NIGERIA COUNTRY REPORT
June 2011
Peter M. Lewis
Johns Hopkins University
School of Advanced International Studies
Summary of Research Findings
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Nigeria’s National Assembly has undergone a process of institutional development since
the 1999 transition to electoral rule.
The Assembly has created a significant counterweight to the Executive in key areas,
including term limits, electoral law and budgetary affairs.
Legislative oversight has provided an important element of government transparency.
Legislators provide some representation and services for constituents, though largely on a
clientelist basis.
The Nigerian Assembly is not regulated by strong internal oversight or party discipline,
and Members have considerable opportunity for personal gain.
The relative weakness of parties also allows for considerable legislative independence,
since patronage and recruitment systems are unstable.
Constituents view legislators as distant and self-interested.
Reform elements within the Assembly are active, but limited and marginal.
Institutionalization and rent-seeking reflect a central tension in the Nigerian legislature:
between the establishment of “rules” and competition for “rents.”
There are fruitful areas of engagement for donors, including professional development
and technical assistance, support for internal oversight mechanisms, and cooperation with
civil society organizations.
1
Methodology 1
The broad objective of the African Legislatures Project is to address four fundamental
questions about legislatures in emerging African democracies:
1. How and why do African legislatures function as they do?
2. Why does the legislature play a measurable role in contributing to accountable and
transparent governance in some African countries but not in others?
3. What conditions and changes are required to develop African legislatures into institutions
that will sustain accountable and transparent governance?
4. What constitute “best practices” for the purpose of strengthening African legislatures?
This research project focuses on a study of the Nigerian country case in depth and
endeavors to draw relevant comparative inferences.
Research Coordination
Peter M. Lewis (Johns Hopkins University-SAIS) supervised a research team including
Dr. Deji Olaore (consultant), Dr. Ukoha Ukiwo (University of Port Harcourt), Dr. Jibrin Ibrahim
(Center for Democratic Development), and Mr. Auwal Ibrahim Musa (Civil Society Legislative
Advocacy Center) to implement the above project in Nigeria and Washington DC, from May
2009 through May 2011.
Field research was conducted by the team in 2009 from May 19 through June 20,
November 8-20, and December 14-18, with continuing data collection and inquiries in early
2010. Final data was collected in April-May 2011.
The Core Tasks of the research team included field research and research coordination. The
team collected and analyzed data on the operations of the Nigerian National Assembly,
particularly the House of Representatives. Research focused on:
1. Evaluating how the legislature carries out four core functions including: (a) Representation;
(b) Legislation; (c) Oversight; (d) Constituency service
2. Conducting structured interviews with samples of legislators, legislative staff and other
relevant informants.
3. Assessing the public’s knowledge and perceptions about the operation of their legislature.
4. To the extent feasible, evaluating the distinctive role of women, if any, in the legislature,
their recruitment and retention.
The research team conducted 57 face-to face interviews of Members of the House of
Representatives, using a survey instrument including more than 100 items. The survey covered
behavioral and attitudinal questions including background, demographics, policy preferences,
institutional roles, resources, political party governance and constituent relations. A number of
1
Acknowledgement is made to the Africa Public Sector and Capacity Building unit of the World Bank for support
to the African Legislatures Project in this multi-method study of the legislative process and legislative institutions in
Nigeria. Special thanks to Jeanne Elone, who provided invaluable research assistance.
2
former members of the House and Senate participated in unstructured interviews, in addition to
numerous professional Staff of the National Assembly.
In addition, the team collected documents including the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, the
Standing Orders, the Code of Conduct, documents on the budget process and the role of the
legislature, Statistics on the National Assembly, the annual digest of the Members and
performance of the National Assembly, a roster of Bills and a Bill Tracker, numerous media
articles, previous academic literature concerning the National Assembly, and other
documentation. Data was also utilized from the Afrobarometer surveys since 2000 in Nigeria. 2
Background
Since independence, Nigeria has had three civilian governments with working
legislatures. During two long periods of military rule, civilian institutions were suspended. Each
successive democratic regime was founded on a new constitution. The First Republic (19601966), governed slightly longer than a single term, and was terminated by a military coup.
Similarly, the Second Republic (1979-1983) was ushered in by military rulers and then usurped
by the armed forces a few months after the regime’s second election. Military leader General
Ibrahim Babangida created the groundwork for a Third Republic, proceeding as far as elections
in June 1993. The transition was curtailed by the regime, extending the period of military rule for
several more years.
The current democratic regime inaugurated by military leaders in May 1999 is known as
the Fourth Republic, although it is the third elected civilian regime to govern Nigeria. Nigeria’s
democratic governments have reflected different constitutional design and changing party
systems.
History of the Legislature
The First Republic (1960-66): Regionalism and Parliamentary Division
Nigeria’s First Republic was a federal parliamentary system based on the British
Westminster model. A lower House of Representatives was apportioned among the regions on
the basis of population, and an upper house, the Senate, had seats distributed uniformly among
the units of the federation. Executive power was claimed by the majority party (or coalition) in
Parliament. The federal structure was intended to accommodate the broad ethnic and regional
divisions of the territory.
The three regions each reflected a dominant ethnic group. 3 In a national context, these
ethno-linguistic groups were minorities, but together they accounted for two-thirds of the
Nigerian population, generating a vigorous three-way rivalry. Each of the major groups formed
the basis for a political party: the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) had strong backing from
2
Data and related reports can be found at: http://www.afrobarometer.org/
Demographically the Northern Region was predominantly Muslim, with an ethnic Hausa-Fulani majority; the
Western Region, mainly Yoruba, was roughly balanced among Muslims and Christians; the Eastern Region was
predominantly Igbo and overwhelmingly Christian.
3
3
Hausa-Fulani elites; the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) had the overwhelming
allegiance of Igbo voters in the East; and the Action Group attracted a substantial following
among the Yoruba in the Western Region. The federation was quickly polarized among three
ethnically-segmented regions ruled by dominant parties and leaders.
Under the First Republic, the central government was controlled by the NPC, which held
a commanding position in the Northern Region and benefited from a population advantage that
gave the north a majority of seats in the legislature. The first Parliament was sharply divided
among sectional groups, and the various caucuses in the legislature generally represented
communal and factional interests. The legislature had only three working committees, which
largely served administrative and business roles. There was little expertise in specific policy
areas. The First Parliament was an anemic political body, never serving more than 54 days in any
year. Both chambers were generally quiescent toward the executive and rarely initiated law. 4
The Second Republic (1979-83): Federalism and Executive Dominance
Legislative politics in Nigeria’s second civilian regime was shaped by new institutions
and party alignments. The 1979 Constitution was substantially modeled on U.S. presidential
institutions.5 The Assembly had greater prerogatives than the earlier parliament, notably with
regard to money bills. Laws might originate in either chamber of the Assembly, and passage
required the assent of both houses. A majority vote of two-thirds would override a presidential
veto. The legislature retained its structure of representation, apportioned by state population in
the House of Representatives, and by uniform seats for each state in the Senate. Legislators were
elected from single-member constituencies and the House was expanded from 312 seats in the
first Parliament to 450 seats.
The federal system was altered from the original three-region configuration to 19 states in
order to dilute the large ethno-regional blocks and party dominance of the First Republic. The
1979 Constitution required a broad geographic spread of votes as a condition for election to the
presidency. 6 This encouraged the formation of parties that could reach beyond ethno-regional
appeals to more diverse constituencies. The National Party of Nigeria (NPN), which was to
dominate the Second Republic, proved successful in forging a coalition of elites for the purposes
of electoral competition and the distribution of rents.
The Second Republic, like the First, had a relatively weak legislature, as Executive
preferences shaped the political agenda. Attention to legislation was episodic and fragmented.
Neither the Presidency nor the Assembly branch fostered clear targets or legislative plans.
During the entire four-year civilian term, only one bill was introduced and passed entirely by the
Members, while all other legislation was initiated by the Presidency. The Assembly did not
exercise significant oversight of the executive or other government operations.
4
Mackintosh, John P., Nigerian Government and Politics, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966, p. 113.
Akande, Jadesola O., The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979, with annotations, London: Sweet
and Maxwell, 1982, p. v.
6
Akande, p. 126
5
4
Elections for the Assembly in a Third Republic were convened under military rule in
1992, but the Assembly never had legislative authority, and the civilian government was stillborn
after the annulment of the presidential election in June 1993. General Sani Abacha seized power
in late 1993, and civilian rule was deferred until Abacha’s death in 1998 opened the door to a
new political transition.
The Fourth Republic (1999-): Turbulence and Autonomy
The 1999 Constitution was largely modeled on the 1979 charter, maintaining the
presidential system with an expanded federal structure of thirty-six states. The bicameral
legislature was preserved, with single-member districts elected at four-year intervals concurrent
with the Presidential vote. The House of Representatives was allotted 360 seats among the 36
states, with seats allotted by relative population, and the Senate had 109 seats – three per state
and one for the Federal Capital Territory. The 1999 Assembly continued to have constitutional
authority over budgeting and spending by the Federal government, substantial control over
legislative budget, and prerogatives for committee formation and oversight activities. By law,
the legislature was required to sit at least 188 days a year, and the finances and qualifications of
members were to be declared and vetted. The rights and the obligations of the National
Assembly were enhanced over preceding governments.
The party system in the Fourth Republic differs from those under earlier civilian
regimes. 7 General Babangida’s abortive experiment with non-sectional parties had a lasting
impact on political coalitions in Nigeria by breaking up regional and ethnic party structures and
channeling political groupings into multi-ethnic, ‘national’ entities. The People’s Democratic
Party (PDP) quickly ascended to dominance in the Fourth Republic. Other large parties have
included the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) the Alliance for Democracy (AD), the Action
Congress of Nigeria (ACN), the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), the All Progressives
Grand Alliance (APGA), the Labour Party (LP) and the ACCORD Party. Following the 2011
elections, ten parties were represented in the National Assembly.
The People’s Democratic Party (PDP) has held a majority of seats in the National
Assembly. In presidential elections, the governing party achieved a 62% majority in Olusegun
Obasanjo’s 2003 re-election, and reached an unprecedented 70% in the election of the late
Umaru Yar’Adua in 2007. In 2011, Goodluck Jonathan secured 59% of the popular vote. Within
the National Assembly, the PDP majority grew to more than three-fourths of the Senate and the
House of Representatives by 2007, and the ruling party’s majority dropped to about two-thirds
after more competitive elections in 2011.
7
Lewis, Peter, “Nigeria: Elections in a Fragile Regime,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 3, July 2003, p. 134.
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Table 1: Party Dominance in the National Assemblies of the Fourth Republic
Assembly/Parties
Senate
House of Representatives
(109 Seats)
(360 Seats)
1999
People’s Democratic Party (PDP)
59
206
All People’s Party (APP/ANPP)
29
74
Alliance for Democracy (AD)
20
68
Other
1
12
2003
People’s Democratic Party (PDP)
76
223
All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP)
27
96
Alliance for Democracy (AD)
6
34
Other
6
2007
People’s Democratic Party (PDP)
87
263
All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP)
14
63
Action Congress (AC)
6
30
Other
2
4
2011*
People’s Democratic Party (PDP)
77*
233*
Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN)
18
53
Congress for Progressive Change
6
31
(CPC)
All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP)
4
23
Other
4
20
Source: African Elections Database, at: http://africanelections.tripod.com/ng.html
Source for 2011: Nigeria Elections Coalition, at: http://nigeriaelections.org/
*Estimates based on 2011election returns. Legally contested seats (those under dispute, or with
continuing tenure from earlier court rulings) are not all accounted for.
Although the 1999 Constitution outlined new legislative prerogatives, the National
Assembly contended with a strong executive and institutional weakness. The first Assembly
seated after the transition had little experience, as most members were new to politics altogether,
and no legislature had served for sixteen years. Facilities were limited, staff was sparse and
inexperienced, and resources such as archive or computers were lacking. President Olusegun
Obasanjo (1999-2007), a previous military ruler, had an assertive leadership style. Executivelegislative relations were often tense and sometimes confrontational. Over time, the National
Assembly established independent roles through contention over the budget, key legislation, and
the scope of executive authority and tenure. Increased resources, institutional growth and
political experience gave rise to greater capacities and assertiveness on the part of the Assembly.
The change of administration in 2007 opened the way to new legislative-executive
relations. President Yar’Adua’s diffident leadership style contrasted with Obasanjo’s assertive
personal control of many aspects of government. Yar’Adua’s untimely death in May 2010 led to
the succession of Vice President Goodluck Jonathan, who did not substantially bolster executive
6
power. A less assertive executive branch emboldened many in the Assembly. Amidst shifts in
executive leadership and political alignments, the Nigerian National Assembly has reflected
significant institutional development. Expansion of the Assembly facilities and professional staff
has enhanced capacities for reviewing drafting legislation, reviewing policy issues, convening
investigations, and exerting a degree of oversight toward other branches of government.
Each successive legislature in Nigeria since 1999 has reflected substantial turnover.
Incumbent legislators typically lose their seats by failing to be re-nominated by their parties,
rather than through defeat at the polls. Nigeria’s 2007 Assembly retained less than 20 percent of
the members from the preceding legislature, and fewer than two dozen House members had
tenure dating back to the first Assembly. When surveyed in 2009, two-third of Members were
serving their first term.
In 2011, about a third of incumbents in the Senate and a quarter of the House of
Representatives were returned to office. Some of the veteran members of both houses have
pursued reforms, particularly with regard to the electoral system, public expenditures, and
constitutional change. Although this group only comprises about two dozen members, their
institutional experience has offered some advantages in leadership.
Legislative Functions
As per the Standing Orders, a bill can be introduced by the Executive, judiciary, or
private Members of Parliament. It is first read to the relevant committee and presented for
discussion, after which it is either tabled or a 2nd reading is scheduled. Following the second
reading the committee votes on whether or not to pass the bill. After passage, the bill is read for a
third time and entered into law. The Nigerian House of Representatives sits for approximately 30
weeks per year, split into four sessions. Despite constitutional stipulations, the Assembly
averages about 100 days of actual sittings per year.
In response to survey questions, Members of the House of Representatives identify
legislation as their primary role. The majority of parliamentary debate is dedicated to reviewing
bills and presenting reports. They consider the quality of debate in the chamber to be adequate,
although this largely varies in by the level of technical expertise required to analyze bills and
associated documents.
Between 1999 and 2010, a total of 973 bills were placed before the House of
Representatives by the Executive or by private Members. 8 In all, some 206 bills were passed, or
about a fifth of the bills introduced. About half the bills considered by the Assembly were
introduced by the Presidency, though executive control of the agenda has steadily declined. In
2003, most bills were introduced by the executive branch, but five year later Members sponsored
8
Listed on the House of Representatives Website at: http://www.nassnig.org/nass2/legislation.php. The Senate lists
558 bills introduced in the same period. A number of bills were processed exclusively by the House or the Senate. In
total, the National Assembly considered over 1,100 proposed laws or resolutions during the first three terms of the
Fourth Republic.
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eighty percent of new legislation. The Assembly has played an increasingly important role in
shaping the legislative process.
Another perspective on the pattern of legislation is displayed in Table 2, which tracks
bills in the House of Representatives during the second Assembly from 2003-2007. In all, 333
bills were introduced, and 141 bills were passed (including many bills that were introduced
before 2003). While legislation introduced during the Assembly originated almost evenly among
the Executive and Private Members, the majority of bills passed were Executive initiatives.
Table 2: Bills Progression in the House of Representatives 2003-2007
Total number
Percentage**
333
Bill presented
Executive
146
44%
Private Members
169
51%
141*
Bills Passed
Executive
90
64%
Private Members
51
36%
*Note: Bills not necessarily presented in the same year as passage.
**Bills from Senate to House not included.
Source: The Lawmakers: Federal Republic of Nigeria 2007-2011, Abuja: Chris Anyanwu, 2007.
Although the legislature has been more assertive in the introduction and review of bills,
productivity has been uneven and many prominent bills have been delayed. Committees are
important for producing reports on new bills, the most active being the Finance, Appropriations,
and Justice/Judiciary committees, which together considered a third of all bills proposed between
2003 and 2009. While the initial drafting and review of legislation can be timely, delays often
arise from debates, amendments and political bargaining. Legislation for constitutional
amendments, elections, Freedom of Information, anti-corruption and budgetary management
have been passed only after long periods of discussion or inaction. The status of the Petroleum
Industry Bill remains uncertain, though it touches on central aspects of the Nigerian economy.
Oversight Functions
Legislative oversight under the Fourth Republic has provided an important new element
of transparency in government and restraint on the executive. Members of the Assembly
surveyed about their roles cited oversight functions as their second priority after legislation.
Issues of parliamentary oversight extend broadly to the Presidency and other departments of
government, the judiciary and even the legislature itself.
During the administration of President Obasanjo, tensions between the executive and
legislative branches prompted considerable efforts to assert the oversight functions of the
Assembly. Members confronted with the presidency in 2002 over the Elections Bill, and in the
same year a substantial caucus (including many from the ruling PDP) took serious steps toward
impeaching Obasanjo, citing an imperious leadership style and failure to adequately consult with
Parliament. While legislators relented on impeachment after the president sought
accommodation, the next Assembly blocked a 2006 bid for an extension of presidential tenure,
which would have allowed Obasanjo to seek a third term in office. In addition, legislators have
8
regularly contended with the executive over fiscal issues, resulting in repeated delays in the
approval of the annual budget.
The Assembly has often turned its attention inward, prompting a number of leadership
changes and inquiries into the conduct of prominent Members. At least five Senate Presidents or
House Speakers have been impeached or compelled to resign under scrutiny from the Assembly.
Others, including the head of a major committee investigation into the electricity sector, and a
former Speaker of the House, have been investigated for corruption or abuse of office. While
misconduct is widespread, there have also been substantial efforts at internal oversight and
monitoring.
The investigative role of the committee system has expanded markedly with improved
staffing, facilities, resources and experience. The introduction in 2006 of “due process” reviews
of public expenditures has encouraged inquiries across many areas of procurement and spending.
In recent years a number of probes have been followed in the national media. The most
prominent inquiry covered the alleged misuse of more than $16 billion allocated by the Obasanjo
administration for rehabilitation of the country’s troubled electricity system. Other probes have
considered safety funds in aviation; projects in transportation and public works; fertilizer
distribution under the Agriculture Ministry; land and housing sales in the Federal Capital
Territory; spending and projects under the Nigeria Delta Development Commission; the funding
of prominent teaching hospitals; and the use of constituency project funds by legislators and
governors.
In recent years the legislature has expanded the number and scope of committees, which
grew to number 84 in the House of Representatives and 54 in the Senate. Committee activity has
been spurred partly by political ambition, but also by reaction to misconduct in numerous
departments of government. The most capable are those focused on public finance and legislative
affairs, including committees on the budget, fiscal affairs, external debt, and assembly rules and
procedures. A few committees for such issues as HIV/AIDS, women’s affairs, and the
Millennium Development Goals have also been quite active with concerted assistance from
donors. Another set of committees periodically initiate inquiries or legislation regarding
elections, the electricity system, transportation and health. A number of committees are dormant
or unproductive.
The proliferating committee system, while an important source of information and
pressure, has been an uncertain mechanism of accountability, possessing limited enforcement
capacities. This aspect of legislative activity also proved a drain on energies, as many members
served on multiple panels. Few legislators in the first two terms had participated in more than
two committees, but in the Third Assembly some members were involved in as many as a dozen
committees. Although investigative activities have been revealing, there is a growing sense of
ambivalence among many citizens who have been saturated with revelations, and skeptical about
political grandstanding. Nonetheless, committee activities revealed a growing willingness and
capacity to exercise legislative oversight of the presidency along with a degree of self-regulation.
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Representation Functions
The expansion of federalism has successfully dislodged the large ethno-regional blocks
and party dominance seen in the First Republic. Despite the progress made in terms of regional
representation, the Nigerian Assembly remains distant from many domestic constituencies and
lacks the institutional channels required to facilitate civil society input into the legislative
process. Legislators provide some representation and services for constituents, though largely on
a clientelist basis.
From survey data, the representation of constituents is identified as the third highest
priority among Members of the House. Although Representatives rank legislative and oversight
roles as more central to their work, delivering “development” to their constituencies provides the
highest degree of self-reported satisfaction. Representatives regularly visit their districts: 86
percent travel home at least twice a month, and a majority travel weekly. They incur substantial
expenses during these trips, both through travel costs and various outlays during their stay in the
constituency. This is a frequent complaint of Nigerian legislators, along with criticism of the
level of constituency development funds available to Members. Eight in ten legislators consider
these funds to be inadequate for their needs.
While many Members of the Assembly express a commitment to constituent service, and
satisfaction in providing these roles, the perceptions of average citizens are quite different.
Survey data from the Afrobarometer research network clearly illustrates the deficit of legitimacy
for the legislature in the Fourth Republic. As indicated in Table 3, Nigerians rarely contact their
National Assembly representative, and hold limited trust in the legislature as an institution.
Nigerians increasingly perceive corruption as a major problem in the Assembly, and they have
declining confidence in the performance of their own elected representatives. It is evident that
many voters and constituents have critical views of the National Assembly, and in crucial areas
the reputation of the legislature has not improved with time.
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Table 3: Public Attitudes toward the Nigerian National Assembly
2001
2007
Contacted member of the National Assembly
(% within past year)
5
11
Degree of trust for the National Assembly
(% Somewhat/Quite a lot/A lot)
21
26
“How many of the following people do you think are involved
in corruption (members of the National Assembly)?”
(% Most/All of them)
44
54
Do you approve or disapprove of the way (your National
Assembly representative) performed their job over the past
year?
(% Approve/Strongly Approve)
Which of the following is closest to your view:
“The members of the National Assembly represent the people;
therefore they should make laws for this country, even if the
President does not agree.”
(% Agree/Strongly Agree)
46
37
n/a
76
n/a
15
“Since the President represents all of us he should pass laws
without worrying about what the National Assembly thinks.”
(% Agree/Strongly Agree)
Source: Afrobarometer, accessed at
At the same time, Nigerians hold strong views about the appropriate role of the
legislature in their democracy, even as they are increasingly discouraged by the actual
performance of the Assembly. Nigerians overwhelmingly believe that that the National
Assembly rather than the executive is the proper source of legislation, as a representative elected
body. The public also supports the separation of powers, and deference of the executive branch
to the legislative authority of the Assembly.
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Legislative Management and Administration
As noted earlier, the Assembly that was seated at the transition to the Fourth Republic
faced many constraints and challenges. Members and staff had little experience of a working
legislature, and virtually no background in managing independent lawmaking, committee
activities, or internal institutional development. The day-to-day operations of the Assembly were
also hampered by inadequate premises, insufficient staff, limited funding, and few library,
archival or research facilities. The turnover of leadership in the Assembly has also been
unsettling, as five leaders in the Senate or the House have been ousted or departed under pressure
in the past twelve years, and others have come under investigation or indictment.
Despite these challenges, the Nigerian National Assembly has undergone significant
institutional development over three civilian terms. Fiscal flows have grown rapidly as
legislators have successfully used their budgetary authority to raise allocations to the Assembly.
The premises of the Assembly in Abuja have been expanded to provide office space for
Members and committees. Research and support staff has also grown, and many employees have
developed expertise over more than a decade of work in the institution. Computerization, recordkeeping and archival resources have improved considerably, though many improvements are still
needed. Representatives also reflect greater experience, as half those surveyed in 2009 had some
experience in government service prior to being elected to the Assembly.
The increasing resources claimed by the Assembly are nowhere more evident than in the
area of compensation. When the Fourth Republic was inaugurated, Members of the House
received the Naira equivalent of about $8,000 in salaries, with additional allowances and
perquisites bringing total compensation to about $75,000. This sum tripled by 2007, and in 2010
the package of emoluments for legislators soared above $1.5 million per Member. Compensation
for Nigerian legislators is now the highest in Africa, and certainly at the apex of legislative
compensation worldwide. Naturally these “jumbo salaries” as they are commonly known in
Nigeria, have elicited criticism and protest, especially as legislative performance and
productivity have slipped in the public eye.
Apart from formal allotments to Members, other opportunities for personal gain arise
from government contracts, discretion over constituency funds, and private ventures that benefit
from political influence. More than two-thirds of Members in the House acknowledge spending
some time (usually about 10-15 percent of their efforts) on private employment or business,
which is permitted under House rules. However, Members have frequently been cited for the
inappropriate use of influence or constituency resources, and there is evidently a widespread
public perception that malfeasance is a problem in the Assembly.
The Nigerian National Assembly is not regulated by strong party discipline. Although the
ruling PDP has been able to secure electoral majorities, none of the major parties has defined a
strong identity around ideology or programs. The turbulence within the party system has also
worked against the establishment of strong internal leadership. About two-thirds of surveyed
Members say they have sometimes voted differently from their party’s position, and more than
eighty percent say they would oppose their party if the organizational position differed from their
constituents’ views or the national interest.
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The absence of party discipline has opened space for considerable independence among
members of the Assembly. This has been evident in the impeachment initiatives of 2002 and
2003, as well as resistance to presidential term extension and support for the assertion of Vice
Presidential powers during President Yar’Adua’s extended illness in 2009-10. Another area of
autonomy is the formation of a small reform cluster in the Assembly. The “good governance”
caucus in the House has drawn around twenty members around key issues and bills, with larger
numbers around particular votes. While this represents a minority of legislators, the presence of a
multi-party reform element focusing on transparency, fiscal oversight, and responsive
governance is a significant voice in the Assembly.
Conclusions and Recommendations
This report covers institutional, political and economic dimensions of Nigeria’s
legislature. Historically, Nigerians have experimented with different legislative institutions,
shifting from a British Parliamentary model at independence to an American-styled presidential
federal system in the 1970s. The current National Assembly, inaugurated in 1999, is bi-cameral,
including a House of Representatives and a Senate, directly elected in single-member districts at
four-year intervals. While previous legislatures in Nigeria were institutionally weak and largely
overshadowed by executive power, the National Assembly in the Fourth Republic has developed
greater institutional capacity and political autonomy across a range of issues.
The Nigerian legislature has wielded considerable influence in legislative and oversight
roles, providing a significant counterweight to the presidency in such areas as the budget,
presidential tenure, and critical legislation affecting elections, government operations and fiscal
affairs. The Assembly has claimed increasing budgetary resources, including generous
emoluments for legislators. Facilities, staff, and support services have increased accordingly. A
vigorous committee system is active in reviewing legislation and appointments, as well as
sponsoring numerous hearings and inquiries. Committee investigations have enhanced
governmental transparency by exposing significant problems of public expenditure,
administrative probity and even internal leadership.
Legislative and oversight roles have been more prominent than representation roles.
Nigeria’s political system has been dominated by the ruling People’s Democratic Party since
1999, and despite setbacks in the competitive 2011 elections, the leading party retains about twothirds of the seats in the Assembly. Nigeria’s leading parties are not distinguished by strong
ideological or programmatic identities, and representation tends to be organized along clientelist
lines. Personal networks and key notables are instrumental in determining legislative outcomes
and the distribution of resources. Nigerian legislators express a commitment to developing their
constituencies, though budgetary allotments and the use of constituency funds are rarely
transparent.
The legislature has often reflected weak party discipline and leadership. Several leaders
in the Senate and the House have been ousted for misconduct, and party organizations are not
consistent in enforcing votes or alignments. These leadership factors have different implications.
The weakness of internal management is often a problem in regulating the institution. Legislators
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have wide scope for rent-seeking and self-serving behavior, and there is a great deal of
factionalism in the Assembly. In other areas, however, the lack of strong central control allows
opportunities for reform initiatives and considerable independence from the executive and the
ruling party establishment. A number of politicians have a sense of the institutional roles of the
legislature in a presidential, federal democracy, and a significant proportion of representatives
have sought to shape the activities of Nigeria’s National Assembly toward those objectives.
Public perceptions mirror these disparities in legislative politics. Nigerian voters
generally support an autonomous legislature, and view the Assembly as an important
counterweight to the executive. There was much public approval of legislators’ resistance to an
extension of presidential term limits, and a majority of Nigerians believe the President should
respect the Assembly’s authority in law-making and other roles. At the same time, relatively few
Nigerians interact directly with their representatives, and many view legislators as distant and
self-interested. Though recent electoral reforms may have improved the credibility of elections,
the misconduct evident in earlier polls tended to undermine the standing of elected officials. A
particular focus of public criticism has been the extravagant compensation of legislators.
Collecting as much as $1.5 million apiece, in a country where two-thirds of the population is
living below the poverty level, poses a stark divide between representatives and voters.
The tensions within the legislature as a body of rules, and an outlet for the distribution of
rents, remain central to Nigeria’s struggle for a more durable, credible, and responsive
democracy. The policy implications for donors are relatively clear. There are many opportunities
for developing institutional capacity and professional expertise, particular in the committee
structure. Professional seminars in selected areas of the economic policy, health, education, and
foreign affairs can also be useful areas of engagement with the Assembly. Support for civil
society consultations and the development of expertise among civic organizations is a
complementary area of assistance. Work with reform caucuses can be strategically important,
especially when there is a clear focus on particular legislation or policies. More generally, donors
can support internal mechanisms for financial transparency and internal monitoring of rules and
procedures in the National Assembly. Stronger institutional routines and structures will advance
the performance of the legislature looking ahead.
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