NATO and Estonia: Costs and Benefits
Running head: NATO and Estonia: Costs and Benefits
NATO and Estonia: Costs and Benefits
Henri Erti
Dubrovnik International University
Ivana Žužul, Tiona Žužul and Vedran Lešić
Erti1
NATO and Estonia: Costs and Benefits
Erti2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………………………….3
INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………………...4
METHODS……………………………………………………………………………………..9
RESULTS………………………………………………………………………………………12
DISCUSSION………………………………………………………………………………….16
CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………………..19
BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………………..20
APPENDIXES…………………………………………………………………………………22
NATO and Estonia: Costs and Benefits
Erti3
ABSTRACT
The expansion of NATO to the former USSR satellite states has been viewed problematic
ever since the topic was discussed upon the collapse of the USSR. The Baltic States have been
particularly involved in the dialogues between multiple actors. When Estonia became a partner
nation for NATO in 1991, the discussion on the importance of belonging to such prestigious
organization has been increased. Due to the shift in global power-balance and financial crisis,
more questions need to be asked whether it is beneficial to belong to NATO. Furthermore, it
must be examined what are the financial costs of NATO membership and study if these costs are
aligned with tangible returns and whether the probability of future threats is sufficiently high to
justify military spending during times of economic austerity. By interviewing Estonian people
and using risk analysis on the probability of external hostility, it is possible to locate data on
whether the fear factor has taken over rationality in decision-making and whether NATO
membership is an investment and insurance for Estonia, rather than the latter.
NATO and Estonia: Costs and Benefits
Erti4
LITERATURE REVIEW
The Cold-War era created new influential international institutions to counter balance the
Soviet System. Among one of the most influential, if not the de facto formidable institution, was
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The initial role was to ensure safety in the European
continent with the help of Pax-Americana. Since the Western world had a common villain to
contain, NATO’s purpose was to integrate nations together with set of standards and binding
rules. As the NATO Public Diplomacy Division states:” NATO’s purpose was to protect the
freedom and safety of its members.”(Division, 2010). Furthermore the report reminded that upon
the fall of the Berlin wall, NATO protected the integrated Europe by dismantling possible
hostilities from the communist bloc by supporting democratic initiatives and ideologies
(Division, 2010). However, the fall of the Soviet Union left a blank space for the NATO’s
statement of purpose, since its main protagonist and raison d’être had crumbled. The elimination
of Soviet Union created a dilemma for NATO because the historic purpose of NATO no longer
integrated states against a collective threat (Chaynes, 1996). Such an argument can be attributed
to the Baltic States and their current as well as future relationship with NATO. Zbigniew
Brzezinski reminded that NATO has lived up to its potential as being the most powerful and
successful military alliance in the world, but it faces new issues regarding its relationship with
Russia and its fear for NATO expansion within the former USSR satellite states, such as the
Baltic States(Brzezinski, 2009). Given the current solemn global financial crisis, smaller nations
have been forced to rethink their spending policies not only in public spending such as education
or infrastructure, but also in military spending. Therefore, it must be asked what are the costs and
benefits of NATO membership for smaller former USSR satellite states, such as Estonia?
NATO and Estonia: Costs and Benefits
Erti5
The Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, were the satellite states of the Soviet
Union and operated as the initial shields to protect the Soviet Union. The three states
emancipated upon the collapse of the Soviet Union and were the first former USSR states to
enter the NATO after serving as partner states since 1994. NATO for Baltic States has been a
strong insurance against Russian hostility and the Baltic relationship with NATO has contained
such behavior by balancing the powers of the region (Weber, 1992). Perhaps the most prominent
tool for ensuring the safety of the NATO members is the Article 5, which states the
following:”An armed attack against one or more member states shall be considered an attack
against all members”(Division, 2010). Thus far smaller nations have not been able to develop or
finance their military capabilities to defend themselves from a larger external threat, which
naturally foments the membership of NATO. Article 5 seems to be the sole reason for Baltic
membership since such meek nations urge to delegate the defense responsibilities to other states
with adequate military capabilities (Kaufman, 2002). Not only is the weak military capability a
significant reason for relying on Article 4&5, but also the fact that Baltic States are preoccupied
with processes regarding their development of sovereignty, economics and democracy (Bleiere,
1997). Perhaps the de facto reasoning for NATO membership prior to the collapse of the Soviet
Union was geostrategic; however such geostrategic justifications became obsolete as the Soviet
Union extirpated (Sapronas, 2002). There are inducements for joining the NATO. For example,
strengthening democracy or creating favorable preconditions for entering other international
institutions such as the European Union (Cyr, 2000). Nevertheless, given the invocation of
supportive rhetoric of NATO and the fear factor expressed by the academia and military within
the Baltic States, it is clear that the main reason for NATO membership for Baltic States is
Russia and their perceived threat based on historical events and the security dilemma.
NATO and Estonia: Costs and Benefits
Erti6
The Baltic’s fear of Russia, however, is not purely constructed on assumptions based on
historical events, rather on aggressive signs of hostility towards the NATO expansion in Europe
and especially in the Baltic region. Although a Russian attack on the Baltic States is highly
doubtful in the near future, both sides are forced to make calculations on the scenarios, which
provide the rhetoric on both sides (Kaufman, 2002). Moscow has already expressed its concerns
for NATO enlargement using fierce rhetoric. In 1994 the Foreign Minister of Russia, Andrei
Kozyrev, warned that NATO should not draw new lines in Europe, using NATO as their de facto
justification (Cyr, 2000). He referred to the increasing interests towards NATO membership
from the former USSR satellite states. Polish President Lech Walesa exacerbated the situation by
stating that there is a deficit of partnership due to Russia and its peremptory attitude towards
NATO expansion. Therefore, such attitude is creating fear among states, which are between the
NATO’s main actor USA and Russia (Erlanger, 1994). In addition, the Ukrainian President
Leonid Kuchma had a parallel stance when he cautioned NATO for too rapid expansion since
such move would trigger Russia’s counter reaction, which would place nations close to Russia to
possible danger (Smith, 1994). Russia’s fierce opposition can be justified since NATO’s
influence is overwhelmingly directed by USA’s interests. Such an argument is supported by neogeopolitician Aleksandr Pikaev, who argued that Baltic membership to NATO would construct a
direct path to attack Russia (Blank, 2002). Consequently, NATO’s presence in the Baltic region
can be sensed powerfully in St.Petersburg, which is less than 100 miles from the Estonia-Russia
border (Kaufman, 2002). Such military power in the back-yard of Russia poses an imminent
threat for the interests and security of Russia, hence legitimizing Russia’s strong rhetoric against
NATO expansion. Kaufman also argues that if the purpose of NATO is to ensure peace, the
Baltic accession to NATO could be interpreted as lack of confidence towards Russia, thus both
NATO and Estonia: Costs and Benefits
Erti7
sides are inclined to believe that the other side is the enemy. Consequently, the leaders of Russia
promulgated their concerns on the NATO and its initiatives. Russia has demanded a revised
statement of purpose from NATO, which would prove that NATO is not only expanding in order
to isolate Russia, but actually pursuit’s common interests beyond containing Russia in Europe
(Blank, 1998). Currently, Russia is not an enemy for NATO or the Baltic States; however
Russia still maintains its ominous and peremptory attitude towards NATO. Such congenial
attitude is likely to remain under Putin’s administration, which still vicariously espouses Cold
War realpolitik (Lucas, 2008). Consequently nationalism emerges as such rhetoric is
promulgated publicly in order to cause fear in Europe and especially in former USSR satellite
states (Brzezinski, 2009).
Estimating the financial costs for NATO membership can be less complicated, but one
has to recognize the externalities and political costs of NATO expansion especially in the Baltic
region. Flirting with NATO has resulted in severe political costs for Baltic States. Not only in
terms of trade, but also in several EU/NATO led projects. Upon accession to NATO, President
Putin publicly encouraged Russian citizens to boycott Baltic States, which consequently had an
impact on the Baltic economies (Blank, 2002). The Russian government hopes to discourage
Baltic citizens from joining NATO by diminishing their standard of living through economic
subjugation. Furthermore, Russia has repeatedly demanded compensations from the European
Union as a result of lost revenues and market shares from the Baltic States. Such demands have
made it difficult to Baltic leaders to pursue NATO and EU membership due to strong opposing
rhetoric and direct threats from the Russian political leaders (Affairs, 2000). After the collapse of
the Soviet Union, the Baltic States have aggressively shifted their trade to Central-Europe.
However, Russia remains as the largest trading partner for the Baltic States (Jurgelevicius, 2006).
NATO and Estonia: Costs and Benefits
Erti8
In addition, Jurgelevicius argues that even if the Baltic States would decrease their trade with
Russia, they are still dependent on the energy flowing from Russia. The direct economic costs
are divided to multiple categories, but first and foremost is the military spending regarding gross
national product. Currently, NATO requires nations to have at least 2% military budget from
GDP (Division, 2010). For smaller nations such share is significantly high as opposed to larger
states with economic strength beyond comparable standards. Given the national security, nations
are reluctant to publicly announce military spending, which causes issues in terms of measuring
costs and benefits. It is very unlikely that the costs of transition to collective security, for Baltic
States and other nations, can be estimated with any precision (Chaynes, 1996). Regardless, given
the fact military is a public good, the opportunity costs of military spending are significant,
therefore costs must be taken into account on multiple levels of governance and decision-making
bodies. Such costs are allocated based on nation’s needs or future projects. However, there are
also fixed costs, which are shared among member states. For example, the costs of maintaining
head quarters and staff are crucial and must be shared effectively. The costs of maintain, training
and deploying NATO forces are also fixed costs (Sapronas, 2002). Furthermore Sapronas adds
that equipment costs are not shared, since they derive from each nation’s existing capabilities.
However, NATO has set standards for existing equipment, which must be reliable and updated.
That being said, nations and in this case the Baltic States must spend their own finances to
improve their military capabilities. (Defence Standardisation, 2012). Given such guidelines of
existing capabilities, other member states have questioned the Baltic membership to NATO by
arguing that small nations are a risk, since they do not carry strong military capabilities.
Therefore, smaller nations are more of consumers than contributors. As a result, NATO
membership must be a nexus of quid pro quo.
NATO and Estonia: Costs and Benefits
Erti9
As a conclusion, examining and measuring benefits and costs of NATO is ambiguous.
Article 4 & 5 provide security against external threats through collective security for smaller
states (Havel, 2002). Furthermore, the presence of the preponderant military apparatus of NATO
enables states to decrease their military costs and reinvest finances to public projects (Chaynes,
1996). Chaynes continues by noting, “Joint training, exercises, and the development of some
integration in command, control, and the intelligence may further enhance the value of NATO”.
As a result of such policies, European states have incentives to share their military intentions
with each other, which enhance collective security and regional partnership (Chaynes, 1996).
The Baltic States therefore have received intangible benefits through shared military operations
and maintenances. For example, the Baltic Air Defense allocates responsibilities and costs of air
patrolling between the Baltic’s (International, 2012).In addition, Estonia has been the command
center for NATO’s Cyber Attack department, which enables the IT industry to develop and
create entrepreneurial opportunities for the Estonians (Boyd, 2010). Defining tangible benefits is
difficult because initial benefits result in economic success along the supply-chain within the
society. However, secured borders and more sustainable military spending are the de facto
benefits of NATO membership for the Baltic States according to the majority of conducted
research.
METHODS
Measuring the costs and benefits of NATO membership for Estonia is a task that would
be fit for doctoral students or professional researches with access to adequate data. That being
said, it has been utterly difficult to substantially put a price tag on such membership. However, a
small portion of financial details can be found from the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of
Estonia website. For example, a new package of 500,000USD for Afghanistan or the fixed 2%
NATO and Estonia: Costs and Benefits
Erti10
portion of GDP used for military can give data, but nothing complete as in how much it is to be
part of NATO.
Through case studies, academic research work, examining the current news as well as
past news on NATO and Estonia, and using specific interview protocols helped to gain a hint on
how the costs and benefits of NATO would look like in the macro spectrum. Using academic
and professional articles published and available in the NATO databases as well as in the NATO
college of Rome and Tartu, the attitude of professionals was very clear and straightforward. The
political leaders of Estonia have promulgated their desires of NATO in several Estonian
newspapers. Therefore, the notion of Estonian political stance was easy to interpret. By looking
for key words and overall sense in the published papers, the conclusion was that in every single
paper the words security and Russia were oftentimes attributed or coalesced.
Using interviews through Skype gave me the ability to formulate an understanding of
how Estonians living in Finland see NATO as insurance for Estonia. Since Finland has had a
great relationship with Russia without the NATO membership, it was interesting to examine the
responses from Estonians. Unfortunately, I was limited to contacting my relatives. Nevertheless,
I managed to compile 8 responses from different people with different characteristics, age,
education and profession. This strategy would perhaps provide results, which would differ
according to geographical location, economic situation and absence of Estonian media coverage
on Russia/Estonia relations. The interview protocol focused on the economical side as well
questions, which indirectly addressed the security dilemma between Russia and Estonia. The
responses were surprising, since the younger respondents had a positive view of Russia and the
older generation maintained their security dilemma against Russia. However, I intend to organize
an additional interview with similar number of people living in Estonia and see whether there is
NATO and Estonia: Costs and Benefits
Erti11
difference in responses. If there is difference, I believe that can be attributed to the fact that
living in Finland as an Estonian, the Russian threat is not as obvious and the rhetoric used by
politicians does not influence the attitudes of people.
I do recognize that these methods are not sufficient enough to locate the most popular
theory due to the lack of external validity and small sample size deriving from biased selection of
relatives and friends. Therefore, I hope to conduct and microeconomic risk assessment on Russia
and its foreign policy towards Estonia. Such risk assessment techniques are used in finance
industry where probabilities of return on investments are calculated using complex quantitative
methods. However in this case, drawing qualitative measures from interview results and
literature can provide data on how the Estonian people view Russia and whether NATO is the
only way to gain security regardless of costs. Using the articles from professional military
people, interview results from conducted protocols from Estonia and Finland, SWOT1 analysis of
NATO membership and risk measurement techniques related to the SWOT from the Security
Risk Analysis Directory organization ought to give me an understanding whether the risk of
Russian hostility towards Estonia is significant or merely a perception based on historical events.
The results of the interviews are hard to generalize and the papers written by the academia can be
biased to please the reader. That being said, I believe that the risk assessment can provide
adequate data on the probability of Russian aggression and whether the costs of NATO respond
to the level of that probability.
In the end these strategies/methods can provide me the key to understanding whether the
perceptions of different age groups with a diverse education/professional background affect the
popular opinion. If the results taken from the interviews suggest that Russia does pose a military
1
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
NATO and Estonia: Costs and Benefits
Erti12
threat and NATO is a beneficial institution to belong to regardless of perhaps obscure and
oftentimes invisible benefits, the costs are irrelevant.
RESULTS
The results from the interviews provided adequate data on the perceptions and attitudes
of Estonia, NATO and measure what is the major threat for Estonia. The goal was to get 10
responses, but 9 people responded due to the lack of pure communication via Skype. One
interview response was discarded due to the fact that it was sent by email, therefore follow-up
questions were absent and the responses thus lacked validity. Every respondent evaluated
security as the most important benefit from NATO membership. As you may note from the
figure 1.1 below, visibility in terms of nation branding, economic benefits and “bandwagon2
effect were mentioned along secondary choices and shared military was mentioned once.
However, it must be noted that the concept of shared military may be attributed to security.
Figure 1.1 Importance of NATO for Estonia
2
Phenomenon of participating only because others participate
NATO and Estonia: Costs and Benefits
Erti13
The follow-up question on the benefits of NATO was on the most likely threat to
Estonian security. Figure 2.1 below illustrates the most popular responses based on primary
choice and secondary choices. Russia is seen the most likely threat to Estonia in terms of security
by the majority due to historical events and hostile rhetoric of Russian politicians. 3 responses
mentioned terrorism deriving from Estonian soldiers participating in Afghanistan under NATO
flag. One response referred to the cyber-attacks from Russia after the “Bronze Soldier” event in
20073.
Figure 2.1 Threats to Estonia
Furthermore, a part of the responses indicated that future cooperation is not very likely
due to the impossibility of Russia changing its rhetoric against former USSR satellite states.
Surprisingly, responses were similar despite age differences, education or current employment 4.
3
The statue represents Soviet occupation in Estonia and the removal of the statue created a political crisis
between Estonia and Russia. Riots and looting occurred in Fall 2007 between Russian speaking minorities and
Estonian nationalists.
4
Whether person had professional ties with Russian industry or culture.
NATO and Estonia: Costs and Benefits
Erti14
Figure 3.1 Cooperation with Russia
Respondents were asked about possible cooperation opportunities with Russia and as the
illustration 3.1 exhibits, tourism was seen the most popular alternative in improving relations
with Russia. However, 2 responses indicated that tourism would be mostly Russian tourists
visiting Estonia due to the difficulties of attaining visa to Russia. Culture was somewhat
surprising given the short period of time for Estonian independency and the ending of the Soviet
occupation. Transport referred to the logistics and flow of goods between Russia and Estonia
despite difficult toll/tariff regulations. Arts and culture could be incorporated, but culture referred
more to mutual understanding of differences and interpretation of history between Estonia and
Russia. Only one respondent answered that Russia is an unreliable partner, hence every kind of
cooperation with Russia would an instant “backfire” on Estonia.
Other questions supported mostly these 3 questions, which gave direct answers on the
fundamental attitudes of what is Estonia’s role in NATO given its most likely threat? The
interview questions and answers are located in the Appendixes section for further investigation.
NATO and Estonia: Costs and Benefits
Erti15
The SWOT analysis was compiled from the answers of interviews as well as from the
literature review. Such analysis may provide indicators whether the NATO membership is
beneficial particularly to Estonia. By measuring strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats
mentioned or presented in the literature and interviews, the overall notion of the trilateral
relationships of NATO, Estonia and Russia can be estimated in terms of risk. By risk, the SWOT
analysis in this case refers to the probability of Russian aggression from threat to weakness.
However, alternative scenarios can be noted ranging from economic partnerships to increased
terrorism. From the SWOT analysis one can draw conclusions whether the costs exceed benefits
for Estonia or vice versa.
STRENGHTS
Shared military
Security
Cooperation
Economic return
Employment
Nation branding
Visibility
OPPORTUNITIES
Closer partnerships with other nations
Increased investment abroad
Learn new military technology
Increase Estonian influence in Europe
Access to important decision-making
bodies
More employment opportunities
WEAKNESSES
Casualties in military operation
Financial burden during recession
Minor stake in decision making
Participation in undesirable operations
Further provoking of Russia
Disrupted economic/trade ties with Russia
THREATHS
Terrorism deriving from NATO membership
Over spending in military operations
Becoming a “puppet" of larger states
Loss of sovereignty
Corruption at the military level through arms smuggling
Russia increasing aggression from rhetoric to action
Overall the methods provided can provide sufficient amount of data of the dominant
attitudes on NATO and Estonia as well as combined with the literature, estimate the risk of
hostility deriving mostly from Russia.
NATO and Estonia: Costs and Benefits
Erti16
DISCUSSION
The tone combined from the literature and interview results suggests that membership in
NATO is perceived strongly beneficial and necessary to maintain sense of security and prestige
in other international organizations. Historical events from the USSR occupation still remain in
the discussions and reasons for advocating NATO.
As the results section suggested, security was chosen as the de facto reason for NATO
membership. Notably, economic benefits, shared military intelligence/technology were not seen
beneficial returns on investment. Furthermore, visibility from NATO membership is thought to
generate a positive picture of Estonia among other nations. This as a result is seen beneficial
when investors accumulate capital in Estonia through such visibility. In addition to visibility,
nation branding was seen crucial for Estonia through NATO and European Union, which
suggests that the “bandwagon” effect holds truth in this particular case. The majority of the
literature focused more on the technical aspects of benefits. For example, shared air command
center with Lithuania, cooperation with the Scandinavian states and consultancy aid from the
USA were seen beneficial and desired long-term goals to maintain.
In order to justify NATO membership to the citizens of Estonia, the government needed
to locate a common threat. Not surprisingly, Russia was seen as the largest threat for Estonian
security. This statement was shared in the interviews where people named Russia as the first and
foremost danger to Estonia. Furthermore, terrorism was mentioned in the context of participation
in Afghanistan, where Estonian forces operate with other Western states, which fundamental
terrorists organizations see as their enemy. Therefore, NATO operations have perhaps brought a
fraction of negative visibility, hence security threats to Estonia. However, it must be noted that
the literature did not mention extensively the threat of terrorism in the Baltic States because of
NATO and Estonia: Costs and Benefits
Erti17
minor geostrategic importance for terrorist groups. Interestingly, cyber terrorism was mentioned
in the interviews as well as in the literature. Such suspicion derives from the Russian attempts to
disturb Estonian cyber transactions as a response to anti-Russian rhetoric and attitudes.
While the younger generation (according to the interviews) holds less hostile attitudes
towards Russia and supports more economic participation, the overwhelming support in
cooperation possibilities was directed to tourism and cultural joint projects. However,
interactions between governments have been non-existing, but commercial ties within the private
sector have not been disturbed by government inabilities to cooperate. Perhaps the government
of Estonia is reluctant to bear the risks in establishing relations with Russian leadership because
the former USSR states have learned from observing Russia’s behavior with Ukraine, Georgia
and Poland, which to some degree still need to occasionally “consult” with President Putin in
their internal affairs.
Most importantly, the SWOT analysis compiled from the responses mentioned in the
interviews and key points collected from the literature list possible scenarios or key concepts in
the NATO-Estonian bilateral cooperation. Few of the strengths actually suggest much tangible
benefits, which therefore leads to the question if the reactions and perceptions of NATO
membership are distorted by the Russian threat, which is actually based on historical grievances
rather than probabilistic scenarios. Furthermore, the weaknesses listed in the analysis have been
proven to be quite accurate and already occurred. Casualties in the NATO missions have created
controversy in public discussions because Estonian soldiers have little connection to Afghanistan
affairs or culture. The answers from the interviews also suggest that these missions have been
ongoing extensively long and no progress is expected. Also, the financial contributions to
NATO and Estonia: Costs and Benefits
Erti18
military spending and NATO membership can be questionable when the government has
declared inability to increase budgets for other designated public spending projects5.
Because Estonia is such a small nation with minor contributions to the NATO funds, their
stake in the decision-making process is similar. Therefore, the agency problem might appear
when Estonia is being used as chess pieces serving the interests of other nations. Most
importantly, NATO membership for Estonia has resulted in further disruption in economic ties
with Russia and further provoking through NATO makes the reconciliation process immutably
impossible. The weaknesses are, therefore, already occurring and thus tangible based on facts,
while the strengths are mostly normative assumptions, which could occur in the future. However,
when we study the opportunities and threats of NATO membership we can see a reverse effect.
Threats are mostly based on rhetoric and inaccurate assumptions measured in terms of worstcase scenario. For example, the threat of terrorist attack due to NATO membership is highly
unlikely and loss of sovereignty is irrelevant when Estonia is already part of EU. Opportunities
include “things” that have a high probability of occurring. Further investment, obtaining military
technology from other member states and more employment opportunities are realistic
possibilities, which can only be achieved through NATO membership. Even though the strengths
do not exceed weaknesses per se, the realistic opportunities from NATO against unrealistic
threats create Pareto efficiency6, which means that NATO membership has future potential and
opportunities for Estonia. At the same token, the membership satisfies the perceptions and
desires of the people, albeit not being the most beneficial returns of investment.
5
Estonian government refused to increase the salaries of teachers albeit the current wage is under the poverty
line.
6
A change to a different allocation that makes at least one individual better off without making any other
individual worse off
NATO and Estonia: Costs and Benefits
Erti19
CONCLUSION
Given the opinions from interviews, tone from literature and results from SWOT
analysis, NATO membership is beneficial to Estonia. However, it is crucial for the Estonian
economy to follow-up on the given strengths and weaknesses as well as focus on the
opportunities generated from NATO membership. The threat of Russian invasion is sensed by
the population and simply this justifies the desire to belong to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.
NATO and Estonia: Costs and Benefits
Erti20
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Affairs, O. o. (2000, May). Estonia in NATO and EU. (S. Blank, Interviewer)
Blank, S. (1998). World Affairs, 1-2.
Blank, S. (2002). US Army War College, 6-7.
Bleiere, D. (1997). Cooperation of the Baltic States with the Visegrad Countries: Security
Aspects. NATO Fellowship, 1-3.
Boyd, C. (2010, July 20). Why Estonia Is the Poster Child for Cyber- Security. Discovery News,
1.
Brzezinski, Z. (2009). An Agenda for NATO. Foreign Policy, 5-19.
Chaynes, A. (1996). Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World. Washington D.C: The
Brookings Institution.
Cyr, A. I. (2000). After the Cold War: American Foreign Policy, Europe and Asia. New York
City: New York University Press.
Defence Standardisation, C. a. (2012, January 24). Defense Standardisation Department.
Retrieved April 17, 2012, from Standardisation Within NATO:
http://www.oos.army.cz/english/nato-standardisation.htm
Division, N. P. (2010). NATO 2020: Assured Security;Dynamic Engagement. Analysis and
Recommendations of the Group Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO, 5-7.
Erlanger, S. (1994, October 21). East Europe Watches the Bear, Warily. New York Times, p. 10.
Havel, V. (2002). NATO, Europe, And the Security of Democracy. Praha, Aura-Pont: Theo
Publishing Pardubice.
International, N. (2012, March 28). North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Retrieved April 17,
2012, from Fighter jets secure airspace of the Baltic countries:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_85569.htm
Jurgelevicius, A. (2006, August 6). Bilgesam. Retrieved April 16, 2012, from Wisemen Center
for Strategic Studies:
http://www.bilgesam.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=311:russi
a-and-three-baltic-states&catid=70:ab-analizler&Itemid=131
Kaufman, S. J. (2002). NATO, Russia and the Baltic States. Washington D.C: POLARS Policy
Memo 216.
NATO and Estonia: Costs and Benefits
Erti21
Lucas, E. (2008). The New Cold War: Putin's Russia and the Threat to the West. Palgrave
Macmillan.
Sapronas, R. (2002). The Costs of NATO Enlargment to the Baltic States. Vilnius: EAPC
Fellowship.
Smith, J. (1994, November 23). Danger Is Seen in Rapid NATO Expansion. Washington Post, p.
16.
Weber, S. (1992). Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO.
International Organization, 633-680.
NATO and Estonia: Costs and Benefits
Erti22
APPENDIXES
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL:
1) Is NATO membership beneficial for Estonia given its small size and population?
2)A How do you see the current status and strength of the Estonian military?
2B. Do you feel that the government should spend more than 2 % of the GDP to
military?
3. How do you see the relationship between Russia and Estonia in the future?
4. Why do you feel the relationship could be positive/negative?
5. What kind of partnerships could you suggest between Russia and Estonia?
7. How do you see the Estonian participation in the NATO missions?
8. What kind of position do you see Estonia in NATO? Does NATO offer any
benefits to Estonia in terms of finances?