Rights, Rules, and Respect for Nature
OxfordHandbooksOnline
Rights,Rules,andRespectforNature BenjaminHale
TheOxfordHandbookofEnvironmentalEthics
EditedbyStephenM.GardinerandAllenThompson
OnlinePublicationDate: Feb
2016
Subject: Philosophy,SocialandPoliticalPhilosophy
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199941339.013.19
AbstractandKeywords
Foryears,manypeoplehavebelievedthattheonlyreasonablewaytoapproachaproblemofenvironmental
concernistoevaluatetheeventuatingstateofaffairs.Sinceenvironmentalmattersareprimarilyaboutstatesof
affairs,these‘consequentialist’approachesappeartomakesense.Morerecently,however,othershavelookedto
differentbranchesofphilosophyforguidance.Thesenon-oranti-consequentialisttheoriststypicallyfallintotwo
camps:act-orientedcampsandcharacter-orientedcamps.Thischapteraimstodefendnonconsequentialistactorientedethics,andinparticular,adeontologicaljustificatoryliberalism,asatleastoneplausiblerouteforwardfor
environmentalethics.Itdoessobysuggestingthatmoretraditionalconsequentialistapproachestoenvironmental
problemsaresubjecttopotentiallydevastatingcriticismsthatcanmoreadequatelybehandledbysome
deontologicalapproaches.
Keywords:nonconsequentialism,anticonsequentialism,deontology,trespass,responsibility,rights,rules,respect
Thoughestimatesvary,expertsbelievethatnearly80,000acresofrainforestaredestroyeddaily; 1afurther150to
200speciesofplants,insects,birdsand/ormammalsgoextincteveryday; 2 andapproximately85%ofglobalfish
stockshavealreadybeendestroyedordepleted.3 Itistemptingtoassessthesefindingsandsupposethatthe
salientethicalproblemisthatnaturehasbeendegradedordevalued,thattheensuingstateofaffairsisless
valuableordesirablethanitotherwisemighthavebeen.Accordingtothiswayofthinking,whatmakesanaction
rightiswhetheritpromotesorproducesthegood.Inthisrespect,apreponderanceofviewsaboutenvironmental
wrongdoingareexpresslyconsequentialist.
Suchaviewisquitereasonable.Whentalkingabouttheenvironment,arewenotfirstandforemostconcernedwith
statesofaffairs?Certainlyonecannotbelievethatmountainshaverights,orthatonehasdutiestostreams.But
consequentialistapproachestoenvironmentalwrongdoingaresubjecttomanyoftheclassicalconcernsthathave
otherwiseplaguednon-environmentalconsequentialism.Thatis,theyaresubjecttoconcernsaboutwelfarism,
aggregationism,responsibility,demandingness,andapplicability.
InthischapterIwouldliketodefendavariantviewofenvironmentaldeontologythatstrikesmeasatleastless
problematicthanotherenvironmentalpositions.Ishallapproachthetopicfirstbyassessingthemostprevalent
environmentalstandpoint:consequentialism.Mystrategyherewillbeprimarilynegative,inthatIwillofferfive
complicationsforenvironmentalconsequentialism,suggestingthatanonconsequentialistaccountmaybebetter
equippedtoaddressenvironmentalconcerns.Iwillthentouchonthreecomplicationsfornonconsequentialist
accountswiththeobjectiveofzeroinginonaplausibledeontologicalview.Attheend,Iofferafewreasonsasto
whytheaccountthatIfavor—roughlyadeontologicalaccount—maybebettersuitedtodealwithenvironmental
issuesthanaconsequentialistaccount.Ihavelittlespaceinanessayofthislengthtocoverthefullbreadthof
objectionstotheconsequentialistaccount,butitisimportanttonotethatconsequentialistargumentsofvarious
stripeshavebeenofferedacrossanenormousrangeofenvironmentalsubfieldsandthatveryoftenthechinkin
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thearmorfortheenvironmentalpositionrestswithoneoftheweaknessesIwilladumbrate.
1.TheConsequencesofEnvironmentalConsequentialism
Criticismsofconsequentialistethicaltheoryarelegion,butintheenvironmentalrealm,thesefamiliarproblems
becomeallthemorepronounced.Considerjustfiveobjections.First,consequentialistsfacetheproblemof
welfarism:thatis,Howtoestablishtheenvironmentalgood?Typically,environmentalwelfarepositionsinvoke
eitherasubjectivetheoryoranobjectivetheoryofwelfare.Subjectivetheoriescharacteristicallylocatewelfarein
thesubjectivestatesofaffectedparties,whereasobjectivetheoriesidentifyfeaturesoftheworldthatareessential
forwelfare(Heathwood,2014).Thereishugevariationwithinandacrossthesetwocategories,socriticismscan
getalittleclumsy,butthebasicideaisthatvalueiseitherassociatedwithsomestateofthemindorwithsome
stateoftheworld.
Intherealmofenvironmentalethics,subjectivetheoriestendtomanifestintheguiseofprivateorexchange
valuation,whichoftenthentranslateintoclaimsaboutecosystemservicesorthemeritsofcostbenefitanalysis.In
essence,theideaisthatwhatevervaluenaturemayhave,thisvalueisperhapsbestisolatedbydeterminingnet
increasesinwelfareforhumanusersoftheenvironment.Thesewelfareimprovementscanbeassessedthrough
empiricalmeans,whetherexperimental,hypothetical,orderivative.Takeforestryasanexample.Techniqueslike
hedonicpricingandcontingentvaluationstudiesaimtodemonstratethevalueofnaturebyillustratinghow
consumersandusersoftheenvironmentalreadyvalueit.Asmanyothershavepointedout,suchattemptsat
valuationquicklygetmiredinobjectionsaboutcomparabilityandcommensurability(J.O’Neill,1993),aswellas
objectionsthattheveryideaof“preferences,”whichisfundamentaltomanysubjectivetheories,underdetermine
thefullextentoftheethicalproblem(HausmanandMcPherson,2009;Kawall,1999;Sagoff,2004).Without
question,subjectivetheorieshavegeneratedandcontinuetogenerateenormouscontroversyinthe
environmentalcommunity.
Othershavethereforesoughttoarguethesecondhornofthewelfaredilemma:forobjectivevalues.These
objectivetheoriesofwelfarepresentstilldifferentcomplications.Thatis,environmentalpositionsthatprioritize
naturalgoodsoverotherhumanconcernscomeoffas,atbest,unappealinglyelitistand,atworst,crassand
inhumane.Anobjectivetheorythatplacesgreatvalueonrecreationoraestheticsmightbeviewedaselitist,
whereasonethatplacesvalueonpredationandtrophiccascadesmightbeviewedasinhumane.Moreover,itis
nearlyimpossibletoprocessthevarietyofvalueinnaturegiventhemultiplelevelsatwhichanobjectiveapproach
mightbetargeted.Somethingsthatmaybeverygoodformembersofonespeciescanbequitebadforthe
ecosystemasawhole,andtranslatedacrossthesevariousgroupsisnosimpleendeavor.Whatisgoodfora
lobstermaywellnotbegoodforacoralreef,whichinturnmaynotbegoodforacropofpotatoes.Sotheproblem
ofwelfarismisparticularlypronouncedintheenvironmentalarena,whereestablishingwhatisgoodiscomplicated
bythediversityofnature.Putsimply,therightsetofobjectivevaluesremainselusive.
Ofcourse,welfarismisnottheonlyproblemconsequentialistsface.Consquentialismisalsocharacterizedby
aggregationism,whichistheideathatwecancompareandaggregatevaluesacrossvalue-holders.Ineconomics,
aggregatingvaluesworksnicelytotabulatetotalbenefits,aswhenonecalculatesupthevalueofthreebushelsof
applesandeightwheelsofcheese.Itworksimpressivelywellinmarketcontexts,whenanarrowlycircumscribed
communityofactorsandafairsystemforcomparinglike-goodsdetermines,asifbymagic,theexchangepricefor
thosegoods.Intheenvironmentalarena,however,thesedistributionalquestionstakeonaslightlydifferent
contour.Asgoodsbegintospilloutofthecommoditybinandintodifferentcategoriesofmoralvalue—thatis,when
goodsceasetobemere“goods”—aggregatingvaluesbecomesamuchstickierproposition.Itistruethatthe
problemofaggregationismisnotlimitedtotheenvironment,butagainduetonature’sdiversityandthecommon
viewthatentitieswithintheenvironmentarebestunderstoodasresources,thefullextentoftheproblemswith
aggregationismtrulykickin.
Whensetinamarketcontext,theproblemofaggregationisthereforeintimatelytiedtoproblemofwelfarism
mentionedabove.Thatis,aggregationalsopresentstheproblemthatitcannoteasilybepresumedthatvalue
commitmentsareheldequallyacrossallindividuals.Inthehumanarena,thissometimesmanifestsasclaimsabout
theseparatenessofpersons,whichononehandregardsthematterofhowpersonsthemselvesshouldbevalued,
butontheotherhandregardsthematterofwhethersubjectiveutilityschedulescanbeaggregatedwithoutregard
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forthesubjectholdingthoseschedules.Rawls,mostfamously,defendstheseparatenessofpersonsagainst
utilitiarianismbyinvokingtheKantianideathateachpersonbetreatedasanendinhimself,butmanyothernotable
theoristshavemadesimilarpoints(Kant,1785;Nagel,1970;Nozick,1977;Rawls,1971;Williams,1973).
Consequentialiststendtodenytheseparatenessofpersons,bycontrast,andinsteadsuggestthatonecanand
oughttoaggregategoodsandbadsacrossallpersons,andthatweoughttodosoinawaythatdisregards
distribution(Norcross,2008).
Thismanifestsasanenvironmentalcomplicationwhenclassicalwelfareeconomicsisextendedintoenvironmental
valuation,whichisawidelyutilizedapproachforarguingonbehalfoftheenvironment(Gowdy,2004).Insuch
instances,theenvironmentalconcernisnotsomuchaboutthemeremoralinseparabilityofwelfareand
experienceforpersons,orevennon-humanpersons,butratherwithconcernsaboutthegeneralgood.Itis
challengingtodefendtheview,forinstance,thatkillingsomenumberofanimalsofdifferingspeciesisequivalentto
killingthesamenumberofdifferentanimalsofthesamespecies,particularlyifkillingthoseanimalsofthesame
specieswouldresultinamarkedproblemforthespecies.Ifsomeecologicalmanagementapproachsuggeststhat
culling500elkfromanecosystemwillbenefitthesystem,butthatnoneofthecreaturesinthesystemwillbe
individuallybenefitted,onewhoholdssuchapositionmaywellalsobecommittedtotheviewthatculling500
wolvesfromthesameecosystemcarriesroughlythesamemoralvalence.Moreover,withoutafixedsourceof
value—say,forinstance,humanwelfareoranimalwelfare—itisallthemorechallengingtoaggregatevalues.
Whereaggregationismrequiresthatgoodsaretransitiveacrossentities,anyecologistmustacknowledgethat
eventhemostbasicpredatoryrelationshipscastdoubtonwhethergoodscanbeaggregatedacrosspredatorand
prey.AsJeffMcMahonprovocativelyasks,“Ifwecouldbringabouttheendofpredation…oughtwetodoit?”
(McMahan,2010).
Third,itwouldappearthatonegreatbenefitoftakingtheconsequentialistapproachtoenvironmentalproblemsis
thatitevaluatesactionsassessmentofintentionsorreasonsforthoseactions.Indeed,thishasbeenacore
objectiveofconsequentialismforcenturies:toobservethatfailingtoactmaybejustasmorallyproblematicas
acting.Butsomanyofourenvironmentalproblemsarepresumablyproblemspreciselybecausetheyare
anthropogenic.Whenanoilbedopensupontheoceanfloor,thisisgenerallynotconsideredanenvironmental
disaster.It’sjustthewaythatnatureis.Ifacompanyblowsopenanoilbedontheoceanfloor,ontheotherhand,
thisisaneventoffarmoreseriousmoralimport.Sotooformostenvironmentalproblems.Wintercomesandgoes
everyyear,killingbillionsofplants,starvingcountlessanimalsandinsects,andforcingmillionsofchildrento
endurethehumiliatingindignityofwearingmittens.This,again,isjustthewaythatnatureis.If,ontheotherhand,
humaninterventionweretocauseanextremelyharshwinter,perhapsbygeoengineering,manywouldconsider
thistobeafarmoremorallytroublingmatter.It’snotthattheensuingstatesofaffairsinnaturearethebestorthe
worstthatcouldpossiblybe,butratherthattheyaregoodorbadbyaccident.Therearelimitstothispoint,of
course.Asstatesofaffairsgrowincreasinglyworse,wemaycometoevaluatethemdifferently.Butsuchconcerns
canbeaddressedbyclearlyunderstandinghowwecometovaluethings.
Fourth,environmentalconsequentialisttheoriessufferfromstridentdemandingnessobjections.Ononehand,
consequentialismissaidtodemandtoomuchofindividualactors.Inordertomaximizeorpromotevalue,onemay
berequiredtogiveofoneselfuntillittleofvalueremains.Utilitarianism,forinstance,mayrequirethatonegive
almostallofone’smoneytoassistthepoor.Ontheotherhand,consequentialismmaynotdemandenough.So
longasthegoodispromoted,consequentialismmaypermitrightsviolationsorothermorallyproblematicpractices
—like,forinstance,sacrificingsometosavemany.
Inanarrowlydefineduniverseofhumans,thedemandingnessobjectionisenoughofaproblem,butinauniverse
inwhichonemustgrapplewiththeconsumptionofenvironmentalresourcesandtheireventualemission,the
demandingnessobjectiontakesonrenewedpotency.First,moralextensionisminenvironmentalethicscomplicates
demandingnessobjectionsconsiderably.Iffacedwithadecisionaboutwhethertoapplypesticidestobodiesofstill
waterinordertopreventmalariaandthussavehumanlives,someconsequentialistpositions,suchasbiocentric
individualism,mightholdthatsuchsprayingoughtnottooccur.Thelivessavedarefewerthanthelives
destroyed;thusenvironmentalconsequentialismmaydemandthathumanslivewithmorediseaseandmisery.
Conversely,iffacedwithadecisionaboutwhethertotakeadriveonaSaturdayafternoonorcontributea
minisculeamountofcarbontotheatmosphere,thuscontributingimperceptiblytoclimatechange(cf.SinnottArmstrong),itmaynotbethecasethatconsequentialismhastheresourcestorequireashiftinaction.Muchof
howthedemandingnessobjectioncuts,ofcourse,willdependonwhattheoryofthegoodinformstheview,aswell
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asthescopeofthetheory.
Thisraisesrelatedproblems.Sinceconsequentialisttheoriesalmostallinsistuponeitherpromotionofthegoodor
preventionofthebad,ifweconsiderthateverybeneficialactiongeneratesaharmfuloutcomesomewhereinthe
world,thenweareinfactinquiteapredicament.Allactionsmustbeconsideredstrictlyintermsofwhethertheydo
whatconsequentialismdemands.Buteverysingleactionbothpromotesthegoodandcausesdamage;orprevents
damageandcausesgood.Principleslikemaximizinggoodsorminimizingharmscanbequitelimitingindeedwhen
incorporatingthefullscopeofenvironmentalactivities—asopposedtonarrower-scopeconsequentialisttheories
thatfocusonthepleasureorsufferingofsentientcreatures.
Finally,oneotherpointmeritsnote.Thatis,oneofthereasonsthatconsequentialistapproachestoenvironmental
ethicsarethoughtsoattractiveisthattheymakeintuitiveappealstoprinciplesandvaluesthatarealready
prevalentinthepolicyprocess.Environmentaladvocatesoftenenoughsuggestwecannotaddressenvironmental
problemswithout“usingthesamelanguage”asthosewhosetourpublicpolicies.Thus,manyaredrivento
answersuchconcernsoutofadesiretoseedeeperphilosophicalcommitmentsaddressedinthepolicydiscourse.
Oneapproachtosalvagingenvironmentalismfromthewreckageofconsequentialismisobviouslytoseeksound
responsestotheobjectionsraisedearlier.Environmentalistshavespilledafairbitofinktoaccountfordeficiencies
intheseviews.Agoodportionoftheworkinenvironmentaleconomics,conservationbiology,restorationecology,
andotherfieldscentersondescribingbetterandworsestatesofaffairs.Butinmyviewthisisunpromising.For
everyconsequentialistargumentinfavoroftheenvironment,there’sanequallycompellingargumentinfavorof
sacrificingtheenvironment.Itismorepromisingtoabandontheconsequentialistapproachentirely.
Fortunately,ethicsoffersother,nonconsequentialist,options,likedeontologyandvirtueethics.ForreasonsthatI
willbrieflycoverinthenextsection,Ifavorthedeontologicalviewoverthevirtueview,butafirstcriticalstep
involvesmovingawayfromanemphasisonstatesofaffairs.ThenonconsequentialistviewthatIadvocate—
roughly,democraticjustificatoryliberalism—alsohasparallelsinthepolicyarena.Indeed,manypoliciesarenot
forgedontheanvilofcost-benefitanalysis,oronrationalself-interest,butratherthroughreasoned—or,atleast,
ostensiblyreasoned—publicdebate.Theabovecomplications,whileperhapsnotalonedevastatingfor
environmentalconsequentialism,doatleastraisesignificantquestionsabouttheviabilityofaconsequentialist
view.
2.ANonconsequentialistTurntowardDeontology
Giventheconcerns,thereisreasontofavornonconsequentialist—andparticularlydeontological—viewsover
consequentialistviews.Nonconsequentialisttheoriesofferwiderlatitudefordeterminingwhatthegoodis,
adjudicatingbetweenvariousconceptionsofthegood,assigningresponsibility,andavoidingthedualhornsofthe
demandingnessobjection.Whereconsequentialistsmayinsistthatmoralitydemandsthatsomegoodstateof
affairsbepromoted,nonconsequentialistscanspeakmuchmorebroadlyaboutobligationsandpermissionsand
rights.Consider,forinstance,PaulTaylor’sdeontologicalapproachtoenvironmentalrespect.Taylor’sbiocentric
egalitarianismestablishestheattitudeofrespectfornatureasmorallypriortootherconsiderationslikethe
promotionofvalue(Taylor,1986).OrconsiderMarkSagoff’sscathingdeontologicalscreedsagainstcost-benefit
analysisandecosystemservices,inwhichhearguesfordemocraticallyratifiedmoralpermissionsandconstraints
overappealstoutility(Sagoff,2004,2008).Alternatively,fromtheanimalethicsliterature,considerTomRegan’s
viewthatallsubjectsofalifedeserverights(Regan,1983).Twofeaturesofnonconsequentialismoughttomakea
moredeontologicalapproachattractivefortheenvironmentaltheorist.
Foronething,deontologistsareconcernedfirstandforemostwithrightactions,notwithproducingabetterstateof
affairs.Wheretheconsequentialistproposesthattherightnessofanactionhangsontheeventuatingstateof
affairs,deontologistsmustinvokesomeothercriteriaentirely.So,forinstance,theymaysuggestthatoneshould
defendanendangeredspeciesbecauseitistherightthingtodo,notnecessarilybecauseitwillmaketheworlda
betterplaceorbecostefficient.Theycansituateresponsibilitiesandobligationsinbasicrightsorhumanityorin
someothersuchprinciple.Sothetaskforenvironmentaldeontologyisn’tnecessarilytoidentifybeststateofaffairs
innature,butrathertoidentifyasufficientlycomprehensivesourceofnormativity.
Moreover,asmentionedbefore,thoughitmayseemstrangetosuggestthatpromotingbetterstatesofaffairsought
nottobetheguidingmoralobjectiveforenvironmentalists—howelsetodescribeatailingspondoraclear-cut
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forestbutbyappealtostatesofaffairs?—toemphasizerightactionsoverstatesofaffairsoughtnottoimplythat
statesofaffairsdonotmatter.Indeed,statesofaffairsareconstituentcomponentsofactions—allofouractions
areresponsestostatesofaffairsand/orbehaviorsthatbringaboutnewordifferentstatesofaffairs.It’sjustthat
thedeontologistlooksmoreexpansivelyonactionsthansimplytheeventuatingstateofaffairs.Inotherwords,the
deontologistarguesratherthatstatesofaffairsarenotallthatmatterinthedeterminationofwhatqualifiesan
actionasright.Toputthiscolloquially:whereconsequentialistviewsplacepriorityonthegoodovertheright,
deontologicalviewsplacepriorityontherightoverthegood.
Takingadeontologicalapproachisn’twithoutitspitfalls.Tobesure,therearemanyreasonsthatdeontology
hasn’tbeenparticularlyattractivetoenvironmentaltheorists.Butthereiswidedisagreementamongdeontologists
aboutthebesttheory,andasmartwaytoapproachthisquestionistotakeasomewhatfinerlookatthevarietyof
deontologicalpositiononoffer.Complicatingmatters,thereclearlyaregoodreasonstobeskepticalofsome
deontologicalviews.
Tobeginwithaverybluntpreliminarydistinction,deontologistsfallintoeitherpatient-centeredoragent-centered
camps.Thefirstcamp—patient-centereddeontology—isperhapsmostobviousforthoseseekinganinroadto
environmentalethics.Thosewhoarepatient-centeredfocusonwhatsortsofobligationsorpermissionsanagent
haswithregardtootherentitiesorpatients.Thesetheoriestendtoisolatequalitiesorattributesofthemoral
patient,inasmuchastheyaimtocircumscribethesetofactionsthatarepermissiblewithregardtothepatientsof
moralconcern.Historicallypatiencyhasbeenweddedintimatelytorightsandagency,whichmaybepartlywhat
tripsupenvironmentalists.Butthispresumptionisfartoohasty.Muchtractioncanbegainedbyturningthefocus
ofenvironmentalethicsbackontheobligationsofactingparties.Agent-centeredtheories,inthisvein,may
suggestinsteadthatitistheagent,notthepatient,whohasstrongpositiveobligationstoabidebyprinciplesor
dutiestorespectothers.So,forinstance,theymaysaythattheburdenfallsontheagenttodiscover,endorse,
andabidebytheprinciplesofrightandmoralaction;itdoesnotfallonthepatienttosetitselfapartasasubjectof
moralconcern.Lessabstractly:ifweaimtobetterunderstandconstraintsonactions,weoughtnottolooktothe
attributesofanimals,say,inordertodeterminewhetherwecancompletelyexcludethemfromourmoral
deliberations.Rather,werationalhumansmustaskourselveswhatobligationswemustuphold;anditisoutofthis
understandingaboutourobligationsthatwecandeterminehowtorelatetoothers.Sinceoneofthekey
distinguishingfeaturesofenvironmentalethicsisitsemphasisonnon-humannature,whichismanifestlynonrational,andsinceagent-centereddeontologyostensiblyplacesaheavyburdenrationalagency,ethicistswithan
environmentalleaninghavetendedtodiscountagent-centereddeontologyratherrapidly.Inmyview,thisistoo
hasty.
Returnforamomenttopatient-centereddeontologyandconsiderthehowitmightservetoilluminateobligations.If
weidentifydolphinsandgreatapesasthecutoffclassofentitiesdeservingmoralconsideration,thenwehavea
cleardemarcationofpermissionsandconstraints(providedthatwecancorrectlyidentifythesetofattributesthat
setsthisclassofentitiesapart).Wearepermittedtoactuponentitiesfallingoutsidetheclassofdolphinsandgreat
apes,butrestrictedfromactinguponentitiesfallingwithinthisclass(withoutfurtherconsiderationorpermissionseeking).Initsnarrowestcontour,patient-centereddeontologygroundsdowntoaquestionaboutthescopeof
moraltheory:whatsortsofthingsdeserveconsideration;whatsortsofthingscountasmoralpatients?Thisisa
vexingquestion.
Humansareeasy.Withoutthem,ethicsdoesn’tgetofftheground.Mattersgrowfarmorecomplicated,however,
onceonetriestoexpandthecircleofmoralstatus.Wideningthescopeofmoraltheorytoincludefirstnon-human
animals,butthenevennon-animalorganisms,communitiesoforganisms,orevenabioticentities,suchasrock
formations,raisesseriousproblemsaboutcriteriaformoralconsiderability.Almostallcriteriathathavebeen
suggestedasnecessaryorsufficientformoralconsiderability—reason,agency,autonomy,interests,andsoforth
—leaveawoefulclusterofentitiesoutoftheconfiguration.ThisisIthinkadevastatingproblemforthepatientcentereddeontologicalliterature,wherepatiencyiscritical.
Naturally,manycontinuetopursueremediestothisproblem,butthediscussionremainssaddledwith
terminologicalandconceptualcomplications.AsKennethGoodpasterpointsoutinhisseminalarticle,moral
considerabilityquestionsintercalateandoverlapwithotherquestionsaboutrights,scope,andstatus(Goodpaster,
1978).Thoughsomehavesoughttoapproachtheprobleminafiner-grainedfashion(Warren,2000),inmyview
suchapproacheswillalwaysbehamstrungbytheirinclusive/exclusivenature.
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Nodoubt,theseapproachesareunacceptablynarrowandrifewithcomplications.Theoristshavehadlittleplaceto
turn.Itwouldappearthatoneeithermustacceptthatidentifyingdeontologicalconstraintsinvolvesonlyidentifying
theuniverseofmoralpatients,afterwhichpointonehasnoobligationsordutiestoentitiesthatfalloutsideofthis
universe;oronecanseekawider,morecomprehensive,more“environmental”viewandabandonconsiderability
questionstoturntosomeotheragent-centeredposition—typicallyvirtueethics.
Indeed,thishasroughlybeenthestoryofenvironmentalethics.Toelidethequestionofmoralconsiderability
altogether,importantearlyauthorssuchasAldoLeopold,whowritesofa“bioticright”intheLandEthic,sought
insteadtoemphasizeecosystemsandspecies(Callicott,2001;Leopold,1966);whereasotherholistssuchas
ArneNaess,widelyviewedtobethefatherofdeepecology,soughttopointoutthebasicinterconnectednessofall
individuals.Thisturnawayfromindividualismandtowardholismwithinenvironmentalethics,whilemuchdisputed
amongeventheholists,neverthelessunderscoresthedeepdiscomfortthatenvironmentaltheoristshavehadwith
moralconsiderabilityandpatient-centering.Onecouldcertainlycharacterizetheholist’spositionasoneof
expansionism—thatis,asoneofexpandingmoralscopetoincludeeverythingasamoralpatient—butthisdoesn’t
resonate,atleasttome,withthewritingsoftheseholistauthors.Onmyread,theneedtoeschewthe
complicationsofpatient-centeringandinsteadturntoagent-centeringhasnotyetbeenfullyexplored.Ihave
arguedelsewherethatthequestionofmoralconsiderabilitygetstangledupinpresumptionsaboutmoralstatus
(Hale,2011a).
3.Agent-centeringinaUniverseofNonagents
Thisleavestheoristswiththeoptionofturningtoagent-centeringinstead,whichthenraisessomewhatseparate
complications.AsI’vementioned,itisnaturalwhentakinganagent-centeredapproachtoassumethatemphasis
mustturntothemotivationsorthecharacteroftheagent.Indeed,frustrationswithdeontologicalpatient-centering
anddissatisfactionwiththereductivismofconsequentialistaccountsmayhelpexplainwhysomanyenvironmental
theoriststurntovirtueethicsastheonlyremainingalternative.Butforallofitspromise,virtueethicsturnstoo
sharplytoagent-centeringandtendstoshortcircuitmany,ifnotall,ofthedifficultethicalandpolicyquestionsthat
perplexenvironmentalists.Asoneverybriefobjectiontoturningtovirtue:manyenvironmentalproblemsarethe
outcomeofcollectivebehaviors,notindividualactions,andassuchdemandresponsesattheinstitutionallevel.
Focusingonthecharacterofallrelevantactorsseemswoefullyinsufficienttoaccountfororaddresswrongdoing.
Withoutarobusttheoryofinstitutionalcharacter,virtueethicsispracticallyimpotenttosolvesomeofthemost
vexingenvironmentalchallenges.Fortunately,thedeontologisthasanalternative.
Firstthingsfirst,environmentalethicshastendedtoavoiddeontologicalagent-centeringfairlyaggressively,inpart
becauseitappearstoplaceagooddealofemphasisonagency.Since,environmentallyspeaking,mostofthe
objectsofconcernaren’tagentsinthepropersenseoftheterm,thiswouldappeartobeadead-end.Certainly
somebraveadvocateshavesoughttoarguefortheagencyandautonomyofnature(Heyd,2005;Ridder,2007),
whereothershaveevengonesofarastosuggestthatnature“speaks”toman.Butthispath,whiletested,has
yieldedfewcompellingopenings.StevenVogelhaswrittensuperbandin-depthessaysdismantlingsuchpositions
(Vogel,2006).
Afurthercomplicationforagent-centeringrestsinthebeliefthatitleaveslittleroomtodistinguishbetweendoing
therightthinganddoingtherightthingfortherightreasons.Itisimportanttonoteherethatthereareatleasttwo
differentdirectionsthatagent-centereddeontologicalviewsmaytake—eithertheymayfocusontheintentionsand
motivationsofagents,ortheymayemphasizeanddefendthedutiesandresponsibilitiesoftheagentabsentany
concernaboutintentions.Theymay,forinstance,placeagooddealofemphasisonwhatreasonsmotivatean
agenttoactinaparticularway,inwhichcaseanethicalevaluationwillturnprimarilyon“motivatingreasons.”Or,
theymayinsteademphasizejustificationsfortheactionsthemselves,inwhichcaseintentionsandmotivationsare
farlessofanissue.Insteadwhatisatissueiswhetherthereareanyexistingreasonsthatspeakinfavorofor
againstagivenaction.
TheKantianpositionthatIfavor,andonethatmanyneo-Kantiansfavor,doesn’trelyonhavingtherightintentions
somuchashavingtherightreasons.Onceonecleavesoffreasonsfromintentions,havingtherightreasons
doesn’tentailbeingmotivated(psychologically)bythosereasonsorhavingthosereasonsasintentions.Itjust
meansthatthereasonsinprinciplehavetobestexplainthecauseoftheaction.Intheseinstances,deontologists
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willhopetodistinguishbetweendifferentact-descriptions,cuttingafinerlinebetweenjustificatoryandmotivational
reasons.Inmyview,thelatterapproachismorefruitfulforpreciselythereasonthatitleavesenoughspaceto
distinguishbetweendoingtherightthinganddoingtherightthingfortherightreasons.Onecanspeakofthe
justificationforanactionandalsoaskwhetheritwasthatjustificationthatmotivatedtheagent.
Whereconsequentialismhastheadvantageofofferingupagent-neutralconceptionsofthegood,locatingvaluein
astateofaffairsthatallagentshaveareasontopromoteregardlessoftheircircumstances,theagent-centered
deontologistmustgiveanaccountofwhysomeactionsarerightonlywithregardtoparticularagents.Manyof
theseapproacheshavecomebywayofKantiansandneo-Kantianswhohavesought,throughvaryingstrategies,
tomakespaceforanimals.WhileKant’sfamousFormulaofHumanity—thatoneshouldalwaystreatothersasends
inthemselves,andneverasameansonly—appearstorestrictmoralconsiderationtohumans,severalprominent
Kantianshavemadeinroadsintotheanimalsdebatebyarguingthatitisnotsolimiting(Hayward,1994;Korsgaard,
2004;Wood,1998).ContrarytotheorthodoxinterpretationofKant,thesetheoristshavearguedthattheFormula
ofHumanityplacesgreateremphasisontheagentthanonthepatient.Thesameideacanbebroughttobearon
environmentalquestionsmorebroadly,asOnoraO’Neillhassuggested(O.O’Neill,1997).
Onefollow-onconcernfordeontologistsisthatevenintherealmofmoreanthropocentricquestions,deontologists
mustyieldinparttoconflictingpermissions,obligations,andrestrictions.Obligationstoassist,forinstance,may
supersedeprohibitionsonlying.So,forinstance,Jonesmayfaceasituationinwhichheisforcedtolieinorderto
savealife;orSmithmayfaceasituationinwhichshefeelsforcedtoembellishthedangersofapollutantinorder
tofacilitatetheregulationofthatpollutant.Ononehand,suchaconflictrelatestothedefeasibilityofobligations—
inotherwords,whetheroneispermittedtoviolatesomerestrictionsinordertoachievemorepraiseworthyends.
Ontheotherhand,italsorelatesagaintothedemandingnessobjection:thatis,Howmuchcanmoralitydemandof
us?Arigiddeontologistmayarguethatnoviolationofobligationorprincipleispermissible,wheresomeothersmay
arguethattherearecircumstancesinwhichrulescanbebenttoachievemoreintuitivelygoodends.Generally,
suchconcernscanbeaddressedbysofteningtheabsolutismofmoretraditionalKantiandeontologicalviewsand
advancingRossianorPragmatistpositionsthatadmitofdefeasibleorprimafacierightsorduties,butobviously
oncerightsordutiesbecomeviolable,thestrengthofthedeontologicalpositioncanmoreeasilybecalledinto
doubt.
Ourdiscussionoffersapathwayintonovel,potentiallycompellingdeontologicalpositions.Forinstance,many
theoristsaroundtheturnofthetwenty-firstcenturysoughttolocatedutiesandresponsibilitiesincontractualist
agreementsorinterpersonalendorsements.AuthorssuchasJürgenHabermas(1991)withhisdiscourseethics,
TimScanlon(1999)withhiscontractualistaccountofwhatweowetoeachother,ChristineKorsgaard(1996)with
herpracticalidentities,StephenDarwall(2006)withhissecond-personalstance,andRainerForst(2012)withhis
righttojustification,eachinslightlydifferentways,allseektolocatemoralityinthearrangementsbetweenparties.
Thesehybriddeontologicalapproaches—somemorecontractualist,somemoreAristotelian—holdpromiseover
moreclassicaldeontologicaltheoriesinthattherootofnormativitycanbelocatedinactualorhypothetical
agreementorendorsements.Farfromwhatonemightanticipate,thisviewdoesnotnecessarilycommitmoralityto
elitistorproblematicanthropocentrism.Indeed,varianthybridapproacheshavebeenpickedupbyanumberof
recentenvironmentaltheorists(Cohen,2007;Hale,2011b,2013a,2013b;HaleandGrundy,2009;Rowlands,
1997;Sagoff,2004).
Foronething,these“justificatory”approachescanofferguidanceonforward-lookingquestionsabouthowtoact.
Forinstance,theymayrequirethatprinciplesforactionbereasonable,wherethismeansthatreasonsforaction
mustbesubjectedtothescrutinyofreasonableandrationalaffectedparties.Ifreasonsforactionpasssuchatest,
thenthisostensiblyauthorizestheaction.Thepermissionfortheaction,inotherwords,emergesoutofthe
justificatoryprocess.Justificationinthissenserestsinthejustify-ing,notinsomefeatureofthepatientorsome
statusoftheact.
Forinstance,ifwewishtocutanacreofforestinordertobuildaschool,arobustjustificatoryapproachmight
requirethatweobtainpermissionforsuchanactbyjustifyingtheacttoaffectedparties.Weneedn’tinthis
instanceappealprimarilytothemoralstatusorvalueoftheresidentspeciesinordertodetermineourpermissions
orconstraints,butinsteadcandrawfromlocallyrelevantstandardsandnorms.Certainly,suchpublicscrutinyis
alwayssubjecttotheperversionsofself-interest,politics,informationasymmetries,andsoon,butjustificatory
approachescanappealtoidealsofjustificationandleavetheconclusionsofthejustificatoryprocessalwaysopen
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torevision.Inthisrespect,theguidancemaybebothnonabsoluteandfallible,meaningthatasweseekclarityon
howtohandlenon-humannature,wecanalwaysbecalledupontoclarifyourreasonsforacting.So,perhapswe
discoverthatthisforestishabitattoauniquespecies.Uponsuchadiscovery,wemayneedtoreevaluatethe
reasonablenessofbuildingtheschoolonthatsite.
Suchapproachesmayalsoofferclarityonbackward-lookingassignmentsofresponsibilityforenvironmental
wrongdoing.Iflookingbackonanactionitcanbedeterminedthatactorsactedwithoutgoodreason,orwithout
reasonthatwouldhavepassedthescrutinyofreasonableandrationalaffectedparties,suchactorsmightbe
accusedofenvironmentalwrongdoing.Throughthismechanism,then,onecanidentifyincidentsofwrongdoing,
andconceivablyalsoperpetratorsofwrongdoing,withoutfirstestablishingthatsomecriticalenvironmentalvalue
hasbeenlostordamaged.
Finally,suchapproachescanofferanexplanatorybackdropagainstwhichtomakesenseofasuiteof
environmentalconflicts.Whereitmightfirstseemthattheprimaryproblemwithrampantlogging,overfishing,and
speciesdepletionisthattheenvironmentisbeingdegraded,ifwelookatafewbasiccriticismsofconsequentialist
theorywecanseehowquicklysuchaviewfallstotatters.OnthehybriddeontologicalviewthatIhavebeen
advocating,degradationoftheenvironmentonlyreallymattersifitcan’tbejustifiedagainstotherconflictingor
competingmoralnormsandvalues.AsIseeit,thecontemporaryenvironmentalpredicamentisatleastasmuch
aboutactionsorpracticesthataretakenfor“nogoodreason”(thatis,withoutjustification,withouthavinggone
throughthejustificatoryprocess)asitisaboutthedegradationofnature.And,asithappens,ifonetakesawide
viewofjustification(asIandothertheoristsdo),thedegradationofnaturefitsneatlyintothesetofreasonsthat
onemightofferforadvancingoravoidingsomeactionsintheenvironment.Whenoneconstruesvaluenotasasocalled“factabouttheworld,”butratherasadeterminationemergentoutofsharednormativecommitments,ashas
beensuggestedbymanyoftheaforementionedturn-of-the-centurydeontologists,thenthereismorespaceto
adjudicatebetweenconflictsofwelfarism,aggregationism,responsibility,anddemandingness.Moreover,this
justificatoryapproachhasparallelsinpoliticalandpolicylifeaswell,sincesuchtheoriesdovetailneatlywith
justificationsfordemocracy.
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Notes:
(1)http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=earth-talks-daily-destruction
(2 )http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/aug/16/nature-economic-security
(3 )http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20120920-are-we-running-out-of-fish
BenjaminHale
BenjaminHale,UniversityofColoradoatBoulder
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