Oxford Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2014), pp. 311–339
doi:10.1093/ojlr/rwt026
Published Advance Access May 2, 2014
Religion and the Nigerian State: Situating
the de facto and de jure Frontiers of
State–Religion Relations and its
Implications for National Security
ISAAC TERWASE SAMPSON*
Since its independence in 1960, Nigeria has struggled unsuccessfully to clearly
articulate the relationship between religion and the state. Whereas the British
colonialists seemingly bequeathed to the new nation-state a secular regime at
independence, the internal contradictions, which, paradoxically were propagated by
the colonial authority, incubated to pose a challenge to the new state soon thereafter.
On the one hand, there was the Muslim north, groomed under the English indirect
rule, which accommodated the sharia legal order; on the other hand, there was the
Christian/Animist south, mentored under the British-secular regime. Thus the postindependence secular state, which seemed acceptable to the Christian/animist south,
was abhorred by the Muslim north. This paradox has remained the Achilles’ heel of
Nigeria’s corporate existence, as northern Islamists have consistently sought the
establishment of an Islamic state to replace the extant secular regime. This article
therefore seeks to situate the legal and constitutional frontiers of state–religion
relations in Nigeria. It is intent on delineating the conceptual boundary between
religion and politics, while evaluating the impact of the current relationship on
national security. The article advocates for a moderate secular regime—by whatever
name—that is constitutionally defined and institutionalized.
1. Introduction
Nigeria is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state. The major religious groups
in this country of more than 160 million inhabitants are Christianity and Islam.
There is a scientific representation of neither the numerical strength of these
religious groups nor their geographical distribution.1 The Islamic faith
preponderates in the northwestern and northeastern parts of the country
* Centre for Strategic Research and Studies, National Defence College, Nigeria. Email: [email protected]
1
Most claims about Nigeria’s Christian–Muslim population distribution are anecdotal and based purely on
assumptions, since ‘religious distribution’ is not an index in Nigeria’s National Population Commission’s
population head counts. Some Western-based population resource services like Index Mundi.com, CIA World
Fact Sheet, Population Resource Centre etc—which are commonly relied upon—put Nigeria’s population ratio at
50% Muslims, 40% Christians, and 10% indigenous believers. For evidence of this presumptive population
distribution, see Nigeria Demographics Profile 2011 <http://www.indexmundi.com/nigeria/demographics_profile.
html> accessed 25 August 2011; and CIA World Population Factsheet <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html> accessed 25 August 2011). These approximations are not based on Nigeria’s
official estimates and therefore, lack statistical integrity.
ß The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions,
please email: [email protected]
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[which is composed of Sokoto, Zamfara, Borno, Yobe, Katsina, Kano, Kebbi,
Jigawa, Bauchi, Taraba (although Taraba State has an almost equal distribution
of Christians and Muslims), Gombe, and Adamawa states]. On the other hand,
Christianity is more prominent in the southeastern and south-south geographical zones (composed of Imo, Enugu, Anambra, Abia, Ebonyi, Delta, Edo,
Bayelsa, Rivers, Cross-Rivers, and Akwa Ibom states—with Edo State arguably
comprising an equal distribution of Muslims and Christians.
The southwest and north-central zones (composed of Lagos, Oyo, Ogun,
Ondo, Ekiti, Osun, Kaduna, Niger, Plateau, Nassarawa, Benue, and Kogi
states) and the north-central zone (the Federal Capital Territory) have
reasonably balanced numbers of Muslims and Christians; except for
Benue State, which is entirely composed of Christians and followers of
Traditional Religion (TR). Although often marginalized, TR has a fair amount
of followers and, therefore has a significant degree of influence in the
determination of state–religion relations. In spite of the apparent dominance of
Islam and Christianity in public relations, the syncretic nature of religion
among Nigerian tribes has paradoxically made TR a sort of melting pot, as
those who profess both Islamic and Christian faiths frequently patronize
traditional religious priests for spiritual rituals. Thus, in spite of the apparent
scorn of TR by Nigerian elites as a result of the modernizing influences of the
colonizing religions, TR continues to be furtively patronized by a great many
adherents of both Islam and Christianity and has therefore maintained its
relevance.
Pre-colonial state–religion relations among the disparate ethnic nationalities
that now form the geographical entity called Nigeria took various forms.
Whereas the traditional institutions of governance of some ethnic nationalities
were an amalgam of political and religious authority, religion and its
institutions were independent of political authority in some communities.
Also, the incongruous system of colonial administration in the different regions
allowed the Islamic caliphatorial system of governance in northern Nigeria to
continue uninterrupted, while imposing a Western secular system in the
southern part of the country. This administrative contrast reinforced the preexisting incompatibility in state–religion relations among the ethnic nationalities that were now integrated as one nation state. Ultimately, the cultural
divergence among the ethnic nationalities, which was reinforced by the colonial
policy of governance, bred a culture of sustained conflict and struggle for
superiority between religious and state institutions on one hand, and between
the various religious groups inter se.
Contemporary state–religion relations in Nigeria are characterized by illdefined boundaries. Whereas the Nigerian Constitution has declared freedom
of religion and apparently seeks to separate state affairs from the doctrinal
leanings of religion, the same constitution creates and recognizes executive and
judicial institutions with religious biases. Thus the existence of multiple judicial
systems based on secular, religious, and traditional jurisprudence, as well as
multiple educational systems based on secular and religious principles, only
serve the purpose of obfuscating the real character of the Nigerian state,
whether secular or religious. The security ramifications of this conceptual
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313
uncertainty mean that religion is often instrumentalized for political and
hubristic ends, thereby creating strong animosity among religious groups. This
is particularly so as the politicization of religion inevitably breeds premeditated
inequities in terms of resource allocation and other ramifications of patronage
by the dominant religious group(s).
The consequence of this dysfunctional configuration of state–religion
relations is the persistence of religiously induced conflicts in the country
since the early 1980s. The persistent struggle by Islamists in northern Nigeria
to establish sharia law and governance has been a consistent source of conflict;
hence radical and violent groups often take advantage of the predominant
deference to sharia law and governance among northern Muslims to orchestrate their clandestine motives. The Boko Haram’s campaign of terror in
northern Nigeria, which is ostensibly founded on an Islamization agenda,
demonstrates the ramifications of this challenge, as this group’s violent
activities have stretched the elasticity of national security and unity, thereby
calling into question the viability of the Nigerian state. This scenario
necessitates an enquiry into the real nature and character of the Nigerian
state in terms of its relationship with religion. In this regard, this article argues
that the contradictions propagated by the colonial administration in the
northern and southern regions before their eventual amalgamation in 1914 are
deeply implicated in the post-colonial character of state–religion relations. In
view of the destructive character of this current situation, the article advocates
the separation of state from religious affairs, without necessarily detracting
from the spiritual essence of religion in private life.
2. Pre-colonial Religious Influences on Governance Among the
Ethnic Nationalities in Nigeria
Prior to British colonial incursion into the disparate territories that are now
aggregated as Nigeria, the various ethnic nationalities within these territories
had their respective systems of social organization and religious beliefs.
Although religion and politics were dominant features of life in the traditional
settings of the different ethnic nationalities,2 there were some communities
where religion and politics were autonomous. In view of the variety of ethnic
nationalities in Nigeria,3 reference can be made to the pre-colonial religious
practices among three most populous ethnic groups in the country (the HausaFulani, Yoruba, and Igbo) which existed in the pre-independence geographical
arrangements (northern and southern Nigeria) before they were amalgamated
in 1914. An analysis of religious influences on communal politics/governance in
these pre-colonial societies as well as the transformation of state–religion
2
Raymond Ogunade, ‘African Religion in Democracy’ in Monotony Adam K arap Chepkwony and Peter MJ
Hess (eds), Human Views on God: Variety Not Monotony (Moi University Press 2010) 63–70, 63.
3
For a cursory background on Nigeria’s ethnic groups and languages, see O Otite, Nigeria’s Identifiable
Ethnic Groups <http://www.onlinenigeria.com/tribes/tribes.asp>; another comprehensive list of 371 ethnic
nationalities is available at <http://www.nigerianelitesforum.com/ng/my-nigeria/1060-nigerian-languages-tribesand-ethnic-groups.html> all accessed 23 February 2012.
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relations among them will show how their respective historical developments
influenced contemporary state–religion relations.
A. State–Religion Relations in Pre-Colonial Hausa-Fulani Societies
For a clear understanding of the nature and character of state–religion relations
among the Hausa-Fulani ethnic nationality, a cursory consideration of its
transformation is useful. ‘Hausa’ was a term originally used to describe the
Hausa-speaking peoples of northern Nigeria (consisting of the Habe and
Maguzawa). The Hausas were traditionally organized into seven large,
centralized states—Biram, Daura, Kano, Katsina, Gobir, Rano, and Zazzau
or Zaria.4 These states were ruled by independent emirs, yet there were close
political and cultural ties among them.
In 1810, however, the Fulbe-speaking nomadic tribe, popularly called Fulani,
invaded the Hausa states, under the leadership of Uthman dan Fodio, and
established an Islamic central authority under the Sokoto caliphate.5 The
caliphate was an amalgam of 15 states called emirates, each headed by a ruling
dynasty of Fulani origin. The Fulani rulers of the Hausa states progressively
adopted the sedentary life, language, and other customs of the Habe people
whom they subdued, partly through intermarriage.6 Thus the term ‘Hausa’ is
now normally used to refer to the original Habe population, the sedentary
Fulbe-speaking people, the Tuareg or Kanuri of the old Kanem Borno Empire,
and most other tribes of northern Nigeria who have adopted the Hausa
language and culture as well as Islam.
Before the traditional Hausa communities were captured by Uthman dan
Fodio’s Islamic jihad in the 19th century, both Islam and TR flourished in
Hausa societies, although the former had an edge over the latter due to its
universality.7 The nature of traditional Hausa religion was spirit- and familycentred.8 The spirits formed hierarchies of good and evil, while sacrificial
offerings and spirit possession were prominent characteristics of the worship.
Diviners and shamans exercised significant influence over the family worship,
although this influence was localized at the family level.9
In terms of general administration, the emirs in the respective states were
responsible for local politics and foreign relations. Administration was
hierarchically organized, from the family (Gida) which was the lowest level,
to the emirate, at the apex of political authority. Communal leadership began
from the family head (Mai Gida) to the ward head (Mai Ungwa) to the village
head (Sarkin Gari) before crystalizing up to the emir, who was the ultimate
repository of administrative and judicial authority. The emir often appointed
state officials such as the Waziri, the Sarkin Yaki (Chief of the Army and War),
4
Toyin Falola and others, History of Nigeria 1: Nigeria Before 1800 AD (Longman Publishers 1989) 51;
Hausa Society <http://lucy.ukc.ac.uk/ethnoatlas/hmar/cult_dir/culture.7844> (accessed 18 March 2011).
5
Toyin Falola and others, History of Nigeria 2: Nigeria in the Nineteenth Century (Longman Publishers 1991)
8–10.
6
Hausa Society (n 4).
7
Falola and others (n 5) 2.
8
Frank A Salamone, ‘Hausa Concepts of Masculinity and the Yan Daudu’ (2007) 1(1) Journal of Men,
Masculinities and Spirituality 45–54, 49.
9
ibid.
Religion and the Nigerian State
315
the Sarkin Ruwa (Chief or Minister of Water Resources), or Magaji to assist in
the execution of these functions10; religion, however, remained a personal
endeavour.
The surrender to dan Fodio’s jihad and the subsequent establishment of the
Islamic caliphate, however, changed the complexion of state–religion relations
in Hausa communities. From the pre-caliphate notion of religion as an activity,
essentially within the family and personal realm, Islam became a state religion.
The Sultan of the Sokoto, who superintended the 15 emirates of the caliphate
also served as the caliph, a position that encompassed both political and
religious authority. Based on the British fiction that northern Nigeria was
mainly Islamic, the colonial government’s system of ‘indirect rule’ relied heavily
on the Hausa-Fulani political cum religious establishment to maintain control
of northern Nigeria.11 Thus, by political design, the British authorities not only
protected the existing marriage between the state and religion, they prevented
the disturbance of the status quo by prohibiting missionary proselytization in
these areas. Islam, therefore, was not only strengthened during British
colonialism in these areas; it was made an organ of the state.
B. State–Religion Relations in Pre-Colonial Yoruba Communities
Religion was a critical element of pre-colonial Yoruba politics; in fact, political
activities derived their source and legitimacy from religion. There is unanimity
among all oral traditions regarding the foundation of Yoruba social organization
that Ife is the traditional home and centre of dispersal of the Yoruba people.12
Accordingly, the complexion of state–religion relations in Ife and its sister
Kingdom of Oyo would be used to represent all Yoruba kingdoms, which are
indeed similar in composition and character. In pre-colonial Yoruba land, the
King (Oba), or in the case of Ife and Oyo specifically, the Ooni and Alaafin
respectively, was the chief executive, in whom was reposed both religious and
political authority.13 The traditional authority in Yorubaland was perceived as
divinely ordained and, therefore, was revered by its subjects. According to Afe,
‘Kings in Yorubaland were regarded as the divine representatives of the gods on
earth . . . . They were often credited with various kinds of supernatural powers,
including that of clairvoyance.’14
The political organization of the old Oyo Empire was analogous to that of
Ife, where the King (Alaafin) personified political and religious authority.
Falola and others have aptly described this political complexity:
. . . the Alaafin combined spiritual and temporal powers in his office. In his spiritual
capacity, the Alaafin was seen by his subjects as the companion of the gods. As far as
10
Hausa Society (n 4).
Salamone (n 8) 48.
Falola and others (n 4) 58.
13
See generally, Samuel Johnson, The History of The Yorubas: From the Earliest Times to The Beginning of the
British Protectorate (Lowe and Brydone Printers Limited 1960); Adedayo Emmanuel Afe, ‘Chieftaincy Institution
and Traditional Taboo in South-Western Nigeria: Review Article’ (1999) 1(1) Current Journal of Social Science
Research 6–9 and Adedayo Emmanuel Afe and Ibitayo Oluwasola Adubuola, ‘The Travails of Kingship
Institution in Yorubaland: a Case Study of Isinkan in Akureland’ (2009) NEBULA: A Journal of
Multidisciplinary Scholarship 114–32.
14
ibid 7.
11
12
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temporal powers were concerned, he exercised political control over central
administration; designated administrative officers reported to him as well as owed
him allegiance in exercising powers over provincial matters. But whilst in theory,
the Alaafin’s power was absolute because he was Ekeji Orisa, that is to say the
companion of the gods and owner of the land, in practice, the Alaafin was
circumscribed by a system of checks and balances which greatly limited his influence
and power.15
Generally, therefore, kings in Yorubaland, were to be accorded utmost
reverence by the people whose perception was that doing otherwise was
acting contrary to demands of traditions, which could incur punishment from
the gods’.16 In this theocratic monarchy then, reverence attached to the Oba’s
authority not because of his temporal standing but due to the spiritual
endowment, which put him beyond ordinary mortals. Religion was, therefore, a
cornerstone of Yoruba politics.
C. State–Religion Relations in Pre-Colonial Igbo Communities
Politically and socially, the traditional Igbo society had no centralized form of
government,17 except in kingdoms such as those of the Nri, Arochukwu,
Agbor, and Onitsha.18 The Igbo society was segmentary, as various social units
based on kinship existed.19 Socio-political organization among the Igbo people
was stratified into several independent but interrelated kinship layers, from the
family to the extended family, lineage, village, and the clan levels, constituting
the lowest to the highest socio-political unit. The elders at all the identified
levels of government played a prominent role as the holders of authority,
though they did not act alone.20 At all levels, government was largely
republican and democratic, as all adult males, or in exceptional situations some
females, took active part in the decision-making process.21
The Igbo communities presented a paradox of a sort, in terms of
community–religion relations. Whereas the people were highly religious,
politics in Igboland was not completely dominated by religious bias, although
religion played an important role in communal relations. The Igbo are, and
have always been, a profoundly religious people who believe in a supreme
creator, known as Chukwu. According to oral traditions, Chukwu created the
visible universe (uwa)22 and everything in it, but dwells in the sky with a host
of powerful divinities and primordial beings.23 Whereas Chukwu is seen as the
supreme deity and ultimate beneficiary of sacrifices, there are a host of
15
Falola and others (n 4) 62.
OB Olaoba, in Afe and Adubuola (n 13) 117.
Chinewe MA Nwoye, ‘Igbo Cultural and Political Worldview: An Insider’s Perspective’ (2011) 3(9)
International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology 306.
18
Suzanne Miers and Richard Roberts (eds), The End of Slavery in Africa (University of Wisconsin Press
1988) 437.
19
Falola and others (n 4) 87.
20
ibid 88.
21
ibid.
22
Katherine Slattery and Leon Litvack, ‘Religion and the Igbo People’, Queen’s University Belfast <http://
www.qub.ac.uk/> accessed 9 April 2014.
23
Nwoye (n 17) 307.
16
17
Religion and the Nigerian State
317
subordinate gods, which represent him on earth and are worshipped by men.
These gods or spirits are known as Alusi, alternatively known as Arusi or Arushi
(depending on dialect).24 They include, among others, Ala (the earth-goddess,
the spirit of fertility of man and the productivity of the land), Igwe (the skygod), Imo miri (the spirit of the river), Mbatuku (the spirit of wealth), Agwo (a
spirit envious of other’s wealth), Aha njuku or Ifejioku (the yam spirit), Ikoro
(the drum spirit), and Ekwu (the hearth spirit, which is woman’s domestic
spirit).25
These minor divinities were worshipped at the level of the family, as there
existed variations in the choices of deities among families. The role of the
diviners was to interpret the wishes of the Alusi, while the role of the priest was
to placate them with sacrifices.26 The priests of the various divinities enjoyed
enormous respect in the communities;27 they were important political men
since they acted as final arbiters in cases through the use of traditional oath
taking. They were also in charge of oracles, whose declarations were final in
certain disputes.28 In spite of the respect accorded to religion and the diviners/
priests, the priests enjoyed no superiority in communal decision making, as
they were just a part of the political complex. Thus, in terms of the relationship
between politics and religion, the Igbo society differed significantly from the
Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba societies, as religion and its personalities were merely
accorded some privileges and respect in the decision-making process. Though
relevant to social organization in Igboland, religion was dominant at the family
level due to the diversity in worship and subscription to diverse minor
divinities.
3. Post-Colonial Nature of State–Religion Relations
As British colonialism came to its twilight, it was recognized that ‘a functioning
Nigerian state – one that incorporated both the Muslim north and the
Christian and animist south – would have to be of a secular character’.29 The
independence constitution made Nigeria a regional parliamentary democracy,
with a ceremonial president and a prime minister who was the head of
government. There were three regions (northern, eastern, and western) and the
Federal Capital Territory.30 The regions were led by their respective premiers
and had their laws and constitutions, distinct from the federal laws and
constitution.31 By virtue of this regional configuration, the allegiance and
loyalty of politicians and public servants were to their respective regional
24
Patrick Vinton Kirch (ed), ‘Islands Societies: Archeological Approaches to Evolution and Transformation’
(illustrated edn) (1986) CUP Archive 71.
25
Litvack (n 22).
26
ibid.
27
Falola and others (n 4) 86.
28
ibid 89.
29
David McCormack, ‘An African Vortex: Islamism in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2005) Center for Security
Policy Occasional Paper Series No 4 <http://www.offnews.info/downloads/Af_Vortex.pdf> accessed 1 April 2014.
30
See s 3 (1–5) of the 1960 Constitution.
31
See s 5 of the 1960 Constitution.
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Oxford Journal of Law and Religion
governments and premiers as opposed to the federal (central) government.32
This situation had negative implications for the development of common
national consciousness as it reinforced regional differences, including religious
diversity. The northern region particularly championed a policy of regionalism,
which was essentially aimed at weakening the centre and strengthening the
regions, the objective of which was to promote peculiar regional tendencies,
particularly adherence to Islamic law. In spite of the relative regional autonomy,
the legal system was unified and cast in a constitutional framework which gave
pre-eminence to the secular legal order, while subjecting all other laws to the
unified control of the secular federal Supreme Court and, ultimately, the
Crown.
Accordingly, the judicial structure that was adopted during the amalgamation of the northern and southern protectorates in 1914 was retained with
modification. There was a Federal Supreme Court, which was presided over by
a Chief Justice of the Federation, while each region (then northern, eastern,
and western regions) had a high court presided over by a Chief Justice. Appeals
from each of the high courts of the regions went to the Federal Supreme
Court, while appeals from Magistrate Courts, Customary or Native Courts
Grade A went to the regional high courts. Although customary law was still
applicable in secular courts, its legitimacy was contingent upon the validity test
established by the Native Courts Proclamation of 1900.33 Islamic law was
considered as customary law,34 by which standard it had to pass the validity
test before being recognized by the secular courts. Similarly, although a Sharia
Court of Appeal was established for the northern region, by Section 112 of the
1960 Constitution, appeals from the Sharia Court of Appeal lay before the
Federal Supreme Court—which was a secular court, established under Section
104 of the Constitution. In terms of the sources of Nigerian law, the common
law of England, the doctrines of equity, and the statutes of general application,
applicable to Nigeria before 1900, were to be administered in the courts in so
far as local circumstances permitted. Thus three sources of law were applicable
in Nigeria courts—English law, customary law, and sharia law—although sharia
law was considered by the British as part of customary law.35
Following the colonial legacy reviewed above, the predominantly Christian
and animist south (comprising the eastern and western regions) had little
problem embracing the secular character of the state, since that was the
32
See, among others, Okwudibia Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria (PACREP 2008) 198–224; Ekanade
Olumide and Tinuola Ekanade, ‘The First Republic and the Interface of Ethnicity and Resource Allocation in
Nigeria’s First Republic’ (2011) 2(22) Afro Asian Journal of Social Sciences 3–5.
33
By the provisions of s 14 (3) of the Evidence Act, customary law could only be validated if it was in
accordance with natural justice, equity, and good conscience; this was in addition to its non-violation of the
provisions of any existing statute law. See the cases of Lewis v Bankole (1908) 1 NLR 81; Edet v Essien (1932)11
NLR 47 where this principle was espoused.
34
By virtue of the Native Courts Proclamation of 1900, the colonial government considered Islamic courts
as being on par with customary courts and said ‘these courts are to administer native law and custom prevailing
in the area of jurisdiction and might award any type of punishment recognized thereby except mutilation, torture,
or any other which is repugnant to natural justice and humanity’. See also Cyprian Okechukwu Okonkwo and
Michael E Naish, Criminal Law in Nigeria (Spectrum Publishers 1990) 5.
35
On the colonial legal system and its tripartite sources, see among others, Kharisu Sufiyan Chukkol, Law of
Crimes (Ahmadu Bello University Press Ltd 1988) 10–11; Philip Ostien, ‘The Sharia Penal Codes’ in Philip
Ostien (ed), Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria 1999–2006, a Source Book (Spectrum Books Limited
2007).
Religion and the Nigerian State
319
political legacy bequeathed to them by the colonial administration. On the
other hand, the contradictions inherent in the very nature of Islamic law and
political theory36 predictably generated serious resistance from northern
Muslims, who saw secularity and secular institutions as atheistic and against
the very foundation of Islam. Although the conflict between Islamic legal and
political values and the Western colonial principles was tolerated by the
northern establishment under colonialism, these contradictions became
relevant shortly after independence. As noted by a northern scholar, ‘When
we were hopeless because of foreign domination, we tolerated the supremacy of
unIslamic laws, but we are now the masters of our destiny.’37 Thus
independence for Nigeria came with a serious burden of defining the
relationship between religion and politics, as the northern Muslims continued
their search for an Islamic identity through the realization of a full Islamic
state.
The conflict between Islamic and secular law in northern Nigeria was in
place before independence. The colonial native courts in the region, which
were in most cases presided over by Alkalis (local judges who applied Islamic
law), had their decisions sometimes quashed on appeal to the regional high
courts on the basis of repugnancy.38 For instance, under the Maliki school of
Islamic jurisprudence, an accused person is prohibited from pleading provocation, either as a defence or in mitigation of the offence of murder or
homicide; hence the death penalty [qisas] is applicable, on the demand of the
heirs of blood, where the accused caused the death of the deceased by any
hostile assault, however intrinsically unlikely to kill or wound and no matter
how extreme the provocation.39 In accordance with this principle of Islamic
penal law, the accused person in Tsofo Gubba v Gwandu Native Authority40 was
convicted of intentional homicide and sentenced to death by the emir of
Gwandu’s court (applying Islamic law), although, had the accused been tried
on the same facts in the English courts (applying the Criminal Code), he
would only have been convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to a term of
imprisonment due to his plea of provocation. Before the West Africa Court of
Appeal, the conviction was quashed and the sentence set aside. In the opinion
of the court, whenever a native court tries any person for any offence defined in
the Criminal Code, it is bound to follow the Code to the exclusion of Islamic
law or native law and custom. Similarly, in Maizabo v Sokoto Native Authority41
it was held that though a native court had power to try a case under native law
and custom—Islamic law then considered as native law, it could not impose a
36
It is argued that in Islamic political theory ‘, . . . the State is subordinate to sharia, and it is sharia which
lays down the general norms and functions of a State and all the public institutions of the State.’ See S Kumo,
The Organization and Procedure of Sharia Courts in Northern Nigeria (PhD thesis, SOAS London 1972) 41.
37
Quoted in Matthew Hassan Kukah, Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria (Spectrum Books
Limited 1993) 120.
38
See the validity test in n 33.
39
Ostien (n 35).
40
(1947) 12 WACA 141.
41
(1957) NRNLR 133. See also Kano Native Authority v Fagoji (1957) NRNLR 57 and Tsamiya v Bauchi
Native Authority (1957) NRNCR 73, where inconsistencies between Islamic penal law and statute (English law)
were resolved in favour of the later.
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sentence higher than what the accused would have received had his case been
tried under the provisions of the criminal code.
The nullification of Islamic courts’ (native courts’) judgments by secular
courts, therefore portrayed the emirs, who administered Islamic law in these
courts, as powerless, consequently depicting Islamic law as subservient to
secular or British law and justice.42 The establishment of a Muslim Court of
Appeal in 1956 was therefore aimed at pacifying the northern emirs and
thereby quelling the resistance that the subordination of Islamic law to Western
secular law generated. This was followed by the establishment of a Sharia
Court of Appeal for the Northern Region on Nigeria’s Independence Day (1
October 1960). Thus the British bequeathed to a unified Nigeria a seemingly
secular system of government, albeit with deeply segmented religious cleavages,
reflected in its institutional configuration. Nonetheless, all post-independence
regimes in Nigeria have striven to enforce the country’s secular character in the
face of serious constraints from northern Islamists who have persistently wished
for an Islamic state.
Several factors underlie the resistance of northern Muslims to secularism
after independence. First, dan Fodio’s jihad, which brought about the
caliphate, was anchored on the establishment of an Islamic state based on
sharia. Clearly therefore, Islam was a state religion in the Hausa-Fulani states
that were subsumed under the caliphate, after dan Fodio’s jihad. As noted
earlier, the British colonialists themselves sought to protect this political and
legal order for reasons of imperial convenience, until it became obvious that an
Islamic legal order would not serve the commercial interest of Western
merchants, particularly after independence. Unfortunately for Britain, its
change of mind at the twilight of colonialism was too little too late, as the
sudden introduction of Western secularism introduced a contradiction that
would challenge the Islamic way of life and, therefore sow a seed of instability
in the new state. This is because Islam under sharia is conceived by Muslims as
an amalgam of political, religious, social, and economic life of Muslims, and
even more. An emergent secular regime that sought to separate religion from
state affairs was therefore problematic to the northern oligarchs, who were
accustomed to the fusion of political, economic, and spiritual roles under an
Islamic regime.
As demonstrated below, this contradiction is clearly and consistently asserted
by Nigerian Muslims in their quest for an Islamic political and legal order.
According to Olayiwola:
Islam does not admit a narrow view of religion by restricting it within the limits of
worship, specific rituals and spiritual beliefs. In its precise meaning, Islam is not only
a religion; it is also a way of life that regulates all the aspects of life on the scale of the
individual and the nation. Islam is a social order, philosophy of life, a system of
economic rules and government. Islam clearly establishes man’s duties and rights in
all relationships – a clear system of worship, civil rights, laws of marriage and divorce,
inheritance, code of behaviour, laws of economy, laws of governance, laws of war and
peace, of buying and selling and laws of relations and co-existence with one another,
42
See Kukah (n 37) 116; Ostien (n 35) 12.
Religion and the Nigerian State
321
parents, children, relatives, neighbours, guests, Muslims, non-Muslims and
brethren.43
In the same vein, Abikan, posits that:
A Christian for instance may be prepared, in the notion of giving to Caesar and God
what respectively belong to them, to limit his right to religious freedom to matters of
faith and worship only. A person from the West may also be contented with the
western compartmentalization of life into religious and temporal. . . . A Muslim on the
other hand would view religion as covering all the facets of life. This is because his
spiritual and moral worth is tested against his daily interaction with others at the
congregational prayers, in marital union, in the pursuit of his legitimate livelihood and
in the holding of public responsibilities, amongst others. To him, right to freedom of
religion would encompass aqÊdahwa al-ibādah (freedom of belief and worship), right
to live by Allah’s commandments (SharÊ‘ah) and (ámr bi al-ma‘rËfwa al-nahy ‘an almunkar) right to encourage good and forbid evil.44
It is this monolithic philosophy of Islam that has sustained the persistent
agitation by Nigerian Muslims especially those from the north, for sharia.
Second, northern Muslims have had an obstinate adherence to the
traditional philosophy of power and leadership that existed in pre-independence caliphate, a philosophy that associated governance with rulership in the
traditional mould of the caliphatorial oligarchy. As stated earlier, the British
maintained the Fulani oligarchy that was created and led by dan Fodio’s
lineage. Accordingly, the transition from an Anglo-Fulani colonial northern
government to a modern democratic Nigeria based on egalitarianism came to
the northern oligarchy as a rude shock. This political jolt was essentially based
on a previous perception of power as an exclusive preserve of the emirs and the
nobles, as well as the reality of a new nation that sought to create a distinction
between political and religious authority. Consequently, when the new class of
northern oligarchs engaged in political activities, it did so within the limits of
the concept of power in Hausa society, a concept guided by a hierarchically
stratified society, with the emir at the top.45 This abrupt incorporation of less
noble individuals into governance on the one hand and the separation of
political from religious authority on the other was not well received by the
northern elite, and it still remains a contentious issue.
Given that the social organization of the caliphate recognized the fusion of
political and religious authority, the post-colonial Hausa-Fulani political elite
continued, albeit informally, to associate religion with politics in the new
political order, thereby creating an unhealthy tradition of politicizing religion
and instrumentalizing it for political mobilization. Under the new political
43
Abdur Rahman O Olayiwola, ‘Nationalism and Nation Building in Islam’ in Campbell Shittu Momoh
(ed), Religion and Nation Building: Nigerian Studies in Religious Tolerance, vol 1 (Centre for Black and African Arts
and Civilization, and National Association for Religious Tolerance 1988) 227.
44
AbdulQadir Ibrahim Abikan, ‘Constitutionality of Islamic Banking in Nigeria’ in M Musale and OO
Olatawura (eds), Contemporary Issues in Islamic Jurisprudence (Rawel Fortune Resources 2009) 94–121. See also
Is-hāq Lakin Akintola, ‘Introduction to Islam’ in Gbolade Aderibigbe and Deji Aiyegboyin (eds), Religion: Study
and Practice (Alamsek Press 1997) 138–55, where the opinion is also expressed that Islam as a way of life dictates
and governs the totality of life of Muslims from cradle to grave, and, therefore, Islam sanctions a relationship
between religion and politics.
45
Kukah (n 37) 6.
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dispensation, the Sardauna of Sokoto, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, a caliphatorial
prince, became the premier of the northern region, the de jure political leader
of northern Nigeria, while the Sultan of Sokoto remained the de facto leader of
the Muslim community in the north. This unorthodox arrangement, by
caliphatorial standards, created a gulf between the two personalities, as Islam
hitherto provided political legitimacy to the political leader in the caliphate. As
eloquently captured by Kukah, ‘although the Sardauna had now come to
preside over the political kingdom of dan Fodio, his biggest problem lay in the
fact that the real basis of the power, that is, the spiritual authority, had now
eluded him.’46
Realizing that the division between political and religious authority was cast
by modern politics, Sardauna, the political leader of northern Nigeria, sought
to establish himself as the religious leader of the region in order to consolidate
his legitimacy. This motivation led him into an ambitious Islamization
campaign in the region and beyond, he allied with the Arab Islamic world in
the process, attracting praise from that region as a champion of Islam and
drawing millions of dollars from there in support of the faith in Nigeria.47 Of
utmost concern to critics of Sardauna’s Islamization campaign was the use of
state funds for the support of Islam, by way of building mosques and schools,
granting educational scholarships, and dispensing patronage to new converts,
among others.
In addition, the Islamic faith became a source of political patronage. The
Northern People’s Congress, NPC (the political party that held power in the
north), was knit in the identity of Islam and Allah. For northern Nigerians,
therefore, attainment of political power as well as advancement in the Public
Service and the Military were intricately tied to Islam and association with the
faith.48 Although the Sardauna’s pan-Islamic campaign was cut short by the
1966 military coup—bringing to an abrupt end the first republic—the sharia
controversy survived him, and indeed heralded the second republic in a more
acrimonious atmosphere. This contradiction has remained the most challenging part of Nigeria’s political existence. Thus de jure, religion was separated
from politics, but de facto, it remained a veritable source of political legitimacy
in the north before the end of the first republic.
4. Between Secularity and Spirituality: Situating the
Nigerian State
A. What is Secularism?
Before determining whether Nigeria is a secular or spiritual state, it is useful to
unbundle the concept of secularity/secularism. The terms secularity and
secularism have undergone intense scrutiny by various scholars, institutions,
or groups seeking to conceptualize distinctions and impose definitions on the
46
ibid 20.
For a comprehensive exposé on Sardauna’s Islamization campaign, see among others, ibid 20–24;
McCormack, ‘An African Vortex: Islamism in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (n 29) above.
48
On these assertions, see Kukah (n 37) 21–23.
47
Religion and the Nigerian State
323
terms. Although scholars have established a distinction between secularity and
secularism, these concepts are commonly regarded as meaning the same thing:
political neutrality, freedom of religion, atheism, or irreligion. The English
word ‘secular’ derives from to the Latin saeculo, referring to parish priests who
were ‘in the world’ (in saeculo), as opposed to the monks who withdrew to a
cloister.49 The contemporary use of the term in English is credited to the
British philosopher, George Holyoake, who first used ‘secularism’ in 1851 to
describe his views of promoting a social order separate from religion, without
actively dismissing or criticizing religious belief.50 Barry Kosmin outlines the
etymological development of the concept:
The terms ‘secular,’ ‘secularism,’ and ‘secularization’ have a range of meanings. The
words derive from the Latin, saeculum, which means both this age and this world, and
combines a spatial sense and a temporal sense. In the Middle Ages, secular referred
to priests who worked out in the world of local parishes, as opposed to priests who
took vows of poverty and secluded themselves in monastic communities. These latter
priests were called ‘religious.’ During the Reformation, secularization denoted the
seizure of Catholic ecclesiastical properties by the state and their conversion to nonreligious use. In all of these instances, the secular indicates a distancing from the
sacred, the eternal, and the otherworldly. In the centuries that followed the secular
began to separate itself from religious authority.51
In contemporary sociological ‘secularity’ refers to individuals and their social
and psychological characteristics while ‘secularism’ refers to the realm of social
institutions. Secularity involves individual actors’ personal behaviour and
identification with secular ideas and traditions as a mode of consciousness.
Secularism, on the other hand involves organizations and legal constructs that
reflect the institutional expressions of the secular in a nation’s political realm
and public life.52 Thus the secularity continuum ranges from liberal religionism
to deism to agnosticism to atheism, while the degree of secularism depends on
the level of institutional expression of secular sentiment in a nation’s political
and public realms.
In terms of typologies, the soft and hard (correspondingly moderate and
strict) variants of secularity and secularism have been identified.53 This
distinction relates to attitudes towards modes of separation of the secular from
the religious and the resulting relationship between them. Kosmin used the
historical divergence between the French and American revolutions to
construct the theoretical divergence between soft and hard secularism.
49
National Secular Society, ‘Secularism: What Does it Mean Exactly’ <http://www.secularism.org.uk/
whatissecularism.html> accessed 25 February 2012. Contrast this with Tom Boyd, who contended that monks
who lived entirely within the community were known as regulars (later, ‘religious’) while those who were obliged
to stay outside of the community overnight or for extended periods became known as seculars; see Tom W Boyd,
‘Secularism in America and Turkey and Fethullah Gulen’s Response’ <http://fethullahgulenconference.
org/oklahoma/read.php?p=secularism-in-america-and-turkey-fethullah-gulen-response> accessed 25 February
2012.
50
George J Holyoake, The Origin and Nature of Secularism (Watts and Co 1896) 51.
51
Barry A Kosmin, ‘Contemporary Secularity and Secularism’ in Barry A Kosmin and Ariela Keysar (eds),
Secularism & Secularity: Contemporary International Perspectives (Institute for the Study of Secularism in Society
and Culture 2007). Electronic copy available at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/17142803/Secularism-SecularityContemporary-International-Perspectives> accessed 26 April 2013.
52
ibid 6–9.
53
ibid 5–7.
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According to him, the French revolution, which was anchored on a joint
struggle against despotism, religion, the monarchy, and the Roman Catholic
Church (ie the French Jacobin tradition), was unreservedly antagonistic to
religion and therefore promoted atheism.54 This tradition, which epitomizes
hard secularity/secularism, is predicated on Max Weber’s ‘transformation of
consciousness’ as popularized by other philosophers.55 This atheistic ideological viewpoint was leveraged by the former USSR and today’s remaining
communist countries to infuse secularization at the social and political levels of
their societies, the objective of which was to assault and eradicate religion using
the state apparatus to bring about a thorough and consistently hard secular
society.56
Contrary to the French Jacobin tradition, the American Revolution was
anchored on the Protestant heritage of the Reformation, whereby religious
individualism and autonomy predated any concept of political autonomy;
hence Americans adopted a more moderate approach, characterized by
indifference towards religion or encouragement of religious pluralism as
promoted by the deists and liberal Protestants of the early republic.57
Kosmin describes a soft secularist of the American creed as one who is
. . . neither a convinced Atheist nor a principled materialist, and may not be hostile to
religious beliefs and institutions. In fact, the majority are liberal religionists. The soft
secularist is willing to take a live-and- let-live attitude toward religion as long as it
doesn’t impinge on his freedom of choice or seek control of American public
institutions. For the soft secularist, religion is properly a private lifestyle option, which
must not threaten liberty and social harmony in a differentiated and pluralistic
society.58
From the theoretical construction of soft secularism described above, it is
discernable that the legal and constitutional safeguards of soft or moderate
secularism are dual-pronged. On the one hand, such safeguards ensure the
right to be free from religious rule and teachings, the right to freedom from
governmental imposition of religion upon the people in a multi-religious state
and secure insulation of human activities and political decisions/actions from
biased religious influences. On the other hand, soft secularism safeguards
guarantee the right to freedom of worship and religion to all persons, both
leaders and the led, thereby protecting the rights of religious minorities. Such a
soft secularism, therefore, seeks to significantly reduce religious influence in
public life, while at the same time guaranteeing freedom of religion and
conscience to individuals and groups in the private realm.
A nation state could therefore adopt the hard (strict) variant of secularism or
the soft (moderate) form. Hard secularism in its contemporary form is
associated with the French laı̈cité, which denotes the strict absence of religious
54
ibid 2.
Hobbes, for example, claimed that those who followed the light of reason are bound to discard faith as
intellectually unreliable and therefore morally dangerous while Marx suggested that faith was an ideology in
contradistinction to knowledge, which was used by regimes for the purpose of political control. See Kosmin
(n 51) 6.
56
See Kosmin (n 51) 6–9.
57
ibid 3.
58
ibid 7.
55
Religion and the Nigerian State
325
involvement in government affairs as well as absence of government involvement in religious affairs.59 In its classical form, it abhors or prohibits the use
and display of religious symbols in public institutions, while religious references
are generally considered out of place in mainstream politics and vice versa.
Laik is the Turkish model of hard secularism, modelled after the French
laı̈cité.60 The soft (moderate) variant of secularism practised in most liberal
democracies attempts to separate government affairs from religious dogmas
while divesting religious leaders of authority over political decisions.
Nevertheless, in such systems religious symbols and connotations are
commonly used in public institutions, while religious beliefs are widely
considered a relevant part of the political discourse in many of these countries.
This is true of the United States, for instance, where religious sentiments are
brought to bear on issues of abortion, euthanasia, same-sex marriage, etc.
Similarly, religious indications like ‘In God We Trust’ are engraved on the
currency; ‘one nation under God’ is a part of their Pledge of Allegiance, while
the Bible has remained the book upon which most public officials may swear
their intention to perform their duties.61 It has been argued that these practices
all illustrate the willingness of the American secular order to allow an
institutional intimacy with the sacred order.62
As we shall see later, the colonial intention was to bequeath to Nigeria a
moderate secular state; yet the historical religious sectarianism, occasioned by
intense politicization of religion, has deeply implicated the state in religious
patronage, thereby creating a contradiction as to the true character of state–
religion relation. Thus even the soft or moderate conception of secularism is
vehemently opposed by religious organizations as a threat to spirituality and a
gradual recession to atheism. Accordingly, a middle-of-the-road approach
which seeks the limited integration of religion into the public realm (what I
refer to as moderate or concessional secularism63) is hereby suggested as the most
appropriate strategy.64
B. Is Nigeria a Secular State?
Anyone saying Nigeria is a secular nation does not understand the meaning of the
word secular. There is nothing secular about the Nigerian nation since whatever we
do will always put Islam and Christianity in the fore front.
—Alh Sa’ad Abubakar; Sultan of Sokoto and leader of the
Islamic community in Nigeria, 2011
59
René Rémond , Religion and Society in Modern Europe (Antonia Nevill tr, Blackwell Publishers 1999).
Yilmaz Aliefendioglu, ‘Laiklik ve Laik Devlet [Secularism and Secularist Government]’ in Ibrahim O
Kaboglu (ed), Laiklik ve Demokrasi [Secularism and Democracy] (2001) 74, 75–76.
61
See Boyd (n 49) NP.
62
See Kosmin (n 51) 10.
63
I call it concessional secularity because, since strict adherence to secularity is unattainable, religious
stakeholders ought to make concessions on their strict adherence to religious tenets by agreeing that religion
would play no part in political decision making. This would, however, be without prejudice to the right of
worship and reverence to the respective religious doctrines.
64
See Ahmet T Kuru, ‘Fethullah Gulen’s Search for a Middle Way Between Modernity and Muslim
Tradition’ in M Hakan Yavuz and John L Esposito (eds), Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Global Impact of
Fethullah Gulen Nur Movement (Syracuse University Press 2003); Danoye Oguntola-Laguda, ‘Religion and
Politics in a Pluralistic Society: The Nigerian Experience’ (2008) 2(2) Politics and Religion 123–33.
60
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Nigeria is a secular nation. Somebody said it’s a multi-religious nation. It’s a secular
nation. . . . Ours is a secular nation. That’s what our constitution stands for.
—Bishop Ayo Oritsejafor, President Christian Association of
Nigeria, July, 2011
The statements above demonstrate the divergent perspectives on secularism by
the two dominant religious communities in Nigeria. On the one hand, the
Nigerian Christian community, particularly its leadership, has consistently held
the view that the divine state has universally given way to the secular state,
where the temporal (secular) ruler enjoys full autonomy as ruler with no
control from religious or spiritual authorities.65 A statement by Archbishop
Olubunmi Okogie, the Catholic Bishop of Lagos Diocese, represents the
Chrisitan community’s perception on the relationship between the state and
religion: ‘When you are in a position of trust, forget about your religion
because it is a private affair between you and your God. If you want to bring
religion in, let it be after office hours.’66 On the other hand, northern Muslims
have consistently maintained a hostile view of secularism since independence,
describing the concept as atheism or irreligion, a perception consistently
expressed whenever reference is made to Nigeria as a secular state. The
Jamma’atu Nasril Islam (JNI) (Society for the Victory of Islam) for example,
argued that ‘secularism is a system of social teachings or organisation which
allows no part of religion’, while Sheik Abubakar Gummi, the late pillar of
Islamic activism in Nigeria, said ‘a secular State is an atheistic State.’ Another
Muslim intellectual, Ibrahim Suleiman, argued that ‘secularism is hostile to
Islam. It seeks to undermine Islamic values, supplant the Islamic laws with
those of its own and deface the sanctity of the Muslim society.’67 With this
divergent view of secularism by the two dominant religious groups, it was
only a matter of time before the contradictions inherent in the
seemingly secular Nigerian state bequeathed by the British colonialists would
manifest themselves.
To situate Nigeria’s locus on the secular–non-secular spectrum, the relevant
provisions of the constitution and other applicable laws are examined in
contrast with the attributes of secularism. Afterwards, an evaluation of these
laws is made against the de facto relationship between religion and the state.
This analysis attempts to isolate what ought to be from what is the actual
relationship between religion and the Nigerian state. The starting point,
therefore, is to identify the characteristics of secularism in a constitutional
democracy. Wing and Varol exhaustively circumscribed the attributes of
secularism in the following passage:
First, in secular regimes, sovereignty belongs to the nation and not to a divine
body . . .. Second, religion is separate from the State in a secular government. Religion
does not affect the government’s affairs, meaning that laws and regulations are not
based on religion. Third, a secular government is neutral towards all religions. As
65
66
67
Kukah (n 37) 228.
Quoted in ibid.
On all the quotations in this paragraph, see Kukah (n 37) 228–29.
Religion and the Nigerian State
327
such, the regime cannot have an official religion and does not protect one religion
over another. Likewise, all individuals, irrespective of their religion, are equal before
the law. Fourth, a secular regime requires the education and the legal systems to be
secular. The legal system does not contain laws based on religion, and the education
system is based on logic and science, not religion or dogmas. Fifth, a secular
government requires freedom of religion and conscience. Thus, secularism does not
mean the absence of religion from society. Individuals are free to exercise their
religions and manifest their religious beliefs in both the private and the public sphere.
Finally, a secular regime is based on pluralism, which requires the government’s
respect for all religions and religious beliefs.68
Granted that the Turkish state, upon which Wing and Varol constructed
their analysis, is regarded as a hard or strict secular state, the characteristics
they identified represent the barest minimum professed by all secular states, be
they strict or moderate. On the basis of these characteristics, therefore, the
following queries are appropriate: Where does sovereignty reside in Nigeria—in
the state or in a divine body? To what extent are Nigerian laws insulated from
religious dogmas? Is the Nigerian state neutral and fair in its dealings with all
religions? Are Nigerian legal and educational systems independent of religious
dogmas? Does the Nigerian constitution guarantee freedom of religion and
conscience? Does the Nigerian state adhere to the principle of religious
pluralism (respect for all religions)?
First, Section 14 (1) (a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria 1999 (1999 Constitution) provides that ‘sovereignty belongs to the
people of Nigeria from whom government through this constitution derives all
its powers and authority.’ The import of this provision is that whereas
sovereignty resides in the state, the state in itself derives its sovereignty
ultimately from the peoples who had collectively yielded sovereignty to the state
via the constitution. The state is therefore sovereign to the extent that the
constitution permits. Consequently, Nigerians being a multi-religious people
would not have conceded to the state the right to govern them on the basis of a
particular religious creed. This logic rationalizes the provision of Section 10 of
the 1999 Constitution which says: ‘[T]he Government of the Federation or of
a State shall not adopt any religion as State Religion’, thus ensuring the
absence of a State religion. It has been argued that the significance of this
provision is that no aspect of governance, federal or state, should be run
according to the exclusive dogmas or jurisprudence of any religion.69
Second, Section 38 (1) of the 1999 Constitution provides that ‘every person
shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom (either alone or in
community with others, and in public or in private) to manifest and propagate
his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance.’ Nigeria can
therefore be referred to as a multi-religious state where freedom of worship and
conscience is constitutionally guaranteed. It is doubtful, however, whether
68
AK Wing and OO Varol, ‘Is Secularism Possible In A Majority-Muslim Country?: The Turkish Example’
(2007) 42(1) Texas International Law Journal 5 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1130262p.6> accessed 15 April 2012;
see also Aliefendioglu (n 60) 75–76.
69
Jude Ezeanokwasa, ‘Islamic Banking, CBN, Secularity and Unity of Nigeria’ (2011) <http://www.
nigeriavillagesquare.com/guest/islamic-banking-cbn-secularity-and-unity-of-nigeria.html> accessed 21 July 2011.
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Nigeria’s educational system is secular, as both the law and practice concerning
education are unclear on issues of secularism in religious instructions. Section
38 (2) of the 1999 Constitution provides that ‘[N]o person attending any place
of education shall be required to receive religious instruction or to take part in
or attend any religious ceremony or observance if such instruction ceremony or
observance relates to a religion other than his own, or religion not approved by
his parent or guardian.’ Similarly, subsection 3 says ‘[N]o religious community
or denomination shall be prevented from providing religious instruction for
pupils of that community or denomination in any place of education
maintained wholly by that community or denomination.’ The implication of
these provisions is that, whereas all religious groups or communities have the
legal right to wholly own educational institutions and provide religious
instructions to pupils/students of that community based on their faith, any
pupil/student of the community or another who professes a religion other than
the one recognized and provided by that institution, shall not be compelled to
take the said religious instructions provided by the institution.
In practice, the Nigerian Federal and States’ Ministries of Education have all
provided similar non-faith-based guidelines for the establishment of primary
and secondary schools.70 Nonetheless, religious organizations do establish
private schools which are run in accordance with their respective religious
dogmas. In many instances, pupils in such institutions who profess faiths other
than those recognized and instructed are not afforded the opportunity of
receiving instructions in their religions. For instance, Christian children who
attend Islamiya schools are sometimes denied the opportunity of receiving
Christian religious instruction, while Muslim pupils attending Christian schools
are sometimes denied the right of receiving Islamic religious instructions, in
violation of the constitution. In addition, by virtue of the introduction of
Islamic law in some northern states of Nigeria, all girls attending public schools
in those states are required to wear the hijab scarf. In some cases also,
admission into schools owned by religious organizations or societies is
restricted to pupils of the recognized faith. For example, the Covenant
University Ota, an institution owned and run by a renowned Pentecostal
fellowship, Living Faith Chapel, was embroiled in controversy over its refusal to
admit a Muslim student who met all the admission criteria.71
In most cases, parents who question the legitimacy of such actions by
religious school authorities are asked to withdraw their children or wards. The
major incentive for this development is that such religious schools are situated
in predominantly religious communities; hence open confrontation with the
school authorities over such perceived violation of right to freedom of religion
and conscience could generate religious violence capable of undermining the
70
Guidelines for the establishment and regulation of tertiary institutions like Polytechnics, Colleges of
Education and Universities in Nigeria are provided by the National Board for Technical Education (NBTE)—a
parastatal under the Federal Ministry of Education, National Commission for Colleges of Education and
National Universities Commission, which have invariably provided non-religious guidelines for the establishment
of Universities respectively. All have liberal non-religious regulatory rules and guidelines.
71
Omobolaji Omoyele, ‘Broken Covenant - Bishop Oyedepo’s University Denies Student Admission Because
He’s a Muslim’ The Premier (26 February 2013) 5(4), <http://www.thepremiernewsonline.com/articlereader.
aspx?newsid=gdefbdcgagbhccihfa> accessed 18 April 2013.
Religion and the Nigerian State
329
welfare of the pupils or parents in question. Unfortunately, the common,
though fallacious, presumption in Nigeria is that putting children in religious
schools where opposing religious instructions are given is voluntary; hence
parents who willingly do so are deemed to have volunteered to expose their
children or wards to such religious instructions. In view of such environmental
and cultural constraints, most parents who for any reason decide to put their
children or wards in such schools, forbear to complain against such practices or
even trigger judicial intervention in aid of the situation. Although any
courageous challenge to such constitutional violation stands the prospect of
favourable judicial determination, the potential consequences of legal actions
are thought by parents to outweigh the benefits; hence, to date, there has been
no known legal challenge or judicial determination of any legal challenge to
such practices.72 Ultimately, parents and their children who find themselves in
such situations live in forbearance of religious oppression. As a student of
Covenant University Ota aptly described his situation, ‘I’m a Muslim and my
roommate is a Muslim. I know some Muslim students who go into hiding
before they pray . . ..’73
Third, the sources of law under the Nigeria legal system are three-pronged.
The system recognizes the English law—composed of the common law of
England, the doctrines of equity, and the statutes of general application in force
before the 1st day of January 1900– in addition to the customary laws of the
constituent ethnic nationalities74 and Islamic law75 as the sources of Nigerian
law. This system is given constitutional validity under Section 6 (2 & 3) of the
constitution, which vests judicial powers on the Federal and State courts
created by the constitution. Section 6(5) creates the Sharia Court of Appeal of
the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja; Sharia Court of Appeal of a State; the
Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja; and
Customary Court of Appeal of a State, among others, as the courts vested with
judicial powers.76 These courts have been established by several sections of the
constitution77 and have been practically institutionalized. In addition, the
renaissance of sharia in some northern States since the year 2000 has seen the
adoption of full sharia law in at least 12 northern states, although it runs
concurrently with the secular English law. These states include Zamfara,
Bauchi, Kebbi, Jigawa, Sokoto, Kaduna, Kano, Niger, Borno, Gombe, Katsina,
and Yobe.78
72
Mr Taiwo Salami, the father of the lad denied admission in Covenant University, has vowed to sue the
university over the alleged violation of his son’s constitutional rights.
73
See Omoyele (n 71).
74
See Akintunde Olusegun Obilade, The Nigerian Legal System (Sweet and Maxwell 1979) 3–4.
75
Before now, Islamic law was categorized as part of customary law by virtue of the Native Courts
Proclamation 1900. However, it is now recognized as a distinct source of law. See Elliot Alexander Keay and Sam
Scruton Anderson, The Native and Customary Courts of Nigeria (Sweet and Maxwell 1966) 22.
76
Historically, the Sharia Court of Appeal was created in the northern region of Nigeria on the 1st day of
October 1960, see Keay and Anderson, ibid 75.
77
See ss 244–261 for the Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) ss 275–279 for the
Sharia Court of Appeal of the States, ss 265–269 for the Customary Court of Appeal for the FCT, and ss
280–284 for the Customary Court of Appeal for the States respectively.
78
On the legality or otherwise of sharia implementation in Nigeria, see among others, Ostien (n 35); Philip
Ostien, Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria 1999-2006: A Sourcebook-Ulama Institutions (Spectrum Books
Limited 2011).
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Fourth, there are laws establishing religious institutions which are wholly
funded by government. The Muslim National HAJJ Commission of Nigeria is
established by law and funded from the Federation Account.79 By Sections 3
and 9 of the Act, members of the Commission are appointed by the president
and remunerated by the federal government. Similarly, the secretary and staff
of the Commission are remunerated by the federal government and also enjoy
all privileges available to public servants. By Section 12 of the NAHCON Act,
the Commission prepares and submits its budget for pilgrimage to Saudi
Arabia directly to the president for funding. In the same vein, the Nigeria
Christian Pilgrims Commission is established by an Act of the National
Assembly.80 The Christian Pilgrims Commission Establishment Act has similar
provisions and functions with its Muslim counterpart—except for that fact that
it addresses the Christian faith—and also obtains its funding from the federal
government.
Government sponsorship of pilgrims, which was initiated during military
rule, is sustained under the present democratic dispensation. In spite of its
endurance, the practice has recently come under intense scrutiny from Civil
Society Organizations (CSOs), the media, and adherents of religious groups
other than Christianity and Islam. Among other reasons, critics contend that
the substantial amount of public funds used on this unconstitutional
endeavour, the lack of transparency in the process of selecting beneficiaries,
and its general abuse as a tool of political patronage and loyalty by senior
politicians, among other reasons, have completely obliterated the religious
essence of the practice and rendered it a tool of class and political conflict.81
Whereas opposition against state sponsorship of pilgrimage has endured, none
of its critics has so far approached the courts for judicial determination of its
constitutionality or legality; hence the practice has continued in spite of the
president’s indication that government may soon stop the sponsorship of
pilgrims. In any case, a presidential directive for the discontinuance of this
practice may likely meet with opposition from some state governors, who may
exercise their constitutional autonomy to defy such directive.
In view of the current political reality, it would be extremely difficult to
eliminate government sponsorship of pilgrimage. In spite of the president’s
expression of intent to discontinue the practice, the political imperatives heavily
weigh against such action. This is because the practice has become a tool for
political patronage, as state governors and federal politicians use the opportunity to reward party men and women in the hope of solidifying their political
bases. As aptly represented by one commentator, state sponsorship of
pilgrimage is a tool for political parties and governments in power at all
levels to reward their cronies.82 Furthermore, the practice creates opportunity
79
See the National HAJJ Commission of Nigeria (NAHCON) Establishment Act, 2006.
The Nigerian Christian Pilgrims Commission (Establishment) Act, 2007.
On these dissenting opinions, See among other sources ‘Government Sponsorship of Pilgrimages’ Sun
News (8 May 2012) <http://archive2.sunnewsonline.com/webpages/opinion/editorial/2012/may/08/editorial-0805-2012-001.html> accessed 22 April 2013; Idumange John, ‘Nigeria: Abolish State Sponsorship of Pilgrimages’
Sahara Reporters (2 February 2010) <http://mobile.saharareporters.com/article/nigeria-abolish-state-sponsorshippilgrimages> accessed 22 April 2013.
82
Government sponsorship of pilgrimages . . . (n 87).
80
81
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for rent-seeking among politicians and senior public servants who exploit the
impervious process of administration at the various pilgrim boards, for personal
aggrandizement. This opportunism is effectuated by inflating the cost of travel
fares and other logistics as well as travel allowances. Most significantly, the
practice has generated a huge bureaucracy at the state and federal levels, which
benefits from state sponsorship of pilgrimage. This bureaucratic force would
resist any effort at reversing the status quo. Under these circumstances, only a
judicial declaration of unconstitutionality or illegality would suffice to dismantle state sponsorship of pilgrimages.
Fifth, legislative activity in the National Assembly and its outcomes
demonstrate a strong deference to religious bias. For instance, the recent
attempt by the senate to enact a law legalizing prostitution was condemned by
legislators who cited religious reasons to delegitimize it.83 In the same vein,
some Nigerian laws are laden with religious substance. The Penal Code Act,
which is modelled after the Sudan Criminal Code, has significant sharia
flavour,84 while the enactment of laws like ‘Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition)
Act 2006’ were influenced by religious arguments. The English law, therefore,
runs concurrently with customary and Islamic laws, and there is a strong
religious influence on the Nigerian legal system generally. One can therefore
assert that Nigeria falls short of the characteristic of secularity which requires
laws devoid of religious bias.
The preceding analysis provides an informed platform for assessing Nigeria’s
neutrality and religious pluralism in its official dealings. As one commentator
has observed concerning Nigeria’s respect for religious inclusiveness ‘Muslim
and Christian holidays are observed. Nobody respects the wishes of traditionalists. Politicians want power to rotate between Christians and Muslims as if
every Nigerian must be either a Muslim or a Christian. Pilgrimages are
sponsored by the State.’85 In addition, there is an unofficial tradition of making
Christian and Muslim prayers at every official and state function in disregard to
animists and other religious adherents. The Presidential State House has a
church and mosque in it, while states’ government houses have either churches
or mosques, depending on the religious predominance of a religion in the state.
The sponsored pilgrimages are for Christians and Muslims; no one gives a
thought about traditional religious adherents. One can argue, therefore, that
whereas religious pluralism is guaranteed in the constitution, the religious
neutrality requisite for characterizing a state as secular is obviously lacking in
Nigeria. All of which urges the question: Is Nigeria a secular state?
From the analytical depiction of state adherence to secular ideals made
above, it would be difficult to answer the question in the affirmative; yet to say
Nigeria is not secular also would be a fundamentally flawed conclusion.
83
Prostitution Bill: ‘We will reject it -Hon. Yusuf Galambi’ Sunday Tribune (9 October 2011).
The Penal Code regulates criminal proceedings in the Muslim dominated northern part of Nigeria. ss 387
and 388 thereof, prohibits adultery while canning, which is a sharia mode of punishment is also recognized.
These provisions are absent from the Criminal Code Act which regulates criminal proceedings in the Christian
dominated southern part of Nigeria.
85
Dialogue on Re: ‘Sultan: Nigeria Not a Secular State-Sultan’ Sun News Online (25 August 2011),
excerpted at <http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/forum/main-square/65131-sultan-nigeria-not-secular-state.
html> accessed 29 September 2011.
84
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Whereas the constitution demonstrates a genuine intention to separate the state
and its institutions from religious doctrines, the religious character of the
people—which has attained cultural synthesis—makes it extremely difficult to
avoid reference to religion in the public sphere. Moreover, the predominance of
military regimes in the country, which ruled with characteristic absolutism and
autocracy, precluded any critique of this aberration, as is the case with many
other public issues. In spite of religious influences on Nigeria’s laws,
government patronage of the two dominant religions, the trifurcation of the
legal system and other imperfections identified above, the essential aim of the
Nigerian state, as depicted by the constitution, is to conduct government
business in a manner that is devoid of religious dictates. Indeed, the ambiguous
character of states in respect of their suitability to secularity is universal;
Nigeria is not an exception. To that extent, Nigeria may be classified as a
moderately secular or soft secular state, since there is a clear constitutional
intent to separate official from religious affairs.
Of course, no state possesses the entire array or absolute attributes of
secularism.86 Although Nigeria’s prohibition of a state religion, its constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion and conscience, as well as the
prohibition of discrimination on the ground of religion by the constitution
are not sufficient to warrant its characterization as a hard secular state, yet the
deficits identified above also do not warrant a description of the country as
non-secular. Although some commentators have argued that Nigeria is a multireligious state as opposed to a secular one,87 secularism and multi-religiosity
are not necessarily antonymous,88 nor is religiosity antithetical to secularism.
France and Turkey, which exemplify strict secularism, are multi-religious
nations with many pious people, yet religion is kept out of government and its
institutions.
Neither does secularism mean irreligion or disregard of the sacred as some
have attempted to assert. Consistent with the Muslim perspective on
secularism discussed above, one commentator concluded that ‘a nation is
secular only if it is ‘‘concerned with temporal, worldly matters’’ to the exclusion
of ‘‘religion’’; or ‘‘the profane’’ in disregard of ‘‘the sacred’’.’89 In this view,
Nigeria is not a secular state, to the extent that it is concerned with both
‘temporal’ and ‘religious’ matters.90 This is the general illogic that pervades
Islamic literature on secularism in Nigeria. In reality, secularism does not
detract from religious devotion; instead, it reinforces it. This is because a
secular state guarantees freedom of religion and conscience, thereby enabling
all religious adherents to practise their faiths uninhibitedly. Turkish citizens are
predominantly Muslim, yet the Turkish state is a hard secular state.
It is true that many nations with deeply entrenched Euro-Christian traditions
lay claim to secularism, in spite of the overt influence of religious traditions on
their public lives. In the United States, for instance, religious references are
86
See Wing and Varol (n 68) 11.
L Abdulraheem, ‘Is Nigeria a Secular or Multi-religious Nation?’ National Mirror.
M Adamu, ‘Secularism, State and Religion’ Peoples Daily (21 July 2011).
89
Adamu (ibid) defined the word ‘secular’ to mean: ‘concerned with temporal, worldly matters’ to the
exclusion of ‘religion’; or ‘the profane’ in disregard of ‘the sacred’.
90
ibid.
87
88
Religion and the Nigerian State
333
copiously imbued in national functions and symbols. It is common for
example, to hear the US President say ‘God bless America’ at the conclusion of
an address to the nation. As mentioned earlier, the American currency bears
the slogan ‘In God We Trust’; US government officials and Supreme Court
justices take oaths of office while placing their hands on the Bible or other holy
book; the Pledge of Allegiance refers to ‘one nation under God’; while some
Justices of the Supreme Court attend the ‘Red Mass’ annually before the first
day the Court is in session.91 Yet the United States is said to be a secular State.
In England, where there is still an established church, the secularism that has
emerged clearly rejects the church’s total authority over society and its
collective institutions.92 Until 1985, Catholicism was the recognized state
religion in Italy, and public life is heavily influenced by Catholic traditions and
personalities; yet, the Italian State asserts its secular nature. To assert that
these states’ claims to secularism are founded on their temporal or worldly
form of existence would be grossly incorrect. It would be more accurate to
describe such secularism as ‘the separation of the state from the dogmas and
personalities of the church’.
Ultimately, therefore, it is safe to assert that Nigeria is a moderately secular
or soft secular state, as there is ample constitutional evidence of an
unambiguous intention to separate state affairs from religious creeds.
Whereas successive military dictatorships either aided or condoned the
illegitimate influence of religion on state matters, the gradual entrenchment
of democracy and the rule of law should, and has, indeed marked the erosion
of these religious vestiges from the domain of governance. Recently, the
Stephen Oronsaye Committee on cessation of sponsorship of pilgrimages
recommended that the federal government should stop sponsorship of both
Christian and Muslim pilgrimages, to Jerusalem, Israel, Mecca, and Saudi
Arabia.93 President Goodluck Jonathan has himself suggested that the
government may stop the sponsorship of pilgrimage in the near future.
These developments not only present evidence of separation between state and
religious activity; they represent the beginning of the end of religious influence
on public affairs.
5. Implications of State–Religion Relations on National Security
The blurred relationship between religion and the Nigerian state has negatively
impacted national security since Nigeria’s independence in 1960. However, for
a proper understanding of these implications, the explication of the concept of
‘national security’ in the Nigerian context is imperative. Globally, security has
transformed from the orthodox or state-centric viewpoint that prevailed prior
to and during the bipolar era, to the contemporary human security viewpoint
which focuses on the individual as the primary referent of security analysis.94
91
See Wing and Varol (n 68) 7.
On this perspective see David Voas and Abby Day, ‘Secularity in Great Britain’ in Kosmin and Keysar
(n 51).
93
Sun Newspapers (8 May 2012) 1.
94
See among others, Harold Brown, Thinking About National Security (Westview Press 1983); Barry Buzan,
Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rienner Publishers 1998);
92
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The current view on national security envisions protection or safety from a
wide variety of existential threats such as hunger, violation of human rights,
crime and criminality, political instability and conflict, poverty, and environmental degradation.
From this premise, national security is defined to reflect the ability of a
state to protect its citizens from these multiple threats. National security can
therefore be defined as freedom from danger or absence of threats to the
multidimensional elements that may affect the nation’s ability to protect and
develop itself, promote its cherished values and national interests, and
promote and increase the wellbeing of its peoples. Invariably, the Nigerian
notion of national security denotes ‘the aggregate of the security interests of
all individuals, communities, ethnic groups and political entities’.95 It is in
this sense that that the ‘Nigerian Defence Policy’ identifies Nigeria’s national
security interests as including strengthening the Federal Republic of Nigeria,
advancing her interest and objectives, containing instability, controlling crime,
eliminating corruption, enhancing development, progress and growth, and
improving the quality of life of every citizen.96 Accordingly, any act that has
the potential to trigger instability and conflict, thereby undermining the
development of Nigeria and weakening its co-operate existence, negates its
national security objectives. It is in this light that the implication of the
current state–religion relationship is examined.
Since independence, religion has remained Nigeria’s Achilles’ heel.
As demonstrated in the analysis of the various pre-colonial nationalities in
Section 2 above, religion was in that time a source of political legitimacy. This
tradition was dominant in the Hausa-Fulani caliphate, where Islam had
established a tradition of governance which guaranteed a union between
politics and religion. Consequently, like Sardauna in the First Republic, all
post-independence northern political elites have consistently striven to keep
religion within the corridors of power for purposes of political legitimacy on the
one hand and of religious sanctity on the other. This development has led to a
culture of ‘religious politicization’, a tradition that has engendered sectarianism and engendered political divisiveness between the two dominant
religious communities.
Although it was significantly active in the First Republic, the instrumentalization of religion for political objectives was taken to its climax in the build-up
to the Second Republic, through the secular/sharia debates at the Constitution
Drafting Committee (CDC) and the Constituent Assembly (CA) in
1976–1978.97 Bola Ige, a member of the CDC and CA, captured succinctly
the controversy that raged at the CDC over the purported secularism or
otherwise of the Nigerian state: ‘It was suggested that the phrase ‘‘Nigeria is a
C Thomas, ‘Introduction’ in Carolyn Thomas and Peter Wilkin (eds), Globalization, Human Security and the
African Experience (Lynne Rienner 1999) and David A Baldwin, ‘The Concept of Security’ (1997) Review of
International Studies 23, 5–26.
95
Olusegun Obasanjo, Grand Strategy for National Security (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2001) 1.
96
ibid 2; Federal Republic of Nigeria, National Defence Policy (Federal Ministry of Defence 2006).
97
The CDC and CA were two bodies set up by the then military regime to prepare a constitution that
would herald the return to civil rule.
Religion and the Nigerian State
335
secular state’’ be inserted in the constitution. Immediately our Muslim
colleagues heard this, they raised objection, saying a secular state is a godless
state. In spite of the hot debate members of the CDC had on this, the word
‘‘secular’’ had to be deleted.’98 This debate was to be a harbinger of the
spurious sharia debate that followed in the CA in 1978. The bone of
contention was the proposed establishment of a Federal Sharia Court of
Appeal by the Muslims, a move that was fervidly resisted by non-Muslim
delegates who saw it as creating a parallel judicial system for Nigeria, against
the spirit of secularism bequeathed to the country by the British.99
The debate was inconclusive due to the tension it generated and the lack of
consensus among members. In the end, the military government decided to
give states the liberty to establish ‘State Sharia Courts of Appeal’ as opposed to
a ‘Federal Sharia Court of Appeal’ which was sought by the Muslim north. In
spite of its inconclusive nature, the sharia debate was significant in two material
respects: one, it reinforced the politicization of religion, as both sides of the
divide adopted pseudo-religious populism to impress their followers; two, it
either introduced or reinforced religious acrimony in politics; a development
that has remained a significant indicator of political alignments and policy
configuration. As noted by Kukah,100 the sharia debate at the CA was part of
the political landscape for the Second Republic, as various groups and
individuals engaged in pre-CA manoeuvring and strategic positioning, using
Islam and Christianity as bases. While rationalizing this contention in respect
of the Muslim north, Alhaji Balarabe Musa, the former Governor of Kaduna
State argued that:
In the face of the new political programme, the ruling class had no foothold or any
solid base for political competition as a block with the rest of the country. In view of
this political bankruptcy, it became clear that Islam would offer the only alternative
for the protection of their class interest. But even this was not an easy card to play.
The Muslim north no longer existed, but all the same, it was clear that to seek to
defend it would enhance their position. So they held on to the issue of sharia in the
Assembly as their only weapon for mobilisation in the north.101
As the sharia question consistently rears its head in the Nigerian polity, its
costs for the nation are damning. Sharia-motivated violence has become the
nation’s prime security challenge. The issue has transcended its extant utility
for the ruling elite to become an existential obsession for most urban and rustic
northern Muslims. The consequence of the search for a pristine Islamic state
has taken its toll on the security of the people, as innocent lives are lost and an
incalculable degree of destruction is done to property and the nation’s social
capital. There is an unprecedented proliferation of militant Islamic movements
in the northern part of the country, which are intent on forcing the
establishment of an Islamic state. The most vicious of these movements is
the Boko Haram sect, which killed an estimated 10,000 Nigerians between
98
Bola Ige, ‘Religious Freedom and the Nigerian Constitution’, quoted in Kukah (n 37) 228.
For a comprehensive reading of the spurious sharia debate at the CA, see Proceedings of the Constituent
Assembly. Official Report Vol 1 (Federal Ministry of Information 1978).
100
Kukah (n 37) 120.
101
Quoted in Kukah (n 37) 121.
99
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2002 and 2013, and 1500 in the first three months of 2014 alone, as well as
dozens of Nigerians and foreigners and has caused untold damage to property,
in apparent pursuit of an Islamic republic. The mayhem unleashed by this sect
has made Nigeria an unsafe destination for business and leisure, and in
November 2013 the United States categorized the sect as a terrorist
organization—a move that could further threaten Nigeria’s interests. The
activities of these Islamic puritans have almost rendered the government
impotent, as both Nigerians and foreigners no longer have confidence in the
state’s ability to provide security. This situation ultimately threatens the
viability of the Nigerian state as calls for secession or disintegration have
bourgeoned amidst the Boko Haram challenge. Ultimately, therefore, the entire
gamut of Nigeria’s professed security interests identified above has been
compromised by religious extremism and violence, which is induced by the
blurred relationship between religion and the state.
6. The Need for a Secular Paradigm
The analysis above reveals that, though opposition to secularism is ostensibly
founded on its apparent anti-religiosity, the concept does not necessarily
connote agnosticism or atheism. Instead, the cultural basis of religion as a
fulcrum for political mobilization has been exploited by politicians to portray
secularism as promoting atheism and moral degeneracy. This perception has
served to degrade the utility of secularism while reinforcing an unholy
matrimony between religion and politics at the expense of national security.
In view of Nigeria’s extant multi-religiosity, and having advertence to the
unsavoury inter-religious relations that are created by the blurred relationship
between religion and politics, subscription to concessional secularism is
strongly advocated. This suggestion is premised on the historical, religious,
political, and existential factors shown below, which have compromised
national security and thereby reinforced a transition to moderate secularism.
Nigerian politicians have historically leveraged religion and religious identity
to gain political advantages for themselves.102 The elite have used religion as a
tool of exploitation to achieve selfish socio-economic ends, while politically
deploying religious fanaticism and favouritism to polarize the people and
sustain unhealthy tension in the country.103 To date, public officials use public
funds as a tool for political patronage, thereby generating resentment and
outrage from rival religious groups.104 The Nigerian scenario is identical to that
of pre-Ataturk Turkey, where religious fundamentalism and its concomitant
culture of political opportunism led to the reforms that transformed a highly
spiritual state of Turkey to a strictly secular one. Secularism therefore acquired
constitutional status in Turkey by reason of the historical experience of
102
This view pervades the treatise of Kukah (n 37); especially at 121.
Oguntola-Laguda (n 64) 127–28.
Isaac Terwase Sampson, ‘Religious Violence in Nigeria: Causal Diagnoses and Strategic
Recommendations to the State and Religious Communities’ (2012) 12(1) African Journal on Conflict
Resolution 103–33, 122–23.
103
104
Religion and the Nigerian State
337
religious fundamentalism.105 Given Nigeria’s similar character of sectarianism,
secularism—albeit the moderate type—would serve as a guarantor of religious
tolerance and cultural convergence which are essential conditions for democracy and development.
On the other hand, the current divergence over the notion of secularity held
by Muslims and fundamentalist Christians creates confusion as to the true
character of the Nigerian state, a situation which requires clarification. Is
Nigeria a secular or non-secular (ie religious) state? If it is a secular state as the
Christians posit, what nature of secularism does it subscribe to? If it is a
religious state, what is the nature and extent of the role of religion and/or
religious leaders in state affairs? It would serve the purpose of political clarity if
Nigerians could define the character of the state and the role of religion and
religious dignitaries in it. If Nigeria subscribes to moderate secularism as
advocated in this article, then there is the need for a clear constitutional
definition of the attributes of this concept, a proper delineation of its scope and
extent, and, most significantly, a consensual home-grown designation or
appellation of the concept that is agreeable to all religious stakeholders without
derogating the essence and reverence attributed to their respective religions.
It can be gleaned from the constitutional provisions examined above that
there is an understanding, in principle, among all Nigerians that state affairs
should be separated from religious affairs. If the drafters of the constitution
intended otherwise, that should have been clearly captured in the constitution,
in view of the collective reverence that Nigerians hold for religion. The
problem with the word ‘secular’ is its Western-liberal origin and its association
with agnostic-reformists like Holyoake, which has created the old and nearly
universal sentiments against the concept among Christians and Muslims. But
most importantly, it is my view that the characterization of secularism as
anti-religiosity or atheism is a deliberate strategy of the religious power blocs,
calculated to sustain political loyalty through religious identity, a situation
which benefits them politically and economically. In view of the contemporary
universal acceptance of a separation between political and religious authority,
Nigeria requires some introspection about how it really wants the relationship
between the state and religion to be. If there is a convergence on separation, as
we assume here, then an autochthonous appellation may be required to define
such a political system and appropriately characterize its attributes, without
necessarily referring to it as secular.
In the meantime, this article takes the view that religion should be separated
from the public realm and encouraged in the private domain. The excessive
zeal with which Nigerians attend to religious rituals could be exploited
positively in building strong ethics and values that would serve as building
blocks for the transparency and not quite that are required for national
development. The individual internalization of religious values could also serve
to invoke the moral ethos of communalism requisite for evoking humanist
feelings, as opposed to the crass individualism that has taken centre stage in
105
Leyla Sahin v Turkey (Sahin I), No 44774/98, para 36 (ECtHR 29 June 2004) <http://cmiskp.echr.coe.
int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en> accessed 16 April 2011 (search by Application Number).
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our national life and consequently eroded our communal values. The universal
religious code of ‘respecting the sanctity of human life’ would also serve as a
restraint against the senseless killing that is often done in the name of religion.
My advocacy for a separation of state from religious affairs is predicated on
the fact that religious codes are based on inelastic doctrines which are
obviously not in harmony with the dynamism, pragmatism, and farsightedness
of contemporary statehood and the vicissitudes of governance. Whereas the
dynamism of contemporary governance requires foresight and balancing of
forces, religion is retrospective, paying premium to its fundamental ideals in
abhorrence of change. Moreover religion does not provide reliable grounds for
making policy designed for the entire populace.106 The foundation for decision
making is always based on morality or spiritual health of adherents; hence
religious decisions are almost if not entirely, emotive and parochial, considering
the common good of adherents only. This customary inclination to bias does
not provide a good platform for unity in a multi-religious or multi-cultural
society. In addition, religion has not generated the expected puritanical
disposition or abhorrence for sin (wrongful acts) among adherents, which
would have served as a basis for universal integrity in governance. It is a
historical fact that the unbridled corruption of religious institutions in the
Ottoman Empire in Turkey led to its eventual fall.107 Many have questioned
why Nigerians are highly religious yet unimaginably corrupt. This fact justifies
my assumption that religion in itself is not a guarantee of ethical conduct; its
patronage by politicians is, therefore a mere tool for propaganda and political
advantage. The natural demise of the sharia legal system in northern Nigeria as
well as the indulgence of some Boko Haram leaders in the use of exotic
technological articles and pornographic videos108 is indication that the real
motivation for the group’s fanaticism and violence is anything but sharia.
Similarly, the indiscriminate selection of urban and rural party men and
women, who have no business with the church or Christianity, for pilgrimage
to Jerusalem has nothing to do with spiritual edification but all to do with
political patronage.
I am not oblivious of the impediments that would challenge an attempt to
constitutionally designate Nigeria a moderate secular state, in view of the
vested interests that thrive on the present constitutional contraption. The
approach should therefore be gradual but sustained, with the long-term aim of
developing significant consciousness among Nigerians of the basic principles of
secularism and religious pluralism. This could be achieved through intellectual
development in the province of secularism and religious pluralism at three
levels: the local, school, and intellectual—with the intellectual level taking the
lead role. At the intellectual level, the establishment of an institute for religious
pluralism is advocated. This institute should be charged with the responsibility
of research and publication as well as advocacy in these fields of study. It
should also develop guided curricula for instruction at the school level
106
107
108
Express.
Boyd (n 49).
See Wing and Varo (n 68) 10.
See J Ajani, ‘Sex Films and Incriminating Documents Found in Boko Haram House’ African Herald
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(involving universities as well as secondary and primary schools). In the same
vein, the institute could develop the framework for advocacy at local levels
(composed of communities, faith-based organizations, political parties, etc).
Once sufficient awareness has been developed of the shared values of religion,
the desired values of religious pluralism, and the fundamental principles of
secularism, a constitutional recognition of secularism would be made easier. As
long as the religious adherents are largely ignorant or at most ill-informed
concerning what secularism represents, the religious power blocs would
continue to present their self-seeking conception of secularism, with the
clandestine aim of preserving the status quo which benefits them.