Peter N. Stearns
The Baltimore Riots of 1812 and the Breakdown of the Anglo-American Mob Tradition
Author(s): Paul A. Gilje
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Journal of Social History, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Summer, 1980), pp. 547-564
Published by: Peter N. Stearns
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3787432 .
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THEBALTIMORE
RIOTSOF1812ANDTHE
MOBTRADITION
BREAKDOWN
OFTHEANGLO-AMERICAN
The natureof rioting-what riotersdid-was undergoinga transformationin
the half century after the American Revolution. A close examination of the
extensive rioting in Baltimoreduring the summer of 1812 suggests what those
changeswere.Telescopedinto a month and a half of riotingwas a rangeof activity
revealing the breakdownof the Anglo-Americanmob tradition.l This tradition
allowed for a certainamount of limited populardisorder.The tumultuouscrowd
was viewed as a "quasi-legitimate"or "extra-institutionals'part of the political
system and was to be tolerated in certain situations as long as its action was
circumscribedto an immediategoal with a minimum of violence to persons and
property.The idea was predicatedon the assumptionthat the normal process of
government was imperfect and that it was occasionallynecessary to resort to
"politics out-of-doors" to meet the needs of the community.Just enough force
was to be provided by the crowd to rectify an obvious injustice which ofElcial
channelswere incapableof handling.2
This Anglo-Americanmob traditioncan be seen operatingin the Englishbread
riots E.P. Thompson describes;crowdsacted to re-establishthe "just price," set
by custom and ancientlaw, and violatedby proflteeringgrainmerchants.3So too,
colonial American mobs in the 1760's and 1770's moved to oppose British
imperialmeasures in actions which were generallyconfined to limited attackson
symbols of that imperialauthority,as in the Boston Tea Party.Occasionallya mob
might get carriedawayin the passionsof the moment, such as in the destruction
of GovernorThomas Hutchinson'shouse in 1765, but even when it did, it rarely
acted in a brutishmanneragainstpersons-rages were limitedto attacksagainst
property.4
Yet there always remained in each riot situation the potential for excessive
disorder.5 This created a tension between the elite, who would reluctantly
condone rioting in only the most extreme circumstances,and the lower and
middlingranks of society, who were far more willing to countenance collective
violence.6 That tension, which was evident in the attempt of American Whig
leaders to bridle the pre-Revolutionarymob activity of the 1760's and 1770's,
was resolved throughinformalmeans of socialcontrol.If the riotdid not appearto
threatenthe prevailingsocial system unduly, then a kind of temporarylicense was
grantedto the mob. When the mob had finished with its attackon its immediate
and proscribedobject, or when its actions began seriously to challengethe social
system, then it was time for the elite to pull in its reins and reassertits authority.
No elaboratepolice powerswere thought necessaryfor this. The Anglo-American
mob traditionthrived in small scale pre-industrialcommunities where contacts
between all levels of society were fluid and where social relationswere markedby
deferenceand personalrecognition.
548
journalof socialhistory
Thus, informal mechanisms combining the personal and public prestige of
local magistratesand members of the elite, were the mainstaysof riot control.
Very often the magistratewould simplyaddressthe membersof the mob, inform
them that they were actingin an overly tumultuousmanner,and tell them it was
time to disperse. The riot acts of both England and America were merely a
legalizationof this practice;the magistratewould read the act to the disorderly
crowd and then wait for a stipulatedtime, ordinarilyan hour, allowingthe mob
ample opportunity to disband.8 The posse comitatus can also be viewed as a
regularizationof these informal means of social control. Members of the posse
were temporarydeputiesof the magistraterecruitedfrom the communityat large.
Theoreticallyanyone and everyone could be sworn in as partof the posse.More
often than not, however, the possewas recruitedfrom men the magistrateknew
would supporthim and these were usuallymen of prominenceand standingin the
local communitywhose real value lay in their furtherbolsteringthe moralweight
of the magistrate.The militia,too, mightbe calledupon to help supressa riot. But
the militia, which tended to include all able-bodiedmen in a community, was
likely to be overly sympatheticwith the mob and could hardlybe expectedto turn
out and protect an unpopularcause. More importantly,in both England and
America there was a deeply ingrainedfear of the military,inhibitingthe use of
both the militiaand the regulararmy,as well as limitingthe size and powerof the
ordinarypoliceforcesof constablesand nightwatch.9
Of course, implicitin every one of the magistrate'spossibleavenues of action,
be he assertinghis authorityalone, readingthe riot act, with a posse comitatus, or
with a detachment of the military at his side, there was always the threat of
coercion.But few magistratesreallywantedto be takenup on that threat.They did
not want to be responsiblefor spillingthe blood of men they knew all their lives
and with whom they must continue to deal with long after the riot was over and
whateverforce thatwas musteredhad been dismissed.l°In fact, manymagistrates
knew that any force, and especially the army put an extra burden on local
resources and hurt everyone in the community.\l Moreover, as E.P. Thompson
has reminded us, "the credibility of the gentry and magistracy" had to be
maintained and this was most effectively done through the "reassertion of
paternalistauthority" rather than the use of troops or force.l2 Therefore, the
preferred means of riot control was to "talk the mob down' after the
community'sneeds had been served by "politicsout-of-doors."
The Baltimoreriots of 1812 began in the spiritof this deep-seatedtradition.l3
The vast majorityof Baltimore'scitizens were Republicansand the publicationin
their city of the Federalist partisannews sheet, the Federal-Republicans
was a
constantirritantto theirJeffersoniansympathies.Threatshad long been mouthed
by the Republicanpaperswarningthe Federal-Republican
that its persistentattacks
on Madison's administrationandon local Republicanswere bound to rouse the
wrathof the citizenry.l4With the declarationof waragainstGreat Britainin June
1812 the Federal-Republican
only becamemore vehement in its assertions.On the
night of June 22 the people of Baltimoreacted, as agroup of thirtyor forty men
dismantled the Gay Street printing office of the Federal-Republican.One
Republicanpaperreported,"Last night between9 and 10 o'clocksa partyof men
and boys began,with greatsang froidto demolishthe printingoffice of the Federal
Republican . . . and perservered till they accomplished their purpose. The
business went on as regularlyas if they contractedto performthe job for pay."lS
Demolishing or "pulling down" buildings was a widespreadpractice of both
THE BALTIMORERIOTSOF 1812
549
English and Americanmobs in the eighteenth century, while the destructionof
the printingpress was an activityreminiscentof several AmericanRevolutionary
mobs. Obviously this was not a raging, overly destructive mob; rather it was
orderly,workmanlikeand restrictedin its goal.
Littleeffortwas made by the Republicancity officialsto stop the mob that night.
Mayor EdwardJohnson, a staunch Republican brewer, made a half-hearted
aPpearanceat the scene of the riot.l6 His entreatiesto halt the riotin&however
were respectfullydeclined as one ringleadertold the mayor, "Mr. Johnson, I
know you very well, no body wants to hurt you; but the laws of the land must
sleep, and the laws of nature and reason prevail; that house is the temple of
Infamy,it is supportedwith Englishgold, and it must and shall come down to the
ground!''17This one statementsums up the very essence of the Anglo-American
mob tradition. First, the rioter knew Johnson personally. Both men were
members of the largerRepublicancommunity. Politicaloffice in Baltimorewas
still mainly the provinceof the elite. EdwardJohnson was a member of that elite
whose base of politicalpower was his close connection with the mechanicsand
laborersof "OldTown," wherehe lived and worked,and Fell's Point. On election
day the Republicanleadershipexpected Johnson to deliver the workingman's
vote.l8 Thus it is not surprisingthat the rioterknew Johnson and treatedhim with
deference and respect.Secondly, and more importantly,was the declarationthat
the "laws of the land must sleep, and the laws of natureand reasonprevail."This
short phraseepitomizes the theoreticaljustificationof the Anglo-Americanmob
tradition.The underlyingassumptionwas that there was a gap between the "laws
of the land" and the "laws of natureand reason." It was the people's right, no, it
was the people's duty, to assert themselves in unison to bridgethat gap even in
the most reasoned of governments. Finally, there was the identificationof the
with the nationalenemy, for war had been declared,and the
Federal-Republican
implicationwas that the destructionof the "temple of Infamy" was a patriotic
duty.
No doubt MayorJohnson found it difficultto arguewith this statementand was
probablynot too disturbedby the banishmentof this maligningtool of his political
¢pponents. In any case, he did not press the point and, as might be expected in
good Anglo-Americanmob tradition,he retreatedfor the time being, allowingthe
peopletheir moment of riot.
The tumult lasted until the early hours of the morningas the mob scouredthe
streets in pursuitof one of the Federalisteditors, JacobWagner,who had wisely
left town. Wagner's own house and the house of his father-in-law,where his
family was staying, were both searchedby select members of the mob. In doing
this no violence was offered to anyone nor was any privatepropertythreatened.
Had Wagner been captured he would probably have received some rough
treatment,for it had been rumoredduringthe day that he was to be clothedwith a
terrapinshell and a sheepskin with a pairof horns, but it is unlikely, considering
the overallself-controlthe mob exercised,thatthey wouldcarryout theirthreatof
puttinga bulletthroughhis 1t.19
So far, then, all the criteriafor the traditionalAnglo-Americanmob had been
Xlfilled: the attackwas limitedto only the odious objectof the Federal-Republican
printingoffice; opportunityfor doing furtherviolence was declinedwhen the mob
had Wagner'shouse and familyat its mercy;and the communityapparentlygave
its tacit approvalto the riot-over five hundredpersonswitnessedthe evening's
activity, includingthe mayorwho made no arrests.With the "laws of natureand
reason" satisfied, and the Federalistnewspaperdriven from the city, it was time
sso
journalof socialhistory
for the "laws of the land," in the guise of the localauthorities,to reassertcontrol.
There was no anticipateddifficultyhere and on the next day MayorJohnson and
the city magistratesissued a statementurging"all citizens who were so disposed
to preserve the order and peace of the community" to discountenance "all
irregularand tumultuousmeetings" and aid the civil ofElcersin supressingthem.
If the riot were to i true to the form of the Anglo-Americanmob traditionthis
publicstatement,combinedwith the personalsurveillanceof the mayor,wouldbe
sufflcientto preventany furtherdisturbances.20
MayorJohnson soon had a chance to test his informaltools of riot control.On
the evening after the destruction of the Federalist newspaper office a mob
threateneda Mr. Hutchinsfor havingspokenout againstthe wareffort.Beforethe
40 or 50 angry Republicanscould break any law MayorJohnson arrivedat the
scene and persuaded the would-be rioters to leave Hutchins alone. Johnson
personallyled them away from Hutchins' home to the Market house, several
streets away, where he made sure they all dispersed.However, no sooner did the
mayorreturnto his vigil at Hutchinsshouse, joined by severalgentlemenfriends,
than another and larger mob appeared.Standingin the doorwayJohnson was
forced to give in and allow an inspectionof the premises.But first he made sure
that Hutchins escaped out a back door. With Hutchins safely out of the way,
Johnson escorted a committee of the mob on its search.Satisfiedthat Hutchins
was not to be found, and leaving his propertyunmolested, the mob began to
disband.Again MayorJohnson could congratulatehimself on his handlingof the
unrulypopulace.Yet he was to experienceone more scare that night. As the last
of the crowd was breakingup Johnson got word ';that a few gentlemen, having
heard of the riot, had armed themselves, and were probablyon the way" to
support him. Fearing that such a show of force would antagonize the lingering
mob, Johnson "privately withdrew" and went off to intercept his would-be
saviors. He met with Samuel Hollingsworths a Federalist, and two other
horsemen, all armed to the hilt, and, after assuringthem that he had everything
undercontrol, he managedto get them to returnhome.21
In all, MayorJohnson could view his night's workas success; he had gone face
to face with two mobs and preventedboth from committingany serious violence.
However,Johnson was upset by the effortsof the three armedFederalistsand was
afraidthat bloodshed, and possibly civil war, might be the result of any further
popularpoliticaldisturbances.Definitely committedagainstthe use of force, and
rather than simply relying on another public statement, the mayor and city
magistratesdecided that a more symbolicgesture was needed. Within a few days
all of the city's officialsand constableswere massed togetherand paradedthrough
the streets in a deliberate attempt to match the theater of the mob with the
counter-theaterof the elite and to exhibit before the entire Baltimorecommunity
their united stand against any further public disorder.22In a still largely oral
society this physicaland dramaticdemonstrationwas calculatedto impress the
mechanicand laboreras no high sounding proclamationcould-for it was with
"body language' and the "oral-dramaturgical process' that the elite
communicatedmost effectivelywith the lowersection of society.23
Somehow the people of Baltimorewere unimpressedwith this show of countertheaterand the mob continued to be active. The Anglo-Americanmob tradition
Rouishedin simple, generallyunified communities.Baltimore,howeverswas no
longerthis kind of unifiedcommunity.In the half centurybefore 1812 the city has
experienced phenomenal growth and was transformedfrom a few clusters of
THEBALTIMORERIOTSOF 1812
551
houses to a thrivingmetropolisof fifty thousand.It was a commercialboom town
with many different kinds of people-rich and rising merchantson the make,
middlinf tradesmen,native-bornand immigrantlaborers,and both slave and free
blacks.2 Moreover, the city's work force was undergoinga significanttransition
as artisansbecameincreasinglyrelianton a pool of unskilledlaborers;apprentices,
slaves, and even women were replacing the journeyman at the work place,
creatingadditionalresentment between employerand employee.25In such a city
there were a great number of diverse interests and some of these were starkly
exposed in the followingwave of rioting.
Racialantagonism,for instance,was revealedin the tearingdown of two houses
owned by James Briscoe, a free black.Briscoe had been quoted as sayingthat "if
all the blacks were of his opinion, they would soon put down the whites," and
this, combined with a widespreadfear of a British-inspiredslave conspiracy,was
quite enough to provoke the ire of the mob. The action, which was not very
violent, seems to have been limited in its goals and might therefore easily be
consideredas being in the spiritof the Anglo-Americanriot tradition.However,a
more careful examination suggests another conclusion. A magistratewas at the
scene of the riot and attemptedto prevent the destructionof any property.Not
only did he fail to stop the mob from pulling down Briscoe's home, but he was
equally powerless when the mob decided that they would 'ivisit the sins of the
father upon his generation" and, draggingBriscoe's daughter out of her bed,
levelled her house to the ground as well. Harassment of blacks continued
thereafterand even the Africanchurchwas threatened.26
Other divisions in society can be seen in the street fighting which erupted
between Protestant and Catholic Irish. Mayor EdwardJohnson reported "A
numberof inferiordisturbancestook place, confinedto the Irish alone, who were
persecutingeach other as orangemen." AlexanderWiley, who was apparentlya
ProtestantIrishman,was twice threatenedwith tar and featheringand was finally
temporarilyforced to leave town. The mob claimed he had ridden express for
Wagner,but Wiley believed that he was attacked"to gratifyprivaterevenge, and
that the enmity to him partook of religious animosity." Neither Wiley nor his
persecutorsknew very much about politics, althouFhthey did use "a cant term,
'Tory',whichwas the signalfor insult and violence." 7
More directlyconnected to the war effort was the dismantlingof several ships
bound for the Iberianpeninsulaand the Spanishpossessions in the West Indies.
One ship, the schooner Josepha,was regularlyclearedat the Customs House and
set sail on July 7, but was "broughtback by armedmen, who dismantledher and
cut off her rudder." The next morning the Collector put the ship under the
protectionof the revenue cutter;however, since no carpenterhad the "hardihood
to make a new rudder"it was thought unlikelyshe would be able to set sail. The
reason given for these depredationswas that the Spanish and Portuguese were
Britain'sallies against Napoleon and that a number of these ships were loaded
with grain and were bound to supply Wellington's army in Spain. Just as
important,however, was longstandingprejudiceagainsthispanicsand resentment
againstprofiteeringmerchantswho seemed willingto tradewith the enemy.28
office
Nearly every night, then, after the destructionof the Federal-Republican
in late June until late July the mob roamedthe streets of Baltimore,strikingat a
varietyof targets.As it did so, the mob's activityceased to representthe interests
of the majority of the Baltimore community and began more and more to
represent special and private interests which often reflected the growing
animositiesin an increasinglyheterogeneouscommunity.Screenedbehind a plea
552
journalof social history
of patriotismthe mob could begin to vent its pent up anger and frustrationover
racial, ethnic, and class issues. To almost all of this the mayor and magistrates
continued to use their "gentle" methods of persuasionin dispersingmobs and
minimizingviolence despite the a2ppearance
of some evidence that the elite could
not always"talkthe mob down.' 9
It was againstthis backgroundof constant mob activitythat the other editorof
the Federal-Republican,
the aristocraticAlexanderContee Hanson, decidedto reestablishhis paperin Baltimore.30The paper,which was being printedin the less
volatile Georgetown, was to be distributedfrom a Baltimoreaddress. Asserting
that the "empire of the laws' had been "overthrown' and that society had
become "unhinged" and 'idegradedto a state of nature," Hanson plannedto do
what he felt Mayor Johnson and the other city ofElcialswere failing to doguaranteethe freedom of the press. He had no intention of facingthe Baltimore
mob alone and at least fifty ardent Federalists were recruited from both the
Maryland countryside and Baltimore to help defend Hanson's "natural and
constitutionalrights.''3l
On Sunday, July 27, the Federalist host quietly collected at No. 45 Charles
Street. Although Hanson and companyattemptedto attractas little attention as
was possible, they made no secret of their location-the CharlesStreet address
was defiantlyplacedon the mastheadof the paper.By Monday,the twenty-eighth,
everyone in Baltimoreknew that Hansonand his Federal-Republican
were backin
town, and the Federalists on Charles Street preparedthemselves to meet the
onslaughtof the mob. Being well armedand committedto stand their groundthe
Federalistswere confidentthat the cowardlymob wouldnot darerisk a prolonged
attack.32
That night proved them wrong. A largecrowdcollected outside the Federalist
fortressand a riot brokeout as men and boys pelted stones and shouted insults at
the Federalistdefenders. Warningsto the crowd only intensified the shower of
stones and aftersome debateinside the Federalistfortressa blankvolley was fired
in the hope of intimidatingthe mob. The loud blast from the Federalistguns had
the desired effect as the street was quicklycleared of the crowd of people. But
findingthat no harmwas done, and angeredby the temerityof this new Federalist
affronts the mob soon returned and re-commenced its taunting activities
Becomingbolderand bolder,Dr. Gale, a crackpotapothacary,led a rush upon the
house. As Gale enteredthroughthe battereddoor the Federalistsleveled another?
this time lethal, volley. More shots followedand the dyingGale was carriedaway.
Otherswere hit as they retiredto cover. The firingcontinued intermittentlyfrom
the house and the mob, whichnow beganto armitself.33
OfElcialreactionto the riot was slow. MayorJohnson left Baltimorethat day for
his countryresidence.Furtherup CharlesStreet lived GeneralJohn Stricker,the
commanderof the city's militia. He obviously knew something was going on as
much of the crowd had to file past his house on their way to the Federalist
stronghold.Perhapshe hoped that the events of the night of June 22 would be
repeated and once again the Federalist news organ would be expelled from
Baltimore.In any case, he and several friends, who were at his house that night,
became increasinglyalarmedby the constantstreamof reportsof the intensifying
conflict and by the first shots. Finally, after many appeals by Federalists and
others, Strickerset the complicatedmachineryfor callingthe militiainto motion.
Before any troopscould be musteredhe needed the signatureof two of the city's
magistrates.Unfortunately,magistrateswere an extremely rare commodity that
THE BALTIMORERIOTSOF 1812
553
night and those who could be found, even Federalists,were reluctantto sign the
order for fear of mob retaliation.Four different magistrateswere brought to
Stricker's house and each managed to disappearbefore their signatures were
secured34
After much delaythe properorderswere signed and deliveredto MajorWilliam
Barneyaround midnight.Two more hours passed before the thirty militia men,
out of the two companies called, were ready to move down CharlesStreet. Both
MajorBarneyand General Strickerwere apprehensiveof the crowd'sreactionto
the appearanceof the militia. On Stricker'sadvice Barney removed the proud
aristocratic eagle and ribbon of the Order of Cincinnati from his uniform,
believing that if Barneywore this insignia he would be attackedby the mob as a
i'foreigner.' By the same token, Barney ignored militaryeitquette and allowed
the more robust and lower class red-featheredChausseurs to lead ahead of his
own white-featheredHussarsbecause, so he laterclaimed the red feathersmade
No doubt he also felt that the mob would be less willingto
less obvious targets+35
attack the innkeepers, peddlers, butchers, carpenters, and ship joiners of the
Chausseurs than the merchants in the Hussars.36Barney, who was to lead this
expedition, removed his own white featherfrom his hat. He did not want to wear
anythingthat mightantagonizethe mob.
Meanwhilethe situationwas becomingincreasinglyserious. A cannon had been
brought up by the mob and placed opposite the building occupied by the
Federalists It remained unused, but the exchange of musket fire continued. At
this criticaljunctureBarneyand his small bandof militiaarrived.Consideringthe
size of the mob, which some estimatesput as largeas a thousandpersons, and the
fortitude of an undeterminednumber of Federalistsdefending No. 45 Charles
Street, Barney's predicamentwas extremely delicate. Rather than attemptingto
use bruteforce (which he did not have) Barneyzstrippedof his white featherand
emblem of the Cincinnati,resortedto the time-tested method of personalappeal.
He pleaded with the mob declaringhimself their "political friend," and gave
assurances that those inside would not escape. The moment was precarious;
hostilities had ceased upon the arrivalof the mounted uniformedmilitiaand the
mob even temporarilywithdrew.But the cannon remainedpoised to fire upon the
Federalists, and the mob, seeing how small Barney's force really was, quickly
regathered.Barneystalled for time, believing that reinforcementswere bound to
come and that the impendingdawnwoulddispersethe mob as its memberswould
fear recognitionin the growingdaylight.He placed his militia between the mob
and the defenderswith orders to guardevery windowand door of the buildingto
preventanyone fromenteringor leaving.A tense cease-firewas established.37
With ehe mob incensed over the murderof Gale, the wounds of its friends,and
the presenceof the Federalists,there was nothing for Barneyto do but negotiate.
Finally,aidedby MayorJohnson, who arrivedfrom the countryzGeneralStrickers
and a numberof other gentlemen, a compromisewas workedout. The Federalist
defenders surrenderedto the authorities for protection.Since they were to be
placedin the jail for safe keepingthe mob could be assuredthat the "murderers"
of Gale wouldnot go free.
As daylightarrivedone last insult was offered to the people of Baltimore.The
Federalistswanted to call for carriagesto convey them to the jailhouse. Stricker
thought it best to submit this proposalto the sovereigntyof the people and asked
the mob if they would allow this. The idea of these 'imurderers"ridingto prison
in a symbol of wealth and prestige was unacceptableto the crowd. Instead of
carriages they shouted that the Federalists should be taken in carts-the
554
journal of social history
common mode of conveyance for criminals and victims of the mob.38 It was
decidedthat the processionwould walkand at about seven o'clock the Federalists
filed out of the house they had defended all night. The mob surroundedthe
twenty-threefearless Federalistsand their meager guard.39Insults were heaped
upon the defendersall the way to the jail house and some stones were thrownat
both the guardand their charge.A fife and drum serenadedthis odd assemblage
with the "Rogue's March.'z40
All in all, the Republicanleadershipcould heave a sigh of relief that Tuesday
morning. The situation had been on the brink of disaster, yet somehow that
disasterhad been averted. The mob appearedsatisfiedto see the Federalistsput
intojail. The militiahad to be calledupon but it had provedunnecessaryfor them
to use force. Ultimately, it was the persuasive powers of the city's leadership
which held sway.Furthermore,the Republicanpoliticians,and the populacethey
represented, were once again assured that the insidious Federalist tabloid was
silenced in Baltimore.Two men lay dead-one was only a spectator-but still
the Anglo-Americanmob traditionwas left somewhat intact. Had the mob been
unrestrainedin their attackon the CharlesStreet fortressand had MajorBarney
and company failed in quelling the disturbancethat night that traditionwould
have been whollyabandoned.
By no means, however, was the CharlesStreet disturbancecast completelyin
the traditionalmold of the Anglo-Americanmob. Firstof all, the rioters,both the
Federalistdefendersand the Republicansin the street, were much too violent and
preoccupiedwith inflictingphysicaldamageon one another.Normally,riots in the
Anglo-Americanmob traditionfocused on property,not persons.Second, had the
informalmethods of social control been fully operative,the mob, seeing so many
of the city's elite attemptingto restrainthem, would have feared recognitionin
the growing daylight and dispersed as Major Barney expected. Instead their
numbersdoubled after dawn. General Strickerdid recognize many of the rioters
as being members of his militia brigadebut they almost uniformly ignored his
entreaties that morning to join the militaryescort and protect the Federalists.
They preferredto remainwithin the ranksof the mob ratherthan being recruited
for such an obnoxious duty.41Finally, the traditionalbonds of deference and
respect were sorely tested a number of times that night. Before marchingdown
Charles Street, Barney saw a group of men with muskets and a drum heading
towardsthe riot. He ran to interceptthem and in the ensuing scraphe was almost
bayonetted.In the midst of the fight one lad, 15 or 16 years old, shouted to the
man Barneywas wrestlingwith "give me the gun and I'll shoot the son of a bitch
in a minute.'42 Neither Barney'ssocial position nor his uniform intimidatedthis
young man. MajorBarneywas awareof this-hence his removalof the Orderof
Cincinnatiinsigniaand his aristocraticwhite feather.These symbolsof wealthand
prestige,whichshould have been assets in gainingthe deferenceof the mob were
now consideredliabilitieswhich were best discarded.In short, the Baltimoremob
appearedreadyto transcendthe boundariesof acceptedriotbehavior.
During the day, despite the mob's promisesto the contrary,the buildingat No.
45 Charles Street was destroyed. In marked contrast to the workmanlike
demolitionof the Federal-Republican
office in JuneSthis activitywas carriedon in
an unorganizedfashion by looters and scavengerswho grabbedwhat they coulds
down to the bricks and lumber, and then scurried off into the side streets of
Baltimore.Talk and rumorwere everywhere.Close to one thousand militiamen
were called for; only about forty reportedfor duty and since GeneralStrickerfelt
that the uniforms might anger the Baltimore citizenry they were dismissed
THEBALTIMORERIOTSOF 1812
555
withouteven going near the jailhouse. Crowds milled in and about the jail and
gazedat the Federalistprisonersto assure themselves that the "murderers"had
not been bailedout.43
That evening, afterthe militiawas dismissed, the crowdoutside the jail became
more hostile and threateneda generalassault. MayorJohnson stood in the front
of the door as the mob began to press towardsit. Once againhe hoped to curbthe
furor of the mob. As he was being swept aside he declared:"I am the mayorof
your city; they are my prisoners, and I must protect them.' Johnson recieved
several answers, but the one he remembered as the most vicious was "you
damn'd scoundreldon't we feed you, and is it not your duty to head and lead us
on to take vengeance for the murders committed."44For the first time that
summer MayorJohnson completelyfailedin a face to face confrontationwith the
mob. His personalauthoritymeant little to the riotersand in a perversesense of
democracythey viewed him as a mere hireling,dependentupon them for his very
sustenance and duty bound to lead them in their wild depredations. This
separationof personaland politicalauthorityleft the mayorhelpless and with the
protectionof a few gentlemenfriendsJohnson beata hastyretreat.
The mob, with the possible connivanceof the turnkey,was instantlyinside the
jailhouse. Confusion reigned and some of the Federalist prisoners escaped
through the crowd unscathed.Others, includingAlexander Contee Hanson and
the RevolutionaryWar generals Light Horse Harry Lee and James Maccuban
Lingan, did not. All told, eight or nine of these Federalistprisonersfell into the
hands of the mob and receiveda ferociousbeatingfrom fists, clubs, and whatever
else was handy: penknives were stuck into their faces and hot candle grease
droppedinto theireyes. GeneralLinganattemptedto addressthe mob and remind
them of his past services to the country,but the mob could not careless abouthis
personalstatureand proven patriotismand they turned upon him with renewed
vigor.Linganwas beatenuntil he stoppedmoving-by then he was dead.45
John Hall, one of the Federalistprisoners,vividlydescribedthe scene. As Hall
tried to run out of the jail he was caught by "two rough looking men" who
promised to take "care" of him. "They held me by the wrist for about ten
minutes, duringwhich I saw several of my friendsknockeddown and their blood
scattered all over the pavement . . . they either cut off or tore off my coat,
leaving none of it on me but the cape and the sleeves. Having thus securedmy
pockets,they tore my shirt leaving my bosom bare." He feared extra torture
because he was a resident of Baltimore. "I made another effort but just as I
escapedtheir hands, I receiveda blow on my head which broughtme senseless to
Hall made yet
the floor. I was revived by some one jumping on my arm ...."
another attempt to escape with the same results-more and harsher beating.
Finally he realizedthat every time he moved he attractedattention to himself as
being alive and decidedjust to lie there, playingdead. He was then thrownin a
heapwith the others who had fallenvictimto the mob.46
Althoughit may appearthat this torturewas senseless brutality,all of the mob's
actionswere symbolicallyimportant.47Hall mayhave felt thathis coat was tornoff
him to secure his pockets, but in that moment of riotous excitement, the "rough
looking men" who attackedhim were probablymore concerned with stripping
him of that importantsymbol of Hall's wealth and standing-his clothing.Each
of the Federalist victims had their clothes ripped off them and after the
"massacre" the jailhouse was strewn with "foreign clothing," "Montgomery
coats," and "VirginiaBoots."48So too, Hall's final realizationthat the only way
for him to survive the ordeal was to play dead is significant.Others among the
556
journalof socialhistory
victimsrelated how they came to the same conclusion;49in each case the mob
seemed to be demandingthat these membersof the Federalistelite surrender,at
last,to the forcefulwill of the people.GeneralLinganalone steadfastlyrefusedto
submitand his appeal,based upon his statureas an aged patricianand war hero,
wasrewardedwith the mob's beatingthe very life out of him.
After piling up their victims in front of the jailhouse the mob searched for
Hanson's body, planningspecial cruelties. But amidst the darkness, blood and
gore it was impossible for them to find Hanson in the stack of nearly naked
"corpses."50 In a society where personal recognition was crucial the mob's
inabilityto identifyHanson, who was no strangerto Baltimoreans,is curious. It
was almost as if the distinguishingcharacteristicswere purposefullybeaten off of
the faces of the Federalistvictims. For the moment Hanson, Lingan, Lee, Halls
and the others were no longer land owners, RevolutionaryWar heroes, lawyers,
or merchants,they were mere criminals,strippedof clothes and rank fit only to
be surrenderedto the city's medicaldoctorsas cadaversfor dissection.51
Reactionto the "massacre"was terrific.Federalists,with their families, began
to leave Baltimoreand it was feared that there would be a run on the banks.
Newpapersacross the country carried accounts of witnesses and some of the
victims. Even Republicanswere shocked. A few of the partyleaders expressed
sympathywith the aim of punishing the Federalist"murderers'7but almost all
were displeasedover the way this was done.52The mob meanwhileseemed to rule
triumphantin Baltimore.
In early August the relentless and intrepideditors of the Federal-Republican
mailed their paperto subscribersin Baltimore.What AlexanderContee Hanson
failed to do was now left to the United States government. Again the mob
threatened.This time, however, the authoritiesmoved quicklyand exhibited a
new willingness to use force. On August 4, without even pausing to get the
requisitemagistrates'signatureslGeneral Strickerorderedout the militia,which
reportedin strength.Contraryto the fearsof the Republicanleaders, therewas no
mutiny of the militiathat night and a chargeby two membersof a troop of horse
was enough to send the mob on its heels. For six nights thereafterthe militiawas
Baltimorehad had enough of mobs and on one
calledout to guardthe Post OfE1ce.
of those nights as many as seven hundredmen were in uniform.53That the old
techniques of riot control, using personal appeal and conciliation, were now
abandoned was further indicated when several ringleadersof the "massacre"
were arresteda few weeks later.Once againthe mob seemed readyto strike,only
now with the aim of setting the prisonersfree. Several companiesof the militia
were orderedout and artillerywas placedin the hall of the prison.54The barrelof a
cannon proved to be a far more effective deterrent to mob action than the
entreatiesof an unarmedmayor.The mob yieldedunderthe show of forceand its
powerwaned
Althoughthe viciousnessof the Baltimoreriots burnta deep markof infamyon
the conscience of America,so deep that twentyyears laterAlexis de Tocqueville
would hear of the riots on his visit to America and for generations Baltimore
would be known as a "mobtown," the summer of 1812 marks no irreversible
breakwith the past.55Mobs would still occasionallybe raisedin the spiritof the
Anglo-American riot tradition as whole communities attempted to pure
themselves of undesirables,be they abolitionists grain hoarders,or criminals.6
Yet the Baltimoreriots of 1812 are an importantbenchmarkin the history of
Americanpopulardisorderbecause they suggest the outlines of a new trend of
THE BALTIMORERIOTSOF 1812
557
rioting in which the larger community was divided into warring factions of
competingsub-communitiesand because they presagethe intense racial,ethnic,
and class conflicts of JacksonianAmerica.s7Compressed in the shift from the
in
organizedand workmanlikedestructionof the ofElceof the Federal-Repulican
June to the nearanarchicand brutal"massacre' at the jailhouse is an example of
the disintegration of the traditional Anglo-American mob behavior and the
emergence of a new form of rioting representativeof the heterogeneous and
confused democratic society. As the mob moved from objects which were
disapprovedby the entire communityto objects detested by only one segment of
the communitynew tensions withinsociety were exposed-in Baltimorethis was
shown by the attackson blacks, Irishmen and grain ships. Furthermore,these
same tensions could be expressed with an added vehemence and savagery,as in
the 'imassacre" at the jailhouse, which was unlike anything ever experienced
under the old norms of the Anglo-Americanmob tradition.Yet even at-its most
violent the mob retaineda purposefulnessin its action, revealed in the demand
that the Federalists symbolicallysurrendertheir lives, wealth, and prestige or
suffer death at the hands of the mob. The Republicanelite did not recognizethis
purposefulness;they only saw a bloodthirstymob severing its unwrittencontract
with the elite and offeringan unprecedentedchallengeto the social order.All that
the elite city ofElcialscould do was to slowly react to this challenge, hesitating
becausethey were loath to give up the deferentialperquisitesthey had enjoyedfor
so long.
With this failureof the old informalmeans of social control the mob denied all
paternalisticauthorityand asserteda new, purelydemocraticorderof society.58In
response the elite had to turnto its one remainingtool to controlsocialdisorderthe use of force. But no longerdid that force act as a mere bulwarkto the personal
authorityof the magistrate.Nor did that force represent the coercion of some
outside power-as did the use of the militaryin the Shays' Whiskey, and Fries
Rebellions. Rather the force used representeddivisions within the community.
Most adult males in Baltimorein 1812 were in the militiaand the failureof that
militia to report for duty until after the 4'massacre" as well as the presence of
some militiamen in the crowdon CharlesStreet, indicatesthat there was a broad
level of supportfor the mobwsactivities up to the fateful night at the jailhouse.
However, after the 'imassacre' that support was no longer so widespread.By
musteringto defend the Post OfElcein August one segment of Baltimoreshowed
that the consensus behind the mob had ended. Battle lines were drawn,loyalties
tested, and luckily for Baltimore, the mob was sufficiently cowed by men in
uniformthat furtherbloodshedwas avoided.
Under the old Anglo-Americanmob traditionit was assumed that the entire
communitysharedcertainbasicvalues and could agree on when the "laws of the
land must sleep." Now, however, the bloodstained halls of the Baltimore
jailhouse stood as a gruesome testament to the varietyof meaning a diverse and
complicatedsociety could have for the "laws of natureand reason." As a result
the mob lost whateverlegitimacyit mayhave once had in the eyes of the elite. The
trend towards condemnation of "politics out of doors' became even more
evident as the nineteenthcenturywore on. Rioting, whichoccurredmore often in
the earlynationalperiodthan is generallyrealized,becamea majorsocial problem
by the Jacksonianera and was an importantimpetus behind the formation of
urbanpolice forces.S9As the elitess attitudetowardsthe mob hardenedthere was
an increasedwillingnessto use force to supressany disturbance,and the historyof
the nineteenth centuryis marredby a continualchronicleof bloodyhead-to-head
combatbetweenthe militaryand the mob.60
558
journalof socialhistory
In the wake of the Baltimorerioting in 1812 a few observers recognizedthat
there had been some greatchangesin society. GeorgeWashingtonParkeCustis, a
Federalistspokesman,gave the funeralorationfor the martyredGeneral Lingan.
In the "good old Federalisttimes," declaredCustis, no one would have dared
touch Lingan,and his venerablepresencealong would have been enough to hold
back the mob. Those halcyon days were now gone, and Custis cautioned, soon
every city wouldhave its own Baltimoremob.61
PaulA. Gilje
Brown UniversiW
FOOTNOTES
1. Some historians reject the term "mob" and prefer the less perjorative "crowd."
However, "mob" has been used here beeauseit is what is found in the sourees. "Crowd"
seldom appearsin the primarymaterialand when it does it ordinarilyrefers to spectators
watching riot aetivity. "Mobs," on the other hand, were the perpetratorsof the riot.
Furthermore,"mob" was also used as a generalslurand tagwordfor the lowerelasses.This
ambiguitysuggests that the elite not only mistrustedthe lower classes but feared them as
well. For interestingdiseussionson the definitionof "mob' see: WilliamAnders Smith
"Anglo-AmerieanSoeietyand the Mob" (Ph.D. diss., ClaremontGraduateSehool, 1965)
10-12; and George Rude, "The London SMob'of the EighteenthCentury,1'in Parisand
Londonin theEighteenth
Century:
StudiesinPopu/arProtest(New York, 1971), 293-318.
2. This is but a briefsummaryof a complex bodyof literature.The mainworksinclude:E.P.
Thompson, 'iThe MoralEeonomyof the EnglishCrowd," PastandPresent,51 (1971), 76136; Thompson, "PatrieianSoeiety, PlebianCulture," Journalof SocialHistory,7 (1974),
382-405;Thompson, "Eighteenth-eenturyEnglishSociety:Class StruggleWithoutClass,"
SocialfiIistory,
3 (1978), 133-165;George Rude, TheCrowdin History:A Studyin Franceand
England,1730-1848(New York, 1964); R.B. Rose, "EighteenthCentury Priee Riots and
Publie Policy in England," International
Reviewof SocialHistory,6 (1961), 277-292; John
Brewer,Part IdeologyandPopularPoliticsat theAccessionof GeorgeIII (Cambridge,1976)
PartIII;PaulineMaier, FromResistanceto Revolution:Colonia/Radicalsand theDevelopment
of AmericanOpposition
to Britain,1765-1776(New York, 1972), 3-48; Gordon S. Wood, "A
Note on the Mobs in the AmerieanRevolution," Williamand ANary
Quarterly,
3d Ser., 23
(1966), 635-642; John Philip Reid, 'iIn a Defensive Rage: The Use of the Mob, the
Justifieationin Lawand the Comingof the AmerieanRevolution," New YorkUniversiw
Law
Review,49 (1974), 1043-1091;Smith, "Anglo-AmerieanSoeietyand the Mob;" andCharles
Tilly, "Colleetive Violenee in EuropeanPerspeetive," in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted
RobertGurr, eds., TheAlistoryof Violencein America:Historicaland Comparative
Perspectives
(New York, 1969), 4-45.
3. Thompson,'iMoralEconomy,"76-136.
4. Maier,Resistance,passim.
5. The elite viewed riot as a "calamityto be avoided if at all possible.'7Thompson, "Moral
Economy,"98, 120-126.
6. E.P. Thompsonemphasizesthe differeneesbetween what he calls patrieiansoeiety anck
plebianeulturein two reeentartieleson eighteentheenturyEngland.Althoughhe fallsshort
of eallingthis a elass alignment1he does assert "The mob may not have been noted for an
impeeeableeonseiousnessof elass; but the rulersof Englandwere in no doubt at all that it
[the mob] was a horizontal sort of beast." Thompson also points out that the gentry
tolerated mobs as a part of the priee they paid for a limited monarehyand weak state.
"PatrieianSoeiety,PlebianCulture" 397; and i'Eighteenth-eentury
EnglishSoeiety," 145.
THE BALTIMORERIOTSOF 1812
559
7. Some historianshave stressedthe differencesbetween the aims of the elite and the aims
of the people in the riots leading up to the American Revolution. Jesse Lemisch, i;The
AmericanRevolutionSeen From the Bottom Up" in BartonBernstein,ed., Towardsa New
Past:DissentingEssaysin AmericanHistory(New York, 1968), 3-45; Lemisch, "JackTar in
the Streets:MerchantSeamen in the Politicsof RevolutionaryAmerica," WilliamandMaly
Quarterly,3d Ser., 25 (1968), 371-407; Dirk Hoerder, Peopleand Mobs: CrowdActionin
MassachusettsDuringtheAmericanRevolution,1765-1780(Berlin,1971);Hoerder,"Boston
Leadersand Boston Crowds, 1765-1776," in Alfred Young, ed., TheAmericanRevolution:
Explorationsin the Historyof AmericanRadicalism(DeKalb, Ill., 1976), 233-271; Hoerder,
"'Mobs, A Sort of Them at Least, Are Constitutional;'The AmericanRevolution,Popular
Studies,21 (1976), 289-306.
Participation,andSocialCharge,"AmerikastudienJAmerican
8. Of course the original English Riot Act of 1715 was intended to strengthen the
magistrate'shand by makingriot a felony and allowingthe use of coercionwithoutliability.
Yet Englishsensibilitiesdictatedrestrainingthe use of forcewith the odd resultof givingthe
mob an hour of unmolested freedom after the Riot Act was read. The justice, however,
could use that hour to persuadethe mob to disperse,that is if he wantedto limitthe mob's
activitytwith the Riot Act and threat of force acting only as an added rationalefor his
influence over the mob. On the origins of the Riot Act see Max Beloff, PublicOrderand
I660-1714(London, 1938), 136-137.
PopularDisturbance,
9. Maierz Resistance,16-20; Thompson, "PatricianSociety, Plebian Culture," 403-405;
of
TheImpactof Crimeon theDeveJopment
David R. Johnson, Policingthe UrbanUnderworld:
1800-1887(Philadelphia,1979),13-14.
theAmericanPolice,
10. Furthermoreza magistratesor anyone who would supporthim, might himself be liable
to a suit or criminalchargesif excess forcewere used. Maier, Resistance,19.
11. Thompson,'iMoralEconomy," 121-126
12. Thompson,4'PatricianSociety PlebianCulture,'t 404-405.
13. Two articleson the Baltimoreriots have recently appeared.Frank A. CassellS"The
Great Baltimore Riot of 1812," MarylandHistorical Magazine, 70 (1975), 241-258,
concentrateson the politicalcontlictand the apparentbreakdownof democracy.Donald R.
Hickey, "The Darker Side of Democracy: The Baltimore Riots of 1812," Maryland
7 (1976), 1-20, is more concernedwith the threatposed to the libertyof the press.
Afistorian,
Alexis de Tocquevilleused the riotsas a i'strikingexample
Both echo earlierinterpretationsv
of the excesses to whichdespotismof the majoritymay lead,5'J.P. Mayerzed., Democracyin
America(GardenCity, N.Y., 1969), 252 fn. HenryAdamsemphasizedthe politicalconflictin
of JamesMadison,VI
his Historyof the UnitedStatesof America:DuringtheFirstAdministration
(New York, 1931) 405-408. Gelnn Tucker, Poltroonsand Patriots:A PopularAccountof the
Warof 1812 (New York, 1954), 136-144,focuseson the freedomof the pressissue. See also
RichardBuel, Jr., Securingthe Revolution:Ideolog in AmericanPolitics,1789-1815(Ithaca,
The
1972), 286-288;and David HackettFischer, TheRevolutionof AmericanConservarism:
(New York, 1965), 156-158.
Democracy
Parwin theEraof Jeffersonian
Federalist
of Grievances. . . on theSubjectof theRecentRiotsin theCityof
14. Reportof theCommittee
(Annapolis,1813)l 1-2.
takenfortheCommittee
withtheDepositions
Together
Baltimores
July 1, 1812.WilliamGwyn an eye witnessconfirmsthis
15 AnnapolisMarylandRepublican,
impression,"The workof the destructionwas performedwith greatregularityand but little
noise." Report. . ., 21. See also AnnapolisMarylandGazette July 2 1812; and John
Mss.,
HowardPayne to Virgil Maxcyl June 24, 1812, Yol. 31, Galloway-Maxcy-Markoe
Libraryof Congress.
560
of social history
journal
alwaysaccompaniedby a group
Johnsonseldom confronteda mob alone. He wasalmost
16.
and bolsteredboth his
comitatus
posse
informal
an
as
"gentlemen" friends who acted
of
acquaintance,before
an
told
and
this
and unofficialposition.The mayorrecognized supportedby only a few friendsat
offlcial
be
could
he
"if
that
disturbance,
later
a
stop
to
attempting
to prevent mischief." Report. . ..
commencement . . . Iof a riot] he might be able
the
161.
John Scott also made a futile
Report. . ., 242, 160-161, 199, 336, 344-345. Iudge
17.
153-154.
119-120,
.,
.
.
Report
to influencethe mob.
attempt
B. Wheeler, iiUrban Politics in
For Johnson's role in Baltimorepoliticssee William
18.
in the Seaport Cities in the
Parties
Political
of
Development
The
Republic:
Nature's
and WilburH. Hunter,
168-169;
1967),
Virginia,
of
Era" (Ph.D. diss., University
Federalist
Anthem," American
National
America's
War:Its GallantDefence produced
i'Baltimore's
politicssee Wheeler,"Urban
Baltimore's
of
structure
general
the
For
31.
3 (1952),
Heritage
Beginningsin Maryland"
144-120; Dorothy Marie Brown, "Party Battles and
Politics,"
"The Emergenceof
Verstandig,
Loverly
Lee
diss., GeorgetownUniversity, 1961);
(Ph.D.
1970); J.R. Poleo
University,
Brown
theTwo Party System in Maryland"(Ph.D. diss., Maryland, 1790-1812," Maryland
in
Statistics
Election
and
"ConstitutionalReform
Structureof Baltimore's
A{agazine,55 (1960) 275-292; Frank A. Cassell, "The et al., eds.7 Law, Societ,
Historical
Land,
C.
Aubrey
in the Age of Jefferson, 1795-1812,"in
Politics
L. Marx Renzulli,Jr., Matyland,
Politicsin EarlyMaryland(Baltimore,1977), 277-296; H. Ridgeway, i'Community
and
Whitman
1972);
N.J.,
TheFederalistYears(Rutherford,
Historical
A8aryland
BaltimoreDuring the First and Second Party System,"
Leadership:
Federalist Revivalb1808iiMaryland's
Sapio,
Victor
and
334-349;
(1976),
71
Magazine
(1969), 1-17.
1812,"ANarylandHistoricalMagazine64
had strict laws imposingheavy
19.The terrapinshell was to be used because Maryland
321-324;and New YorkEvening
292-296,
174,
,
.
.
.
Report
feathering.
and
for tar
penalties
Post,July 13, 1812.
20. Report. . . , 161, 326-327.
to Maxcy, June 24, 1812, Vol. 31
21. Report. . ., 3, 63-65 161-164, 222; and Payne
Mss., Libraryof Congress.
Galloway-Maxcy-Markoe
and counter-theaterbetween the elite
22. E.P. Thompson examines the role of theater
Plebian Culture," 382-405; and
Societys
(patricians)and the mob (plebs). "Patrician
.
.
EnglishSociety," 133-165.Report . , 161-164,300-320.
"Eighteenth-century
process" is from Rhys Isaac,'iDramatizingthe Ideology
23. The term "oral dramaturgical
to 1776," Wil/iamandMaryQtlarterly,
of Revolution:PopularMobilizationin Virginia,1774
357-385.
(1976),
3dSer., 32
The Genesis of a Community" (Ph.D.
24. Denis RankinClark, "Baltimore, 1729-1829:
P. Gould, "EconomicCausesof
Clarence
diss., The CatholicUniversityof America, 1976); Presentedto CharlesMcleanAndrewsby
the Rise of Baltimore,"in Essaysin ColonialHistozyM. Bernard,'iA Portraitof Baltimore:
his Students(New Haven, 1931), 225-231; Richard
American City," MarylandHistorical
Economic and OccupationalPattern in an Early
and Baltimore,1790-1840:A
"Philadelphia
Garret,
69 (1974), 341-361;Jane N.
A{agazine,
HistoricalA6agazine,55 (1960) 1-13; James S.
Study of Intra-RegionalUnity," lWaryland
and CulturalChanges, 1800-1850,"in Richard
Social
Development,
Van Ness, i'Economic
(Baltimore,1974), 156-238.
1632-1974
History
A
Walsh,etal., eds., Maryland,
of ArtisanProductionin Baltimore.
25. CharlesG. Steffen, "Changesin the Organization
101-117.
(1979),
36
Ser.
3d
Quarterly,
Mary
and
William
1790to 1820,"
THEBALTIMORERIOTSOF 1812
561
26. Report. . ., 3, 149, 160-163, 23; David Hoffmanto Maxcy, July 11, 1812, Vol. 31,
Mss., Libraryof Congress.
Galloway-Maxcy-Markoe
27. Report. . . , 169, 177, 200, 203.
July 15,1812; Report...
July 13,1812; New YorkSpectator,
28. New YorkEveningBost,
50-51,243, 254, 346-347.
29. Report. . ., 22-24, 97, 160-162,337. The militiawas calledout to protectthe African
church,but there was no recordedclash or confrontationwith the mob. Report. . ., 3,
149.
30. For Hansons background see Joseph Herman Schauinger, "Alexander Contee
Hanson,FederalistPartisan,"MarylandHistoricalMagazine,35 (1940), 354-364.
Federal31. Report. . . , 3-4; Niles' WeeklyRegister(Baltimore),Aug. 8, 1812; Georgetown
July27, 1812.
Republican,
32. Report . . ., 5; A.C. Hanson to Robert Goodloe Harper, July 24, 1812, HarperPenningtonCollection,MarylandHistoricalSociety; An ExactandAuthenticNarrativeof the
EventsWhichTookPlace In Baltimore,on the 27th and 28th of JulyLast}CarefullyCollected
FromSome °S the Sufferersand Eyewitnessess. . . (n.p., 1812); Grace Overmyer, "The
58 (1963), 54-61.
BaltimoreMobsandJohn HowardPayne,s' MaClandHistoricalMagazinen
BaltimorelWob
33. Report. . ., 56, 282-284, 303-306; Henry Lee, CorrectAccount°S tE7e
Narrative. . ., 6-10; Niles' WeeklyRegister
(Winchester,1814), 6-8; An ExactandAtlthentic
(Baltimore)Aug. 8, 1812.
34. Report . . ., 25, 230-232, 257-260, 279-280, 308; Jacob Wagner to Alexander C.
MagrlldersDec. 3, 1812, from Executive Archives, printedin "BaltimoreRiot of 1812,"
HistoricalMagazine,5 (1910), 191.
ANaryland
35. Report. . . 260.
36. A list of the HussarsandChausseursof the Baltimoremilitiafor 1814was examinedand
the names there checked for occupationsin the city directory.Of the 81 Hussarsonly 32
were not listed.Of the 49 names in the directory,27 were listed as merchants.A numberof
others had positions like ';cashierof the city," "masonic lottery ofElce" "atty-at-lawts'
i;Presidentof the Levy Courtanda J.P ," etc. Some hadonly theiraddresslisted, suggesting
that they were men of means without an occupation.There were very few tradesmen In
contrast, the 47 Chausseurswere less likely to be listed-only 23 were found in the
directory.Otherthan the officers, a few of whom were merchants,the companyhad more
mundaneoccupationslike those listed in the text. A list of the Baltimoremilitiaby company
September12 & 13
can be found in The CitizenSoldiersat NorffiPointand FortA6cHenry,
(Baltimores1889); the directoryused was John Lakin, TheBaltimoreDirectoryand Register
for 1814-1815: Containingthe Names, Residence and Occupationsof the Citizens . . .
(Baltimore,1814).
37. Report. . ., 27, 150-151, 192-197,211-213,235-236,260-272,316, 320, 339-343;Lee,
CorrectAccount. . ., 8-12; An Exact and AuthenticNarrative. . ., 10-13; Niles' Weekly
Register(Baltimore),Aug. 8, 1812.
38. Report. . ., 288-289, 312-313. Criminalsat this time were executed from a cart.
(Baltimore,1829?), 227.
ThomasW. GrifElth,Annalsof Baltimore
562
of socialhistory
journal
othershad been in the Charles
Twenty-threeFederalistswere takeninto custody.Many the nightor had been sent out
39.
during
time
some
fortressthatnightbut eitherescaped
Street
"The Baltimore Mobst'' 191;
tocontact city officials or reconnoiter. Overmyer,
282-284.
259,
16-18,
,
. . .
Report
317; An Exact and Authentic
40.Report . . ., 118, 191, 211-212, 224-225, 305,
14-16.
.,
.
.
Narrative
41.Report. . . , 79, 165-166.
42.Report. . ., 259-260.
Aug. 8a 1812;
43.Report. . ., 132, 135, 227-228, 290; Niles' WeeklyRegister(Baltimore),
1812.
30,
July
Advertiser,
Daily
American
's
Poulson
Phi/adelphia
44.Report. . . , 170, 48, 190.
Narrative. . . , 27-35?60-62, Niles'
45.Report. . . , 7-8) 28, 171; An Exactsnd Authentic
1812.
8,
Aug.
WeeklyRegister(Baltimore),
(Philadelphia,1812), 55-59.
of theRecentRiotsat Baltimore
PapersIllustrative
46.Interesting
extremecases, as in the religious
47.NatalieZemon Davis remindsus thateven in the mostway."Thereis symbolicmeaning
mindless
a
in
act
not
do
"crowds
studied,
has
she
violence
Rites of Violence:ReligiousRiot in
behindthe form and occasion of that violence. "The 51-91, especially91.
(1973),
Present59
France,"Pastand
Sixteenth-Century
center in Marylandknown for its
48. Montgomerycounty was an importantFederalist Report. . . , 275, 295.
in.
lived
Hanson
county
the
gentry.It was also
aristocratic
tarredand feathered, as well as
49. John Thomson, who was taken from the jailhouse,
maltreatment. After the
further
escape
to
death
feigned
have
to
tortured, claimed
Hall, and Hanson all
Kilgour,
Charles
WarF1eld,
"massacre"Henry Nelson, Peregrine
their senses"
retained
"perfectly
they
that
signeda joint statementin which they asserted
betrayingany signs of life. or
without
sustained
"they
that
and
ordeal
the
throughout
the tortures that were inflictedon
gratifyingtheir butcherswith a groan or murmer, all
. . ., 29-30.
. . ., 45; AnExactandAuthenticNarrative
them." InterestingRapers
Hanson personally but could not
50. At least one member of the mob said he knew
Narrative. . . a 30.
Authentic
and
Exact
n
A
recognizehim amongthe "corpses."
. . ., 28.
51. Report. . ., 7-8, 294-295;AnExactandAathenticNarrative
Aug. 3, 1812, Vol. 31, Galloway52. Report. . ., 29, 251; WilliamLansdaleto Maxcy,Poulsons AmericanDailyAdvertiser,
Maxcy-MarkoeMss., Libraryof Congress;Philadelphia
1, 1812. Meetings against the
July 30, 1812, New YorkEveningPost, July 31, and Aug.
YorkCity, Boston, and other
New
counties,
Maryland
several
in
held
Baltimoremob were
castigatingHanson et
reaction,
Republic
typical
For
Papers. . ., 66-80.
places. Interesting
AnnapolisA8aryland
see
brutality,
mob's
the
al. for provoking the mob while deploring
1812.
12,
S,
Aug.
29,
July
Republican,
Pringleto RobertSmith, Aug. 5,
53. Report. . ., 8-9, 155-159, 171, 177, 200-201;Mark
Society.
1812,Letterbookof MarkPringle,MarylandHistorical
54. Report. . . , 9, 216-217.
THEBALTIMORERIOTSOF 1812
563
55. De Tocqueville,Mayer,ed., Democracyin America,252 fn. Of course Baltimorewould
have plentyof other riots in the nineteenthcenturyto reinforcethe epithetof "mobtown,"
but as J. ThomasScharfpointsout, the riots in 1812were "the chief cause of the evil repute
into which Baltimorefell." Historyof BaltimoreCiS andCount FromtheEarliestPeriodto the
Men(Philadelphia,1881),
Sketchesof theirRepresentative
PresentDay: IncludingBiographical
(New York, 1951), 142-155.
780-781;see also FrancisF. Bierne, TheAmiableBaltimoreans
56. A number of anti-abolitionistriots were apparentlyin the spiritof this tradition.The
flour riots of New York City in 1837 and the 1863 bread riot in Richmond,Virginiaalso
seem to fit this model, while the long vigilantetraditionin Americais probablyderivedfrom
of ProperSandStanding:"
the Anglo-Americanmob tradition.LeonardRichards,"Gentlemen
Anti-AbolitionMobs in JacksonianAmerica(New York, 1970); Richard Hofstadter and
Afistory(New York, 1970), 126MichaelWallace,eds., AmericanViolence:A Documentary
129; WilliamJ. Kimball,"The BreadRiot in Richmond,1863," Civil WarHistoly7 (1961),
149-154;RichardMaxwellBrown, Strainof Violence:HistoricalStudiesof AmericanViolence
(NewYork, 1975).
and Vigilantism
57. The bulkof riotingin the nineteenthcenturyappearsto be of this type.Recentworkson
Jacksonian rioting which emphasize racial, ethnic, and class divisions include: Michael
Feldberg, "Urbanizationas a Cause of Violence:Philadelphiaas a Test Case," in Allen F.
A Historyof EthnicGroupsand
Davis and MarkH. Haller,eds., ThePeoplesof Philadelphia:
Lower Class Life, 1790-1940 (Philadelphia, 1973), 53-69; Feldberg, "The Crowd in
PhiladelphiaHistory: A Comparative Perspective," LaborHistory15 (1974), 323-336;
(Westport,Conn., 1975);
Riotsof 1844:A Studyin EthnicConf7ict
Feldberg, ThePhiladelphia
David Grimsted, "Riotingin its JacksonianSetting," AmericanHistoricalReview77(1972),
361-397;TheodoreK. Hammet, "Two Mobs of JacksonianBoston:Ideologyand Interest,"
Journalof AmericanlAistory62(1976), 845-868;VincentP. LannieandBernardC. Diethorn,
"For the Honor and Glory of God: The PhiladelphiaBible Riots of 1840," Histoty °S
EducationQuarterly8 (1968), 44-106; Bruce Laurie, "Fire Companies and Gangs in
Southwark:the 1840's' in Davis and Haller, eds., Peoplesof Philadelphia,71-87; David
Montgomery,"The Shuttleand the Cross:Weaversand Artisansin the KennsingtonRiots
of 1844," Journalof Social Afistoly,5 (1972), 187-218; John Charles Schneider, "Mob
Violence and PublicOrder in the AmericanCity, 1830-1865" (Ph.D. diss., Universityof
Minnesota,1971); Schneider,"Urbanizationand the Maintenanceof Order:Detroit, 18241847," MichiganHistory60 (1976), 260-281;Paul Weinbaum,"Temperance,Politics,and
(1975), 246-270.
the New YorkCityRiots of 1857," New YorkHistoricalSocietyQuarterlyS9
58. There is some evidence suggestingthat even the membershipof the mob was changed
in the
over the course of the summer.The men arrestedin the fall of 1812for participating
office (N-11) were recruitedfrom a wide spectrumof
destructionof the Federal-Republican
society, includinga keeperof bathsworth over $1000, a grocerworth$133, three artisans
an unpropertieddruggistand his son, some journeymen, a drummerin the army, a sailor
from a privateer,and a numberof unidentifiedothers.The men triedwith the CharlesStreet
riot (N= 16) includeda few less men of middlingpropertyand a numberof journeymen.At
the "massacre," however, none of those charged with the murder of General Lingan
(N= 16) seem to have been artisansor men with property.Those chargedwith the tar and
feathering of John Thomson (N=12), which occurred the night of the "massacre,"
includeda few men who had some property:the same keeperof bathslisted above, a grocer
worth $255, and a cooper worth $90. There were also a number of unpropertiedand
unidentifiedindividuals.Thus, despitethe overlappingof one or two persons,thereseems to
be a generalshift towarda mob composedof journeymenandthe unpropertied.
In each phaseof the riot only about half of the men named in the court docketscould be
reasonablyidentifledusingdirectories.A tradesmanwas considereda journeymanif he had
less than$100 of taxablepropertyor if he was not listed in the tax recordsat all. There were
othersarrestedfor variousintermediatedisturbancesbetweenthe destructionof the Federaloffice and the "massacre."See BaltimoreCourtof Oyerand TerminerDockets,
Republican
564
journalof socialhistory
July and SeptemberTems, 1812, MarylandHall of Records, Annapolis,WilliamFry, rhe
BaltimoreDirectoryforl810. . . (Baltimore,1810), Fry, Fry'sBaltimoreDirectorForthe
Year
1812 . . . (Baltimore,1812); James Lakin, TheBaltimoreDirectoryand Register,for 18141815 . . . (Baltimore,1814); BaltimoreCity Assessment Records, 1813, BaltimoreBureau
of Archives.
59. My researchon populardisorderin the early nationalperiod has revealed nearly200
instancesof riot between 1793and 1829in New YorkCityalone. PaulA. Gilje, 'iMobocracy:
Popular Disturbances in Post-RevolutionaryNew York City 1783-1829" (Ph.D. diss.
BrownUniversity,forthcoming).For the developmentof Americanpolicesee: RogerLane
Policingthe City:Boston,1822-1885(Cambridge,Mass., 1967), James F. Richardson, The
New YorkPolice:ColonialTimesto 1901 (New York, 1970); WilburR. Miller, Cops and
Bobbies:Police Authorit in New Yorkand Londonl1830-1870(Chicago, 1977), 3Ohnson
Po1icing
theUrbanUnderworld.
60. FrederickT. Wilson, FederalAid in DomesticDisturbances,1 787-1903 (Washington
D.C., 1903); Robert Rheinders, "Militia and Public Order in Nineteenth Century
America,"Journalof AmericanStudies11 (1977), 81-101.Ultimatelythe trendimpliedin the
last stages of the Baltimoreriots is seen most starklyin the great draft riots of New York
City, 1863, in which the riotersand the militaryfought pitchedbattlesin the streets. For a
nineteenth-centuryview of that and other disturbancessee Joel Tyler Headley, TheGreat
Riots of New York,1712-1873.Introductionby Thomas Rose and James Rodgers (New
York, 1970;originallypublished1873). The best modernaccountof the draftriots is Adrian
Cook, TheArmiesof theStreets:TheNew YorkCityDraftRiotsof 1863(Lexington,Kentucky,
1974).
61. George WashingtonParkeCustis, Oration
byCustis. . . withanAccount
of theFuneral
So/emnities
inhonorof . . . Lingan
(Washington,D.C. 1812), 13, 18-20.