After Many Twists and Turns China's First Vertical Monopoly Agreement Dispute
has Ended---Comments on Rainbow v. Johnson & Johnson
Author
Promulgation Date
Ding Liang (DeHeng Law Office)
2013.08.05
Beijing Ruibang Yonghe Technology and Trade Co., Ltd. ("Rainbow"), with registered capital of
RMB 6.9 million, is a Beijing-based private enterprise that mainly engaged in the sale of medical
devices. Rainbow was a distributor selling Johnson & Johnson‟s Ethicon brand staplers and surgical
sutures.
Johnson & Johnson (Shanghai) Medical Equipment Co., Ltd., Johnson & Johnson (China) Medical
Equipment Co., Ltd. (hereinafter jointly referred to as "Johnson & Johnson") was founded in 1994
in Shanghai, and is a wholly foreign-owned enterprise of Johnson & Johnson. Johnson & Johnson
produces and sells medical devices, including Ethicon brand stapler and surgical suture.
In August 2010, Rainbow filed an anti-monopoly lawsuit to the Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate
People's Court (“Intermediate Court”), alleging that Johnson & Johnson set a minimum resale
price for surgical sutures in their distribution agreement, violating Article 14.2 of the
Anti-monopoly Law of China (“AML”). The hearing was conducted by Shanghai Intermediate
Court on February 3, 2012. On May 18, 2012, the Intermediate Court issued a judgment and
dismissed all Rainbow‟s claims.
Rainbow appealed, and the Shanghai Higher People's Court held three hearings on August 30, 2012,
October 30, 2012, and January 21, 2013. On August 1, 2013, the fifth anniversary of the AML, the
Shanghai Higher People's Court announced the final Judgment, overturned the Intermediate Court‟s
civil judgment, and ordered Johnson & Johnson to indemnify Rainbow‟s economic losses of RMB
530,000.
This is an antimonopoly agreement civil dispute triggered by the resale price maintenance (“RPM”).
The judgment was issued while the National Development and Reform Commission (“NDRC”)
was actively pursuing its own RPM investigations, and there were many twists and turns from the
first trial to the appeal. The Judgment on the RMP will have an impact on future disputes over
vertical monopoly agreement, and will provide guidance for enterprises on drafting the terms on
pricing in a distribution agreement. This article will compare the judgment of the Shanghai Higher
People's Court and the judgment of the Intermediate Court, combined with the NDRC RPM
investigation practice, to provide comments on the Rainbow v. Johnson & Johnson.
I. Background
Johnson & Johnson and Rainbow signed a distribution agreement (“Distribution Agreement”) on
January 2, 2008. The Distribution Agreement provides that Rainbow sells Johnson & Johnson‟s
Ethicon surgical suture in the area specified by Johnson & Johnson from January 1, 2008 to
December 25, 2008. The Annex to the Distribution Agreement stipulates that Rainbow shall not sell
Ethicon surgical suture at a price less than that stipulated by Johnson & Johnson. The Annex to the
Distribution Agreement also defines the distribution area of Rainbow.
In March 2008, Rainbow won a bid supplying surgical sutures to the People's Hospital by offering a
price less than the price stipulated by Johnson & Johnson in the Distribution Agreement. Johnson &
Johnson alleged that Rainbow breached the Distribution Agreement by selling surgical sutures
below the minimum resale price, and supplying surgical sutures beyond the defined distribution area.
On July 1, 2008 Johnson & Johnson sent a letter to Rainbow deducting its bond of RMB 20,000 and
terminating its distribution right in Beijing Fu Wai Hospital and Beijing Plastic Surgery Hospital.
On August 26, 2010, the Intermediate Court accepted the Complaint filed by Rainbow against
Johnson & Johnson re the dispute over vertical monopoly agreement. On February 3, 2012 the
Intermediate Court held a public hearing.
On May 18, 2012, the Intermediate Court held that a business operator shall assume civil liability
under Article 50 of the AML, if (1) it implemented the monopolistic conduct, (2) others suffered
losses therefrom; and (3) the monopolistic conduct and the losses have a causal relationship. Since
there is insufficient evidence to approve any of the above factors, the Intermediate Court dismissed
all Rainbow‟s claims.
In the appeal, the Shanghai Higher People's Court conducted detailed analysis on six major disputes,
and finally overturned the Intermediate Court‟s civil judgment and ordered Johnson & Johnson to
indemnify Rainbow economic losses of RMB 530,000. The six major disputes are as follows:
1. The Distribution Agreement was entered before and terminated after the implementation of the
AML. Is the AML applicable to this case?
2. Rainbow itself is a party of the Distribution Agreement and is a signing and implementing party
of the RPM. Does Rainbow have a standing to sue?
3. Whether “the effect of eliminating or restricting competition” is a necessary factor in
determining a monopoly agreement of the RPM under Article 14 of the AML?
4. If so, in a vertical monopoly agreement dispute, who bears the burden of proof to show the
agreement has an effect of eliminating or restricting competition?
5. Whether the RPM agreement in the case constitutes a monopoly agreement?
6. Whether the claims for damages of Rainbow should be granted?
II. The Distribution Agreement was Entered before and Terminated after the Implementation
of the AML. Is the AML Applicable to this Case?
Johnson & Johnson alleged that the Distribution Agreement was entered into and the action taken by
Johnson & Johnson against Rainbow re breach of contract before the implementation of the AML,
and there is no action taken by Johnson & Johnson afterwards. Therefore, Johnson & Johnson
believes the AML should not be applicable to this case.
The Shanghai Higher People‟s Court held that the AML was implemented on August 1, 2008. Even
though the Distributional Agreement was entered on January 2, 2008, but it was effective until
December 31, 2008. After the implementation of the AML, Johnson & Johnson did not terminate
the Distribution Agreement, but continued to perform the agreement with the distributor, and carried
out the accused monopolistic conduct. Therefore, the AML should be applicable to this case.
The significant of this case is that it interprets “entering into” monopoly agreements under the AML.
Article 3 of the AML provides, “monopolistic conduct in this Law shall include: (1) monopoly
agreements entered into between business operators.” Article 13 of the AML provides, “competing
business operators are prohibited from entering into the following agreements: …” Article 14 of
the AML provides, “business operators are prohibited from entering into the following monopoly
agreements with their trading counterparts: …” and Article 46 of the AML provides, “Where a
monopoly agreement has been entered into but has not been implemented, a fine of not more than
RMB500,000 may be imposed.” According to the literal interpretation, the AML emphasizes the
process of entering into a monopoly agreement, such as competitors repeatedly meeting to discuss
price increases. Whether the price actually increases, would then seems only related to the amount
of fines or damages.
We believe that the effect of eliminating and restricting competition can only be reflected during the
implementation of the monopoly agreement, therefore, the “entering into the following monopoly
agreements” should not be interpreted as only punishing the activity of “entering into” a monopoly
agreement. The Shanghai Higher People‟s Court's decision confirms the above understanding. This
suggests that the provisions restricting competition in a contract (such as a JV agreement) entered
into before the implementation of the AML may still need to be further scrutinized.
III. Rainbow itself is a party of the Distribution Agreement and is a signing and implementing
party of the RPM. Does Rainbow have a standing to sue?
Johnson & Johnson alleged that the Distribution Agreement was concluded and jointly
implemented by Rainbow and Johnson & Johnson. According to Article 1 of the AML, the aims of
the AML are to protect fair market competition, consumers‟ and public interests. It does not protect
the interests of the participants and implementers of the monopolistic conduct. Thus, competitors
and consumers who suffered from the monopolistic conduct have the standing to sue, but it does not
include the participants and implementers of the monopolistic conduct. Therefore, Rainbow has no
standing to sue.
The Shanghai Higher People‟s Court held that the parties to the monopoly agreement could be both
the participants and implementers of the monopolistic conduct and the victims of the monopoly
agreement. They would thus fall into the scope of the person who suffered losses under Article 50 of
the AML. If they were not allowed file civil lawsuits against the monopoly agreement, the parties
could not get remedies for their civil rights. In addition, only parties to the agreement know about
the content of the agreement, consumers usually do not. If parties of the monopoly agreement who
know the information and have the evidence to file antimonopoly lawsuit do not have standing, the
unlawful act of monopoly agreements will be hard to be investigated and punished.
We would like to emphasis that the victims of the vertical agreement may not always be the
distributors. In a “channel is the king” market, the distributor who controls the distribution channel
may have more negotiating power than suppliers. In this case, the suppliers may be the victims of
the vertical agreement. Thus, using words such as “participants”, “implementers” and “victims” in
the judgment is proper, and will leave the space for other kinds of anti-monopoly lawsuits in the
future.
IV. Whether “the Effect of Eliminating or Restricting Competition” is a Necessary Factor in
Determining a Monopoly Agreement of the RPM under Article 14 of the AML?
Johnson & Johnson alleged that only when the RPM has the effect of eliminating or restricting
competition can it constitute a monopoly agreement. Instead, Rainbow alleged that the RPM will
inevitably affect intra-brand competition and the RPM in a vertical agreement itself constitutes a
monopoly agreement.
In the first trial, the Intermediate Court held that Article 14 of AML prohibits business operators
“from entering into any of the following monopoly agreements with their trading parties: ...”
According to Article 13 (2) of the AML, “monopoly agreements referred to in this Law shall mean
the agreements or decisions to eliminate or restrict competition or other collaborative acts”.
Therefore, a monopoly agreement under Article 14 of AML cannot only be determined by whether a
RPM agreement has been entered into, but it is also necessary to consider Article 13 (2) of the AML,
to see whether such agreement has the effect of eliminating or restricting competition.
In the appeal, the Shanghai Higher People‟s Court stated, after going through the whole context of
AML, that there are four sentence patterns of the type “… referred to in this Law shall mean …” in
the AML. They are: Article 12, “business operators referred to in this Law shall mean…”; Article
12, “the relevant market referred to in this Law shall mean …”; Article 12, “monopoly
agreements referred to in this Law shall mean …”; and Article 17, “dominant market position
referred to in this Law shall mean …”. Obviously, these sentence patterns expressly define relevant
terms “in this Law”. Logically, these terms shall be applied to the whole context of the law, rather
than just one article. Thus, the definition of the monopoly agreements under Article 13 is also
applicable to the vertical agreement stipulated by Article 14.
Moreover, the Shanghai Higher People‟s Court stated, Article 7 of the Provisions of the Supreme
People’s Court on Several Issues Relating to Laws Applicable for Trial of Civil Dispute Cases
Arising from Monopolies (the “AML Judicial Interpretation”) provides: “where the monopolistic
conduct sued falls under any types of monopoly agreements prescribed in Items (1) through to (5) of
Paragraph 1 of Article 13 of the AML, the defendant concerned shall bear the burden of proof to
show that the relevant agreement has no effect of eliminating or restraining competition”. These
items cover horizontal agreements. Accordingly, horizontal agreements stipulated under Article 13
of AML shall be presumed to have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition and thus
constituting a monopoly agreement. This is probably because it is commonly believed that the effect
of restricting competition of a horizontal agreement is much stronger than a vertical agreement.
The Shanghai Higher People‟s Court„s analysis clarifies that the vertical RPM agreement itself does
not necessarily violate the AML – it is not a per se prohibition. The Court will take into
consideration of effect of the agreement, and whether it eliminates or restricts competition.
Therefore, if a distributor claims damages based on a signed and sealed RPM distribution agreement,
it may not be endorsed by the Court, unless the plaintiff can prove that the vertical agreement has a
stronger effect of eliminating or restricting competition than the any pro-competitive effect. This
needs to be demonstrated by economic experts.
The relevant comments by the Shanghai Higher People‟s Court highlighted four commonly used
terms in the AML: “business operators”, “the relevant market”, “monopoly agreements” and
“dominant market position”. These terms apply to the whole context of the AML, and they are very
likely to be the center of disputes in anti-monopoly lawsuits and anti-monopoly law enforcement in
the future.
V. In a vertical monopoly agreement dispute, who bears the burden of proof to show the
agreement has an effect of eliminating or restricting competition?
Article 7 of the AML Judicial Interpretation provides, “where the monopolistic conduct sued falls
under any types of monopoly agreements prescribed in Items (1) through to (5) of Paragraph 1 of
Article 13 of the AML, the defendant concerned shall bear the burden of proof to show that the
relevant agreement has no effect of eliminating or restraining competition” But the AML Judicial
Interpretation does not clarify the distribution of burden of proof in terms of circumstances
stipulated by Items (1) and (2) of Article 14 of the AML, which cover vertical agreements.
The Shanghai Higher People‟s Court held that the principle of conversion of burden of proof can
only be applied in a civil litigation when there is a clear stipulation by laws, regulations and judicial
interpretations. Because the current laws do not stipulate that the defendant shall bear the burden of
proof to show that the relevant agreement under Article 14 of the AML, the court should obey the
principle that “who makes claims shall bear the burden to prove its claims”. Thus the appellant must
prove that the RPM agreement has the effect of eliminating and restricting competition. The
principle of burden of proof that is applicable to horizontal agreements under Article 7 of the AML
Judicial Interpretation does not apply to vertical agreements. Therefore, the appellant should first
prove the existence of a RPM agreement, then provide evidence that the RPM agreement has the
effect of eliminating or restricting competition. This final evidence may include arguments that the
relevant market competition is not sufficient, the appellee has a very strong market position, the
appellee aims to restrict competition, and the RPM agreement has a negative influence on market
competition, etc. The appellee may of course present rebuttal evidence.
The reason why the AML Judicial Interpretation distinguish the burden of proof with respect to
“having an effect of eliminating or restricting competition” between the horizontal agreement and
vertical agreement is that according to rule of thumb, monopoly agreements prescribed in Items (1)
through to (5) of Paragraph 1 of Article 13 of the AML are very likely to have a strong
anti-competitive effect. There is no need for the plaintiff to prove it. However, in terms of vertical
agreements, such as the RPM, they have the possibility of promoting competition, so they should be
analyzed on a case-by-case basis.
VI. The Competition Analysis of a Vertical Monopoly Agreement
The economic analysis accounts for a large proportion in the judgment of the Shanghai Higher
People‟s Court. It is a good reference to enterprises involved in vertical monopoly agreement
lawsuits or investigations.
The High Court of Shanghai held that when analyzing the nature of the RPM, there are four prongs
that should be considered, and that constitute the basic method for the Shanghai Higher People‟s
Court to analyze and evaluate the RPM. They are:
1. whether the relevant market competition is sufficient;
2. whether the defendant has very strong market position;
3. the motive of the defendant to impose the RPM, and
4. the competition effect of the RPM.
1. Whether the Relevant Market Competition is Sufficient
The Shanghai Higher People‟s Court held that insufficient competition shall be the first prong to
determine if an RPM constitutes a monopoly agreement. Only when market competition is
insufficient does the court need to analyze the effect that the accused monopoly agreement has in the
next step.
In a market with sufficient competition, consumers have enough choice to buy products from
competing firms; while in a market without sufficient competition, because of lack of substitutable
products, not only do intra-brand products lose price competition, inter-brand products could also
come to a tacit understanding on pricing.
The Shanghai Higher People‟s Court held that to evaluate whether the relevant market competition
is sufficient, the court not only needs to consider market concentration, but also needs to consider
the substitutability of products-in-suit, the difficulty that potential competitors have for entering into
the relevant market, the competitive situation of the downstream market, and other factors affecting
the competitive situation of the relevant market.
In this case, the Shanghai Higher People‟s Court held: (1) the medical suture is a disposable medical
supply in surgery, the patients assume the expense, so hospitals are not very sensitive to the price of
the suture and as buyers their price competition motivation is weak. (2) there is high brand loyalty to
the suture. (3) Because China imposes strict restrictions on market access in the medical device
market, and brand loyalty has been formed, there are relatively high obstacles to entering into the
market. In sum, the Shanghai Higher People‟s Court held that competition in the medical suture
market is insufficient.
The analysis of sufficiency of the competition is in line with the Maotai, Wuliangye RPM
investigation case. In that case, although there are many kinds of liquors in the market, not every
liquor brand can participate in the market competition of high-end liquor. Because of the
consumer‟s preference to certain brands, it is hard for other liquor products to get access to the
high-end liquor market, and leads to insufficient competition in the high-end liquor market.
2. Whether the Defendant has a Strong Market Position
The Shanghai Higher People‟s Court held that enterprises implementing the RPM must have a
strong market position and to be able to affect market competition. The market position of an
enterprise can be evaluated by the interaction between an enterprise‟s pricing conduct and market
competition. An enterprise without a strong market position usually must adapt to the market, rather
than affecting the competition, let alone leading the market.
As to what level of competition is required for a “strong market position”, the Shanghai Higher
People‟s Court held that the market position of enterprises is reflected by their abilities to control
price. If a company has a strong ability to control price and an absolute advantage in pricing
negotiations with purchasers, then the company should be deemed as having a strong market
position to effect market competition.
The Shanghai Higher People‟s Court stated, (1) the actual market share in the relevant market
should be above the 20.4% estimated by Johnson & Johnson; (2) the price of suture products of
Johnson & Johnson remained the same for 15 years, and Johnson & Johnson has very strong control
on pricing in the relevant market; (3) Johnson & Johnson has brand influence and strong control
over its distributors. In sum, the Shanghai High People‟s Court held that Johnson & Johnson has a
strong market position in the relevant market.
We should emphasis the term "strong market position” used by the Shanghai Higher People‟s
Court. In the appeal, the attorneys for the plaintiff have questioned whether the requirement of
proving dominant market position will confuse the requirement of Article 14 with Article 17, which
stipulates the abuse of dominant market position. The Judgment of Shanghai Higher People‟s Court
gave a clear answer: to constitute a vertical monopoly agreement, it is not required to prove a
business operator holds market dominance, but just to prove such operator has a “strong market
position”. For example, the data provided by Johnson & Johnson showed that its market share was
around 20% (it didn‟t reach 50% which is the threshold to be presumed having dominant market
position), but Johnson & Johnson was deemed to have strong market position. We consider 20%
market share could be a reference for future cases.
3. The Motive of the Defendant to Impose the RPM
The Shanghai Higher People‟s Court held that if a company having a strong market position
imposes the RPM with the motive of restraining market competition, because of the advantage of its
financial strength, technological conditions and information, as well as strong control power over
the upstream and downstream market, the likelihood for the RPM to generate the effect of
restricting competition will be greatly increased. Therefore, the motive of imposing the RPM should
be a vital factor judging whether the conduct will restrain competition.
The Shanghai Higher People‟s Court held that the following evidence clearly reflected that the
competitive strategy of Johnson & Johnson was to avoid price competition in the suture product
market:
(1) the relevant provisions under the Distribution Agreement and its annexes
1.
According to Clause 2 of Annex 5 of the Distribution Agreement, distributors were obligated
to help Johnson & Johnson to maintain the market price system, and any forms of malicious
bidding were prohibited.
2.
According to Annex 7a “practical appraisal system of excellent distributors” provides that
being, “unable to cope with price-down pressure and thus causing price decreases, or, due to
other errors in work, causing damage to the price system” belong to the situation where the
distributors should be penalized because of failing to “effectively control the price system”.
(2) The evidence re the management of distribution activities of Johnson & Johnson
3.
In “Action plan of 2004”, regarding the sale of “purse suture” to the hospital, Johnson &
Johnson proposed that the distributors should establish a good relationship with most doctors,
in order to eliminate the negative factors of Ethicon‟s price. The Shanghai Higher People‟s
Court expressed the view that Johnson & Johnson, with the uncompetitive price of its suture
products, would rather maintain price through maintaining customer relationship
In practice, many enterprises maintain resale price out of many different considerations, and there
may be corresponding evidence to justify such arrangements. In this case however, the court found
that Johnson & Johnson‟ motive is to maintain a normal price system and avoid price competition,
which is also the original motive of many other enterprises to establish an anticompetitive RPM.
4. The Effect of the RPM on Competition
The Shanghai Higher People‟s Court held that RPM may promote competition as well as restricting
competition. On the one hand, markets have self-healing capabilities; and some effects of restricting
competition may soon be corrected by the market. On the other hand, some effects of restricting
competition will be offset by other effects of promoting competition. Thus, only if the effect of
restricting competition can‟t be overcame and offset should the RPM agreement be deemed as a
monopoly agreement.
The Shanghai Higher People‟s Court first analyzed the effect of eliminating or restricting
competition of the Distribution Agreement. It held that the Distribution Agreement eliminated
intra-brand competition, and restrained the freedom of pricing of distributors. However, the court
found that the present evidence stopped short of proving that the RPM of Johnson & Johnson suture
products contributed to a cartel among producers of suture products.
We believe that in the aspect of the vertical agreement having the effect of eliminating and
restraining competition, the evidence of this case is weak compared to the NDRC case of Maotai,
Wuliangye. In Maotai and Wuliangye, because the two firms hold a very large market share in the
high-end liquor market they form an oligopoly. When Maotai announced a price increase,
Wuliangye tended to follow. Under this market situation, the pricing act of Maotai may indirectly
affect other competitors‟ pricing, causing a clear effect of excluding and restraining inter-brand
competition on price. However, such a market situation is not apparent in the present case. This may
be the weakest point of the Court‟s argument.
In terms of promoting competition, the Shanghai Higher People‟s Court stated that the RPM can
have various effects of promoting competition, such as: preventing “free riding” of other
distributors, promoting new brands or new products into the market, promoting quality competition
of the product, safeguarding the goodwill of products, providing accurate price information to
customers, promoting the development of distributors and the establishment of distribution system,
resisting discount sales of competitors, etc. However, they found that the effects of “safeguarding
the goodwill of products, and enabling consumers to obtain accurate price information”, are not
necessary to if the purchaser is very familiar with the products. The effect of promoting the
establishment of distribution network may not necessarily benefit consumers. Therefore, the
effects of promoting quality of products and service, and promoting new brands or new
products into the market are the most critical.
In the aspects of promoting product quality and service, Johnson & Johnson didn‟t give evidence to
prove that the quality of suture products is promoted due to the RPM. Johnson & Johnson have been
in the Chinese market for 15 years, and it cannot impose the RPM under the name of promoting new
brands or new products into the market. The Shanghai Higher People‟s Court held that the present
evidence is insufficient to prove that the RPM has an obvious effect of promoting competition.
The analysis of the Shanghai Higher People‟s Court clearly listed the effects of promoting
competition that could be brought by the RPM. While not published, the NDRC has conducted
detailed analysis regarding the above mentioned effects of eliminating or restraining competition
and the effects of promoting competition by the vertical monopoly agreement. From the Shanghai
Higher People‟s Court‟s perspective, it is permissible to impose RPM when a new product or new
enterprise enters into the market, which can ensure distributors promote sales service. This opinion
relatively new and is helpful in directing the future conduct of enterprises. Besides, when an
operator profits from the RPM, using the profit to improve the products‟ quality and service can be a
defense - but corresponding evidence should be given.
VII. Whether the claims for damages of Rainbow should be granted?
The Shanghai Higher People‟s Court held that Rainbow has ground under the AML to claim
compensation of profit damage for their suture products. According to the facts of this case, the
profit damage for suture products claimed by Rainbow has a direct causal relationship with the
implementation of the RPM. The RPM agreement constitute a monopoly agreement in this case,
thus Rainbow can claim compensation according to the AML.
The profit damage of suture products in 2008 claimed by Rainbow was based on the available profit
under the condition that the 2008 Distribution Contract was normally performed.
The Shanghai Higher People‟s Court held that the damage compensation can‟t be calculated based
on the rules of Contract Law, since that calculation method is in conflict with jurisprudence of the
AML. If the RPM agreement constitutes a monopoly agreement, that means the agreement
eliminates or restricts competition and caused loss to consumers. Therefore, when claiming
compensation, the loss shouldn‟t be calculated according to the available profit of performing the
RPM agreement, but should be calculated by referring to the normal profit of the relevant market.
Otherwise it will fall into the logical conflicts of pursuing monopoly profits through an
anti-monopoly lawsuit.
According to the specific circumstances of this case, the Shanghai Higher People‟s Court stated: (1)
the price of suture products of Johnson & Johnson is generally higher than others brands‟ products.
Especially the price of the suture product-in-suit is 15% higher than other brands‟ price. The sale
price and profit of Rainbow should be adjusted according to the price and profit of other bands‟
products. (2) Rainbow should pay tax according to law. After full consideration of the foregoing
factors, the Shanghai Higher People‟s Court determined Rainbow can gain the normal profit which
is roughly equivalent to 16% of the sale value before the tax. Accordingly, the courts discretionary
decision is that the sale loss of normal profit of suture products in 2008 caused by Johnson &
Johnson‟s monopoly conduct is RMB 530,000. Other compensation claimed by Rainbow is not
sustainable.
Conclusion
This case is China‟s first vertical monopoly agreement civil dispute. As most contracts have
provisions of the RPM, this case not only affects the dispute between Rainbow and Johnson &
Johnson. The result of this case has instructive meaning to the lawsuits of vertical monopoly
agreement disputes and the agreements entered into by their operators. To some extent, it may also
influence the anti-monopoly law enforcement of the NDRC on the RPM.
The announcement of the judgment comes just at the 5th anniversary celebration of the
implementation of the AML. This case, as well as a series of anti-monopoly enforcement cases
carried out by the NDRC and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”) show
that the AML has entered a new mature stage.
Ding Liang（DeHeng Law Office）
地址：北京市西城区金融大街 19 号富凯大厦 B 座 12 层 100033;电话： +86 10 5268 2977 ;
传真： +86 10 5268 2999 ;手机： +86 13521668628;邮箱： [email protected]
Areas of Practice
Mr. Ding specializes in Antitrust and Competition Law, WTO dispute settlement, and
Section 337 Investigation.
In the area of antitrust and competition, Mr. Ding has advised clients in
telecommunications; chemical; pharmaceutical; food and beverages; software; cement;
machinery; electrical appliances; finance; and retail industries on their M&A agreements,
distribution agreements, business models under the Anti-monopoly Law. He has advised
clients on several antitrust litigations and investigations. Mr. Ding has drafted
Anti-monopoly Law Guidelines and conducted antitrust audit, provided antitrust training for
multinational companies. He is coauthor of a CCH book – China Anti-monopoly Law Guide.
Work Experience
Mr. Ding joined DeHeng Law Offices in 2013. Before joining DeHeng, he worked at King &
Wood Mallesons, Dewey Ballantine LLP in DC, China National Textile Import & Export
Corp, and the US International Law Institute.
Education
Mr. Ding received master degrees of law from Georgetown University Law Center and
University of International Business & Economics. Mr. Ding is admitted as a Chinese
lawyer.
His working languages are Chinese and English.
No reproduction is allowed without permission.