International Phenomenological Society
On the Pseudo-Concreteness of Heidegger's Philosophy
Author(s): Guenther Stern (Anders)
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Mar., 1948), pp. 337-371
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2103208
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ON THE PSEUDO-CONCRETENESS OF HEIDEGGER'S
PHILOSOPHY
I. HEIDEGGER CUTS ACROSS THE ALTERNATIVE
"NATURALISM-SUPRANATURALISM")
If thereis a formulaapt to definethe locusofHeidegger'sExistential
andto clarify
thecauseofitsintricacy
Philosophy
and itspowerofattrac-
tion,the formulawould read: Heidegger'sphilosophycuts across thetraditionalalternatives
"Naturalism-Supranaturalism."It matterslittlethat
nosuchcharacterization
can be foundin Heidegger's
works. Whatdo we
meanby"cutting
across"?
asideintermezzos,
Setting
thehistory
ofmodernphilosophy,
particularly
thatofthepost-Hegelian
of"Naturalizations"hadbeena history
period,
ofnaturalization
ofman,ofmorals,ofthestate,andso on. The provinces
wonfromChristian
philosophy
had accruedto therealmof
automatically
"Nature." Yet in the last century"atheism"and "naturalism"were
interchangeable
terms.
Notso forHeidegger.Although
he inherited
atheismfromnaturalism,
particularly
fromitsnineteenth
century
variant,be keepshisdistancefrom
naturalism-adistancebarelyshorterthanthe gulfthatexistsbetween
Christian
anthropology
and materialism.True,the "Dasein"l-the topic
ofHeidegger's
philosophy-is"hiesig,"belongsto 'ro-rco
T Kitc6os,but it is
not"nature,"muchless "life"in its biologicalsense:forin Heidegger's
philosophy
the word"Nature"alreadydesignatesa "Seinsweise,"
i.e., a
modus
existendi
amongothermodi,andNature"is" only"for"a "Dasein."s2
Thoughnotnature,"Dasein" is farfrombeingsomething
ofthesupranatural
order:thereis justas little"Beyond"in Heidegger's
philosophy
as
there
is inmodernscienceorin historical
materialism.Even in thatdisgutised
formwhichthe philosophy
ofbourgeoissocietyhad invented:in
theform
of"Oughtto be" or as "worldofwralues"
the "Beyond"does not
' Thisterm(seebelow)designates
thespecific
modum
existendi
ofman,the"being
there";
notthefactof his existence.Beinguntranslatable
the Germantermwill
beadopted
throughout
thisarticle.
I Itmayseemsuperfluous
tostressthatthis"for"is notidentical
withtheclassical
"for"in the"Genesis"according
to whichNaturehas beencreatedforman. We
consider
it,however,
important
to emphasize
theinfluence
oftheJewish-Christian
"For"inthehistory
ofphilosophy.Asa matteroffact,it represents
theultimate,
though
secret,basisforall variantsof "Transcendental
to
Philosophy"
according
which
manis not"parsinterpartesmundi"';buttheworldrather
or
a "correlate"
a 'product"
ora "Datum"(derived
from"dare"!)ora "property"
ofman.
M37
338
PHILOSOPHYANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
enterhis dimension
"Dasein." His objectiveseemsto be a newplane-
a plane that requiresa new approach,a new vocabulary,new categories
Let us admitfromtheoutset:The philosophical"draught,"('"Tiefgang"'
andtheeffects
ofhisphilosophy
"outsidethecustomary
alternatives"
have
to be takenmostseriously.Heidegger's
mustnotbe compared
philosophy
verbal"syntheses,"
withthosemerely
all those"Real-Idealisms"
or"IdealRealisms"whichhadaccumulated
inthecourseofthelastcentury.
Firstofall: fromthepurelylogicalangle,his"neutrality"
has itsmerits.
Onceonepartofa logicalalternative
is abandoned,
itscounterpart,
owing
to itsverycounterposition,
itsmeaning
cannotclaimto a meaningeither.
is dropped,the concept"Natural"
Oncethe conceptof "Supra-natural"
cannotremainintacteither. Obviouslythephilosophers
ofthelast cenconclusion.By stressing
turyhad notdrawnthisnecessary
"naturalism,"
a systemofconcepts
thatstilldependedon thecountheywerepreserving
terconcept
theyhad abolished.
tosaythatHeidegger's
It isneedless
Wasnotan
stepoutofthealternative
firststep. It had its pre-history,
or ratherits pre-histories
of
absolutely
ancestries.
verydiverse
The one attemptto start "outside"the alternativewas the postofMNind"
Hegelian"Philosophy
(example:Dilthey)according
to whichthe
lifeof "Mind" or "History"was notany longerdirectedby Providence,
to therealmof "Nature"
althoughtheywerenot concededas belonging
either. In hisalreadythoroughly
bookontheGrenzen
dernaturforgotten
in a wholly
wissenschaftlichen
Rickert,
epigonicandinsuffiBegriffsbildung,
cientway,had triedto givethisdimension
itslogicalarticulation.
in all hisphenomenological
Furthermore,
works,
Husserlhad undertaken
a "region"outsidethe alternative:
the task of exploring
when,afterhis
in psychology
attackon "Psychologism,"
and logic,he
i.e., naturalism
he neither
startedto describethe so-called"intentionalen
Strukturen,"
aimedat "Metaphysics
ofMind" (although
his attemptwas temporarily,
evenbyhimself,
as a sortofnewPlatonism)
norat a psychology;
mistaken
but,as it is sufficiently
whichhe was
known,at some"neutral"province,
rightin givinga newlabel,namely"phenomenology."
Afterall,Husserl
had startedfrommathematics,
whosesubjects,thoughnot supranatural,
do notbelongto therealmofNatureeither. He hadbeenabsolutely
consistentwhenhe nevertiredin requiring
fromhisreadersan uncustomary
whichthey
approach(alltoooften
misrepresented
as "Mysticism")
without
would be utterlyunable to focusthe objects or to verifythe truthof his
descriptions.The strangefact,that despiteits programmatic
soberness
and the drabnessof its subjects("Aleaning,""Perception,"
"Memory,"
etc.) Husserl'sphenomenology
could exertsuch a fascination
upon his
philosophical
contemporaries,
is easilyexplainedby thisveryfactthathe
OF HEIDEGGER'SPHILOSOPHY
PSEUDO-CONCRETENESS
339
opened a provincebeyond metaphysicsas well as beyond empiricalre-
in his
thathe described
search:the "life" or "stream"of consciousness
that
analysesofthe"actsmeaningorhavingtheirobjects,"wasso neutral,
consolidate
hisdescriptions
by meansof
he believedhe couldmethodically
hisobjects
ofthequestion
as to whether
theproxy,
thus,by thesuspension
''areorarenot."
thatHusserlhad cut
maycausetheimpression
Thisemphasison rhrox'
and thatthejumpfromHusserlto
offtheontological
questionaltogether,
will
shortofa miracle-which
is nothing
however,
impression,
Heidegger
Reality,as
ariseonlyif oneunderstands
by "Sein" ("being")exclusively
his "Gegenstandmeantin NaturalScience. Althoughhe safeguarded
he
bereich,"
the"provinceofintentional
objects,"by meansofthe rhrox',
hemeanthis
didnotmeanhisobjectstobe phantoms.Somehow
certainly
wasthe
objectsas 6vra,to speakwithPlato'sParmenides.What,however
meaningof "6v" here?
It was Heidegger's,or morecorrectly,one ofHeidegger'stasks to answer
this question,at least, to formulatethe questionof the "Seins-Sinn"and
acts. Asa matter
offact,despite
of"being"inthe intentional
themeaning
philosophy,
to a large
thewholly
different
moodandpurposeofHeidegger's
his"thematic
field"hadbeenpre-tilled
extent
byHusserl:forthe"Dasein"3
(whichalreadyhad
withthe"Vorhandensein"4
contrasts
whichHeidegger
inby Husserlby meansofthei7roxj),
is defined
by Heidegbeenbracketed
("Aussein
"beingaftersomething"
geras "Sorge."5 Now, "Sorge"meaning
in thesamewayas Husserl's
fromthis"something"
aufetwas"),differing
to a cerfromits "object,"represents
"intentional
act" had differed
philosotaindegreethecommon
ofHusserl'sandHeidegger's
denominator
thetranphies. Strangeas itmaysound,Englishreadersmayunderstand
because
moreeasilythanGermanreaders,
sitionfrom
Husserlto Heidegger
of the connotations,"tendency,"or "intention"conjuredup by the word
whenusingthefamousterm,had imHusserl,however,
"Intentionality":
whatsoever
akinto "tendency"
or "intention"-andthisall
pliednothing
of "inwhichhe used forhis characterization
theless,as themodel-acts
or "thinking,"
"recollection,"
tentionality"
(as the acts of "perception,"
revealthe "relation"between"act"
borrowedfromtraditionalpsychology),
and its "object" in a purely"structural,"a whollyunpragmaticway.
acts"-of course,
Had Husserlchosenhungeras modelof "intentional
a purely
ofscience
hisplaceinthehistory
considering
academicassumption
footnote1.
This equals the naked "esse" ofobjectsof Nature; resp.resexistences.
6 This termwhich combinesthe connotationsof "cura," "worrying,""caring
for.. I," and "takingcare of," wouldbe besttranslatedby "interest,"ifunderstood
in its broadestmeaningalthoughthe word,unfortunately,
lacks the gloomynuance
ofthe Germanoriginal. Thus we will keep Heidegger'swordagain.
3 V.S.
4
340
PHILOSOPHYANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
and his "polemicdependence"on the psychologyofperceptionand recollec-
tionaround1895-phenomenology
wouldhavelookedverydifferent.Had
he chosen"hunger"as "Modellakt"and its adequation(or better"satisand its "adequation"or "fulfillment,"
faction")insteadof "imagination"
he wouldhavebeencompelled
to engageinthediscussion
ofstrictly
"ontoinsteadofembarking
logical"problems
ofthe"pure"
uponthedescription
and "bracketed
in" fluxorcontextof"intentional
relations"
inwhich,from
thetimeofhisbookIdeenon,hesawthefieldofhisresearch;
he wouldhave
beenforcedintoaskingthefollowing
questions:"Is Proxy
stilllegitimate
in
act as 'hunger'which(althoughstructurally
face of an intentional
"containing"its "immanent"
doesnot
object)is whatit is,becauseit precisely
containits object(food)? Is the ontological
oftheintentional
neutrality
act's "immanent"
and "neutrality"?Does
objecta genuine"immanence"
ratherindicatethe "not-having"?Could the Proxy)be
not "neutrality"
in faceofan act whose"agent"(thelivingbeingorman) has
maintained
no otherinterest
but to actuallyseize and literallyconsumehis object?
in faceofan "act" whoseagentcannotbearliving
Couldit be maintained
orlivewithout
it?"
These,of course,werenot Husserl'squestions. Had he focussedthis
problemof"without,"
theproblemofactual"want"and "incorporation,"
theywouldhavedrawnhimout ofthetranscendental
sphere;theywould
haveforcedhimintoan exploration
ofwhat"being"meansin faceofthe
first"absent"and then,materialistically
speaking,"immanent"object;
and finallyintothe interpretation
of what"being"meansin faceof the
"agent"oftheact-thehungry
one,forwhomtheobject(food)is a question
of"being"or "notbeing." In short,Husserlwouldhavebeencompelled
toresume
theclassicalproblem
of"want"or"need,"thediscussion
ofwhich
nosmaller
idealists
thanPlato(inhisPhilebos)
andHegel(from
hisJenenser
Logicon) had prepared
in a mostprofound
way.
We admitthatHusserlcouldnotask thesequestions;afterall,hisultimateinterestcenteredin theoretical
structures,
exactlyas that of NeoKantianism
had;itwastheoretical
actsthatheusedas modelsforhistheory
ofactsin general,
and it is fromtheTheoryofSciencethathe had started
outas a philosopher.It is this"defect,"thisdent,intowhichHeidegger
drovehis axe, although-we have to stressthatpointfromtheveryoutset-
he cautiously
abstainedfromsplitting
thetrunk:Heidegger
tookoverat
theboundary
lineofHusserl'sprovincewithoutactuallyreaching
or even
wishingto reachthe problemjust sketched,
in whichthe "battleof the
books,"thediscussion
between-'idealism
and materialism,
becomesreally
acute. We willsee later on, that he knewwhathe was doingwhenhe took
a longrun,butmadebuta shortjumpwhichlandedhimonlyontheground
ofExistentialism.
OF HEIDEGGER'SPHILOSOPHY
PSEUDO-CONCRETENESS
341
But we are anticipating. Heideggerrightlyfeltthat dealingexclusively
ofthephilosophanunbearable
actsrepresented
withtheoretical
narrowing
was drawnintophilosophizical task. No one can denythatHeidegger
butbythemostelementary
ingnotbyacademic"problems,"
philosophical
and theology
terrors;
besides,the broadproblemsof classicalphilosophy
of"meaning,"
farmorethantheproblems
embraced
whosehorizons
"perhadbeenhisdailyfoodfromhisstudent
and"evidence,"
ception,"
dayson.
thispeculiar
formofa
Husserl's"intentionality,"
Thus,whenherecognized
offarbroader,
ofevenunihe had to seeit as a structure
"livingrelation,"
whichHusserl,
versalapplication;he had to take it out ofthedimension
stillhad labelled"consciousness."True,Scheler
thetradition,
following
acts (as thoseof"evaluatnon-theoretical
himby examining
had preceded
ing,"orthoseof"sympathy");
but,despiteundeniably
profound
insights,
he had justdealtwithother"species"ofacts; thoughhe evenutilizedhis
had not revisedhis conceptof
he certainly
resultsforhis "Metaphysics,"
ofhis findings.That is whereHeidegger
differs
"being"on thestrength
him.
from
saw thestructure
of "intentionality"
As a matteroffact,Heidegger
in
of
thewholeofpre-theoretical
life,"in theentire7rpaits,in the"making"'
or
in "dealing"withthem,inusingthem-notonlyin "imagining"
things,
to a com"meaning"or "perceiving"
them;and it wouldhave amounted
ofthe "meaning"oftheterm"consciousness."
had he
pleteannihilation
classified
"making"or "dealingwith"as "acts of consciousness."6 By
the Husserlian"intentionality,"
he suddenlyfound
rightly
universalizing
whathe was describing
was the way,
himself
droppedon terraincognita:
in acts ofconsciousness,7
"oneis in theworld"-notornotexclusively
but
in all those acts of everydaylife which,usuallyunfitforthe societyof
philosophical
themes,at best are casuallytoucheduponby thisor that
science. In short,he foundhimselfin that provincethat he called
this"Dasein"-not any longerclassifiable
"Dasein." Since,however,
as
markedby "intentionality,"
consciousness-was
thusas a typeof"Sein,"8
distinguished
by its "Aus-sein-auf-etwas"
(its "beingaftersomething")
after
something,
thatisnotthisbeingitself-"world"
becameforhimsomethinglikean ontological
attributeof"Dasein." While"nature"(as far
as somethinglike "nature" occurs in Heidegger'sphilosophy)just "is,"
6 Thus,eventhe term"act" has been abandonedby Heidegger. We used it here
solelyto clarifythe transitionfromHusserl to Heidegger.
7Just as little in "subconscious" acts. Heidegger's position cuts across this
dubiousalternative,too.
8 In Heidegger'sontologythe distinctionbetween elovtu and OP,"Sein" and
"Seiendem,"is of capital importance;while the Englishlanguage disposes but of
he oneparticipe"being,"we will have to keep thisGermanterm,too,at least where
he substantivation
of theverb "to be" is in question.
342
RESEARCH
PHILOSOPHYANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
sentenced,as it were,to just dumbbeing,"Dasein" is a sortof"to be in the
world," which findsits actuality as "Sorge" and "Besorgnis," i.e., in a
wouldargue,the
Heidegger
thousanddealingswiththeworld. However,
ofouracts (of
factof"in derWeltsein,"is notdue to theworld-relation
takingcare of.. .perceiving...) but the
doing,dealing,communicating,
fromthings
otherwayround:onlybecauseour "Sein,"as distinguished
just "being,"is "in der Welt sein" or "Sorge,"our acts are aiming
at "world." The examinationofthis "Sein," called "Dasein," thus "Her-
to him,ofphilosophy
desDaseins"is thetaskofhis,oraccording
meneutik
toutsimple. Why the examinationof just thistype of "Sein"? Because,
mayreply,we are thistypeof"Sein,"whichfactmightincur
Heidegger
thatanyothertypeof "Sein" is, whatit is, onlysubspecieDasein,only
just because
continues,
"for"theDasein. On the otherhand,Heidegger
Dasein is a sort of "Being in. . ." ("In-sein") it is so exclusivelymade for
withthefieldin whichit moves(world,objects,etc.)thatit
an-dconcerned
as
whenfacedwithits ownspecific
difference-just
is sortofblindfolded
is notmadeforseeingthe object"seeing."
the eye,thatseeseverything,
"Dasein" is notjusta sortof"to be," buta "beingthere,"
Sincehowever,
a-"beingpresent";sinceit says "hereI am" or "I am there";sinceit is
livingin thelightofthis"I am" and notonly"existsabout,"(herumexisand unmentioned,
was called
the factorwhichformerly
tiert)obscurely
nowbecomesthe specificum
in a
ofthismodusexistendi;
"Bewusstsein,"
waywe couldputit: consciousand,we admit,stillinsufficient
traditional
nessis embeddedby himintobeing.9
It shouldbe noted here that Heideggerintroducesa pluralityof "Seinsarten"
(modorum
existendi),while in traditionalphilosophy"plurality",is used to apply
only to "Seiendem" (to genera,species, individua rerumexistentium). In Sein
und Zeitoccur(a.e.) the following"Seinsarten":
1) The "facticity"which is the contingentfact that there is somethinglike
"there is."
2) The "Zuhandensein" (being at man's disposal), the modusexistendiof the
"Zeug" ("stuff"the everydaytools ofthe "Sorge").
3) The "Vorhandensein"(of Nature,not elaboratedon by H).
4) The "Dasein" (withits variants):
a) "Uneigentlichsein"(beingunauthentically),
"man."
b) "Eigentlichsein"(beingauthentically)whichequals Selbstsein.
It is obviousthat the introduction
of modiexistendiincursthe abandonementof
thephilosophicalidea ofoneworld(Universe),whichimplication,however,mustnot
necessarilybe wrong. Since,however,"Dasein" is not an elementum
mundi,rather
mundus,an elementofthe"In derWeltsein," it is obviousthatHeideggermaintains,
thoughin ontologicalterms,the divisioninto specificprovinces,on whichdivision
Neo-Kantianism(disguisingthe divisionof labor, i.e., of methods)had insistedso
emphatically. Thus, the idea of a philosophicalsystem,as it had existedfromthe
Timaioson, as imageofthe Cosmos,is givenup in Heideggersphilosophytoo, again
not a necessarilyfalse step. No doubt Heideggerwas fullyaware of this fact; yet
PSEUDO-CONCRETENESSOF HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY
343
By embracingall practicaldealingsin thehorizonofintentionality
called
"Sorge,"Heideggerobviously-wascast intothe vicinityof naturalistic
its philosophicalimplicationsare not properlytakeninto account,and this all the
less as he furnishessomethinglike a "system" himselfthoughwithoutclarifying
the questionwhat "system" could mean afterthe abandonmentof the conceptof
Cosmos. As to thepeculiarsubstantivation"das Dasein" whichdesignatesa modus
existendias well as somethingthat is, originallyHeideggerhad introducedit for
positive,to be moreprecise,forprophylacticreasons,namely,in orderto make a
start withoutsuch ontologicallyunverifiedtermsas "Ego," or "individual," or
"conscioussness,"and the like, all of whichstill conceal a dubiousconceptof substance,exactlythat conceptof ousia whichHeideggerwishesto revisethroughhis
new ontology. If we may expressit in classical terminology,
in that of Plato and
Parmenides,Heideggerused the deliberatelyfoggytermsin orderto suspend the
decisionof the questionas to whetherel'vatmustnecessarilybe embodied in individual 6praor egos. As a matterof fact,Heidegger,insteadof startingout, as it is
usually done, fromthe "Ich," opens with the question: who is the Dasein? As
longas this questionis not answered,the substantivicverb "Dasein" (3) means the
amorphousnessand anonymityof everydaylife, the so-called "man": what one
thinks,does, says; in short,whatsociologyinsufficiently
had labelled "public opinion" or what Kierkegaard,moralisticallyand anti-democratically
had foughtas
"Publikum." As we will see later on, this "man," althoughbeinga firststage of
"Dasein" is farfromrepresenting
"Dasein's" highestdegree;it is ratherthe background,the "Unmittelbarkeit,"for a second stage in whichthe "Dasein" makes
itselfidentical with itself:for Heidegger'sphilosophy(therebysharply differing
fromHegel's) knows only of two stages, very understandably
so, for the hidden
motorofthe wholeis Moralismthatcannotknowbut ofthe dualityofevil and good.
However,by introducingthe "man" as an aprioricmodalityof the "Dasein,"
Heideggersaves himselfthe troubleof exploringthe historicalcauses. responsible
forthis strangephenomenonof an elvat withoutan identifiableGv. Nor does he
ask whetherthe relationsthat in othersocietiesor civilizationsmay exist between
the collective"Dasein" and the individualone complywithhis schemaof "man"
and "Self." Finally,he does not even touch upon the capital questionof whether
the "Dasein" called "man" (i.e., average man, livingin the doxa and feedingon
averageand pre-chewedvocabularyand emotion)could be abolishedor changed.
It doesnotenterhis mindthatwhathe calls "man" mightbe a deterioratedremnant
of genuine"mores,"genuinesociality;or whetherit could be just a by-productof
massproduction. He is opposedto mores(withoutsupplantingthemby "morality"
as classical GermanPhilosophyhad done), and economicconsiderations
would fall
shortof his high ontologicalstandards. Consequently,his interestcentersexclusivelyaround the question of, how "Dasein" or he, Heideggerhimself,could
escapethe "man." Moreover,thisquestionof howto escape replacesin his philosophy all classical problemsof "individuation"whichformerly
had pertainedto
philosophyof Nature. Never does he formulatethe question of how "Dasein"
becomes"Daseiende" (elvatbecomes6pra), this questionis being avoided like all
questionsthat borderon biology. The onlyindividuationhe knowsof is the "existential"one in whichthe "Dasein" raisesitself,transforms
itselfintoa Self. Therefore"Dasein" veryoftenhas theby-meaning
ofthepre-self-stage.
The fact that the word simultaneouslycontainsthose different
meanings,one
344
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
historicalmaterialism.Yet,
operationalism,
theories-ofpragmatism,
as mentionedabove, all his. relationsto naturalismare of a somea quasi-pragmatic
introduces
Heidegger
howequivocalnature. Wherever
he getsstuckin theveryintroduction.As a matteroffact,
concreteness,
oftherelationthatexistsbetweenthe
he startswitha detaileddescription
"Dasein" and its "Zeug," i.e., the tools,by meansof whichit runsthe
householdof his world. And he is still on the righttrackwhen he
or "revealing"truth:not
thosepracticaldealingsas promoting
considers
do we knowwhatit is,butby hammering.And
by staringat a hammer
theworld"revealsitself."So far,so good. It sounds
onlyin "Sorge"-acts
of thisinsight
to the
concrete. But whatwiththeapplication
extremely
by
tools of today? Aremodernmachinesreally"revealing"themselves
theiroperation? Is theirproducttheirpurpose? Is not theirpurpose
themmuchmorethanthemachines
transparent
tobe seenonlybymaking
lie at thebottomof
idea of directness
selves? Does not an illegitimate
of"Zeug" occurs
Heidegger'sthesis? As a matteroffact,self-revelation
sim("mediation")is ofextreme
onlyin thoseactswhose"Vermittelung"
and the product,the "dealer"and the
plicity,i.e., wherethe producing
and the good,formone simple,transparent,
"dealt with,"the consumer
or in apple-eating.
functional
unit,as it maybe the case in shoemaking
a modernmachine,doesnotrevealit at all; its "alienation"is
Operating
within present-day
societyandin itsdivisionoflabor.
obviously
reckoned
exampleprovesthatat thepointwhereHeidegger
Alreadythispreliminary
shows,so
he is mostobsolete,
or "pragmatic,"
seemsto become"concrete"
forall hisexamplesaretakenfrom
attitude,
to speak,a machine-smashing
workshop.The alienationproducedprecisely
the provincialshoemaker
is aliento him. All the
by thosetoolsthatare supposedto be revealing,
morepuzzlingis thefactthatin a way "alienation"playsa fundamental
it appears,it does so in a harmless
but,wherever
rolein his experiences;
e.g.,as so-called"Nichten"ofthe
alienation,"
as a "metaphysical
disguise,
world.'0
chanceformakingobscurestatements,
blendinginto the other,is an extraordinary
of whichchanceHeideggerneverfailsto take advantage.
10There is no such intransitiveword as "Nichten," only the transitive one
"vernichten." What Heideggermeans is: to become nothing,to vanish. Likely
his new word is just his translationof Pascal's "s'andantir." The metaphysical
brimming
of the phenomenonof "reification"or "alienation" can be tracedback to
in his theoryofmatter,whereby"matter" is
Bergsonwho mooredthe phenomenon
the elementresistingthe "6lan vital." Thus he describedthe alien characterof
the metaphysicalraw materialinsteadof the alienationof life's own products. It
is hardlya coincidencethat Bergson,by making"alienation" a metaphysicalcharacter, arrived at the discussionof the "Neant" long beforeHeideggeror Sartre
did. (L'idhe de NMant,"1901, later used in EvolutionCrkatrice.) Incidentally,
PSEUDO-CONCRETENESSOF HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY
345
II. THE FACT "HUNGER. TIME AS FALL BETWEEN NOT-HAVING
AND HAVING. THE PROBLEM OF "'CONSTITUTION''
ofthe"self-alienating"
thattheemission
however,
Far moreimportant,
of the concept
Zeug whosecontextformsour world,is the ambiguity
its
philosophy
whichconceptis supposedto giveHeidegger's
"Sorge"itself,
veryconcreteness.
categoryof "Dasein."
We had called"Sorge"the centralHeideggerian
both:"Dasein'srelation
wemeanthat"Sorge"designates
By thatformula
to itself:it is a "Sein," "dem es um es selbstgeht"(a "modusexistendi
to itsworldof
foritself");as wellas itsrelation
byitsconcern
characterized
in the
"Umgang"("dealing"and communications).Thus it is "interest"
featureof
broadestsense of the wordthat is made the fundamental
is no coincidence
thatthe "Beingin the world"
"Daseini." It certainly
rendersthe latinword"interor "beingin" ("In-sein")almost-literally
initsbroadestsense,"for,whatHeidegger
hasin
esse." We said"interest
thatformof "interest"
whichMarx,standingup forthe
mind,is neither
northe
ofhistory;
themotor
ofan unprivileged
class,considered
"interest"
inthe"moralsituation,"
soleobject;norsimplythe
Kierkegaard's
interest
ofthelivingbeingin self-preservation.
Whilein the
"interest"
biological
designatestheiractual
theterm"interest"
worksofMarxorKierkegaard
in theiractual cause,Heidegger's
originalequationof "Dasein"
interest
statement,
ontological
and "Interest"at firstis but a ratherdisinterested
meantneitherin its purelymoralnorin its merelyeconomicsense. Its
economic meaning particularly remains utterly vague.
The simple ques-
whyitbusies
in all its" Sorge"occupations,
itself
tion:whytheDaseinthrows
aroundday and night,thisquestionwhoseconcernis not the"Bedingungder
but the "Bedingung
der N6tigkeit"(derSorge),is simply
MAglichkeit,"
out
forthisquestionwouldhavepulledHeidegger
embezzled.No wonder,
concrete
analysisofpractical"Umgang"intoan analysisof
oftheallegedly
withmaterialism.
andwant,thusintoproblems
connected
hunger
Heideggerwas discreetenoughnot to betrayBergsonin whoseworkmuch of his
ownthoughtswereundulyanticipated. Ofcourse,Heidegger'semphasison "alienation"has social rootstoo,althoughreasonsfardifferent
fromtheusual ones. SinceX
as we willsee lateron, Heideggerretiresinto the cloisterofhis ownSelf,in orderto
become"authenticDasein"; since he does not knowof any way of becoming"authentic"withina definiteworld,a society;since, on the otherhand he can't help
continuing
to live in thisworldwhich,so to speak, continues"in spite," it is bound
to become"alien" to him: i.e., again and again it will have to "nichten" (vanish).
All the same it is remarkablethat his theoryof the metaphysicaland ontological
(at least not economicallymotivated) "alienation" of the world,was recognized
by the world. As a matterof fact,it was Heideggerand Kafka who conjuredup
that apotheoticaffirmation
of "Weltfremdheit"
which FrenchExistentialismhas
madetheprogramof nihilism.
346
PHILOSOPHY
AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
This seemsto be a rathersharpreproof.Arewe entitledto it? After
all, does not Heideggerdenyhis "Dasein" any Hegelianabsoluteness?
Does he notlimitthe Dasein soberlyto its proportio
humana? Is nothis
a Kantianizing
philosophy
"critique"ofthe"DaseinsGrenzen"?
he describesman's
It is and it is not. Whynot? Becausewherever
limitations,
he is doingit in a harmlesswayby denying
himdivinequalities. True,"Dasein" is finite-thusnot eternal:its experience
is no inthusnotcreative. For thefacthowever,
that"Dasein"
tuitusoriginarius,
we arelooking
ishungry,
or,inmorecustomary
words,thatmenarehungry,
in vain.11If Husserldid nottake "hunger"intoaccount,he was rightin
confined
his deliberately
province. Heideggeris not,forhis wholecriticentersaroundthis problem. Husserlwas standing
cismof philosophy
is supoutsideit. Heidegger,
althoughconstantly
movingin its vicinity,
leaveshiswholearchitecture
pressing
it,andthereby
basisless;for"hunger"
in its broadestsense,dependence
or "Xwant"
on theworld,"starving
forthe
world"-thatactuallydefines"Dasein's" finiteness.As a matterof fact,
itis notonly"Sorge"whichbythisomission
remains
incomprehensible,
but
manyotherfundamental
featuresof Heidegger's"Dasein" withit. To
= prosecution
mention
justa few:"Intentionality"
oftheprey;the"nothingness"(=standingvisd visde rien)-are evidently
"rooted"in hunger.
Even man'sX6'yos
mustremaina puzzleto us, as longas we failto retrace
its underlying
conditosine qua non,"want": forthe first"generality
of
of"hunger"(orwantn"or"need"). Obviously
the
notion"is thecorrelate
intentional
objectofhunger
is a "such,"(nothoc,buttale);hunger"means"
to eat in general,
to drinkin general. The "this"
something
something
ortheX&yos-articu(hoc)doesnotbecomea "such"by meansoftheX)oyos
as
not by meansof the "Etwasals etwasansprechen,"
lated perception,
Heidegger
putsit, but in the courseofhunger-propelled
processofchase,
the conceptof "Intencapture,and consumption.Thoughbroadening
it intothatof"Sorge,"Heidegger
does not
tionality,"
thoughtransforming
retrace
"Sorge"to itslastbasis,orto thelastbasislessness
oftheliving
being.
If he had doneso,he wouldhavebeenledto theactualgenealogy
ofX&et'Ev
fromneed,to a sortof "naturalistic
logic"or "idealisticmaterialism"thusto a stepfromwhicha thousandsocialconsiderations
had to holdhim
back.12
11It is, of course,farmorethancoincidence
that"hunger"is notHeidegger's
sole omission.All wantis wanting;thussex,too. It wouldbe worthwhile
to examinewhichfeatures
of"Dasein" Heidegger
admitted
as fitforontological
society,
whichcriteria
he chosefortheomissions
ofa philosophy
areitsearmarks.
12 On theother
hand,no variantofmaterialism
has evertakenthisstepeither,
and, considering
its far fromarticulatedconceptof "reality,"materialism
wouldnothavebeenable to takethisstepeitherfor"Hunger"is nota pieceof
or HEIDEGGER'SPHILOSOPHY
PSEUDO-CONCRETENESS
347
oftheconceptof"world"
thedependence
seeingthrough
Thus,although
or "object"("Zeug") on the 7rpait, Heideggerdid not call the spade a
byitsname,nor
didhe callthemotorof"Sorge,""Hunger,"
spade;neither
of today,the economicsystems,
industry,
the main-made
"Sorge-tools"
ofHeidegger's
concreteness
beginsbehindhunger
machines.The province
and endsbeforeeconomyand machine:in themiddle"Dasein" is sitting
"Sorge"and
its "Zeug" and therebydemonstrating
around,hammering
ofontology.
therenaissance
*
*
*
omissionof
betweenHeidegger's
Thereexistsa veryclose connection
oftime. As everyone
linesofhis philosophy
'want"and theintertwined
mainopusis entitledSein undZeit. As a matterof
knows,Heidegger's
r6leinhisontology
fact,"time"quitelegitimately
playssuchan important
with"Sein"byjust an "and."
thatit couldappearin thetitle,connected
philosophy,
just
Thus"time"is not,as inmanyvarietiesoftranscendental
with"space,"butis ofquiteanotherontological
weight.
coordinated
that(despiteprofound
detail-interpretations
It is all themoreoppressing
writtensinceHegel about "time")the
whichsurpassnearlyeverything
remains
relation
between"Sein" and "Zeit,"i.e.,theirmutualfoundation,
opaque throughoutmostofthe book.
This opaqueness,however,is the consequenceofthe indecisivecharacter
of"want"reofhisanalysisof"Sorge,"i.e.,ofthefactthatthe problem
the "Sorge." The outlineof a "genealogyof
mainshiddenunderneath
time"(if thisparadoxialfigureof speechbe allowed),the deductionof
"time"fromthe fact "want"wouldnot have beenso difficult.Such a
thefollowing
course:
wouldhavehad to takeapproximately
deduction
is "needy"(andthatitis constantly,
sinceitdepends
So faras a creature
on world), it has not what it should have. True, there are classes of
disposal:air, for
"needed"thingsthat are at the creature'simmediate
fromitbya
areabsent,orareseparated
however,
example. Otherthings,
certaindistance. Now want,by insistingon havingits "object,"insistson
itsprey,inorderto have
thedistance.The livingbeingis after
annihilating
living. ("Es stelltdemvorgestellit,and thusto continue
it,to consume
nach.") This "to be after,"this act of prosecution
ten Gegenstande
equalto the distance
i.e.,theextension
necessarily
fillsa certainextension,
of"having"orof"capture."'3 It
between
"nothaving"and themoment
matter. Of the fact that the concept of "idea" (with it "idealism") stemsfrom
ordinarymaterialismis
practicallife (as patternof the object to be manufactured),
just as unawareas idealismof the fact that the "generality"of its logos is related
to "need."
13This distanceis far frombeing a merelyspatial one: nothingwould be more
348
PHLSOPHY
AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
thatis called"time." It is littlewonder
is thisextension
thatthoseactivioftheneededmaterial
supplying
tiesthatconsistin direct(distance-less)
do not "constitute"time,but onlythoseactivities
(as, e.g.,breathing)
theprey.14Then"time"is rolling
thedistancefrom
thathaveto overcome
byor,as theGerman
languageputsit,"running."Butitisnotwewhorun
tellsus), buttimethatrunswith
withit (as a rhyme
byW. Buschjokingly
us. Oncetheneededobjectis reached,timeceasesto elapse:thesatisfied
schldgt
keineStunde. This
babysleepsandis "timeless." DenGlfwklichen
whichhad to
oftimeoutofwant,a genealogy
is thebasicmodel
ofthegenealogy
becausethe deductionof the
remainobscurein Heidegger'sdeductions,
ofthelivingbeing
character
"time"fromtheonticinsufficiency
ontological
andtheselftheprimacy
(orofmanas a livingbeing)wouldhaveshattered
oftheontological
sphere. It is needlesstostressthatourdeducsufficiency
betweenanimalicand human
tionis but a first
step. In it thedifference
timeis notyettakenaccountof;justas littleas thequestionas to howthe
oftimedevelopsout ofthisprimitive
formin whichtime,as it
continuity
fits,to die downagain.' Thisis,however,
were,breaksoutin temporary
nottheplacetofollow
up thosequestions.
thoughconnecting
"time"with"Sorge,"clarifies
As littleas Heidegger,
wantandsatisfaction,
thefactthat"time"is the"fall"("Gefaelle")between
oftheconcept"Dasein." Nojust as littledoeshe clearup thelimitation
hintthatit could
where-againin spiteof "Sorge"-is theretheslightest
ofman,morecorrectly:
hisonticdefect
be theonticcondition
thatmightbe
ofhisbeing"ontological."'6Nowhere,
the "Bedingung
derM6glichkeit"
futilethandeducingthe phenomenaof temporaldistancefroma purelyspatial one.
The distanceembodiesthe entiretyof relationsbetweenpersecutorand persecuted,
theirrelationof strength,
courage,etc.
14 Thereis an interesting
connectionbetweenHeidegger'somissionofthis problem
of distanceand his (to a considerableextentlegitimate)ridiculingof the episteinological questionof how to get at the "outer world." PrimarilyHeideggersees the
feature"beingin theworld,"but hardlythe distancesfromthe objectswhichhave
not been inventedby mediocrephilosophersbut that existon the strengthof "individuation"separatingone beingfromthe other,and on the strengthof "hunger,"
whichhas to bridgea metaxu in orderto "have" and to "be." Entirelysuppressed
by Heideggeris the thirdfact that "Dasein" is (part of the natural) world. Only
dealingwiththe threefeatures:Being in, beingin distance,and
by simultaneously
beinga partoftheworld,can one claimontologicalcompleteness. (See myremarks
on "Integrations-Koeffizient"
in "Une interpretation
de l'Aposteriori,"Recherches
Philosophiques,
1934-35).
15 A
patternthatmakesunderstandablethe changeofthe wakingand sleeping.
16 It would be tempting,
indeed, thus to reverseHeidegger'sordo rerum. Not
selfsufficient,
as he is, man, in orderto be at all, is compelledto be "In der Welt
sein"; to be "there" (the "Da" of "Dasein") when and because want awakens
him. As a matteroffact,it is.onlythewaking"Dasein" thatis really"da" whilefor
Heideggerthis character"da" belongsto Dasein independentlyfromwant. The
OF HEIDEGGER'S
PSEUDO-CONCRETESES
PHILOSOPHY
349
thatDaseinhas (oris) a body;nowhere,
thatit has,as it
is it mentioned
nature.
a twofold
yearsofphilosophy,
wascalledinmorethantwothousand
passesoverin silence,despitehis livingnextdoorto
All thisHeidegger
theories.
naturalistic
thatHeidegger,
althoughavoidIn theopening
line,we had announced
neverreaches"nature." Thisthesisseemsto
ingall things
supra-natural,
nowinfull. As a matteroffact,hisDaseindoesnotknowof
be confirmed
ofanytooth-ache.Verysoonwe will
ofanyinstinct,
any concupiscentia,
or duties,or the
see.thatit knowsjust as littleofcaritas,or friendliness,
an
it is notprecisely
condition,
state. Doomedto thisdoublymultilated
enviablespecies. One is temptedto varythe famousFrenchword"ni
c'estun capucin"into:"ni homme,
c'estun
ni'capucin,
hommeni femme,
Dasein."
*
*
*
of the "Dasein," "world"is,
Since"beingin theworld"is a character
an elementof "beingin theworld"-hencethewholesystemof
roughly,
pragmatic"Sorge," "In der Welt sein," is, as it were,the transcendental
oftheworld. Thisoddsounding
thesismeansthatthe"Dasein"
condition
transcendental
has supplanted
consciousness
which,as we know,was supitsobjects. As a matter
offact,Heidegger
hasblown
posedto "constitute"
to
cartridges,
bymeansofhispragmatic
up theconceptof"consciousness"
a sortof"Consciousness"
maketheresultofhisexplosion
again. Trhe,one
couldnot go so faras to state,thatHeidegger's"Dasein" constitutes
its
inthesenseofthewordusedbyKant,
world. Thatitdoesnotdo; neither
relation"as
norinthatofFichte,Cohen,orHusserl. The "constitutional
as "grfinden,"
describedforone hundredand fifty
yearsby metaphors
or "konstituieren"
"setzen,""schaffen,"
"positing,""crea("founding,"
has lost its activecharacter
philosin Heidegger's
ting,""constituting")
of the
he does not startwithrecognition
ophy. This notwithstanding,
"world"either-itis the"In derWeltsein,"thatis his basis. Againhis
cuts acrossthe ordinaryalternative.This timeacrossthat
philosophy
of"realism"and "idealism."
withtheidealisticidea of "constitution"?
But whydidhe notcontinue
relationbetween
Whydid he deprivethestillsomehow"transcendental"
character?Did he do it forpurely
"Dasein"and "Welt"ofitsactivistic
reasons? Hardly.
philosophical
to Fichte,the "ego))"posits"himself,
thisstrangeact of
If,according
betweenwakingand sleepingis omittedas so many others. Obviously
difference
thesleeping"Dasein" is neither"da" noris it "man," nora "self." These problems
did notinterestHeideggerwhose"Dasein," it is true,maybotheraboutthe "Zeug'
bed,but willneverlie downin it.
350
PHLOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
selfconstitution,
orratherthisterm,represented
thetranslation
ofa non.
speculative
activityintospeculativelanguage:by "positing"himself,
the
as a freelegislator("setztsichals Gesetzgeber");
ego positedhimself
by
it positedorcreated"its"world,namelyitsself"positing"
theNicht-Ich,
madecitoyen's
state,its "constitution,"
its "Satzung"(law.)"7 If Fichte's
strange"positing"
evenembraces"Nature"(and notonlytheconstitution
of Society),thisphilosophical
"overstatement"
represents
an exampleof
harmless
and academic"universalization,"
thatwas boundto takeplace
aim(political"Setzung")wasdoomedtoremain
becauseeventheparticular
purelyacademic. Not admitted
to "positing"
himself
as politically
active
orto shapinga "constitution,"
citoyen
he looksforvengeance
by"positing"
Natureand by theoretical
self-deification
whoin
ofthe "Ego." Stirner,
so manypointsanticipated
is a caricaturistic
Heidegger,
exampleforsuch
harmless
radicalization.
Yet,although
"Dasein"doesnotposititsworld,itdefinitely
Heidegger's
positsor constitutes
itself. His makinghimself,
anand makinghimself
swerableforhimself,
takestheplaceofthe "gesetzteSatzung"(the"constitution"of societymade by "subjects"). This meansthat interest
in
moralorpoliticalparticipation
oraction(whichhad beenembodiedin the
concept"Setzen") has becomeextinctin Heidegger'sphilosophy.The
the"Dasein"takesintoitsownhands,is theDaseinitself;each
onlything,
in hisindividual
individual
hands-in spiteoftheworld. Thisfact,that
the "Dasein"'does not positthe worldany longer,but solelythe "self,"
is easilyunderstood.The politicaloptimism
oftherisingbourgeoisie
one
hundred
and fifty
yearsago,whichhad hopedto buildup a worldoftheir
to thepetit-bourgeois
own,was whollyunknown
around1920. It minded
"constitutions.""Democracy"seemedto themto incarnatefirstthe
oftheGermandefeat,thenthebloton Germanhonor;therefore,
principle
"world"didnotassumetheroleofa "product
oflife"anylonger,
butthatof
a somehow
neutralcorrelate
oflife. Thesoleproduct
the"Self"remains
at least virtually-i.e.,the humanbeing,who drags himselfout of
the anonymity
of "man,"to boldly("verwegen")riska Daseinin social
nothingness
("Nichts")as a lonelyand stubborn
man.
self-made
Incidentally,
whatholdsgoodforHeidegger,
applies,in a way,to the
whole and much praised returnto realismand metaphysics(thus
to "Sein")thattookplacein Germany
in theyearsbetweenthecollapsein
1918and thatin 1933. This development
can be derivedfromthefact,
thatthe philosophers
had abandonedthe fundamental
categoryofbour17 The othersourcesof the idea of "constitution"as f.i.,the "geneticdefinition"
which"makes" its objects by constructing
them;or modernsciencewhich,by constructingthe experimentalmodel, "realizes" naturallaw-are of no importancein
thiscontext.
PSEUDO-CONCRETENESSOF HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY
351
the participationin
geois revolution:"Making" which had circumscribed
themaking
ofa societyoffreesubjectsbyfreesubjects('of thepeople,by
to
thepeople")."8Now theyeitherlet "things"slideortheywerewilling
"power"ortheworldofpowerthatwasnotmadeby themselves.
recognize
to translation
into"Realismus."19
Eitherattitudelendsitselfmarvelously
variantsofthisperiodreflect
The diversemetaphysical
partlybourgeois
acdefeatism,
partlyapotheosisof power. The pathosof Neo-Kantism,
to which"world"is nota "datum"buta "dandum"(nicht"Gegecording
had thinnedout miserably;
as a matter
benes,"sondern"Aufgegebenes")
offact,it was voicedonlyby two or threeKantianizing
"Kulturphilosophen,"representatives
ofthewhollyunrepresentative
"Deutsch-demokratto theshort-lived
ischePartei,"and at bestcorresponded
pseudo-optimism
in Germany
around1927.20
*
*
*
III. INDICATIVUSAND CONJT3NCTIVUS.
THE PROBLEMOF FREEDOM. THE
ACOSMISTICSELF-MADE MAN
"Habeo,nonhabeor"
(Aristippos)
We saidthatHeidegger
doesnotask forthe"Bedingung
derN6tigkeit,"
but onlyforthe "BedingungderMiiOglichkeit."21
As a matteroffact,it is a
decisivemarkofidealism(ultimately
a Stoicheritage)
thatit re-coins
every
"must"intoa "can,"everyfeature
ofexistence
intoa markoffreedom;
that
it assertsmanas allegedly
beingfree,because(no matterwhatthe actual
circumstanceslook like) he could befree;that it passes offthe ontic conjunctivusof freedomas an ontologicalindicativus. It is far more than a
18It is very characteristic
that the philosophersopposed to the FrenchRevolution,as Bonald,saw veryearlytheimplicationsofthiscategoryand violentlyfought
it.
19It is no coincidencethatDiltheywho,by recognizing
"Widerstand"(resistance)
as the criterionof Reality,opposed the idea of a "constituted"object, politically
was moreconservativethanthe earlytranscendental
philosophers.
WOn the otherhand the patheticidea of "makingthe world"was still,or again,
alive in groupsof the socialistmovements. However,by maintainingthe naturalistic conceptof worldas formulatedin the nineteenthcentury,those groupswere
preventedfromseeing the "Konstitutionsproblem."It is needless to add that
Germanacademic philosophycame in contact with socialist theoriesfor passing
momentsonly,in the years precedingand followingthe revolutionof 1918. (Example: Natorp.)
21 It is very characteristic
that the two greatestpost-HegelianGermanphilosophers,Marx and Nietzsche,whoseothersimilaritiesare not exactlystriking;both
have transformedthe traditionalquestion for the "Mbglichkeit"into that of
'N6tigkeit"without,however,expressesverbs, opposingtheirway of thinkingto
theRantianformula.
352
PIWSoP
AND PBENOMENOLOGICALRz8ARcH
coincidencethat, in the post-Kantianphase of German idealism,Kant's
moral and politicalconcept of "freedom"became, as it were, "de-humanized," i.e., deprivedof its exclusivelyanthropologicaland moral meaning;
that freedomwas transformedinto a sort of "being"-into (natural)
"potency" by Schelling,into "history" by Hegel. Selling downright
that "freedom"is "Seyn" as opposedto "Seyendem."12
formulated
If Heideggermakes "K6nnen" the fundamentalcategoryof "Dasein,"
he findshimselfin respectablesociety,althoughin a traditionwhich,by
libertyhas renouncedthe idea ofactuallyliberatingman.
"ontologifying"
Now, one could easily assume that Heideggerwould grantto "K6nnen"
a smallerscope than the post-Kantianphilosopherswhohad made freedom
a cosmological,at least a universalprincipleand, by thus broadeningthe
concept,had deprivedit of its actual moral momentum. Afterall, there
developingtowardfreedomnor Schelis nothingakin to Hegel's W{1eltgeist
in
to
found
Heidegger'sphilosophy.
ling'snaturanaturans be
This assumption,however,is deceptive. True, it is only "Dasein" that
"kann" (not nature or history);but whateverit is doing,its doings pass
forproofof its potentiality;whateveroccursto it, it seemsto be "Dasein"
itselfthat makes it occur. As a matterof factHeidegger'strickconsistsin
intoMacht. The
everypossibilitasintopotestas,everyMb16glichkeit
re-coining
entireprocess of becomingoneself(the kernelof Heidegger'sphilosophy
and, no doubt, the exclusive duty of every better class of "Dasein") is
composedof a seriesof "occupations,"the wholeappears as an "occupatio
fati," if we thus may disfigurethe classical figureof speech "amor fati."23
It is very characteristic,indeed, that the words "Eigentum" (property)
and "Eigentlichsein"(being proper,authenticbeing) stem fromthe same
root. The "Dasein" that, accordingto Heidegger,firstfinds itself as
strandedgood ("cast into the world") becomesauthenticby makingitself
its ownproprietor.
One should not overlookthe featuresdenied in such a processof total
any formof"belongingto" (to the world,groups,duties,
self-appropriation:
friends)seems, thoughsilently,excluded. Nevertheless,can therebe no
as his moralphilosodoubt that he means this descriptionof self-adoption
phy,althoughhe does not dissociatethe moralpart of philosophyfromhis
theoreticalontology. Thus, he leaves it open, no doubt deliberately,
" On theotherhand,it is no coincidence
apostlesof
eitherthatthetheoretical
althoughit was theywho
sociallibertyregardedthemselves
as "determinists,"
of
heldgoodforspokesmen
wantedto buildup actualfreedom.Thisobservation
as wellas forsocialists.
revolution
theearlybourgeois
""Amor fati,"properly
doesnotplayanyrole. The "Dasein's"consent
speaking
to itselfis notinducedbyamor,ratherdictatedbya sortof"so what,"ofstubbor"
it 'existence,'
bymaking
ness. "SinceIam whoI am,I willpunish
thecontingency
it seemsto speak.
PSEUDO-CONCRETEBESSOF HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY
353
his self-transformation
of the "Dasein" into"existence"is supwhether
an ontologicalfact
oran "oughttobe." Apparently
posedto represent
we
herewitha newneutralization
witha
are confronted
or,morecorrectly,
newambiguity.
startsoutin a stateofindignation:
The self-adoption
to the
as response
scandalof"facticity";
thismeansthatas response
tothescanmetaphysical
dal that"Dasein" findsitselfas beingthere(notordered,
as it were,by
and as beingX or Y ofall peoplewhichfact"Dasein"cannothelp
itself),
recognizing.We say it "can not." Thus the primordial
conditionof
as totallack of freedom.In a way,the whole
"Dasein" is stigmatized
a drawn-out
lifethatnow follows,represents
act of vengeance.After
ifit only
havingfacedtheprimordial
scandal,"Dasein" "can" everything
wantsto,fortheonlythingit wantsto be is to becomea self,oritself,
or
his own "Self." Now he shoulders
neverceasingto outbidhimself,
his
"facticity"
contingent
(hisbeingtherewithout
havingdispatched
himself)
decidesto existas ifhe had beenthereofhisfreewill,takesoverhispossibilitiesand, in a way,becomeshis own father. This undertaking
it
achievespartly
bymeansofan ontological
partly
bymeansofstubbornness,
punt; fornow,by usingthe "Wurfkraft"
of the "GeworfolieiL,"DLain
intoan "Entwurf":
transforms
"Geworfenheit"
by usingthemomentum
intotheworld"it "throwsitselfintoplanning
ofits "beingthrown
life."
ofour
thisdescription
is a truism:Onlyonthestrength
Generally
speaking
beingthere,can we takelifein ourownhands. It shouldbe noted,however,thatHeidegger's
as it stands,presupposes
description,
that"Dasein"
comesto theworldas a nobody,
andthat,whathappenstoit,is up tonone
buttoitself-inshort:itappliestothehistorical
typeoftheself-made
man,
notto manin general-though
to a self-made
manwhohas no longerthe
toriseintheworld,
opportunity
thusto an acosmistic
self-made
man.26
Yet,it is notonlythe"facticity"
ofitsbeingtherebutthe"locus"into
whichitwascast,too,thatscandalizes
"Dasein." It hasfounditselfas an
24Of course,this metaphordoes not occurin Heidegger's
writings. Since,however,the "cast" "Dasein" is ancestorless,the Self supplantshis ancestryand becomeshis ownmaker. See my article,"Nihilismusund Existenz,"Neue Ruizdchau
(October,1946).
N It is hardlypossible to convey the ethymological
connotationsthat pervade
the Germanphilosophicalidiom. In it profundity
and pun are strangelyblended.
This appliesnot onlyto Heidegger-farfromit; it ratherhas its sourcein an attitude
towardsLanguagewhichhad beengeneral:sincetheRomanticmovement
Language,
was not consideredsolelyas a meansto conveythoughts,but as a livingsourceor
reservoirof thoughtsand truths. Since, for Heidegger(and quite legitimately)
"Sprache" is one of the "Existenzialien"of "Dasein," "Dasein" has to listen to
its wordsto knowsomethingabout itself.
2 On the conceptof "Self-mademan" hiddenin His philosophysee the above
article,"Nihilismusund Existenz."
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IPHILOSOPHY
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
amorphousbeing,drownedin the mush of what one says, what one uses to
do, what one uses to claim,in short:drownedin what Heideggercalls the
"one," the "man." Expressed in more positive words,one findsoneself
carriedby anonymousothers,not sentencedto doing,judging,shouldering
all by oneself. However,forHeidegger,whodoes not belongto
everything
any group,thisfact of one's not onlybeing oneself,impliesno connotation
of reliefwhatsoever. The others,doxa, prejudice,customs,are nothing
but the loam stickingto the self's foot and hinderinghis being himself.
It is out of this loam of "Mian," that "Dasein" has to drag itself,
like Miinchhausenseizinghimselfby his own hair. Only if and when it
it has become "Existence," onlythen has it
succeedsin this performance,
attained that status of "Lnbedingtheit,"of not being conditionedby, in
which"Dasein" is the realizationof its own possibilities.
If we translatethis action fromthe ontologicalidiom into everyday
language,it turnsout to circumscribe
quite familiarphenomena:emancipationand social rise,emancipationfromthat social anonymityin whichone
is born,and rise to anotherone, withthe exception,though,that Heidegger's "Dasein" considersits originas such an indelibleblot, that it has to
cover it up completely.-Not bcingborn,but "cast," it comes (like an outcast) fromnowhere,and remainsan outcast as long as it does not succeed
in bestowingon itselfthe titleof "existence."
and the "Man" onlythat limit"DaHowever,it is not "Geworfenheit"
sem's"urgefortotalfreedom. Mortalitybeingits otherlimit,death has to
be adopted or occupied likewise. Therefore"existence," according to
Heidegger,consistsofusurpingdeath, of makingit a "momentum"of life,
a "SeimzurnTode"(beingtowarddeath)-a self-transformaof-becawming
tionwhereby,in a way death,despiteits ever-present
threat,is made rather
harmless,fornow it is becominga propertyor an attributeof life itself.
Thus, therestrictions
of "Dasein's" freedomseem to be located exclusively
outside the two ends of life, in its arrival and its departure, and
eitherofthemseemsto limit"Dasein" onlyto be victoriouslydefeatedand
appropriatedby the Self. Those powers,however,
thatin courseof actual
life,deprive"Dasein" ofitsfreedom:therealpowersthatbe,are notworthwhile
in Heidegger'sphilosophy. N ot once are theyalluded to. And
mentioning
whentheyactuallyenteredthe scene,Heideggerdid not tryto fightthem
like "Geworfenheit"
or "death," but kowtowedto them. What a philosophyoffreedom! No wordis utteredto build up orto "constitute"a world,
no crumbis leftofthepoliticalconceptof "Freedom" as formulatedby the
greatspeakersof bourgeoisrevolution. "Autonomy"has turnedto mere
stubbornness,
has becomethatasocial semblanceof"freedom"to own one's
originand one's owndeath. True, no one can denythatthe gloominessof
this "Being toward death" is presentedvery impressively,gloominessis
PSEUDO-CONCRETENESS
OF HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY
355
neithera meritnor a proofof truth. If Heideggerbases his identification
of "Being a Self" and "Being towarddeath" on the implicationthat death
be theonesituationutterlyexcludingany possiblesubstitutionby anybody
in a way,"moremine" thananythingelse), thisimplicaelse (and therefore,
tionis dubious:just as littlesubstitutionis possiblein everylivingrelation
or rapportbetweenhumanbeings. Moreover,it is not a fact,but the prejudice of the totallyde-solidarizedbeing,to consider"replacability"a feature of necessarilynegativevalue. Granted even, that nothingis "more
thegrammatical
possessive
mine" than my own death, Heideggertransforms
pronouninto an actual titledeedwhich is meant to consolehim the same
way as the moriturusin the ArabianNightswho,by shouting"my headsman!" suddenly,by the very power of the uttered possessive pronoun,
ownedhimas his slave.
We see: Heidegger's"being towarddeath" is, despite the macabre ring
ultimatelyeven a sortofescapism.
oftheformula,a newpseudo-radicalism,
of"Sterbenk6nnen"(potesFearingdeathhe escapes intothesham-freedom
tatemmoriendi)als "eigensterMfglichkeit." What a miserable,what a
desperateformoffreedom,to live towarddeath instead oflikingto live or
from
insteadoflivingfora cause. To object to such a desperado-situation
a givenset ofvalues, would be idle, of course. The Self whoselifelives for
nothing("ins Nichtshineingehalten"as, in anothercontext,he puts it) is
sufficiently
punishedby the desperadosituationitself. Still, punishment
is no meriteither;neitheris it proofof truth. Incomparablytruerand
more dignifiedappears to be what classic philosophyhad to say about
hopelesssituations. The Stoics nevertired of stressingthat the last and
the last consolingact of freedomis suicide. If the nihilisticphilosopher
keepson livingin spite of all, and ifhe even makestheoriesofjustification,
thenhe oughtto admitthat,in spiteofall, helikestolive,or,sincehe prefers
livingafterall-whatever this
generalstatements,that life is worthwhile
word"worthwhile
living"may mean. Then he oughtto fitthis statement
as decisiveelementintohis analysisofthe "Dasein." How"worthwhile"
lifeas being
ever,althoughthefact-ofhis "keepingon living"demonstrates
grave Existentialistcannot edge his
worthwhileliving,the professionally
way throughto this fundamentalstatement:it would sound to him too
at least too superficial. Thus, he mustfindor inventsomething
frivolous,
betweenlifeand suicide. And that is exactlywhat Heidegger's"Self" is
doing:it presentslifeitselfas a sortof suicide. By voluntarilyand incessantly shoulderingits death, Heidegger's "existence" commits lifelong
suicide,a pitifuldeath which,nonetheless,sinceit lasts as longas lifeitself,
offers
certainundeniableadvantages.
Thus,thefreesubject,who,in the epoch ofKant and Fichte,had wanted
to participatein the buildingof a societyoffreecitizens,has reducedhim-
356
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENONOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
selfto therankofa stockholder
ofhis ownend. The movablesceneryof
of the self-conethico-political
hopes,that had formedthe background
itselfhadalreadytakendownthat
stituting
Ego,istakendown(forhistory
onecouldfindas themotorof
hope);thereis no aim,no idea ofhappiness,
Heidegger'saction. Nor is the Ego occupiedwithKant's moralacts
("Handlungen")orHegel's"RealityoftheMind"-solelyand exclusively
itselfas "Kbnnen,"thusas
withitself. Since "Dasein" stillinterprets
theactivity
dynamic,
since,on theotherhand,it doesnotact anylonger,
to theincessant
of "Dasein" reducesitselfto a meremoralself-treatment,
maintenance
of its existentialcondition.Its categorical
imperative
(inherent,
thoughnotformulated
by Heidegger)wouldnot openanylonger
it would
withtheKantianword"act" or "do"-what sanctimoniousness!
a harmless
tothenaked"be!,"atbesttoa "beyourself!"
command
confine
itself
thatlifecan complywithwhilesittingat thedesk. In a way,compliance
withthis imperative
even consistsin philosophizing
is
sincephilosophy
ofthe "Dasein" as a self; and since "Philoso&Xatwfv, thus self-revelation
phy" and "Dasein" sharein the same object,"Wesen" (essence)-for
"Existenzist das Wesendes Daseins." Now,at last,do we understand
andpracticalphilosophy
is theoretical
at
fullythatHeidegger's
philosophy
thesametime. Thusbeingeitherone simultaneously,
he is likean anarchistwhohasmadeita rulenottoleavehisstudio,who,inhisphilosophical
acts resolves-no,not to do thisor that,but to be,to be resolved. The
oftheoryintotheconcreteness
boldjumpoutofthe"generality"
allegedly
endsas a purelytheoretical
ofexistence
as thepure"mood"of
existence,
"resoluteness
fiberhaupt"
("viverepericolosamente").Thus,inspiteofhis
harshlyanti-aesthetic
pathos,as a purelyaesthetic
phenomenon.If his
causestheimpression
ofbeingenormously
philosophy
ifphilos"activistic,"
intoactivelife-mereappearance,
ophyseemstobe re-transformed
for,but
forthisphilosophic
activitythereis noneto whichexistence
is boundor
is thatactivebecauseall actionhasbecome
called. His philosophy
philosophy
as Hegel's "Geist" is that concrete,
becauseeverything
concretehas
become"Geist." The activistic
ofhisphilosophizing
vehemence
is nothing
butthereverse
ofthefactthatheneither
postulates
norclaimstheslightest
moralorpoliticalactionin thisworld,thereverseofthefactthathe (like
themajority
ofGermanpetitbourgeoisie)
carried
through
a moralandpolitical sit-domrn-strike.
Littlewonderthathe hadno principle
whatsoever,
no
social idea, in short:nothing,
whenthe trumpetof NationalSocialism
startedblaringintohismoralvacuum:he becamea Nazi.
ILV. HEIDEGGER 'S LACK OF SYNCHRONIZATION.
" GESCHICHTLICHKEIT ")
CONCEPT OF
However,this disgraceof the moralpretensions
of the "existential"
is farremovedfromtheoriginalmotivesofhisphilosophy.If
philospher
PSEUDO-CONCRETENESS
OF HEIDEGGER'S
PHILOSOPHY
357
we take no account ofhis nakedly opportunisticreasons,Heidegger'satcan be understoodonlyfromthefact
temptat fallingin line,his conformism
one;
thathis starthad been an unusuallyand vehementlynon-conformistic
for,when he was workingon S&in und Zeit Heideggerfoundhimselfin
a periodin which
thesecularthepeculiarsituation
ofstillbeinga heretic-in
izationofboththeinnerand theouterlifehadbeena matter
ofcourseformany
is
generations. He is a marvelousillustrationof the facthowlittlehistory
withitself. He grewup a Provincial-not surroundedby
"synchronzied"
"modernlife,"social problems,industrialization. His first"Bildungswelt"
ontology-whilehis contemporaries
was Christianityand Greek-Christian
in a worldarticuweremovingin the mostdiverseplanes of secularization,
latedby techniqueand naturalscience.'-7He had to denyGod oncemoreina period,inwhichno oneeventhoughtofhisindifference
longer;he had to
get rid ofthe conceptof a "created" world,in a period,in whicheven the
worldhad alreadylost its interest-and that he did by
idea of a becoming
(beingcast into) whichdoes
inventingthe negativeidea of "Geworfenheit"
not implyany "Werfenden"(anyone who did cast man into the world).
Though excludinganythingsupranatural,this notion obviously rejects
natural "descendance" likewise. Our first thesis according to which
Heidegger'sphilosophycuts acrossthe alternative"Natural-Supranatural"
findsits confirmation
again. Once more he had to recoverLuther'sstep
which,in his life,played the same vehement,even liberatingrole which,
events of theirdays mighthave played.
formany of his contemporaries,
It is no wonderthat he designatesthe trueapproachto "History"as "WViederholen"-which world, when accentuated on its firstsyllable,denotes
whenaccentuatedon its thirdone, "repeating." It wNas
not
"re-covering,"
with
which
so
that
the
he
was
his
poorly
synchronized,
from presentday,
historicalroad led him to this or that locus historicus-heratherworked
himself
outfromthepastin whichhe was farmoreat home,climbingthrough
again,
the diversefloorsofhistoryup to the roofsof our days onlyto differ
thistimefromthe roof-dwellers
whowerelivingon top ofthefloorswithout
actually knowingthem. Whatever he broughtup fromtheir forgotten
floors,they regardedas somethingnew: e.g., the theologicalremnantsof
hisatheismwhich,in theireyes,seemedto be thegermsofthe metaphysics
27It is no coincidence
thatmanyofHeidegger's
pupilsin thetwenties
weresiforBruckner
whowasstill(though
in
multaneously
fascinated
byAntonBruckner,
a genuinely
Christian
composer,
had been
thealreadysecularformofsymphonies)
just as "anachronistic"
as Heidegger
was. If ourconceptof "HistorynotsynthereadermaythinkofBruckner
saying
chronized
withitself"needsan illustration,
Richard
Wagner
whoseownprayers
hisprayer
onthetomboftheFeuerbach-disciple
werefarfromChristian
had becomea wholly
and whoseconceptof redemption
secular,
evenan eroticone.
358
PMLOSOPHY
AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
to come; or the total blendingof philosophyand anthropology28
which,
formulatedby Feuerbach a hundredyears before,had meanwhilebeen
buriedagain underotherstrataofphilosophy. In short,his anachronistic
origingave rise to his triptowardthepresent,where,because ofhis travelhe foundhimselfagain an anachronisticand lonelycreature.
experiences,
So far,biographically,
his approachto historyis plausibleand consistent.
Unanswered,however,remains,if we may use this obsolete word, the
is possible. As a matterof
"epistemological"questionofwhether
repetition
fact,thescope ofthings"repeatable"is limited,except as we are willingto
dilutethe compactrealityofthingspast withhwhichwe are obviouslynot
identical)intosomethingthat can become "one's own existence."
Now, timeand again,we had had the opportunity
to noticethat Heidegger'sefforts
pointin thedirectionof"Owning,"ofappropriating
and owning
even the event absolutelyremovedfromour sphereof power: death, by
it into "Sein zum Tode." In quite a similarway Heidegger
transforming
appropriates"History." Being,as it were,a "Daseins-Monist,"recognizingnothingbut "Dasein," he dilutesthe "Vergangenheit"into "Gewesenheit," the past eventsto "Dasein that has been," into realizedpossibilities
of "Dasein," therebydeprivingthe continuumof "ontic" events,political
systems,etc., of theirundeniableweightin favorof the "Dasein that has
been." Obviouslythe key of interpretation
shows the Hegelian making,
though with the two fundamentaldifferences,
that Heideggeromits all
"ObjektivenGeist" and that he neutralizes,even reverses,the idea of progressingpossibilities,in such a way as to sometimesmakinghistorylook
like the historyof its own decay or self-burials("VerschUttungen"),in
short:likea re-qress.29
Now, the deliberatevagueness of the term "Dasein" and Heidegger's
failureto give it a definitehypostasis,allows him to call both himselfand
history"Dasein." To put it clumsily,eitheris made out ofthe same ontological vXtq. Being "Dasein," being "geschichtlichesDasein" himself,he
can "repeat" history. The famousGoethe-word"Waer nicht das Auge
21Whenemphasizing,
nevertheless,
thathis "Hereneutik
des Daseins" doesnot
simplyamountto a new "Philosophical
Anthropology,"
Heidegger
meansto say
thatwhiletheanthropologist
naivelydealswith"men"as an "ontic"speciesamong
otherswithout
so muchas entering
thediscussion
of "Sein,"he is examining
him
ontologically."
29In this,again, he is a secularizedChristian. For he comes forwardas a sort
of re-formulator
of the once apparenttruth(ontology). That is whyfindingtruth
equals forhim&xjtebeai,whichwordhe takes literacyas "uncoverthe coveredup."
This applies at least to the firstpart of Sein und Zeit in which he unburiesthe
Greekontologicalquestion,chokedup and coveredwiththesand ofcenturies. Since
he is doingthisuncovering
withthenowadayswhollyunusual pathos ofthereformer,
he could not help beingmistaken(even by himself)as a sort of philosophicalrevo
lutionary.
OF HEIDEGGER'SPHIILOSOPH
PSEUDO-CONCRETENESS
359
sonnenhaft..." could be varied: "waer Dasein nichtgeschichtehaft...'
losesits compactrealityand becomes
by becoming
his,history
However,
of"Dasein": "Geschichtlichkeit."30
meretonality
Afterthat one would.easilyexpectfromHeideggera universalistic
foreverything
and susceptibility
humanthathas been,
Hegelianreadiness
is againdeceptive. Heidegger
is, or mightbe. This expectation
repeats
buttheline
has madehimnothing
onlythathistory
thathas orallegedly
but theone,to annihilate
ofhisownancestors.Sincehe has no interest
it into a natumesse. Changingthe
he re-transforms
his "Geworfenheit,"
checkofhisownfacticity
intothehardmoneyofhisancestors,
unendorsed
in orderto"ownA"
he triesto "erwerben"
history
it,inordertobe it. ("Was
es zu besitzen.") Thus,
du ererbtvondeinenViternhast,erwirbes, umr
is forhimeo ipso,"myhistory,"
history
whereby
thepossessive
pronoun
to whichwe had calledattention
be"my"displaysagaintheirridescence
fore. It denotesthingsthatowemejust as wellas thingsI owe. Heidegger
alwaysre-coinsthefirstmeaningintothesecondone. To be moreconcrete,
confines
thehistorical
Heidegger
"Dasein"withwhichhe identifies
himself,
oftheGreek-Christian-European
totheboundaries
andonlyto its
history,
"geistesgeschichtlichen"
sector. His is an attitude
ofdeliberate
self-provinfarthest
cialization,
It is
away fromany philosophical
seafarer-attitude.
thathe takeshissoundings.Historyno one
onlyinthedepthsofhistory
him. No interest
cantakeawayfrom
leadshimintooecumenic
whatsoever
into"oneworld,"into"foreign,"
nottomention
civilizabroadness,
primitive
tions. Accordingto him,they are merelyobjects of curiosity,never our
retreatinto
business. ObviouslythisretreatparallelsthatofGermany's
afterthedefeat,thelossofherfleetand hercoloniesin 1918. It
herself
withsuspicionand xenophobia
his
goestogether
that,lateron,facilitated
inlinewithNationalSocialism.
falling
Thus, Heidegger'spositionis a very intricateone. On the one hand,
is beingre-transformed
ofDasein,in sucha way
intoa possibility
History
as to enableman,beingequally"Dasein,"to re-experience
it as his own
On theotherhand,man,beinghistory,
but onlyhis own
"M\I6glichkeit."
history,
recognizes
onlyhis ownpre-history
as history.Obviouslythis
of"History"and "Dasein"bringsabouta twodoubleormutualmooring
oftheconceptofHistory.
foldnarrowing
into
By re-translating
"past" into "havingbeen," "Vergangenheit"
"Gewesensein,"Heideggeragain makes mankindappear "free"in a higher
degreethanit actuallyis. He passesoverin silencethedecisivefactthat
(ifnotall,at leastthemajority
of)historical
situations
donotdirectly
repre10It was GeergSimmelwhopreceededHeideggerbydefining
historyas themedium
in which"Subjekt" and "Objekt" are of the same "nature." Heideggerbetrays
prematureformulation
as littleas mostphilosophers
fromDiltheyon.
Simunel's
360
PHILOSOPHY
AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
indirect
responses
ofman
ofman,but extremely
sentpositivepossibilities
ofworldorsociety. Theseconditions
arefarfrom
to objectiveconditions
forby "humannature"(ifthereis sucha thing);to many
beingprovided
ofthem"humannature"is evenwhollyunableto liveup, to makethem
(example1)
theirown. To say theleast,it wouldbe uselessto interpret
a historical
as a genuine
M6glichphenomenon
thefascistworld,certainly
keitof "Dasein." Mostly"Dasein" does not knowhowto masterthis
to
it is man-made,
and ifthere
is a "Dasein"corresponding
world,although
speaking,
but
Dasein" properly
it,thistypeof"Dasein" is nota "megliches
product
hasbecome
response
toitsownproduct,
which
often
"Dasein's"forced
takesintoaccount
bigger
thanitsproducer.In short,as littleas Heidegger
factorinman)as littledoeshe accountforhis"Nature"(thenon-human
as "objective
mind,"
transcend
ensproportioned
humanam,
toryas a medium
thisproportion
Geistor Un-geist.The onlyfeature
transcending
objektiven
ofno oneand everyone)
he dealswithis the"one" (theaveragepublicity
slavery,
law
State,economy,
which,however,
is a purelynegativepattern:
in Heidegger's
philosophy
ofhis-nothingofit is so muchas mentioned
tory.
of "History"as
As we have just remarked,
Heidegger's
interpretation
is closelyconnected
withhis impliedtheoryof freedom.
"Gewesensein"
ofhistory
is history
ofpower,thushistory
Thefactthatthemajorportion
oftheun-free,
imposed
uponpeople,is totallysuppressed.'Now,
history
thihs
has themostimportant
fortheconceptof
consequences
suppression
notonlyby "Dasein,"
situation
is determined
"repetition."If a historical
but by objectivefactorsimposedupon man,the sole factof my being
"Dasein" does not suffice,
does not enableme to repeatthe situation.
has notnecessarily
to do withthe"Wesen"of "Dasein" as
"Gewesenheit"
ofthewords
Heidegger
seemsto imply.As a matteroffact,thetreatment
"Wesen"and "Gewesen"as twinwords,as we findit timeand againin
had alwaysa conservative
Germanmetaphysics,
ring(example2). Is
as it is investedin a
it possible,
e.g.;to repeatthetypeof"Gewesenheit"
the
a
truismto stressthat
as
Kantion
"autonomy"?
It
would
be
concept
of"Dasein,,"at leastit was too
"autonomy"
was notsimplyan emanation
theechoof"Dasein"to an irrevocably
bourpassedworldto thatofrising
geoisie. The answerto ourquestionhasbeengiventhoughin an indirect
before,
Heidegger
has
for,as wehaveemphasized
way,byHeidegger
himself,
notrepeatedthe "cityen-motives"
inherentin bourgeoisrevolutionary
changedworldin which"republic"
philosophy.Livingin a thoroughly
anddefeatseemedto be equivocal,he justcouldnotrepeattheconceptof
becausesuch
intheKantianterm. Andprecisely
"world"thatwasimplied
was impossible,
dissolvesin complete
Heidegger's
undertaking
repetition
nihilism.Our example"autonomy"was not accidental. As we know,
PSEUDO-CONCRETENESS
OF HIDEGGER'S
PHILOSOPHY
361
or "emantoo,had startedin a wayfroma sortof"autonomy"
Heidegger,
cipation"(e.g.,from"belief"). Since,however,in the worldof a disinin thatdirecsocietyit was outofthequestionto marchforward
tegrating
in
which
the
ofthe troisibme
Etatoncehad
speakersofemancipation
tion
the
in a short
like
spark
switched,
position
Heidegger's
pre-secular
pointed,
the
intermediate
nihilism
into
that
of
without
passingthrough
directly
circuit,
or politicalstages,without
in-between
stamoralistic
on secularized
dwelling
(i.e.,freefromauthoritiesand the
he wantedto be "himself"
tions. lWhen
whenhe wantedto be in the"truth"(insteadof
ofhisorigin),
contingence
in
"dexa"
and
"man")FreedomorTruthas meantinthepoliticodrowning
ethicsof Germanidealismcouldnot conveyany positive
philosophical
to him. True,he freedhimself,
but onlyoutof a bondage,not
meaning
intoanothercondition.Whilethe Kantianand Fichtean"subject"had
inthenameofgroups,
spokeforno groupunlesswerecogHeidegger
spoken
numberofGerconsiderable
oftheadmittedly
nizehimas themouthpiece
had becomeequivocalor even
mansafter1918whosegroup-consciousness
imaginary.Grantedeven,he was speakingforthem,he was doingit the
he may have beenfor them,bw
way feverspeaks for illness: characteristic
notdoinganything
devising
no positivemoralorpoliticalplansor
forthem,
"for"them. Sincehe triedto "repeat"historyor "Gewesenpostulates
ofhisdays,as truephilososein"insteadofpassingthemoralwatchword
of
bondbetweenhis philosophy
phers
had done,thereexistsa systematic
ofhismoralrigorism.
history
andtheemptiness
V. PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE HOSTILE TO LIFE.
EXISTENCE-BASHFUL
ETERNITY
If onedistinguishes
threetypesof "Morality":(1) Beingmoralin the
world,(2) Buildingup a "moralworld,"(3) Making onegiven
recognized
belongsto
unequivocally
regardoftheworld,Heidegger
selfmoralwithout
forinhisprocessof
is notaccounted
thethird
type. Sincethefellow-being
neitheras
as "proximus"noras "stranger,"
oneself"(neither
"Becoming
partner
oflovenorofdutynorofpolitics)theonlygoalleftis to becomea
homonovus3' thoughone lacking caritas as well as social responsibilities.
things. The conceptof
To call sucha lack "omission"is understating
is broughtto sucha pointthatit has becometheexclusively
"individuality"
it hadbeenonly
intheformofconscience,
whileformerly,
binding
content
thevoiceofconscience
theultimate
voice. To be moreprecise,
andbinding
butit is
orKantianism,
to thatin Christianity
playsa parthardlyinferior
31In thefirstyearsfollowing
the GermanRevolutionof 1918,the harmlessly
extremist
word"NeuerMensch"was a pet phrasein thosecircleswhichbeingneither
Christiannor socialist feltthat somethingunheardof was due in the
outspokenly
newsituation. The wordwhosemeaningwas purepretense,neitherdenoted"belief"
nor"revolution."Heidegger's"self" is the ironcladbrotherof this "new man."
362
PHILOSOPHYANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
thevoiceoftheSelfexhorting
theSelf(orthe"Dasein")tobehisSelf. Thus,
making
theSelfspeaking
tothe"Dasein,"Heidegger
maintains
throughout
the Dualismof Christianity
althoughGod or Spiritin theircustomary
meaningare shutout. It is hardlynecessary
to remindthereaderonce
moreoftheformula
ofouropeningparagraph.Againhe cutsacrossthe
alternative
"Natural-Supra-natural."
We hadsaidto be "myself"
is thesolecontent
oftheSelf'sexhortation.
True,"Mit-sein"(to be withothers),and "FUrsorge"
(takingcareofthe
in SeinundZeit;however,
other)arementioned
theyarebarelymorethan
Aristotelian
reminiscences
(rCOovOrXLrLKO'V,
unableto compete
qvg,8ovXe~etv)
withthevehement
pathosofthe"Selbst-werden."Theyremaindryfootnotesofhissystem. ThismeansforHeidegger's
"Dasein"itsown"Leben"
(qua existence)is "der Guterhkchstes"
(summumbonum). Yet, while
usually(at leastup to thefirstworldwvar)
thewatchword
"Das Lebenist
derGfiter
h6chstes"
expressed
eithersomething
utilitarian
orEpicurianor
Dionysic("fulllife,""Denn alle Lust willEwigkeit"),
lifeis,
Heidegger's
thoughthesole good,farfromenjoyingitself. As a matterof fact,his
is thefirstand uniquesampleof thespecies"philosophy
philosophy
of life
hoetileto life." His "Dasein" still suffersfromthe Christianbad
evenfromtheadditional
conscience,
bad conscience
ofhavingthrown
overboardtheChristian
conceptofsin afterall. This doublyevilconscience
makesHeidegger's
"Dasein" so vile that it begrudges
itselfall joy. If
3ieleggerneitherappointedgrudgenor stubborness
as "Existenzialien,"
thisomission
canonlybe explained
by thefact,that,despitehispassionate
searchforaletheia,
he suppressed
the motivesofhis philosophizing
altogether.No man couldbestowa worsetreatment
on his fellow-man
than
"Dasein"bestows
is sadisticor
Heidegger's
onitself. Whether
thetreatment
masochistic
thisquestionis hardto decidesincethe socialpartnersare
Siamesetwins. When"Dasein" sleeps,it wakesitselfup, ifit wantsto
read the paper it tearsthis"tool of mediocrity
and average-life"
from
its own hands. It excludes itself fromleisure,friendship,friendliness,
in short,fromculture. Its exercitia
fillthe twenty-four
hours of the
day,its drudgery
to marchtowarddeathlaststhe wholelife. Perhaps,
onceit has reacheditsend,"Dasein"willsay "I madeit afterall,"thenit
as it is
mighthaveenoughofit,but it willcertainly
notbe "lebenssatt"
saidofthepatriarchs
wholivedtheirfill. The doublybad conscience
gives
hisphilosophy
sucha stonysternness,
sucha lackofSocraticirony,
suchan
inability
at "frohliche
Wissenschaft,"
thatthemere
factofonesinglelaughter
wouldgivethelietothegeneral
validity
ofhisanalysisof"Dasein."
Despiteits utterlack ofcaritas,thenihilistic
procedure
through
which
"Dasein"worksitswayto "Existence"showsa Christian,
to be moreconcise,a Paulinicstructure,
fortheonlythingthatmatters,
theonlyissueat
OF HEIDEGGER'SPMLOSOPHY
PSEUDO-CONCRETENESS
363
thus in a status
not in "law" orin "acstakeconsistsin salvation,
ofbeing,
tion." ThismeansthePaulinicconceptof"Belief"reappearsin Heidegmododiabolico,
andwiththelabel"existence."
ger'sphilosophy,
though
As everybody
knows,in Paulinism"belief"is meantas thestatuswhich
theLaw. Thus,"belief"is rangedaboveobedience
enablesmanto fulfill
de-Christianandtheactionsthatflowoutofbelief. Now,inHeidegger's
the"statusrangedaboveactions"is beingretained,
izedtheology,
though
nowbybeliefin oneself
as saviorof"Dasein"
beliefis supplanted
Christian
thatbelief
fromdeath. WhilePaulinebeliefpurported
and as redeemer
of good workssuperfluous,
becausethesewill
rendersthe commanding
befollowfrombelief,in Heidegger's
philosophy
goodworksthemselves
ofcourse,notexpresses
oncethestateof
come(though,
verbis)
superfluous,
isarrivedat-at leastat noplaceareweadvisedofthem.
"Existence"
It is notas easyas thatto drawtheword"blasphemy"
fromthemouth
of a non-believer. I can hardlysee, however,how this total reversalof
the originalmeaningofPaulinismcould be labelledotherwise.
*
*
*
Whenwe spokeof the maltreatment
of the "Dasein" by the "Self,"
we saw that the chase of the Selfafterhimselfis an exceedinglytorturous
operation. Since, as the title Sein und Zeit indicates,"Dasein" is tem-
poral,ithas "extension":
thus,whenever
"Dasein,"travelling
through
time,
and seizedby missing-panic,
triesto catchitselfas a wholered-handed,
the preywillalwaysslip fromits fingers;
"Dasein" willcatchjust one
moment
ofitselfinstead,alwaysthisor thatcontingent
traveling
station
ofitscontinuous
neveritswholetrack. Hence,unableto seizeor
journey,
to be itselfin itsextensive
"wholeness"
("Gaenzedes Dasein"),it has to
findor inventan intensive
way ofbeingas a whole. As a matteroffact,
thismissing
panicis one ofthefundamental
motivesforHeidegger
to introducethe conceptof "Existence"whichis the intensive
wholenessof
"Dasein." Betterthanfromanyotherpoint,do weunderstand
from
here
ofdeathforthe"Existence." Since,ina way,it is deaththat
thefunction
limitsordefinestheextension
oflifeso as to makeit a whole,Heidegger
retainsit and ordersit to maketheintensive
wholeness
oflife. Heidegger'sastonishing
requestforthe"GaenzedesDaseins"is thedesperado
requestoftheonewhois mortally
afraidofcontinually
missing
theonlycapital in hishands,his "Dasein,"because,beingtemporal,
thisDasein continually
reducesitselfto something
un-occupiable
andunseizable.33
Thus,
31The connection
and definitie
has hardlyeverbeentakenas seriously
betweenfinis
as in Heidegger'sphilosophy.
3 It is astonishingthat this philosophicalmotive (thoughshowingall the marks
ofa genuinephilosophicalpanic) nonethelessseemsto be thevariationof a classical
364
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICALRESEARCH
of
goalof"Sein undZeit"is theconquest
admitted
though
never
theultimate,
itstimeorthedissolving
oftimeintothe"Intensivum"
one'sownSeindespite
be called
stateofDaseinwhich,seenfromthisangle,might
oftheexistential
to which
word,according
ofDasein." In a way,Heidegger's
the"eternity
this interpretation:
"Existenzist das Wesendes Daseins" corroborates
afterall, in thehistoryofEuropeanthoughteversincePlato,thenotion
of timelessness.
"Wesen" (essence)had alwaysimpliedthe connotation
fromGreekand Chrisavoidsprofessing
thisinheritance
True,Heidegger
or to call it by its propername. Beingan anti-supertianmetaphysics
ofeternity."
he is,in a way,"ashamed
naturalist,
oftime,
at leastofneutralization
It is obviousthatthisideaof"eternity,"
theHegelianconceptofan
in modernphilosophy:
novum
is nota complete
"end of Philosophy";the Marxianthesisaccordingto whichhistoryis
idea
stage;theNietzschean
ofan extra-historical
but a pre-history
nothing
a sortof
of"eternalrecurrence"-allofthemare attempts
at establishing
because "time"had becomethe axis of
withintime,precisely
"eternity"
in a farhigherdegreethanit had everbeenin the
thinking
philosophical
antiqueworld.
againstandsapartby
Heidegger
in a broadtradition,
standing
Although
oflife
thewholeness
embracing
(i.e.,his "existence,"
makinghis "eternity"
whereby
itbecomesan oddvariant. His
affair
private
and death)a totally
lockedup in theindividual.Being
is buta life-long
eternity
"existence"
an eternitydenudedof God, of a realmof "validity,"of
furthermore
"ideas,"ofnaturalor morallaws,ofhappinessor a socialaetasaurea,in
which,in thecourseofthe
and contents
short,deprivedofall accessories
ofreligion
had accruedto theconceptof"eternity,"
andphilosophy
history
just theemptyobjectofthefanaticwishnotto
it is againa nothingness,
leftto him.14It is
lifetheonlyproperty
inthefluidelement,
getdrowned
to thefactthat,for
needlessto stressagainthatwe cannottakeexception
with"eternity"
connected
formerly
thevalidityofall contents
Heidegger,
for
whichhad beenbreeding
situation
had evaporated. Oncethenihilistic
text. In his well-knowndiscussionof Happiness, (NIC. Eth., 1100a 1) Aristotle
disputesthe child the possibilityof being happy-since it has not or has not yet
reachedits completenessof life; a fewlines later, Aristotlequotes Solon's question
of whetherone could be happyaltogetherbeforedeath,onlyto rejectit. The connectionbetweenHeidegger'sproblemof "Gaenze" and thispassage is beyonddoubt.
ApparentlyHeidegger's"Bildungserlebnisse"and "Urerlebnisse"are inextricably
intertwined.
3 There is an obvious connectionbetweenthis intensitydenuded of contentand
of the Germanpre-warMouthmovementwhich
the programmatic,
programlessness
formsan importantpartofHeidegger'slife. It was intoit thathe escaped fromthe
consistsin the fact that Heidegger's
"Man" of his surroundings.The difference
intensity,called "existence,"lacks all dionysicconnotations.
OF HEIDEGGER'SPHILOSOPHY
PSEUDO-CONCRETENESS
365
a longtime,becomesacute, it is, of course,out ofthe questionjust to order
values back in line. It is ratherhis attemptat concealingthe nihilistic
natureofhis Nihilismthat seems to us objectionable,the factthat he presentsit as "ontology,"and that he tries,despitethe completeannihilation
ofvalues,to perform
a sortof "Verewigungs-Ritual."
VI. ISOLATION-THE
CONDITION OF ONTOLOGY
thatHeidegger
Althoughat firstsightit maybe surprising
presents
his
as ontology,
theconnection
"Trotz-Ritual"
is farfromaccidental.
in breaking
actionhad consisted
out of
As we had seen,his elementary
thecontingent
situationintowhichhe felthimself
cast; thisact did not
ofhisSelf. Hence
implyanypositivestepforhisonlyaimwastherecovery
to carryhimintoextreme
intoa situahisactionhad,bynecessity,
isolation,
tionin whichhe facedthenaked"I am" and inwhichhewasnot"this"or
"that"anylonger("this"or "that"alwaysbeingsociallyrecognized
functions)butjust "there." As a matteroffact,extreme
isolation
is theconditio
sinequa nonfordiscovery
of "Sein" as differing
from"Seiendem"(elva&as
from
whatHeidegger,
in theopening
differing
o6)andthus,thecondition.of
of Sein undZeitannounced
as the epochalre-simptinD of thp
paragraphs
at the
consternation
Platonic-Parmenidean
distinction.The ontological
likea "there
"facts"thatthere
"is" thisor that,thatthereexistssomething
is something"
cannotstrikeintoeverybody;
it can alarmonlythebeing
totallyisolatedfromthe world,thebeing,forwhomtheexistence
ofthe
is "thirnkable."35
worldis no matterof course,forwhomits non-existence
The distinction
between"thingsthatare" and the"beingofthings"originatesonlyifandwhentheexisting
worldhasbecomecontingent
andalien;
thusifand whenI am notboundto it anylonger. Thisappliesto one's
own"Dasein" just as wellas to "Sein" in general. Onlythehopelessly
maroonedhumanis amazed thathe himselfis-a keeneranalysiswould
showthatontology
is rather
a theory
ofthis"consternation-that"
thana theory
of"Sein". True,onecouldobject,thatthis"deduction"
oftheontological
approachis ofno consequence
forthetruth
ofontology;
that,afterall,each
andeverydiscovery
needsa definite
situationwithout
whichit couldnever
be made;thata river'ssourcedoesnotrefute
itsmouth. Generally
speaking,thisobservation
maybe true. Not,however,
wherediscoveries
inthe
province
of "Dasein" are at stakebecausetheveryactofphilosophizing
on
"Dasein" is a symptom
of a specialsortof "Dasein"-not to speakofits
changing
effect
on Dasein. Therefore
the existential
philosopher
doesnot
3sAs paradoxical
oftheworldis not
as it maysound,onlybecausetheexistence
a matterofcourseforHeidegger,
he had to emphasize
the"to be in theworld"as
a matter
ofcourse.
366
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
philosopher.Sua res
discover"Dasein,"but "Dasein" oftheexistential
agitur. Sola sua.
VII. SELF-MUTILATION
to be thefirstto
rightwhenhe contends
Be thatas itmay,is Heidegger
buriedontological
question?
havelaidopentheage-long
style
Plato's,Aristotles',
Although
it is beyonddoubtthatParmenides',
it is questionwas abandonedforcenturies,
questions
ofaskingontological
gave
altogether.Modernontology
thisappliesto ontology
able whether
Philosophy."It is a truism
itselfanothername,thatof"Transcendental
thesubjectas "Erscheinung"
to stressthatKantorFichtedidnotclassify
metaphorsin
or just as a beingobjectamong6vrca. The innumerable
or as "sourceof
as "spontaneity"
whichthe subjectwas circumscribed
term,it was
provesthat,to use Heidegger's
causality"oras "unbedingt"
thathad beenthe
of "Subjectivity"
the "Seinsart,"the speciesexistendi
himself
philosophy.It was Heidegger
exclusivethemeoftranscendental
has presented
the condeepKant-Interpretation,
who,in his admittedly
upsidedown. Transtherelation
exceptforthefactthatheturned
nection
is not,as it appearstobe
offreedom)
(i.e.,philosophy
.rendenal
Pphiloozaphy
is
rather
notyetfullyunderstanding
itself;
toHeidegger,
an ontology
according
which
doesnotunderstand
itself
offreedom
"Ontology
ofDasein"a philosophy
we
without
offreedom
freedom.Although
anylonger,
namelya philosophy
of
beforewhenwe discussedthecategories
had toucheduponthisproblem
wehaveto resumeit oncemore.
and "potestas,"
"possibilitas"
In theverymoment
inwhichthe"freesubject,"despiteallhis"boldness"
efusingthisfreedom
word!)has renounced
Heidegger's
("Verwegeniheit;"
in whichhe doesnot,or willnot,or cannot
in theverymoment
fectively,
utilizeit as freedomof action,it discoversitselfas a sort of Jilia.
philosopher
hands,"theexistential
Lessing's"Raphaelwithout
Resembling
registers
himself,
handsbutonewho,aftermutilating
is a freemanwithout
limband hisstilllivingimpulsetoward
hisintensepainin theamputated
it becomesunderas a sortof "Sein." Increasingly
actionand freedom
in a periodoftotalpashad to originate
standablethatsucha philosophy
ofan immobilized
sivity(after
thedefeatof1918),thatitwastheexpression
declinedto solidgroupandthatit was the workofa manwhoscornfully
understandable,
arizehimselfwithwhatcause so ever,and increasingly
was
its truevocation,"freedom,i'
that"Dasein,"afterhavingrenounced
it had to becomeunscrupulous.
boundsomehow
to realizeit nonetheless:
ofa philotheconnotation
usingthisword,callingforth
Wearedeliberately
forthat'swhatthe"Self"reallyis-exceptforthefact
sophicalanarchist
itsaverthatit remains
totallyacademicandtame,thatit doesnottestify
by physicalterroror annihilation
sionofauthorities
or moralobligations
PSEUDO-CONCRETENESS
OF HEIDEGGER'S
PHILOSOPHY
367
ofthe
and actuallyboldRussiannihilist
as thedesperate
("Vernichtung")
had done,but onlyby "nihilation"
Heideggei's
("Nichtung",
lastcentury
ofthe
term,
beingjustas littlepartoftheGermanlanguageas "nihilation"
himself
neither
endangering
English). The "Self"is a bloodlessanarchist
hisuniversity
chairfromexactly
northeworld. If its advocateprocured
forthe
it was the premium
he heldin suchcontempt,
thatworldWhich
ofhisaction.
bloodlessness
VIII. SKEPTICAL CHRISTIAN AND CHRISTIAN SKEPTIC
"Daseinist ein Sein,demes urnes selbstgeht...."6 "It is a species
it takesin itself. . ." or moreprecharacterized
existendi
by the interest
by thefactthatit is at stakeforitself." In a way
cisely:"characterized
forthe wholeof Heidegger's
thisformulais the commondenominator
Dasein ("man") and
forit appliesto boththenon-authentic
philosophy,
one ("Selbst"). Afterall, it is just by takingthisprinciple
theauthentic
that"Dasein"makesitself"authentic."
seriously
is meantto refer
thereaderbackto
It is quiteobviousthatthisformula
whowas the firstto
Kierkegaard,37
the fatherofExistentialphilosophy,
use the term"Existenz"and whoseleadingcategorywas "Interest."
is obviously
maintained
by Heidegger.However,is
Thus,thecontinuity
shouldbecomepartof
that"Existence"or "interest"
it notcontradictory
like a philosophical
system? Had not Kierkegaardused.his
something
as weaponsagainstthe veryidea of a systematic
philosophy?
categories
a system-like
Existential
Has notHeidegger,
despite
philosophy,
bymaking
ofall religious
theomadesomething
his outspoken
questions,
suspension
religious
undertaking?
logicaloutofKierkegaard's
againstHegelrunsaboutas
accusation
Kierkegaard's
Asitis wellknown,
omits
necessarily
follows:
Philosophy
(as systemof"being"or"becoming")
ina way,Kierkegaard
charges
situation;
myunexchangeable
me,meanrem,
thatphilosophy
(i.e.,Hegel'ssystem)amountsto a vast and vastlycomthing
thewhole,allowseveryindividual
plicatednetthat,thoughcovering
to slip through,
thusme too. "Mfe,"however,does neither
or situation
36 The expression
"es gehtum" is a deliberatelyblunt,extra-academic,
"concrete"
wordimplyingsomethingof an ultimatum. (See: 'Es geht urnLeben und Tod,'
'es gehturndie Wurst.')
37 The Existentialism
whichcomesto Americatoday as "derniercri" is a dernier
cri, indeed,-the cry of a fourthgeneration-Kierkegaard,Strindberg,Heidegger,
Sartre-one hundredyearsof dernierscris-to say nothingof the fifthand sixth,of
Herder,Hamann,orRousseau. Thereseemsto be a farcrybetween
Chateaubriand,
and the day on whichit arrivesin the most advanced,country.
the cri d'avanthier
So far,Americahas not been in need of thosecries. Now, theremightexistcertain
reasonsforthe fashionwhich,so far,however,does not amount
extra-philosophical
to muchmorethanto a ceaselessprintingof the wordin magazines.
368
PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
norme,empirically;
the"Ichheit"oftranscendental
designate
philosophy,
rathertheinescapablemoralsituationwithwhichI happento be identical
and inwhichI can'thelpmakingdecisions;or,in moreChristian
terms;I,
God orconfronted
confronting
byGod-thus,I withregardtomysalvation
is the Self'sexclusive"interest."No
which,accordingto Christianity,
this
situation
thatI am, can,according
to Kierkephilosophy
neglecting
gaard,claimto thetitleofbeingphilosophy.It is obviousthat,thus,in a
re-moors
to
philosophy
in "Sein" and thathe attempts
way,Kierkegaard
knewperfectly
although,
as Kierkegaard
force"interest"
backintotheory,
in "suspenwell,themaincharacteristic
oftheoryhad precisely
consisted
called"objectivity."a
sionofinterest,"
is usuallyregardedas havinginaugurated
a wholly
Now,Kierkegaard
the conceptof "Existenz,"which
newconceptof "Sein" by introducing
the
withthemostgeneral,
makestheungeneralizable
(mycase)as contrasted
uniqueobjector task of philosophy.This versionis, to say the least,
in a farmore
by Kierkegaard
equivocal. If "one'sbeing"was formulated
is his despair;
rigoristic
keythaneverbefore,thereasonforthisrigorism
is at
"status"inwhichnothing
despairaboutthe factthatthetraditional
stakebut "one-self"
orone'ssalvation:belief-found
itselfina deadlycrisis.
It is not onlyagainstthe background
of "system"(Hegel) thathe had
hisanti-conceptual
notonlyagainstthat
conceptofexistence;
formulated
ofrisingpositivism
whichfailedto tellanybodyanything
abouthimself;
of the press,nor
not onlyagainstthe lack of judgmentand conviction
adulteration
ofmanwho couldnot genuinely
againstthe petit-bourgeois
it kneweverything
since,as "Publikum,"
understand
anything
anylonger,
is, to at least the same degreetheattackof the
anyhow:his undertaking
attemptof one,not
Christian
beliefon "knowing";or the philosophical
back"
firmly
believingin his ownbelievinganymore,to "philosophize
himself
tobelief,
a sortofa "dubiteergosum,"theattemptofa skepticto make
his veryskepticism
the "pibcede resistance"ofhis religioussituationan attack,though,
his enemy'sweapons,makinguse of
by a mandonning
carriedforward
witha maximalphilosophical
.thelanguageofphilosophy,
furor,and disguisedinto the aphoristicrags of despairand paradox.
a rescuing-device
of a
Seen fromthisangle,his existentialism
represents
growing
evermore
newstyleforceduponhimby thecrisisofthechurch,
acuteand by thevanishing
ofreligion
which(as "absolutesWissen")had
been drawnand swallowedby Hegel'sPhilosophy.Thus,Kierkegaard's
as (ifoneunderso muchin thecauseheadvocated
originality
didnotconsist
standsthewordin its broadestmeaning)in themethod
he had toapplyto
I8 It is needlessto stressthatMarxwhenre-mooring
Philosophy
in "Sein" and
"Interest"had verydifferent
between
conceptsin mind;stilla certainparallelism
theircriticalundertakings
is undeniable.
OF HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY
PSEUDO-CONCRETENESS
369
keepalivean old or,as he admitswithoutshame,"eternal"cause.39 Hence
is far moreof a re-former
Kierkegaard
than of an innovatoror of a
factcouldnotbe properly
philosophical
revolutionary--which
recognized
sincethe conceptof"progress"
was necessarily
in thenineteenth
century
the veryunderstanding
of thishistorical
thwarting
category"re-form."
hiscause:salvation,
as oldas Christianity
His "method"was "existence";
itself. It is,thus,notforprimarily
ontological
reasons,thatKierkegaard
in the "I am"; at bestfor"negatively
wasinterested
reasons:
ontological"
in orderto stallthe omnipotency
ofphilosophy's
of
concept "being"-ultimately,however,for purelyChristianmotives. The last Christian,
smashedby theweightoftheequallylast,theHegelianmetaphysics,
foroftheenemy:
mulateshisthreatened
position
by meansoftheinstruments
in orderto demonstrate
the philosopher,
the philosopher's
incompetency
forhis own position:Belief. He philosophizes
againstphilosophy.Pasandmostlikely,successfully,
sionately,
wouldhave defended
Kierkegaard
himself
againstthepraiseofhis"newness." New,indeed,ishisattempt
to
transfer
hispolemicagainstphilosophy
intotheprovince
ofphilosophy
itwas not entirely
self,whichundertaking,
however,
unique,since,in a way,
all post-Hegelian
of the competency
philosophyconsistedof criticism
of
eachand any ofthemwas a philosophically
philosophy:
antiformulated
philosophy.The factthat Kierkegaard's
uniqueundertaking
was bound
to becomedecisiveforHeidegger,
is obvious. It lacksplausibility
only
whenone introduces
Heidegger
as Husserl'ssuccessor,
as we had donefor
external
reasons. Theiraffinity
restsin thefollowing
facts:
(1) SinceKierkegaard
felthimself
to be a "Korrektiv
gegendie Zeit"
and a last Christian
he had to livein a vacuumnotso different
fromthe
vacuumin whichHeidegger's"Self" is doomedto live; and had to go
throughthe same moods connectedwith isolation(as anxiety)which
is describing.
Heidegger
(2) WhileKierkegaard
isa skeptical
evenhisdoubts
Christianwhoworksup
forhisChristian
is a Christian
whoconsumes
purposes-Heidegger
Skeptic
evenhis Christian
dowry(as "guilt,"etc.) forhis non-religious
purpose.
Eitherofthemstandsinan equivocalsituation
(ifthetwosituations
do not
actuallycoincide
witheachother)buttheyareinterpreting
itfromopposite
directions.Eitherphilosopher
offersa philosophy
of salvation,Kierkegaardstillclinging
to a conceptofsalvationhandedto himby tradition,
whileHeidegger
inventsa newone. Both,however,
arefocusing
onlythe
influence
ofthecrisisontheindividual-while
movements
offarlargersize
triedto solvethecrisisor pretended
to solveit. As a matteroffact,the
39 It is evident
thatsuchundertakings
are alwaysdoomedto certaindialectical
turns.By introducing
a newrescuing-device
foran old cause,one can not help
engendering
a newcause. (Mostimpressive
example:NationalSocialism.)
370
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICALRESEARCH
ofthe conceptof "existence"is onlythereplyto thefactthat
invention
man and deprivedhim of
had overpowered
"things"and institutions
"being."
IX. STUFFID NIHILISM
GreekonWe had producedancestorsofthemostdiverseprovenience:
transcendental
philosotology,Christianity,
phenomenology,
pragmatism,
phy,Kierkegaard-andone couldhaveaddedmanymore,suchas, Dilthey,
indeed.
Nietzsche,Bergson. This abundanceof ancestorsis surprising,
hasbecomethesourceof
It is nottheleastreasonforthefactthatHeidegger
a larger
fascination.As a matteroffacthe has digested
part
an undeniable
sinceHegel.
of the historyof the Europeanmindthan any philosophy
theuniquesampleofthe
Existentialism
Whilewe have calledHeidegger's
oflifehostileto life,"we cannowadd thatit is thesole
species"Philosophy
Nihilism"(Farcierter
Nihilismus)whereby
exampleofthespecies"Stuffed
bursting
withall motives
tendency,
we meanthatit is, despiteit nihilistic
isnotsimplyanaesthetic
however
ofHistory.This"stuffing,"
phenomenon,
itis rather
as abundance
hadbeeninRomanticism;
theresultofthe"Self's"
willto power,of its omnivorous
everything.Nietzurgeto appropriate
sche'swords:"If therewerea God,howcouldI bearnotto be God?"seem
into"If thereis History,
howcouldI bearnottobe Histobe transformed
tory?"
changed
"all or nothing,"
The desperatemottoofall activedesperados,
one intoan "all and nothing,"
which
underthe handsof the existential
thatthebookthatcontinues
hisworkis not
makesit wellunderstandable
entitledTo beornottobe,butEtreetNMant.
GUENTHER STERN (ANDERS).
NEW YORKCITY.
EXTRACTO
En estearticulose muestracomoHeidegger,
al situarseentrealternatives
de establecer
un pianofilos6fico
clAsicas,
producela impresion
enteramente
"6ntica,"sinode la
neuvo:"Dasein" comotema,no de la investigation
"Ontologica." Por ejemplo,Heideggercortaa trav6sde la alternative
a pesarde sertanatea como
su filosofia,
"Naturalismo-Sobrenaturalismo":
el materialism,no reconoceninguna"naturaleza." Comparadocon el
su "Dasein" pareceextraordinariaconceptoacad6micode "conciencia,"
menteconcreto,
a su "Sorge"("cura"); sinembargo,
debidoen particular
"menesde la raizverdadera
de la "Sorge,"delefectivo
Heidegger
prescinde
ter" del hombre(y de todoslos seresvivientes),
se
pues al interpretarlo
hubiesesituadoen la peligrosa
vecindaddelmaterialismy estole hubiese
PSEUDO-COTNCRETENESSOF HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY
371
obligadoa consideraral hombrecomo un ente necesitadode otrosentes
sinlos cualesno es capaz de existir.Y es precisamente
"materiales,"
esta
del "menester"
o necesidadlo que le permite
omision
estableeer,
Comoun
supuestoplanonuevo,el plano"ontologico,"
diferenciado
del planopuramente"ontico."
Aunqueno es naturalist,su filosoffa
tampocoes idealist. Los ideales
moralesy politicosque, desdeKant,motivaron
el idealism,ya no aparecenen 61. Su concepto
de libertades enteramente
mientras
solipsista,
que
su Etica esta separadatan completamente
del obrarefectivo
en el mundo
social,que para 61este"obrar"se reducea una especiede operacion
sobre
si mismo(la "Eigentlich-werden").
Este hechoha producido
una neuva
la dela alternative
neutralizaci6n:
entrefilosofia
teor6tica
yfilosofia
practica.
De hecho,el filosofar
se presentacomola "accion"del "Dasein"; porotro
lado,toda"aut6ntica"
acci6ndel "Dasein" consiste
enfilosofar,
porcuanto
la filosofia
es el caminopara "liberarse"del prejuicio
de la opinionpublica
("man")y parallegara serun "Yo mismo."