QOM VERSUS NAJAF
Rivalry between two religious centres
Student:
Karin Neijenhuis
Table of contents
Introduction
3
1. Hierarchy in Shiite doctrine
4
2. The religion centres of the Shiites
5
2.1. Najaf
5
2.2. Qom
5
3. Iran’s support for Iraqi Shiite factions
6
3.1. SCIRI
6
3.2. The Sadr Movement
7
3.3. Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani
8
4. The interest of Iran in Iraq
8
5. The fourth interest of Iran: Najaf
9
Conclusions
11
List of references
12
2
Introduction
A lot of accusations toward Iran are coming from different actors of the conflict in Iraq about
the influence of all kinds like the presumed support for militant movements of Iran in Iraq.
Regarding old pains of Iraqis out of the Iran-Iraq war and the going on suspicion of the United
States towards Iran is it questionable whether these accusations are right. What’s the proof of
these accusations and what would be the interest of Iran in doing so?
It’s therefore important to investigate motivations and aims of Iran’s involvement in Iraq.
What is shaping the interest of Iran and does the Iranian identity play a part in its policy on
Iraq?
It’s clear that Iran has its religious majority of Shiite Muslims in common with Iraq. In the
eighties of last century Ayatollah Khomeini made no secret of his interest in spreading the
Islamic Revolution to other countries and this appealed mostly to Shiite groups in the
neighbouring region. Does this interest again takes part of Iranian policy? The most important
religious city for Shiite adherents is Najaf in Iraq and till only twenty years ago it was the
most important religious learning centre as well, which got replaced by Qom in Iran because
of the repression of Saddam Hussein on the Shiite clergy and adherents.
What me interests most is the role of these theological centres of Qom and Najaf on the
influence of Iran in Iraq and so I will emphasize my paper on the following questions:
-
In which way does the religious centre of Najaf plays a part in the foreign policy of
Iran?
-
What does it mean to Iran if Najaf is able to be restored as major religious centre of
the Shiite?
I will try to answer these question by starting with a small explanation of the hierarchy and
the role of clerics in Shiite religion. Then I write about the history of Najaf as well as Qom as
religious centres. Next is a description of Shiite factions and stances in Iraq and the ties of
those factions to Iran and the support of Iran to them. Then I analyse the interest of Iran in
Iraq and the role of the Shiite identity in this. Then I’ll hope to be able to answer the questions
and end this paper with some conclusions.
3
1. Hierarchy in Shiite doctrine
The majority of all Muslims in the world are Sunnis, they figure about 85% of all Muslims.
The second group are the Shiites and then specifically the “Twelver” Shiites and they form
the majority of the population of Iran with about 90% as well as Iraq with about 65%1. The
Shiite branch came into existence out of a conflict about the succession of the Prophet
Mohammed. They thought that Ali ibn Ali Talib (Imam Ali) should be the successor, because
he was a family member of the Prophet and he was appointed by Mohammed at Badr. So they
followed other leaders – ‘Imam’ is the Shiite title – than the Sunnis did. Imam Ali and his son
Imam Hussayn are the two most important Imams and they are both buried in Iraq; in Najaf
and Kerbala.
The branch is called “Twelver” Shiites because in the 8th century the twelfth imam
disappeared and the Shiites believe that he will come back as the Mahdi (like the Sunnis
expect also the Mahdi) at the end of times to judge about all people if whether they go to
paradise or to hell.
So from the disappearance of the twelfth imam till now the Shiites are without a leader.
The Usuli school of jurisprudence held that all Shiite Muslims must follow a person, trained
in religious jurisprudence with superior qualities, known as a marja-e taqlid. These ‘marjas’
are Grand Ayatollahs as well. These leaders can be chosen to be followed by the adherents of
the Shiites, but the one you chose is a personal choice. Marja-e taqlid is the highest rank in
Shiite doctrine, but also the Grand Ayatollahs do belong to the most prominent leaders, which
differs from the Sunni doctrine, where this kind of hierarchy is absent. At the moment there
are eight marja-e taqlid of which seven live in Qom and one (al-Sistani) in Najaf.2
Ayatollah Khomeini introduced in the seventies of last century an new form of ruling of the
clergy, that is the Velayat-e faqih, the regency of the jurisprudent; which means that the
highest religious leader would rule over the country. The main line till Khomeini came up
with his concept, was that clerics don’t bother in politics and a political institute was a just a
necessity. Most of the clergy of Iraq opposed the idea of the Velayat-e faqih.
1
Vali Nasr, `When the Shiites Rise`, Foreign Affairs, July/August, 2006, p.6 in:
www.foreigaffairs.org/2006701faessay/85405/vali-nasr/when-the-shiites-rise.html
2
Pepe Escobar, Waiting for the Mahdi, part 1, p.4
4
2. The religious centres of the Shia
2.1 Najaf
The city of Najaf is founded in the 7th century (A.D.), after Imam Ali was entombed here and
this is after Mekka the most important place of pilgrimage for the Shiites. From the 11th
century on Najaf became city of religious studies and it houses the oldest Hazwa al-Ilimiyya
(seminary of religious knowledge) of the Shiite Muslims. The most respected Shiite clergy
came to study here.
The beautiful tomb over the grave of Imam Ali has been erected in the 10th century and after a
fire it has been rebuilt just after 1500.
From the 19th century on the city of Najaf (and to a lesser extent Kerbala) became even more
important through easier ways of travelling and the famous centre of learning for scientific,
literary and theological studies. Estimations of amount of the pilgrims and student reach till
half a million from countries like Persia, China, India and the east crescent3. And in 1900
there had been about 8000 students.4
The prosperity of the religious city went on till about 1980, when Saddam Hussein got more
repressive to the Shiite clergy out of fear of power of the Shiites, because of the victory of the
Islamic Revolution in Iran. A lot of religious people got killed and a lot fled or were deported
to Iran, where the clergy continued their religious work in Qom.
2.2. Qom
The first holiest place in Iran isn’t Qom, but Mashhad, because of the tomb of Imam Reza, the
eighth imam, but Qom is the spiritual and religious capital, with an important educational
centre. Qom houses the tomb of Fatima, she’s the daughter of Imam Musa Kazim, the seventh
Imam, and the sister of Imam Reza. Fatima died in Qom on her way to visit her brother in
Mashhad and because of her important religiosity people start building houses close to the
place where she got buried. The popularity of the city grew during the Safavid dynasty (15011722) because it made Shiite the official doctrine of Iran and the Savafid Shah Abbas the first
built in the 17th century the shrine, which still attracting a lot of pilgrims.
Qom didn’t get the same importance as Najaf till the Islamic Revolution, when Saddam
Hussein started his repression of Shiites. The emergence of Qom as the most prominent
3
4
“Najaf”, Report from Camp Baker in Najaf, on www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/najaf.htm
Juan Cole middle east journal, p. 549
5
religious Shiite centre got stimulated by Khomeini, which made that his view about the
Velayat-e faqih got emphasized in the world of the Shiites.
According to the principle of the Velayat-e faqih Ayatollah Khamene’i is considered the
supreme leader of the Shiites. Because this doctrine is rejected by a lot of Shiites they don’t
view Khamene’i this way
Because of the decline of Najaf and the funding by the state Qom became the biggest and also
the most important Shiites centre. Nowadays about 40.000 to 50.000 of religious scholars and
clergy are studying and working in Qom. Also a lot of Iraqi clerics came to study here after
they fled or got kicked out of Iraq.
Since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 some clergy went back to Najaf, but till now this
amount haven’t been big.
3. Iran’s support for Iraqi Shia factions
Like I mentioned in the introduction, Iran got accused of destabilising Iraq by funding
different actors of the conflict, by manipulating elections, by sending weapons and even
fighters. These accusations come from - as you may expect - U.S. officials, newspapers,
Sunni-leaders Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt5, but as well from Iraqi politicians and
civilians.
Different reports about the role of Iran in Iraq get different outcomes, but the most convincing
to my opinion is the report of the International Crisis Group: “the evidence of attempted
destabilising Iranian intervention is far less extensive and clear the is alleged..”6 Iran itself
claims that their ties with Shiites clerics and parties are helpful to the situation in Iraq.7
In the following paragraphs I discuss the three most important Shiite actors and their relations
with Iran.
3.1. SCIRI
The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) is established in 1982 in Tehran
by Mohammed Baqir Al Hakim a Shia cleric who fled Iraq. This organisation got help from
5
Vali Nasr, `When the Shiites Rise`, Foreign Affairs, July/August, 2006, p.7, in:
www.foreigaffairs.org/2006701faessay/85405/vali-nasr/when-the-shiites-rise.html
6
International Crisis Group, “Iran in Iraq: How much influence?”, Middle East Report N. 38, 2005, p. 1, on:
www.
7
Robert Lowe and Claire Spencer., Iran, Its Neighbours and the Regional Crisis, London: Chatham House, A
Middle East Program Report, 2006, p. 8, on: www.chathamhouse.org.uk
6
Iran and it took the stance of Khomeini regarding the issue of the Velayat-e faqih. Attached to
the SCIRI is a military grouping which is called the Badr Brigade. They got trained by the
Revolutionary Guards and in 2003 counted about 10.000 man.
Just after the overthrown of Saddam Hussein in 2003 al Hakim went back to Najaf and got
murdered there in September and his son succeeded him. The Badr Organization – they
changed name – is responsible for guarding Najaf. Though Iran is still funding the SCIRI and
the Badr Organisation, their leaders changed mind about the kind of state they wished and
they left the idea of the Velayat-e faqih in favour of a constitutional parliament. One of the
reasons for this is the security of knowing that the Shiites are a majority in Iraq and can get
easily a majority in elections. Another reason according to Cole is that they got disillusioned
of the dictatorship of secular Saddam Hussein and theocratic Khomeini8.
They took part in the United Iraqi Alliance, which got also supported by Iran, with other
Shiite parties and they won the elections of January 2005.
3.2. The Sadr Movement
Muqtada al Sadr is the son of Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al Sadr, who succeeded his
uncle Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al Sadr. Muqtada, though himself not enough religious
educated, continues the works and ideas of his father.
Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al Sadr studied in Najaf with Khomeini and agreed with his
ideas about the Islamic State, whether or not reigned by clerics. His cousin Mohammed Sadiq
took the same stance, but also accepted Khomeini’s concept of the Velayat-e faqih.
Mohammed Baqir as well as Mohammed Sadiq got murdered by the Ba’th Party. Muqtada
established a militant movement in 1995, which is mostly called the Sadr Movement, to
oppose the regime of Iraq. This movement is quite radical and it attracts a lot of young people
of the poorer districts of Baghdad and other cities in the south of Iraq . They fought some
battles in Baghdad’s ‘Sadr-City’ and in Najaf.
Iran got accused of funding this militant movement. Some facts indicated that there were
some links; Muqtada al Sadr visited Iran in 2003 and met several important politicians, but
even when there has been some funding, relations between al Sadr and Iran seems to have
deteriorate.
8
Juan Cole, The Ayatollahs and Democracy in Iraq, ISIM-paper 7, Amsterdam, 2006, p.25
7
3.3. Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani
Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani is the most important religious person in Shiite Iraq. He is born
in 1930 in Mashhad in Iran. He studied in Qom with Ayatollah Husayn Borujerdi 9, who was
also teacher of Khomeini, but Borujerdi was opposed to interference of clerics in politics.
This is the same stance al Sistani took, but though his starting point is quietism, the last years
he did interfere in politics and he was a fervent advocate of democratic elections. Al Sistani is
independent from Iran and he totally disagrees with the principle of Velayat-e faqih. Still he is
supported by Iran as well. He has been the mobilizing factor behind the United Iraqi Alliance
and he advised his followers to vote for it. Some people think the influence of al Sistani is
decreasing, but to get the elections going on he was able to get ten thousands of people in the
street to demonstrate.
4. The interest of Iran in Iraq
In most of the literature and reports you find three points of interest of Iran in Iraq.
The first one is Iran’s behaviour towards Iraq in the view of its experience in the Iran-Iraq
war; Iran wants a neighbour that forms no threat, like the Sunni nationalist threat which came
from Iraq during about the last forty years. This is a strategic and geopolitical objective. So
Iran strives for an Iraq as friendly neighbour, who isn’t strong enough to present a threat, but
strong enough to prevent the country from breaking up.
This leads to the second interest of Iran: it wants Iraq unified as it is. A break-up would lead
to unrest in the region and in Iran itself, because it’s also an ethnically mixed country, like the
other countries in the region and especially a Kurdish independent state in the north of Iraq
will lead to unrest in the Kurdish region of Iran.
The third interest of Iran in Iraq is about the presence of the United States. This bothers Iran a
lot. While from one way Iran is happy with the U.S. moves of throwing over the regimes of
Afghanistan and Iraq, on the other hand the U.S. has threatened Iran as well by putting it on
the axes of evil. So it is favourable for Iran to have some controlled chaos in Iraq which keeps
the United States busy. This can lead to three positive outcomes for Iran: the United States
don’t see the advantage of regime change anymore, they are too preoccupied with Iraq to
bother Iran and the last: their military bases in Iraq form an easy goal for Iran in case of a
9
Ibid, p. 7
8
planned attack on nuclear plants. This forms the motive for Iran to fund and support different
factions in Iraq. Still this is a short term interest; in the end Iran shares the same interest as the
United States: a stable Iraq as a neighbour, without U.S. presence.
What about their interest in an Shiite Islamic state in Iraq? Vali Nasr mentions that “Iran is
riding the crest of the wave of Shiite revival.”10 It’s clear enough that Iran is supporting
mostly the Shiite factions in Iraq, but nothing points to the former ideal of Khomeini to spread
the Islamic Revolution. Iranian officials reject any interest in another Islamic republic.11
Iran strongly supported the elections of January 2005 and funded the United Iraqi Alliance.
Though this seems to be the best way to stabilize Iraq, there is a threat for Iran’s regime, when
Iraq will become a prosperous democratic country. This can cause jealousy and this can
destabilize the regime of Iran.
In viewing the policy of Iran and the interests in Iraq it’s hardly possible to explain these out
of one of the three identities which are mentioned by Maloney12: nationalism, Islamism and
anti-imperialism. For sure the Iranian Shiite Islamic identity plays a part in its foreign policy
towards Iraq; it’s mostly supporting Shiite factions. But in my view, the policy of Iran in Iraq
is easier to explain from a realistic stance: its policy is based on strategic interests in the
region and consolidation of its own regime. The assumptions on which Iran bases its policy
are realistic and explainable and not based on false ideas of other actors. Like the assumption
on what will happen if Iraq breaks up; it’s quite logic to presume that it has impact on its own
Kurdish people and the same refers to influence of the presence of the U.S. in Iraq.
What about the role of Najaf in this context?
5. The fourth interest of Iran: Najaf
From reading the chapters 3 en 4 there is no outcome of a clear policy of Iran regarding Najaf,
because there isn’t, at least not openly. But Najaf plays a role in Iran’s policy. For example
the worries about Shiite faithfuls about the sanctity of the shrines in Najaf. Maybe that’s the
10
Vali Nasr, `When the Shiites Rise`, Foreign Affairs, July/August, 2006, p.7, in:
www.foreigaffairs.org/2006701faessay/85405/vali-nasr/when-the-shiites-rise.html
11
International Crisis Group, “Iran in Iraq: How much influence?”, Middle East Report N. 38, 2005, p. 11, on:
www.
12
Suzanne Maloney, ”Identity and change in Iran’s foreign policy” in: Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle
East, New York, 2002
9
reason the Badr Organisation is now responsible for defending Najaf. This can be easily
explained out of the Shiite identity of Iran.
Though not always acknowledged by Iranian clerics, I can’t hardly imagine there isn’t any
rivalry between Qom and Najaf. Most reports do confirm the rivalry13 or mention that rivalry
will increase when the situation in Najaf becomes more stable.
Vali Nasr sees it different: “Since 2003, the two cities have cooperated. There is no visible
doctrinal rift between their clerics or any exodus of dissidents from one city to the other.”14
He mentions that the website of al Sistani is headquartered in Qom, that Najaf clerics don’t
criticise Iran’s politics and that Iranians accept the authority of Al Sistani. But thereafter he
says that Iranians are “although largely cynical about their own clerical leaders, many Iranians
have embraced the revival of Shiite identity and culture in Iraq”15 This can hardly be of profit
of the Iranian clerical leaders, so this is more a reason for rivalry about legitimacy of the
Shiite identity.
Rivalry can be on the bases of the different religious stances of Najaf and Qom. The clear
choice of the now most prominent Shiite leader in Iraq al Sistani against the concept of
Velayat-e faqih and pro quietism can challenge moderate Iranians in their strive of separating
religion and politics. Al Sistanis’ opinion on this has been already subscribed by some Iranian
clerics and academics, who see politics prevailing over religion.16 Najaf is working
independent of any regime and so a centre of autonomy and free criticism while Qom is
linked to political power in Tehran. Though it doesn’t happen yet, there is a risk for attacks on
the religious legitimacy of Iranian clerics in politics. So again the Shiite identity of Iranian
clerics who are involved in politics can be under discussion. If you view this in a realistic
theoretical framework, than will Iran’s policy probably be based on regime consolidation.
There has also been a discussion about whether Kamene’i is the highest Shiite authority in
Iran or in the world. For all Shiite clerics who oppose the ruling of the clergy Khamene’i isn’t,
on the contrary it is that outside Iran the convention is that the most senior Grand Ayatollah of
Najaf is the religious authority for Shiites in the World.17 But even inside Iran Khamene’i
hasn’t been able to achieve the same respect and authority as Khomeini.
13
Robert Lowe e.o. p. 20, William O. Beeman, p. 3, Pepe Escobar, Who’s in charg.., p. 4, Pepe Escobar,
Waiting for the Mahdi,p. 2, no author, Khomeinism vs. Quietism. p. 1, K. Katzman, p. 6, International Crisis
Group, p. 12 (see list of references)
14
Vali Nasr, `When the Shiites Rise`, Foreign Affairs, July/August, 2006, p.4 in:
www.foreigaffairs.org/2006701faessay/85405/vali-nasr/when-the-shiites-rise.html
15
Ibid, p. 4
16
Karin Neijenhuis, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran, jan. 2007, p. 16
17
Juan Cole middle east journal, p. 547
10
The rivalry can also be based on religious and historical importance. And it is a fact that Najaf
prevails in both regards, because of the shrine of their most important Imam Ali is there and
also the long history of the hawza (seminary).
Soon after the fall of Saddam Hussein Shiite pilgrims started to visit Najaf again and the
amount of pilgrims has been estimated at half a million a year. Also some clerics went back,
but with the murder of Ayatollah al Hakim and the bombings still going on, this trend won’t
be followed by masses. When Najaf will starting to attract more students and even when
people will change Qom for Najaf, this is also a loss for Qom regarding economics, prestige
and influence. But for now, because of the unstable situation, it is not happening yet. Though
when fighting and bombing in Iraq and Najaf will be ended, I foresee a new revival of Najaf.
It then depends who is the most prominent Shiite leader. Al Sistani is still getting support
from Iran. Does it continue when al Sistani works on the re-emergence of Najaf? Another
aspect is that he is going on eighty and who will be his successor? The struggle for power in
Najaf will be of great importance to Iran.
CONCLUSIONS
-
In which way does the religious centre of Najaf plays a part in the foreign policy of
Iran?
-
What does it mean to Iran if Najaf is able to be restored as major religious centre of
the Shiite?
These were the two questions I sought to get answered.
I don’t have a clear view of the answer of the first question, because as far as I know, Iran
doesn’t have one clear policy, but I‘m quit sure, that some Iranians worry about the revival of
Najaf, because as I showed in the last chapter: this can have a huge impact on Iran’s politics,
religion, prestige, influence and economics. So there will be a kind of policy. For the moment
they are still supporting al Sistani and I think that in the overall view of Iran’s interest in Iraq,
this is the most wise thing to do. Some stability in your backyard has a positive influence on
your country as well, like Foreign Minister Abbas Maliki stated: “chaos in Iraq ‘does not help
Iranian national interest. If your neighbour’s house is on fire, it means your home is also in
danger’.”18
18
Vali Nasr, `When the Shiites Rise`, Foreign Affairs, July/August, 2006, p.8 in:
www.foreigaffairs.org/2006701faessay/85405/vali-nasr/when-the-shiites-rise.html
11
LIST OF REFERENCES
William O. Beeman, The U.S.-Shi’ite Relationship in a New Iraq: Better than the British?,
Strategic Insights, Volume 3, Issue 5, 2004, on:
Juan Cole, The Ayatollahs and Democracy in Iraq, ISIM-paper 7, Amsterdam, 2006
Juan Cole, The New and Improved Iraq, 2004, on:
www.inthesetimes.com/article/the_new_and_improved_iraq/
Juan Cole, The United States and Shi’ite Religious Factions in Post Ba’thist Iraq, Middle East
Journal,
Safa Haeri, Relations deteriorate between Iranian and Iraqi Shi’a Leaders, 2004, on:
http://www.iran-press-service.com/ips/articles-2004/june/iran_iraq_relations_7604.shtml
Robert Lowe and Claire Spencer, Iran, Its Neighbours and the Regional Crisis, London:
Chatham House, A Middle East Program Report, 2006, p. 8, on: www.chathamhouse.org.uk
Karin Neijenhuis, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran, jan. 2007
News online:
BBC News, Iran positive on Iraq conference, 2007, on: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr//2/hi/middle_east/6404609.stm
CNN, Iran: U.S. causes Iraq violence, 2006, on:
http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/11/28/iraq.iran
Bill Nichols and Barbara Slavin, “Report: Iraq conditions ‘grave and deteriorating”, USA
today, 2006, on: http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-12-06-iraq-report_x.htm
Ardeshir Moaveni, “Iran seeks to expand influence among Iraqi Shi’a community”, Eurasia
Insight, on:
12