FROM MACAU TO RIO.
THE FLEMISH-PORTUGUESE RELATIONS IN THE
EAST INDIES AND BRAZIL, 1715 - 1745.
JAN PARMENTIER °
Introduction
Until the first decennia of the 18th century, direct trade between the Southern
Netherlands and the East Indies did not exist. Political circumstances such as
the devastating Eighty Y ears War ( 1562 - 1648) and the monopolistic attitude
of the Dutch and English East India Companies, who claimed trade and
shipping towards Asia for themselves, formed abarrier to Flemish participation
in this direction.
The international commercial relations of the Antwerp, Ghent and Bruges
merchanthouses during the second half of the 17th century were concentrated
on the Spanish Empire. In exchange for luxury textiles and art, Flemish
merchants principally received colonial products, wool and wine '. Portugal
also played an important role in this traffic with Setubal as main saltport and
Lisbon as centre for purchasing pearls, diamonds, spices and sugar2.
But at the dawn of the 18th century, the War of the Spanish Succession
fundamentally altered the trade with the Iberian peninsula. With the revision
of the European map in 1713, the Southern Netherlands were allocated to
Austria. Although this change at first seemed like an economic disaster for
Flemish entrepreneurs, since they lost a privileged position on their major
export market, more liberal Viennese perspectives on international commerce
soon presented new opportunities.
From 1715 on, traders and financiers from Ostend, Antwerp, Ghent and
Bruges started the search for alternatives. They enlarged their commercial
horizon to the East Indies, probably inspired by the lucrative expeditions of
the Saint-Malo armateurs to the South Sea and China. These Breton voyages
attracted a lot of attention in Flanders because they were undertaken with
modest funds3. So East India trade, without the support of the government or
° Assistant-professor at the University of Ghent, Dep. Colonial and Overseas History.
1K . D E G R Y SE & J. EV ER A ERT , Antwerpen in de XVIIe eeuw. De handel. (Antwerpen, 1989),
p. 1 1 4-1 1 7 .
2F. M AURO, Le Portugal et l ’Atlantique au XVIIe siècle (1570-1670) Paris, 1960, p. 213 - 234.
3L. DERM IGN Y, L a Chine et l ’Occident à Canton au 18ième siècle, 1 7 1 9 -1 8 3 3 .3 vols., Paris,
1 964,1, p. 151 - 154.
not based on a financially strong company like in Holland and England,
proved to be workable. In imitation of the Saint-Malo ventures, a direct
commerce with Asia organised by several separate partnerships in the
Southern Netherlands became quite profitable and resulted in a plethora of
new initiatives in long-distance trade. Between 1715 and 1723 nearly forty
vessels sailed from Ostend to China, India, Bengal and Arabia, all financed
by private entrepreneurs4. Associations were even created in Ostend to
develop trade with Guinea3.
However the flood of East India voyages under Imperial flag diminished the
benefits after a few years. To avoid this increasing mutual competition, the
major shipowners and financiers decided to found a joint-stock company the
“Generale Keizerlijke Indische Compagnie” (G.I.C.), which successfully
concentrated her activities in China and Bengal.
The prominent maritime nations - England and the Dutch Republic - were not
very pleased with this new competitor in Asia and tried from the start to harm
these Imperial outfittings with all possible means. This grim attitude forced
more or less the Flemish entrepreneurs to look for new allies in this trade. Due
to this situation a natural collaboration grew between the Southern Netherlands
and other European countries which were also active in the East India-trade.
On the maritime route beyond the Cape of Good Hope, Ostend vessels could
count on the support of the French, the Swedes, the Danes and the Portuguese.
Also in India, Bengal and China these “ interlopers” were thrown on each
other’s society. Especially the evolution of the Flemish-Portuguese relations
on the seaway to and from Asia and the commercial contacts in the East and
Brazil under the above-mentioned circumstances, form the topic of this
paper.
Sailing to the Cape
The first difficulties for the Imperials, also called the Ostenders, occurred
when crossing the Atlantic Ocean towards the Cape of Good Hope. The East
Indiamen encountered a lot of problems in finding suitable refreshment
stations on their long voyages, because the Dutch and the English opponents
4J. PARM ENTIER, The Private E ast India Venturesfrom Ostend: The Maritime and Commercial
Aspects, 1715 - 1722. in : International Journal o f Maritime History, V, n ° 2 (Dec. 1993), p. 75
- 102 & K . D E G R Y SE and J. PARM ENTIER, Maritime Aspects o f the Ostend trade to Mocha;
India and China (1715 - 1732). in : J.R . BR U IJN & F.S. G A A ST R A (ed.), Ships, Sailors and
Spices. East India Companies and their Shipping in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, Amsterdam,
1993, p. 139 - 175.
5J. PARM ENTIER, The Ostend Guinea-Trade, 1718-1720. in : International Journal of Maritime
History, II, n° 1 (June 1990) p. 175 - 206.
treated them viciously when they tried to supply at Dutch and English
settlements like the Cape and St.-Helena.
Shortly after the appearance of Ostend vessels in Asian waters the court of
directors of the English East India Company (E.I.C.) instructed several
commanders of their fleet to look for ships under foreign commissions or
colours “and enquire diligently but with secrecy whether any of His Majesty ’ s
subjects English, Scotch or Irish are on board. If there be use your best
endeavours to seize and secure them and bring them to England ...” 6. Further
in October 1716 a proclamation was issued by the English king, prohibiting
all British natives from serving the Ostenders bound for the East Indies7. Also
lists of ships, outfitted on the river Thames were spread, which the E.I.C.
“have very great reason to believe are designed for the East Indies (under
foreign colours) as well from private information to be depended on as they
are full sheathed and filled with nails which are never done except for the East
India voyages”8. The English knew very well from the start which vessels and
even which fellow countrymen assisted the Flemish merchants, but only on
a few occasions they had success with the above-mentioned measures9. Quite
similar actions were undertaken by the Dutch from 1717 on. So the Imperial
vessels tried to avoid as much as possible confrontations with Anglo-Dutch
ships because an exhaustive use was made of English and Irish officers to
train the Flemish newcomers in this traffic10. Hoisting a non-imperial flag
when they met another vessel was one of the most effective protections ".
To make relatively safe outward-voyages, the Ostend East-Indiamen
traditionally called at the Cape Verde Islands, which belonged to the
Portuguese crown. This small archipelago near the West African coast was
ideally situated to replenish the food stock on board and to give the crew a
shore leave. The Cape Verde Islands were not exclusively called at by the
6 India Office Library London (I.O.L.), Home Miscellanea Series (H.M .S.) n ° 74, f° 445 & 457.
7 1.0.L., H.M .S. n ° 74, f° 104.
8 1.0.L., H.M .S. n° 74, f° 465 & 473.
9 Four mariners o f the Ostend East Indiaman “St. Mattheus ” (1715) were persuaded by the Dutch
to desert in Surate (Algemeen Rijksarchief Brussel (A .R .B.) Raad van Financiën nr. 8603). In the
same Indian port an English man-of-war hailed the Imperial frigate “ G ra a f van Lalaing ” (1721)
and after examining the muster roll five British natives had to leave the Ostend ship (A.R.B.,
Admiraliteit nr 665 - 666, log o f the “ G raaf van L alain g ’’).
10 K. D E G R Y SE and J. PARM ENTIER, Maritime Aspects, p. 143 - 146.
11 During her voyage to China the “St. Franciscus-Xaverius" (1720 - ’21) used Dutch, English
and French flags. Rather seldom the Imperial double eagle flew (Private collection Baron de
Brouwer, log of the “St. Franciscus X averius’’ ).
O sten d ers, but quite often v isited b y the other E u ro pean E a s t - and W est
In diam en a s w ell. T h e F le m ish sh ip s anchored in the B a y o f Porto P raia on
the island San tiago. In this harbour, the Portuguese govern or alw ay s w elcom ed
them very frien dly and regu larly invited the cap tain s, su p erc arg o es - the
m erch ants on board - and o ffic e rs at h is table. B e in g o f F le m ish origin w as
h ere co n sid ered a s an ad v an tage, fo r in M arch 1720 three O sten d E a st
In diam en - the “ St. F ra n c isc u s- X a v e r iu s” , the “ S ta d t O o ste n d e ” and the
“ P rin s E u g e n iu s” - arriving on the ro ad s o f Porto P raia sh ow in g E n glish
f la g s w ere k in dly ad v ised by the P o rtugu ese gov ern or to u se the Im perial
co lo u rs. A lth ough not very clearly ex p lain ed in the jo u rn a l o f the “ St.
F r a n c is c u s- X a v e r iu s” , it se em ed that the E n g lish did not h ave a g o o d
reputation in S a n tia g o 12.
Porto P raia b ecam e the e x q u isite p lace fo r the crew to b arter cloth es, linen
an d trinkets fo r fresh food . T h e unknow n w riter o f the jo u rn a l o f the Im perial
C h in am an “ St. E lisa b e th ” m entioned in 1724 that he g a v e a p a ir o f threadbare
trou sers to a b la ck n ative in ex ch an ge fo r a p ig o f 6 0 poun ds. H e a lso bartered
a k n ife fo r 7 cocon uts and 4 0 o r a n g e s13. S e v e ra l sa ilo rs a lso brou gh t on b oard
m o n k ey s a s p e ts14.
T h e o ffic ia l sh ip ’ s victu als p u rch ased in Porto P raia b y preferen ce co n sisted
o f liv in g cattle - the p u rser o f the “ St. E lisa b e th ” bou gh t 8 sh eep, 2 p ig s and
4 co w s - poultry, fresh v e g e ta b le s, fruit and drinking-w ater.
N o rm ally the n ext stag e on the v o y a g e s to the E a s t w as the C ap e o f G o o d
H op e. H ow ever, the D utch E a s t In dia C om p an y (V .O .C .) co n sid ered the
O sten d ers a s “ in te rlo p e rs” . A sk in g fo r assistan ce , ev en w ater, b ecam e
alm o st im p o ssib le. O n the o u tw ard -vo y age on ly one Im perial v e ss e l the
“ K e y se r C a r o lu s V I” (1 7 1 8 )trie d in vain to call at the C ap e. T h is sh ip, under
the co m m an d o f G o d efro y de la M erveille -an exp erien ced cap tain from St.
M a lo - w as in a very b a d sh ape, but the D utch ordered the cap tain to leav e at
on ce. D e la M e rveille w a s not a m an to g iv e up ea sily . H e sh eltered fo r so m e
w eek s in Sald an h a B a y , n ear the C ap e co lo n y , under F ren ch co lo u rs and on
C h ristm as E v e , 1718 sh ip ped into T a b le B a y again , h opin g to en list the active
su p port o f other foreign v e ss e ls then at anchor there. H is p lan fa ile d and he
h ad to continue h is jo u rn ey with a hardly seaw orth y s h ip 15.
12 Private collection Baron de Brouwer, op. cit., f ° 20 - 22.
13 Koninklijke Bibliotheek Brussel (K .B .B .), Hs. Ill - 966, diary o f the "St. E lisabeth ", f ° 5 - 6.
14 Private collection Baron de Brouwer, op. cit., f ° 22.
15 M. BO U CH ER, Flemish interlopers beyond the Cape o f Good Hope, 1 7 1 5 -1 7 2 3 , in Historia
2 1 ,2 (1 9 7 6 ),p. 121 - 131.Boucherwronglymentionedthatthisincidentwiththe “KeyserC arolus
VI" happened on the retum-voyage (A .R .B., Raad van Financiën nr 8604).
View of Macau, ca. 1770. On the leftside the roads for European Chinamen and other seagoing-vessels were situated (Hong Kong Museum of Art, Hong Kong).
T h e arrival o f the O stenders w a s a liv ely event fo r the lo ca l inhabitants. W e
fou n d that the D utch fam ily M e ijer took the opportunity to em bark on the
“ K e y se r C a r o lu s V I” fo r In d ia 16.
In co n sequ en ce o f this incident the Im perial sh ip s p referred to fo llo w from
1718 on an alternative route to avoid a c a ll at the C ap e and even m an aged to
sa il fa ste r through the A tlan tic to the Indian O cean. It b ec am e com m on
practice fo r the O stenders to p ro ce ed further south than the C ap e. S ev era l
E a s t In diam en m ad e a land fa ll at T ristan d a Cunha. In this area, they turned
east, h opin g to m eet the w esterlies so that they co u ld reach the Indian O cean
very q u ic k ly 11. I f n ece ssary , sh ip s bound fo r A rab ia and In d ia co u ld p rovision
a few w eek s later a secon d tim e in M o zam b iq u e o r at the islan d Joh an n a,
n o w ad ay s A n jo u an in the C o m o res A rch ip elago.
Goa and Macau
O nce arrived in A sia , the L u so -F le m ish contacts w ere lim ited during the
p erio d precedin g the fou ndation o f the G .I.C . A t first the O stend ers p o sse sse d
no facto ries in this area and w ere o b lig ed to sa il from port to port in E a s t India
until a com plete ca rg o w as gath ered . A n excep tion h as to b e m ad e fo r the
C h in a ventures in the course o f w hich the transactions on ly took p la ce in
C an ton . Indiam en u sin g this m ethod visited several ports at the M a la b a r co ast
(south -w est-In dia) b efo re callin g at G o a, the P ortugu ese o v e rse a s cap ital, in
pursuit o f p ep p er and textiles. F ree Indian harbours, like C o lech i and C alicu t,
w here unlim ited trade w ithout D utch interference w a s p o ssib le , w ere
frequ en ted by the Im perials. A ls o in the Fren ch factory M ah é and at the tiny
D an ish tradin g-post O dd ew ay T orre trade assistan ce w as n ever r e fu s e d l8. In
contradiction with the o ffic ia l p o licy o f the E .I.C ., R o b ert A d a m s, the h ead
o f the E n g lish settlem ent A n jen g o (n ear C alicu t), b ecam e a m a jo r su p p lier o f
p ep p er to the O ste n d ers19. In form ed b y their netw ork o f sp ie s at the M a la b a r
co ast, the D utch protested ag ain st A d a m s’ b eh aviour, but the facto r o f
16J. PARMEN11HR, De holle compagnie. Smokkel en legale handel onder Zuidnederlandse vlag
inBengalen, ca. 1720-1744. Hilversum, 1992,p. 11. The youngest daughter o f the Meijer-family,
Anna Cornelia, married in India François de Schonamille, later on governor of the Imperial
factory Banquibazar in Bengal.
11 K . D E G R Y SE and J. PARM ENTIER, Maritime Aspects, p. 153.
18 A .R .B., Raad van Financiën nr 8604; Universiteitsbibliotheek Gent (V .B .G .), Hs. nr. 929,
Journal of the “Sint-Pieter" (1721 - '22) and K .B .B ., Hs. II - 161, Journal of the “ C oncordia”
(1 7 1 9 - 7 0 ).
19 J. PARM ENTIER, D e specerijhandel vande Oostendse Oost-lndievaarders, 1 7 1 4 - 1735, in:
Specerijkelijk. De specerijenroutes. Brussel, 1992, p. 232.
A n jen go argu ed that the E n glish E a s t In dia C om p an y w ould alw a y s be
served b y p referen ce and fo r the rest he w as free to n egotiate with all other
n ation s20.
O nly in the port o f M an galore, at the m id -co ast o f M alab ar, the F lem ish
m erch ants on ce started trading relation s with the P o rtugu ese residents. Th e
su p erc argo es o f the “ C o n c o rd ia ” (1 7 1 9 - 1720) b ought a not sp ec ified
quantity o f co w ries o v er there21. T h ese little se a-sh e lls originated from the
M ald iv e Islan d s and w ere sh ip ped to E u ro p e a s barter-products in the
G uin ea-trade. T h e co w ries w ere w idely u se d a s a stan dard valu e a s w ell as
a currency on the S la v e C o a st (T o g o and B e n in )22.
S a ilin g to the north, the n ext stop b ecam e G o a , but the co m m ercial facilities
there w ere very poor. T h is tow n w a s not anym ore the co sm o p olitan city, the
centre o f E u ro -A sian traffic n or the lead in g seap o rt o f intra-A sian trade Ja n
H uygen van L in sch oten describ ed in 1 5 9 6 23. Th e ch aplain on board o f the
“ C o n c o rd ia ” (17 1 9 - ’2 0 ), S erv atiu s V arrée, m irrored u s a com pletely
different picture; only a sh adow w as left o f this on ce flourish in g town.
B u ild in g s w ere in d e cay and com m erce w a s m argin al due to the exorbitant
exp ort-taxes o f 10 % dem an ded by the P o rtugu ese. O nly the clo iste rs and
churches w ere - m ore than n ecessary - w ell-m ain tain ed24. T h is view on the
P o rtu gu ese p resen ce and activities in G o a m atch ed with the 18th centuryreality. S in c e the 17th century L isb o n and G o a had grad u ally lost grip on the
E u ro -A sian traffic and their su p erior positio n in the pepper-trade w a s fadin g.
A round 1650 the D utch and E n glish co m p an ies dom inated trade with the
E a st and the P o rtugu ese w ere relegated to the b ack gro u n d 25. H ow ever, the
P o rtu gu ese C row n w a s determ ined to revive the direct trade with In dia by
estab lish in g a national trading com pan y in the 169 0 s. T h is enterprise w as
20Algemeen Rijksarchief Den Haag (A.R.D.H.), V.O.C. nr. 1897, Letters from the Malabar coast,
April 1718. In this case the attitude o f the Dutch was rather hypocritical because they also
purchased large quantities of pepper from Robert Adams (J. PARM ENTIER, De specerijhandel,
p. 232 - 234).
21 K .B .B ., Hs. II - 161, Journal o f the "Concordia” , 1/1/1720.
22 M. JO H NSO N, The Cowrie Currencies o f West A frica, in : Journal o f African History, vol. 11,
n° 1 (1970), p. 14 - 28.
23 H. K ER N . Itinerario. Voyage ofte schipvaert van Jan Huygen van Linschoten naer Oost ofte
Portugaels Indien, 1579 - 1592. Linschoten-Vereeniging II, dl. 1, 's Gravenhage, 1910, p. 120 124.
24 K .B .B ., Hs. II - 161, Journal of the “ C oncordia", 30/8/1720.
25 S. A R A SA RA TN A M , India and the Indian Ocean in the Seventeenth Century in : A. DA S
GUPTA and M.N. PEA RSO N (ed.), India and the Indian Ocean 1500 - 1800. Calcutta, 1987,
p. 9 4 - 130.
fun ded in g o o d m easu re b y w ealth y m erch ants b a se d at G o a. It receiv ed a
tw elv e-y ear co n ce ssio n , during w hich p eriod it w a s gran ted a m o n op oly ov er
trade in a large n um ber o f co m m o d ities. U nfortun ately fo r this co m pan y ,
w hich w as rather su c c e ssfu l, the fa ll o f the P o rtu gu ese stro n gh old M o m b a sa
(E a st A fric a ) in late 1698 b ecam e the o c c a sio n fo r p ressu res on the V icero y
o f G o a from priv ate traders to su p p re ss its activities, on the gro u n d s that it
n eglected the secu rity o f P o rtu gu ese p o sse ssio n s fo r the sin gle-m in d ed
pursuit o f p rofit. T h us, in 1700, the co m p an y m erged w ith another L isb o n b a se d co m p an y , w hich only lasted a few y e a rs26.
F ifteen y ears later, w hen the Im perial co lo u rs w ere first sp otted in India,
priv ate m erch ants o rg an ise d from L isb o n a few ventures quite sim ila r to the
initial F le m ish E a st In dia exp ed ition s.
A s fa r a s w e w ere able to retrace, the initiative w a s taken b y E n g lish
adventurers sa ilin g with P o rtu gu ese p assp o rts and on ce even Im perial
credentials issu ed in Legh orn (L iv o m o ) w ere u se d 27. D utch and E n glish sources
m ention fou r so -called “ P ortuguese” v o y a g e s. The first jo u rn ey w a s originated
b y H enry Jo h n so n o f L o n d on w ith the frigate “ St. F r a n c is c o X a v ie r ” ( 1715)
tow ards C h in a and B e n g a l. T h e E n g lish su p ercargo Joh n O pie and captain
P eter S o lg a rd w ere the co m m an ders o f tw o exp ed ition s in 1715 and 1717,
w ith the “ C h a rle s the 6 th ” , b ou nd fo r B o rn e o and C h in a28. T h e C hin am an
“ Sta. C a th a r in a ” (1 7 1 7 - 1718) w a s the last su sp icio u s outfitting under
P o rtu gu ese co m m issio n . A cco rd in g to the V .O .C . the Irish m an P edro Fren ch
set u p this en terp rise29. L ik e the O stend ventures the A n glo-P o rtu gu ese
“ in terlopers” w ere bann ed out o f A sia n p la c e s controlled b y the D utch and
the E n glish .
It is not very clear i f these v o y a g e s w ere p rofitab le at all. W e only h ave
in d ication s that resu lts w ere not co m p arab le to the su c c e ssfu l O stend
exp ed ition s. C on cern in g the la st jo u rn ey o f cap tain S o lg a rd , an E n glish
inform ant w rote that “ her ow ners are greatly frustrated o f their exp ectation s” 30.
26 S. SU BR A H M A N Y A M , The Portuguese Empire in Asia 1500 - 1700 : A Political and
Economic History. London/New York, 1993, p. 186 - 188.
27 A.R.D.H., V.O.C. nr. 1878, Generate Missiven, 30/11/1717, f ° 577 and I.O.L., H.M .S. n" 74,
f°4 7 3 .
28 A.R.D.H., V.O.C. nr. 1872, Generale Missiven, 30/11/1716, f ° 671 - 672.
29 A.R.D.H ., V .O.C. nr. 1878, Generale Missiven, 30/11/1717, f ° 578.
301.O.L. H .M .S. n° 74 f ° 453.
A s sketch ed ab ove, one m igh t think that the P ortugu ese did not p la y a
prom inent role in the E a st In dia trade anym ore. C ertainly the E u ro -A sian
sh ip pin g w as taken ov er b y other E u ro p ean s, but inside the A sian com m erce
the L u sita n ia n p resen ce co n tin u ed to b e im portant. In p articu lar, an
exam in ation o f both E n glish and French trade in the first decenn ia o f the 18th
century re v eals the existen ce o f structures o f cooperation betw een these
n ation s an d the P ortugu ese, w ho w ere fa r m o re expert than these other
E u ro p ean s at understanding the structure and functioning o f A sia n m arkets
and p o litical sy ste m s31. E sp e c ia lly with the p articipation o f the P ortugu ese
p rivate traders in the B e n g a l intra-A sian trade and in the traffic from M acau
the Im p e rials go t acquain ted with.
A s soon a s the F lem ish C hin am en m o ored at M ac au , the cap tain s and the
su p erc arg o es p aid a courtesy v isit to the tow n ’ s P ortugu ese govern or, during
w hich they w o u ld enquire abou t the p o litical situation in C h in a and the
co m m ercial facilities in C an ton , n ow ad ay s G u an gzh ou. T h is C h in ese inland­
port a lo n g sid e the P earl R iv e r b ecam e in this p eriod the only w indow to the
W est. F ro m the late 17th century on w ards, E u ro p ean trade with C h in a w as
cen tralised in C an ton and strictly regu lated 32. E m p eror K ’ ang-h si (1 6 6 2 1722) ev en rigorou sly en forced this p o licy in 1717. A fter b ein g inform ed that
in the p rovin ce S o o ch o w (sou th -east C h in a) m any o f the C h in ese o cean ­
go in g v e ss e ls bu ilt there, w ere so ld o v ersea s and rice w as sm u g g le d out to
foreign coun tries - both acts w ould deprive C h in a o f scarce reso u rces and it
m igh t b e a threat to the coun try’s m aritim e defen ce - K ’ ang-h si im p o se d a
ban, w hich lasted until 1727, on the native trade with M an ila and the V .O .C .capital B atavia on Ja v a 33. Th e P ortuguese and the C hin ese in M acau w elcom ed
K ’ ang-hsi ’ s com m ercial restrictions for it g a v e the deathblow to the flourishing
trade o f the C an ton ese ju n k s to B a ta v ia . M o reo ver, the stead ily grow in g
D utch dem an d fo r tea benefited m ainly the M acau n ese shipow ning m erchants,
w ho to o k adv an tage o f the opportunity to b u m p up their p ric e s34.
31 S. SU BR A H M A N Y A M , The Portuguese Empire, p. 181 - 196.
32J. PARM ENTIER, Tea Time in Flanders. The maritime trade between the Southern Netherlands
and China in the 18th century, Gent, 1996, p. 94 - 98.
33 N G CHIN-KEONG, The case o f Chen I-lao : Maritime Trade and Overseas Chinese Policies,
1717-1754. in: R. PTA K andD. ROTHERMUND (ed.), Emporia, Commodities and Entrepreneurs
in Asian Maritime Trade, c. 1400 - 1750, Stuttgart, 1991, p. 377 - 378.
34 The number o f ocean-going ships registered in Macau rose from 9 to 23 in a single year (C.R.
BO X ER , F idalgos in the F a r E ast 1550-1770. Fact and Fancy in the history o f M acao , The Hague,
1948, p. 211).
L o lt
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Detail from the auction-book o f the cargo of the Swedish Bengalman “ Ulrica Eleonora " (1735).
A s mentioned here the Lisbon supercargo Tempest Milner sold his part of the Bengal textiles with
10 % profit (Rigsarkivet, K0benhavn).
4 3 ^ i}
M eanw hile in the D utch R ep u b lic the V .O .C .-d irectors w anted to elim inate
the grow ing com petition from the O stenders, w ho carried a sign ifican t
proportion o f C h in ese tea in the y ears 1 7 1 9 - 1 7 2 8 to E u ro p e 35. T o crip ple the
F le m ish tea-trade, the D utch E a st India C om p an y co m m issio n e d her servan ts
in B a ta v ia to buy up a s m uch tea a s p o ssib le and a lso to obtain it in C h in a
itself. W ith this plan , the V .O .C . hoped to u pset the b alan ce betw een su p ply
an d dem an d in C anton, through w hich the acq u isitio n o f tea b y other
E u ro p ean s w ould be im peded sin ce the C h in ese tea production w as ge ared
to a lim ited dem and. P u rch asin g tea in C an ton w o u ld b ecom e m ore exp en siv e
an d b y sendin g a bulk o f tea to A m sterdam , p rices w o u ld drop in E u rope. Th e
V .O .C .-direction w a s ev en prepared to reckon with a p o ssib le lo ss on tea only
to ruin the O stend C hina-trade. B a ta v ia carried out these instructions to the
b est o f its ability, bu yin g up a s m uch tea a s p o ssib le from the P o rtu gu ese in
M acau fo r large su m s o f m oney, but did not send any sh ip s to C anton. T h e
m arket w as, indeed, sp eed ily flood ed , but the O sten d m erchants ’ co m petitive
p ositio n w a s hardly w eakened at a ll36.
T h e failu re o f the D utch attem pt can b e ex p lain ed b y the fa ct that the Im perial
frig a tes m ad e fa st v o y a g e s, o b lig ed a s they w ere sin ce the num ber o f p orts
w here they co u ld take p ro v isio n s, w a s very lim ited. Th e short jo u rn ey s
turned out to be ad v an tageo u s fo r they low ered the co st o f tran sport37. A b o v e
a ll, the O stenders p u rch ased tea o f higher qu ality, w hich w a s m uch in dem and
in E n glan d and even m ore w anted in the D utch tea-h ou ses. S o the ironic
situation occurred that m erch ants from H ollan d and Z eelan d w ere presen t in
g re at n um bers at the F le m ish tea-auction s, w hile at the sam e tim e the poorer
tea o f the V .O .C . w as b ein g haw ked around the streets o f A m ste rd a m 38.
T h ese circu m stan ces created by the D utch and the C h in ese em peror ev o lv ed
into the p arad o x ical ou tcom e that the F lem ish and the M acau n ese m erch ants,
both com petitors in the tea-trade, had ben efits o f each others situation ; the
35 During the period 1719 - '28, the Imperial ships brought 7 ,0 4 7 ,5 8 4 lb. Chinese tea to Ostend
and Bruges or 41,78 % of the global import into Western Europe (J. PARM ENTIER, Tea Time
in Flanders, p. 110).
36 C .J.A . JÖ RG , Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade, The Hague, 1982, p. 20.
37 K . D E G R Y SE and J. PARM ENTIER, Maritime Aspects, p. 148 - 162.
38 J. PARM ENTIER, "Tea Time in Flanders” , p. 110 - 117 and K. D E G R Y SE , D e Oostendse
Chinahandel (1718 - 1735). in : Belgisch tijdschrift voor filologie en geschiedenis, III, 1974,2,
p. 330 - 340.
Portuguese could sell large quantities of tea at very high prices to Batavia
only because the Dutch tried to harm the Ostenders in their most important
commodity, while on the other hand the Flemish were only too pleased to
leave the trade in less profitable, cheaper sorts of tea to the V.O.C. and her
Macaunese intermediaries39.
Tempest Milner and Banquibazar
The third region in Asia where the Flemish-Portuguese interests in maritime
trade got intertwined, was Bengal. In 1720, after a range of Imperial voyages
towards India, Mocha (Arabia) and Canton, the “Stadt Weenen ” anchored as
the first Flemish frigate in the Ganges-delta. The commercial responsibility
of the venture was entrusted to the Scotchman Alexander Hume, what proved
to be an excellent choice40. He explored the trade facilities and already
received the offer to establish an Imperial factory in this region. The positive
result of the expedition later on stimulated the directors of the Ostend
Company to invest a lot of money in the Bengal trade and to organise a trading
post over there, called Banquibazar41.
At the turn of the 18th century, the Bengal region - roughly defined to include
the territory now covered by Bangladesh and the Indian states of West
Bengal, Bihar and Orissa - provided nearly 40 percent of the average annual
value in Asian goods the Dutch Company sent to Holland. The picture was
not too different in the case of the English East India Company42. Bengal had
39The difference in the quality o f the tea was also caused by the way it was packed. The Ostenders,
like the E.I.C., used sheet lead to line the insides o f the tea chests, what guaranteed more or less
the freshness. The Dutch, by contrast, bought their tea in Batavia packed in baskets and bambooleaves. In addition, this tea had to be stored in damp warehouses until the return fleet to Holland
was ready, which did not improve its quality (J. PARM EN TIER Tea Time in Flanders, p. 101 and
C.J.A . JÖ RG , Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade, p. 19 -20).
40The Scot Alexander Hume can be described as an modem manager with exceptional diplomatic
qualities. In very difficult circumstances he succeeded to persuade the local government in Bengal
to give the Imperials the necessary facilities to set up afactory. The Dutch and certainly the English
discovered his qualities and the latter offered him a seat in the Board o f Directors o f the East India
Company, when the future o f the Ostend Company became very uncertain in 1731. Alexander
then moved to London and was also chosen as a member o f the Secret Committee o f the E.I.C.,
which largely determined its policy. For many years he represented the borough of Southwark in
Parliament (J. PARM ENTIER, De holle compagnie, p. 21 - 36 and C. G ILL, Merchants and
M ariners o f the 18th century, London, 1961, p. 46 - 47.
41 J. PARM ENTIER, D e holle compagnie, p. 21 - 28 and L. BO EV A , D e factorij Banquibazar.
in : Spiegel Historiael X V (1980) p. 393 - 397.
42 O. P RA K A SH , The Dutch E ast India Company and the Economy o f Bengal, 1630 - 1720,
Princeton, 1985, p. 8 - 1 0 .
actu ally taken o v er the lead ersh ip o f the C o rom an d elcoast (sou th -east In dia)
as m ain production centre o f textiles for the European m arket. The com parative
adv an tage o f the G an ges-d elta in relation to the other textile-producing
regio n s o f India co n siste d in the m an ufactu ring o f fin e cotton and silk
textiles. In term s o f qu ality, the cotton grow n in the vicinity o f D a c c a did not
h ave a rival on the entire subcontinent. T h e quantity grow n, how ever, w as
rather sm all, and the bu lk o f the cotton u sed in the region had to be im ported
from are as such as G u jarat (north-w est In dia). In raw silk , on the other hand,
the region w as not on ly self-su fficien t but, in fact, su p p lied large quantities
to other areas. M ore im portantly, there w a s a lon g tradition o f highly sk illed
craftsm an sh ip in the regio n 43.
C o m p ared to India, the are a around the G an ges-estu ary had a rather stab le
p olitical structure. D irectly proportional to this p olitical stability the econ om ic
im po rtan ce o f B e n g a l in creased . U n til the 1 7 4 0 s, the B e n g a l ex p ort
m erch an d ises w ere ch eaper than those p rodu ced b y the Indian com petitor,
m ainly b ec au se the fo o d p ric es, due to abundant h arv ests, w ere m uch low er
and the lo cal labour-m arket o v ersh ado w ed the Indian potential. B e sid e s
these trum ps, the m aster card o f B en gal becam e the rich variety o f com m odities.
T h e prin cipal item s procu red b y the E u ro p ean s in the region w ere raw silk ,
textiles and saltpetre. Furtherm ore, this area fun ction ed a s a m ajo r p rodu cer
o f su gar, rice and w heat. A ll these profitab le exp ort p rodu cts a lso fo rm ed the
cyn osu re o f the “ country-trade” or intra-A sian trade, organ ised b y both
E u ro pean and A sian m erch an ts44.
In contradistinction to the F le m ish C hina-trade, w hich ended when the G .I.C .
w as d isso lv e d b y the A ustrian em peror C h arles V I in 1731, the factory
B an q u ib a z a r su rvived the sw an -son g o f the O stend C om p an y until 1744,
desp ite the grim op po sition o f the D utch and the E n g lish in the early y ears o f
its existen ce. W ithout any fin an cial assistan ce o f V ien n a or F lan d ers, the new
go v ern o r o f the Im perial tradin g-post, the O stender F ra n ç o is de S ch o n am ille,
w as able to p articipate m ore or le ss under-cover in the Fren ch country-trade,
set u p by the w ell-know n director o f the neighbouring factory C handerm agore,
Jo se p h F ran ço is D u p leix. R ather im portant fo r the su cc e ss o f D u p le ix ’
netw ork from D jed d ah to M acau w as the P ortugu ese elem ent. French
country-traders em p loy ed Lu so -In d ian seam en and p ilots fo r their know led ge
o f certain routes. In other c a se s, the Fren ch and a lso the O stenders m an aged
to bu y into or m erge with estab lish ed P ortugu ese partnerships. T h e brothers
A lexan d re, Jo ä o and D o m in g o s C arvalh o, liv in g in C alcu tta and M a d ras
43 O. PRAK ASH , The Dutch E ast India Company, p. 53 - 62.
44 J. PARM ENTIER, De holle compagnie, p. 15 - 17.
together with their brother-in-law, Luis de Medeiros, formed with Dupleix
and his friends a major association dealing with inter-Asian trade during the
1730s45.
The Ostenders earned other revenues in Banquibazar by acting as agents on
behalf of smaller companies such as the Danish Asiatic Company and the
Swedish East India Company, or for private merchants, who possessed no
settlements near the Ganges. Having a factory in Bengal implied that the
Ostenders enjoyed a favourable tax-climate compared to non-residents who
tried to develop commercial activities. In this framework, François de
Schonamille managed, with the help of Dupleix and a few other French
merchants, who were eager to rake in some extra money with illicit trade, to
help three Portuguese expeditions to procure return cargoes for Brazil and
Lisbon during the years 1733 - 174046. At first sight, three ships is a modest
number, but we have to emphasize that these were the sole Portuguese
vessels, sailing from Lisbon to Bengal in this period47.
The initiator of the Portuguese Bengal ventures was Tempest Milner, an
Englishman, bom in Lisbon48. It was hardly a surprise that an English
entrepreneur was in charge of the expeditions for in the Portuguese capital a
large and wealthy British merchant community was living, which participated
in several branches of Portuguese commerce such as the Brazilian sugartrade49.
On board of the “ N o s sa S en h o ra d ’A d ju d a ” , Milner arrived in 1733 in
Banquibazar after making a long journey along Surate, Bombay and the
Coromandelcoast. As soon as this Portuguese vessel sailed up the Ganges,
the Dutch and the English were alarmed. Both nations tried hard to prevent
Milner from ordering textiles and silk by prohibiting their servants and their
Bengali employees to negotiate with this newcomer. This situation meant an
exquisite opportunity to Schonamille and Dupleix to offer their services in
return of a high commission-fee of 7.5 percent on the cotton textiles and 8
percent on silk manufactures. In exchange, Tempest Milner could get these
45C. M ANNING, French interest in Asian Trade, 1719-1748. in : Moyen Orient & Océan Indien,
V il (1990), p. 149 - 150 and J. PARM ENTIER, De holle compagnie, p. 52 - 57.
46 J. PA RM EN TIER, De holle compagnie, p. 58 - 77.
47 V. M A G ELH Ä ES GODINHO, The Portuguese and the "C arreira da India”, 1 4 97-1810. in:
J.R . BR U U N & F. S. G A A ST R A (ed.) Ships, Sailors and Spices. East India Companies and their
Shipping in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, Amsterdam, 1993, p. 20 - 21.
48 A.R.D.H., V.O.C. nr. 2304, M issives of the Council of Hughli to Batavia, 28/01/1734.
49 H .E.S. FISH ER , The Portugal Trade. A Study o f Anglo-Portuguese Commerce 1700 - 1770,
London, 1971, p. 128- 131.
w m
iÆ
W,
The Indian Ocean with the port of Moçambique, M adagascar and the islands Mauritius and
Réunion, where the “Stadt Oostende ’’ got involved in one of the biggest acts of piracy of the 18th
century (Rijksarchief, Gent).
commodities at the level of the French and Ostend prices. Besides Milner was
exempted to pay the traditional exuberant export taxes the local Muslim
government normally demanded.
Unfortunately the Portuguese textile-orders arrived rather late in Banquibazar.
The “N o s sa S en h o ra d ’A d ju d a ”, not wanting to miss her passage to Europe,
left the Ganges-delta without this large cargo. Tempest Milner on the other
hand, stayed in Bengal waiting for his textiles. A few weeks later he finally
managed to ship these products, valued at 60,000 rupees, on the Swedish
Bengalman “U lrica E le o n o ra ” to Göteborg50. Milner accompanied his cargo
to Sweden. After a real Odyssey - the “ U lrica E le o n o ra ” was haunted by an
English man-of-war in the Indian Ocean - the Swedish frigate arrived in
Göteborg on the 15th of February 1735. The auction-list of this ship revealed
that 5,452 pieces of cotton and silk belonged to Tempest Milner51.
During his first stay in Bengal Milner got acquainted with François de
Schonamille and he saw a possibility to revive the Imperial factory. While
still being in Sweden he made up apian to start a new company based in Lisbon.
He proposed to the former directors of the Ostend Company to become the
mayor financiers of this enterprise. Milner suggested the yearly outfitting of
one ship bound to the Coromandelcoast and Bengal. The Indian textiles and
the saltpetre would be sold in Brazil or in Europe. The Englishman George
Snow, the first mate of the “U lrica E le o n o ra ” , would be engaged as captain
while the commercial aspects of the expeditions would be controlled by
Milner himself. The reactions in Antwerp and Ghent were adverse because
the Flemish merchanthouses thought that the relations with the two big
maritime nations were still too vulnerable to give this new project financial
support52.
Tempest Milner was not a man to give up so easily for in October 1737 he
returned to Bengal with the Portuguese vessel “ N o s sa Sen h o ra d a C on ceicam
ê St. F r a n c is c o X a v ie r ” . The maritime command of this frigate was in the
hands of the Portuguese captain Joseph da Costa Ribeira. The ship left the
port of Lisbon on the 12th of March, called at Brazil and Moçambique, to
moor in September at Porto Novo (Coromandelcoast). In this small, but very
active trade-centre, the “N o s s a S e n h o r a ” left behind two Portuguese
supercargoes to purchase chintz. In Bengal, Tempest Milner followed the
same procedure to acquire the main cargo. The Dutch in Bengal looked at
these Portuguese activities with Argus ’ eyes and they reported to Batavia that
50 1 rupee = 22 Flemish “ stuivers” .
51 Rigsarkivet K0benhavn, Vestindisk - Guin. Komp., A3 Ch. Barrington’s rejse.
52 J. PA RM EN TIER, De holle compagnie, p. 61 - 63.
M iln er had the intention to stay one y ear in the G an ges-d elta. Furtherm ore
the ou tw ard-cargo o f the Portugu ese v e sse l co n siste d o f E n g lish cloth, liquor,
Sw e d ish iron, cochineal -probably from B raz il - and a lot o f Span ish A m erican silver53. A ll these data g a v e u s the assu m ption that M iln er’s secon d
v o y a g e w as very w ell arran ged and prob ab ly su fficien tly funded.
In Jan u ary 1738 the “N o ssa S e n h o ra ” m ad e a “ country-trade” -trip to the
C o rom an d elcoast, on account o f D u p leix and de S ch o n am ille, to transport ca.
6 3 0 ,0 0 0 k ilo s o f rice. T w o m onths later, the P o rtugu ese ship returned to
B a n q u ib a z a r loaded with salt and spelter. T h is intra-A sian trade w as certainly
very profitable b e c a u se a fam in e d isab le d daily life on the C o rom an d elcoast
fo r a num ber o f y ears alread y 54. On the other hand, w e h ave reason ab le doubts
that M iln er’ s B e n g a l trade p roved not to be so su c c e ssfu l this tim e as
exp ected . A cco rd in g to the D utch servan ts in B e n g a l the A n glo-P o rtugu ese
su p ercargo “ apparent een ige b anquerou tes te hebben om trent de leverantie
v an zijn aan besteede goederen ” (M iln er fa ile d to get all h is orders delivered
on tim e, due to a few bankruptcies o f native m erch ants). O f co urse the D utch
sid e o f the story w a s p o ssib ly ex a g g e ra te d 55.
A bou t the last B e n g al exp ed ition initiated b y T e m p est M iln er in 1740, w e are
scarce ly inform ed. W e on ly know that during this stay in B an q u ib azar he
jo in e d a partnership with D u p leix , de Sch on am ille and the director o f the
D utch factory C h in su ra (B e n g a l) Ja n A lbert Sich term an, w ho earned in these
y ears a fortune with priv ate trade. A m o n g other p ro jects, they fin an ced fo r
certain tw o country-trade-ventures to M o ch a and M o ça m b iq u e56.
Piracy at the M ascarenes
B ro w sin g through the m aritim e history o f the O stend vo y a g e s to the E a st w e
encountered only one c a su a l contact betw een an Im perial and a P o rtugu ese
East-In d iash ip in a troubled atm osph ere. In F eb ru ary 1721, the F le m ish
Indiam an “Stadt O ostende ” , returning from the C orom an delcoast and M ergui,
n o w ad ay s M y eik in M yan m ar, with m ainly chintz a s carg o , m isse d her
p a ssa g e to round the C ap e due to a tem pest. T h e sh ip m ad e w ater and n eeded
53 A.R.D.H., V.O.C. nr. 2427, M issive o f the Council of Hughli to Batavia, 25/11/1737.
54S. A RASARA TN AM , Merchants, Com paniesand Commerce on the Coromandelcoast, 1650 1740, Delhi, 1986, p. 178 - 179.
55 A.R.D.H., V.O.C. nr. 2427 , M issives o f the Council of Hughli to Batavia, 30/11/1738.
56 Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, Fonds Français nr. 8982, correspondence o f J.F. Dupleix, 13/1
& 22/1/1740.
to be repaired urgently. Captain Andreas Flanderin decided to call at the
island Bourbon (Réunion), one of the Mascarenes57. Unfortunately, after a
short stay of eight days, the Ostenders were ambushed on the 21st of April
by two pirate ships under the command of the notorious captains Olivier La
Buze and John Taylor58. According to Flanderin the “Stadt Oostende” was
an easy prey, for the sea-robberships were armed with 36 to 40 guns and had
a complement of 700 men. The Flemish Indiaman was plundered and about
50 members of the Ostend crew were forced to become pirates, except 14
sailors who volunteered to serve Taylor. Of the cargo only 160 bales of Indian
cottons, which had already been discharged and stored on Bourbon before the
private attack, were salved59. Two weeks earlier Taylor and his companions
were even more lucky, while heading towards their major settlement on
Madagascar they made a landfall at Bourbon and found on their arrival a
Portuguese vessel at anchor, of 70 guns, but most of them thrown over board.
This ship named “Nossa Senhora do Cabo ” was not seaworthy anymore - her
masts were lost - and so much disabled by the violent storm the “Stadt
Oostende ” met, that she became a prize to the pirates with very little or no
resistance.
The company onboard of the “Nossa Senhora do Cabo”was very distinguished.
One of her passengers was Dom Luis Carlos Ignacio Xavier de Menes, Count
of Ericeira and Marquis of Lourical, who was returning to Portugal after
many years of service as Viceroy of Goa. Further captain Flanderin mentioned
also that the archbishop of the Portuguese capital in India, the highest catholic
leader in Asia, accompanied Dom Luis. The Portuguese vessel was not only
carrying her own rich cargo of Oriental silks, spices and porcelains, she was
also bringing home the Viceroy’s personal fortune : chests, brimming with
diamonds, exotic Indian art, and precious illuminated manuscripts. The
diamonds alone would command a worth of more than £ 500,000 Sterling,
an enormous sum in purchasing power of the 18th century. The art treasures
and manuscripts were beyond price.
Dom Luis was made a prisoner by the pirates and obliged to ransom ; but in
consideration of his great loss, they agreed after some demurrings, to accept
a small ransom of £ 400 Sterling - advanced by the French governor of
Bourbon - and to set him and the other prisoners ashore, with empty promises
57 Rijksarchief Brugge (R.A .B.), Not. F.J. Van Caillie, Depot 1941, nr. 14, akte 51, 6/4/1722.
58 C. G R EY , Pirates o f the Eastern Seas (1617 - 1723), London, 1993, p. 323.
59 R .A .B., Not. F. J. Van Caillie, Depot 1941, nr. 14, akte 51, 6/4/1722.
to leave a sh ip that they m ight transport th em selves, b ec au se the islan d w as
not thought in a condition to m aintain a few hundred stranded p e o p le 60.
In the m eantim e T a y lo r and L a B u z e decid ed to send the “ S ta d t O o ste n d e"
w ith a m ix ed crew o f O stenders, P ortugu ese and sea-rob b ers to M a d a g a sc a r,
to sp read the n ew s o f their su c c e ss and to prepare m a sts fo r the “ N o s sa
Sen h ora do C a b o ” . T h e m ain b od y o f the outlaw s w ould fo llo w soon after,
w ithout re gard to the su fferers, carryin g 2 0 0 M o çam b iq u e sla v e s with them
in the P o rtu gu ese ship. B u t the in toxication o f victory p ro v ed to b e an
adv an tage to the O stenders. Ju s t arrived in M a d a g a sca r, the b rav e secon d
m ate o f the “ Sta d t O o ste n d e” , Jo h n F reem an organ ised a m utiny and w as
able to ov erm aster the han dful co rsairs, w ho had to gu ard the F lem ish P ortugu ese crew on the 2 2n d o f Ju ly . B e fo re T ay lo r and the others anchored
there the “S ta d t O o ste n d e” set sa il tow ards the P o rtu gu ese co lo n y o f
M oçam biqu e, ap o rt the pirates w ould not dare to attack o p en ly 61. T h e govern or
o f this E a st-A fric an trading-station co n fiscated the O stend In diam an and
fo rc ed the crew , now under P ortugu ese co m m an d, to return to G o a. O n the
20th o f D ecem b er 1720 M ich el de Feb u re, the ch aplain o f the Im perial frigate
“ S in t-P ie te r” , saw the unfortunate “ S ta d t O o ste n d e” lyin g on the w h arf o f
G o a. T h e sh ip w as refitted and w ould so on sail again u n d er Portugu ese
colours. A ll the seam en o f this sh ip w ere p la ce on d ifferen t Portugu ese
v e ss e ls62.
T h e w an dering o f the “ S ta d t O ostende ” en ded on the co ast o f J a v a in A u gu st
1723. U n d er the P o rtu gu ese n am e “N o s sa S en h o ra d ’A d ju d a S a n to C h risto ”
sh e m ad e a jo u rn ey to T im o r, a centre o f san dalw ood-trade in the ea st o f the
M a la y A rch ip elago. O n the h om eb oun d-voy age the sh ip w as w reck ed near
S u m an ap (north ea st Ja v a ), but m o st o f the m arin ers w ere sav ed . T w o o f the
rescu ed m en, Ja n de W aal from D enderm onde and the L o n d o n er John
B ertram , form ed a part o f the origin al crew w hich left O stend in F eb ru ary
1720. T h ey retailed the D utch in B a ta v ia their adven tures and w ere allo w ed
to return to E u ro p e in V .O .C .-se rv ice 63.
60 One o f our main sources describing the dramatic story o f the “N ossa Senhora do Cabo ” is the
vivid narrative of Daniël Defoe, which he published in 1724 under the pseudonym Captain
Charles Johnson, A General History o f the Robberies and Murders o f the Most Notorious Pirates,
London, 1724, p. 99 - 101.
61 A .R .B., Admiraliteit nrs 868 & 872 and A.R.D.H., V.O.C. nr. 1986, Generale Missiven, 3/12/
1723, f ° 770 -771.
62 U .B.G ., Hs. nr. 929, Journal o f the “Sint-Pieter” (1721 - ë22).
63 A.R.D.H., V.O.C. nr. 1986, Generale Missiven, 3/12/1723, f ° 770.
View of the Brazilian island Fernando de Noronho. This watercolour was made by supercargo Henry Carlos Gyselinck during the inspection-visit of the
island in 1727 (Stadsarchief, Antwerpen).
W hat h appened w ith the d azed seam en stock on the islan d B ourb on ? C ap tain
F lan derin first tried, w ith the help o f the lo cal French govern or, to recov er the
co m plete ca rg o o f the “ S ta d t O o ste n d e” . F o r this plan the French gov ern or
ev en invited “ diversch e van de zeeroo vers t ’ sijn en h u y se aen tafel” (sev eral
p irates to h ave dinner in h is h om e), but restitution o f the Im perial g o o d s w as
n ever gran ted64. A t a lo ss w hat to do Flan derin, accom p an ied b y the ch aplain ,
three su p ercargo es, on e sa ilo r and h is you n g son A n d reas Ja c o b u s took a
p a s sa g e in N o v em b e r 1721 w ith the Fren ch C om p an y -sh ip “ Triton ” 65. On
the Islan d S t. H elen a they ch an ged to a returning E n g lish M och am an , w hich
sa ile d them to D over.
T hirteen other seam en , w ho took part in the m utiny set up by F reem an,
arrived in 1723 on the ro ad s o f O stend. T h ey reclaim ed one third o f the
p ro ce ed s o f the sa lv e d ca rg o , b ecau se Flan derin brough t 160 b a les o f Indian
cotton s w ith him to F la n d e rs66. Furtherm ore, another part o f the freigh t w as
auction ed b y the P ortugu ese in G o a, on b e h a lf o f the F le m ish sh ipow ners
M a e lca m p and S o e n e n s67. F in ally on 17 F eb ru ary 1730, the C ou n cil o f
F lan d ers, the su p rem e court in the A ustrian N eth erlan ds, decided to aw ard a
sm all allo w an ce to the unfortunate sailo rs o r to their h e irs68.
The Brazilian Connection
S a ilin g from A sia to F lan d ers, the Im perial v e sse ls had to tackle a sim ilar
p roblem a s on the o u tw ard -vo y ages ; cro ssin g the A tlantic to E u ro pe without
callin g at the cap e or at the E n g lish fort on the islan d S t. H elena, w hich w as
certainly a p la ce to be avoid ed . T h e first O stend In diam an “ St. M a tth e u s”
tried in 1716 to buy at S t. H elen a tw o do zen s o f lem on s to cure so m e o f the
sailo rs su fferin g from scu rvy , instead this sh ip w a s re g a le d by the E n g lish
w ith can n on -balls w hich co sted the life o f the captain. A fte r this incident the
first m ate, R ich ard G arg an , did not pan ic and h eaded directly fo r Pern am buco
(R e c ife ) in B raz il, w here the P o rtu gu ese g a v e the n ece ssary a ssistan ce .
64 R .A .B., Not. F .J. Van Caillie, Depot 1941, nr. 14, akte 51, 6/4/1722.
65 The captain’s son, aged 13 in 1721, made a successful career as supercargo with the Ostend
Company and the Swedish East India Company, before he settled in Ostend as a well-respected
merchant (C. K O N IN C K X, Andreas Jacobus Flanderin. Een achttiende eeuwse middelgrote
koopman, in : Bijdragen tot de Geschiedenis, L V l (1973), p. 243 - 290).
“ A .R .B., Admiraliteit nr. 872 and R.A .B., Not. F.J. Van Caillie, Depot 1940, nr; 27, akte 6 8 ,4 /
12/1728.
61 Stadsarchief Antwerpen (S.A .A .), Insolvente Boedelskamer nr. 1672, correspondentie J. De
Pret aan Maelcamp & Soenens, 28/7, 2 & 4/8/1723.
68 Rijksarchief Gent, Raad van Vlaanderen nr. 34557
G arg an w rote abou t th is ep iso d e “ et q u ’en quattre jo u rs de tem s les m a la d e s
du v a isse a u p resqu e d é se sp éré s ne pouvan t rem uer ny p ie d s ny m ain s, ont
e sté rétab lis parfaitem en t p ar l ’u sa g e d e s ch istron s et autres lég u m e s” 69.
W ith this n egativ e exp erien ce in m ind, the traditional retu m -jo u m ey fo r the
F le m ish E ast-In d iam en w a s to round the C ap e o f G o o d H o p e befo re the end
o f the north e a st m o n soon - otherw ise they had to winter n ear M a d a g a sc a r o r
on the M asca re n e s - an d to lo o k fo r the in d ispen sab le refresh m ents on the
inhabited islan d A sce n sio n , renow ned fo r its turtles. B u t drin kin g-w ater w a s
d ifficu lt to fin d there, so se ld o m sh ip s m ad e a c a ll70.
A b ou t tw o third o f the O sten d sh ip s m ad e a detour to the B raz ilia n p orts R io
de Jan e iro , B a h ia and P ern am b uco, although it lengthened the v o y a g e with
tw o or three w e ek s71. A few sh ip s tried to sa il non-stop from A s ia to O stend,
but they encountered se rio u s p rob lem s in reaching the hom e port. T h e
In diam an “ Sta d t G h en d t” (1 7 2 1 ) m ad e an attem pt to co m plete the return
jo u rn ey in this w ay , though sh e h ad to c a ll at F alm outh , in C orn w all, after
m ore than six m onths at se a , b ec a u se h a lf o f the m en on b o ard w ere su fferin g
fro m scurvy. T h e cap tain h ad to m u ster new sa ilo rs to reach the ro ad s o f
O sten d72.
F o r m o st seam en sa ilin g with the Im perial E ast-In d ia sh ip s, B raz il b ecam e
a rather attractive refreshm ent-station and an interesting sp ot fo r sm u g g le
an d illic it trad e. T h is situ a tio n w a s a lre a d y sin c e the 17th centu ry
u nintentionally stim u lated by the P o rtugu ese th em selves. P ortugal p u rsu ed
orth odox econ om ic p o lic ie s tow ards her em pire, restricting the grow th o f
m an ufactu rin g and re servin g trade to her ow n ports and n ation als. S u ch
co n d ition s o ffered other E u ro pean n ation s attractive opportunities fo r trad e73.
Furtherm ore it alread y w a s a com m on habit sin ce the 1 660s that P o rtugu ese
In diam en, the “ C a r r e ir a d a I n d ia " , on the hom e b ou n d -v oy age put in at
B a h ia to se ll A sia n g o o d s74.
69 A .R .B., Raad van Financiën nr. 8603.
70 The crew o f the Ostend Chinaman “St. Franciscus Xaverius ” caught several turtles o f 400 to
500 lb. on Ascension. Remarkable was that they found a bottle with a letter written by captain
Becque of the Imperial ship “ St. Jo sep h ", who visited this island on the 7th of March 1720.
Captain Philip de Moor of the "St. Franciscus Xaverius’’ also left behind a message in a bottle
(Private collection Baron de Brouwer, log o f the “St. Franciscus Xaverius” , f ° 170).
71 K . D E G R Y SE and J. PARM ENTIER, Maritime Aspects, p. 155 - 156.
72 A .R .B., Admiraliteit nr. 663 - 664, log o f the "Stadt Ghendt" (1721 - ’22).
73 H .E.S. FISH ER , The Portugal Trade, p. 8.
74 S. SU BR A H M A N Y A M , The Portuguese Empire, p. 183 - 184.
T h e m o st exten siv e d ata on the O stend sm u g g lin g a ffa irs in B raz il w ere found
in the diary o f Serv atiu s V arrée, the ch aplain o f the Indiam an “ C o n c o rd ia ”
(1 7 1 9 - ’ 2 0 ), w ho originated from B ru g e s. A t the begin n in g o f D ecem b er
1720 the “ C o n c o rd ia ” anchored n ear R io de Jan e iro , accordin g to V arrée a
port only seld o m attended by foreign sh ip s. V arrée, a F ran ciscan m onk, w as
ask ed by the captain to put h is habit on to accom p an y the su p ercargo es for
the first contacts with the lo cal governm ent. T h is frock, the O stenders
b eliev ed , w ould m ak e a g o o d im pression on the very re ligio u s P o rtugu ese,
and they h oped the B razilian authorities w ould co n sid er them a s honest
p eop le. T h e first v isit to the gov ern or o f R io w a s a su c c e ss and the O stenders
co u ld freely pu rch ase su p p lies. T h ey w ere a lso allo w ed to spen d so m e extra
tim e fo r repairing the ship, but sellin g so m e o f the carg o w as strictly forbidden.
V a rré e’ s reaction on this prohibition sh ow ed v e iy w ell the intentions o f the
Im p erials : “ h ad de de C ap tain deze conditiën gew eten w ij en souden sek erlijk
n aer d e se staet niet gecom m en hebben” (if the captain had know n that trade
w a s forbidd en he w ould su rely not h ave called at this town). M eanw hile
several Portugu ese civ il servan ts v isited the “ C o n c o rd ia ” and controlled her
cargo. F iv e d a y s after their arrival, fou r o f the m ay or O stend o fficers, w hile
w alk in g in the streets o f R io , w ere arrested and put into ja il, b e c a u se the
B raz ilian s su sp ected illicit trade. T h e ch aplain had to u se all his dip lo m atic
sk ills - w ith a lon g v isit to the b ish o p o f R io de Jan e iro and the u se o f a
recom m en dation letter o f the b ish o p o f B ru g e s - to obtain the re le ase o f h is
unfortunate frien ds. T h is incident w as settled and the F lem ish captain ,
Jo se p h de G h ese lle , even go t the p erm issio n to sell six sla v e s - a very odd
ca rg o fo r an In diam an - originated from G o a and C alicu t to the P ortugu ese
govern or. In spite o f the prohibition m an y m em b ers o f the crew still
su cceed ed in d isp o sin g o f a large quantity o f their private g o o d s, the
“p a c o t ille s ” , in R io .
A fte r this adventure the “ C o n c o rd ia ” left fo r P ern am buco, where cap tain de
G h ese lle knew cu stom ers to b u y a part o f the Indian tex tiles on board. Stran ge
en ough this transaction w a s instructed b y the sh ipow ners from the start o f the
jo urn ey 75. M o st likely this fact exp lain s why the expedition o f the “ C o n co rd ia ”
only g a v e a m eagre ben efit o f le ss than 2 percent to the other fin an ciers o f this
v o y a g e 76.
75 K .B .B ., Hs. II - 161, Journal o f the “ C oncordia" (1719 - ’20).
76 J. PARM ENTIER, De handelaars en supercargo ’s in de Oostendse Moka- en Indiahandel
(1714-1735). in : Handelingen van het Genootschap voor Geschiedenis te Brugge, C X X II ( 1985)
3 - 4, p. 202.
Th e ab o v e-d escrib ed ex am p le o f ille g a l trade in B ra z il w as not an iso lated
c a se during the priv ate E ast-In d ia en terprises from O stend. In the com pan yperiod , the directors tried to em b an k this p roblem , w hich co sted the G .I.C .
a lot o f m on ey, b y g iv in g sp ec ific instructions to the cap tain s. In 1725, the
O sten d C om p an y forb ad e cap tain D e W inter, com m an der o f the B e n g a lm a n
“ C a r o lu s S e x tu s” , to n egotiate in B ra z il otherw ise the C o m p an y w ould
co n fiscate his w a g e s and h is b elo n gin g s. T h e directors ev en a d v ise d him to
p ro v isio n in B e n g u ella , at the co a st o f A n g o la , ab o v e B ah ia or P e rn am b u c o 77.
T o understan d better w hat w a s go in g w rong - esp e c ia lly w ith sm u g g lin g - the
G .I.C .-d irectio n alread y in 1724 put a sp y on b oard o f the C h in am an “ St.
E lis a b e th ” . T h is inform ant, G erard de B o c k , h ad to lo o k m ore sp ec ifica lly
i f ille g a l p rivate trade b y the crew in C anton, B ra z il or in other ports o f call
existed . T h e resu lt o f his in vestigation affirm ed the su sp icio n s o f the
d irectors78.
In order to so lv e this issu e , the G .I.C . laun ched in 1725 a realistic p ro ject to
install a refreshm ent-station on the deserted islan d F ern an d o de N oronh o,
situated n ear the north ea st c o a s t o f B r a z il79. On the return v o y a g e in 1727 two
O stend C hin am en, the “ M a rq u is de P r i é ” and the “ K eyzerinne ” v isited this
islan d . C ap tain G u illau m e d e B rou w er o f the “M a r q u is de P r ié ” w rote a very
p o sitiv e report on the p o ssib ilitie s to estab lish there a sm a ll settlem en t80. A la s
the abolition o f the O stend C om p an y prevented the co m pletion o f this
p ro m isin g p roject.
A lread y from the start o f the G .I.C . the directors fitted out every y ea r one or
tw o sm all v e ss e ls -brigantines, h o ok ersh ips o r g a llio ts - to B ra z il o r the
A zo re s to brin g the latest n ew s on the p o litical situation in E u ro p e, and on the
safe ty o f the routes fo r the returning sh ip s from A sia . In order to gu arantee
the e fficien cy o f this m e ssag e -se rv ice , the co m p an y en g a g e d M an uel de S a o
P ay o y Freith es a s the resp o n sib le agen t in B ah ia. T h e sy stem w a s certainly
not w aterproof. T h e P o rtu gu ese authorities in B a h ia alw ay s intercepted the
m e ssa g e s and on ce one o f the “ a v iso ” -sh ip s “D olph in ” 1727, w as not allo w ed
to enter the p ort o f B a h ia 81.
77 U .B.G ., Fonds Hye-Hoys H s. 1879.
78 S.A.A., Generale Indische Compagnie (G.I.C.) nr. 5689bis.
79 S.A .A ., G.I.C. nrs. 5705& 5740.
80 J. PARM ENTIER, Guilielmo de Brouwer (1693 - 1767) En skitse afen kaptajn, handelsmand
og rederi i det 18. ârhundrede. in : Maritiem Kontakt 14, K0benhavn, 1990, p. 69 -70.
81 U .B.G ., Fonds Hye-Hoys Hss. 1837, 1852 & 1853.
The roadstead of the island of Faial (Azores) with the Flemish Chinamen "Arent" and “St. Elisabeth" (1724) at anchor (Stadsarchief, Antwerpen).
On the w h ole, w e m ay a ssu m e that during the com pan y-period it b ecam e
m ore d iffic u lt fo r the O stend E ast-In d iam an to trade in the B razilian ports.
E sp e c ia lly in B a h ia sm u gg lin g w a s so m etim es im p o ssib le. C ap tain L a rm e s
o f the C h in am an “L e e u w " (1 7 2 7 ) m entioned that shortly after they arrived
in B a h ia the V iceroy “ fit pub lier p ar touts le s carfo u rs de la v ille et fau xb o u rg ,
sur p ain e de m ort a touts les habittants de n egotier av e cq n ou s” 82. N everth eless
the sm u gg le -ac tiv itie s still continued and even flou rish ed in this p eriod on the
P o rtu gu ese islan d s in the A tlan tic O cean. Th e islan d F a ia l, one o f the A zo res,
w a s often frequented. L ik e on S an tia g o (C a p e V erde Islan d s) the O stenders
alw a y s g o t a friendly reception and m any tim es they received there the latest
instruction s from F lan ders. T h e an o n y m o us w riter o f the “ St. E lisa b e th " jo u rn a l noted that during the short stay at F a ia l a lot o f P ortugu ese cam e on
board to b argain p orcelain and tea83. T h is com m erce w a s confirm ed by G erard
de B o c k ’ s o b serv ation s. H e noticed that m ainly the sa ilo rs and not the
o ffic e rs p articip ated in this trade. It w a s p o ssib le to m ak e a h an dsom e profit
by se llin g Indian and C h in ese co m m od ities on the A zo res, but m o st o f the
seam en spen t their e a sy earned m oney at on ce on liquor and other p le a su re s84.
C on clusion
W e m ay state that on the w hole, the F lem ish -P ortu gu ese relation s in A sia ,
B raz il and the A tlan tic Islan d s form ed a n on -n egligib le fa cto r in the
d evelo pm en t o f the E ast-In d ia trade in the A ustrian N eth erlan ds during the
first h a lf o f the 18th century. E sp e c ia lly the C ap e V erde Islan d s and the
B raz ilia n ports w ere essen tial fo r the m aritim e w ell-bein g o f the F lem ish
E ast-In d ia exp ed ition s. T h ese P ortugu ese p orts o f call counterw eighted the
grim op p o sitio n o f the D utch and the E n g lish , w ho w anted to rule out the
O sten d “ in te rlo p e rs” with all p o ssib le m ean s.
T h e co m m ercial con tacts in A sia on the other hand, only b ecam e im portant
in relation to the m o d est O stend intra-A sian trade and in the su rvival stru ggle
o f the Im perial factory B an qu ib azar. Indirectly M acau and the P ortugu ese
tea-exp ort to B a ta v ia p lay ed a k ey role in the su c c e ss o f the O stend C hinatrade.
T h e B raz ilia n connection fin ally o ffered interesting opportunities to an
ex te n siv e sm u g g le from the O stend ers, fro m w hich w e h ave only discern ed
the top o f the iceberg.
82 U .B .G ., Fonds Hye-Hoys Hs. 1837, Journal o f the "Leeuw " (1726 - ’21).
83 K .B .B ., Hs. III-966, Journal of the "St. Elisabeth" (1724 - "2 5 ).
84 S.A .A ., G.I.C. nr. 5689 bis.
SAMENVATTING
K o rt n a de V red e van U trecht (1 7 1 3 ) toonden handelshuizen uit O ostende,
A ntw erpen, G en t en B ru g g e een leven d ige b elan gstellin g vo o r rechtstreekse
handel m et O ost-Indië. D e Z uid-N ederlan d se on dernem ers w aren verplicht
om hun co m m erciële horizon te verruim en om dat zij hun bevoorrech te
p o sitie op de Iberisch e m arkt w aren k w ijtgesp eeld . D e eerste “ O o ste n d se”
uitredingen n aar Indië bleken zeer su k se sv o l, w at de grote m aritiem e n aties,
de N ed erlan d se R ep u b liek en E n gelan d , on gerust m aakte. D ez e m o gen dh e­
den w ensten g e en n ieuw e m ededin ger in A zië en p o o gd en m et a lle m iddelen
de directe O ost-Indiëvaart van uit O ostende te fnuiken. D it n ood zaak te de
V la am se reders bon dgenoten te zoeken in d eze handelsrichting. O p die w ijze
gro eid e er g e le id e lijk aan een natuurlijke co alitie tu ssen de O osten rijkse
N ederlan den en F ran k rijk , D en em arken en P ortugal lan gs de zee w e g n aar
Indië. R e e d s tijdens de eerste ex p ed ities ondervonden de K eiz e rlijk e sch e­
pen heel w at m o eilijk h eden om gesch ik te en v e ilig e ravitaillerin gsp laatsen
te vinden tussen V laan deren en K a a p de G o ed e H oop , om dat zow el de
E n g e lsen in S t. H elen a a ls de H ollan d ers aan de K a a p de Z uid-N ederlan d ers
v ija n d i g b e h a n d e ld e n . Z ij b e s c h o u w d e n d e “ O o s t e n d e n a a r s ” a ls
“ lo rred raaijers” die hun m o n o p o liep o sities aantastten. M et P o rtu gese hulp
w isten de Z uid-N ederlan d ers toch gesch ik te bevoorradin gspu n ten te vinden.
Op de heenreizen ankerden de V la am se fregatten b ijn a altijd aan de P ortugese
K aap v e rd isc h e eilanden , w aar ze zon der problem en de sch eepsvoo rraden
konden aanvullen . H ierd oor b leek het v o o r de K eizerlijk en m o g e lijk om
zon der halt te houden de K a a p te ronden ; in tegen stellin g tot hun E n ge lsN ed erlan d se concurrenten, v o lgd en zij een zu id elijke route la n g s de T ristan
d a C un ha-archipel, zod at ze konden profiteren v an de “ w esterlies” (sterke
w estenw inden) om sn eller de In dische O ceaan te bereiken. O p de terugreizen
m aakten de K e iz erlijk e O ost-In d iëvaarders een om w eg lan gs de B raz ilia a n se
h aven s B a h ia , R io de Jan e iro en Pern am buco, w aar m en v rije lijk w ater en
v o ed sel kon aan sch affen . D och deze B raz ilia a n se aan leg p laatsen bleken
tevens u itgelezen m o gelijk h ed en te bieden om een sm ok k elh an d el op te
zetten. V a a k w erden er heel w at A ziatisch e produkten op ille g a le w ijze aan
de m an gebrach t, w at a f en toe de go ed e relaties m et de P ortugezen d aar
vertroebelde.
In O ost-Indië vonden de V laam s-P o rtu gese contacten vo o rn am elijk p laats in
M ac a o , G o a en B en galen . D e P o rtugese k olon ie M a c a o w as de poort n aar
C hin a, w aar de Z u id-N ederlan d ers al hun inform atie v e rgaard en om op
op tim ale w ijze thee aan te kopen. G o a vertolkte een sleutelrol in een lastig
p iratenverhaal, w aarb ij zow el de Portugezen als de O osten d en aars een schip
verloren. In Bengalen, waar de Keizerlijken tot 1745 de factorij Banquibazar
uitbaattten, kwam er een zeer gunstige samenwerking tot stand zowel voor
de Euro-Aziatische trafiek als voor de intra-Aziatische handel. De EngelsPortugese supercargo Tempest Milner en de Oostendse factorij-directeur van
Banquibazar, François de Schonamille, zorgden ervoor dat beide naties aan
de Ganges-delta commerciële activiteiten konden ontwikkelen.
Globaal bekeken betekende de positieve relaties met de Portugezen in OostIndië, Brazilië en de Atlantische eilanden een onmisbare schakel in de
uitbouw van de Zuid-Nederlandse Oost-Indiëvaart tijdens de eerste decennia
van de 18de eeuw.