Grounding
the social meaning of
need to in its semantics
Lelia Glass
Stanford University
[email protected]
LSA Annual Meeting
Washington, DC
January 2016
introduction
social meme-ing
•
Would these memes have the same effect with you have to
substituted for you need to? Why or why not?
the elusive social meaning of need to
•
Focus on the 2nd person; interpersonal meaning is heightened
•
Need to described as “polite”
•
“need to often is more polite, implying that the action demanded
is in the addressee’s own interest” (Nokkonen 2006; also Leech
2003, Smith 2003)
•
…but also associated with authority
• “need to is useful when addressing subordinates
politely” (Nokkonen 2012); it “expresses . . .
assertiveness” (Nokkonen 2012)
the elusive social meaning of need to
•
“Polite,” “assertive”, lends a sense of sassiness to memes…
• Not all compatible with each other
• Not clear how these elusive social meanings could be grounded in
the meaning of need to
•
What’s going on?
plan for today
•
Pinpoint the semantic difference between need to and have to: need
to ties the obligation to someone’s needs or goals, whereas have to
is more general
• Experiment 1
•
Use this difference in ambiguity to make predictions about the
social contexts in which you need to vs. you have to will be used
• Experiment 2
•
Contextualize this project within the growing literature on the
relationship between semantic and social meaning
semantics of
you need to
vs you have to
semantics of need to vs have to
•
“You have to admire her for persevering.”
• suggests that in general, in view of the fact that we tend to admire
perseverance, you should admire her
•
“You need to admire her for persevering.”
• suggests that it would be good for you somehow to admire her
semantics of need to vs have to
•
Claim: need to and have to are both strong necessity modals, but that
they differ in the types of obligations they can report
•
Root (non-epistemic) modals express obligations in view of some set of
contextually relevant goals, laws, etc (e.g. Kratzer 1977); often left
somewhat ambiguous
•
Claim: need to is a teleological modal (Rubinstein 2012; see also, from
the functional side, Sweetser 1990, Bybee & Pagliuca 1994, Nokkonen
2006), meaning that it ties the obligation to some party’s goals…
(generally the hearer’s, in the 2nd person)
•
…whereas have to does not specify the source of the obligation
complications
•
A person could have a goal of complying with a rule, so need to can
also report an obligation stemming from an external source
(Rubinstein 2012’s “pseudo-deontic” reading)
•
Since have to does not specify where the obligation comes from, it
might be used to report an obligation that stems from someone’s
goals or needs
•
But the idea is that need to provides more information about the
source of the obligation than have to
experiment 1
experiment 1
•
Experiment 1: forced-choice need to vs. have to in “external rules”
condition vs. “internal needs” condition
• Hypothesis: need to more probable when obligation is tied to
internal needs than external rules
•
External rules condition: Kelsey and Toni are friends. Toni is explaining
the rules of her new novel-writing course. Kelsey asks Toni,
• Do you —— write every day?
•
Internal priorities condition: Kelsey and Toni are friends. Toni is
explaining that she feels happier when she is working on a novel. Kelsey
asks Toni,
• Do you —– write every day?
experiment 1
•
7 test items (+ 12 fillers involving might vs. could or should vs. want to);
2 conditions per test item; subjects see each test item in 1 randomly
chosen condition
•
Stimuli + fillers presented in a random order; choices (need to, have
to) also presented in a random order
•
38 participants using US IP addresses, all self-identified native English
speakers (non-native speakers excluded)
experiment 1
•
Analyzed results using glmer() function: mixed-effects logistic
regression (binary outcome: need to vs. have to)
•
Fixed effect: obligation type (external vs. internal)
•
Random effects: allowed both slopes and intercepts to vary for both
subjects and items (to be conservative; Barr et al 2013)
experiment 1
External
Internal
0.8
***
•
The model (via plogis()) gives us the
probability of need to being chosen
over have to in external rules vs.
internal priorities conditions
•
Need to is far more likely to be chosen
in the internal priorities condition
(“feels better when she is working on a
novel”) than the external rules
condition (“explaining the rules of her
new novel-writing class”; p < 0.001)
}
probability of choosing need to
1
0.6
0.4
0.2
24%
0
63%
experiment 1
External
Internal
0.8
***
}
probability of choosing need to
1
•
Consistent with the starting
assumption that need to ties the
obligation to someone’s internal
priorities
•
…whereas have to is more general
about the source of the obligation
0.6
0.4
0.2
24%
0
63%
from
semantics to
social meaning
from semantics to social meaning
•
Since you need to tells the hearer what to do in view of his goals /
what is good for him, a speaker who uses you need to suggests that
she knows what is good for the hearer and is qualified to advise him
•
But in using you have to, a speaker leaves open an interpretation
where she is not telling the hearer what is good for him, but simply
reporting a general rule
from semantics to social meaning
•
We can reconcile the conflicting descriptions of you need to (“polite” vs.
“assertive”) by positing that the social meaning of you need to depends
on how speaker and hearer relate to each other
•
If the speaker is licensed to tell the hearer what is good for him, you
need to may seem considerate
•
But if the speaker is not licensed, you need to may seem
presumptuous; after all, telling one’s hearer what to do is
notoriously threatening (e.g. Hutchby 1995; MacGeorge et al 2009)
to the hearer’s face (in the sense of Goffman 1967; Brown &
Levinson 1987)
from
social meaning to
social contexts
of use
a straightforward prediction
•
Speakers who are in a social position to know what is good for their
hearer (experts, authority figures, close friends) will be more likely to
use you need to than speakers who are not (non-experts, subordinates
or peers, distant acquaintances)…
•
…perhaps because such qualified speakers are more likely to make
statements about what would serve the hearer’s goals — statements
associated with you need to
• Maybe a professor is more likely than a classmate to tell you “I think
you need to finish your QP this quarter” because professors are
more likely to tell you what’s good for you in than peers are
•
(corpus evidence to this effect in Glass 2015)
a more subtle prediction
•
If, in using you need to, the speaker has to go on-record as telling the
hearer what is good for him…and if she could alternatively use you
have to and leave open an interpretation in which she is simply
reporting some sort of general rule…
•
then if she does not feel licensed to advise the hearer, even if the
obligation really does directly relate to the hearer’s goals, she may choose
you have to to avoid the face threat associated with you need to —
choosing a more ambiguous option for social reasons
• Prediction: you’ll choose to say “you have to finish your QP this
quarter” if you are a peer, “you need to finish your QP this
quarter” if you are a professor
experiment 2
experiment 2
•
Experiment 2: forced-choice need to vs. have to in “speaker +licensed”
condition vs. “speaker unlicensed” condition
• Hypothesis: need to more probable when speaker is more licensed to
tell hearer what to do — even though the obligation stems from the
hearer’s stated goals in both conditions
•
Speaker +licensed condition: Dr. Wong is Sarina’s doctor. Sarina just
mentioned that she would like to be more fit. Dr. Wong tells her,
• Then you —– try to get a bit more exercise. That’s my recommendation.
•
Speaker unlicensed condition: Katie is an employee of Sarina. Sarina
just mentioned that she would like to be more fit. Katie tells her,
• Then you —– try to get a bit more exercise. That’s what I try to do, anyway.
experiment 2
•
Speaker +licensed condition: Dr. Wong is Sarina’s doctor. Sarina just
mentioned that she would like to be more fit. Dr. Wong tells her,
• Then you —– try to get a bit more exercise. That’s my recommendation.
•
Speaker -licensed condition: Katie is an employee of Sarina. Sarina
just mentioned that she would like to be more fit. Katie tells her,
• Then you —– try to get a bit more exercise. That’s what I try to do,
anyway.
•
In both conditions, the obligation is the same, and is explicitly tied to
Sarina’s goal of becoming more fit — the only difference is whether the
speaker is socially licensed to give advice to Sarina
experiment 2
•
8 test items (+ 12 fillers involving might vs. could or should vs. want to);
2 conditions per test item; subjects see each test item in 1 randomly
chosen condition
•
Stimuli + fillers presented in a random order, choices (need to, have
to) also presented in random order
•
48 participants using US IP addresses, all self-identified native English
speakers
experiment 2
•
Analyzed results using glmer() function: mixed-effects logistic
regression (binary outcome: need to vs. have to)
•
Fixed effect: speaker licensedness (+licensed vs. -licensed)
•
Random effects: allowed both slopes and intercepts to vary for both
subjects and items (to be conservative; Barr et al 2013)
experiment 2
Unlicensed
*
}
probability of choosing need to
1
0.8
Licensed
•
The model (via plogis()) yields the
probability of need to being chosen
over have to in licensed vs. unlicensed
conditions
•
Need to is more likely to be chosen
when the speaker is more licensed
(the doctor context) to tell the hearer
what to do (p < 0.05)
0.6
0.4
0.2
62%
0
77%
experiment 2
Unlicensed
*
•
Consistent with prediction that
speakers will avoid using you need to,
even when the obligation does directly
relate to the hearer’s goals, if they are
less socially licensed to give advice
•
Speakers do indeed choose the
more ambiguous option you have to,
even when the less ambiguous option
you need to would be semantically
appropriate, for social reasons
}
probability of choosing need to
1
0.8
Licensed
0.6
0.4
0.2
62%
0
77%
situating
this project
in the literature
contextualizing
•
Some previous studies use a semantic difference between functional
items to ground a difference in social meaning
• (Torres Cacallous 2001 on estar vs andar progressives in Mexican
Spanish, Acton & Potts 2014 on the vs. this/that, Beltrama 2015a,
2015b on totally vs. really, completely)
•
Here, the items (need to, have to) are both strong necessity modals,
but they differ in the range of interpretations available to them: need
to ties the obligation to someone’s goals, have to is more general (thus
more ambiguous)
contextualizing
•
I’ve argued that even when the obligation does relate to the hearer’s
goals (making you need to the less ambiguous choice), speakers have a
tendency to choose you have to instead for face reasons
•
Grice’s Maxim of Manner (“…avoid ambiguity…”) would encourage
speakers to always choose the less ambiguous option — using you
need to whenever the obligation relates to the hearer’s goals
•
But to avoid the face threat associated with unambiguously telling the
hearer what is good for him, I’ve suggested that the speaker may
choose the more ambiguous you have to in these cases instead (as
also suggested in Bonnefon et al 2009, Pinker et al 2008)
wrap-up
•
•
In-a-nutshell social meaning associated with you
need to: “I am telling you what you should do
because I know what is good for you”
• Depending on the relationship, could come
across as considerate, presumptuous, slightly
threatening…(ripe to be exploited in memes)
In-a-nutshell social meaning associated with you have to: “I’m telling
you what you should do, but not necessarily because I think I know
what’s good for you”
• A good choice if the obligation does not relate to the hearer’s
priorities, or if the speaker want to pretend it doesn’t so she don’t
offend him, if she’s not in a position to advise him
(1-slide version of this talk)
1. You need to has some sort of
unique social meaning that you
have to doesn’t…what is it? Can
it be grounded in semantics?
2. Have to and need to are both
strong necessity modals; the only
difference is that need to reports
an obligation stemming from
someone’s goals (Rubinstein
2012; Exp. 1), whereas have to
can report obligations from any
source (—> difference in
ambiguity)
3. Based on this semantic difference,
the speaker who uses you need to
goes on-the-record as telling the
hearer what to do in view of his
goals, whereas the speaker of you
have to does not — giving rise to
social meaning difference
4. We predict (Exp. 2) that certain
socially-unlicensed speakers might
choose the more ambiguous you
have to in order to avoid the
interactional risk of using you
need to
thank you!
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many thanks to….
•
Chris Potts, Daniel Lassiter, Penny Eckert, Cleo Condoravdi, Andrea
Beltrama, and James Collins for valuable conversations on this topic
•
Simon Todd and Ed King for their very generous help with statistics
•
Audiences at Stanford, NWAV 43, and Nuance Communications
•
Elizabeth Allyn Smith, Joseph C. Tyler, and Andrea Beltrama for inviting
me today! :)