RSC GUEST ANALYSIS
No. 3 | March 2016
Military Engagements of the South Caucasus Countries
Marine Sargsyan*
It would not be an understatement to say that the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact (the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation
and Mutual Assistance) in 1991 and the breakdown
of cooperation between the various socialist states
led to a set of great changes in world politics. The
Cold War ended with the victory of the West.1
Using this situation and reflecting the new balance
of power, NATO enlarged its “zone of interest” and
expanded its borders, moving to the East towards
Russia. The attempts of the Russian Federation to
prevent NATO from making headway visibly failed.
In 1998, the former Warsaw Pact member states,
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined
NATO, while Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Latvia,
Lithuania and Estonia also expressed interest in
joining at that time. The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization established a new form of cooperation
with the former socialist countries named the
“Partnership for Peace” (PfP).
Elsewhere, in 1992, all three countries of the South
Caucasus became members of the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council (NACC) and later joined the
PfP programme in 1994, and in 1997, became
founding members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council (EAPC). NATO’s activities in the postSoviet space prompted Russia to set up a new policy
initiative within the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS), based on a Russian view of “special
responsibility” in the “post-Soviet space,”
proclaiming stability and peace in the CIS of the
utmost importance. Taking into account the serious
geopolitical changes and the shift of power at the
time, Russia sought to reunite the former Soviet
countries into a new common defense zone.2
Ваагн Аглян, (2006). “Российская Федерация и
Южный Кавказ: Структурная Взаимосвязанность и
Перспективы Развития Отношений”, Ереван, «21-й
ВЕК», № 1 (3), стр. 147. Vahagn Aglyan, (2006). “The
Russian Federation and South Caucasus: structural
interconnectedness and prospects of relations,” Noravank,
Yerevan, 21st Century.
www.noravank.am/upload/pdf/145_ru.pdf
2
Галина Шинкарецкая, (1995). “Проблемы
правопреемства и границы Российской Федерации”.
Москва, Журнал Межд. Права. N4, стр. 102. Galina
Shinkaretskaya, (1995). “The problems of succession and
the Russian border.” Moscow, Journal of International
Rights. N4, p. 102
1
RSC Guest Analysis No. 3 | March 2016
It was with this aim that, on 15 May 1992, the heads
of six post-Soviet states (Russia, Armenia,
Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan
and
Uzbekistan), met in Tashkent to sign the Collective
Security Treaty (later referred to as the “Tashkent
Treaty”), establishing an intergovernmental military
bloc, officially known as the Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO).
With the formation of both the CIS and the CSTO,
Russia was trying to create a common militarypolitical space among the former Soviet countries.
Yet there were many inconsistencies in the newly
formed organization, as each member state had its
own approach to national defense and military
policy, corresponding to each of their divergent
needs and reforms. Seeking to overcome these
differences, these states created a “Partnership of the
Defense Ministries,” highlighting the importance of
compliance and conformity with defense reforms
and military-related legislation.
A subsequent
agreement, reached on 21 January 1993, adopted a
more uniform agreement on defense legislation.
This was later approved in May 1993 by the InterParliamentary Conference of CIS countries.3
Despite this move, while there were thousands of
legislative acts, agreements and documents related
to military cooperation between the CIS countries,
and their implementation was not always effective.
In
1999,
Armenia,
Belarus,
Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan signed a new
agreement for another five years, but Georgia and
Azerbaijan did not. Furthermore, Georgia, which
had initially joined the CIS in December 1993 and
the CSTO in 1994, officially withdrew from the CIS
on 18 August 2009, in the wake of its war with
Russia in August 2008.
Georgia has always had pursued a pro-Western
political orientation and espoused NATO
membership, becoming a NACC (EAPC) member
in 1992 and signing the PfP Basic Document in
1994, as well as joining the PARP process and in
1999, contributing Georgian peacekeepers to
NATO’s KFOR operation in Kosovo KFOR. And
at the NATO Prague Summit in November 2002,
Georgia officially announced its desire to join
NATO. But the more Georgians talked about
“knocking at NATO’s door,” the tougher the
Russian responses became.
Сборник Документов СМО государств- участников
СНГ (Collected Papers of the CIS Defence Ministers
Council), 1995. N 1, стр. 56.
3
Regional Studies Center (RSC)
In 2002, the US Congress approved $100 million in
aid to Georgia, while Turkey became the second
largest provider of support to Georgia after the US.
Naval assistance from NATO was also pivotal for
Georgia in the formation of its coastal defense
forces.4 And although Georgia was a member of the
CIS until 2009, during the Sahakashvili
Administration, it refused to participate in CIS
leadership meetings and events.
Eventually, after the August war of 2008, there was
no point for Georgia to remain a member of the CIS,
and when it became clear that at least for the
foreseeable future, the breakaway regions of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia were lost, it further
strengthened relations with the West, and deepened
ties to the European Union (EU) and NATO.
For Azerbaijan, CSTO membership was preferable
to NATO partnership, as it hoped to solve its
military conflict with Armenia over NagornoKarabakh by military means.
Moreover, as
Armenia was the most loyal partner of Russia in the
region, and the latter is also a chair of the OSCE
Minsk Group, Moscow diplomacy is often blamed
for being pro-Armenian. Meanwhile, from the
Armenian position, Russian arms sales to
Azerbaijan are not consistent with Moscow’s proArmenian policy. In fact, Moscow’s politics are
seen as pro-Russia, in aiming to keep its influence
over the former Soviet republics, and to maximize
Russia’s strong position internationally.
If in the early 1990s Azerbaijan showed interest and
even joined the CSTO, it still disagreed on the
possible deployment of Russian peacekeeping
forces to Nagorno-Karabakh and in 1995, during the
meeting of the CIS leaders in Almaty, Azerbaijani
President Geidar Aliyev did not agree to a proposal
for the re-establishment of Russian forces along the
Armenian borders with Turkey and Iran and refused
to take part in the unified air defense system of the
CIS states.5
Mkrtchyan, Tigran (2004). “NATO and the South
Caucasus,” Cambridge, MPhil Thesis, p. 76.
5
Ibid, p.57.
4
2
RSC Guest Analysis No. 3 | March 2016
According to data from the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), for the period of
2011-2015, Russia’s military arms sales increased
significantly, with Azerbaijani purchases among the
highest. This was matched by a steady increase in
Azerbaijani defense spending, which increased
dramatically, and most notably, Russia has emerged
as the primary arms supplier for not only Armenia,
but also for Azerbaijan, with Russian military
supplies to Azerbaijan estimated at roughly $5
billion.6 Additionally, according to World Bank
Military expenditure figures in 2014, (as percent of
GDP), defense spending in Armenia was measured
at 4.0 percent, in Azerbaijan 4.8 percent, and
Georgia 2.3 percent.7 However, when comparing
the total amounts, the huge difference is more
visible, as Azerbaijani defense expenditures for
2016 will amount to around AZN 1.838 billion
(nearly $1.77 billion), while Armenia plans to
allocate AMD 208.014 billion (or approximately $
430 million) for its 2016 defense budget. And as
Azerbaijan is the biggest supplier of oil to Israel
(accounting for about 40 percent), it also buys more
sophisticated arms, including missile systems and
drones from Israel, as demonstrated in the fact that
Azerbaijan is Israel’s second biggest military
customer.
Armenia, having no borders with Russia, has
nevertheless bound itself politically, economically
and militarily with the Russian Federation. It is, for
example, the only country in the South Caucasus to
host a Russian military base. Armenian-Russian
relations also have deep historical roots, dating back
to the 18th century, and are further based on the
historical view of the Russian Empire as the
protector of Christians in the Ottoman Empire.8
However, the history of the Armenian-Russian
relationship largely shows that this alliance was
beneficial only for Russia, which strengthened its
military position in Armenia after the 2008 war in
Georgia when its military base was moved from
Georgia to Armenia. And although Armenia has
military agreements with the US, NATO, Greece,
France and others, Russia’s dominance is obvious.
The development of Armenia-NATO relations is
synchronized with Russia-NATO relations. In
1997, Russia participated in the NATO summit in
Madrid, and in the same year, Armenia’s interest in
NATO also increased, welcoming Solana in
Yerevan. Further NATO-Russia relations and the
establishment of the Russia-NATO Council in 2001
have also had a positive impact on Armenia-NATO
relations, and in April 2004, the Armenian
Parliament ratified the multilateral PfP Status of
Forces Agreement (PfP SOFA).
In fact, the more NATO-Russia relations improved,
the more Armenia became involved in NATO
programmes. But two factors essentially limited the
extent of Armenia’s cooperation with NATO. One
was the NATO membership of Turkey, which given
tension over the Armenian genocide issue and the
closed border tended to foster Armenian distrust.
The second factor, also related to the first, was
Armenia’s military alliance with Russia.9 On 20
August 2010, the lease on the Russian 102nd base in
the Armenian city of Gyumri was extended until
2044, largely cementing the Russian role as a
guarantor of Armenia’s security.10 The Russian
base is part of the Joint CIS Air Defense System
(Объединённая система ПВО СНГ) and is home
to S-300 anti-aircraft missiles and Mikoyan MiG-29
fighters, as well as a new helicopter squadron.
9
“ՌԴ արտահանող զենքի 5%-ը Ադրբեջանին է
վաճառում,” PanArmenian.net, 22 փետրվարի, 2016
www.panarmenian.net/arm/news/206573/SIPRI_
7
World Bank Report, (2015). “Military expenditure (%
of GDP).
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.
ZS
8
Mkrtchyan, (2004), p. 87.
6
Regional Studies Center (RSC)
Ibid., p.100.
Սարգսյան, Սերգեյ (2013). “Ռազմաքաղաքական
Համագործակցությունը Եվրասիական Ինտեգրման
Համատեքստում,” Երևան, «21-րդ Դար», թիվ (48).
Sargsyan, Sergey (2013). “In the context of political
cooperation of the Eurasian integration,” Noravank,
Yerevan, 21st Century, No. (48)
www.noravank.am/upload/pdf/1.Sergey%20Sargsyan_02
_2013.pdf
10
3
RSC Guest Analysis No. 3 | March 2016
However, the presence of the Russian military base
in Gyumri, has held an ambiguous status from the
beginning, and has been a source of underlying
tension, however.
The murder of an Armenian
family in January 2015 by a Russian deserter, for
example, was not the first act of violence committed
by Russian soldiers. In 1999, two intoxicated
Russian officers opened fire on a crowd near a street
market, killing two and wounding twelve people. In
another example, in 2013, two boys died in an
accidental explosion of Russian military ordinance
left unguarded outside the base perimeter.
Moreover, the terms of both military and economic
ties with Moscow have also continued to be
controversial in Armenian politics and society.11
Thus, in terms of the military affiliations of the
South Caucasus, each country in the region follows
a very different trajectory. Armenia is closely tied
to Russia and the CSTO, hosts the only Russian
base in the region (until 2044), and relies on Russia
as its primary arms supplier. Azerbaijan, on the
other hand, has given up on any expectations of
NATO support over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
although it has strengthened its military relationship
with Turkey, with a 2010 agreement on “Strategic
Partnership and Mutual Support,” that pledges
support “using all possibilities” in case of a military
attack or aggression against either country.
In contrast, Georgia clearly considers NATO as the
only security factor in Europe, and has NATO
membership ambitions, bolstered by NATO
Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s view that
“Georgia has made a lot of progress.”12
Krzysztan, Bartlomiej (2015). “Gyumri Massacre and
Armenia’s Indispensable Alliance,” Krakow. New
Eastern Europe, Poland.
www.neweasterneurope.eu/interviews/1476-gyumrimassacre-and-armenia-s-indispensable-alliance
12
Kucera, Joshua (2015). “NATO Deals Blow to
Georgia’s Membership Hopes,” EurasiaNet, 2 December
2015. www.eurasianet.org/node/76381
11
Regional Studies Center (RSC)
However, the possibility of Georgian membership in
NATO is neither easy nor assured. Georgia has not
been offered NATO’s Membership Action Plan
(MAP), which is the prelude to full membership,
reflecting NATO hesitation that any move
supporting Georgia is obviously a move to defend
the country against Russia. Therefore, in the face of
the current geopolitical reality, there is no serious
chance for Georgia to be offered the MAP at the
upcoming NATO Summit in Warsaw in May 2016.
* Marine Sargsyan is a Doctoral student at Leiden
University in the Netherlands and holds a Resident
Fellowship with the RSC. Her views do not necessarily
reflect the views of the RSC.
The Regional Studies Center (RSC) is
an independent think tank engaged in a
wide range of strategic analysis and
research, developing policy initiatives
aimed at bolstering political and economic
reform and conflict resolution in the
broader South Caucasus region.
As a leading think tank based in Armenia,
the RSC strives to elevate the level of
political discourse and deepen civic
activism while broadening engagement in
the public policy process. One of our core
longer-term goals is to serve as a catalyst
for reform and sustainable development
by contributing to the formulation of public
policy through innovative research and
objective analysis.
Regional Studies Center (RSC)
Yerevan, Armenia
www.regional-studies.org
4