Soviet Involvement in the Korean War: A New View from the Soviet-Era Archives
Author(s): Mark O'Neill
Source: OAH Magazine of History, Vol. 14, No. 3, The Korean War (Spring, 2000), pp. 20-24
Published by: Organization of American Historians
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25163360
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Mark O'Neill
Soviet
in
Involvement
New
A
In
to
order
diplomatic
tion
we
what
with
now
in the Korean
secret
top
to
begin
the military,
understand
of the Soviet
know
Before
War.
gained
in the early
archives
Soviet-era
Union's
scholars
1990s,
and
political,
it is useful to start
forces that shaped the Cold War,
they
to previously
could
only
guess
at the extent of Joseph Stalin's direct involvement (1).
That the Soviets trained and equipped Kim II Sung's Korean
People's Army (KPA, the North Korean Army) and supplied
to Mao
weapons
(CPVA)
Soviet
MiG-15
were,
until
hearing
pilots
as
"MiG
Recent
pilots,
secret.
fighting
but
Alley,"
the
the
and
Force
Air
and
radio
extent
of
of Soviet
anti-aircraft
this
involvement
in Russia
but
gunners
reported
non
distincdy
was
not
also
of
often
pilots
archives
units,
Army
activities
sighting
corner of Korea
in the northwest
in the Soviet-era
involvement
the direct
over
spoken
while
research
the wartime
However,
U.S.
kept
Volunteer
People's
radar operators,
fighter
Chinese
in doubt.
been
recendy,
Russian
Chinese
Zedong's
never
has
provides
known
unknown.
Soviet
dictator
a policy
pursued
designed
to ensure
Chinese
shoulder most of the burden of defending East Asia
Syngman Rhee in South Korea. For the better part of the late 1940s,
nor
the U.S.
neither
on
series
The
superpower
of
and
embarrassing,
tion
were
(NATO)
was
War
direct
ing
as
it was
consequence
The
calculation.
that Stalin
readily
fate
agreed
Red Army limit its post-World War
38th parallel.
As
the
alliance
between
of Korea
with
was
the U.S.
II occupation
of
such
of Soviet
NATO
his
regarding
similar
that
request
the
of Korea at the
fears
powers
and
the
20
OAH Magazine
of History
Spring 2000
foreign
policy
reverses
of
that
the
designs
was
the
and
its foreign
on
rest
the
of
of
realization
other
increasingly
this
of U.S.
was
B-29
stunned
the world.
worst
events
in
nightmares
1949
leaders.
That
nation.
Five
commander
bombers
to deliver
atomic
scientists
had managed
months
(3). In October,
the People's
this
before
Republic
declaration,
Mao
most
Liu
in
of
combination
interest
the
European
in North
creation
of
failures
a modern
and
Asian
air
the
to end
Zedong
signaling
populous
future
Shaoqi,
of the Chinese Air Force, had visited Moscow
support
August,
weapons,
of China
in the world's
of Communism
victory
impending
of
produced
the U.S.S.R.
that Soviet
so quickly
creation
the
guided
as an
repression
Stalin's
and military
political
through
Hungary
policy
viewed
fervor,
in Europe,
U.S.
among
States
Soviet
Soviet
the
put
force
successes
seeking
(4).
This
kindled
Korea.
Soviet
disintegrated at the end ofWorld War II, the Soviets began
arming and training Kim II Sung's forces inNorth Korea, while the
United States did the same, albeit less lavishly, with the forces of
Union
series
Czechoslovakia,
Poland,
security
copies
only
Stalin's
the Western
dangerous,
the Soviets detonated their first atomic bomb. Although
had
minor
a
among
over
control
While
United
the result of historical accident, bad timing, and diplomatic blunder
in Europe, Stalin had suffered a
potentially
repression.
bloody
Washington,
anti-Communist
by a fierce
troops
as much
situation
the
however,
on the defensive by 1949. Stalin reacted by increasing his
Union
announced
in the Korean
confrontation
By
in promoting
interest
any
1949,
setbacks. The Marshall Plan, Yugoslavian President Josip Tito's move
down a "Separate Road," the failure of the 1948-1949 Berlin
Blockade, and the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza
(2).
Context
had
peninsula.
the atomic monopoly
Historical
Union
the Soviet
the Korean
had changed dramatically.
In the Cold War confrontation
indication
only verifies
an inside
view of Stalin's high-level diplomacy and the military deployments
that implemented these policies. This evidence indicates that the
would
Archives
a conflict
participa
military
access
War:
View
Soviet-era
the
from
Korean
the
The Start of theWar
Between 1945 and 1950 the relative importance of North Korea
(the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK) had not
Involvement
O'Neill/Soviet
increased dramatically, and Stalin had refused Kim IISung's repeated
saw
Stalin
and,
to
for permission
requests
so doing,
by
invade
an opportunity
in Europe.
He
some
relieve
also
1950/however,
By
on Communist
of
success
on
the pressure
to bring
sought
Korea.
South
to build
successful
Mao's
in Asia
the Soviet
Union
into
revolution
line with the Soviet Union's foreign policy goals.
In April 1950 Kim II Sung again begged for a chance to unify
Korea,
that
promising
the
would
campaign
over
be
in
three
Soviet
military
sixty
economic
and
thousand
aid,
quickly
Mao
agreed.
combat-hardened
also
released
Koreans
ethnic
from
the
People's Liberation Army (PLA) for duty with the Korean People's
Army (KPA, the North Korean Army).
The KPA's Soviet advisory staff drew up the assault plan for the
attack on South Korea, and on 25 June 1950 North Korean forces
crossed the 38th parallel in an effort to unify Korea under DPRK rule.
Two
later
days
and
sailors,
President
intervention
The
of the Chinese
Kai-shek.
Mao's
of
nationalist
War.
release
the PLA
of
the KPA's
7th Fleet
remnants
the
toMao and led by Chiang
the U.S.
virtually
veterans
and,
the Straits of
saved
was
War
Korean
much
the
as
result
historical
of
bad
accident,
and
timing,
diplomatic
as itwas
blundering
calculation.
Mao's
guaranteed
the North
assisted
in the
confrontation
airmen,
advance
ships to block
the U.S.
from
the Korean
U.S.
ordered
stop
forces opposed
assistance
This
into
entry
to
action
he also commanded
significantly,
Formosa.
into
soldiers
S. Truman
Harry
superpower
days.
Stalin gave his permission, provided that the Chinese agreed to
support the North Korean action (5). Mao, in desperate need of
over
The
Korean
army as it drove south. The combined forces quickly pushed South
Korean and U.S. forces (rushed in from Japan) into the Pusan perimeter
in the extreme
U.S.
corner
southeastern
air power
to slow
managed
of Korea
the North
(6). Nevertheless,
superior
Korean
(7).
offensive
Stalin did not want to inviteU.S. B-29 attacks on Soviet or Chinese
cities, and so halted his order to send Soviet pilots into North Korea.
While
the fortuitous
during
Mao
negotiated
the Soviet
1950,
August
in China
already
cover
Chinese
air
attacks
of
Union
the Soviet
Korea.
airbase
In this
some
of
several
itsMiG-15
In
units
the border
along
between
the Soviet
position,
and
involvement.
jets could
forces massing
the border
and prevent
military
along
on Manchurian
Stalin
ordered
However,
targets.
not to cross
into North
the Yalu River
pilots
errant U.S.
this border
bombers
crossed
Soviet
Stalin
representative,
redeployed
to the Andong
and North
Manchuria
U.S.
absence
the level and price of Chinese
even
Korea,
after
In September U.N. forces landed at Inchon behind KPA lines and
simultaneously broke out of the Pusan perimeter forcing the KPA to
withdraw
from South
Korea.
as U.N.
In early October,
forces
prepared
to cross the 38th parallel intoNorth Korea, negotiations between Stalin
and Mao
In late September,
intensified.
Stalin
took
the extreme
to send
Mao
pressuring
the Chinese
to
infantry
defend North Korea, but the Chinese leader demanded Soviet air
support in exchange for his cooperation. Between 2 and 14 October
ciphered telegram traffic between Beijing and Moscow included many
promises and threats. During this period, Stalin also began making
to take in elements
preparations
Kim
II Sung's
of the retreating
As
government.
the U.N.
and on toward theManchurian
troops into North Korea (10).
Russian
thus
far available
from
Korean
past
pushed
on what
still disagree
to secure
in order
North
forces
and
army
Pyongyang
border, Mao finally agreed to send his
sources
and Chinese
Mao
promised
ments
(8).
was
Stalin
Meanwhile,
Soviet-Chinese
Negotiations
the United States rallied the support of the United Nations
Chinese
the Russian
exactly
Stalin
The
docu
intervention.
archives
indicate
that Stalin
never planned to use his MiG-15s and anti-aircraft forces for anything
other than defending Chinese industry and supply lines. However,
the Chinese claim that Stalin promised complete air support for their
ground
step o?
forces.
In any
the Chinese
event,
army
went
into
combat
against
U.S.
ordering two Soviet fighter regiments to defend theNorth Korean capital
of Pyongyang. Soviet Minister of Defense Aleksandr M. Vasilevskii
pointed out that these units, equipped with outdated propeller aircraft
and South Korean troops in lateOctober 1950 without air cover or
bomber support. This alleged betrayal by Stalin was a critical point
and
certainly
able
lacking
to U.S.
radar
and
anti-aircraft
air attack. Vasilevskii
defenses,
also noted,
would
while
be extremely
moving
vulner
to carry out
Stalin's orders, that itwould be impossible to hide the fact that Soviet
pilots
were
actively
engaged
in combat
(9).
in
the
Moscow
suggest
eventual
that
that
in Sino-Soviet
breakdown
that
possible
he
he
later
took
already underway
Stalin
reneged
any
steps
made
on,
in northeast China
to
While
the
no
is currently
there
to change
OAH Magazine
relations.
promises
the military
Chinese
evidence
it
is
in
to
deployments
(11).
of History
Spring 2000
21
Involvement
O'Neill/Soviet
Most Soviet air divisions deployed to China were sent to defend
Chinese
cities
industrial
cities.
Manchurian
along
the eastern
two Soviet
Only
coast,
air divisions
the Beijing
were
area,
and
at any
deployed
one time to defend the airspace over "MiG Alley." The first Soviet
units deployed to the Andong airbase continued to train Chinese
pilots
while
carrying
out
their
defensive
mission
along
River.
the Yalu
The Chinese People's Volunteer Army (CPVA) in North Korea
began initial actions against U.N. forces in lateOctober but did not
launch its general offensive until the end of November. Soviet pilots
flying missions
began
November
1950.
against
Apparently,
the U.N.
air forces
this was
in reaction
on
the afternoon
to a reported
raid on North Korean planes on an airfield inManchuria
U.S.
o? 1
air
Korean
War
was
in fact
two
separate
fought
vital
addition
(12).
air over
in the
conducted
to defend
air
space
and
to the bombing
bombers
aircraft
also
Soviets
the
to cut
seeking
Korean
North
U.N.
raids,
I.The second war
where
Korea,
U.S.
against
to Chinese
supplies
northwest
off
In
ground
forces.
fought
air-superior
ity battles that pitted U.S. F-86 "Sabre" jets against the Soviet-piloted
MiG-15s. Both Chinese and North Korean pilots eventually became
involved in the aerial combat over "MiG Alley," but the Soviets bore
the brunt of the air defense fighting throughout the war (13).
The appearance of theMiG-15 and the ground control radar that
vectored
atomic
it to
bomb
its target
had
been
was
as great
nearly
a year
earlier.
The
a surprise
as
Soviet
the
Soviet
cannon-equipped
jet
could fly higher and faster than even the F-86 and proved very effective
at destroying the lumbering U.S. B-29s. InApril and October 1951 the
The Air War
The
38th parallel that was reminiscent ofWorld War
was
wars.
Following
the
initial successes of the CPVA during early 1951, the ground war
settled into bloody artillery-dominated positional warfare around the
Soviets
Force's
demonstrated
major
atomic
their
over what
superiority
bomb
system
delivery
was
the U.S.
still
in two major
Air
air battles.
Following the "Black Tuesday" defeat on 23 October
1951, B-29s no
longer operated during daylight hours and
eventually were pulled out of combat in "MiG
The
altogether.
Alley"
atomic
Washington's
and
accelerated
the
ramifications
for
were
strategy
obvious
of
development
tactical
atomic weapons
that could be dropped from
jet fighter-bombers, which led eventually to
missile-launched weapons (14).
The
that
training
pilot
ducted
throughout
con
the Soviets
northeast
was
China
just
as important to the development of theCold
as their
War
mission.
combat
Stalin
ordered
MiG-9 and MiG-15 fighter units along with
Tu-2 bomber and 11-10ground attack units to
to China,
deploy
leagues,
formed
and
unit,
Union.
train
over
turn
Through
their
their
aircraft
then
return
Chinese
to
col
the newly
to the Soviet
the U.S.S.R.
this process,
helped China establish the third largest
modern air force in the world (15). Al
though Chinese pilots still lacked many of
the skills needed to fight U.S. F-86 pilots, as
the war
they were
progressed
an
increasing
factor in "MiG Alley." A modern
was
one
tions
of Mao's
with
major
the U.S.S.R.,
goals
in this
and
toward
step
the
aerial
more
carried
out
ter
crew
in Korea,
of the U.S. Air Force's 4th Fighter-Interceptor
Wing
into place for instal lation
photographed
through the tail pipe of an F-86 Sabre, hoists an engine
on one of the jet fighter planes, September
i
1951. (Cou rtesy of the National Arch ves
and Records
-13676.)
Administration, NWDNS-306-PS-51
An aircraft maintenance
22
OAH Magazine
of History
Spring 2000
received
much
the U.N.
gaged
the Korean
air superiority
were
Alley"
of
portion
The
side.
in the much
status
superpower
rela
regard
took its first
the People's Republic of China
giant
air force
in his
battles
than
during
War.
in "MiG
the slaugh
glamorous
on
the ground,
and
more
press
coverage
In
reality,
most
less glamorous
pilots
they
from
en
and more
Involvement
O'Neill/Soviet
lethal work of bombing and strafing ground targets. Anti-aircraft
artillery and ground fire took the greatest toll of U.N. pilots over
the battlefield. Close support aircraft and night flying B-26 and
and died in greater numbers
B-29 bombers flew more missions
than did the high-flying sabre pilots.
One of the enduring myths of this conflict has been the general
insistence by the U.S. Air Force that it fought in "MiG Alley"
by the Manchurian
handicapped
Air
across
sanctuary
to maintain
continues
Force
its aircraft
that
the Yalu.
The U.S.
cross
not
did
the Yalu
to pursue MiG-15s
and thus were sitting ducks for Communist
aircraft diving at high speeds from across the border. This was indeed
the case until April 1952 when U.S. F-86 pilots?apparendy on their
own initiative, but with the knowledge of their commanders?began
inManchuria. On 21 April 1952, three Soviet
attacking MiG-15s
were
shot
and killed while attempting to land at the
down
pilots
This
airbase.
Andong
Korean
North
pilots
increased losses accordingly
U.S.
The
Air
in tactics
change
on
the
their
and
Chinese,
home
and
bases
their more
continued
Navy
aggressive
major failure for the Soviet fighters charged with their defense
(17).
to accelerate
the
not
the
the
peace
negotiations
air pressure,
increased
in part
designed
at Panmunjom,
air power
U.S.
could
stop
flow of supplies toCommunist ground forces. Itdid, however, reduce
the flow to such levels that the Chinese and North Korean forces were
a successful
to launch
unable
the war.
The
F-86,
better
air-to-air
pilots
fought
than
fighter
offensive
ground
in the hands
Weathersby
of highly
for
pilots,
Soviet
but
of
remainder
U.S.
trained
the MiG-15,
the
and
to gain
scholars
the first Western
among
Her findings
International
Issue 3 (Fall
with
History Project (CWIHP) Bulletins, beginning
own
is
for his
the
This
author's
archival
research
basis
1993).
dissertation. SeeMark O'Neill, "TheOther Side of theYalu: Soviet
Pilots in the Korean War" (Dissertation: Horida State University,
1996). Two of the best works in English on Soviet involvement in
the early Cold War are Vladislav Zubok and Constantine
Pleshkov, Inside the Kremlim's Cold War: From Stalin to
Khrushchev
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); and
Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The
Stalin Years (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
2. Documents pertaining to the Soviet 64th Fighter Air Corps and
its related units can be found in the Central Archive of the
Ministry of Defense (Tsentral'nii Arkhiv Ministerii Oboroni, or
inMoscow
in fonds 64iak, 151gv.iad,
50iad, 324iad, 303iad, 97iad, 216iad, 32iad and 190iad. The
posture during the late spring of 1952 when they launched a series
of fighter-bomber strikes against the Suiho hydroelectric facilities up
the Yalu from Andong. These raids succeeded in cutting off power
to much of southern Manchuria and North Korea and marked a
Despite
was
access to Soviet-era archives in the early 1990s.
have been published in a series of Cold War
TsAMO)
(16).
and
Force
Soviet,
put
at
defensive
Endnotes
1. Kathryn
a
was
Chinese
first
concrete
Korean
and Podol'sk
evidence
arose
War
of
direct
Soviet
interviews
from
in
involvement
with
former
the
See G.
pilots.
"The Time Has Come to Tell the Story: It was
Dyachenko,
Krasnaia
Zvezda (25 June 1989), translated in Joint
Korea,"
Publication Research Service-UMA-89-019:
13-15; Aleksandr
Smortskov on Moscow International Service in Korean (11 June
1990), translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service
SOV-90-121: 9-10; and Georgii Lobov, "Blank Spots inHistory:
In the Skies of North Korea," Aviatsiia IKosmonovtika, 2 parts
(10 October
1990), translated in Joint Publication Research
Service-UAC-91-003:
27-31 and Joint Publication Research
22-25.
Service-UAC-91-004:
27 July 1953 armistice.
3. The best account of the development of the Soviet atomic bomb
isDavid Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union
and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven: Yale University
The War's End
Stalin's death on 5March 1953 had asmuch to do with the eventual
end of the fighting in Korea as did the ground and air combat. The
4. Shu Guang Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism:
United
States
its perceived
Union,
increased
limited
commitment
Sadly,
Vietnam,
essential
even
interests
to commit
the combat
itself
of China
capacity
lessons
Korea
the Asian
force
mainland.
Soviet
instead
transfer
technology
the
to defend
The
and East Asia,
Europe
through
until
and
forces.
from
States
northwest
to use military
on
in Eastern
of combat
the United
over
skies
itswillingness
demonstrated
national
unable
in the
tenaciously
the Korean
again
War
went
unlearned.
to use massive
attempted
In
air power
and technological superiority to force a decision. The Soviet Union
supplied North Vietnam with air defense weapons, including Soviet
manned
surface-to-air
it trained
and
missiles,
North
Vietnamese
pilots. In this war, however, U.S. policy makers did keep inmind the
possibility of Chinese and Soviet intervention when they declined to
invade
North
Vietnam.
We
are
that resulted
complex
relationships
so we can better
understand
now
better
in the Korean
the history
of
the
able
to
War,
last fifty
understand
and
by doing
years.
1994).
Press,
Korean
1950-1953
War,
1995), 39, 49-50.
5. Kathryn Weathersby,
Korean
University
China
Press
and the
of Kansas,
"The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the
New
War:
(Lawrence:
Evidence,"
Documentary
Journal
of Ameri
can-East Asian Relations 2 (Winter 1993): 425-58; and "Soviet
Aims in Korea and theOrigins of the Korean War, 1945-1950:
New Evidence from the Russian Archives," CWIHP Working
Paper No. 8 (November 1993): 23-24.
6. Ibid. Zhang thoroughly covers Chinese military capabilities in
Romanticism.
Military
7. Detailed discussion of the impact of U.S. air raids on KPA mobility
and
the
efforts
throughout
military
advisor
Lt. Gen.
V.
Koreiskoi
to
taken
reduce
their
effectiveness
a 1957 dissertation written
N.
and
later Soviet
Razuvaev,
Narodnoi
Armii
ambassador
"Nekotrye
Vyvody
v Voine
v Koree"
OAH Magazine
of History
is found
by the chief Soviet
to Pyongyang.
See
iz boevogo
Opyta
(Dissertation:
Spring 2000
K. E.
23
O'Neill/Soviet
Involvement
B-29 Superfortress bombersofthe
1951.
supply centers, 30January
U.S. Far East Air Forces BomberCommand
(Courtesy of the National
Archivesand
Voroshilov Military Academy,
1957), available on microfiche
through EastView Publications, Minneapolis, MN.
8. TsAMO: fond 16, opis 3139, delo 16, list 1.
9. AVPRF: fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, list 79-82.
10.This debate is covered in Sergei N. Goncharov, JohnW. Lewis, and
Xue
Litai,
Uncertain
Partners:
Stalin,
Mao,
and
the Korean
War
Mansourov,
"Stalin,
Mao,
and China's
Decision
to Enter
fond 151 gv.iad, opis 152688ss, delo 7, listi 38-39;
"Blank
Lobov,
Spots;" German and Seidov, Red Devils, 120-35;
and TsAMO: fond 303 iad, opis 174133ss, delo 1.
15. TsAMO: fond 16, opis 3139, delo 16, listi 1-22 and 162-65.
16. No Kum-Sok, A MiG-15 to Freedom (Jefferson, NC: McFarland
and Co., 1996), 114-23; interviews with U.S. pilots Frederick
15, listi 12-15.
12. TsAMO: fond 151 gv.iad, opis 152688ss, delo 7, list 2.
13. O'Neill, "The Other Side of the Yalu;" and German and Seidov,
Red Devils. These sources indicate the high levels of Soviet
combat
during
the war.
OAH Magazine
of History
Channel's
War
Spring 2000
"Bud" Mahurin
and Walker
Secrets
documentary
(airedMarch
of War
Secret
Air
and German
and
Seidov,
Red
fond 16, opis 3139, delo 131, listi 3-18.
Mark O'Neill
dissertation,
is presently completing a manuscript based on his
"The Other Side of the Yalu: Soviet Involvement in
Air
diplomatic
Community
for the History
Stalin's
316.
Devils,
17. TsAMO:
U.S.
#20:
1999), transcripts of interviews available on
<http://www.secretsofwar.com>;
the Korean
14. Some o? the best descriptions of "Black Tuesday" (Chernyi
oktiabf) and other battles with U.S. B-29s can be found in
24
"Boots" Blesse
the
KoreanWar, September 16-October 15,1950: New Evidence from
the Russian Archives" CWIHP Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996):
94-107; and Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism.
11. Orders issued to Soviet air units did not change their deployment
or mission. See, for example, TsAMO: fond 16, opis 3139, delo
attack on North Korean
NWDNS-342-AF-7877AC.)
TsAMO:
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 175-85; Alexandre Y.
Kim
a concentrated
unleash
Records Administration,
War,
history
College.
1950-1953."
as
an
He
adjunct
teaches
professor
twentieth-century
at Tallahassee