United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia

Netherlands Institute of
Military History
Van Alkemadelaan 786
PO Box 90701
2509 LS The Hague
Netherlands
Contact
United Nations Advance Mission in
Cambodia (UNAMIC), United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia
(UNTAC)
Duration:
Number of military personnel:
Decorations:
Fatalities:
UNAMIC 18 February 1992 - 15 March
1992; UNTAC 15 March 1992 - 18
November 1993
UNAMIC 27; UNTAC 2,609
1
2
Background
In 1954, the French colonial empire in South-east Asia collapsed and the French
colony of Cambodia was granted independence. After the declaration of
independence, the Cambodian sovereign, Norodom Sihanouk, gave up the throne
in order to become first prime minister and then president. In the 1960s,
however, Sihanouk saw his position seriously threatened by both left-wing and
right-wing factions. He was deposed after a right-wing coup in 1970. Royalists
and communists organised themselves into militant resistance movements, the
hard core of which was formed by the communist Khmer Rouge, which received
support from North Vietnam. The right-wing government quickly lost its grip on
the country and in April 1975, the Khmer Rouge marched into the Cambodian
capital Phnom Penh. The next year, Pol Pot appointed himself as the undisputed
leader of the Khmer Rouge. He isolated Cambodia from the outside world and
embarked on a regime of ruthless politics and social revolution. This reign of
terror is estimated to have cost the lives of more than a million Cambodians.
The aim of the Khmer Rouge was to restore the lost Khmer kingdom of the Middle
Ages to its former glory, at the expense of the neighbouring countries of Vietnam,
Laos and Thailand. In response, Vietnam sided with the Cambodian resistance
against Pol Pot’s bloody regime. The support was of such magnitude that the
Vietnamese troops in turn captured Phnom Penh in 1979. The ousted Khmer
Rouge began a fierce guerrilla war against the new pro-Vietnamese regime.
Prince Sihanouk's royalists, known as the "White Khmer", continued their military
actions. It was another ten years before the Cambodian resistance and the
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Vietnamese-backed Cambodian government were ready to come to the
negotiating table to resolve their differences.
Mandate, tasks and execution
In 1989, the UN, Indonesia and France appointed themselves as mediators in the
Cambodian civil war. In April 1991, the warring parties agreed to a ceasefire.
Prince Sihanouk asked the UN in August 1991 to send observers to Cambodia
urgently to oversee observance of the ceasefire. In response, the Security Council
decided in resolution 717 on 16 October 1991 to set up the United Nations
Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC). During a new round of negotiations, the
parties then looked into the definitive peace plan and, on 30 October 1991,
ratified the Paris Accords. In support of the implementation of these Accords,
UNSC resolution 745 of 28 February 1992 gave rise to the United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The comprehensive mandate for this
'second-generation' peace mission came into force on 15 March 1992 with a
duration of eighteen months. UNAMIC was to be dissolved as soon as UNTAC
became operational. The mandate for this ‘advance mission’ was, however,
expanded on 8 January 1992 in order to be able to deal urgently with the acute
threat of mines.
The implementation of the peace accord in Cambodia was conducted in phases.
The first phase commenced on 30 October 1991, immediately after the signing of
the Paris Accords. The main tasks were to monitor the ceasefire and to clear
mines from vital areas. UNTAC took over these tasks in March 1992 and also
oversaw the return of refugees and the repatriation of all foreign, non-UN units,
together with their weapons and equipment. The second phase started on 13
June 1992 and concentrated on the cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation
of the military personnel of the four Cambodian parties. The third phase began in
October 1992: the organisation of the elections, which were to be held in May
1993.
Dutch participation in UNAMIC
The Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs informed the House on 31 January
1992 that they had agreed to the participation of 27 military personnel in UNAMIC
to eliminate the problem of mines. The Royal NL Navy’s Diving and Mine Disposal
Group and the Royal NL Army’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal Service would each
supply a training team and a supervising team, the former consisting of seven
members, the latter of three. Together with two staff officials, these teams were
assigned to the Mine Training and Coordination Unit (MTCU). The other five
military personnel were assigned to staff functions in the Planning and Liaison Cell
at UNAMIC’s headquarters.
The Dutch staff officials arrived in the Cambodian capital on 18 and 27 February
1992. The start of the major operation progressed so slowly, however, that the
teams themselves were not able to leave the Netherlands until 5 April 1992. By
then, UNAMIC had already been absorbed into UNTAC. After a brief introduction
programme, the navy’s training team was posted to Siem Reap and that of the
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EOD to Battambang. The two supervising teams set off for the area between
Sisophon and Siem Reap.
Both training teams started to give demining courses on 27 April, but were forced
to stop the training for the indigenous deminers on 9 May because of opposition
from the Cambodian government. The time was then spent on providing mineawareness courses to UN units and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The
training for the Cambodians started again at the beginning of July 1992. At the
end of that month, the Minister of Defence, A.L. ter Beek, approved an expansion
of the teams’ tasks: they could now also disarm explosives.
Dutch participation in UNTAC
On 14 April 1992, the Secretary-General approached the Netherlands with a
formal request to provide an infantry battalion for the UNTAC mission. Minister of
Defence Ter Beek had already authorised the preparations for this on 11 February
1992, following the usual informal request by the UN. The Council of Ministers
had agreed to participation in UNTAC on 12 March 1992. The Dutch contribution
was made up of a Marine Corps battalion, three F-278 Troopship transport planes
from 334 Squadron and three Alouette III helicopters from 298 Squadron, as well
as approximately seventy support personnel and a few staff officials. Two officers,
Colonel W.A. Huijssoon (RNLA) and Colonel K.C. Roos (Royal Marechaussee),
were posted to important staff functions. From 5 April to 14 November 1993,
Huijssoon was responsible for the planning within the UNTAC staff. Colonel Roos
left for Cambodia on 14 April 1992 to take on the leadership of UNTAC's civil
police apparatus in the rank of brigadier general. In that capacity, he was
responsible for 3,600 police officers, who were assisting in the training of the local
police and helping them to perform their duties. He returned to the Netherlands
on 1 September 1993.
On 30 April, the UN also asked the Netherlands to supply a movement control
unit (MCU). The Council of Ministers agreed to this on 8 May and most of the
personnel left for Phnom Penh on 2 July. The MCU took on the responsibility for
the freight handling at several airports in Cambodia and Thailand. The unit
contained 49 RNLA soldiers and was commanded by Major A. Huttenga. At
UNTAC’s request, the unit composition was changed in October 1992, so that
more planners and controllers were included and fewer truck and forklift truck
drivers. The MCU returned to the Netherlands in several waves in October and
November 1993, with the last wave leaving on 18 November.
A reconnaissance group of 56 naval and air force personnel left for Thailand on 22
April 1992. Marine Corps quartermasters left on 14 May, followed two weeks later
by a 123-strong military contingent to help unload the transport ships in
Bangkok. Eighty-four marines who had the job of setting up the camps left on 1
June.
Cambo-I, as the first marine battalion for UNTAC soon became known, was only
able to deploy two of the four companies in the allocated sector 1 because of
opposition from the dreaded Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge considered that too
great a presence of UNTAC would jeopardise a highly lucrative source of income,
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namely the distribution of ‘concessions’ for logging and gemstone mining in the
area that they controlled. Sector 1 lay in the extreme west of Cambodia, on the
Thai-Cambodian border. C-company installed itself on 16 June in Phum Nimit, a
cantonment location for government troops in the north of the sector. Phum Nimit
was also the site of the field hospital. B-company set up a cantonment location
for units of the White Khmer in Sok San, in the south of the sector. A-company,
D-company, the battalion staff and the service units tried to gain access to the
Khmer Rouge’s area from Ban Klong ta Knong, a former camp for Cambodian
refugees on the Thai side of the border. When that failed, the battalion
commander, Lieutenant Colonel (Marines) H.F. Dukers decided to look outside the
sector for another location for his headquarters. The battalion commander was
also the sector commander, and wanted to set up a sector headquarters in
Cambodia as quickly as possible. For this, UNTAC expanded the Dutch sector on
the north side. The staff, the service units and A-company set up their base just
to the north of Sisophon between 11 and 20 July. D-company was assigned to
Phum Bavel.
Three F-27 aircraft were stationed at the Thai naval base U-Tapao on 27 May. The
detachment commander was Lieutenant Colonel F. Knappers. The Alouette
detachment stayed at U-Tapao as long as the battalion was not fully deployed.
The helicopters joined A-company on 16 July. One of these helis was a standby
for the evacuation of any wounded personnel. As well as the heli detachment, the
battalion was also assigned four marechaussees and a 2-man (RNLA) field post
detachment. This brought the total strength of the Dutch contribution to UNTAC
in mid-September 1992 to 870 military personnel, of whom 751 were marines.
As far as the cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation of the warring
factions were concerned – the main task of the marine battalion in this phase – it
soon became clear that the royalist White Khmer in Sok San was willing to
cooperate. In Phum Nimit, government troops were also willing to be cantoned at
first, but when the Khmer Rouge refused to cooperate, they too became more
reluctant. The marines were able to carry out the other tasks satisfactorily,
namely escorting the returning refugees, protecting convoys, assisting in border
control and improving the infrastructure.
Cambo II, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel (Marines) P.C. Cammaert,
relieved Cambo I on 8 December 1992. Just like the first battalion, Cambo II was
equipped with the BV 206 snow vehicle, which proved invaluable during countless
patrols on the muddy Cambodian roads. On 27 December 1992, UNTAC lent the
battalion the Wolf II armoured vehicle for patrols in high-risk mine areas. The
arrival of the new battalion coincided with a change in the Dutch contribution to
UNTAC and with changes to the borders around the Dutch sector. The F-27
detachment was withdrawn on 12 November 1992 and the number of helicopters
was increased from three to four. In the light of the forthcoming elections, UNTAC
changed the sector borders so that they coincided with the provincial borders,
which meant that the new Dutch sector now contained the province of Bantey
Meanchey. Only Sok San was kept on, because of the good contacts with the
population: part of F-company was stationed here. The remaining part of Fcompany, as well as Cambo II’s E-company took over the compounds from
battalions from Bangladesh and Pakistan. Some new building was necessary,
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however. G- and H-companies based themselves respectively at the locations
vacated by the departing A-company from Cambo I in Sisophon and C-company
in Phum Nimit. The field hospital stayed in Phum Nimit and treated not only
marines, but also the local population. Lastly, the headquarters remained in
Sisophon.
The newly defined Dutch sector was relatively quiet to start with. Highly unusual
for Cambodia was the calm in what was known as the Liberated Zone, in the
north-west of Bantey Meanchey. Troops from three mutually hostile factions,
including the Khmer Rouge and the White Khmer, had joined forces to seize this
zone from the Vietnamese. The three factions allowed each other unrestricted
freedom of movement in the area. The Khmer Rouge was even prepared to work
with UNTAC to a limited extent. The battalion had the most problems in the areas
which lay outside the Liberated Zone and which were controlled by government
troops. They sometimes displayed an aggressive and provocative attitude towards
the marine patrols. Undisciplined government soldiers were also guilty of
banditry; they supplemented their meagre pay packets with 'toll collections'.
Despite the Khmer Rouge’s refusal to take part in the peace process, phase 3
started on 5 October 1992 with the electoral registration. It was partly because of
this that the tensions in the Khmer Rouge-controlled areas reached boiling point
in December 1992. There were firefights between government troops and the
Khmer Rouge, Cambodians of Vietnamese extraction were attacked and UNTAC
personnel were frequently shot at or taken hostage. So it was that the Khmer
Rouge attacked Sok San on 12 January 1993.
In Sector 1, it looked as if the peace had been definitively shattered at the
beginning of May. A convoy of Dutch marines and Japanese police officers ran
into an ambush on 4 May 1993. Marine Cl 1 D.A. Vonk managed, despite being
wounded himself, to get his badly damaged Landrover and wounded fellow
marines out of the danger zone. Using his machine gun, he forced a vehicle
belonging to one of the warring factions to stop in order to evacuate himself and
the other wounded personnel. Vonk was awarded the Bronze Cross in January
2002 for his bravery.
The election campaign had in the meantime got under way on 7 April 1993. On 1
March 1993, Cambo-II had received orders from UNTAC HQ to ensure that the
elections were heading in the right direction in its sector. The marines guarded
the polling stations, protected UNTAC personnel and the international election
observers and provided the necessary transport. The elections, held from 23 to
28 May, proceeded remarkably peacefully. The Khmer Rouge even appeared to be
seeking some sort of rapprochement after the elections. However, relations
between the Khmer Rouge on the one side and the other factions and UNTAC on
the other deteriorated again in August.
On 10 June, the day that the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for
Cambodia, Yasushi Akashi, declared that the elections had been free and fair,
Cambo III took over area responsibility from Cambo II, under the command of
Lieutenant Colonel (Marines) F.W. Hoogeland. This third battalion was made up of
marines who, before their UNTAC deployment, had been performing tasks outside
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the two active marine battalions. It quickly became known as a 'hotchpotch
battalion'. The size of Cambo III stayed the same as that of its predecessor and
its deployment was mainly characterised by the dissolution of UNTAC. The
battalion commander and his staff considered it advisable, in view of the task, to
set up five compounds. The number of infantry companies was thus increased
from four to five. J-company took over the compound in Sisophon from the
departing G-company, K-company took over that of H-company in Phum Nimit
and M-company took over F-company’s compound in Sok San. I- and Lcompanies took over locations from E- and F-companies in Phum Prasat and
Phum Thma Pok. Before Cambo III left, the battalion was given an extra task:
guarding the wage transports for the soldiers of the new national Cambodian
army. The death of marine R.M.H. Bos on 23 July 1993 cast a shadow over the
mission.
For Cambo II, the end phase of the UNTAC mission began when M-company
received orders to leave Sok San before 15 July 1993. The Dutch battalion then
had to take over the neighbouring Sector 2 from the departing Bangladeshi
battalion before 20 August 1993. The old Sectors 1 and 2 then became known as
Sector 1 West and Sector 1 East respectively. In this context, I-company received
orders to man the Siem Reap airfield and the provincial UNTAC HQ from 5
August. Lastly, from 2 September, the battalion supervised the withdrawal of the
Pakistani battalion from the old Sector 3.
Two weeks later, on 14 September, Cambo III itself began to prepare for
departure by handing over a number of border posts to the Cambodian army. It
was only at the airfields of Siem Reap, Phum Banteay Neang and Poi Pet that
detachments remained until the very end. UNTAC’s mandate ended on 24
September 1993. and Cambo III ceased its operational tasks on 5 October. I-, Jand L-companies left Cambodia on 11 October. At that time, M-company and the
service company were in Sisophon. K-company left the border town of Poi Pet on
12 October and joined the staff in Phum Nimit. The last units left the country on
16 October.
Commanders of Cambo I, Cambo II and Cambo III
Lt Col (Marines) H.F. Dukers (22 April 1992 - 8 December 1992)
Lt Col (Marines) P.C. Cammaert (8 December 1992 - 10 June 1993)
Lt Col (Marines) F.W. Hoogeland (10 June 1993 - 5 October 1993)
Commanders of Movement and Control Unit
Maj A. Huttenga (2 July 1992 - 11 January 1993)
Maj J. Biesmans (11 January 1993 - 4 July 1993)
Maj A. Huttenga (4 July 1993 - 18 November 1993)
Commanders of F-27 Troopship detachment
Maj T.J. Zuurbier (20 May 1992 - 10 September 1992)
Maj A. Kappers (10 September 1992 - 18 November 1992)
Deceased
Marine Cl 1 R.M.H. Bos (23 July 1993)
Able Rating L. van Doremalen (19 October 1993)
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Bibliography
Bais, K. Het mijnenveld van een vredesmacht: Nederlandse blauwhelmen in
Cambodja (Den Haag, 1994).
Cammaert, P.C. “Verenigde Naties-operaties in Cambodja: omzien en
vooruitkijken”. Marineblad, CIV-3 (1994) 90-95.
Cinqualbré, R.; Langenkamp, M. en Majoor, J. Dutchbatt (III). Royal Netherlands
Marine Corps, herinneringsboek detachement Cambodja – III (S.l., 1993).
Cremer, C.C. “Mijnenruimers in Cambodja”. Armex, nr. 9 (1993) 21-23.
Dukers, H.F. “Peace-keeping in Cambodja: Nederlandse mariniers in UNTAC”.
Mars in Cathedra, nr. 94 (1993) 2845-2859.
Fiers, W. “Explosievenopruiming in Cambodja”. Carré, XXIII-3 (2000) 18-22.
Geldere, G.J. “Stafofficier genie bij HQ-UNTAC, Cambodja. Russisch roulette of
een spreadsheet”. Militaire Spectator, CLXVII-5 (1998) 238-244.
Huijssoon, W.A. “United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia: een terugblik
op een grootse VN-operatie”. Militaire Spectator, CLXIII-12 (1994) 525-535 en
CLXIV-1 (1995) 27-37.
Roos, K.C. “UNTAC’s civilian police monitors” in: N. Azimi, The United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC): debriefing and lessons. Londen,
1995.
Schoonoord, D.C.L. De Koninklijke Marine in actie voor de Verenigde Naties:
mariniers in Cambodja 1992-1993 (Leeuwarden, 1993).
Updated: 1st May 2009
The views expressed in this leaflet do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Minister of Defence.
© 2016 by the Netherlands Institute for Military History, The Hague, the
Netherlands
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