 24 answers from vessel-owners who scrapped without support, and 15 of
them scrapped their only vessels, so results cannot be considered as representative, but 5
of the remaining 9 vessel-owners said they chose their oldest or most technically out-dated
one.
48
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Similarly, for vessels scrapped with support, in most cases (75%) the owner only had one
vessel, so it does not provide information about the impact on modernisation. However out of
the remaining 25% (89 vessels), vessel-owners mainly chose their oldest or most technically
out-dated vessel (36%) or their least profitable one (32%), which again tends to show a
slight indirect impact on the overall modernisation of the fleet and the importance of
economic-profitability considerations by vessel owners.
Figure 26: Answers about the choice of vessels to scrap
Vessel$with$the$
fewest$fishing$
enHtlements$
6%$
Only$one$vessel$
fit$the$eligibility$
criteria$
24%$
Vessel$was$
not$acHve$
anymore$
2%$
Oldest/$most$
technically$out!
dated$vessel$
36%$
Least$profitable$
vessel$
32%$
Responses about the use of scrapping funds lead to the same conclusion. Since most
vessel-owners only had one vessel (75%) and are not active anymore (68%), the subsidy
was mainly used to pay off debts (45% of the beneficiaries) or retire (38%). 22% of the
beneficiaries invested in the modernisation of another vessel.
% of respondants
Figure 27: Answers about the use of permanent cessation funding
6.3.5
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
To a little extent
To some extent
To a great extent
Paid off debts
Retire
Invested in the Invested in
modernisation
another
of another
business
vessel
sector
Invested in
another
aspect of the
fishing
industry
Opinions from the case studies interviews
Findings from the case studies vary to some extent but taken as a whole they confirm the
previous analyses.
49
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
The impact on fleet age was generally considered small, except in Portugal where the vessel
age requirements were raised to 20 years-old in the main adjustment plans. Other Member
States had lower age requirements of around 10 years, which most stakeholders did not feel
was high enough to impact significantly on fleet age or modernisation. It is evident, however,
that scrapping has slowed down the ageing of fleets.
Re-investment was significant in some MS. In Estonia for instance, four out of five
beneficiaries declared they used the funds to invest in the modernisation of another vessel.
In Denmark, there was a condition to re-invest the money in new vessels or in the
modernisation of existing ones. In Portugal, there was no specific incentive to invest
scrapping money in modernisation, however interviews with the managing authority and
industry representatives as well as the vessel-owner survey show that vessel-owners with
more than one vessel often did so.
6.3.6
Summary
Analyses show that there is an overall continuous ageing of the EU fleet, despite permanent
cessation measures. However, scrapping slows down that process.
There is no evidence that vessels scrapped with support are older or more out-dated than
vessels scrapped without support and interviews conducted for the case studies have shown
that the measure is considered to have at best a moderate impact on modernisation of the
fleet.
However, in some MS the measure has contributed to modernisation to some extent, mostly
through re-investment strategies (Estonia & Denmark).
6.4 To what extent have temporary cessation measures led to temporary drops
in fishing activity?
There are a number of reasons why fishermen sometimes need to stop fishing temporarily,
ranging from foreseeable and seasonal events such as spawning in particular species, to
unexpected shocks such as natural disasters, public health or the unexpected termination of
international fishing agreements. In some of these cases, fishermen would be expected to
temporarily stop fishing whether or not the public purse is available to support them while
they do. In others, the authorities may be required to temporarily ban fishing. But, the
overwhelming majority of survey respondents benefiting from temporary cessation funding
would have been required to stop fishing; in any case, it does not seem that the measures
as an effort reduction tool. Temporary cessation measures as implemented in the Member
States under study have acted much more as an economic management tool than one
geared to reducing fishing activity.
It is worth pointing out that national measures for temporary cessation varied far more by
country than those for scrapping. Indeed, of the nine Member States under study, three
(Denmark, Estonia and the UK) did not operate any temporary cessation measures at all.
Sweden implemented two isolated and relatively small-scale temporary cessation schemes.
France and Portugal also implemented relatively small-scale schemes but on a regular
cessation basis and Spain, Italy and Poland operated very large annual schemes. The table
below makes this clear, showing that, both in terms of vessels aided and spending, the
schemes as implemented in the countries concerned were different by more than 20 fold.
Sweden’s scheme was by far the smallest, whereas the Italian scheme benefited the most
vessels and the Spanish scheme claimed the most funding.
Table 5: Temporary cessation by Member State
50
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
France
Italy
Poland
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Total
Funding
disbursed Funding per vessel
Vessels aided
(EUR thousands)
(EUR thousands)
Not available
16,661
Not available
8,615
36,789
4.3
Not available
74,308
Not available
578
9,900
17.1
2,367
163,964
69.3
302
3,356
11.1
14,780
304,977
20.6
Source: Article 40 data and national operational programmes
The available data do not allow for an aggregation of days of fishing prevented due to
temporary cessation funding. However, the national case studies show that, in most cases,
the subsidies served to make temporary cessation requirements more palatable to vessel
owners who would have lost income if forced to stop fishing without compensation, rather
than providing vessel owners with an incentive to stop fishing when they otherwise could
have fished. In this sense, the net effect of temporary cessation funding in terms of fishing
days prevented might be close to zero. Indeed, among survey respondents, the vast majority
claimed that the main reason they temporarily stopped fishing was to adhere to government
requirements, and over 80% of respondents received public support for the temporary
cessation they underwent. Member State authorities could plausibly have used various types
of national funding, e.g. unemployment benefits, to subsidise vessel owners during periods
of obligatory temporary cessation, but the extent to which this would have been the case is
not clear from the survey or interviews with managing authorities.
For example, in Italy, where temporary cessation affected the largest number of vessels, the
managing authorities have used temporary cessation since 1988, and have each year
mandated temporary closure for bottom and mid-water pair trawlers while providing funding
to cover the fixed costs of keeping vessels at port. The 30-45 days of cessation are timed to
coincide with the spawning season of the most significant target species, usually in July and
August, with the stated goal of rebuilding the most important stocks through the reduction of
fishing activity. Importantly, since most Italian trawlers are multi-gear, they often continue to
fish while benefiting from the funding with other gears in their license. Again, it is unclear
why the periods of inactivity would be unforeseen or even whether temporary cessation has
a net effect on the amount of fishing in comparison with measures for which no funding
would be required, such as building the costs of seasonal closures into the business model.
Moreover, a significant number of vessel owners claimed that they would have temporarily
stopped fishing in order to carry out necessary maintenance on their vessels during these
periods.
In Spain, temporary cessation measures were implemented under three main adjustment
plans related to the recovery of specific stocks, the absence of an international fishing
agreement with Mauritania and non-ratification of the EU-Morocco fisheries agreement. Like
most others, they were mandatory. The Portuguese case was very similar in that stoppages
were obligatory. Interestingly, in Sweden cessation measures were used to pay for the fixed
costs of vessels which had to stop fishing due to bad weather conditions. Certainly the
funding would not have been necessary to keep vessels at port, since the vessel owners
would have been unable to fish at the time in question, but it helped to sustain the vessel
owners involved during the time in question. The Swedish authorities, concluding that such
events, while not predictable individually, could be expected probabilistically, later decided
not to implement any further temporary cessation funding after 2008.
51
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
6.4.1
Summary
Given the fact that temporary cessation schemes are implemented due a compulsory stop to
fishing activity, public funding has been more useful in rendering the measures politically
acceptable than in actually reducing the amount of fishing. This is especially the case in
instances, such as Italy, where temporary cessation subsides have become entrenched and
incorporated into yearly payments to cover vessel owners’ fixed costs during periods where
they would be inactive anyway or fishing with other gear.
It is not possible to calculate the exact number of days of fishing prevented with the funding,
but as most vessel owners would have been required to stop fishing for the periods in
question the net effects are expected to be small. Moreover, in no country under study did
the case study conclude that the measures had been effective at curtailing fishing effort in
relation to the counterfactual.
6.5 To what extent have temporary cessation measures assisted vessel
owners to adapt to emergencies and other shifting conditions?
It is clear from the survey/interviews that vessel owners have benefited financially from
publicly funded temporary cessation schemes such as those supported by the EFF.
However, in most countries under study, the measures were intended to support vessel
owners as they responded to resource conservation measures or recurrent seasonal
suspensions (e.g. in Italy, Poland, Sweden and Spain). A different conclusion was reached
in Portugal, where the evaluation determined that temporary cessation funding enabled
vessel owners to cope with increased quota restrictions in addition to the fuel crisis as
envisaged in Regulation 744/2008.
6.6 To what extent have temporary cessation measures contributed to the
maintenance of jobs in the fishing sector?
The evaluation has consistently found that the impacts of temporary cessation were primarily
economic, rather than environmental, in nature. Although temporary cessation measures
were implemented very differently according to the Member State in question (for example,
by funding only the fixed costs of keeping vessels in port, as in Sweden, or substituting for
unemployment benefits, as in Spain, France and Portugal), they had a common goal of
sustaining (segments of) the European fishing fleet, rather than aligning fishing / fleet
capacity with available fishing resources. Temporary cessation measures could thus
plausibly prevent vessels from exiting the market, thereby contributing to the maintenance of
jobs in the fishing sector.
Though findings were anecdotal and thus difficult to quantify, the case studies showed that
temporary cessation measures had positive impacts – at least in the short term – for jobs in
Poland, Sweden, Italy, Portugal and Spain. There was some nuance in these results. For
example, in Sweden, Managing Authorities interviewed for the study felt that temporary
cessation funding shielded vessel owners from gradually shifting market conditions that
might in the medium to long-term reduce employment, even while maintaining it in the short
term. Findings were more positive in Portugal. There, the managing authorities interviewed
for the study claimed temporary cessation helped maintain jobs and three out of five vessel
owners surveyed stated that they would have relied on more short-term contracts for crew or
scrapped or sold their vessels without the funding. In Spain, the evaluation determined that
unemployment in the fishing industry was reduced by, depending on the year, 0.2-2%.
52
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
The vessel owner results were inconclusive on this point, as it is difficult to predict how
employment would have been affected by, say, the 43% of respondents claiming they would
have temporarily stopped fishing regardless of the subsidy. But it is worth pointing out that
4% would have laid off workers while 3% of respondents would have relied more on
temporary contracts for crew.
6.7 Have the effects of permanent and (to a lesser extent) temporary cessation
measures contributed to environmental, economic and social
sustainability in the European fishing sector?
6.7.1 Extent to which permanent cessation measures have contributed to alignment
between living aquatic resources and European fishing capacity
By the end of 2012 for the nine case study MS, permanent cessation schemes under EFF
had been completed, were underway or approved to remove 2,210 vessels with a total GT of
142,498, which involved €366million of EFF funding in a total cost of over €600million (DG
MARE, 2013 Article 40 data request).
The nine case study MS represent 59% of vessels scrapped and 89% of EFF spend on
measure 1.1 permanent cessation. The case study proportion of total GT removed can be
assumed to be greater than 59% as the average total spend per vessel is 14% greater for
the case studies than all MS together and therefore the average size is likely to be larger.
The results from the case studies represent the majority of removed capacity and
experiences from these nine member states should be indicative of experiences with
cessation measures as a whole.
Contribution to Environmental Sustainability
The CFP Green Paper recognises that economic and social viability of fisheries can only
result from restoring the productivity of fish stocks (EC, 2009). The Commission’s proposal
for CFP reform (COM 2011/425), adopted by the European Parliament and council in 2013,
reiterates this stating that “the main problem of the current CFP is the lack of environmental
sustainability due to overfishing”. Below we therefore explore how the status of European
fish stocks has evolved during the life of the programme and what contribution cessation
measures may have made.
In 2009, 88 % of EU stocks were being fished beyond MSY and 30 % of these stocks were
outside safe biological limits (EC, 2009). It was also the case that many stocks were still to
be assessed and their status was unknown. The recent stock status situation across
European fisheries is mixed (EC, 2012):
•
•
•
•
53
Where the state of stocks has been assessed, they seem to be improving,: the
proportion of overfished stocks in the Atlantic and nearby seas fell from 94% in 2005
to 47% in 2011 [and 39% in 2013].
The new stocks that are no longer assessed as overfished (above FMSY) include
Iberian-Atlantic anglerfish, blue whiting, Celtic Sea sole, west of Scotland haddock,
North Sea herring, North Sea plaice and Herring in the Gulf of Bothnia.
European waters 65% of the stocks are not fully assessed and only 22% of stocks
under TACs are known to not be overfished.
For the Mediterranean and Black Sea, the number of stocks being assessed has
increased, but this has highlighted that 88% of the 85 assessed are overfished.
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
•
The tendency over the past years has been that a decreasing proportion of stocks
(from 47% in 2003 to 35% in 2012) can be classified according to safe biological
limits. It is not clear how far this may be affecting the data (i.e. is it the stocks at
highest risk that are no longer assessed?).
In the context of the CFP reform, the Commission establishes a link between overcapacity
and overfishing. However, the relationship between fishing capacity and the status of
biological resources is difficult to establish as:
• Fishing capacity is not wholly defined by vessel capacity (measured in GT and kW
terms) as gear, wheelhouse technology and other vessel characteristics such as
engine efficiency play a part;
• Fishing effort is not wholly defined by fishing capacity (as many vessels are not
operating at 100% capacity);
• Fishing mortality is not wholly defined by fishing effort (as by-catch in the target and
in other fisheries contributes to total fishing mortality); and
• Fishing mortality is just one factor influencing the status of stocks (natural mortality
and recruitment are also critical elements).
Consequently the link between fleet capacity and resource sustainability is difficult to
establish. Despite this significant constraint, as the intended outcome of permanent
cessation schemes is a sustainable balance between these two elements, the following
analysis compares the evolution of specific fleets with target resources.
Table 6 presents the main fleets and resources that were identified by FEAPs in the nine
case study countries. Not all MS FEAPs could be analysed in this way, as many were not
sufficiently targeted for specific fishery resources to be identified (a shortcoming noted by the
European Court of Auditors in 2011).
The adjustment plan, the proportion of the fleet removed, and the trends in stock status and
fishing mortality for key target stocks are presented. Other management measures applied in
the fisheries (quota, effort and closed areas/seasons) used to conserve these resources are
also identified, however it should be noted that various other conservation measures such as
technical measures and minimum landing sizes (MLS) are also applied in most fisheries in
Europe.
The table reflects the general situation seen across Europe with more Atlantic stocks in
recovery compared to Mediterranean stocks, and that the status of many Mediterranean
stocks remains unknown.
While the increases in spawning stock biomass (SSB) seen across many of the Baltic and
North East Atlantic stocks are encouraging, this could be due to natural changes and so it is
the change in fishing mortality (F) over time that best illustrates the impact of management
interventions. Fishing mortality at a level consistent with achieving maximum sustainable
yield (FMSY) is presented for 2008 and the most recent year available, usually 2012. Fishing
at or below FMSY is only evident for a few stocks:
Eastern Baltic cod (targeted by trawlers from Denmark, Estonia, Poland and Sweden)
North Sea and Western Channel sole (targeted by UK beam trawlers vessels)
North Sea and West of Scotland haddock (targeted by UK trawlers)
Bay of Biscay sole and anchovy (targeted by French trawlers)
54
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Table 6 Assessment of key target stocks for fleets subject to fleet adjustment schemes
55
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
56
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
The stocks that show clear reductions in F have been the subjects of comprehensive and wide-reaching
recovery plans involving quota and effort reductions across target and (in the case of cod) non-target fleets
with cod by-catch.
The majority of fisheries presented in the table are yet to show reductions in F down to MSY levels. For
some, such as North Sea and Western Baltic cod and Southern Hake stocks, levels of F are reducing, but
remain above FMSY according to the 2013 ICES advice. These fisheries appear to be moving towards
sustainable levels of exploitation and permanent cessation measures may have played a part. However
these cod and hake stocks are also subject to quota, effort and many other conservation measures, making
it difficult to conclude whether cessation measures have made a significant positive contribution to this
progress.
Cessation measures are one of many interventions used in these fisheries showing signs of recovery. The
Hake and Nephrops adjustment plans in Portugal and Spain show how difficult it is to assess the impact of
a single measure on fishery sustainability. In this case, permanent and temporary cessation measures were
used together and the plan also included the modernisation measure to change fishing gear. The plan was
implemented after two years of closure of the fisheries for over-fishing (catches were greater than quotas).
Individual quotas (not transferable) were implemented at the same time to increase individual responsibility.
As a result of all these measures, the fleet capacity was reduced by 15% and the fishing effort measured by
the number of days spent at sea using the targeted gear reduced by 38% in total (source: Portuguese Fleet
Report 2011). The impact on stocks however is variable: the biological biomass for hake has improved, but
continues to deteriorate for Nephrops and the fishing mortality remains high because of multi-gear and
multi-specific fisheries.
One factor to consider in the apparent success of management interventions is compliance. If the scale of
fleets had remained unchanged in the fisheries and the necessary reductions in F applied through
reductions in quota and effort alone, vessels would have seen significant reductions in fishing opportunities
and so revenue generation. MS managing authorities (UK and Poland) suggest that this would have led to
a greater likelihood of non-compliance. This, along with the social impact of more failed businesses, has
cost implications and would negatively impact the economic and social elements of achieving a sustainable
fishery.
If a Total Allowable Catch (TAC) is set, the quota from scrapped vessels is simply redistributed to the
remaining fleet and there is expected to be no significant impact on fishing mortality from scrapping. In
these instances fishing mortality is more likely to be reduced through reductions in quota and effort.
Where a TAC is not set, such as for many Mediterranean stocks, it is more likely that fishing mortality could
be directly reduced through cessation measures (as effort is reduced) and if other interventions are not
being applied. Trawl fleets from Spain and Portugal were reduced through EFF permanent cessation
schemes by 50% and 26% respectively and Italy’s Mediterranean fleet was reduced by 13% in tonnage
terms. Over the 2008-2012 period estimates of fishing mortality have reduced by 70% for Mediterranean
hake. It is not unreasonable to assume that permanent cessation measures that removed vessels targeting
hake in these MS have contributed to this reduction in F, particularly in the absence of quota and effort
controls. However, the varied estimates of F for hake fisheries in the Mediterranean (see IEO, 2012)
suggest that there may be significant changes to F due to the targeting of different stocks and sub-stocks
and fleet capacity may shift between these stocks. This makes the ability to target a cessation scheme
difficult as a FEAP intended to remove capacity from a specific fishery could easily be undermined by
capacity from other fisheries leaking back in
French managing authorities and the sector consider that the restructuring of the French fleet would
probably have taken more time and produced negative effects (reorientation of fishing effort and
overfishing) without scrapping schemes. The recovery of some stocks exploited by the French fleet is
considered by the national authorities to be the result of relevant management measures (quotas, effort
and access) and more targeted E.U. fleet adjustment measures. The authorities mention Anchovy (gulf of
Biscay), sole (gulf of Biscay) and blue fin tuna (Mediterranean Sea) as examples of fisheries where the
quick and permanent exit of capacity supported by EFF has proven to be effective regarding stock
availability.
In France’s glass eel fishery a 28% reduction in capacity was seen, 10% of which was EFF funded. While a
good recruitment to the stock was reported in 2012, the level of fishing mortality is still significantly above
sustainable levels (2013). This example highlights the difficulty in determining the impact of a single
57
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
cessation scheme on highly migratory stocks that may be targeted by numerous MS and non-EU countries.
Without international agreement, unilateral permanent cessation schemes may be futile and it appears
impossible to balance fleet capacity with fluctuating, highly migratory resources.
For the remaining stocks presented in Table 6, the level of F and even the status of the stock remains
unknown. It is therefore difficult to establish what, if any, contribution has been made by cessation
measures. This also calls into question the ability of the MS to set appropriate targets for these fisheries
within FEAPs. An example is the Portuguese FEAP to remove capacity from the fleet in Madeira targeting
black scabbard fish, the title of which would suggest it is highly targeted. However ICES reports stock
status for Black scabbard fish is unknown (ICES, 2013) and the Portuguese fleet report of 2011 reports that
the deep-sea fishery was also subject to a capacity reduction regime involving the reduction in the number
of licences. Therefore it is not evident that the permanent cessation scheme has had any impact on the
status of the stock and this impact could have occurred through license reduction without the adjustment
plan.
A similar situation is evident with the Spanish red sea bream fishery in the Straights of Gibraltar. The FEAP
used both permanent and temporary cessation measures to remove capacity, but the stock information is
not available to determine the extent to which fleet capacity exceeds sustainable levels.
The lack of a link between fleet capacity and resources is accepted by some administrations, such as the
Estonian ministry: “Even if the scrapping schemes targeted the fleet segments with the highest impact on
the resource (according to Marine Institute surveys), there is no evidence of a link between scrapping
measures and the evolution of the resource.”
Contribution to Economic Sustainability
Several MS administrations recognise the lack of a clear link between fleet capacity and resource status
and an inability to measure the impact of cessation measures. Some have, however, still implemented
cessation schemes to:
1. Support other fishery recovery measures
2. Attempt to improve the economic efficiency of the fleet (Scotland)
3. Target the removal of fuel inefficient vessels (Denmark)
4. Modernise the fleet (Estonia)
The last three points do not seek to achieve a rebalancing of fleet with resources, the primary objective of
cessation schemes funded under EFF. This was recognised in Poland where management authorities state
that socio-economic objectives or criteria were not associated with the scrapping schemes.
The UK authorities also concede that the two EFF permanent cessation schemes they implemented would
have a limited, if any, impact on stock conservation. The English scheme focused on under 10m vessels
that fished quota species from a very limited pool of quota. Removing 65 vessels only resulted in the
potentially improved distribution of quota across the remaining under 10m vessels. However, the latent
capacity in the fleet is such that any capacity reduction in real terms was quickly eroded and inactive
vessels were brought into activity. The Scottish fleet resilience scheme was also not intended to conserve
stocks as it was recognised quota attached to scrapped vessels would be redistributed around the
remaining fleet. This scheme is described in more detail below.
A number of Member States implemented permanent cessation schemes with the primary objective of
improving efficiency in the sector. For the UK (Scotland) and Denmark it was the potential to support the
transition to more economically sustainable fleet operations that was the driver for cessation funding. In
Denmark authorities reported that the significant reduction in fuel consumption has more than fulfilled the
target set (5.5% vs. 4%). While this can be viewed as a positive result, the impact is modest compared to
the volatility in fuel prices and the increases that have exceeded the peak seen in 2008.
Scotland planned a licence parking scheme whereby for example, two vessels operating at 50% could
combine fishing opportunities on a single vessel and share fishing costs for more efficient use of
operational assets (the vessel). This was not explicitly linked to permanent cessation (the UK is well below
58
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
fleet capacity ceilings), but a scrapping scheme was made available to give the option of permanent
removal of capacity. The scrapping option was taken up by individual owner operators seeking to clear
debts and leave the industry and by companies with more than one vessel seeking to optimise fishing
opportunities.
In 2010 32 vessels were removed from the Scottish fleet with cessation funds; the great majority of these
were whitefish trawlers. The 2012 Annual Economic Report (AER) shows that this segment showed the
improved profitability seen in 2010 continued in 2011 despite reduced fishing days. This is primarily
attributed to an increase in prices for the main whitefish species despite continued high fuel prices and
slightly reduced effort and landings (STECF, 2012). Overall fleet capacity in number, GT and kW terms is
seen to have reduced in this fleet, but the economic impact of 32 vessels leaving the fleet is not evident.
Other MS implemented permanent cessation schemes with the objective of fleet modernisation although
this was not a Commission objective for such schemes. Estonia viewed permanent cessation as a clear
opportunity to remove ageing, inefficient vessels. For Estonia the AER shows that an increasing average
age since 2008 from 19 to 22 was reversed in 2012 to an average age of 20. All other case study Member
States saw an increasing average age of the fleet over the period 2008-2012.
6.7.2
Extent to which temporary cessation measures have contributed to overall sustainability
Temporary cessation (TC) measures do not permanently remove capacity. However, by controlling when
effort is applied, TC could in theory improve the sustainability of the fishery by reducing overall effort and by
avoiding spawning periods. Maintaining fishing businesses during temporary disruptions to fishing
opportunities could also support the economic and social sustainability of fisheries in the short term.
However, long-term sustainability will be dependent on ensuring the sustainability of the resource.
The temporary cessation measure is implemented in Italy under the management plans adopted within the
framework of EU conservation measures and do not necessarily reflect the objective of maintenance of
activity and jobs in periods where activity is interrupted that are unforeseen. In the Italian fishing sector, the
temporary withdrawal of fishing activity aims to rebuild the most important stocks exploited by bottom
trawlers and mid-water pair trawlers. The temporary cessation measure is considered by Managing
Authorities and Producer Organisations interviewed/surveyed in the study to be a very important
management instrument, which should be maintained in the future. Some of the POs interviewed stated
that one of the direct effects of the temporary cessation is the positive impact on the resource and consider
this measure as indispensable.
TC measures have also been widely applied in Spain with payments made to individuals affected by
FEAPs. To benefit from the TC subsidy Spanish crew are required to remain contractually bound to the
vessel. Without the subsidy the crew would be considered as “unemployed”.
Swedish stakeholders interviewed concluded that temporary cessation measures may have indeed
contributed to maintaining excess capacity in the long term by artificially allowing the concerned vessel
owners to continue operating, and no further temporary cessation is planned in Sweden for this reason.
In contrast, French authorities interviewed/surveyed for the study suggest that temporary cessation
measures, when efficiently articulated with permanent cessation, may have contributed to maintain
enterprises and jobs in periods of quick change and emergency, while preventing any shifting of fishing
effort to other fisheries.
6.7.3
Summary
Fisheries showing a clear reduction in fishing mortality to sustainable levels have involved extensive quota
and effort reductions. The impact of scrapping within this mix of interventions is not evident and a clear link
between fleet capacity and resource status is unclear.
Where quota and effort management is not yet applied, as in many Mediterranean fisheries, the removal of
vessel capacity might be expected to reduce fishing mortality, if such removals are significant and lasting.
However, as, good management information is also lacking in many of these fisheries, the stock status and
fishing mortality is often unknown, and so there is no evidence of the impact of permanent cessation
schemes.
59
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Temporary cessation schemes are intended to address the economic and social sustainability of the
fishery. Information provided by Spanish authorities shows crew members are provided temporary support
via EFF funding instead of general unemployment benefit from the state. However, it is not evident that the
schemes maintained jobs that would otherwise have been lost to fishing. Similarly in Italy regular seasonal
closure is factored into sector planning (e.g. allowing maintenance to occur) and so it is not clear that TC
payments maintain jobs that would otherwise have been lost.
60
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
7 Efficiency
The following section considers the efficiency of the cessation measures in delivering the objectives. The
Guidelines for Evaluation of EU activities (EC, 2004) defines efficiency as: “the extent to which the desired
effects are achieved at a reasonable cost.”
7.1 Have the effects of permanent and temporary cessation measures been achieved at a
reasonable cost? Could similar effects be achieved in a more cost effective way?
7.1.1
Methodology and limits
The concept of “reasonable cost” can mainly be approached in terms of relative cost/effectiveness ratio.
Since data available do not allow comparison in terms of effectiveness with other systems contributing to
the reduction of fishing capacity, such as ITQs, the focus here will be on comparing the cost of cessation
measures among the 9 MS selected for the case studies, for which we have detailed financial data.
The comparison for permanent cessation measures can be easily done through the analysis of Euro spent
by vessel scrapped and by GT scrapped. For temporary cessation measures however, the most relevant
common indicator (number of fishers/day) is not reliable enough to be used in such an analysis, partly
because of misinterpretation of the indicator by some MS.
Besides the comparison among MS, for permanent cessation measures, it is also possible to compare with
the market value of vessels to assess the level of incentive from the support. Interviews conducted for the
case studies have shown that there is no official market value for used vessels, and that sales mainly go
through independent local traders. Moreover, the existence and expectations of scrapping measures have
an influence on vessel prices. Therefore, for this indicator, we can only rely on the vessel-owner survey.
Finally results from the vessel-owner survey about what they would have done without the support,,
provides an indication of the potential dead-weight effect (part of the funding that did not impact the
outcomes).
7.1.2
7.1.2.1
Cost effectiveness of permanent cessation measure
Cost per reduction in fishing capacity
According to data provided by the DG MARE, at the end of May 2013, permanent cessation represented
16.8% of total EFF commitments. However detailed data by MS (only available as of July 2012) showed
great differences among MS, up to 97% for Ireland (due to implementation issues on other axes23), 52% in
France or 40% in Italy. Overall the EFF committed for the measure amounted to €501.6m.
Figure 28 Cessation spend per GT and per vessel (as of July 2012)
Source: Analysis from CFR and Art. 40 data
23
See mid-term Evaluation, 2011
61
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Public spending per operation or per GT differs among MS in absolute value, but also as far as the share of
EFF (versus national contribution) is concerned. For the latter, differences can mainly be attributed to the
overall national strategy in terms of budget allocation for the EFF at national level. It is important to keep in
mind that the implementation of the EFF started in a context of major economic crisis, which particularly
affected the fishing sector24. One of the consequences of the crisis was the difficulty to find necessary
private co-funding for other measures of the EFF, which meant that demand for scrapping increased at the
same time that demand for investment measures decreased. Some MS therefore revised their budget
allocation for the EFF in favour of cessation measures, which could have contributed to reducing the
national contribution for these measures.
Differences in the overall amount of public cost per vessel largely depend on the structure of the fleet
targeted by adjustment plans. Premium calculations generally rely on a scale per GT class, with a fixed and
a proportional part (see implementation part in the case studies). Therefore the public spend per vessel
tends to be lower in MS where smaller vessels were scrapped whereas the public spent per GT tends to be
lower where MS where larger vessels were scrapped.
The figure above shows that the size of vessels scrapped by itself does not explain all the differences. The
UK and Estonia for instance have among the lowest public cost per vessel and per GT. In both cases, they
have implemented bidding systems rather than applying a pre-determined premium. The analysis does not
take into account the potential additional administrative burden for the administration and for beneficiaries,
but it tends to indicate that this system allows reductions to the gross public cost.
In Estonia, a maximum amount was set based on a similar premium calculation as in other MS. Then each
tenderer could ask for a lower €/GT. In case of over-subscription, applications with the highest €/GT would
be would be rejected. In practice no application was rejected but it encouraged applicants to request less
than the maximum premium.
According to vessel owners survey, the amount of the subsidy for scrapping was considered to be the
same as the market price of the boat. In this case, it tends to show that vessel-owners would not scrap for
less (or for much less) than the market price as the four beneficiaries interviewed in Estonia said they
would have either continued fishing or scrapped their vessel. Nevertheless, the scheme did not work very
well for long-distance vessels, for which the maximum premium was considered to be lower than the
market price, according to industry representatives.
In the UK, there was also a capped premium, but the price per Vessel Capacity Unit (VCU) was just one
determinant in vessel selection, with the primary criteria being the amount of quota species a vessel
caught. Again, 60% of respondents believed the price was about the same as that on the open market.
These two examples tend to show, that in the absence of a transparent open trade market for second-hand
vessels, the bidding system contributes to bring the premium down to what is assumed by vessel-owners to
correspond to the market price.
7.1.2.2
Comparison with market value
Information gathered from interviews show that there is no official trade market for second-hand vessels, so
the comparison between the amount of the subsidy and the vessels market value is based on qualitative
information only. The vessel-owner survey shows that the subsidy is considered to be higher than the
market price for a minority of vessel-owners (18%).
The proportion of respondents thinking the scrapping premium was above the market price was
significantly higher in two MS. In Sweden, three out of six vessel-owners felt the amount of aid was more
than the market price the vessel could have fetched on the open market and in Poland 15 out of 16 thought
it was higher.
24
Mid-term evaluation of the EFF, 2011
62
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Figure 29: Comparison of the subsidy with vessels market value (350 answers)
50%
40%
45%
33%
30%
18%
20%
10%
5%
0%
Less than the market
price of the vessel
About the same as the
market price of the
vessel
More than the market
price of the vessel
Not sure / don't know
Industry representatives interviewed stressed that the incentive was not only in the amount itself, but also in
the fact that there was more uncertainty with selling the vessel as it is often difficult (and long) to find a
buyer, which explains the third of vessel-owners who decided to scrap over selling their vessel despite a
premium lower than the market price.
For small-scale fisheries, applying a premium higher than the market price may be justified by the
increased effectiveness as shown by the glass-eel case in France (vessels under 5 GT). In this case, the
vessels' market price is rather low, and fishermen do not have many job alternatives, so the subsidy offers
an opportunity to leave with enough funds to retire or invest in another activity than the market would.
7.1.2.3
Dead-weight effect
The dead-weight effect for permanent cessation has been analysed in section 6.2. Available data show that
there is some dead-weight effect, but rather limited as only 12% of beneficiaries would have scrapped their
vessel at the same time without the subsidy, and another 8% would have continued fishing, but for less
than five years. In other words 80% of the vessel-owners, representing 84% of the capacity in GT, would
not have scrapped in the short-term.
7.1.3
Cost effectiveness of temporary cessation measure
In total, the EFF committed for temporary cessation (up until May 2013) amounted to 214m€, representing
about 7% of total commitments. The average cost per operation is meaningless as different units were
used depending on MS (vessel, vessel owner, crew).
Results from the vessel owner survey give a mixed judgement on the efficiency of this measure. Although
only 16% of interviewed vessel-owners who said they implemented temporary cessation periods said they
did so without subsidy, the dead-weight effect is higher than for the permanent cessation measures as the
following figure shows that 42% of beneficiaries said that they would have had to stop fishing anyway
because of regulatory restrictions, but what is more surprising is that 34% of them declared they would not
have accepted the “voluntary” cessation whereas only 8% said they stopped fishing because of a voluntary
decision or because it was not worth the operating costs. All other had to stop because of some regulatory
restrictions (closure of the fisheries, recovery plan, lack of quota…). Therefore, more than the actual likely
action without the measure, these 34% indicate the level of acceptability for the restriction itself that was
gained through the subsidy.
63
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Figure 30: Likely actions without temporary cessation measures (199 answers)
2%
3% 4%
2%
3%
10%
42%
Temporarily stopped fishing
anyway due to legal obligation
Not agreed to the voluntary
cessation
Stopped fishing for a shorter
period
Scrapped the vessel(s) sooner
Sold the vessel(s) sooner
34%
Relied more on temporary
contracts for the crew
Laid off some of the crew
Some of the crew would have
left on their own
Answers to the question about the amount of the subsidy also show that the amount by itself could not
represent an incentive for vessel-owners, as in most cases (69%) it barely covered fixed costs of the
vessel.
Figure 31: How did the funding cover vessel expenses during the period ? (199 answers)
They covered
vessel expenses
and contributed
to my living
expenses
11%
They covered
vessel expenses
(fixed costs,
maintenance,
etc.)
20%
They covered the
vessel's fixed
costs (harbour
dues, etc.)
16%
They were not
enough to cover
the fixed costs of
the vessel
53%
These results are coherent with information gathered from interviews and analyses done about the
effectiveness of the measure. Temporary cessation subsidies are primarily a social measure. It contributes
to the acceptability of regulatory restrictions by vessel-owners and to the greater stability of jobs for the
crew, who are in the end the main beneficiaries. Therefore the efficiency in terms of the reduction of fishing
activity is low as the impact is only marginal. The real impact of the measure being a social one, the
efficiency should be analysed based on the social cost of not having it, which is beyond the scope of this
study.
7.1.4
Summary
Permanent cessation measures:
•
64
Can be considered efficient overall to reduce the fleet size (or a specific fleet segment) significantly
in a short timeframe, as shown by the relatively low dead-weight effect. However, efficiency could
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
be improved to avoid over-paying vessel-owners by applying systems such as a cap per vessel or
bidding systems, at least for industrial fisheries. For some small-scale fisheries a premium higher
than the market price can be justified by the fact that the market price is not high enough to be an
incentive to leave the activity;
•
In the long-run, the least profitable vessels would eventually leave the fishing activity without
support, particularly at times of high fuel costs and reduced fishing opportunities. Therefore, the
long-term efficiency of scrapping measures depends on:
o
The potential environmental cost of not reducing the fleet quickly enough (due to increased
compliance issues for instance as mentioned in section 5.7)
o
The potential increased socio-economic cost due to unprofitability (as vessels would remain
active despite the lack of fishing opportunities for a longer time) and due to the lack of viable
economic alternative to fishing for certain population of on-board vessel-owners.
These two factors are actually related since a difficult socio-economic context tends to increase the risk of
non-compliance issues. The problem is that section 5.7 shows the difficulty of establishing a clear link
between cessation measures on one hand and environmental and socio-economic benefits on the other
hand. In conclusion, available information does not allow us to conclude on the overall efficiency of the
measure in the long-term.
Temporary Cessation measures:
The reduction of fishing activity is clearly related to regulatory restrictions and the dead-weight effect is high
in this case. It is also clear that temporary cessation does not reduce capacity permanently as fishing
resumes after the end of the period covered by the measure. The main advantage of the measure, as
highlighted by the results of the study, is that it contributes to a more stable, less insecure status for the
crew: more fixed contracts versus short-term; they can keep their unemployment benefit entitlements if they
actually lose their job instead of using them during temporary cessations.
Comparison of cessation measures with other instruments:
In terms of the fleet sustainability as a whole: the efficiency is difficult to assess as the net effect of the
measures can hardly be measured and neither the effectiveness nor the cost of other policy tools are
known. However, there are other instruments that could be more efficient in the long-term:
25
•
Regulatory restrictions are more effective to reduce the fishing activity and the only cost is related to
management tools and necessary controls (which could be higher with an over-sized fleet);
•
Market correction (i.e. no intervention) and ITQs would lead to the reduction of the fleet capacity in
the long run without subsidy, but potentially with a short term high socio-economic cost;
•
Investments for a modern, more sustainable fleet (, selective fishing gears, improvements in terms
of security, hygiene and working conditions, investments increasing products added-value so that
market-driven decisions encourage to fish for value more than for volumes, etc.) would probably
have more impact on sustainability in the long term than scrapping vessels. Under the EFF, the
effects of these measures have been undermined partly because of the share of EFF allocated to
scrapping, which was easier to implement (well-known by the sector and the managing authorities
and no need for private co-funding25);
•
Communication towards consumers to encourage sustainable consumption
•
Measures aiming at creating jobs in other areas of the fishing industry (processing, aquaculture,
etc.)
Mid-term evaluation of the EFF, 2011
65
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
7.2 Are the procedures, processes and rules of the cessation measures conducive to
enabling the Commission and Member States to fulfil their respective roles cost
effectively?
To assess the administrative burden of cessation measures, the evaluation team included detailed
questions on the topic both in interviews with management authorities and producer organisations and in
the vessel owner survey. This allows for an examination of the Commission’s interaction with relevant
Member State stakeholders and the processes and procedures at national level as perceived by vessel
owners applying for and benefiting from the scheme. In particular, stakeholders were asked to comment on
the processes and procedures of the permanent and temporary cessation measures in relative terms,
comparing them with other ways of supporting fishermen and achieving environmental objectives such as
reducing fishing effort.
7.2.1
Stakeholder perceptions
Views among Managing Authorities, Producer Organisations and vessel owners were mostly favourable. In
light of the acknowledged need to ensure compliance with the agreed rules for accepting scrapping
funding, the processes and procedures were rarely considered worse than other dealings with authorities or
officialdom. In a few Member States, notably Sweden and Italy, producer organisations felt that the
procedures for accounting for funding were unduly onerous. However, these opinions were exceptions. In
the other Member States under study, stakeholders considered the rules ‘straightforward and simple’, to
use the words of one interviewee, echoed by several of his counterparts.
Vessel owners, not surprisingly, did not express enthusiasm for complying with bureaucratic procedures
and accounting rules. At the same time, opinions were on the whole positive. As shown in the chart below,
on a scale from 1-5, with 1 being very simple and 5 being very complicated, half of vessel owners rated the
processes associated with scrapping funding either 1 or 2. Nearly a third expressed neutral views, while
proportionately few considered these issues complicated or very complicated.
Figure 32 Vessel owner opinions on Permanent cessation application process
Opinions of scrapping processes on scale of 1-5, with 1
being 'very simple' and 5 'very complicated'
Process of receiving and
accounting for funding, n=272
17%
33%
29%
12%9%
1
2
3
Process of applying for
funding, n=272
4
15%
0%
20%
39%
40%
31%
60%
8%7%
5
80% 100%
Criticism of the processes and procedures related principally to delays between submitting applications and
actually receiving scrapping funding. The extent to which survey respondents were critical varied by
Member State and did not seem indicative of bureaucratic efficiency in absolute terms. Indeed, the
evidence indicated that dissatisfaction was higher in those countries, such as Sweden, where expectations
66
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
for administrative procedures are higher than elsewhere. This contrasted with the results in Italy, where
perceptions of the administration of scrapping funding were quite positive.
Opinions of temporary cessation were very similar, if slightly more negative. Just under half of vessel
owners rated the processes and procedures a 1 or 2, around a quarter considered them complicated or
very complicated. As with scrapping funding, upwards of a quarter to a third felt the processes and
procedures were average.
Figure 33 Vessel owner opinions on Temporary cessation application process
Opinions of scrapping processes on scale of 1-5, with 1
being 'very simple' and 5 'very complicated'
Process of receiving and
accounting for funding, n=159
19%
26%
27% 8% 19%
1
2
3
Process of applying for
funding, n=160
4
18%
0%
29%
20%
40%
34%
60%
6%14%
5
80% 100%
Qualitative interviews with managing authorities and producer organisations shed some light as to the
reasons why the administration of temporary cessation funding was less positively received than for
scrapping measures. Evidently, in order to calculate premiums and disburse funding, temporary cessation
often involved intensive coordination with other authorities, notably those dealing with unemployment and
social welfare. This administrative burden on vessel owners, in addition to those responsible for
administrating the funding, and resulted in longer time lags between application and disbursement than was
the case for scrapping. Nonetheless, overall perceptions were reasonably positive given the nature of the
intervention and requisite controls to ensure compliance with the beneficiary conditions.
67
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
8 Coherence
The following section considers the way the permanent and temporary cessation measures complement
other EFF measures and other initiatives (EU and national) towards the achievement of common
objectives.
From a conceptual point of view, modern evaluation approaches distinguish consistency and coherence:
consistency refers to the absence of contradiction between individual policies while coherence is observed
through the presence of synergies (additional effects of mainstreaming the policies).
8.1 To what extent do the cessation measures complement other initiatives at EU and
national levels? Are there any areas of duplication that could be avoided? Could similar
initiatives be expected by the Member States or other actors without EU support?
8.1.1
Methodology and limits
Coherence analyses aim to determine the extent to which the intervention does not contradict (and ideally
acts in synergy with) other interventions having similar objectives.
The main specific objective of permanent cessation measures is the reduction in EU fleet and fishing
capacity. The general objective is to reach a sustainable balance between resources and fishing capacity.
Evidence shows that an indirect effect of permanent cessation measures is the increase of the
competiveness of the remaining fleet, as more technically out-dated vessels exit and quotas are redistributed among the remaining vessels.
Temporary cessation measure aims to compensate fishermen for stopping fishing during limited periods of
time, preventing shifting on other stocks while maintaining (supposed) viable fishing fleets.
Coherence analysis includes internal coherence analysis, which examines the articulation and
complementarities between measures within the EFF, and external coherence, which takes into
consideration other instruments of the CFP and national interventions with similar or contradictory
objectives.
Internal consistency / coherence analysis concerns:
-
The fleet measures themselves, i.e. how and to what extent permanent and temporary
cessations measures were implemented in the aim of maximising their impacts;
-
The consistency/coherence of fleet measures with:
o
The socio-economic compensations for the management of the community fishing fleet
(Article 8 of the Commission Regulation (EC) No 498/2007) 26
o
The support to investment onboard fishing vessels and for selectivity (Article 6).
External coherence takes into consideration the following instruments:
-
26
At EU level :
o
The Entry/exit regime, which ensures from 1 January 2003 the ceiling of EU fleet capacity,
measured in tonnage, and the monitoring of EU fishing fleet through the EU fleet register;
o
The fishing rules, aiming at adjusting fishing opportunities to available resources :
!
Fishing effort limits, which restrict the size of the fleet that sets to sea and the
amount of time it can spend fishing;
!
TACs and Quotas which fix the total quantity of fish that can be caught, overall and
by each Member State, depending on the productivity of the fish stocks;
The Member States may benefit from EFF financing to implement socioeconomic measures designed to help fishermen who are victims of
resource depletion or of the sector’s poor economic situation. Such measures may include training or conversion programmes, the financing of early
retirement, etc.
68
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
-
!
Technical measures, governing how and where fishers may fish - as opposed to
how much they may fish, particularly measures defining closed areas and seasons
!
Multi-annual or long-term plans, introduced by the 2002 reform of the CFP, initially
for stocks which had been depleted to dangerously low levels (‘recovery plans’) and
now being standardised as the method of choice for managing the EU’s major
commercial fish stocks;
o
Common Market Organisation measures, i.e. operational plans from professional
organisations establishing catch objectives in function of market demand and in the way of
limiting resource wastage;
o
Other EU policies: Europe 2020 & the Integrated Maritime Policy.
At national and regional level :
o
National scrapping schemes, funded without FIFG/EFF;
o
Compensations for temporary cessations in fishing (ex: Compensation for partial
unemployment);
o
Temporary cessations implemented by fishermen organisations without any financial
compensation.
8.1.2 Complementarities between cessation measures and other initiatives at EU and national
levels
From a theoretical point of view, all of the measures and instruments within the CFP should be consistent
and should not duplicate and/or produce contradictory effects. However, the way the measures are
implemented in a national or regional context may influence their level of coherence (i.e. synergy in
achieving common objectives). Information from national authorities, industry stakeholders and
beneficiaries allows us to highlight the main areas of coherence and any contradictory effects observed.
Internal coherence:
The national authorities interviewed mentioned the following complementarities between measures of FIFG
and EFF:
•
Scrapping and temporary cessation measures were used in combination in different Member
States (FR, ES, PT) with the aim of both reducing fishing capacity and avoiding the transfer of
fishing effort on other stocks, while maintaining supposed viable fleets;
•
Socio-economic compensations implemented complementarily with scrapping schemes
effectively accompanied early retirement and/or reconversion of crew members (ES, FR),
ensuring a smooth reduction of non sustainable jobs in the fishing sector.
External coherence
From the opinion of stakeholders, the main external complementarities between permanent and temporary
cessation measures and other EU and national instruments concern:
•
TAC and Quota capping and licensing systems. Most of the national authorities see scrapping
as an effective short-term response to quota reduction and more widely to drastic reduction in
fishing opportunities;
•
The entry-exit scheme, in the way it ensures that capacity exited with aid will not come back to
the industry in the short term;
•
Other resource management measures, such as effort and technical measures, which also limit
fishing opportunities.
National authorities and the representatives of the industry did not mention the likeliness of weak
complementarities, or the possible contradiction between the different measures and policies. In particular
the risk of contradiction between permanent cessation measures and the EFF support to investment on
board fishing vessels (likely to increase fishing ability) has not been investigated.
69
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
The following figure presents the logic links (coherent and contradictory) between the different fleet
measures of Axis 1 of EFF 2007-2013 and the specific and general objectives targeted (in orange for TC
and PC).
Figure 34 Logic tree – complementarities of EFF fleet measures with other interventions
EFF'fleet measures
Permanent0cessation0of0fishing
(2)
Sustainable0balance0between0
resources0and0fishing0capacity
(4)
Socio7economic00compensation
Investment0onboard0fishing0
vessels,0selectivity
General''objectives
(outcomes)
Reduction0in0fleet0size
Temporary0cessation0of0fishing
(1)
Fishing rules
Specific''objectives
(results)
(3)
Entry7exit0regime0
Reduction0in0fishing0capacity
Ability0to0respond0to0changing0
conditions
TAC0and0Quota0
Effort0regime0
Adjustment0of0jobs0to0sustainable0
fishing0potential
Technical0measures
Multi7annual0&0long7term0plans0
Increased0competitiveness0and0
maintenance0of0jobs0in0the0
fishing0sector
Adjustment0of0fishing0opportunities
CMO007 PO’s0operational0plans0
Expected effect
effect
contradictoryd effect
Possible0contradictory effect
Some key logic links are:
(1) Permanent and temporary cessation measures have generally been implemented along with reduction in fishing
opportunities;
(2) Scrapping subsidies may have been reinvested in fleet modernisation and act in contradiction with their main
objective by increasing fishing ability
(3) Net effects of entry-exit regime are unclear27,;
(4) Reduction in fleet size contributes to reduction in fishing capacity, but technical progress will increase the
effectiveness of remaining vessels.
One main contradictory effect identified by the European Court of Auditors is the possible increase in
fishing ability of vessels benefiting from EFF support to investment for modernisation, due to the lack of
ring-fencing in the eligibility and selection criteria. The beneficiary survey confirms that a significant part of
scrapping subsidies has been used for financing modernisation: 22% of the respondents declare having
reinvested the premium for the modernisation of another vessel (17% “to a large extent”), 9% of them
mention having benefited from EFF support for investment aboard fishing vessels.28
The coherence of fleet measures has also been weakened by a shift in their focus. The majority of national
authorities and representatives of the fishing sector interviewed recognize that fleet measures have often
more addressed the general lack of economic performance (especially during the 2008-2009 crisis) than
clearly identified overexploitation issues, even though the lack of profitability was partly due to the lack of
resources.
UK management authorities and representatives of the fishing sector identified an initial concern regarding
the potential lack of coherence between permanent cessation measures (where an initial consequence
would be job losses for skippers and crew) and wider EU policies such as Europe 2020, which seeks to
27
ECA issues special report No 12/2011 on whether EU measures contributed to adapting the capacity of EU fishing fleets to
available fishing opportunities
28
It is reported in case studies (Spain, UK) that in a few instances beneficiaries of the PC measure may have reinvested the
subsidy in the acquisition of a new vessel.
70
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
raise the employment rate and the Integrated Maritime Policy seeking ‘growth in the maritime economy and
coastal regions’. However, the social impact of permanent cessation measures (through accompanying
early retirement and/or reconversion outside the fishing sector) is partly addressed by socio-economic
compensation (EFF measure 1.5) and the overall objective is for a sustainable fisheries sector, which
supposes the disappearance of unsustainable jobs and the development of alternative activities in the
fishery dependent areas.
External coherence of fleet measures increased when implemented in the framework of specific fisheries
management programmes. For example, in England the decommissioning scheme was part of a wider
focus on inshore fisheries reform under the Sustainable Access to Inshore Fisheries programme. In this
regard the schemes were not implemented in isolation and so had some complementarity with these wider
initiatives.
Most of the stakeholders interviewed consider that coherence between instruments aiming to ensure a
sustainable balance between resources and fishing fleet capacity are likely to be reinforced in the future
with the adoption of multiannual plans and the ecosystem approach to fisheries (at sea basin or fishery
level). One weakness of the current approach is that the coherence between national/regional strategies
regarding fishing fleet capacity is not ensured. This is broadly considered as a key issue for the
management of mixed/shared fisheries and for polyvalent fleets exploiting shared resources.
In conclusion, EFF cessation measures are not fully coherent. The main reason for this is that the use of
permanent cessation to support modernisation, and both permanent and temporary cessation measures to
address economic issues, can contradict the objectives related to balancing the capacity of the fishing fleet
with available resources.
Complementarily of permanent and temporary cessation measures with fishing rules is judged to be
satisfied by most of the stakeholders interviewed, with fleet measures creating a reduction in the size of the
active fleets when confronted with a drastic reduction in fishing opportunities.
8.1.3
Level of overlap between cessation measures and other initiatives at EU and national levels
The survey identified very few policy instruments likely to overlap with cessation measures and other
national instruments, firstly because FIFG and EFF measures were considered adequate and rather easy
to implement (null or low national co-funding), so that national authorities did not need to develop
complementary initiatives.
Concerning permanent cessation measures, the following national initiatives (and not EU funded initiatives)
have been identified:
•
In Estonia, one scrapping round of the three implemented in the country during the FIFG
programme, was funded from a national budget because all FIFG funds had been spent;
•
In France, a national scheme is currently being implemented for permanent cessation of inland
fishermen targeting glass-eel. This scheme has been launched because inland fishermen are
not eligible for the EFF since their boats are not registered in the EU fleet register.
These two cases illustrate complementarities rather than overlaps. Double-funding is unlikely to have
occurred, considering that national schemes were notified to the Commission.
Concerning temporary cessation schemes, risks of overlaps with national instruments concern:
•
Articulation with national social security systems. In France and Spain, which have made an
extensive use of temporary cessation measure, rules concerning aids for partial unemployment
in fishing are different. In France, fishermen are ineligible for general aids for partial
unemployment, while they are eligible in Spain. Spanish fishermen could thus choose between
FIFG/EFF support and the national aid for partial unemployment.
•
Articulation with national initiatives. In Andalucia, an additional support under de minimis
national aid was implemented in 2007 and 2008.
In all the cases identified, national and regional authorities mentioned have taken precautions to avoid
overlaps and double funding.
71
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Concerning other initiatives at national level, the case studies and the beneficiary survey identified two nonsubsidized actions complementing PC and TC measures:
•
In Sweden and Spain, EFF cessation measures complemented ITQ systems for the adjustment of
some fisheries (large-scale fleets). In these MS, where both ITQ and scrapping schemes have been
implemented, the actors consider that the two types of scheme are not perfect substitutes, and can
be conceptualised as complementary. In this sense, the scrapping schemes were implemented first
and allowed the authorities to quickly remove a substantial proportion of vessels while avoiding
detrimental economic and social impacts that may have been incurred had other means been used.
ITQs allow the concentration of fishing rights, and progressively of the fishing fleet, in the long term.
In Denmark the capacity of the large-scale fleet has been mostly reduced by ITQ system. The
permanent cessation measure under the EFF was only implemented during the crisis (fuel package)
to address economic issues rather than resource issues.
•
In Spain, Portugal and France, private initiatives of temporary cessation are mentioned by
stakeholders and some respondents to the survey (e.g. through strategic decisions of PO,
Cofradias, Prud’hommies or cooperative/association), mostly for biological pause or for market
supply issues (limiting landings when the demand is low).
8.1.4
Summary
Internal coherence of EFF 2007-2013 fleet measures (Axis 1) has been weakened by a focus on fleet size,
rather than fishing capacity (ability) and by their use to address both economic and capacity issues.
The beneficiary survey shows that a significant part of the scrapping subsidies have been invested for the
modernisation of other fishing vessels. Contradictory effects from support to modernisation of remaining
fishing vessels were not prevented by eligibility criteria.
A permanent cessation measure is often complemented by the socio-economic compensation to address
social consequences of the job losses (unsustainable jobs) due to the reduction in fleet size.
External coherence mostly concerns the consistence and synergies with fishing rules and other policies
aiming to adjust fishing opportunities to the level of resource. The quota and effort restrictions applied in
recent years mean that most vessels have been unable to fish to their full potential fishing capacity. These
restrictions have been more significant and effective at reducing fishing effort than the cessation schemes
implemented and so cessation could be viewed as representing duplication. The cessation schemes do,
however, make the reduction in fleet size and employment in the fishing sector more acceptable to the
industry and allowed a quicker reduction in the fleet size than other systems would have achieved.
No overlaps between permanent cessation measure and comparable national initiatives, likely to weaken
the effects (competition, double funding) of the measures have been identified in the 9 case studies. In
Sweden and Spain, where scrapping and ITQ schemes were implemented, the two instruments are
considered as having acted complementarily for the adjustment of large-scale fleets.
Coherence increased in time with the change in the fleet size management strategy, i.e. moving from a
global approach of capacity (in terms of kW and GT whatever the segment and the fisheries) under MultiAnnual Guidance Programmes (MAGPs)29 to a more targeted approach in the EFF with the obligation for
MS to establish strategic plans and FEAPs.
The best synergies have been obtained when scrapping and temporary cessation schemes have been
implemented in the framework of specific fisheries management programmes that consider the
complementarity of permanent and temporary cessation (reducing/suppressing overcapacities and avoiding
shifting in fishing effort during closure periods) with other policy tools for fisheries management.
29
Multi Annual Guidance Programmes (MAGPs) were implemented until December 2002 (introduction of the entryexit regime). Each MAGP fixed global reduction objectives reference level) for a given period (MAGP III: 1992-1996;
MAGP IV: 1997-2002). The total capacity of the fleet of each MS, expressed in terms of either tonnage or power, may
not exceed these reference levels.
72
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
9 Acceptability
The following section considers the acceptability of the cessation measures to stakeholders. The
Guidelines for Evaluation of EU activities (EC, 2004) defines acceptability as: “the extent to which
stakeholders accept the policy in general and the particular instrument proposed or employed.”
9.1 What are managing authorities’ views of the current system for cessation measures in
relation to other potential ways to reduce fishing capacity?
Managing authorities’ views on cessation measures can be classified into essentially three groups. The first
group, which included the UK and Denmark, expressed the view that scrapping schemes are an ineffective
way of aligning fleet capacity with available resources in addition to representing poor value for money.
These Member States have largely eschewed scrapping in favour of market-based approaches.
A second group, which included the bulk of Member States under review, considered scrapping as one
among several ways of reducing capacity. This group, which included Sweden, France, Portugal, Estonia
and Poland, tended to view scrapping as a potentially effective method for reducing fleet capacity quickly in
a politically palatable fashion. After large, initial restructurings, however, managing authorities in these
Member States favoured market-based approaches such is ITQs, to manage fleet capacity in the longer
term.
A final group of Member States, limited to Italy and Spain considered scrapping measures as the main way
of reducing fleet capacity, both in the short term and going forward. Spain has implemented ITQs only in a
limited way so far and Italy has not experimented much with other methods (as pointed out in this report,
market-based approaches are difficult to implement and control given the lack of quota systems and
accurate data for the Mediterranean) and pointed out that, especially for small-scale fisheries, scrapping
schemes were much more politically acceptable than other methods for reducing capacity.
In addition to this, the implications of scrapping for the public purse should also be considered. As EFF
requires match funding, cessation has significant implications for the public purse and the substantial funds
allocated to cessation could have been applied to other measures. For Member States in the first two
groups identified above, the opportunity costs of continued scrapping, despite the possibility of part-funding
by the EU, are considerable, thereby contributing to their reluctance to continue scrapping schemes in the
future.
9.2 To what extent do vessel owners rely on the current level of funding for cessation
measures and are there other interventions that could fulfil a similar role?
Answers to this question in the Member States under study varied along essentially the same lines as
question 13 above. For a small number of Member States, scrapping and temporary cessation measures
are not considered effective by the Managing Authorities, while vessel owners are no longer reliant on
these measures. Denmark and the UK fall into this category.
In the majority of Member States, scrapping and (to a lesser extent, temporary cessation) was considered
as an effective, if often inefficient, tool for managing necessary restructuring in a quick and socially
acceptable way. Since these initial re-alignments of the sector are largely complete, the extent of scrapping
and temporary cessation has been largely curtailed. This reduces the need for future scrapping and, in turn,
the reliance of existing vessel owners on scrapping funding, expectations for which have much diminished.
The third group, consisting of countries such as Italy and Spain, continues to use both scrapping and
temporary cessation to a large extent. Expectations among vessel owners are thus for continued cessation
measures, and reliance on them is commensurately high. Moreover, in these Member States the managing
authorities were unable to suggest other measures that might substitute for scrapping aid.
73
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
10 Evaluation Summary
10.1
Evaluation approach
This retrospective evaluation has involved analysis of data, reporting, interviews and a
vessel owner survey in nine Member State case studies: Denmark, Estonia, France, Italy,
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
The nine case studies account for nearly 90% of spend and 60% of vessels removed under
the EFF permanent cessation measure. Temporary cessation was implemented in all but 3
case studies (Denmark, Estonia and the UK).
Counterfactual evaluation elements were included via the vessel-owner survey by comparing
scheme beneficiaries to a comparison group of non-beneficiaries, including rejected
applicants.
10.2
Relevance
During the EFF programme, the capacity of the European fleet has continued to decrease,
leading some MS (10 out of 22 according to the latest fleet report) to claim that fleet capacity
is now broadly in balance with resources, although some admit that issues remain in certain
fisheries.
The potential for ITQs to remove fleet capacity (at a much lower cost to the state compared
to decommissioning) has convinced Denmark and other Member States (UK, Sweden and
Estonia) that permanent cessation should not be the primary tool for rebalancing capacity
with resources.
Those MS who have chosen not to implement them have highlighted that ITQs would be
difficult to manage for small-scale polyvalent fisheries and would accelerate concentration,
potentially leading to a loss of jobs in the sector.
Applying no public intervention may take too long to achieve conservation objectives, as a
vessel is a long-term investment leading vessel owners to retain unprofitable vessels in the
short term. This also poses the significant risk, particularly in mixed fisheries, that biological
resources will continue to be overfished after that fishery is not economically viable, which
can have dire consequences for the resource and severe economic and social impacts.
Unless permanent cessation measures are applied in a highly targeted manner, which is not
anticipated by vessel owners, they can be counter-productive. Many FEAPs were not
sufficiently targeted and could be anticipated by vessel owners and so scrapping monies
become additional revenue that is factored into investment decisions resulting in a fleet that
continues to be over-capitalised (with no significant reduction in fishing capacity).
10.3
Effectiveness
Between 2000 and 2011, the EU fishing fleet showed a continuous decrease in terms of the
number of vessels (-25 %) and GT (-24%).
The pace of scrapping slowed under the EFF 2007-2013 programming period compared to
the FIFG (2000-2006). About 1,600 vessels /year and 50,000 GT/year were scrapped under
74
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
FIFG, compared to around 800 vessels/year and 35,000 GT/year under the EFF programme
to date.
The contribution of EFF permanent cessation measures to overall fleet exits is greater than it
was under the FIFG, this is particularly obvious when looking at the evolution in GT, which
indicates that most vessels scrapped without EFF funding are small vessels. The EFF
contributed to about 78% of the fleet capacity scrapped (in GT) in the 9 case study MS,
against about 50% for FIFG 2000-2006.
The evolution of fishing fleet capacity between 2000 and 2012 (second FIFG programme
and EFF) is different depending on the MS: the largest reductions (> 30% of fleet capacity
removed) are observed in the North Sea and Baltic areas (BE, NL, DK, SW, LV, EE). Trends
are similar (-24% to -30% in GT terms) in the large fishing fleets (ES, ITA, FR, UK).
The decrease in fleet capacity mainly comes from the trawler segments (75% of exited GT).
The number of vessels scrapped without support decreased steadily from 2005 to 2010,
following the end of the construction measure and remains fairly stable after 2010.
The implementation of the permanent cessation measure under the EFF was affected in
2008-2009 by the sector crisis (high fuel costs and low fish price) and the global financial
crisis, with the consequence that the capacity scrapped during the two years was over
40 000 GT/year and EFF support was highest (more than 80% of the vessels scrapped
benefited of public aid).
According to the vessel-owner survey, only 11% of the capacity removed under the EFF
(78% of total capacity scrapped) would have been scrapped without the subsidy, at the
same time, and another 5% would probably have been scrapped under the EFF, taking into
account those who would have continued fishing for less than five years. Applying this to
overall fleet reductions, it can be estimated that the net contribution of the EFF to the fleet
capacity reduction is about 66%.
The argument that the productivity of EU fishing fleet increases faster than the decrease of
fleet capacity is partly contradicted by analysis of catches v fleet capacity. From 2001 to
2011, the total catch of EU fishing fleet decreased faster than the fleet number and the fleet
capacity, because of reductions in fishing opportunities (overexploitation of most of the fish
stocks and conservation measures restricting the access to fisheries). The catch reduction
was particularly important in Denmark, Spain and France.
Fisheries showing a clear reduction in fishing mortality to sustainable levels have involved
extensive quota and effort reductions. The impact of scrapping within this mix of
interventions is not evident and a clear link between fleet capacity and resource status is
unclear. The scrapping of vessels targeting fisheries with quota results in a redistribution of
that quota between the remaining vessels.
The stock status and fishing mortality is unknown in many Mediterranean fisheries, and so
there is no evidence of an impact of cessation schemes on resources.
Several MS administrations recognise the lack of a clear link between fleet capacity and
resource status and an inability to measure the impact of permanent cessation measures.
Some have, however, implemented scrapping schemes to:
75
•
Support broader
compliance);
fishery
recovery
measures
(including
through
•
Attempt to improve the economic efficiency of the fleet (Scotland);
•
Target the removal of fuel inefficient vessels (Denmark); and
•
Modernise the fleet (Estonia)
facilitating
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
The contribution of cessation schemes to the first objectives is difficult to distinguish against
other management interventions and variables. The achievements of the last three targeted
objectives do not necessarily achieve a rebalancing of fleet with resources, which is the
primary objective of cessation schemes funded under EFF.
Scrapping funding has had a discernible impact on modernisation, mainly by slowing down
the underlying trend of increasing average vessel age, with the exception of Estonia, where
scrapping was used to restructure an entire segment of the fleet.
Vessel owners with more than one boat often used scrapping funding to modernise (parts of)
their remaining vessel(s). However, the vast majority of scrapping beneficiaries (75%) only
had one vessel and thus could not invest in this way.
Given the fact that temporary cessation measures have been put in place when fishing
activity has been stopped, funding for temporary cessation has been more useful in
rendering the measures politically acceptable than in actually reducing fishing. This is
especially the case in Italy, where temporary cessation subsides have become entrenched
and incorporated into yearly payments to cover vessel owners’ fixed costs during periods
where they would be inactive anyway or fishing with other gear. In no country under study
did the case study conclude that the measures had been effective at curtailing fishing effort
in relation to the counterfactual. Though findings were anecdotal and thus difficult to
quantify, the case studies showed that temporary cessation measures had positive impacts
– at least in the short term – for jobs in Poland, Sweden, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
10.4
Efficiency
Differences in the overall amount of public cost per vessel largely depend on the structure of
the fleet targeted by adjustment plans. Public funds spent per vessel tend to be lower in MS
where smaller vessels were scrapped whereas the public funds spent per GT tend to be
lower where MS where larger vessels were scrapped.
The size of vessels scrapped alone does not explain all the differences. The UK and Estonia
for instance show the lowest public cost per vessel and per GT. In both cases, they have
implemented bidding systems rather than applying a pre-determined premium. By contrast
stakeholders report that the premium in Poland and Sweden was too high and the same
results could have been achieved at lower cost.
Overall, permanent cessation measures can be considered efficient in reducing the fleet
capacity (or a specific fleet segment) significantly in a short timeframe, as shown by the
relatively low dead-weight effect. However, efficiency could be improved in some MS to
avoid over-paying vessel-owners by applying systems such as a cap per vessel or bidding
systems, at least for industrial fisheries.
The immediate reduction in fishing activity however is more related to regulatory restrictions
than to the reduction of the fleet size, although, in the short-run, if the necessary reduction of
activity is significant, a simultaneous reduction in fleet capacity is likely to improve
compliance.
In terms of fleet sustainability as a whole, the efficiency is difficult to assess as the net effect
of the measures is not measurable. However, other instruments may be more efficient (e.g.
regulatory restrictions, ITQs.) when they can be implemented.
76
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
10.5
Coherence
Permanent cessation measures are coherent with and complemented by measures within
the EFF to address the socio-economic consequences of the job losses (unsustainable jobs)
due to the reduction in fleet size.
Coherence has increased in time with the change in the fleet capacity management under
MAGPs to a more targeted approach in the EFF with the obligation for MS to establish
strategic plans and FEAPs. However, the internal coherence of permanent cessation
measures continues to be weakened by a focus on fleet size, rather than fishing capacity
(ability) and by their use to address both economic issues and capacity issues.
The best synergies have been obtained when scrapping and temporary cessation schemes
have been implemented in the framework of specific fisheries management programmes.
Overall permanent cessation measures are not fully coherent as contradictory effects from
support to modernisation of remaining fishing vessels were not prevented by eligibility
criteria.
10.6
Acceptability
Other interventions such as transferable rights or market interventions have been shown to
be more effective than permanent cessation measures. However for many in the fishing
industry, these alternative measures are less acceptable than cessation measures.
For some government agencies the acceptability of cessation measures is less obvious.
Some are against the funding of cessation, accepting the evidence base suggesting that
cessation is ineffective and can absorb substantial public funds.
As EFF requires match funding, cessation can have significant implications for the national
public purse. At a time of recession in many Member States, a high level of public spend on
measures to achieve short-term objectives is likely to be questioned.
77
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
11 Conclusions
11.1 To what extent have EU-funded measures in permanent cessation
helped to adapt fishing capacity to available resources?
11.1.1 Was the measure needed to adapt fishing capacity to available resources?
At the time of EFF implementation (2008 onwards), extensive fleet restructuring had already
occurred, but the level of fishing capacity in the fleet remained an issue and a targeted
approach was required to adapt fishing capacity to available resources.
Leaving this adaptation to the market (i.e. no public intervention) would take too long to
achieve conservation objectives: a vessel is a long-term investment and so vessel owners
are found to retain unprofitable vessels in the short term. Market correction also poses the
significant risk, particularly in mixed fisheries, that biological resources will continue to be
overfished after that fishery is not economically viable, which can have dire consequences
for the resource and severe economic and social impacts.
Intervention of some form was therefore needed to adjust fishing capacity to available
resources. One approach to adjusting fishing capacity was to reduce fleet capacity and link
this more closely to the resource by funding permanent cessation within Fishing Effort
Adjustment Plans (FEAPs). Other approaches included different policy instruments, such as
quota and effort management.
MS managing authorities and industry organisations consider that permanent cessation
measures were needed to adapt fishing capacity to available resources. They argue that no
other instrument would have allowed to reduce the fleet to such an extent in a fairly short
time frame (30% of the fleet in the EU 15 since 2000 and up to 39% in Spain) without
dramatic socio-economic consequences.
The introduction of Individual Transferrable Quotas (ITQs) can result in reductions in fleet
capacity over a similar timescale and at a much lower cost to the state compared to funding
permanent cessation. This has convinced Denmark and other Member States (UK, Sweden
and Estonia) that permanent cessation should not be the primary tool for rebalancing
capacity with resources, although these MS have still applied permanent cessation funds to
improve fleet efficiency.
Those MS that have chosen not to implement ITQs have highlighted that they would be
difficult to introduce for small-scale polyvalent fisheries and would accelerate the
concentration of fishing rights, potentially leading to a loss of jobs in the sector.
Therefore permanent cessation measures were needed in specific situations when ITQs
were not implemented and the resource state required rapid adaptation (within a year or
two).
11.1.2 To what extent was it effective and efficient?
Permanent cessation funding under the EFF contributed to about 78% of the fleet capacity
reduction (in GT) in the 9 case study MS. According to the vessel-owner survey, only 11% of
this 78% would have been scrapped without the subsidy, at the same time, and another 5%
may have been scrapped under the EFF, taking into account those who said they would
have continued fishing for less than five years. Applying this to overall fleet reductions, it can
be estimated that the net contribution of the EFF to the fleet capacity reduction is about 66%.
78
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Without permanent cessation measures, 45% of beneficiaries would have sold their vessel,
meaning they would have reduced or stopped fishing, but the vessel capacity would have
remained available within the fleet. The assumption that they would have left fishing is
supported by the fact that beneficiaries tend to be older (58 years-old on average compared
to 52 years old) and less profitable (41% with a negative profit in their last year of activity
compared to 25%) than non-beneficiaries.
The evaluation concludes that permanent cessation measures under the EFF were effective
in permanently removing fleet capacity in a short timeframe (less than 5 years).
However, a reduction in fleet capacity is only one factor contributing to the reduction of
catches, other main factors being the reduction in market opportunities, and more
importantly the reduction in fishing opportunities, mainly through regulatory restrictions such
as quotas. The impact of scrapping within this mix of interventions is not evident and so
there is no clear link between fleet capacity and resource status. The removal of vessels
from fisheries under quota just results in a redistribution of quota between the remaining
vessels. However permanent cessation does remove the risk of vessels moving to fisheries
with less regulatory restrictions as they are permanently removed from the fleet.
Several MS administrations recognise the lack of a clear link between fleet capacity and
resource status as well as an inability to measure the impact of cessation measures. Despite
this, these MS administrations continued with permanent cessation schemes to make other
fishery recovery measures more acceptable (and so facilitating compliance) and to improve
the economic efficiency of the fleet.
In terms of efficiency, ITQs have been found to be effective at encouraging fleet reduction in
a similar short time frame and at a lower public cost. Therefore permanent cessation can
only be considered more efficient in circumstances where ITQs implementation could be
problematic (e.g., small-scale polyvalent fisheries, risks of concentration at a high social
cost) and where no public intervention would take too long.
11.2 To what extents have EU-funded measures in temporary cessation
helped to maintain activity and jobs in periods where activity was
interrupted for reasons beyond the control of fishermen?
Temporary cessation schemes were implemented in six of the nine case studies. According
to the vessel-owner survey, for 82% of beneficiaries funding was awarded due a compulsory
stop to fishing activity. The survey also showed that most targeted fleet segments were in a
poor economic situation: 45% of beneficiaries were loss-making in their last year of activity
and 28% just broke even.
Achievements in terms of jobs maintenance were anecdotal and thus difficult to quantify.
The case studies in Poland, Sweden, Italy, Portugal and Spain suggested that temporary
cessation measures did maintain jobs at least in the short term. However, Swedish
Managing Authorities felt that temporary cessation funding simply shielded vessel owners
from shifting market conditions that might reduce employment in the medium to long-term,
even though it was maintained in the short term. Portuguese managing authorities were
more positive, claiming temporary cessation had helped maintain jobs, which was
corroborated by the survey where three out of five vessel owners stated that they would
have relied on more short-term contracts for crew or scrapped or sold their vessels without
the funding. In Spain, the evaluation determined that temporary cessation reduced
unemployment in the fishing industry by between 0.2 and 2%.
Answers to the counterfactual question (what would you have done without support?) are
difficult to interpret as 33% of beneficiaries said they would not have accepted temporary
cessation, although it was mandatory for most. Only 16% said they would have scrapped or
79
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
sold their vessel or laid off some crew, and of those, close to half (45%) are not in activity
anymore.
The results show that temporary cessation measures do have some positive impact, on jobs
maintenance in the short term, but the main impact might be to increase acceptability of
regulatory restrictions.
11.3 To what extent would measure equivalent to permanent and temporary
cessation have been developed without EU support?
There are no instances of nationally funded permanent cessation schemes in the nine case
studies; all received some level of EU financial support. Managing authorities in Denmark
had determined not to implement further permanent cessation schemes until the economic
crisis created the driver to remove fuel inefficient vessels from the fleet by using much higher
levels of EU financial support. These findings suggest permanent cessation schemes would
not have developed to the same extent without some level of EU support.
Italy provides the only example within the nine case studies of nationally-funded temporary
cessation schemes, where seasonal closures have been used as a management tool since
1988. Italy uses the maximum permitted level of EU funding for temporary cessation.
National funding alone has been used for some schemes, but this could be viewed as part of
a wider strategy of regular Fermio Biologico fishery closures, which do benefit from EU
support. Without EU support the duration and extent of closures are likely to be substantially
reduced.
Temporary cessations are also implemented voluntarily without EU funding, but the support
mainly contributes to better acceptability by the sector and therefore better compliance,
especially in times of economic crisis.
11.4 What have been the socio-economic impacts of both types of measures
on coastal economies?
The overall impact of cessation measures on coastal economies is difficult to measure as
this largely depends on the area’s dependence on the fisheries sector. The vessel-owner
survey shows that the vessels removed were generally the less efficient and less profitable
so the average profitability of the sector may be expected to improve as a result. However
only 12% of beneficiaries and only 2% of non-beneficiaries surveyed felt that an
improvement in financial performance was a result of scrapping schemes. The strongest
influences on profitability are fuel price, fishing opportunities and fish price.
In the short-term, a reduction in fleet size certainly implies job losses, but those would be
expected to occur over a longer period without permanent or temporary cessation funding.
Temporary cessation measures had a small positive impact on job maintenance in the shortterm, but it also contributed to more stable contracts for the crew.
Beneficiaries used permanent cessation funds primarily to pay off their debts (43%) and to
retire (37%), often both at the same time. This tends to confirm opinions from the case
studies that the measure sometimes provided an economically viable way-out to some
vessel-owners seeking retirement, especially in the case of owner-operators in small-scale
coastal fisheries. A minority of beneficiaries used the money to invest in other aspects of the
fisheries sector (22%).
80
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
11.5
Recommendations for the future use of cessation measures
The efficiency of cessation measures in the long-term is questionable and there is
agreement amongst most member states that overcapacity has been addressed in many
fleets. Therefore, any future re-introduction of EU funding of cessation measures should be
limited and highly targeted.
A cap on EU funds to be spent on permanent cessation measures would encourage MS to
focus cessation measures where it is most needed and increase efficiency in terms of
spending per vessel or per GT scrapped, while leaving them enough flexibility to take into
consideration their different needs (type of the fleet, stocks status, industry organisation,
etc.).
A cap on EU funds to be spent on temporary cessation measures should be accompanied
by greater efforts to ensure that funding is used for the intended purposes of maintaining
jobs during unforeseen fishery closure events rather than regular, anticipated payments.
Cessation measures should only be used in conjunction with other measures to recover
fisheries to sustainable levels. This would ensure cessation measures are justified in relation
to resource management objectives and are explicitly linked to fishery target reference
points such as reductions in fishing mortality, not just fleet capacity reduction targets.
Although cessation measures may not reduce fishing effort in comparison to other
measures, they can make the reduction more politically and socially acceptable.
Linking cessation measures to fishery recovery will also ensure that there are incentives to
consider potential measures, such as transferable rights, that are shown to be more effective
over the long-term and less costly for the public purse.
Cessation schemes with a competitive bidding process have shown they could improve
efficiency by ensuring appropriate premiums are set and this can be considered as good
practice. However, care should be taken to ensure this does not result in overly complex
application procedures that may be a disincentive particularly for small-scale operators.
Competitive bidding could be linked to weighting selection criteria in line with the objectives
of EU and national policy. For example, if a scheme has a specific fishery recovery objective,
selection criteria should favour those vessels catching most in the fishery. This would ensure
that scrapping funding is allocated in such a way as to contribute to sustainability and work
towards higher-level policy objectives.
81
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
12 References
Clark et al (2005) Subsidies, buybacks, and sustainable fisheries. J. Environ. Econ. Manage.
50, 47-58. Clark, C.W., Munro, G.R., Sumaila, U.R., 2005.
EC (2013) Report From The Commission To The European Parliament And The Council on
Member States' efforts during 2011 to achieve a sustainable balance between fishing
capacity and fishing opportunities Brussels, 18.2.2013 COM(2013) 85 final
EC (2011) Commission Impact Assessment on the EMFF, SEC (2011) 1416 2 December
2011; Commission Impact Assessment on the reform of the CFP, SEC (2011) 891 13 July
2011).
EC (2009) Green Paper on the reform of the common fisheries policy (COM(2009) 163 final
of 22 April 2009).
EC (2012) Concerning a consultation on Fishing Opportunities for 2013 COMMUNICATION
FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL COM(2012) 278 final
ECA (2011) Special Report No 12/2011 – Have EU measures contributed to adapting the
capacity of the fishing fleets to available fishing opportunities? European Court of Auditors,
2011
FAO (2003). The role and effect of subsidies on
http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/003/U1990E/U1990E02.htm
fisheries
in
West
Africa.
GFCM (2012) REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON STOCK ASSESSMENT OF
DEMERSAL SPECIES Chania, (Crete) Greece, 24-29 October 2011
ICCAT (2012) Atlantic Blue Fin Tuna ICCAT REPORT 2012-2013 (I)
ICES (2012a) North Sea Cod in Division IIIa East (Kattegat). Stock Advice June 2012
ICES (2012b) Sole in Subarea IV (North Sea) Advice June 2012
ICES (2013a) Cod in subarea IV and divisions VIID and IIIa West (Skagerrak) Advice June
2013
ICES (2013b) Cod in Subdivisions 25-32 Eastern Baltic Sea, Advice May 2013
ICES (2013c) Cod in Subdivisions 22-24 Western Baltic Sea, Advice May 2013
ICES (2013d) Herring in Division IIIa and Subdivisions 22–24 (western Baltic spring
spawners) Advice May 2013
ICES (2013e) Nephrops in Subareas IIIa and IV ICES WGNSSK REPORT Section 03
ICES (2013f) Cod in Divisions VIIe–k (Celtic Sea cod) Advice June 2013
ICES (2013g) Cod in Division Via (West of Scotland) Advice June 2013
ICES (2013h) Anchovy in Subarea VIII (Bay of Biscay) Advice July 2013
ICES (2013i) Sole in Division VIIe (Western Channel) Advice June 2013
ICES (2013j) Haddock in Subarea IV (North Sea) and Division IIIa West (Skagerrak) Advice
June 2013
ICES (2013k) Haddock in Division Via (West of Scotland ) Advice June 2013
ICES (2013l) Nephrops in Division VIIIc (North Galicia and Cantabrian Sea, FUs 25 and 31)
ICE (2013m) Black scabbardfish (Aphanopus carbo) in the Northeast Atlantic Advice June
2013
82
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
ICES (2013n) Hake in Divisions VIIIc and IXa (Southern stock)
ICES (2013o) EU request to ICES to technically evaluate the Eel Management Plan
progress. Advice June 2013
IEO (2012) Marine Strategy Good Environmental Status Descriptor 3: Commercially
Exploited Marine Species. Instituto Español de Oceanografía and Asistencia Técnica
TRAGSATEC S.A.
Milazzo (1998) M.J. Milazzo, Subsidies in World Fisheries: A Re-examination, World Bank
Technical Paper, No. 406, Fisheries Series, Washington, 1998
MRAG et al (2009) An analysis of existing Rights Based Management (RBM) instruments in
Member States and on setting up best practices in the EU. MRAG, IFM, CEFAS, AZTI
Tecnalia & PolEM
NAFO (2010) An Assessment of Greenland Halibut (Reinhardtius hippoglossoides) in NAFO
Subarea 2 and Divisions 3KLMNO by B.P. Healey1 , J.-C. Mahé 2 and M.J. Morgan,
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Center.
NIPAG (2012) NAFO/ICES Pandalus Assessment Group Meeting, 17–24 October 2012
Institute of Marine Research Tromsø, Norway
OECD (2009) Reducing fishing Capacity Best practices for Decommissioning schemes.
OECD 2009
Pomeroy (2004) Rights-based Fisheries Management. Dr. Robert Pomeroy, Connecticut
Sea Grant Extension, Department of Agriculture and Resource Economics, University of
Connecticut.
Sumaila and Pauly (2006) Catching More Bait: A Bottom-Up Re-Estimation Of Global
Fisheries Subsidies edited by Ussif Rashid Sumaila and Daniel Pauly. Fisheries Centre
Research Reports 14(6) 2006
Valdimarrsson (2011) Rights-based fisheries management: opportunities and challenges for
addressing IUU fishing. 6th International Forum on IUU Fishing: Chatham House, London
13-14 January 2011
83
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Appendix 1 Evaluation questions matrix
Nº
Evaluation
criterion
1
Relevance
2
3
84
Effectiveness
Evaluation Question
Judgment criteria
Indicators
Data sources
Are measures other
than EU-funded
cessation measures
(e.g. the market,
transferable quotas)
capable of addressing
fishing capacity in the
European fishing fleet?
If not, to what extent are
they insufficient and
why?
To what extent are the
objectives of permanent
and temporary cessation
measures appropriate to
address capacity in the
European fishing fleet?
To what extent have
permanent cessation
measures contributed to
a reduction in the size of
the European fishing
fleet?
Extent to which existing
measures address fishing
capacity in the European
fishing fleet
Relationship between fleet
capacity changes and changes
in Fmsy
- ICES, STECF
- Interviews with managing
authorities
- Interviews with producer
organisations
- Survey of vessel owners
Extent to which managing
authorities, producer
organisations and vessel
owners find cessation
measures appropriate for
reducing fishing capacity
Extent to which permanent
cessation measures have
contributed to a reduction in
the size of the European
fishing fleet
Level of agreement of managing
authorities, producer
organisations and vessel
owners that cessation measures
are an appropriate way to
reduce fishing capacity
- Difference in number of fishing
vessels before and after
implementation of permanent
cessation measures, taking
prevailing trends into account
- Difference in fleet capacity
before and after implementation
of permanent cessation
measures, taking prevailing
trends into account
- Difference in licence
allowances before and after
implementation of permanent
- Interviews with managing
authorities
- Interviews with producer
organisations
- Survey of vessel owners
- National action plans
- Annual operational
programmes
- MS annual implementation
reports
- STECF, ICES, DG MARE
reports
- Interviews with managing
authorities
- Interviews with producer
organisations
- Survey of vessel owners
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
4
cessation measures, taking
prevailing trends into account
- Difference in behaviour
between comparable vessels
benefiting and not benefiting
from permanent cessation
measures
- Difference before and after
implementation of permanent
cessation measures in
European fleet capacity, taking
prevailing trends into account
- Difference before and after
implementation of permanent
cessation measures in Catch
per unit effort, taking prevailing
trends into account
To what extent have
permanent cessation
measures led to a
sustained reduction in
European fishing
capacity (the overall
catching capacity of the
fleet)?
Extent to which permanent
cessation measures have
contributed to a reduction in
European fishing capacity
To what extent have
permanent cessation
measures contributed to
the modernisation of the
European fishing fleet?
Extent to which permanent
cessation measures
contributed to
modernisation in the
European fishing fleet
- Difference before and after
implementation of permanent
cessation measures in age of
vessels, taking prevailing trends
into account.
To what extent have
temporary cessation
measures led to
temporary drops in
fishing activity?
Extent to which temporary
cessation measures have
led to temporary drops in
fishing activity
- Number of vessel days at sea
prevented by temporary
cessation measures
- Difference in behaviour
between comparable vessels
benefiting and not benefiting
5
6
85
- National action plans
- Annual operational
programmes
- MS annual implementation
reports
- ICES reports
- Interviews with managing
authorities
- Interviews with producer
organisations
- Survey of vessel owners
- National action plans
- Annual operational
programmes
- MS annual implementation
reports
- EC fleet register
- Interviews with managing
authorities
- Interviews with producer
organisations
- Survey of vessel owners
- National action plans
- Annual operational
programmes
- MS annual implementation
reports
- STECF, ICES, DG MARE
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
from temporary cessation
measures
7
To what extent have
temporary cessation
measures assisted
vessel owners to adapt
to emergencies and
other shifting
conditions?
Extent to which temporary
cessation measures have
contributed to the ability of
vessel owners to adapt to
emergencies and other
shifting conditions
To what extent have
temporary cessation
measures contributed to
the maintenance of jobs
in the fishing sector?
Extent to which temporary
cessation measures have
contributed to the
maintenance of jobs in the
fishing sector
Have the effects of
permanent and (to a
lesser extent) temporary
Extent to which permanent
cessation measures have
contributed to alignment
8
9
86
- Level of agreement among
managing authorities, producer
organisations and vessel
owners that temporary cessation
measures contributed to vessel
owners’ adaptive ability in
emergencies and other shifting
conditions
- Difference in financial
performance between
comparable vessels benefiting
and not benefiting from
temporary cessation measures
- Level of agreement among
managing authorities, producer
organisations and vessel
owners that temporary cessation
measures contributed to vessel
owners’ ability to maintain jobs
- Difference in employment
performance between
comparable vessels benefiting
and not benefiting from
temporary cessation measures
- Relative contribution of
permanent cessation measures
to reduction of European fishing
reports
- Interviews with managing
authorities
- Interviews with producer
organisations
- Survey of vessel owners
- National action plans
- Annual operational
programmes
- MS annual implementation
reports
- Annual Economic Report,
STECF
- Interviews with managing
authorities
- Interviews with producer
organisations
- Survey of vessel owners
- National action plans
- Annual operational
programmes
- MS annual implementation
reports
- Annual Economic Report
National fisheries
employment Statistics
- Interviews with managing
authorities
- Interviews with producer
organisations
- Survey of vessel owners
- National action plans
- Annual operational
programmes
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
cessation measures
contributed to
environmental,
economic and social
sustainability in the
European fishing
sector?
between living aquatic
resources and European
fishing capacity
Extent to which temporary
cessation measures have
contributed to overall
sustainability
10
87
Efficiency
Have the effects of
permanent and
temporary cessation
measures been
achieved at a
reasonable cost? Could
similar effects be
achieved in a more cost
effective way?
Cost effectiveness of
permanent cessation
measures
Cost effectiveness of
temporary cessation
measures
capacity in relation to other
measures and external factors
- Extent to which managing
authorities, producer
organisations and vessel
owners feel that permanent
cessation measures have
contributed to alignment of
resources and fishing capacity
- Level of alignment between
effects of temporary cessation
measures and sustainability
objectives of the EFF and CFP
- Extent to which managing
authorities, producer
organisations and vessel
owners feel that temporary
cessation measures have
contributed to alignment of
resources and fishing capacity
- Cost per reduction in fishing
capacity
- Relative cost per reduction in
fishing capacity in relation to
vessel sale price on the open
market
- Cost per temporary drop in
fishing activity
- MS annual implementation
reports
- STECF, ICES, DG MARE
reports
- Interviews with managing
authorities
- Interviews with producer
organisations
- Survey of vessel owners
- National action plans
- Annual operational
programmes
- MS annual implementation
reports
- Interviews with managing
authorities
- Interviews with producer
organisations
- Survey of vessel owners
- National action plans
- Annual operational
programmes
- MS annual implementation
reports
- National action plans
- Annual operational
programmes
- MS annual implementation
reports
- Interviews with managing
authorities
- Interviews with producer
organisations
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Are the procedures,
processes and rules of
the cessation measures
conducive to enabling
the Commission and
Member States to fulfil
their respective roles
cost effectively?
Extent to which procedures,
processes and rules are
cost effective
To what extent do the
cessation measures
complement other
initiatives at EU and
national levels? Are
there any areas of
duplication that could be
avoided? Could similar
initiatives be expected
by the Member States or
other actors without EU
support?
What are managing
authorities’ views of the
current system for
Extent to which cessation
funding and other initiatives
are complementary /
overlap
11
Coherence
12
13
88
Acceptability
Extent to which managing
authorities are bought into
current system of cessation
- Existence of significant
differences in national
implementation of cessation
measures
- Existence of problems with
implementation
- Level of satisfaction among
managing authorities, producer
organisations and vessel
owners with cessation measure
procedures, processes and
rules
- Proportion of national action
plans / operational programmes
that are not accepted / need to
be revised
- Level of satisfaction of EU
officials with execution of
procedures, processes and
rules for cessation measures
- Complementarity between
cessation measures and other
initiatives at EU and national
levels
- Level of overlap between
cessation measures and other
initiatives at EU and national
levels
- National action plans
- Annual operational
programmes
- MS annual implementation
reports
- Interviews with managing
authorities
- Interviews with producer
organisations
- Survey of vessel owners
- Feedback from
responsible EU officials
Level of agreement of managing
authorities with current system
for cessation funding
- Interviews with managing
authorities
- National action plans
- Annual operational
programmes
- MS annual implementation
reports
- Interviews with managing
authorities
- Interviews with producer
organisations
- Survey of vessel owners
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
cessation measures in
relation to other
potential ways to reduce
fishing capacity?
14
To what extent do
vessel owners rely on
the current level of
funding for cessation
measures and are there
other interventions that
could fulfil a similar role?
measures
Extent to which managing
authorities perceive
alternatives to cessation
funding
Extent to which the current
level of cessation funding is
necessary for the stability of
the fisheries sector
Extent to which there are
other interventions in place
which could substitute for
cessation measures
89
Level of buy in among managing
authorities for other ways of
reducing fishing capacity
- Interviews with managing
authorities
- Level of agreement among
managing authorities, producer
organisations and vessel
owners that the current level of
funding is necessary
- Differences in behaviour
between beneficiary and nonbeneficiary vessel owners
Existence of other measures
which could substitute for
cessation measures
- MS annual implementation
reports
- Interviews with managing
authorities
- Interviews with producer
organisations
- Survey of vessel owners
- Interviews with managing
authorities & producer
organisations
- Survey of vessel owners
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Appendix 2 Managing Authorities & organisations interviewed
The table below presents the organisations interviewed. The interview guidelines and the
interview questions put to Managing Authorities and industry bodies are presented in the
interim report and responses reported in the case studies. In some case studies a selection
of regional authorities were interviewed and engagement with other regions was via the
national managing authority.
Table 7 Managing Authority and Industry interviews
Case
study
Denmark
Estonia
Spain
Managing
Authority/
industry
MA
Organisation
Location
The Danish AgriFish Agency
Copenhagen
Industry
Danske Fiskeres Producent Organisation
Fredericia
Industry
Danish Fishermen’s Association
Copenhagen/
Industry
Danish Pelagic Producer Organisation, DPPO
Hirtshals
Industry
MA
Levende Hav
Fisheries Economics Department
Ministry of Agriculture
Bønnerup
Tallinn
Industry
Estonian Fishermen’s Association
Tallinn
Industry
Estonian Trawler Fishermen Association
Tallinn
MA
Magrama (Ministerio de Agricultura, Alimentacion y
Medio Ambiente
Madrid
MA
Instituto de seguridad social de la Marina
Madrid
Junta de Andalucia – Servicios de Ordenacion
Pesquera
Federation of vessel-owner associations of Andalusia
Andalusia
Federation of cofradias of Andalusia
Andalusia
Generalitat Valenciana – Servicios de Ordenacion
Pesquera
Xunta de Galicia – Secretario General de Pesca and
Servicios de Ordenacion Pesquera
ARVI (vessel-owner cooperative of Vigo)
Valencia
Cofradia de Portonovo
Galicia
Consejeria – Direccion de Pesca y acuicultura
Pais Vasco
Generalitat – Direccion de Pesca
Cataluna
Organización de productores pesqueros artesanal de
Cádiz
Organización de productores pesqueros de Almería
Cadiz
Conselleria del Medio Rural y del Mar - Xunta de
Galicia
Cooperativa de Armadores de Pesca del Puerto de
Vigo
Santiago de
Compostela
Vigo
Industry
Industry
MA
Industry
90
Andalusia
Galicia
Galicia
Almeria
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Industry
Cofradía de Pescadores San Francisco
Vigo
Industry
Organización de productores de pesca fresca del
puerto de vigo
Direccion de pesca y acuicultura
Vigo
MA
France
Industry
Organización de productores de tunidos congelados
(OPTUC)
MA
DPMA (Direction des Pêches Maritimes et de
l’Aquaculture)
Féderation des organisations de producteurs de la
pêche artisanale (FEDOPA)
Direction interrégionale de la mer Nord AtlantiqueManche Ouest
FROM Nord (PO)
Industry
MA
Industry
San
Sebastian
Bermeo
Paris
Paris
Rennes
Boulognesur-Mer
Guilvinec
La Rochelle
Rome
Industry
Industry
MA
OPOB Bretagne (PO)
FROM Sud-Ouest (PO)
Direzione Generale Pesca e Acquacoltura, Ministero
per le politiche agricole e forestali
Industry
Fed. nazionale delle cooperative di pesca Federcoopesca
Associazione armatori e produttori di pesca di Trapani
Rome
Industry
Federazione delle Organizzazioni di Produttori della
Pesca e dell’Acquacoltura Italiane
Rome
Poland
MA
Warsaw
Portugal
Industry
Industry
Industry
Industry
MA
Fishery Department, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development
National Chamber of Fish Producers
Polish Fishery Association
Northatlantic Producer Organization
Polish Associations of Fish Processor
Direcção Geral das Pescas e Aquicultura
Associação dos arrmadores das pescas industriais ADAPI
Lisboa
Opcentro – Coop. Pesca Geral do Centro
Peniche
Propeixe – Coop. Produtores de Peixe do Norte
Matosinhos
Centro Litoral
Figueira da
Foz
Gothenburg
Jonkoping
Uppsala
Gothenburg
Gothenburg
Uddevalla
Gothenburg
Newcastle
Italy
Industry
Sweden
UK
91
MA
MA
Industry
Industry
Industry
Industry
MA
Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management
Swedish Board of Agriculture
Swedish University of Agriculture Sciences
SFR - Swedish National Organisation of Fishermen
SFPO - Swedish Fishermens' Producers Association
FR - National Organisation of Fishing Retail and Trade
"Swedish Fish" Public Information Service
Marine Management Organisation
Trapani
Warsaw
Koszalin
Ustka
Poznań
Lisboa
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
MA
92
NFFO
The FPO
Marine Scotland
York
Hull
Edinburgh
SFPO
SFF
Edinburgh
Aberdeen
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Appendix 3 Vessel owner questionnaire
Part%1%:%Vessel%and%vessel/owner%information%
1. Vessel CFR: [From sample file]
2. Vessel owner name: [From sample file]
3. Birth year of vessel-owner:
4. Enterprise details (if not in activity, fill in 0):
-
-
Ownership structure :
Not in activity any more
Person (not registered as an enterprise)
Individual enterprise
Partnership
Corporation
Other:
Number of vessels owned:
Number of employees (on average in 2012):
5. List of vessels currently owned (if more than five, ask to provide the data by email or
fax):
Name of vessel
Community Fleet Registry Number
6. Since 2008, have you invested in (check all relevant answer):
Vessel equipment (except gear and other operational investment)
Other aspects of the fishing sector (e.g. processing, marketing, etc.)
Other activities (e.g. tourism)
No investment since 2008
If yes, when (year of investment):
Please describe investment:
Number of vessels
scrapped/reassigned/transferred in the past 10 years:
7. List of vessels scrapped/reassigned/transferred in the last ten years (if more than
five, ask to provide the data by email or fax):
Name of vessel
Community Fleet
Registry Number
Year exited
[From sample file]
[From sample file]
[From sample
file]
Action taken
(scrapped/reassigne
d/ transferred1)
Scrapped
Others…
1 If possible, specify if transferred to another EU-country or to a non-EU country
If%no%active%vessel,%go%to%part%2%
If%scrapped%a%vessel%go%to%part%3%(scrapping)%
If%no%vessel%scrapped,%go%to%part%5%(no%vessel%scrapped)%
93
%
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Part%2:%No%active%vessel%
8. Last year of activity:
9. Enterprise details for the last year of activity:
-
Number of vessels:
Number of employees (on average during the year):
Ownership structure :
Person (not registered as an enterprise)
Individual enterprise
Partnership
Corporation
Other:
10. For your last year of operation was your net profit (excluding subsidies) as a % of
your turnover:
Positive: Greater than 10% of turnover
Positive: Between 0-10% of turnover
Breakeven
Negative: up to –10% of turnover
Negative: Greater than –10% of turnover
Don’t know
11.
12. What happened to the vessel(s):
-
Number of vessels scrapped:
Number of vessels sold:
Number of vessels reassigned to other activities (e.g. tourism):
Number of vessels taken out of the fishing fleet register after being inactive for too
long:
Other (sunk, artificial reef, etc..) :
13. What is your current situation?
Retired
Employed on another vessel
Working in the fish industry (but not on board)
Working in a different sector
If working on a different job, please specify:
94
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Part%3:%Scrapping%%
14. Why did you decide to scrap (check all relevant answers, rank one for the main
reason)?:
Reached the age to retire
Opportunity for early retirement
Did not have a successor
Had too many debts
Limited fishing opportunities due to a lack of quota or other regulatory restrictions
Limited fishing opportunities due to a lack of available resource (without regulatory
restrictions)
The activity was not profitable enough
My vessel(s) was/were inactive
Cost of vessel-overhaul
I had to scrap a vessel to build a new one
other (please specify) ________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
15. How did you choose the vessel(s) to scrap? (check all relevant answers, rank one for
the main reason:
Only had one vessel
Only one vessel fit the eligibility criteria to receive support
It had the fewest fishing entitlements/opportunities
It was the most technically out-dated vessel
It was the least profitable vessel
It was the oldest vessel
The vessel was not active any more
Other (please describe below) _________________________________________
16. Did you scrap the vessel(s) in a Member State other than the one in which you were
normally based?
Yes, which MS: _____________________________________________________
No
17. If yes, why was this? (tick all that apply) (rank relevant choices – equal ranking
permitted)
Because it was cheaper than in my Member State
Because it was more practical to deal with the administrative processes and
procedures in another Member State
The delay to have my vessel scrapped in my MS was too long because of
overbooked facilities
Other, explain ______________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
18. What costs did you incur when scrapping? (in €, or specify the currency)
None
Costs paid to the shipyard: €
Administrative costs : € , please specify: _________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
95
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Other: € , please specify: ____________________________________________
19. Did you sell any equipment (e.g. radar) or parts (e.g. engine) separately from
scrapping the vessel(s)?
Yes __________________________________________________________
No
If yes, what equipment or part did you sell? (check all relevant answers)
electronic equipment
engine
fishing gears
other: _____________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
What was the total amount? (in €, or specify the currency):
20. What happened to your fishing licence after you scrapped the vessel(s)
It was removed
It was re-allocated to other vessel(s) I own
No change (still have fishing licence)
Not sure / don’t know
21. What happened to your quota after you scrapped the vessel(s)
Didn’t own quota
Lost it (re-allocated to remaining vessels in fleet)
Sold it
Lease it out (still own it)
Used by another of my vessels
Not sure / don’t know
Questions%20%to%26,%only%for%vessel%owners%still%in%activity%
22. Last year (2012) was your net profit (excluding subsidies) as a % of your turnover:
23.
Positive: Greater than 10% of turnover
24.
Positive: Between 0-10% of turnover
25.
Breakeven
26.
Negative: up to –10% of turnover
27.
Negative: Greater than –10% of turnover
Don’t know
28. Has the economic performance of your remaining vessels changed since the
scrapping scheme? (one answer)
more profitable
less profitable
about the same
don’t know
96
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
29. Is this change due to the fact that you have scrapped one or more vessels? (one
answer)
yes
no
partly
don’t know
30. Is this change due to the scrapping scheme as a whole? (one answer)
yes
no
partly
don’t know
31. What other factors have caused the change in your profitability? (rank relevant
choices – equal ranking permitted)
fishing opportunities
fuel price
better management of fish stocks
Fish prices
Operating costs
Other market conditions
Technological improvement
Don’t know
Other comments on the evolution of profitability: ___________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
32. Since scrapping the vessel(s), how has your overall average yearly catch changed?
(one answer)
it has dropped by approximately the average yield of the scrapped vessel(s)
it has decreased but less than the average yield of the scrapped vessel(s)
it has stayed about the same
it has increased
33. If it has not dropped by the average yield of the scrapped vessel, what has caused
this evolution?
other vessels were modernised
other vessels were not used to their full capacity before the scrapping
increase in fish stocks
other
34. Did you receive a subsidy to scrap: [to fill in from sample]
Yes (go to part 4) _______________________________________________
35. If no, why did you not ask or receive support? (check all relevant answers)
I wanted to build a new vessel
Application procedures were too complex
97
No
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
I wanted to be able to sell parts and/or equipment separately
I did not fit under any scrapping scheme
My vessel was not old enough
I was not eligible for other reasons, explain: _______________________________
_________________________________________________________________
I did apply but there was insufficient funds available and my application was not
selected
Other reasons, explain:
_________________________________________________________________
98
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Part%4:%Scrapping%support%%
36.
37. Under which scrapping scheme did you apply? (one answer)
Do not know
Scheme focused on a given species, name: _______________________________
Scheme focused on a given fleet segment, name: __________________________
Scheme focused on a geographical area, name: ___________________________
Scheme related to the fuel price, name: __________________________________
Other: ____________________________________________________________
38. How did you apply? (one answer)
Did it on my own
Filed my own claim but with the assistance of my PO or cooperative
My PO or cooperative filed the application
Through a joint scrapping claim (not run by the PO or the cooperative)
Followed the example of others who scrapped
39. Do you think the amount of the scrapping aid was : (just one answer)
Less than the market price of the vessel
About the same as the market price
More than the market price
Not sure / don’t know
40. What have the monies paid for scrapping enabled you to do? (rank relevant choices
– equal ranking permitted)
invested in the modernisation of another vessel
invested in another aspect of the fishing industry
invested in another business sector
paid off debts
retired
other, please describe: _______________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
41. Without cessation funding, would you have:
Scrapped the vessel(s) without public funding
Sold the vessel(s), kept the fishing entitlements
Sold the vessel(s) and fishing entitlements
Sold the vessel(s) (there were no fishing entitlements attached to it)
Continued using the vessel(s) to fish for less than five years
Continued using the vessel(s) to fish for more than five years
Continued fishing, but do not know for how long
Other : ____________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
99
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Part%5:%No%vessels%scrapped%
42. Have you considered scrapping any of your vessels since 2008?
Yes __________________________________________________________
No
43. If so, why did you decide not to (check all relevant answers):
I could not receive the subsidy and the cost of scrapping is too high
I preferred to sell the vessel
I used the vessel for another activity
My situation improved and I decided not too
I could not benefit from early retirement
Other, please specify: ________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Other comments on the reasons why not to scrap:
44. Last year (2012) was your net profit (excluding subsidies) as a % of your turnover:
Positive: Greater than 10% of turnover
Positive: Between 0-10% of turnover
Breakeven
Negative: up to –10% of turnover
Negative: Greater than –10% of turnover
Don’t know
45. Has your vessels economic performance changed since 2008?
□ more profitable
□ less profitable
□ about the same
46. Is this change due to the scrapping scheme?
□ yes
□ no
□ partly
□ don’t know
47. What other factors have caused the change in your profitability? (rank relevant
choices – equal ranking permitted)
fishing opportunities
fuel price
better management of fish stocks
Fish prices
Operating costs
Other market conditions
Technological improvement
Don’t know
Other comments on the evolution of profitability:
%
100
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Part%6:%temporary%cessation%%
48. Have you implemented periods of temporary cessation since 2008 (with or without
support)?
Yes __________________________________________________________
No
If%no%go%to%part%7%
49. Please fill in the following table:
Year
Nb of days of cessation
Nb of days subsidised (if
different)
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
50. Why did you stop fishing? (check all relevant answers, rank 1 for the main reason)
It was part of a national or EU management plan, I was not allowed to fish during that
period
Natural disaster or public health emergency that resulted in closing of fisheries
There was a voluntary decision to implement cessation periods locally (e.g. through
the PO or cooperative/association)
There was no quota available anymore
There was a lack of resource and it was not worth the operating costs to go out
fishing
Fuel price shock
A pollution incident
Gear conflicts with other fishermen/fisheries
Interruption of an agreement or delay in reaching agreement
To undergo restructuring
It is part of the seasonal activity
Other : ____________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Questions%42%to%45%only%if%you%received%support%for%temporary%cessation%(see%
table%Q40)%
51. Under which scrapping scheme(s) did you apply for? (check all relevant answers)
Do not know
Scheme focused on a given species, name: _______________________________
Scheme focused on a given fleet segment, name: __________________________
Scheme focused on a geographical area, name: ___________________________
Scheme related to the fuel price, name: __________________________________
Other: ____________________________________________________________
52. Without temporary cessation funding, would you have (check all relevant answers)
Temporarily stopped fishing anyway because there was a legal obligation (closed
fisheries, lack of quota..)
Not agreed to the voluntary cessation
Stopped fishing for a shorter period
101
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Scrapped the vessel(s) sooner
Sold the vessel(s) sooner
Relied more on temporary contracts for the crew
Laid off part of the crew
Part of the crew would have left on their own
Other : ____________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
53. How did the money for temporary cessation cover your vessel expenses during that
period?
It was not enough to cover the fixed costs of the vessel
It covered the vessel’s fixed costs (harbour dues, etc.)
It covered vessel expenses (fixed costs, maintenance, etc..)
It covered vessel expenses + contributed to my living expenses
54. In relation to the profit normally obtained during the cessation period, was the amount
of support received: (one answer)
Less than the usual profit
About the same as usual profit
More than usual profit
Not sure / don’t know
102
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Part%7:%Other%financial%aid%and%administration%of%the%support%
55. Have you received any other subsidy for your vessel(s) since 2008?
Yes
No
Don’t know/ don’t remember
If so, please detail
Year
example: 2006
Vessel CFR
Other EU fund/nonEU
National funding
Type of support
Engine modernisation
56. What other subsidies have you received since 2008 (not directly for the vessel)
(check all relevant answers)?
None
Investments in processing/marketing, etc..
Socio-economic measures
Projects within a Fisheries Local Action Group
Other collective project
Other…
Please, describe:
If%vessel/owners%received%no%support%for%permanent%and/or%temporary%
cessations,%go%to%last%question%for%final%comments.%
57. On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being ‘very simple’ and 5 being ‘very complicated’, how
would you describe the process of applying for permanent/temporary cessation
funding?
1
______________________________________________________________
2
3
4
5
58. On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being ‘very simple’ and 5 being ‘very complicated’, how
would you describe the process of receiving and accounting for permanent /
temporary cessation funding?
1
______________________________________________________________
2
3
4
5
59. How does your experience of permanent /temporary cessation funding compare with
other interactions you’ve had with public funding programmes?
Much worse
Worse
About the same
Better
Much better
103
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
60. Do you have any other comments you’d like to provide about your experience with
and opinions of cessation funding?
Appendix 4: Vessel owner survey counterfactual analysis: methodology and
results.
The statistical analysis to inform the counterfactual aspects of the evaluation consisted of 3
steps:
1. Recoding and ‘cleaning’ of database
2. Significance tests
3. Identification of significant results
1. Recoding of database
There were a number of interviews with too much missing answers (item non-response) or
no answers at all (unit non-response). The first step in preparing the analysis was to
determine which of the interviews can be used for comparison. In addition some case with
“logic mistakes” were removed – e.g. with answers to the questions that shouldn’t be asked
like for instant where someone states that he/she received subsidies for scrapping even
though they didn’t scrap any vessel.
All closed responses were then allocated a code to enable a count per response.
After preparing the database, as described above, a total number of 629 cases with 5
missing answers to “country” were available for analysis:
Country
Frequency Percent
Denmark
Estonia
France
Italy
Poland
Valid
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
Total
Missing 10
Total
16
9
168
145
42
4
176
12
52
624
5
629
2,5
1,4
26,7
23,1
6,7
,6
28,0
1,9
8,3
99,2
,8
100,0
Valid Percent Cumulative
Percent
2,6
2,6
1,4
4,0
26,9
30,9
23,2
54,2
6,7
60,9
,6
61,5
28,2
89,7
1,9
91,7
8,3
100,0
100,0
The next step was to determine in which of the group each unit falls. As we describe in
inception report we are looking for:
• treatment group – those who scrapped their vessel with EU contribution
• compare group – those who applied for scrapping funds but were rejected in the
countries where there was enough data (DK, IT, PT, SE, UK) PLUS those who
were available for scrapping but did not scrap or scrapped but did not receive funds
to do so.
104
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Using the survey responses the following groups were identified:
Frequency
Valid
Valid
Percent
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Compare
250
39.7
39.7
39.7
Treatment
309
49.1
49.1
88.9
70
11.1
11.1
100.0
629
100.0
100.0
Others
Total
Group category (compare = compare + not scrapping)
Compare
Country
Treatment
Others
6
7
3
16
3
5
1
9
France
73
84
11
168
Italy
57
66
22
145
Poland
21
21
0
42
0
4
0
4
71
85
20
176
2
7
3
12
Denmark
Estonia
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
Total
Total
17
28
7
52
250
307
67
624
The “others” were excluded from the comparisons.
1. Significance tests
The responses to the survey questions were analyzed in the following ways
a. descriptive statistics by country – cross- tabulations “country and any other variable”
with descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, median and mode).
b. descriptive statistics by group compare_treatment_notscrapping_others –
c. 90% / 95% T-test compare vs. treatment
This determines if differences between the treatment and compare groups are significant.
Significant difference is where there are consistent differences evident between two groups.
To determine whether this is the case, two tests are conducted. The first reveals if the
variance between two groups is equal or not. Second, if the difference in means are
statistically significant.
d. Independent samples test:
If any variable “passed” the t-test test it is highlighted (in green in the database). However
the test itself does not tell how big the difference is – only if it is significant.
Tests were conducted assuming two levels of confidence – 95% and 90%.
The following is an example of the outcomes.
You might notice that there is significant difference in: Since 2008, have you invested in:
vessel equipment except gear. This information gives you confidence that there is actual
difference in investing in vessel equipment other than gear between compare and treated
group. But you don’t know what the difference is. The descriptive statistics tells you:
105
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Mean
St. deviation
Treatment
1,83
,382
Compare
1,29
,460
The mean value tells you that the treatment group more often invest in gear then the
comparison group. However standard deviation indicates that – under this characteristic –
the compare group is more diverse. So in addition to the above information you know that
the treat group is more homogenous in their investing then the compare group. This is
illustrate with the frequency table:
Since 2008, have you invested in: vessel equipment except gear * Group category Crosstabulation
Count
Group category
Total
Compare Treatment Not
Others
scrapping
0 (Means NO)
20
18
0
0
38
Since 2008, have
Vessel equipment
8
85
97
28
218
you invested in:
(except
gear
and
vessel equipment
other operational
except gear
investment)
Total
28
103
97
28
256
2. Statistically significant differences
At 95% confidence small, but significant differences between the treatment and compare
groups are in:
Birth year of vessel owner
The age of the vessel owner was significantly older on average in the treatment group than
the comparison group. This supports the belief that some used cessation schemes as a
convenient point at which to retire from the sector.
Number of vessels scrapped
Those in the comparison group were more likely to have scrapped more than one vessel
(mean 1.59) compared to the treatment group (mean 1.23). The reasons for this will be
explored through analysis of case study responses as this may be due to selection criteria
under cessation measures or differences in behaviour and circumstances between the two
groups.
To what extent has the following other factors caused changes in your profitability
The treatment group was more likely to list fishing opportunities as the main reason for a
change in profitability, while the comparison group identified market conditions are a strong
cause of changes to profitability. This may reflect a wider view or more strategic approach
taken by the comparison group over the treatment group.
Investment
The treatment group shows a significantly higher number of claims of investment in vessel
equipment, other aspects of fishing and other sectors. This is perhaps not surprising as the
treatment group contains recipients of large sums for scrapping their vessels and supports
the contention that cessation measures risk maintaining over-capitalisation in the sector,
which can lead to overcapacity.
106
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Additional differences between the treatment and compare groups are identified at 90%
confidence on the following responses:
•
•
•
•
how did you choose the vessel to scrap?
did you incur costs when scrapping the vessel?
since scrapping how has your annual catch changed
how did you find the application process?
The following results are presented with significant differences highlighted in green. These
results were then used to inform the evaluation.
107
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
3. Results
T-Test
Group Statistics
Group category
Number of vessels owned
Number of vessels scrapped
Since 2008, have you invested
in: other activities eg. tourism
Last year of activity
N
Std.
Deviation
309
.83
1.327
.076
Compare
250
1.13
.633
.040
Treatment
309
1.17
.921
.052
Compare
250
.31
.658
.042
Treatment
31
1.48
.508
.091
Compare
23
1.17
.388
.081
Treatment
309
1365.37
938.992
53.417
Compare
250
289.41
707.028
44.716
20
1.00
0.000
0.000
122
1.52
.874
.079
20
1.30
.923
.206
69
2.20
1.220
.147
275
1.30
.458
.028
246
1.45
.498
.032
Treatment
To what extent have the
following other factors caused
changed in your profitability:
Technological improvement
Treatment
Compare
Compare
Treatment
Compare
a. t cannot be computed because the standard deviations of both groups are 0.
b. t cannot be computed because at least one of the groups is empty.
108
Std. Error
Mean
Treatment
To what extent have the
following other factors caused
changed in your profitability:
Fuel price
Have you temporarily stopped
fishing during the period since
2008 (with or without support)?
Mean
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances
t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
F
Country
Birth year of vessel owner
Number of vessels owned
Number of vessels scrapped
Number of employees on
average in 2012
109
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
2.218
2.375
24.738
2.946
8.790
Sig.
.137
.124
.000
.087
.003
t
df
Sig. (2tailed)
Mean
Differenc
e
Std. Error
Difference
Lower
Upper
.992
555
.322
.178
.179
-.174
.530
.997
541.350
.319
.178
.178
-.173
.528
171.3
52
170.5
97
-.855
557
.393
-51.972
60.777
67.408
-.861
544.392
.390
-51.972
60.390
-3.314
557
.001
-.303
.091
-.482
-.123
-3.542
460.664
.000
-.303
.085
-.471
-.135
12.369
557
.000
.856
.069
.720
.992
12.801
548.870
.000
.856
.067
.725
.988
-.108
557
.914
-.075
.695
1.441
1.291
INTERPRETATION
Is
differe
nce in
means
Equality of
signific
variance
ant?
Equal variances
assumed
No
No
Equal variances
assumed
66.654
No
No
Equal variances
NOT assumed
Yes
Yes
Equal variances
assumed
Yes
Yes
Equal variances
NOT assumed
No
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Ownership structure
Since 2008, have you invested
in: vessel equipment except
gear
Since 2008, have you invested
in: other aspects of the fishing
sector eg. processing
Since 2008, have you invested
in: other activities eg. tourism
No investment since 2008
The vessel owner:
Last year of activity
110
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
45.186
.948
.734
21.861
.569
271.135
112.910
.000
.331
.395
.000
.451
.000
.000
-.116
442.589
.908
-.075
.647
1.347
1.197
4.881
487
.000
.461
.094
.275
.646
4.679
367.385
.000
.461
.099
.267
.655
-.488
238
.626
-.023
.048
-.117
.071
-.485
216.853
.628
-.023
.048
-.118
.071
.449
64
.655
.055
.123
-.190
.300
.449
63.561
.655
.055
.123
-.190
.301
2.444
52
.018
.310
.127
.055
.564
2.543
51.942
.014
.310
.122
.065
.555
-.376
328
.707
-.007
.018
-.043
.029
-.386
299.340
.699
-.007
.018
-.042
.028
-15.468
555
.000
-.542
.035
-.610
-.473
-16.172
528.768
.000
-.542
.033
-.607
-.476
15.000
557
.000
1075.958
71.729
935.0
64
1216.8
51
No
Equal variances
NOT assumed
Yes
Yes
Equal variances
assumed
No
No
Equal variances
assumed
No
No
Equal variances
NOT assumed
Yes
Yes
Equal variances
assumed
No
No
Equal variances
NOT assumed
Yes
Yes
Equal variances
NOT assumed
Yes
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
For your last year of operation
was your net profit (excluding
subsidies) as a % of your
turnover
What is your current
employment status
Why did you decide to scrap:
Had too many debts
Why did you decide to scrap:
My vessels was/were inactive
How did you choose the
vessel(s) to scrap : Only had
one vessel
How did you choose the
vessel(s) to scrap: Only one
vessel fit the eligibility criteria
How did you choose the
vessel(s) to scrap: It had the
fewest fishing entitlements
111
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
5.090
1.399
.025
.238
15.445
554.252
.000
1075.958
69.663
939.1
21
1212.7
94
-.689
248
.492
-.215
.312
-.829
.399
-.611
43.811
.544
-.215
.351
-.923
.494
1.544
248
.124
.334
.216
-.092
.759
1.362
43.666
.180
.334
.245
-.160
.827
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
27
Yes
Equal variances
NOT assumed
No
Equal variances
assumed
0.000
Equal variances
NOT assumed
.181
2.476
.000
.672
.123
Yes
Yes
0.000
0.000
0.000
Equal variances
NOT assumed
0.000
127.082
No
No
0.000
9
No
Yes
Yes
-7.859
284
.000
-.444
.057
-.555
-.333
-4.415
41.101
.000
-.444
.101
-.647
-.241
-7.918
56
.000
-1.265
.160
1.585
-.945
-7.273
33.584
.000
-1.265
.174
1.619
-.911
-9.194
45
.000
-1.522
.166
1.855
-1.189
Equal variances
NOT assumed
Yes
Yes
Equal variances
assumed
Yes
Yes
Equal variances
assumed
Yes
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
opportunities
How did you choose the
vessel(s) to scrap: It was the
most technically outdated
vessel
How did you choose the
vessel(s) to scrap: It was the
least profitable vessel
How did you choose the
vessel(s) to scrap: The vessel
was not active anymore
Did you scrap the vessel(s) in
a country other than the one in
which you were normally
based?
Did you incur any costs when
scrapping?
Did you sell any equipment
(e.g. radar) or parts (e.g.
engine) separately from
scrapping the vessel(s)?
What happened to your fishing
license after you scrapped your
vessel(s)?
112
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
4.031
.695
11.852
5.568
.074
14.728
14.510
.048
.407
.001
.019
.786
.000
.000
-8.686
29.896
.000
-1.522
.175
1.880
-1.164
-6.829
72
.000
-.952
.139
1.230
-.674
-6.147
38.441
.000
-.952
.155
1.265
-.639
-7.329
68
.000
-1.078
.147
1.371
-.784
-6.501
32.907
.000
-1.078
.166
1.415
-.740
-10.447
41
.000
-1.669
.160
1.991
-1.346
-10.241
23.359
.000
-1.669
.163
2.006
-1.332
1.130
351
.259
.043
.038
-.032
.117
1.624
84.363
.108
.043
.026
-.010
.095
5.357
340
.000
.399
.075
.253
.546
5.356
56.446
.000
.399
.075
.250
.548
1.668
345
.096
.107
.064
-.019
.234
2.026
68.416
.047
.107
.053
.002
.213
.558
326
.577
.051
.091
-.128
.229
Yes
Equal variances
NOT assumed
Yes
Yes
Equal variances
assumed
Yes
Yes
Equal variances
NOT assumed
Yes
Yes
Equal variances
NOT assumed
No
No
Equal variances
assumed
Yes
Yes
Equal variances
NOT assumed
No
Yes
Equal variances
NOT assumed
No
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
What happened to your quota
after you scrapped your
vessel(s)?
Since scrapping the vessel(s),
how has your overall average
yearly catch changed?
v38
v40
Did you receive a subsidy to
scrap?
If not, why: I wanted to build a
new vessel
If not, why: Application
procedures were too complex
113
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
2.650
4.072
.105
.045
.345
25.248
.733
.051
.147
-.252
.353
-1.068
323
.286
-.420
.393
1.194
.354
-.953
27.151
.349
-.420
.440
1.324
.484
6.791
142
.000
1.726
.254
1.224
2.229
5.953
40.906
.000
1.726
.290
1.141
2.312
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
7.045
12
No
Equal variances
assumed
No
Equal variances
NOT assumed
95.640
59.133
57.414
.102
.000
.000
.000
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.000
2.897
No
Yes
-.516
24
.611
-2.348
4.551
11.74
1
-.837
4.275
.447
-2.348
2.807
9.947
5.251
49.227
348
.000
.908
.018
.872
.944
21.099
44.515
.000
.908
.043
.821
.995
.779
50
.439
.160
.205
-.252
.572
.802
34.221
.428
.160
.199
-.245
.565
3.022
42
.004
.522
.173
.173
.870
Equal variances
assumed
No
No
Equal variances
NOT assumed
Yes
Yes
Equal variances
NOT assumed
No
No
Equal variances
NOT assumed
Yes
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
If not, why: I wanted to be able
to sell parts and/or equipment
separately
If not, why: My vessel was not
old enough
If not, why: I did apply but my
vessel was not selected
If not, why: I was not eligible
for other reasons
Specify name of scheme
How did you apply
Do you think the amount of
scrapping aid was:
114
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
21.599
5.895
116.228
5.243
.841
.717
.792
.000
.015
.000
.027
.361
.398
.374
3.166
22.000
.004
.522
.165
.180
.863
6.698
41
.000
.773
.115
.540
1.006
6.859
21.000
.000
.773
.113
.538
1.007
1.076
557
.282
.040
.037
-.033
.113
1.121
536.967
.263
.040
.036
-.030
.110
-.137
47
.891
-.029
.209
-.448
.391
-.151
29.125
.881
-.029
.190
-.417
.360
10.089
41
.000
.903
.089
.722
1.083
9.974
32.276
.000
.903
.090
.718
1.087
18.06
4
114.5
43
.337
136
.737
3.706
11.008
25.476
.367
1.035
.774
3.706
10.088
-.227
303
.821
-.093
.410
-.900
.714
-.226
3.080
.835
-.093
.411
1.382
1.196
.878
303
.381
.397
.452
-.493
1.287
Yes
Equal variances
NOT assumed
Yes
Yes
Equal variances
NOT assumed
No
No
Equal variances
NOT assumed
No
No
Equal variances
NOT assumed
Yes
Yes
Equal variances
assumed
121.95
5
No
No
Equal variances
assumed
No
No
Equal variances
assumed
No
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Monies received for scrapping
enabled: Invested in the
modernisation of another
vessel
Monies received for scrapping
enabled: Invested in another
aspect of the fishing industry
Monies received for scrapping
enabled: Invested in another
business sector
Monies received for scrapping
enabled: Paid off debts
Monies received for scrapping
enabled: Retire
How has the economic
performance of your vessel(s)
evolved since 2008?
To what extent have the
following other factors caused
changed in your profitability:
115
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
15.530
5.293
22.142
5.226
9.043
46.680
9.273
.000
.023
.000
.023
.003
.000
.003
1.354
3.198
.264
.397
.293
-.505
1.299
7.896
155
.000
1.590
.201
1.193
1.988
12.406
38.418
.000
1.590
.128
1.331
1.850
7.084
129
.000
1.189
.168
.857
1.522
9.545
34.445
.000
1.189
.125
.936
1.442
7.337
127
.000
1.387
.189
1.013
1.762
18.279
110.000
.000
1.387
.076
1.237
1.538
9.285
206
.000
1.912
.206
1.506
2.318
12.542
28.419
.000
1.912
.152
1.600
2.224
7.367
172
.000
1.951
.265
1.428
2.473
8.535
24.912
.000
1.951
.229
1.480
2.422
-3.068
214
.002
-.624
.204
1.026
-.223
-4.493
30.240
.000
-.624
.139
-.908
-.341
2.175
109
.032
.448
.206
.040
.857
No
Equal variances
NOT assumed
Yes
Yes
Equal variances
NOT assumed
Yes
Yes
Equal variances
NOT assumed
Yes
Yes
Equal variances
NOT assumed
Yes
Yes
Equal variances
NOT assumed
Yes
Yes
Equal variances
NOT assumed
Yes
Yes
Equal variances
NOT assumed
Yes
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Fishing opportunities
To what extent have the
following other factors caused
changed in your profitability:
Fuel price
To what extent have the
following other factors caused
changed in your profitability:
Better management of fish
stocks
To what extent have the
following other factors caused
changed in your profitability:
Fish prices
To what extent have the
following other factors caused
changed in your profitability:
Operating costs
To what extent have the
following other factors caused
changed in your profitability:
Other market conditions
To what extent have the
following other factors caused
changed in your profitability:
Technological improvement
116
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
67.246
1.610
.000
.208
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
1.870
24.471
.073
.448
.240
-.046
.943
-2.676
140
.008
-.525
.196
-.912
-.137
-6.630
121.000
.000
-.525
.079
-.681
-.368
-1.696
90
.093
-.503
.297
1.092
.086
1.056
.051
-1.845
1.192
.781
.395
18.532
.277
.379
.531
.000
34.564
.074
-.503
.273
No
Equal variances
NOT assumed
Yes
Yes
Equal variances
assumed
No
No
.921
127
.359
.206
.224
-.236
.648
.948
27.143
.351
.206
.217
-.240
.652
1.252
109
.213
.278
.222
-.162
.718
1.367
31.016
.182
.278
.203
-.137
.693
-1.789
92
.077
-.526
.294
1.109
.058
-1.759
27.279
.090
-.526
.299
1.138
.087
-3.061
87
.003
-.903
.295
1.489
-.317
-3.564
40.204
.001
-.903
.253
1.415
-.391
Equal variances
assumed
No
No
Equal variances
assumed
No
No
Equal variances
assumed
No
No
Equal variances
NOT assumed
Yes
Yes
Retrospective Evaluation of Permanent and Temporary Cessation Measures in the EFF
Have you temporarily stopped
fishing during the period since
2008 (with or without support)?
Did you receive public support
for temporary cessation?
On a scale from 1 to 5, with 1
being 'very simple' and 5 being
'very complicated', how would
you describe the process of
applying for
permanent/temporary
cessation funding
On a scale from 1 to 5, with 1
being 'very simple' and 5 being
'very complicated', how would
you describe the process of
receiving and accounting for
permanent/temporary
cessation funding?
How does your experience of
permanent/temporary
cessation funding compare
with other interactions you've
had with public funding
programmes?
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
38.584
9.749
17.963
.000
.002
.000
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
-3.555
519
.000
-.149
.042
-.231
-.067
-3.538
500.077
.000
-.149
.042
-.232
-.066
1.508
189
.133
.077
.051
-.024
.177
1.560
188.671
.120
.077
.049
-.020
.174
4.250
557
.000
.579
.136
.311
.846
4.207
509.140
.000
.579
.138
.309
Equal variances
NOT assumed
Yes
Equal variances
NOT assumed
Equal variances
NOT assumed
Yes
.849
Yes
16.188
.000
Equal
variances
not assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed
No
No
4.605
557
.000
.665
.144
.381
.949
Equal variances
NOT assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Yes
4.553
505.500
.000
.665
.146
.378
Yes
.952
Yes
2.319
.129
.034
.033
329
271.226
.973
.974
.007
.007
.221
.225
-.427
-.435
.442
Equal variances
assumed
No
.450
No
117